Africa is a large and complicated continent with diverging assessments of its volatility and stability. As a result, development expectations and aspirations do not always align with reality. And the same could be said for peace and security. National goals for security and economic development will remain nothing more than aspirations and expectations unless they are acted upon. Africa’s security and development is further subject to global actors who wield significantly more influence. Finding the balance between ‘means and ends’, is the definition of exercising power within the international system. The contributions brought together in this issue of *Scientia Militaria* provide a vantage point from which to gain perspective on this quest for power.

Maintaining positive engagement with the rest of Africa is a primary driver of South Africa’s foreign policy. However, using the military assets of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) as a policy instrument is an action that cannot be taken lightly. South Africa’s deployment of the military to the Central African Republic (CAR) in 2013 is possibly one of South Africa’s most significant foreign policy actions during democracy. As Francois Vreý and Abel Esterhuyse highlight in their critical reflection on the subject, this deployment revealed not only aspects of the neglect and mismanagement of military resources, issues which are a serious cause for concern, but most crucially, simultaneously revealed what the authors call a catastrophic strategic failure. The absence of a coordinated political-military strategic nexus, as was the case in the military involvement in CAR, the authors argue, is a cause for concern in the context of a subtle policy shift from an implicit to a more explicit use of South Africa’s military in Africa. In the view of the authors, the fundamental challenge is the absence of a clearly articulated national security strategy.

In his article Tshepo Gwatiwa demonstrates how even though Africa has become one of the largest theatres of operations for private military and security companies (PMSC), Africa has been unable to advance a regional policy to regulate the activities of these private transnational actors. In a thought-provoking analysis of this policy stasis, the author argues that although African security is an essential component of international security, Africa nevertheless remains limited in its agency. Therefore, given Africa’s lowly position in international politics, it has had to revert to other means to attain favourable outcomes. Gwatiwa therefore argues that, paradoxically, it is not African inertia that inhibits the AU from formulating a policy on PMSCs, but, rather, what he refers to as “agency slack”, which involves purposeful obfuscation and manipulation of processes deemed to be unfavourable. By doing so, Africa is seen as gently nudging international actors towards an international
convention on PMSCs which will be universally binding on all states. However, such a strategy may result in unintended consequences and does little to fill the immediate regulatory vacuum in Africa concerning PMSCs. Gwatiwa’s argument can also be applied more generally to states on the periphery of what is still a Western-led global order, and his contribution arguably plays a part in helping to transcend, or provide an alternative viewpoint to a Eurocentric view.

One of the key tenets of political geography is that maps are seldom, if ever, entirely politically-neutral. Perhaps nothing brings this into sharper focus than the use of maps in military campaigns. Elri Liebenberg discusses the formation and deployment of 1 SA Survey Company in Kenya, and the former Abyssinia and Somaliland, and the maps it produced during World War II. Once Italy entered the war on the side of the Axis powers, the territories governed by Italy in East Africa were also drawn into the conflict. This led to the deployment of South African troops into these territories. The 1 SA Survey Company effectively coordinated an urgent attempt to design maps to better understand this complex terrain. These maps were to inform South Africa’s campaign. The South African forces were ultimately crucial in the demise of Mussolini’s East African Empire, and these maps were key to their success. The strength of Liebenberg’s article is in the detail given to operational challenges facing the Company as an example of how these intelligence-gathering and reconnaissance processes are key to shaping military outcomes.

What is striking in comparing the World War period with today is the almost exponential acceleration of the means of conventional and unconventional warfare, primarily but not exclusively in the cyber space and the information sphere. For Sascha-Dominik Bachmann and Anthony Papithi the nature of these hybrid forms of warfare, considered in the context of recent conflict in the Ukraine, may soon have serious implications for national defence and security policy. Governments, policymakers, and military planners, the authors argue, need to be vigilant of potential hybrid threats, most of which may be subtle rather than obvious. While their analysis here uses the United Kingdom and the Russian Republic when considering potential vulnerabilities exploited in hybrid war, they are careful to situate this in the wider context regarding strategic alliances and the shifting terrain of international law. However, even the law itself is exposed as a weapon of hybrid warfare for those who seek to exploit ‘lawfare’ and in so doing subvert legal paradigms. A connection can be made to the concern recently voiced by some African leaders that institutions of international order, in particular the International Criminal Court (ICC), while claiming legal impartiality, act unfairly in their relations to Africa. The authors point out that in this new threat environment, African states may be vulnerable to economic warfare, cyber-attacks, and attacks on infrastructure including energy infrastructure. The authors do not make explicit policy recommendations but hope that the lessons from their case study may provide the necessary impetus in this direction.
The article by Ioannis-Dionysios Salavrakos speaks directly to the connection between economics and power. Salavrakos’ rich account assesses industrial production of arms during World War II, in particular Nazi Germany’s defence industry. The article considers various sources on the economic capabilities and industrial strength, including the data of the German Institute for Military History, and assesses not only economic efficiency but also the efficacy of defence industry policy decisions.

The research conducted by Johan J. van Dyk, and his co-authors Richard Haines and Geoffrey Wood also considers industrial production by looking at the economic offsets linked to South Africa’s arms acquisition, the Strategic Defence Package. The authors examine South Africa’s defence industry and make a case for considering the developmental aspects of defence and related production, not necessarily only as an economic cost but as potentially a source of widespread economic benefit. This developmental aspect, the authors conclude, remains to be fully realised as the country’s broader industrial base still has considerable potential for growth.

As the new Editors we wish to sincerely thank our predecessors for lighting the way.

The Editors
Raymond Steenkamp Fonseca & Justin van der Merwe