Migration from the OAU to the AU:

Exploring the quest for a more effective African peacekeeping capability

Bruce Thobane with Theo Neethling and Francois Vreÿ
PREFACE

*Migration from the OAU to the AU; Exploring the quest for a more effective African peacekeeping capability* is a timely publication, emerging as the African Union grapples with many of the old difficulties the Organisation for African Union faced in the peacekeeping arena. With this work, Maj Bruce N. Thobane, Director of Defence and War Studies, Botswana Defence Force, explores the ways in which the African Union has pursued more effective peacekeeping on the African continent. Yet, despite increased political will, especially on the continent, and an improved global security infrastructure, he finds that the African Union remains hamstrung by many of the problems that dogged and scuttled its predecessor. The study is enlightening, but also presents a challenge to statesmen and politicians, to policy framers and their instruments, and, perhaps most of all, to the people of Africa.

This publication developed under the supervision of Prof Theo Neethling and Lt Col (Dr) François Vreý and was originally submitted as a thesis, presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Military Science in Security and Africa Studies at the Faculty of Military Science, Stellenbosch University. It has, however, been editorially altered and revised for this publication. The valuable inputs made to the research proposal by Prof Pierre du Toit and Prof Willie Breytenbach, both of the Department of Political Science at Stellenbosch University (main campus), are acknowledged; as is Stellenbosch University’s policy of encouraging its graduate students to publish their research results. And finally, a personal word to Maj Thobane: we in the School for Security and Africa Studies have been fortunate to engage with you over the past several years and we sincerely hope that our association will continue and develop strong links between Saldanha and Gaborone.

Lt Col (Prof) Ian van der Waag
Chair: School for Security and Africa Studies
Faculty of Military Science
Stellenbosch University

South African Military Academy, Saldanha
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ABSTRACT

This thesis explores the quest for a more effective African peacekeeping capability. It seeks to answer the question what is different now that can enable the African Union (AU) to establish an effective peacekeeping capability after the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) failed to do so in the past. The study is a descriptive analysis of efforts by the AU to enhance its peacekeeping capabilities in resolving conflicts in Africa. The thesis traces the challenges that limited security cooperation and conditions that enhanced such cooperation in recent years, culminating in the approval of a continental standby force. It establishes that Africa was stagnated by security problems and at the same time it was reluctant to directly commit itself to resolve such problems, but instead sought assistance from the international community or relied on its own ad hoc arrangements. The study identifies the reason for this approach to have been the value of sovereignty entrenched in the OAU Charter, which forced leaders to pledge non-interference in each other’s internal affairs.

The study further reveals that the establishment of the AU in 2000 was meant to give Africa the capability to resolve its own problems by consolidating intra-African security cooperation. The establishment of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) and its implementation tools such as the African Standby Force (ASF) opened a new window of hope in peace and security matters. However, the PSC is facing operational challenges, principally because of financial and logistical constraints, above its own lack of institutionalised mechanisms to ensure effective partnerships and burden sharing with its partners. This is against the revelation that the AU has insufficient capacity to embark on multidimensional peacekeeping operations on its own. This was highlighted by the AU peacekeeping operations in Burundi and Darfur (Sudan).

The study concludes that although there is more political will, an improved continental security architecture and better United Nations-African cooperation, it is unlikely that the AU will be able to achieve an effective peacekeeping capability in the short to medium-term. This is against the backdrop that at the moment, the AU has severe limitations in both material and human resources. The AU is also unable to raise sufficient funds to pursue its peace and security agenda, and therefore the AU is still heavily dependent on external donors in its peacekeeping endeavours. However, the intended operationalisation of the ASF represents a promising achievement towards a long-standing Pan-African ideal that calls for “African solutions to African problems”.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AAP: African Action Plan
ACOTA: African Contingency Operations, Training Assistance
ACRI: African Crises Response Initiative
AGOA: African Growth and Opportunity Act
AMIB: African Mission in Burundi
AMIS: African Union Mission in Sudan
APRM: African Peer Review Mechanism
ASF: African Standby Force
AU: African Union
BMATT: British Military Advisory and Training Teams
CADSP: Common African Defence and Security Policy
COMESA: Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
CSSDCA: Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa
DDR: Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
DPKO: Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DRC: Democratic Republic of Congo
ECCAS: Economic Community of Central African States
ECOMIL: ECOWAS Mission in Liberia
ECOMOG: ECOWAS Monitoring Group
ECOSOCC: Economic, Social and Cultural Council
ECOWAS: Economic Community of West African States
ESDP: European Security and Defence Policy
EU: European Union
GUNT: Government of National Unity
HQ: Headquarters
ICISS: International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
IGAD: Inter-Governmental Authority on Development
JEM: Justice and Equality Movement
MLD: Military Logistics Depot
MoD: Ministry of Defence
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NEPAD: New Partnership for Africa’s Development
NMOG: Neutral Military Observer Group
OAU: Organisation of African Unity
OLMEE: OAU Liaison Mission in Ethiopia-Eritrea
PLANELM: Planning Element
PSC: Peace and Security Council
RECAMP:  Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping Capabilities Programme
ROE:  Rules of Engagement
SACU:  Southern African Customs Union
SADC:  Southern African Development Community
SHIRBRIG:  Stand-by High Readiness Brigade for United Nations Operations
SLA/M:  Sudanese Liberation Army/Movement
SOFA:  Status of Force Agreement
SOMA:  Status of Mission Agreement
SOPs:  Standard Operating Procedures
TCC:  Troop Contributing Country
UK:  United Kingdom
UMA:  Maghreb Arab Union
UN:  United Nations
UNMIL:  United Nations Mission in Liberia
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1 ORIENTATION AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

For many years, Africa has been a battleground for various forms of conflict. The euphoria that characterised the process of decolonisation and the acquisition of political independence was short-lived. According to Kieh (1998:12), the joy of replacing colonialism with independence was immediately turned into sorrow and chaos as one conflict after another erupted. These conflicts and political instability continued to plague the African continent, thereby requiring conflict management mechanisms not only from the United Nations (UN), but also from regional and sub-regional organisations. UN analysts established in the 1990s that, since 1970, more than 30 wars were fought in Africa, and the vast majority of them were intrastate conflicts. In 1996 alone, 14 of the 53 countries of Africa were afflicted by armed conflicts, which accounted for more than half of all war-related deaths worldwide and, furthermore, resulted in more than eight million refugees, returnees and displaced persons (Annan, 1998). Recently, violent conflicts in Africa consumed over 70% of the UN’s peacekeeping budget (United Nations, 2006a). The consequences of these conflicts have seriously undermined Africa's efforts to ensure long-term stability, prosperity and peace for its peoples (Annan, 1998). The UN peacekeeping operations, such as those in Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, Somalia, Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), have been among the organisation’s most important peacekeeping endeavours since the Cold War. These involvements have made Africa the most important regional setting for UN peacekeeping.

African leaders made some effort towards conflict resolution though on a limited scale. The peaceful settlement of internal or interstate disputes through negotiation, mediation, conciliation or arbitration constituted a guiding principle of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) since 1963 (OAU, 1963:Article 3(4)). In practice, the OAU established some security mechanisms, such as the Defence Commission, but these were largely ineffectual. The OAU also evolved a traditional African concept of mediation by respected elders and fellow heads of states on an ad hoc basis to diffuse conflicts. In 1993, the OAU established the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution in an effort to shift from an ad hoc to a more systematic conflict resolution strategy. The functions of this Mechanism were:
• to anticipate and prevent situations of potential conflict from developing into full-blown wars;
• to undertake peacemaking and peace-building efforts should full-blown conflicts arise; and
• to carry out peacemaking and peace-building activities in post-conflict situations (Muyangwa and Vogt, 2002).

Two main bodies were formed under this Mechanism, namely the Central Organ and the Conflict Management Division, which dealt with prevention, managing and resolving conflicts (Olonisakin, 2002:243). Despite establishing these bodies, the OAU was still unable to deal effectively with the many conflict situations that consumed the continent. In essence, the OAU’s efforts were limited by its original mandate, which stipulated that neither the organisation, nor any of its members could intervene in the internal affairs of member states (OAU, 1963:Article 3(2)). Furthermore, the intensity and magnitude of these conflicts simply transcended the limited resource capacity of the OAU in addition to its inexperience and lack of political will. However, the OAU was more active despite the constraints in its approach to conflict resolution since the establishment of the Mechanism, and it managed to deploy limited observer missions and small operations in some of the conflict areas such as Rwanda (1991), Burundi (1994) and the Comoros (1997) (Field, 2004a:20).

To the rest of the world, the creation of the Mechanism was expected to boost the OAU’s conflict resolution capability, but results from its activities painted a different picture. An observation by Muyangwa and Vogt (2002) attribute this unimpressive contribution to the “… unequivocal commitment to the principles of sovereignty and non-interference and respect for established borders and territorial integrity”. Furthermore, Powell (2005:10) argues that the OAU itself was neither legally nor operationally equipped to intervene in either intra- or interstate conflicts. The Mechanism was intended to bring about a shift from a rigid OAU Charter on conflict management to a more flexible approach towards conflict management and resolution, but the shift was minimal in practical terms. In fact, the Mechanism did not change the mind-set of African leaders, as the OAU Charter remained unchanged. According to Ibok (2004:16), African leaders resisted the change and maintained their respect for territorial integrity as he affirms “… a strong view pervaded the OAU that conflicts within states fell within the exclusive competence of the states concerned”. Nevertheless, the ability to dispatch peacekeeping or peacemaking forces once a conflict had
broken out was a critical part of conflict resolution. The desire to establish a body capable of conflict management remained a vision within the OAU member states and formed the basis of the OAU’s successor’s strategy towards peace, security and stability.

Having decided on a new continental organisation towards the end of the 1990s, African leaders and representatives from 53 African states launched the African Union (AU), which replaced the OAU in July 2002. The new organisation brought new approaches and strategies to peace and security. In stark contrast to the non-interference principle that underpinned the former OAU since 1963, the Constitutive Act of the AU establishes in Article 4(h) the right of the Union to intervene in a member state pursuant to a decision by the Assembly of Heads of State and Governments in respect of grave circumstances. This is to be achieved whilst at the same time respecting the principles of sovereignty and non-interference in domestic affairs of member states. Furthermore, according to Field (2004a:19), policy-makers have been devising new mechanisms to empower the organisation to deal actively with conflicts as opposed to just working to prevent them. The Constitutive Act of the AU as well as the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of 2002, placed renewed emphasis on building a continental security regime that is capable of preventing, managing and resolving conflicts on the continent (African Union, 2000:Article 4(d); African Union, 2002:Article 3(e)). This new approach seems to differ from the former OAU peace and security mechanisms in its operational dimensions and its recognition of the need to intervene in the affairs of a state when the security of its people is imperilled. On the current global order as observed by Hammerstad (2005:1), hardly a day goes by without the media reporting about AU missions in the Darfur region of Sudan; the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) reversing a coup in Togo; or the AU deploying a peace mission somewhere on the continent. Such an environment dictates that the AU acquire a peacekeeping capability.

Additionally, two developments can be credited to this divergent approach, namely the UN’s Brahimi Report and the International Commission on

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1 The Assembly of the AU, composed of Heads of States and Governments, is the supreme organ of the AU that decides on intervention as provided by Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act.
Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) document, titled *The Responsibility to Protect*. This viewpoint on the changed approach towards conflict management is supported by Ambassador Djinnit, the AU Commissioner for Peace and Security. He noted that the thinking underlying the shift from the OAU’s policy of non-interference to the AU’s new policy of interference mirrors the ideas of conditional sovereignty and the responsibility to protect that is developed by the ICISS (Baranyi and Mepham, 2006:2). Field (2004a:20) also asserts that African leaders were inspired by the resolution that they could never let the horrors that unfolded in Rwanda in 1994 repeat themselves. What has to be established is whether this different approach does indeed yield better conflict management and resolution skills than the limited successes of the OAU that had been engaged in conflict resolution for more than four decades.

Against this backdrop and the desire to resolve African conflicts, African leaders continue to declare the notion of ‘African solutions to African problems’. The creation of the AU amplifies a call for a policy development towards the creation of an African capacity for peacekeeping. A policy point of departure embodied in the Protocol Establishing the AU PSC, calls for a continental vision of a common African defence and security policy framework, intended as “an operational structure for the effective implementation of decisions taken in the areas of conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace support operations and intervention, as well as peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction” (African Union, 2000).

More importantly, the protocol establishing the PSC, created other structures, including the African Standby Force (ASF), to deal specifically with conflicts on the continent. The ASF is envisaged to be a multinational force which comprises five sub-regional brigades of 3 000 to 5 000 personnel regionally based, and a sixth continental brigade of the same strength based at the AU Headquarters (HQ) in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The ASF is mandated to be a tool to enable the PSC to deploy peace support missions and interventions as per the provisions of the Constitutive Act. The members of the ASF will be stationed in their host countries ready to be deployed when the need arise.

The rationale for the PSC’s creation came through mutual concerns about the “…continued prevalence of armed conflicts in Africa and the fact that no single internal factor has contributed more to socio-economic decline on the continent and the suffering of civilian populations than the scourge of conflicts within and between states” (African Union, 2002). A Panel of the
Wise, as well as a Continental Early Warning System, and a Special Fund, will also support the functioning of the PSC.

In view of the above, the most important issue relates to the fact that, in recent years, organisations in Africa have started to accept peace and security as important conditions for socio-economic development. It should be noted that regional or sub-regional organisations were the first to respond to recent crisis situations in Africa as evidenced by the AU in Rwanda, Burundi, Sudan; and ECOWAS in Liberia, Sierra Leone, as well as the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in the DRC (before UN involvement). This highlights the fact that regional and sub-regional organisations can play a significant role in stabilising a crisis situation for a limited time while awaiting follow-on by a peace-building force. According to De Coning (2004:23), this practice seems to play into the strength of the AU conflict resolution attempts and compensate for the weaknesses of the UN and regional and sub-regional organisations. Ibok (2000:7) also supports this view as he acknowledges that regional and sub-regional organisations are “the first line of defence in the search for solutions to conflicts”. This is in recognition of the fact that, though regional bodies can act quicker than the UN, they do not have financial strength and international credibility or even multi-dimensional capacity to undertake post-conflict recovery operations, thus this complementary setup could be a positive arrangement for future attempts at peace and security management. However, as Neethling (2003:91) proclaims, “a fundamental question is [still] whether the AU will be in a better position to make a significant impact on the continent”.

1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT

The OAU was successful in resolving less contentious conflicts, mostly those that concerned border and territorial issues. The organisation was less successful in resolving conflicts that revolved around issues such as subversion, ideological differences or intra-state conflicts in general. Hence, the OAU did not accord much attention to domestic or civil conflicts partly due to the restrictions imposed by its charter. The OAU displayed three patterns in conflict resolutions. Firstly, it used admonition as a conflict resolution tool. This was witnessed in the Ethiopia/Somalia conflict where the OAU simply admonished the warring factions to resolve their conflict peacefully. The second pattern was visible when the OAU was deeply involved in a conflict by supporting and defending the internal
status quo in the country concerned. This happened during the Nigerian civil war where the OAU supported the government against the secessionist Biafra, as well as in Chad against the anti-government factions. This support was motivated by the OAU’s fear of interfering in internal matters; and assisting the incumbent government was viewed as protecting the independence of countries concerned. In the third pattern, the OAU relied on the UN and sub-regional organisations. This last pattern was precipitated by a lack of resources and differences between OAU and sub-regional organisations, which affected the political will (Kieh, 1998:14). Some sub-regions felt better placed to deal with regional conflicts than the OAU itself as exemplified by the case of SADC in Lesotho and DRC in 1998.

Furthermore, the international political order began to witness dramatic changes by the early 1990s: the Cold War ended, African conflicts increased, and at the same time Western powers’ interest on the African continent diminished (Olonisakin, 2002:237). Consequently, African leaders pledged to work together to reduce the scourge of conflicts on the continent through regional and sub-regional organisations, demonstrating more bias to the third pattern. Salim Ahmed Salim, the former Secretary General of the OAU, argued that the “… OAU’s ad hoc approach to conflict management had proven inadequate and that there was an urgent need for the organisation to adopt a new security agenda as well as develop an institutional framework within which African conflicts could be better addressed” (Muyangwa and Vogt, 2002). In pursuance of this collective effort, the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution was established in 1993.

As already indicated, between the latter’s formation and the establishment of the AU in 2002, the Mechanism was engaged in a number of conflicts. Its first test was in Rwanda in 1994 where more than 800 000 civilians were killed. The OAU had pledged to commit 6 000 peacekeepers but could not act on time because of logistical problems and financial constraints (Muyangwa and Vogt, 2002). The OAU was also engaged in Burundi, the Comoros and the DRC but only with limited peacekeeping capability and limited outcomes. This was a sign that challenges to peacekeeping were still unresolved even after the establishment of the Mechanism.

Generally speaking, analysts and researchers argue that the problems and challenges that international role-players and peacekeepers face in Africa
reflect the difficulties of peacekeeping in general and challenges to African peacekeeping in particular. According to Van Nieuwkerk (2004:45), who also cites Muyangwa and Vogt (2002); Keller and Rothchild (1996); and El-Ayouty (1994), there were five main reasons that underpinned the OAU’s limited successes in securing peace and security in Africa. These were:

- an overly limited mandate;
- a lack of political will and weak conflict management institutions;
- limited capacity and experience in core conflict management areas;
- a lack of financial resources; and
- the impact of international politics on conflict management.

These challenges prohibited the OAU from actively and effectively managing conflicts in Africa and thus conflicts continued to ravage the continent even under its successor, the AU. An examination of Africa’s political configuration reveals that states consider themselves bound together solely by virtue of treaties signed under the AU which, in practice, are rarely implemented (Mwanasali, 2003:206). It is hence legitimate to wonder if it is appropriate from both conceptual and policy standpoints, to speak of regions in Africa, and if there can ever be genuine regional security communities on the continent. The migration of the OAU into the AU is a lengthy political, administrative and financial process, which has yet to uncover any visible practical successes in peace and security issues. The frenetic pace of the creation of the AU and its peace and security architecture also puzzles critics who doubt the seriousness of its intentions (Tieku, 2004:249; Kagwanja, 2006:39). Moreover, it is currently planned that the PSC via its ASF will deploy robust forces in demanding and challenging intervention operations, which in terms of UN parlance, will be Chapter VII operations. The success of the AU is not only based on its Constitutive Act, but on how the organisation merges with sub-regional organisations and the international community at large. This linkage is, however, not clearly defined by the Constitutive Act or by its peace and security mechanisms. The link between these organisations needs to be formally spelt out especially as regards the way they will tackle peace and security issues collectively by complementing one another (De Coning, 2004:23).

Another area of interest is the fact that the AU PSC mandate reveals similarities with the OAU’s defunct security mechanisms. Furthermore, a review of literature concerning the AU security framework in general points to ambitious and laudable clauses, which, to some analysts, provoke a lot of
scepticism. This scepticism is mainly provoked by the burning question: What is different now in the global system and in African relations that will enable the AU to succeed in peacekeeping areas where the OAU had failed? According to Ajulu (2002) and Tieku (2004), Africa is worse off now than during the days of the OAU in terms of economic performance, its marginalisation through globalisation, corruption and exclusive rule imposed by the ruling elite. They argue that this environment should make it even more difficult for the AU to meet its objectives in general and peacekeeping in particular. Furthermore, conflicts during the OAU era were mostly interstate affairs whereas today’s conflicts tend to be internal and more complex by nature, which in turn, need better conflict resolution skills than before. Currently, the AU involvement in Darfur, Sudan has become the most important regional setting for AU challenges in recent times, and, in fact, has become a test of the AU’s ability to quell conflicts successfully. Reports from analysts observe that the current Darfur mandate is not adequate and they recommend that it has to be strengthened to prioritise civilian protection and give the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) clear authority and will to carry out a full range of operations (International Crisis Group, 2005). This observation briefly indicates that the AU still suffers from inadequate capacity and core conflict management skills.

Has the migration of the OAU to the AU been the answer to the problems of its limited peacekeeping capability? Tieku (2004) and others argue that the failure or limited successes of the OAU alone were not sufficient reasons for setting up the AU. Kagwanja (2006:38-45) and Tieku (2004:253) claim that Obasanjo’s (Nigeria) and Mbeki’s (South Africa) foreign policies triggered the creation of the AU. Though the authenticity of the AU is not in the scope of this research, its implication in the operationalisation of the AU and its organs is momentous. If these claims have some validity, the future survivability of the AU in general and its envisaged organs (especially for peacekeeping) would be in jeopardy after these two leaders are out of office. This uncertainty is premised on the fact that African countries’ foreign policies are driven primarily by the incumbent presidents/leaders. An example is the Conference on Security, Stability, Co-operation and Development in Africa (CSSDCA), which resurfaced after Obasanjo came to power and made it the focus of his foreign policy (Kagwanja, 2006:41). Analysts also argue that Mandela’s foreign policy was different from Mbeki’s foreign policy, the former having focused on internationalism and the latter on multilateralism (Le Pere and Van
Nieuwkerk, 2002; Kagwanja, 2006). These arguments provoke Kagwanja’s (2006:39-44) pessimism about the interest of the AU, namely whether it is driven by AU member states or by hegemonic states pursuing their own interests. The lack of participation by some AU member states in organs like the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) further strengthens this viewpoint. These situations give rise to serious questions about the future of the AU in peace and security matters. Will the AU succeed in achieving its objectives if it is driven by hegemonic interests? Indeed, the AU has taken keen interest in peace and security issues, but is it not rather too ambitious in its intentions? Furthermore, there is not much evidence to suggest that the challenges of the OAU era are no longer challenges; therefore, the issue is whether the AU will succeed where the OAU had failed.

Given the above scenario within the African political setup and the need for an African peacekeeping capability, the research question of this thesis is formulated as follows: Are the challenges encountered by the OAU still relevant in the AU era? If so, what is the AU doing different to overcome these challenges and what is the likelihood of an effective African peacekeeping capability?

For the purposes of this research, three demarcations, namely conceptual, geographic and temporal, are utilised to streamline the research into a manageable argument.

- **Conceptual demarcation**: The formation of the OAU was the result of a quest for cooperation amongst independent African states. As countries gained their independence, they preferred to forego some of their autonomy and joined the OAU. The transformation of the OAU to the AU further limited African member states’ sovereignty as they agreed to intervene in the affairs of other member states under certain conditions as well as acting collectively as opposed to unilaterally. During the AU Summit in Maputo, Mozambique in 2003, heads of state expressed their “determination to address the scourge of conflict in Africa in a collective, comprehensive and decisive manner, through the AU” (Harsch, 2003:1). The challenges encountered by the OAU and the AU in peacekeeping and efforts pursued to manage conflicts on the continent will form the conceptual demarcation of the problem statement.

- **Geographical demarcation**: The study will be confined to the African continent, including islands that form part of the AU and the specific
international communities discussed herein that have a direct influence on the AU.

- **Temporal demarcation**: This demarcation relates to contemporary Africa, the period since the formation of the OAU in 1963 to the present. This study will be written from a perspective of around February 2007.

### 1.3 THE PURPOSE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH

The purpose of this study is to explore the quest for a more effective African peacekeeping capability and to assess whether the migration of the OAU to the AU has been the answer to the problems of a constrained peacekeeping capability. The AU’s efforts to manage conflicts are driven by the PSC, which uses the ASF as one of the instruments to achieve its goals. Upon its establishment, the ASF is expected to provide military advice to political leaders and to deploy observer missions as well as peacemaking, peacekeeping, or peace-enforcement missions within reasonable time frames in conflict areas (African Union, 2002). The development of an African standby system is therefore a significant milestone because it is aimed at providing Africa with a military capability for peacekeeping and conflict resolution. It should be borne in mind that other AU initiatives such as the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and the Conference on Security, Stability, Development, and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA), may only prevail in a stable environment. Thus, the success of the PSC through its structures is an essential precondition for the development of Africa in general.

According to Abul-Enein (2000:148), “… confronting armed conflicts as well as settling Africa’s disputes peacefully is the most urgent problem facing Africa”. There is no doubt that wars continue to ravage Africa and it is evident that African leaders are concerned about the situation. Some of the problems labelled as obstacles to peace and security in Africa include poor inter-Africa relations and a lack of power to enforce resolutions (Abul-Enein, 2000:151). The AU, or the PSC in particular, is aimed essentially at improving these areas for more effective conflict management capacity. The adoption of the protocol establishing the ASF is principally to give the AU/PSC a tool to enforce resolutions. The establishment and development of such a tool is a continental dream and an international desire. Consequently, its establishment and subsequent progress is an important undertaking for all stakeholders and is awaited with both zeal and optimism.
From a security and military point of view, the study also exposes the significance of defence diplomacy, which has become more acceptable within different militaries especially in the post-Cold War era. The intentions of the PSC, which include joint training within sub-regions through common training doctrine, inter-operability and use of the same standard operating procedures will help build mutual trust amongst African militaries. An official document from the United Kingdom Ministry of Defence (UK MoD) asserts that the mission of defence diplomacy is to “… dispel hostility, build and maintain trust and assist in the development of democratically accountable armed forces, thereby making significant contributions to conflict prevention and resolution” (United Kingdom, 1999:2). Defence diplomacy involves military cooperation and uses armed forces and related infrastructure as tools of foreign and security policies (Cottey and Forster, 2004:6). What is significant in the African context is the fact that African militaries, as part of a continental force are better placed to receive assistance from developed nations than militaries of individual countries. This cooperation allows African militaries to learn from one another and reduces suspicions and tension as it creates an environment conducive to promoting peace. Sub-regional brigades have been conducting joint exercises, which promote transparency within regions. Defence diplomacy promotes transparency in defence relations and exposes state intentions and capabilities hence limiting chances of conflicts.

In Africa, Western governments are supporting countries in reforming their armed forces and developing indigenous peacekeeping capabilities by complementing multilateral defence cooperation through both regional and sub-regional organisations (Cottey and Forster, 2004:5). The concept of defence diplomacy is facilitating a shift in the role of the armed forces from the use or threat of force to a peacetime cooperative use of armed forces and a tool of foreign and security policy. The formation of an ASF is envisaged to benefit from this cooperation and to facilitate the objectives of the PSC.

The findings from this research could help government officials and military officers to explore the likelihood of successfully establishing a fully operational PSC that will meet its intended goals. The research findings may also highlight areas that need attention to facilitate the realisation of the PSC, therefore allowing the relevant stakeholders to take corrective measures. The research will in particular accentuate where military officers stand in the PSC project and will highlight areas that need capacity
development. It will also demarcate to AU partners areas that need external assistance to facilitate more effective peace and security strategies. The significance of a secure environment is also a prerequisite for other AU initiatives to succeed as asserted in NEPAD Framework Document (Anon, 2001b:16) that “… peace, security, democracy, good governance, human rights and sound economic management are conditions for sustainable development”.

1.4 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The study comprises a descriptive analysis utilising an expansive review of literature, both primary and secondary. Primary sources include relevant official OAU and AU documents. It does not apply any specific theoretical framework, but considers the idea of interstate security cooperation in Africa as opposed to unilateral state security. No fieldwork or questionnaires have been administered; but unstructured interviews have been conducted where necessary. The study adopts a neo-realist approach since it deals with contemporary world politics of state interactions. Although an approach from organisational (OAU/AU) level is followed, the significance of the state cannot be underrated because the decisions made at the AU are collective ones emanating from individual states. It is accepted that the success of a peacekeeping mechanism is dependent on the success of the AU, but the prospect of the AU is beyond the scope of this research although its influence on peacekeeping aspects will be highlighted. As far as the research question is concerned, the first AU mission in Burundi and the current AU deployment in Darfur are used to assess the AU capacity in peacekeeping and conflict resolution as well as to investigate the presence of the challenges encountered by the OAU in the past.

The AU engagements in other peacekeeping efforts such as the Comoros and Burundi were quick, small and for the most part, lead-nation-driven (South Africa and South Africa and Ethiopia respectively). In contrast, the Darfur operation is a multi-dimensional operation that is AU-driven and requiring vast resources, capacity, and political will. The Darfur operation is furthermore greatly influenced by international politics, which makes it an important testing ground for AU conflict resolution structures. The unit of analysis is the continental peacekeeping capability and the level of analysis is the AU as an organisation.
1.5 OVERVIEW OF LITERATURE

The literature and data sources consulted for this research can be divided into three categories. The first category deals with the background information on regionalism in the African context. This category covers security cooperation that existed within African states culminating in the formation and facilitation of the OAU and its successor the AU. The following questions are addressed:

- What is security cooperation in the African context?
- What facilitated regional security cooperation in Africa?

The focus on these questions is premised under the view that some form of cooperation is required for the AU and its structures to function and for the OAU to have existed as an organisation for decades. The contribution of cooperation in the production of documents such as the Constitutive Act of the AU as well as agreeing on the functions of the PSC as proclaimed by the protocol establishing it, are assessed and considered.

The second category refers to literature that covers the AU’s peace and security architecture. The literature explores the concept of a Common African Defence and Security Policy and its practicality on the continent. This section paints a picture of the AU peace and security structure currently as opposed to a similar structure during the existence of the OAU.

The third category comprises literature that deals with the AU peacekeeping missions in Burundi and Darfur and some practical experiences in conflict management. This literature seeks to uncover what is different now in terms of peacekeeping operations.

1.5.1 Literature on African security cooperation

The point of departure is an assertion of cooperation by Lindblom (cited by Milner, 1992:467) that cooperation occurs “when actors adjust their behaviour to the actual or anticipated preferences of others, through a process of policy coordination”. Policy coordination, according to Milner (1992:467), implies that the policies of each state are adjusted to reduce their negative consequences for other states. An important assumption under this approach to cooperation is the fact that each actor’s behaviour is directed toward some goal(s) but the goals need not be the same for all actors involved provided each actor gains something. The article by Milner
(1992), *International Theories of Cooperation among Nations: Strengths and Weaknesses*, forms the main source regarding issues of cooperation from a conceptual point of view. Regional cooperation exists in Africa because African states see themselves as part of a geographic-cum-security arrangement. According to Mwanasali (2003), this position is grounded in the recognition that, despite their variations, member states share geographic proximity and feel united by common security concerns. It cannot be expected that each state would benefit from this cooperation the same way, but states’ security concerns are linked such that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another.

Other sources in this category highlight the quest by African states to have a continental military system such as the African High Command during the OAU era and the way it failed to materialise. Important sources in this regard include articles by Franke (2006) and Imobighe (1980). Other authors such as Berman and Sams (2000), Amate (1986) and Wiseman (1984) have been consulted for the OAU operations in Chad, which was the first OAU peacekeeping mission.

### 1.5.2 Literature on the African peace and security architecture

The *Solemn Declaration on a Common African Defence and Security Policy* document (2004) and other earlier AU documents such as the *Constitutive Act of the African Union* that stress the need for a common defence and security policy, have been used. Other supporting documents include the *Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union* (2002); *Policy Framework for the Establishment of the African Standby Force and the Military Staff Committee* (2003); the *African Union Non-Aggression and Common Defence Pact* (2005); *Roadmap for the Operationalisation of the African Standby Force* (2005); and other official reports on OAU/AU meetings dealing with common defence issues.

A number of articles written by different scholars on the common defence and security architecture have been consulted. An article by Touray (2005), *viz The Common African Defence and Security Policy* (CADSP) gives a detailed view of the common defence concepts from a realist point of view. According to Touray (2005:642), the CADSP is “a common understanding among African states about their defence and security challenges and a set of measures they seek to take collectively to respond to these challenges”.


### 1.5.3 Literature on challenges to peace and security implementation

Implementing intentions is always more difficult than conceiving intentions. The literature in this category puts declarations into practice. Most sources here have bearing on the successes and failures of the AU peace missions in Burundi and Darfur. The information on AU operations is found mostly on the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) and the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) websites through articles by analysts such as Sharamo (2006), Appiah-Mensah (2005, 2006), Aboagye (2004), De Coning (2004, 2005), and Boshoff (2003, 2004), amongst others.

Other scholars such as Neethling (2006), Chin and Morgenstein (2005) and Sculier (2003), researched extensively on the AU and peacekeeping. Likewise, non-governmental organisations such as Human Rights Watch, the International Crisis Group and the International Peace Academy also made important research contributions. Behrens (2006) also gives a detailed account of the AU operations in Sudan and its partnership with the EU and provides a review of the operation in *Midterm-Review of the EU Joint Action Supporting the African Union Mission in Sudan*. The prospects of the AU rest on the operationalisation of the AU organs such as the PSC and its instrument, the ASF. The progress of the AU peacekeeping mechanisms is extensively covered by documents such as *The Future of Peacekeeping in Africa* (De Coning, 2006); *The African Union’s Peacekeeping Experience in Darfur* (Sharamo, 2006); *Progress with the African Standby Force* (Cilliers and Malan, 2005); *Realizing the African Standby Force as a Pan-African Ideal: Progress, Prospects and Challenges*

### 1.6 STRUCTURE OF THE RESEARCH

The study is structured in five chapters. Chapter one lays the foundation of the study by formulating the research theme and the problem statement. This chapter demarcates the study by narrowing it down to a researchable slice and provides the methodology adopted in the research. An overview of sources consulted is also offered here in the form of a literature review.

Chapter two provides background information on efforts by the OAU in conflict management as a regional body as opposed to unilateral attempts. It attempts to explain why African states cooperate and give evidence of security cooperation within the organisation since the establishment of the OAU in 1963. It also highlights the OAU peace operation in Chad and traces the OAU quest for an African High Command.

Chapter three discusses the AU in terms of its peace and security architecture. This chapter attempts to explore the concept of a Common African Defence and Security Policy framework and attends to the AU’s effort to pursue security cooperation and defence diplomacy since 2002. In this chapter, an investigation is conducted into what the AU has in place to enforce peace and security on the continent.

Chapter four considers the five generic challenges, *viz.* limited mandate, lack of political will, limited capacity, financial constraints and influence from international politics, to peacekeeping and explores how these impact on the AU endeavours in peacekeeping. Attention is also given to whether the same challenges are still relevant under the present political environment and, if so, what the AU is doing about them. The chapter further evaluates the prospects of a more effective AU peacekeeping capability. It attempts to address pertinent questions such as:

- Are the AU structures likely to succeed in securing peace and stability or they will follow the same fate as the OAU structures?
- What exactly is the AU doing differently to overcome weaknesses of the former OAU in trying to bring peace and stability to the continent?
Chapter five is an evaluation of the study, presenting a summary of the findings and a few concluding remarks.

1.7 CONCLUSION

The post-Cold War era ushered in a different security environment globally. Though conflicts have not diminished, conflict resolution strategies are changing to accommodate regional and sub-regional bodies. In Africa, it is now acknowledged that sustainable development cannot be achieved in an environment without peace. African leaders are calling for better cooperation amongst themselves so as to increase transparency, reduce tensions and be more focused on human security. African leaders are revisiting the call for a common defence and security framework. In 2002, the Protocol on the Establishment of PSC formally revisited the idea of a continental defence mechanism and refocused African leaders to peace and security efforts on the continent. This effort is hoped to bring peace to Africa through the operationalisation of the ASF. This study will attempt to find out what new measures are in place to ensure the AU brings in better results than its predecessor in peace and security issues. The end of the Cold War created a different global environment and it is hoped that this new environment will allow more and meaningful cooperation between African leaders to allow the regional body to perform its peace and security tasks for a more peaceful and stable Africa.
CHAPTER 2: THE EVOLVING MILIEU OF AFRICAN SECURITY COOPERATION

2.1 INTRODUCTION

During the creation of the OAU in 1963, Ghana’s founding president, Kwame Nkrumah, was in a minority in calling for the establishment of an African High Command. He had recognised the need for some type of African regional security arrangement given the situation that prevailed on the continent. The idea was to establish a supranational standing army involving all independent African states, pooling their resources to advance the liberation of the continent and to protect the continent from foreign intervention. Ironically, some African leaders distrusted Nkrumah’s intentions and placed more faith in defence agreements with external powers, notably some former French colonies. The rest of the African leadership, preferred to “freeze the colonially-inherited map of Africa, stressing the inviolability of borders and seeking to entrench their own positions behind the shield of sovereignty” (Adebajo and Landsberg, 2001). Consequently, the OAU Charter was a clear defeat for Nkrumah’s pan-continental and interventionist vision.

In view of constraints imposed upon the OAU to interfere in the affairs of member states, and without a continental force or any instrument to facilitate implementation of its resolutions, the OAU had difficulties in maintaining peace and security on the continent. It only became somewhat successful in the use of mediation, arbitration and conciliation where applicable, or in missions where enforcement was not required. After the Cold War, there was a shift and flexibility in the way sovereignty and territorial integrity were viewed. The number of continental conflicts increased and called for more robust conflict resolution strategies. Human security gained more recognition against state security and thus changed the rigid views on state sovereignty. During the Ouagadougou OAU Summit in 1998, South Africa’s President Nelson Mandela told his fellow leaders that “Africa has a right and duty to intervene to root out tyranny … we must all accept that we cannot abuse the concept of national sovereignty to deny the rest of the continent the right and duty to intervene when behind those sovereign boundaries, people are being slaughtered to protect tyranny” (Adebajo and Landsberg, 2001). The momentum of this shift resulted in the migration of the OAU into the AU, which is more focused on human security.
The aim of this chapter is to identify the challenges that limited or constrained the OAU’s efforts towards peacekeeping during its era. It discusses security cooperation during the OAU era, highlighting the challenges the Organisation encountered in its efforts to carry out peacekeeping missions. Additionally, a definition of security cooperation is provided together with a focus on Pan-Africanism and decolonisation as centripetal forces for security cooperation on the continent. The OAU peacekeeping efforts, the failed proposal for an African High Command, the need for regional responses and the contradictions of the sovereignty-intervention dichotomy are also discussed.

The importance of this chapter is that it highlights the weaknesses of the OAU in peacekeeping efforts. This information will be used in Chapter four to investigate whether such weaknesses are still prevalent in the AU era. This could help AU officials and any stakeholders to map out a way forward for the new organisation guarding against past failures.

### 2.2 DEFINING SECURITY COOPERATION

Security is a multifaceted concept, and for that reason, many definitions exist that give rise to disagreements amongst specialists. This is a consequence of the more complex security environment that emerged after the Cold War, the growing importance of regional security issues and the weakening of military threats, which had dominated the security discourse during the Cold War (Cawthra, 2004:30). For the purposes of this research, it is important to recognise that the definition of security evolved from its Cold War status to a post-Cold War definition. The conventional approach to security was shaped by the political conditions of the Cold War, hence security focused on states and military stability (Booth, 1994:3). Security was concerned with defending the sovereignty, territory and political independence of the state. This approach to security ignored the root causes of conflicts; and it failed to take account of the security of the people and non-military threats that were actually dominant especially in developing countries.

Security is now defined as an “all-encompassing concept that enables citizens to live in peace and harmony, have access to resources and basic necessities of life; participate fully and freely in the process of governance; and enjoy the protection of fundamental rights” (Nathan, 1998:2). Security
cooperation is simply cooperation by states in security-related matters for a common benefit. The regional security cooperation that existed in the OAU is better described as collaborative because it was less systematic and was based on mutual benefits rather than formal agreements (Cawthra, 2004:33).

The semblance of self-interest in this regard was the fact that states cooperated with an anticipated view to benefit as individuals or as a community of states. Milner (1992:468) advances that actors will direct their behaviour towards certain goals and these goals may not be the same in magnitude or kind for all actors involved, but they have to be mutual. The goals may be general, for instance economic development benefits, or shared common security benefits. What determines what and how much benefit one actor gets depends on varying factors, which are influenced by the actors themselves. The underlying motivation for cooperation is the fact that each actor is rewarded for its behaviour. The intention of cooperation, according to Milner (1992:468) and Axelrod (1984:7), is not necessarily to help other actors, but the anticipation of bettering one’s own situation. Cooperation therefore is a goal-directed behaviour that entails mutual policy adjustments so that all sides end up better off than they would have been otherwise.

Security cooperation can manifest in three forms: it can be tacit, negotiated or imposed (Milner, 1992:469). Cooperation between actors can occur without any explicit agreements. This is better captured in a prisoner’s dilemma situation as explained by Russett and Starr (1989:337) and Axelrod (1984:8) that cooperative behaviour emerges as the expectations of actors converge. This mutual rewarding action leads to the creation of norms such as reciprocity. An actor will act in a certain way hoping that the other actor(s) will act in a reciprocal manner for the benefit of all parties involved. When the OAU drew up its charter, for instance, it clearly encouraged promotion of unity and solidarity among African states under Article 2.1(a) (OAU, 1963), but each state was free to promote unity in the best way possible without any explicit documentation binding any state. It was hoped that each state would abide by the Charter, and for the most part they did.

Actors may also negotiate security cooperation for the common benefit of all involved. Keohane (1984) in After Hegemony and Oye’s (1986) Cooperation under Anarchy examine this form of cooperation, which they declare is based on the distributions of gains amongst actors. Examples of
such cooperation are the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) between South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Namibia, and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), where distribution of benefits is agreed and shared as per agreements. Another example of a negotiated cooperation could be a defence pact between actors who agree to come to each other’s assistance when attacked by a third party.

In other instances, cooperation can be imposed on weak actors by stronger ones. This form of cooperation is better explained by hegemonic stability theory\(^2\). Hegemonic stability theory posits that cooperation in international relations is only possible with the presence of one very powerful state (Walraven, 1999:14). However, the relationship between a weak and a strong actor does not necessarily imply rivalry between them. Milner (1992:470) highlights the fact that imposed cooperation may seem anomalous, but as long as there is mutual policy coordination to realise joint gains, this is deemed cooperation. Dominant actors can facilitate cooperation when the weaker actors have the knowledge that the hegemon will protect them against exploitation. Some analysts argue that a hegemon is necessary to facilitate collective action (Mays, 2003:4).

Collective action is better achieved when there is clear distribution of power. According to Snidal (1991:581), the likelihood of collective action depends on distribution of power and interests. In a set-up like the OAU where there are many actors with varying influences, weaker states will follow what the more powerful states do hoping to benefit from their actions of loyalty. For instance, Nigeria led a coalition of states that supported a peace operation in Liberia against opposition from francophone states\(^3\). The Nigerian-led coalition prevailed and fielded the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) because of its hegemonic power (Sesay, 2000:222-233). Gowa (1986:174) also contends that a hegemon can serve as the functional equivalent of a common authority in international politics and thus promote cooperation. Security

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\(^3\) During the Liberian civil war in 1990, ECOWAS intervened by sending a peacekeeping mission. Nigeria was the main player in the mission providing the financial and logistical aid as well as leadership and direction.
cooperation throughout the OAU era followed one or all the above-mentioned forms as will be shown in the next sections.

2.3 SECURITY COOPERATION IN AFRICA

Given the size and the number of independent states on the African continent, it is astounding that the establishment of an organisation such as the OAU was possible. According to Oye (1986:18), “the prospects for cooperation diminish as the number of players increases”. Doyle (cited by Ngoma, 2005:16) also argues that cooperation is not only limited in time but becomes less effective the larger it grows. In Thomas Hobbes’ (1962:100) view, cooperation cannot develop without a central authority, because the state of nature is dominated by the problem of selfish individuals who compete on ruthless terms. Independent African states without such an authority established the OAU in 1963, symbolising commitment to unity. The launching of the OAU was a milestone as it proved that new African states were willing to begin their political independence determined to work together for common goals. Theoretically, the OAU became a platform where new states could settle their disputes, shape joint policies in defence of their freedom and continue the struggle for liberation as well as giving Pan-Africanist ideas a basis in reality (Davidson, 1983:215). However, before focusing on the aspirations of cooperation among African states, it is imperative firstly, to outline the circumstances that characterised African states at independence.

Africa is distinguished from other continents by a number of characteristics that have a direct bearing on colonialism. To a large extent colonialism defined the nature of the African states, the nature of their economies as well as their demography (Nwokedi, 1996:25). Consequently, Africa was the least developed continent with the highest levels of human insecurity, deprivation and poverty (Schoeman, 2002:209). Colonialism had, over decades, a number of security implications for the states on the continent. In the first instance, African states were very weak and had limited command over their citizens who were mostly disparate, unemployed, and illiterate, and this created unstable environments within states. The African states were unable to impose their authority within their frontiers, hence it was often subjected to political and military interference, which resulted in civil wars and insurgency movements. Furthermore, these states had limited capacity to impose their authority over the length and breadth of the
geographical inherited territories, and this attracted border wars (Nwokedi, 1996:25).

The second colonialist-related security implication was the effect of artificial boundaries. This resulted in border disputes and conflicts such as in Somalia-Ethiopia, Libya-Chad, Nigeria-Cameroon, and Mali-Burkina-Faso. Another security implication brought about by colonialism, was the linguistic influence on the colonised populations and semblances of political, educational and administrative systems. This encouraged vertical relations with former colonial powers at the expense of horizontal (inter-African) relations. This proved to be destabilising because it created Anglophone/Francophone rival spheres (Mulikita, 1998:2; Nwokedi, 1996:26). Though African leaders promoted African unity, intra-bloc solidarity remained a security challenge.

In general, African security problems can be classified into three levels. Firstly, Africa faced common classical military threats in the form of interstate wars, insurgency, and external threats from outside the continent. Secondly, there were common non-military threats such as access to energy, water, gender discrimination, and ecological degradation. The last level refers to common insecurity issues related to threats that reduced the functioning capacity of the state, such as unemployment, corruption, and organised crime (Ngoma, 2005:18). During the Cold War, classical military threats were envisioned as the most prominent threats and security initiatives were aimed at securing the continent from these particular threats. The essence of African security, according to African leaders, was to safeguard the continent’s integrity by protecting the sovereignty of independent states (OAU, 1963:Article 2(c)).

Four strategies were adopted to counter these insecurities, and these became the foundation of security cooperation on the continent. The first strategy was to ensure that all African states still under colonial domination become free. Some African leaders believed that until the continent was totally free from foreign rule, its security would be threatened. This strategy was included in the OAU Charter, and called for “absolute dedication to the total emancipation of African territories which are still dependent” (OAU, 1963:Article 3(6)). The dependent states fell either under European colonial regimes or under the minority regimes in Southern Africa. The military mismatch between African states and their potential enemies (South Africa, Portugal and the former Rhodesia), ruled out any chances of
single-state confrontation, hence a joint effort was the only possible solution.

The second strategy was to declare a policy of non-involvement in the West-East ideological struggle (OAU, 1963:Article 3(7)). Nkrumah (1963:174) expressed fear of neo-colonialism by warning that neo-colonialism created client states “independent in name but in point of fact pawns of the very colonial power which is supposed to have given them independence”. African leaders hoped that a neutral Africa could shield the continent from becoming a battleground for the Cold War (Ayebade and Alao, 1998:6).

The third strategy was a provision that all states had to adhere to non-interference in the internal affairs of other member states (OAU, 1963:Article 3(2)). African leaders believed that, if social and political issues considered internal were addressed by those states themselves, sovereignty, territorial integrity and good neighbourliness would be ensured. There was also an underlying fear that internal rebel movements supported by former colonisers or other African governments could destabilise the continent and it was decided that such movements should therefore be condemned at the highest level as a way of discouraging them (Ayebade and Alao, 1998:7).

Lastly, all states had to respect inherited colonial borders (OAU, 1963:Article 3(3)). African states acknowledged the irrationality of the inherited borders, but they decided to accept the borders because any attempt to redraw them could create more problems than it could solve (Isawa, 1996:6). These strategies became the basis of African security cooperation throughout the OAU era. African security took interstate cooperation as the foundation of security cooperation but in some instances this increased the factor of vulnerability, thus heightening the sense of insecurity and underpinning internal conflicts.

These strategies were guiding principles to secure the independence of African states, but the implementation of these principles was sometimes problematic. The OAU failed to establish tools within the organisation that could ensure compliance. Non-interference was compromised as evidenced by conflicts such as in Somalia and Angola. As Obaseki (1982:10) observed, sentiments like “leave African problems to Africans” were contradicted by statements such as “Africa does not exist in a vacuum”.

Non-interference and internal affairs became very controversial phrases with different interpretations as the decision to seek external assistance to deal with internal issues was left to individual states. Such contradictions were witnessed in the fact that African states remained members of the Non-Aligned Movement, but Britain, for example, had military bases in Kenya, Angola had signed a Treaty of Friendship with Moscow, and the French had a significant military presence in her former colonies (Ayebade and Alao, 1998:7). The interpretation by African leaders of non-alignment became subject to internal and regional politics.

Respect for inherited borders was also a victim of violation. Though the OAU declared the principle of *uti possidetis*, thus endorsing the legitimacy of colonially inherited borders, the above-mentioned conflicts and disputes are testimony to its limited successes. Ethiopia and Somalia saw the need to redraw their borders, while some ethnic groups anticipating oppression started calling for secession, as was the case in Nigeria. The desire to preserve territorial integrity also became confused with the frantic bid to preserve incumbent leaders. Above all, the OAU through good offices, negotiations, mediation, and conciliation attempted to resolve any conflict that erupted on the continent by means other than peacekeeping (Kieh, 1998:12).

Indeed, cooperation among African states guaranteed some level of security. The perceived enemies of African security (South Africa and external forces) were physically capable of wreaking real havoc on fractionated African states; therefore, a collaborative front increased these states’ chances of survival. The benefit of security cooperation also meant that more efficient regional defence saved resources that were needed for non-defence programmes (Ostheimer, 1984:158). Though the need for security cooperation was evident, the actual cooperation was not that easy. Some factors helped bring these states together, amongst them Pan-Africanism and the decolonisation process.

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4 Nigeria experienced a civil war from 1967–1970 because of a group (Biafra) who wanted to secede from the main Nigeria. Some OAU member states, including Zambia, actually supported the group who wanted to secede.
2.4 PAN-AFRICANISM AND DECOLONISATION AS CATALYSTS TO SECURITY COOPERATION

Pan-Africanism manifested itself as the willingness of African governments and societies to work together collectively to improve the well-being of people on the continent and in the diaspora (Fakier, 2005:17). The movement gained momentum on African soil when African states were attaining their political independence, and became a driving force for all Africans to regain their dignity and respect. African leaders at the time presented the vision of Pan-Africanism as catalysts:

- to achieve independence from colonial rule throughout the continent; and
- to achieve continental unity so that Africa could
  - experience faster economic growth; and
  - assume a strong position within the international system (Bujra, 2004:2).

The vision was a unifying factor that leaders used as a benchmark to move forward with a common purpose.

Pan-Africanism was an emotional outcry against the humiliations of slavery and discrimination that characterised the colonial era (Walraven, 1999:86). Africans had suffered because of their origins and their history, and this common past brought them together as victims of the past. The hardships from their history played itself as a psychological influence for their union. For his part, Nkumah (1961:132) acknowledged, “African unity may have been a psychological reaction of elite Africans to their sense of vulnerability and inferiority in interaction with the western world”. This common identity hastened cooperation and unity as the shared feelings promoted a sense of oneness amongst Africans. Pan-Africanism played a significant role in binding Africans together, and became the cornerstone of the formation of the OAU.

According to Walraven (1999:142), so much was at stake that African leaders could not afford to allow the OAU founding conference to fail before the eyes of the world. It would have been very “unafrican” for Africans to fail to reach an agreement. Other key players, such as Nyerere, emphasised the need for African leaders to act in unison and to sort out their conflicts in private and not to judge each other’s internal policies publicly. Davidson (1983:211) further quotes Nyerere who emphasised that “only
Nkrumah (1961:19) echoed similar sentiments, namely that “the whole of Africa must be free and united, only then will [Africa] be able to exercise [its] full strength in the cause of peace and the welfare of mankind”. Such words of wisdom, coming from African leaders, cemented the ideals of Pan-Africanism, facilitating cooperation for the good of the peoples of the continent. Pan-Africanism became a front for people who had suffered the hardships of colonialism. With tribal communities spread across different countries, and other potential insecurities created by the legacy of colonialism, Pan-Africanism became a solace of cooperation and underpinned African unity, thus neutralising the already volatile and insecure environment within new independent states.

With independence, most African leaders inherited an illiterate population, no infrastructural development, and insufficient social services to support the populations. None of the newly independent states had been adequately prepared for independence. Tanzania, for instance, had only six graduates at independence (Southall and Conway, 2002:197). No African state was self-sufficient and confident enough to advance development without integrating with other states. Colonialism had disrupted Africa’s political, economic and social development, creating a new set of challenges which African leaders were ill-equipped to handle as individual states (Berman and Sams, 2000:12). The newly appointed African leaders therefore saw unity as necessary for the rapid eradication of colonialism and for the continent’s economic and political development.

Africa’s organisational expressions were also found in political parties, trade unions, religious groups, liberation armies and ethnic associations (Antonio, 2001:64; Walraven, 1999:77). The hardships and common subjections to white rule created a sense of “africanness” that formed the basis for political agitation and a united front to oust colonialism. National liberation movements in the case of countries not yet formally independent embodied the spirit of unity to enhance their success rates. There was a realisation that, in order to defeat the colonisers, states had to combine their resources, which were in most cases very limited (Ostheimer, 1984:158). After the establishment of the OAU, the organisation was compelled to

coordinate continental resources necessary to accomplish the liberation of
the continent so as to restore peace and political stability in order to
promote development for the entire African continent (Buyoya, 2006:167).

The coming together of African states for the first time formally symbolised
an acceptance of Pan-African norms and interstate behaviour, something
that Krasner (1983:355) said influenced foreign policy formulation within
the continent. The meeting of leaders improved what they knew about each
other. The formation of a Pan-African alliance in the UN became a source
of power by relatively weak states, enhancing their ability to influence the
global order. This view is supported by Walraven (1999:134) when he
points out that “a united foreign and defence policy would make a united
Africa great and powerful and … strengthen its impact on world affairs”.
Decolonisation helped shape the history of Africa as it highlighted the
hardships that the African people suffered, which acted as a unifying factor
for Africans who felt that if they had a common past, they could aspire for a
common future.

Security cooperation did not mean that Africa would be a conflict-free
continent; the main idea behind security cooperation was for Africans to be
able to solve their own problems. Through their cooperation, African
leaders attempted to put in place mechanisms that would be used in conflict
management, but as it will be shown in the next section, these mechanisms
fell short in many respects. While the OAU was involved in conflict
management in Africa since its inception, it failed to add the vital
instrument of peacekeeping to its mechanism until the Chad mission of
1981.

2.5 THE OAU AND PEACEKEEPING

The rationale for OAU conflict management was the prescription that
member states first had to try and settle their conflicts in an “African way”.
This was adopted from Article 52 of the UN Charter, which stipulates that
every effort should be made to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes
through regional arrangement before referring them to the Security Council
(United Nations, 1945: Chapter VIII). In pursuit of this provision, the OAU
adopted the principle of “peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation,
mediation, conciliation or arbitration”, and later established the Mechanism
of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration (OAU, 1963:Article 3(4)). In
this regard, the OAU had the competence of an initial concern regarding
African conflicts. However, as Walraven (1999:282) points out, this initial concern did not imply that the OAU was always able and capable of achieving satisfactory settlement of conflicts. Besides the establishment of a Defence Commission, there was nothing in the Charter that entertained peacekeeping. In general, the Organisation was more successful in conflicts that did not require peacekeeping measures, and worked under the principle of consent. Before any further deliberations on OAU peacekeeping, it is important to understand what peacekeeping is.

There are indeed many definitions of peacekeeping, but for the purpose of this research, Imobighe’s definition was adopted, as it is broad and not restricted to deployment of UN personnel, as is the case with the UN definition. The UN definition, as provided by its former Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali (1992:4), stipulates that peacekeeping is the “deployment of a UN presence in the field, hitherto with consent of all parties concerned, normally involving UN military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well”. The weakness of this definition is brought about by the fact that sub-regional bodies have since conducted a number of peacekeeping missions even without the consent of warring parties or the authority of the Security Council. Imobighe (1996:242), on the other hand, defines peacekeeping as a “deployment of a multi-faceted force of military and civilian personnel to stop hostilities between parties in conflict”. Though peacekeeping does not necessarily stop hostilities, it provides a congenial atmosphere for resolutions by peaceful means. In Rikhye’s (1983:10) words, “peacekeeping is an important tool of diplomacy”, it sets out an atmosphere for violent-free bargaining. Traditionally, there are two major types of peacekeeping: observer missions, which are characterised by interposition of unarmed or lightly armed soldiers between belligerents during a ceasefire or in low intensity conflict, and the peacekeeping force that deals with more complex conflicts where soldiers carry arms and use these in self-defence (Fung, 1996:71).

A closer look at the OAU Charter reveals that conflict resolution management was in the minds of the OAU founding fathers, but little was done to develop organs that could facilitate peacekeeping. Furthermore, until 1981 when the OAU engaged in a peacekeeping mission in Chad, the Organisation had shied away from peacekeeping missions. What becomes

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6 Interventions in Liberia and Lesotho by ECOMOG and SADC forces respectively are examples of such operations.
clear is the fact that the OAU’s behaviour did not result from the lack of a need for peacekeeping, as the need was apparent as evidenced by conflicts that ravaged the continent. For instance, after a ceasefire was reached terminating border skirmishes between Ethiopia and Somalia in 1964, the OAU failed to send a monitoring force there and eventually the ceasefire was violated (Imobighe, 1996:243). What then might have been responsible for the OAU’s failure to establish peacekeeping organs to facilitate its conflict management efforts? Perhaps the answer can be found in Neethling’s (2002:113) attribution to the complexity and financial demands of peacekeeping missions.

Moreover, Imobighe (1996:243) presents two possible explanations. Firstly, he claims that the basic defect in the conceptualisation of the role of the Defence Commission that had the responsibility to look after the defence needs of the continent was a hindrance. At the time of its establishment, member states were deliberately unclear on the exact function of the Commission. Indicative of its responsibilities is Article 2, which called upon the Organisation to defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of member states (OAU, 1963), but the question remains: How? By this deliberate omission, it meant that the role of the Defence Commission would be controlled by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government and the Council of Ministers as and when required. The failure of the African High Command and its alternatives as discussed in the next section further explains this deliberate apprehension to empower the OAU. The other fact that contributed to the relative neglect of peacekeeping, according to Imobighe (1996:244), was the lack of critical resources for servicing peacekeeping operations. The continent was yet to build its economic development hence resources were limited and priority given to other objectives. Despite these limitations, the OAU cautiously committed itself to conflict resolution and conflict management at various levels and with mixed successes.

The OAU first ventured into a peacekeeping mission just a few months after its inception in a border dispute between Algeria and Morocco in 1963 (Walraven, 1999:281). The OAU, through the heads of states, arranged for a troop withdrawal and a demilitarised zone to be overseen by troops from Algeria, Morocco, Ethiopia and Mali as military observers (Berman and Sams, 2000:46; Wiseman, 1984:128). However, the implementation of the plan was never realised because of political laxity. The second attempt in
1965 also failed but the two warring countries reached their own agreement through bilateral negotiations (Berman and Sams, 2000:46).

Soon afterwards, in 1964, Ethiopia and Somalia were engaged in a border dispute. Somalia requested the establishment of a demilitarised zone supervised by neutral OAU observers, but Ethiopia opposed the request. In the absence of consent, the OAU chose to use ad hoc arrangements. African diplomats in the region were engaged but were unsuccessful due to limited experience and divisions within the organisation (Wiseman, 1984:128). Next was an OAU effort to intervene in Congo-Kinshasa after the UN peacekeeping force had pulled out in 1964. Again, the OAU efforts did not bring any favourable results, which proved to be an embarrassment to the Organisation that had pushed UN troops out hoping to replace them with OAU troops. Furthermore, an attempt to intervene during the Nigerian Civil War (1967-70) was limited to mediation as Nigeria opposed any intervention on the grounds of principles of territorial integrity and non-interference (Berman and Sams, 2000:47; Wiseman, 1984:129). During the first two decades, the OAU never deployed any sizable peacekeeping force though it occasionally proposed to do so.

The Organisation’s peacekeeping awakening came about in Chad during that country’s 1978 conflict. Libya occupied the northern part of the country while France through its strong post-colonial presence exerted some influence on the country’s political scene. On the other hand, Nigeria was trying to minimise French influence so as to become a regional hegemonic power as well as counter Libyan penetration (Pittman, 1984:303). Initially, the OAU proposed, but failed to send a peacekeeping force; instead, it rubber-stamped measures taken by Nigeria and other neighbouring states to resolve the conflict (Imobighe, 1996:245). Consequently, Nigeria sent a neutral force to supervise a ceasefire in Chad, but it failed also because the warring parties doubted the force’s neutrality and misunderstood its mandate. The unilateral intervention might have given the perception that it was driven by Nigerian national interests, thus playing against the legitimacy of the intervention.

The Nigerian troops withdrew and negotiations continued which resulted in the Lagos Accord of 1979, leading to the formation of the Government of

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7 The OAU actually passed some resolutions supporting the Nigerian government and declined to support humanitarian efforts on Biafran people where civilians and children were killed.
National Unity (GUNT) under President Weddeye (Pittman, 1984:304). The Lagos Accord also provided for an immediate ceasefire, demilitarisation of the Chadian capital, withdrawal of the French troops and holding of general elections (Imobighe, 1996:246). In 1980, the OAU called upon Benin, Guinea, and Congo-Brazzaville to form a peacekeeping force to end the conflict (OAU, 1980). More than two months elapsed after signing the accords before any of the countries made any provisions for the deployment, and the OAU itself had not provided any funding (Pittman, 1984:308). Only Congo-Brazzaville was eventually able to send its troops, though the force was not well supported logistically and therefore did not effect any meaningful contribution to the resolution of the conflict (Berman and Sams, 2000:49). Guinea and Benin announced that they could not meet the cost involved (Pittman, 1984:309). The situation deteriorated and Libya increased its presence in the northern part of Chad driving Habre’s\(^8\) militants as far as the capital N’\’djamena. Furthermore, Libya announced in 1981 that it was merging with Chad (Berman and Sams, 2000:47). This announcement forced the OAU that opposed the merger to react by proposing an immediate deployment of a peacekeeping force. There was also pressure from anti-Libyan lobbyists such as the United States, France, and Britain who viewed Libya as a Soviet surrogate to halt the merger (Imobighe, 1996:248; Pittman, 1984:303). Libya, under pressure from both the OAU and Western powers, agreed to withdraw its troops.

Though sending a peacekeeping mission was agreed upon in principle, the OAU had neither the funds nor the administrative capacity to undertake such a venture (Imobighe, 1996:248). Member states were asked to contribute US$50 000 each towards a fund to support the operation, but only US$400 000 was raised (Walraven, 1999:338). Faced with these limitations, the UN was considered for assistance but some OAU member states were divided on the specific nature of UN assistance, whether it was to be financial assistance or a mixed UN force under UN command (Imobighe, 1996:249). All these delays proved the lack of readiness on the part of the OAU to field a peacekeeping force without substantial external help. Pittman (1984:316) observed that as soon as the United States, Britain and France indicated that they would assist in funding the peacekeeping mission, things started happening. However, the interest of these Western countries was the withdrawal of Libya and not the Chad conflict per se. After the Libyan withdrawal, the promised assistance was reduced

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\(^8\) The leader of a faction fighting the Government of National Unity (GUNT).
(Wiseman, 1984:134). The deployment was faced with many challenges rendering it unsuccessful.

From the outset, there were disagreements between the OAU member states about the intervention, whether the conflict was an internal conflict requiring non-interference or required intervention. Operationally, the OAU faced a dilemma. The mission mandate required a large troop contribution, initially calculated at about 5,000, and, simultaneously, the organisation could not afford such a number both financially and logistically. Nevertheless, member states still failed to supply enough troops to accomplish the tasked mandate successfully. Six countries had pledged to send troops, but eventually only Nigeria, Senegal and Zaire participated. According to Imobighe (1996:250), a Benin battalion had prepared but they had no military uniforms and equipment. Togo could not participate because Weddeye blocked its participation as he claimed they sympathised with Habre, while Guinea did not send its battalion because it disapproved of the operation being funded by foreign powers (Amate, 1986:183). The number eventually reached 3,000 troops at an estimated budget of US$192 million, which Berman and Sams (2000:53) estimated to have been ten times the entire OAU budget.

The peacekeeping mission was doomed from the beginning. Firstly, the number of troops who deployed was far less than projected, therefore the troops could not effectively cover their areas of responsibility. This was an advantage to the warring parties who continued attacking one another with minimal interference. Secondly, some battalions arrived without the necessary equipment needed for their role. For instance, the Benin battalion was to provide communication support, and their non-arrival translated into a lack of communication equipment and thus created communications problems for the entire mission (Amate, 1986:183). The absence of three battalions from the three countries that did not send troops, created gaps in the division of labour, overstretching the little resources available.

The mandate was limited and unclear (Berman and Sams, 2000:54). The peacekeeping force mandate was to “ensure the defence and security of the country whilst awaiting the integration of government forces” (Walraven, 1999:339; Imobighe, 1996:251). The warring parties were not adequately briefed on the neutrality of the peacekeeping force, therefore each side tried to exploit the presence of the troops to their advantage. The Force Commander, General Ejiga, also had problems with the mandate and asked...
for clarification whether they were supposed to act as an interventionist force upholding the authority of the Government of National Unity (GUNT) or to separate warring parties (Adisa, 1996:269). Weddeye assumed that since the troops were replacing the Libyan troops, they would similarly suppress Habre’s forces (Imobighe, 1996:251). According to Amate (1986:181-2), Weddeye had actually secured such an understanding with OAU Secretary General Kodjo, under the Status of Force Agreement (SOFA) signed in 1981. The unclear mandate was also underpinned by the OAU non-intervention principle, which restricted the OAU from operating without the permission of the relevant government. Without the promise to aid the GUNT, it could have been difficult to persuade Weddeye to receive the peace force. Furthermore, without consent from the other warring parties, the deployment of the peace force had very little chance of success.

The command structure on the ground was also confused and not well developed. The Force Commander had no authority over non-Nigerian contingents, the peacekeeping force lacked coordinated political control, and the Force Commander reported directly to the Chairman of the OAU instead of to its headquarters in Addis Ababa (Berman and Sam, 2000:54; Walraven, 1999:340). Another complication was the fact that troop-contributing countries received support directly from donor countries instead of through the OAU; hence, donor countries’ influence was unavoidable.

Generally, the mission was filled with many problems because the OAU member states showed little political will to support the mission and lacked consensus from the outset. The involvement of France, Sudan and Libya also complicated the situation by bringing in external politics and external influences. Libya supported Weddeye whilst Egypt, Sudan and some countries that had pledged to contribute troops were sympathetic to Habre (Walraven, 1999:341; Pittman, 1984:303). The sudden withdrawal of Libyan troops also created a vacuum that Habre exploited to his advantage. The deadline for withdrawal was fixed without consideration of the actual events on the ground because of a lack of enthusiasm from member states (Berman and Sams, 2000:55).

In addition, there were also other issues contributing to the failure of the Chad peacekeeping operation. The conflict was not amenable to mediation, and Habre who felt that he had a more organised force, refused to agree to a peaceful settlement. Both major factions pursued a “win or nothing”
attitude, which resulted in none of them respecting the neutral forces. The many factions also made it difficult to have a focal point for mediation efforts (Pittman, 1984:318). The involvement of foreign powers made mediation difficult as it brought with it distrust driven by different national interests. The external forces also worsened the situation by playing contradictory roles, namely providing aid to the OAU force while at the same time backing the warring parties.  

Logistical problems also contributed to the failure. As the OAU peacekeeping force deployed, few member states had any airlift capability. It took long for troops to be transported to Chad, which meant that the situation worsened whilst awaiting the peace force to deploy. Walraven (1999:340) attributes the mission failure to lack of political will amongst member states, financial constraints, and external influence – particularly France, Sudan, Egypt and Libya and an unclear OAU mandate.

After the Chad peacekeeping fiasco, interest in collective defence plummeted sharply. The 1993 Mechanism, which was meant to revive OAU conflict management capacity, emphasised prevention and containment of conflicts so as to avoid expensive peacekeeping missions (Walraven, 1999:344). The Mechanism allowed deployment of military observer missions of restricted scope and duration to stop or prevent hostilities and to facilitate mediation. It undertook its first test by deploying a Neutral Military Observer Group (NMOG) in Rwanda in 1992-93. If such conflicts deteriorated, the services of the UN were to be sought for financial, logistical and military assistance. After the end of the Cold War, more military observer missions were deployed such as in Rwanda (1991), Burundi (1994) and the Comoros (1997).

As this section pointed out, the OAU member states had problems to empower the OAU organs to carry out conflict resolutions in full independent from heads of states and governments, which was the highest decision-making body. The rejection of a continental force was a sign of this deliberate action. The next section will consider the African High Command and its failure to become a complementary mechanism for peacekeeping efforts on the continent.

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9 The US supported the Congo-Kinshasa contingent, making it a surrogate for US policy in support of Habre against the pro-Libyan Waddeye.
2.6 FROM THE AFRICAN HIGH COMMAND TO THE AFRICAN STANDBY FORCE

The idea of a continental force antedates the formation of the OAU. Nkrumah mooted the idea in the 1960s during the Congo crisis (Hough, 1998:222). There was general dissatisfaction amongst African leaders with the way in which the UN peacekeeping force was being manipulated by the big powers against the interest of the Congolese people and Africans in general. Nkrumah then thought the best way to deal with the problem of super power influence was to establish a continental force of African forces (Walraven, 1999:330; Imobighe, 1980:242). The idea received mixed reactions from member states. According to Wiseman (1984:125), the idea failed to gain adequate support at the founding meeting of the OAU because it “presupposed greater authority to be vested in the OAU than member states were willing to grant”. Some leaders viewed the centralisation of military power as a first step towards the political unification of the continent, and they were not ready for that (Franke, 2006:4). Consequently, a compromise was reached by creating a specialised Defence Commission in 1963 responsible for defence and security issues provided for under Article 20(4) of the OAU Charter; a Commission for Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration as well as a Liberation Committee (Woronoff, 1971:23). The responsibility of the commission amongst others was to “work out a formula for coordinating and harmonizing the defence policies of member states to enable the OAU to execute the defence role it assumed under Article II of the Charter” (Hough, 1998:222). Though not in explicit terms, the use of military force was directly inferred in strong words such as “resist neo-colonialism in all forms”, “eradicate all forms of colonialism”, and “absolute dedication to the total emancipation of Africa” but nothing like a continental force was agreed upon at the founding conference (Wiseman, 1984:125-6; OAU, 1963:Articles 2 (d) and 3 (6)).

The Defence Commission held their first meeting in Accra in November 1963, during which the Ghanaian delegates again presented a modified proposal for a continental force, the so-called African High Command, to member state representatives. According to Hough (1998:223), Ghana suggested a continental defence arrangement controlled by one military authority responsible to the Assembly of Heads of States and Governments in this particular proposal. The military authority was to make recommendations regarding member states’ contributions, where military bases and institutions would be located and all other logistical arrangements
to enable the unit to defend Africa. The foreseen task of this force was to coordinate the defence of the continent against external aggression and police, and to protect and patrol the disputed areas along borders (Ostheimer, 1984:163).

It was envisioned that the Defence Commission would be responsible to issue directives as well as to approve plans for operations, training recommendations, equipment and standardisation and to recommend appropriate steps against any military threats to the security of African states. Responses to the proposal were mixed. Some delegates pointed out that the proposal was beyond what the OAU could afford. Others were suspicious of Ghana’s intentions. Problems of manpower, equipment and weapon standardisation, logistics, unified training and deployment of troops were listed as serious impediments to the proposal. The general feeling was that the proposal was too big a project to be proposed by one state; hence some states were not prepared to finance it (Walraven, 1999:330-1; Imobighe, 1980:242).

Others voiced political objections arguing that such a force would infringe upon state sovereignty (Walraven, 1999:331). In general, the proposal was viewed as too lavish and impractical for the OAU given its limited budget and developmental level. Comments from other delegates suggested that they viewed the high command idea as a counterweight against already established military alliances. A comment by a Liberian delegate summed up this view:

“If a high command were established from whence would come the resources to establish it on a level of already established blocs? For example, was Africa prepared and in a position to deter aggression of the modern type involving the use of inter-continental ballistic missiles? And could African States fight those countries from whom they were receiving aid? … Were those countries to be asked to provide equipment to be used against them?” (Imobighe, 1980:244).

Some argued that the OAU Charter did not have a “provision for collective security” (Ostheimer, 1984:163). The Liberian delegate further argued that an OAU High Command would be useless because its actions would contravene the UN Charter Article 2, which prohibits the use of force or
threat of armed force except for self-defence or in execution of collective measures authorised by the UN Security Council.

An analytical assessment of this view uncovers its misleading posture. The objective of the Defence Commission was to ensure the defence of Africa though there was no provision or article directly to that effect. It was therefore in line with OAU objectives and acceptable under Article 51 of the UN Charter, to have a continental force to meet that objective. Subsequently, activities of the Defence Commission were legal and in accordance with UN principles. Nevertheless, as a consequence of these objections, no concrete plan was drawn up at the end of the Defence Commission meeting to further the establishment of the African High Command. Furthermore, during the next OAU Summit in 1964 in Cairo, the High Command issue was rejected as premature. Wolfers (1976:93), argues that the African High Command project presupposed a much closer form of union government than had been formulated in the OAU, therefore it was highly premature and a non-starter since the union did not exist. The Nigerian delegation presented a counter-proposal, which they claimed was more practical and cost-effective. Their proposal was based on the assumption that there was no external threat against Africa. They suggested further the “establishment of a military council within the framework of the secretariat composed of experts who would gather and transmit information to member states” (Ostheimer, 1984:163). In essence, their proposal was an early warning bell.

During the second Defence Commission meeting in 1965, Sierra Leone delegates submitted their proposal that called for the establishment of an African Defence Organisation. Instead of a permanent army, they advocated for a continental clearinghouse for national armed forces supported by a committee of military experts (Franke, 2006:7). The aim of the defence organisation was to maintain peace and security only in regions that were destabilised by liberation struggles. The idea was broadened from only external aggression to aggression by colonialists on the continent in countries still under colonial rule. Under this proposal, the OAU member states were expected to earmark units from their armed forces voluntarily to be on standby and at the disposal of the OAU, should they be needed. The approach turned out to be too cumbersome and the resolution was only on paper; nothing was done to facilitate or adopt it.
In 1971, the Defence Commission met in Addis Ababa and came up with the suggestion that a regional defence system should be established (Hough, 1998:223). This suggestion, according to Wolfers (1976:96), was borne by the fact that the Defence Commission concluded that a continental force would not be possible because of the different political backgrounds of the OAU member states. Each region was to have an executive secretariat for defence comprising a regional chief of staff, one deputy regional chief of staff and representatives from the national armed forces of states making up the region. The Defence Commission would act as a coordinator through a standing committee. At the OAU Secretariat, there would be an OAU defence adviser of the rank of general. The proposal was presented to the OAU Summit in Rabat in 1972 but no agreement was reached. The concept of a high command was never debated openly again, but alternative proposals were presented.

In 1972, during the OAU Ministerial Council meeting in Rabat, Morocco, the idea of an African Task Force was proposed. The idea was to have a continental force where all OAU member states would contribute troops. According to Imobighe (1980:248), the Task Force’s objectives were to protect freedom fighters and their base areas in neighbouring countries that were still under colonial rule. Those opposing the idea of the Task Force cited the fact that such a force could not successfully wage war against any of the then remaining colonisers, namely South Africa, the former Rhodesia and Portugal. There was great disparity in the level of technology and military power between the contending blocks. Furthermore, political will and logistical factors were cited as additional impediments. Not much consideration was given to the general threat posed by countries under colonial rule apart from the military threat. Consequently, the opposing states to the African Task Force concept failed to analyse the nature of threats posed by colonialists on African security in general, less the idea of a conventional confrontation. The idea was also rejected and never developed any further.

William Eteki Moumoua, the former OAU Secretary General, proposed a Collective Intervention Force during the OAU ministerial meeting of 1977 (Ostheimer, 1984:163). This was a modified concept of the Task Force that was envisaged to provide rapid deployment against any attacks on the Frontline States. It was dismissed for the same reasons that saw the rejection of the Task Force. Consequently, during the 1978 OAU Summit in Khartoum, Sudan, a fresh proposal was tabled for the setting up of a
committee of defence to study the issue of Pan-African defence in totality and to propose a way forward (Hough, 1998:223).

The OAU involvement in peacekeeping in Chad in 1981 revived the spirit of institutionalised continental military cooperation. At the same time, its failure during the operation was perceived as proof of the realities of maintaining such a force. Those who had always negated a continental force had a practical example to enhance their objections.

In 1991, during an OAU Summit of Heads of State and Governments in Kampala, the call for a continental defence and security cooperation was revisited. The delegates acknowledged that “the security and stability of each African country was inseparably linked with the security of all African states” (African Leadership Forum, 1991). The idea and concept were well received by leaders and the meeting was a turning point towards security cooperation after the Cold War. The Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution was established in 1993, which increased the visibility of the OAU in conflict management. It is against this backdrop that the OAU Chiefs of Defence Staff agreed in 1997 in Harare that the OAU should earmark a brigade-size contribution to standby arrangements from each of the five African sub-regions (OAU, 1997). In May 1997, African leaders also agreed on an African Defence Force but the idea remained at the exploratory stage until 2002, when the ASF was approved during the Durban Summit launching the AU (Schraeder, 2004:259).

2.7 REGIONALISM AND REGIONAL RESPONSES TO CONFLICTS IN AFRICA

Traditionally, the responsibility to respond to conflicts was tasked to the UN whose purpose under Chapter 1 Article 1.1 is to “maintain international peace and security … to take effective collective measures for prevention and removal of threats to the peace …” (United Nations, 1945). After the Cold War, the increasing number of conflicts overwhelmed UN resources, resulting in a call for regional organisations to assist in policing the world as authorised by Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. In an effort to legitimise this approach, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the then UN Secretary General, gave his Agenda for Peace speech calling for more participation by regional and sub-regional organisations. He noted, “the Security Council has and will continue to have primary responsibility for maintaining peace and security, but regional action as a matter of decentralisation, delegation and
cooperation … contribute to a deeper sense of participation …” (Boutros-Ghali, 1992:15).

A similar appeal for regional participation was made by his successor Kofi Annan (1998) when he stated, “such support [was] necessary because the United Nations lacks the capacity, resources and expertise to address all problems that may arise in Africa”. This division of labour and responsibilities was prompted by a number of factors: firstly, the belief that regional bodies would be more successful in peacekeeping because they have superior knowledge of their regions, prevailing cultures, the peoples and their idiosyncrasies in their areas of operation than outsiders (Neethling, 2004:74; Malan, 1999:3; Olonisakin, 2000:1); and secondly, as most conflicts were in Africa, it was argued that a response from the continent itself would be swifter, unlike responses from New York (UN Headquarters). Regional bodies have the proximity and a sense of balance that allows them to define the nature of the conflict in terms of regional political dynamics. Political and geographical proximity allow these organisations to realise the effects and repercussions of a given conflict, and, if necessary, seek support from extra-regional sources like the UN. Though debatable, regional responses also bring credibility to conflict resolution. Lastly, following the Cold War, many African states lost their strategic importance. It was therefore more appropriate to engage regional bodies to solve regional problems because the developed world was no longer interested in Africa. Regional organisations also have greater interest in the affairs of their neighbours and a desire to manage regional conflicts before they spill over (Olonisakin, 2000:1; Corum, 1995:132).

A panel on UN Peace Operations commissioned to assess and comment on UN peacekeeping capabilities further encouraged participation in peacekeeping by regional bodies. Their report, commonly known as the Brahimi Report (United Nations, 2000), concluded that the UN “does not wage war” implying that regional and sub-regional bodies had the obligation through the UN Security Council to enforce actions where necessary. The report further brought to the fore the need for the UN to deploy rapidly and effectively to avoid a repeat of a Rwanda-like genocide (Hansen, et al., 2001:16). Consequently, the use of standby forces and regional or sub-regional organisations was viewed as a possible solution to rapid deployment.
2.8 STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND THE NEED FOR INTERVENTION

Thus far, this chapter has shown the need to participate in conflict resolution efforts through peacekeeping, peacebuilding, peacemaking and in some instances peace enforcement. When discussing peace enforcement, questions arise, like are states losing their sovereignty? Or, are states now allowed to interfere in others’ internal affairs? This is against the backdrop of Africa’s traditionally strict adherence to the norms of sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of member states (Hammerstad, 2005:8). However, it has to be borne in mind that the concept of sovereignty presumes that each state had the power, authority and competence to govern its territory. In Africa, sovereignty turned out to be a legal fiction not matched by governance or administrative capacity. A paradigm shift occurred after Boutros-Ghali (1992:4), the former UN Secretary General, gave his speech entitled *An Agenda for Peace*, where he pointed out that “time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty … [had] passed”. The statement provoked a conscious redirection towards the doctrine of humanitarian intervention (Cawthra, 2004:29). It was recognised that when a state was unwilling or unable to protect its population, or targets its own citizens, the responsibility to protect its citizens is transferred to the international community (Powell, 2005:7). Geldenhuys (2006:8) also supports this view when he asserts that if states fail to discharge their responsibilities, the principle of collective security takes over through the international community. This shift in the sovereignty outlook further enhances the role of regional and sub-regional bodies for swift interventions.

The history of intervention during the OAU era does not have much to show. The OAU was established when state sovereignty was high on the agenda. The OAU Charter had no provision for transnational promotion of human rights (Neethling, 2004:76). Instead, the Organisation aspired to protect sovereignty of member states and emphasised the principle of non-interference in the internal matters of member states. International concerns for human rights and democratic governance were viewed as pretexts for undermining state sovereignty (Baimu and Sturman, 2003:29).

Sovereignty debates gained renewed momentum especially after the American-led war against Iraq in 1991. Two questions were often asked:
firstly, to what extent do states have the right or obligation to intervene in the internal affairs of another state? and
secondly, what form should the interventions take – diplomacy, negotiations, sanctions or humanitarian military intervention?

Other questions prompted by the Iraqi invasion include:
• who determines what constitutes gross violation of human rights and who has the right to intervene?
• is intervention applied selectively?

The inaction of the international community that resulted in the Rwanda massacres highlights the question of selectivity, as thousands of civilians were raped and killed without much being done to protect them (Dellaire, 2004). Nevertheless, it transpired that intervention is easy in principle but difficult in practice. According to Cilliers and Sturman (2002:1), “a failed intervention can do as much damage as failing to intervene at all”.

As a response to the new security challenges that saw the genocide in Rwanda and Burundi and human rights abuses in countries like Liberia, the OAU member states signed a Protocol on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights in 1998. The following year, the OAU adopted the Grand Bay Declaration and Plan Action aimed at promoting and protecting human rights (Geldenhuys, 2006:12). In 1999, the Lome Declaration followed, which recognised the responsibility of states to protect their people. This commenced a shift from rigid sovereignty to adoption of the responsibility to protect.

When the OAU transitioned into the AU, it adopted a Constitutive Act that recognises the right to intervene for humanitarian purposes. However, as Neethling (2004:76) points out, the Act does not define intervention, whether it is the use of force or whether it should be viewed as mediation, peacekeeping missions, sanctions or other non-coercive measures. Nonetheless, the fact that the AU recognises intervention is a breakthrough in African political relations where human abuse had been a scourge for many years. Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act explicitly provides for intervention to prevent genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity without the consent of the target state following a decision by the Assembly. Though the intervention clause in the Constitutive Act is hailed as a breakthrough, some commentators question the right conferred on the AU by the Constitutive Act to decide on intervention outside the UN
framework and raise the issue regarding which role the UN plays in such interventions (Kioko, 2003:820). The UN Charter under Article 2(4) states, “all Member States shall refrain in their international relations from threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state …”. The Constitutive Act does not come out clear on the procedures to be followed when undertaking such interventions. What is clear is that the decision to authorise intervention rests with the members of the PSC in terms of Article 7(e) of the Protocol Relating to Establishment of the PSC of the AU. However, without authorisation of the UN any intervention could be deemed illegal and against the spirit of international law. It is expected that the PSC will use its regional option as per UN Charter, specifically Chapter VIII, for any intervention efforts it may undertake. For these reasons, it is evident that the provision on the right of intervention, though well intended, will not be an easy one to decide upon or to implement. The migration of the OAU into the AU brings new hopes and optimism that the concept of the responsibility to protect will find its way within the African states since some effort already shows that the AU is different from its predecessor. The next chapter will seek to identity new measures that the AU has put in place to overcome weaknesses of the old OAU.

2.9 CONCLUSION

This chapter was aimed at highlighting security cooperation in Africa during the OAU era. It commenced by defining security cooperation in particular and cooperation in general, highlighting Pan-Africanism and decolonisation as key centripetal forces that hastened the enthusiasm, which culminated in the formation of the OAU. The OAU peacekeeping in Chad was also discussed to underscore some of the challenges that the OAU encountered during the operation. The chapter also emphasised previous attempts at a continental security mechanism in the form of the African High Command that failed to attain fruition. The need for regional responses was also discussed to underline the interface between the OAU and the UN as a body with the overall responsibility for international peace and security. The last section covered state sovereignty and the way it impacted on the OAU responsibilities towards peace and security.

From these discussions, it became clear that the OAU was a platform for African leaders to declare their intentions, and to showcase Pan-African ideals by cooperating in continental issues. This resulted in the eradication
of colonialism and the dismantlement of apartheid on the continent. Needless to say, OAU successes were overshadowed by their failures, which some analysts tie to the OAU Charter itself. The principles that advocated respect for inherited borders, non-interference in member states internal affairs and poor resources crippled the Organisation’s attempts on peace and security issues. The OAU Charter was particularly crafted to minimise conflicts on the continent, but the realities that existed then, limited trust amongst leaders, which accentuated their short-sightedness in conflict management strategies. The ideological blocs that existed and the influence of the Cold War further allowed too much participation by external actors in African affairs.

Though there was a need for a conflict management mechanism, member states deliberately shied away from setting it up because they did not want the OAU to have more powers than the states themselves. Nkrumah’s proposal for a common African force was viewed with suspicion. Though it cannot be concluded that the proposal was the best strategy to resolve conflicts, the reasons for rejecting it were not convincing as they were based on mistrust and individualism. Again, sovereignty and the fear to lose state control played a role in rejecting a joint African force. Throughout the existence of the OAU, it applied the traditional methods of conflict resolution, such as good offices, negotiations, mediation and conciliation whilst more robust methods, like military peacekeeping, remained on the periphery. The few times the OAU attempted to undertake peacekeeping missions, a number of challenges repeatedly appeared. Chief amongst these was the fact that the OAU member states did not have enough resources to undertake such missions. During the Chad peacekeeping mission, troop-contributing countries, except for Nigeria, had to be airlifted by foreign powers. In essence, the OAU could not deploy without external assistance.

The problem of resources could also be linked to political will. Though the OAU member states were asked to contribute US$50 000 each towards the Chad peacekeeping mission, by the time of deployment, only US$400 000 had been contributed. Of the six countries that pledged to send troops, only three finally deployed. The OAU member states therefore failed to reach the projected strength of 5 000 troops, which was envisaged to accomplish the mandate.

The ad hoc method of tackling conflicts meant that the OAU did not build any capacity for peacekeeping as well as other forms of conflict resolution
skills. The outcome of this ad hoc arrangement was a lack of capacity to build experience in conflict management skills. The SOFA that OAU Secretary General Kodjo and Weddeye signed illustrates this short-sightedness. Command and control problems experienced by the Force Commander also showed a lack of capacity to handle such operations by OAU institutions. The mandate of the mission was thus unclear, resulting in the warring parties taking advantage of the ambiguity.

Since Libya had its troops in Chad, it complicated the whole conflict by drawing in foreign politics that had their own agendas. These foreign powers supported different warring parties, which further complicated the conflict. In the final analysis, it is therefore a reasonable conclusion that the failures of the OAU in peacekeeping were related to lack of political will, unclear mandate, lack of financial aid, limited capacity and experience on conflict resolution and interference from external politics.
CHAPTER 3: THE AFRICAN UNION’S PEACE AND SECURITY ARCHITECTURE

3.1 INTRODUCTION

In Field’s (2004a:19) words, when African leaders formed the AU, they put to bed the inability of its forerunner, the OAU, in order to deal with continental instabilities by adopting new approaches to the maintenance of peace and security. The awakening and sudden quest for a new approach to African conflicts was induced both internally and externally. Internally inducing factors included the desire to end adhocism and the inhibiting of OAU principles, whereas externally compelling factors, amongst others, stemmed from the Somalia debacle of 1993, which resulted in Western abdication and disengagement in African conflicts as well as the hybridisation of UN peace operations, which evolved into complex operations. The Rwanda genocide of 1994 also sent a clear message that, unless Africans themselves stopped conflicts in Africa, no one was going to do it for them. Consequently, a deliberate step was taken to refocus African politics in order to deal with the changes in global politics, hence the formation of the AU.

The Constitutive Act of the AU calls for collaborative and collective security avenues to take up the multifaceted challenges that confront the continent and its people in light of social, economic and political development. This Act places renewed emphasis on building a continental security mechanism capable of preventing, managing, and resolving conflicts in Africa. The AU lays out particular provisions for intervention in the internal affairs of member states through a military force when necessary to protect vulnerable populations (Powell, 2005:1).

To achieve peace, security and stability, the Constitutive Act of the AU under Article 4(d) calls for the “establishment of a common defence policy for the African continent”. Such policy would lay down a broad approach to stability so as to liberate the continent from conflicts, which are viewed as stumbling blocks in its development. Consequently, the Solemn Declaration on a Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP) was adopted in February 2004. The objectives of the CADSP are to be achieved through a PSC, which was established by a protocol adopted in 2002, namely the Protocol Establishing the PSC. In terms of Articles 7(1) (b) and (c), the protocol specifically calls for peacekeeping and related
functions and in terms of Article 7(1) (e), for intervention. African leaders were “conscious of the indivisibility of security in Africa and particularly the fact that the defence and security of one African country is directly linked to that of other African countries, and desirous to harmonise member states’ activities” (African Union, 2004).

There was a strong desire to protect the vulnerable population from abusive governments and to expose them to the joys and benefits of their countries. This responsibility necessitated the AU to build a capacity to react to potential conflict areas and to have a capacity to rebuild in the aftermath of conflicts (Fakier, 2005:18). This, in essence, formed a new AU doctrine on conflict prevention and management. The AU and its intentions seem to represent a revolution in African security cooperation and a detour from the AU’s old approach based on sovereign interests as opposed to regional interests. However, as an organisation at its infancy, the AU faces many challenges, especially those relating to implementation of its intentions and objectives. Some of the objectives are ambitious and will need solid commitment at both national and regional levels.

Actions in support of the “responsibility to protect”, which form the foundation of the AU drive on security and peace, call for a broad range of measures and responses in fulfilment of the accompanying duty to assist. These include:

- assistance to help prevent conflicts from occurring, intensifying, spreading or persisting;
- rebuilding support to help prevent conflict from recurring; and
- in some cases, military intervention to protect civilians from harm.

These responsibilities clearly call on member states to cede some of their powers to the Union, but as Ajulu (2002:2) argues, the Constitutive Act seems to be to the contrary. The Constitutive Act seeks to mirror the old OAU in defending national sovereignty of member states on the one hand, while, on the other hand, proposes to appropriate the right to intervene in internal affairs of member states. It is therefore significant to determine how the AU is structured and poised to undertake its envisioned responsibilities as outlined by the Constitutive Act.

The aim of this chapter is to highlight the configuration of the AU’s peace and security architecture with a view to discover how this is organised in order to deal better with peacekeeping operations than the OAU. This is
achieved by, firstly, presenting an overview of the general AU security framework in an effort to underscore its structural configuration to carry out its responsibilities of preventing, managing and resolving conflicts on the continent. This is followed by a brief discussion of the security aspects of NEPAD and the CSSDCA, both of which have objectives that overlap and complement the CADSP in security issues. The CADSP implementation instruments, namely the PSC and its main organ, the ASF, are also discussed. The last section of the chapter covers the relationship between the AU and other stakeholders in pursuit of peace and security, namely, the international community and sub-regional organisations whose support is critical for the CADSP to achieve its objectives.

In the era after the Cold War, many events proved that the OAU was no longer capable of handling new global challenges. Conflicts became more complex, the UN expected more involvement from regional organisations in regional peace and security matters, and the OAU Charter was not tailored for this new environment. According to Neethling (2004:78), the continent found itself in a profoundly new and different environment that required re-configured strategies to deal with previously ignored sources of insecurity and instability. Having highlighted the challenges that confronted the OAU in peace and security in Chapter two, the emergence of the AU is therefore viewed as a new beginning in peace and security matters. It is for this reason that this chapter tries to lay out the AU and its structures that will deal directly with African peace and security challenges. The importance of this chapter therefore is to show that the AU is better suited institutionally and operationally than the OAU to deal with conflict and instability.

3.2 THE SALIENT FEATURES OF THE AFRICAN PEACE AND SECURITY ARCHITECTURE

Established by Article 4(d) of the Constitutive Act of the AU and Article 3(e) of the Protocol Establishing the PSC, the CADSP is a common understanding among African states about their defence and security challenges and a set of measures they seek to take collectively to respond to these challenges. It was conceptualised by decision ASS/AU/Dec. 5(I) at the inaugural session of the Assembly of the AU in Durban, South Africa, 2002. The CADSP is premised on a common continental “perception of what is required to be done collectively by African states to ensure that
Africa’s common defence and security interests and goals” are safeguarded (African Union, 2004).

As highlighted in Chapter two, the concept of collective defence and security policy had long been at the heart of African politics, and its initial failures created a breeding ground for a multitude of bilateral and sub-regional defence and security arrangements that dotted the political landscape of the continent. Probably the most important aspect about the drive towards a continental force is its reliance on sub-regional bodies. The new concept allows sub-regional bodies to build their capabilities, which then translates into the overall achievement of the continental force in stark contrast to the OAU’s approach to a continental force. It is for this reason that the success of a continental defence system should have ties with the existing security bodies on the continent.

The CADSP holds considerable promise for Africa, which has been ravaged by conflicts for many years inhibiting economic and social development. It aims to deal with conflicts both directly and indirectly through preventive diplomacy and rapid interventions in areas affected by conflicts (Touray, 2005:636). After dealing with conflicts, it is expected that the CADSP will also facilitate peacemaking and peacebuilding initiatives. This was tried in the Sudan where the AU Ministerial Committee on Post-Conflict Reconstruction was formed in 2005 and led by South Africa to identify reconstruction priorities (Mamoepa, 2005; Powell, 2005:14).

Whilst implementation mechanisms were put into place, it is the broader policy framework that will enable envisaged organs responsible for peace, stability and security to achieve some successes. The major advantage of CADSP as a policy framework is its subscription to all AU member states, making it a province of all AU bureaucrats and governments. An understanding and acceptance of its objectives by AU member states, makes it easier for implementation organs such as the ASF, to fully operate on the continent unabated. The CADSP is based on notions, a set of principles, objectives and instruments that aims to promote and consolidate peace and security on the continent.

10 The committee comprised Foreign Ministers from Algeria, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa and the Sudan.
The CADSP rests on the principle in the Constitutive Act that calls for the respect of borders, peaceful resolution of conflict and the right to intervene in any member state in the event of war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity to restore peace and stability (African Union, 2004). African states as part of the CADSP have the responsibility to promote the CADSP through national policies. Theoretically, this gives African states the ability to solve their own problems without always seeking external intervention.

The CADSP works on three key notions, namely defence, security and common security threats. The AU, through the CADSP, defines defence as the “traditional, military and state-centric notion of the use of the armed forces of the state to protect its national sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as the less traditional, non-military aspects which relate to the protection of the people’s political, cultural, social and economic values and ways of life” (African Union, 2004). Security, according to the CADSP, is both the “traditional, state-centric, notion of the survival of the state and its protection by military means from external aggression, as well as the non-military notion which is informed by the new international environment and the high incidence of intra-state conflict” (African Union, 2004). This multi-dimensional notion of security embraces human rights, the right to participate fully in the process of governance, the right to have access to resources and the right to protection against poverty, to name but a few. Common security threats are those threats that may pose danger to the common defence and security interests of the continent as defined under defence and security and threats that may undermine the maintenance and promotion of peace, security and stability. Common threats are threats to one or more member states of the AU, which can either be continental or from outside the continent. Such threats are broadly categorised as: interstate conflicts and tensions, intra-state conflicts and tensions, unstable post-conflict situations, and other factors that may engender insecurity (African Union, 2004).

Amongst threats envisaged by the CADSP are continental (internal) threats, such as interstate as well as intra-state conflicts or situations threatening national sovereignty and territorial integrity of member states. War crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity constitute the bulk of intra-state threats. Conflicts emanating from outside the continent could include aggression against African states, international conflicts and any other crisis that may have adverse effects on African regional security, such as terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and effects of globalisation. The
The objective of the CADSP is therefore to respond rapidly to such threats from the basis of a common/collective security approach.

It is furthermore important to consider what initiatives came out as a result of these drives for common security. The benefits of the CADSP, amongst others, include enhanced defence cooperation between and among the AU members, elimination of suspicions and rivalry between states, the ability to build the strategic capability and military readiness of member states and to create threat deterrence within the AU and, most importantly, to facilitate and encourage non-aggression pacts between member states (Touray, 2005:643).

Why is there a need for African solutions for African problems? Ramsbotham et al. (2005:325) list four issues associated with the need for Africans to solve their own problems. These are:

- an increasing determination by Africans to develop their own peace and security capacity;
- a continued demand for peace support operations in Africa;
- an understanding that African responses to African crises may be more acceptable/appropriate than external responses; and
- previous bad operational experiences for non-African states in African peace support operations.

There is no doubt that there is a need for an African security policy, but scholars point out certain impediments, which could hamper its implementation. They argue that for the CADSP to work, certain assumptions have to be satisfied. Firstly, conflicts can be prevented by the military and diplomatic actions. Secondly, aggressors can be stopped. Lastly, aggressors are wrong, and all those who are right must act in unison to deter the aggressors (Touray, 2005:649). If all African leaders take these assumptions to be true and encourage good governance, it could make it easier to judge wrong doers from a unified viewpoint. According to Mingst (1999:168), this requires political will and commitment. Touray (2005:649) further points out that drafting and adopting a legal framework is always easy but the challenge lies in its implementation. In the case of the CADSP, the intentions and objectives are clearly laid down but the declaration is silent on the manner in which the AU and its instruments will carry out their responsibilities in such an intervention during crises involving member states.
Ajulu (2004:272) is more pessimistic about what can be achieved by the new peace and security framework because of its mirror image of the OAU that had failed to police the continent’s conflicts and instability for decades. His concerns point to the same conclusions by most other analysts who feel that, in order to find a sustainable mechanism for conflict resolution on the continent, “its political elite needs to develop the political will to translate declarations into deeds” (Ajulu, 2004:280). De Coning (2006:40) also points out that the AU lacks institutional human resource capacity that could drive its implementation. With the scale of responsibilities bestowed on the AU and its organs, and with the limited formal secretariat to support its initiatives, it will be difficult for the AU to achieve much. According to Ramsbotham et al. (2005:334), without a strong headquarters capacity for strategic and long term planning, the AU cannot even determine clearly what kind of support it requires and how that support can be delivered thereby making it very difficult to carry out its responsibilities. The responsibility for the implementation of the CADSP lies within the PSC of the AU, as will be discussed later in this chapter. The AU will work in partnership with other bodies such as NEPAD and the CSSDCA in pursuit of its responsibilities, and their interplay is discussed in the section below.

3.3 THE AU INTERPLAY WITH NEPAD AND THE CSSDCA

NEPAD was launched in Abuja, Nigeria in 2001 before the establishment of the AU, but it has a special link to the AU as a policy initiative (NEPAD Framework Document, 2001b). The objective of NEPAD is to “promote accelerated growth and sustainable development on the continent, eradicate widespread and severe poverty and to halt Africa’s marginalisation in the globalisation process” (Kotzé and Steyn, 2003:10). This purpose links well with the CADSP’s principle emphasising the symbiotic relationship that exists between security, stability, human security, development and cooperation, in a manner that allows each to reinforce the other (African Union, 2004). NEPAD is developing a role in post-conflict reconstruction and mobilisation of resources, which goes hand in hand with the overall objectives of peace and security. It developed an African Post-Conflict Reconstruction Policy Framework through a consultative process with civil society actors and key stakeholders. The framework stresses the link between peace, security, humanitarian and development dimensions of post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding. The plan is based on the fact that each country needs a post-conflict reconstruction strategy to cater for vulnerable groups like women and children (Fakier, 2005:30).
NEPAD launched an African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) in 2003. The APRM is to monitor and assess compliance of African governments with the norms of governance and human rights articulated in the AU’s Constitutive Act (Fakier, 2005:36). The intention of the APRM is to promote peace and security through mutual trust. African leaders and governments are also held accountable through the promotion of governance. Good governance is perceived to promote transparency, which is an ingredient of peace and stability and one of the objectives of the CADSP. A NEPAD sub-committee on peace and security was established in October 2001 to direct the work of the peace and security component of NEPAD (African Union, 2004). NEPAD is primarily concerned with social and economic development rather than security issues. This is in accordance with the AU’s concern that conflicts are impediments to socio-economic development of the continent (African Union, 2000). Developmental issues bring in participation by civil society in governance as evidenced by the Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC) and the Pan-African Parliament, which are important organs of NEPAD. ECOSOCC is an advisory body that provides a forum for civil society to influence the formulation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the AU policies and programmes (Fakier, 2005:14). Though the AU-NEPAD interplay may be seen as representing old initiatives, their creation represents a direct creation by African leaders to represent the continental commitment to revitalise its image and to focus on peace and security as central to Africa’s development (Fakier, 2005:11).

The CSSDCA dealt with the concept of peace and security even before the formation of the CADSP. The CSSDCA’s memorandum is a commitment by member states to subscribe to “a set of core values and key commitments to buttress the process of security and stability in Africa” in CSSDCA, Article 9. The CSSDCA approached African problems using a calabash principle. There are four calabashes, namely Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation. Under the Security Calabash, it was proposed that continental peacekeeping machinery be instituted (African Leadership Forum, 1991:9). This was actually the first deliberate call for a continental force after the failure of the African High Command in the 1960s. As an organ of the AU, the CSSDCA is working hand in hand with the CADSP to lift the African continent from poverty, conflict and instability.
The general principles of the CSSDCA are similar to those of the AU, but the CSSDCA firstly acknowledges that the security, stability and development of every African country are inseparably linked to that of other African countries. It secondly acknowledges that instability in one country affects the stability of neighbouring countries and has serious implications for continental unity, peace and development. It thirdly states that the interdependence of member states and the link between member states’ security, stability and development makes it imperative to develop a common African agenda. From these few general principles, it is clear that peacekeeping, security and peace are priorities in the CSSDCA, which then complement the CADSP in its endeavour to seek peace, security and stability on the continent.

According to the Solemn Declaration on a CADSP (African Union, 2004), the CSSDCA “was launched to provide a framework for coordinating, harmonizing and promoting policies aimed at preventing, containing, and eliminating the pernicious internal and interstate conflicts in Africa, as well as accelerating regional integration and development on the continent”. The heads of states and governments of the AU signed a memorandum of understanding on security, stability, development and cooperation, the so-called CSSDCA process, which commits member states to meet certain commitments and deadlines. However, only a few states are able to meet these commitments and deadlines.

Incidentally Van Nieuwkerk (2004:51) asserts that no state would be able to meet the set commitments and deadlines. These included demands that member states should increase their economic growth rate by 7% per year – that was deemed unrealistic. None of the deadlines of these demands were met and consequently no African country had enacted legislation to provide for impartiality of the public service and independence of the judiciary by 2003. In addition, by 2005 no framework had been put in place to codify into national laws the concept of human security. Despite these realities, the positive aspect is the fact that the CSSDCA is driven by Nigeria, a powerful state, which might give it some credibility, while NEPAD is driven by South Africa, another African hegemon.

The objectives of NEPAD and of the CSSDCA are similar to those of the CADSP as well as the Constitutive Act in general. Though the two organisations view stability at a broader spectrum, their security aspects are in tune with and complement the CADSP in many ways. The successes of
the two bodies are directly linked to the stability of the continent. NEPAD and the CSSDCA place emphasis on human security, whilst the central instrument of the AU’s new peace and security architecture is the PSC, which is modelled after the UN Security Council.

3.4 THE ROLE AND FUNCTIONS OF THE PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL

The PSC was established in terms of Article 5(2) of the Constitutive Act of the AU as a standing decision-making organ for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts (African Union, 2004). It is mandated to facilitate timely and efficient responses to conflict and crisis situations on the continent (African Union, 2002:Article 2). The PSC will perform its responsibilities with respect to the deployment of peace support operations and interventions through the instrumentality of the ASF, and other organs of the PSC. The objectives of the PSC are specifically:

- to promote peace, security and stability in Africa;
- to anticipate and prevent conflicts;
- to promote and implement peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction activities and to consolidate peace;
- to coordinate and harmonise continental efforts in the prevention and combating of international terrorism;
- to develop a common defence policy for the union; and
- to promote and encourage democratic practices and to protect human rights as part of efforts for preventing conflicts (African Union, 2002:Article 3).

In order to achieve the above objectives, the PSC is guided by eleven principles, including respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of member states, peaceful settlement of disputes and conflicts and non-interference by member states in the internal affairs of member states. Particular guidelines are:

- the right of the AU to intervene in a member state following a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity; and
- the right of member states to request intervention from the AU in order to restore peace and security (African Union, 2002:Article 4).
The latter two principles depict the most important difference between the AU and its predecessor, the OAU. At the same time these principles bring the most difficult implementation aspect to the AU security framework. While recognising sovereign equality and the principle of non-interference, they also recognise rights to intervene in the internal states of member states. According to Ajulu (2004:271), what is lacking in this arrangement is the fact that the Constitutive Act or the PSC does not state which criteria the Assembly should use to make decisions on intervention. This could easily lead to adopting declarations but without the commitment to implement them. Baimu and Sturman (2003:5) further argue that this lack of clarity on when and how interventions should be conducted may enable leaders to act in order to protect state security instead of human security as it was intended. It was hoped that the fact that such decisions will be taken through a two-third majority vote as per Article 7 of the Constitutive Act would help guard against such a situation. From the past, it is clear that African states have “fostered a kleptocratic ruling elite whose most distinctive trademark has been the systematic deployment of the state for predatory activities” (Ajulu, 2002:3). Can the new African leaders reinvent themselves, and put human security before state security?

On a positive note, the Assembly will decide an intervention on two levels: on its own initiative (Article 4(h)) and at the request of a member state (Article 4(j)). This means that the Assembly will not be obliged to wait for the consent of the member state concerned. But the bottom line, as alluded to by Ajulu (2002:2), is that sovereignty is likely to remain one of the areas of unmitigated contestation, even in future AU efforts to bring peace to the continent. Issues emanating from interpretation of sovereignty have been discussed in Chapter II, under \textit{State Sovereignty and the Need for Intervention}. What might be important is the power vested in the PSC.

Through the PSC the AU has more authority than its forerunner, the OAU. Amongst others, the PSC has the authority to:

- undertake peacemaking and peacebuilding missions;
- develop guidelines and authorise peace support missions;
- recommend to the Assembly intervention in a member state as well as approve the modalities for the intervention;
- institute sanctions against member states in cases of unconstitutional changes of government;
- implement the defence policy of the AU;
- pursue action against international terrorism;
• promote regional cooperation regarding the peace and security agenda;
• take appropriate action where the sovereignty of a state is threatened by acts of aggression; and
• support and facilitate humanitarian action in situations of armed conflicts or major natural disasters (African Union, 2002:Article 7).

The PSC comprises fifteen member states, five elected for a three-year term and the remaining ten for a period of two years. Decisions are based on consensus, but in the case of failing, voting can be used. Voting has to be done by at least two thirds of members and decided by majority. The chairmanship is rotated amongst members on a monthly basis (African Union, 2002:Article 8).

The PSC has four main components aimed at helping it accomplish these challenging tasks and most importantly to meet its objectives. These are the Panel of the Wise, a Continental Early Warning System, the ASF and a Special Fund. The Panel of the Wise will at any given time comprise of five highly respected African personalities who must have distinguished themselves and contributed to the course of peace, security and development of the continent (African Union, 2002:Article 11). The five members must be chosen from the five respective regions. The panel will be responsible to advise the PSC and the Chairperson of the Commission on all matters relating to the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability.

The Continental Early Warning System shall consist of an observation and monitoring centre, that is a Situation Room at the Conflict Management Directorate at AU Headquarters, and will be responsible for data collection and analysis (African Union, 2002:Article 12). There will also be such observation rooms at sub-regional level linked directly to the one at AU Headquarters. The Early Warning System will collaborate with the UN and its agencies and other relevant international organisations to facilitate its effective functioning (Cilliers and Sturman, 2004:101). Article 12(4) of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of PSC also maintains that the Early Warning System shall develop an early warning module based on clearly

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11 The five regions of the AU are the Southern African Development Community (Southern Africa), the Economic Community of Western African States (Western Africa), the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (Eastern Africa), the Economic Community of Central African States (Central Africa) and the Arab Magreb Union (Northern Africa).
defined and accepted political, economic, social, military and humanitarian indicators that will be used to analyse developments on the continent so as to recommend the best course of action to the PSC. This requirement sets the stage for an objective process, where the Early Warning System tracks situations in its member states and alerts the PSC via its chairman.

In essence, the information gathered through the Continental Early Warning System will be used timeously to advise the PSC on potential conflicts and threats on the continent. It will probably be difficult to interpret and convince AU member states to agree that certain situations within the AU itself are actually indicators warranting some form of action. The present situation in Darfur is an example of such a challenge where the state concerned claims that things are in order while innocent people are being killed. As rightly observed by Golaszinski (2004:7) and Cilliers and Sturman (2004:101), in Africa, “good governance and conflict prevention are two sides of the same coin”. Indicators of intra-state conflict and regional instability have repeatedly proved to be abuse of power and transgression of human rights, bad governance and circumvention of democracy. In most of these cases, there was never consensus or acceptance that a crisis indeed existed warranting some intervention.

The PSC also has a special fund known as the Peace Fund governed by relevant financial rules and regulations of the AU. According to the PSC Protocol, Article 21(2), the Peace Fund shall be made up of “financial appropriations from the regular budget of the Union” and from other sources, including private sector, civil society and individuals and appropriate fund-raising activities. In times of deployment, states contributing troops may be expected to bear the cost of their participation during the first three months and be refunded within six months by the AU (African Union, 2002:Article 21 (6) and (7)). As late as 2004, the Peace Fund was funded at 6% from member states’ annual contributions, which was too small to support any peacekeeping mission (Golaszinski: 2004:8). The last component and probably the most important in terms of peace and security, is the ASF, which is discussed separately below.

Some analysts, including Cilliers and Sturman (2004:98), question the wisdom of prioritising the PSC, which is more expensive to operate than departments such as the Political Affairs Department. In essence, it is a choice between conflict prevention, management and resolution (PSC) against conflict prevention through political dialogue, democratic
institutions, transparency and accountability. They further argue that the development of a Political Affairs Department\textsuperscript{12} could be more useful as an early warning indicator, which could hopefully avoid conflicts. With this view in mind, political dialogue, which was the main bargaining weapon before the establishment of the AU, failed to stop conflicts in Africa. Therefore it is a reasonable supposition that political dialogue has to be complemented by military coercion.

3.5 THE ROLE AND FUNCTIONS OF THE AFRICAN STANDBY FORCE

The establishment of the ASF is necessitated by the AU need for a collective peacekeeping and peace support operation capacity to deliver on the ambitious peace and security objectives set out in the AU’s Constitutive Act (Baranyi and Mepham, 2006:5). It was established in terms of Section IV(b), paragraph 18 of the CADSP and Article 13 of the PSC Protocol as an implementing mechanism for the decisions of the PSC. The AU publicly asserted that its approach to peace and security will be aligned with the idea of the “responsibility to protect” as proposed by the ICISS. For this reason, in order to render protection, there is a requirement for a protection force and the ASF is envisioned to be that force. Consequently, the AU member states shall take steps to establish standby contingents for participation in peace support missions or interventions authorised by the Assembly in the protection of civilian population. The function of the ASF is to provide a rapid deployment/early entry capability that can quickly react to prevent killings/genocide while a follow-on peacekeeping force is preparing to deploy. Such a force shall be composed of multidisciplinary contingents with civilian and military components based in their countries of origin and ready for swift deployment at appropriate notice (African Union, 2002:Article 13(1)). Its mandate shall inter alia perform the following functions:

- observation and monitoring missions;
- other types of peace support missions;
- interventions in a member state in respect of grave circumstances or at the request of a member state in order to restore peace and security;
- preventive deployment in order to avoid (i) a dispute or a conflict from escalating, (ii) an ongoing violent conflict from spreading to

\textsuperscript{12} The Political Affairs Department does exist but it is not developing at the rate of the PSC, it has less staff members and gets less funding.
neighbouring states, and (iii) the resurgence of violence after parties to a conflict have reached an agreement;

- peacebuilding, post-conflict disarmament and demobilisation;
- humanitarian assistance to alleviate the suffering of the civilian population in conflict areas and to support efforts to address major natural disasters; and
- any functions mandated by the PSC (African Union, 2002:Article 13 (3)).

Senior military officers of members of the PSC states will form a Military Staff Committee responsible for advising and assisting the PSC in issues relating to military and security requirements. The Military Staff Committee shall meet as often as required to deliberate on matters referred to it by the PSC.

The ASF will need to plan for six distinct scenarios along a spectrum covering small observer missions, classic peacekeeping operations and large-scale interventions in response to grave human rights violations or conflicts. The scenarios will be as follows:

- scenario 1 – AU/Regional military advice to a political mission;
- scenario 2 – AU/Regional observer mission co-deployed with UN mission;
- scenario 3 – Stand-alone AU/sub-regional observer mission;
- scenario 4 – AU/regional peacekeeping force for Chapter VI and preventive deployment missions;
- scenario 5 – AU peacekeeping force for complex multidimensional peacekeeping mission with low-level spoilers; and
- scenario 6 – AU intervention, e.g. genocide situations, where the international community does not act promptly (African Union, 2003b).

The deployment of the ASF was recommended as follows: for simple missions, the ASF should be able to deploy within 30 days; for complex ones it should complete its deployment within 90 days, with the military component deploying within 30 days. For interventions, the ASF is to deploy a robust military force within 14 days (African Union, 2003b).
Undertaking scenario 6 missions, implies that the ASF envisages UN Chapter VII\textsuperscript{13} types of operation, which require strong command and control, logistics support and other resources that AU member states currently lack. The AU, for instance, struggled to fund simple observer missions, such as the one in Burundi in 2003; hence it will be a very difficult task to actually fulfil Chapter VII missions with so little resources and expertise (De Coning, 2006:41). Although the challenges facing the operationalisation of the ASF are huge, some progress has been made. It was agreed that at AU Commission level, there will be a single continental planning element (PLANELM) and a single continental Military Logistic Depot (MLD) (Baranyi and Mepham, 2006:6). The ASF will be developed in two phases and be operationally ready by 2010, if all goes according to plan.

For each ASF mission, the Chairperson of the Commission will appoint a special representative and a Force Commander to facilitate command and control. Their roles and functions will be spelt out in appropriate directives as per the PSC standing operating procedures. Training for contingents’ members will also be done through guidelines provided by the Commission at both operational and tactical levels. The training doctrine will be in line with the UN doctrine with similar standards.

At the moment, the progress of the five sub-regional brigades is at different levels. The SADC Brigade has been conducting joint exercises, and has finalised the ASF training doctrine they were tasked to do as a sub-regional contribution to the continental effort (Anon, 2006a). In June 2005, a brigade-size military exercise code named Thokgamo was conducted in Botswana in an effort to build the SADC brigade capacity (Anon, 2005b:16376). Major General Les Rudman, a former SADC Brigade Commander, reported that the region was on target with its contributions to the ASF (Anon, 2005a:30). According to Colonel Carlos Francisco, a member of SADC PLANELM, a verification exercise conducted during 2005 revealed the SADC Brigade is ready for deployment. He further pointed out that the SADC Brigade will be officially launched during the SADC Summit in Zambia in August 2007 (Francisco, 2006). ECOWAS states created their standby brigade in 2004 which is, however, not yet fully operational because of a lack of resources (Da Costa, 2006). According to

\textsuperscript{13}Chapter VII missions are those that may be deployed without consent from the host nation or warring parties thereby making it an enforcement mission.
Cilliers and Malan (2005:18), ECOWAS pledged 6,200 troops for its regional brigade and progress has been made in consolidating and finalising the requirements for the brigade. The establishment of the West African brigade was much easier given that ECOWAS states have been involved in peacekeeping missions in the sub-region and the fact that they contribute substantially to UN operations hence affording them a large pool of experienced troops.

The eastern sub-region has also been active as they have already identified their brigade headquarters in Addis Ababa and based their PLANELM in Nairobi, Kenya. By February 2004, member states had pledged troops and equipment, and a budget was drawn up, which required all member states to contribute a pre-agreed amount (Cilliers and Malan, 2005:18). By the end of 2004, the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) had held several meetings and reached agreements on the structure of the regional headquarters of the PLANELM and the ECCAS standby brigade (Powell, 2005:16). The North African brigade is one that is not active yet but according to Aboagye (2007), they signed a loose association under African Regional Capabilities. Under this association, they cooperate in military aspects without necessarily forming formal structures on the ground.

The AU expects to develop a headquarters component with a robust planning cell and strategic planning unit to coordinate development in the five regional brigades. Juma (2004) posits that for the African peacekeeping efforts to work, three fronts must clearly be met, which she identifies as normative, political and technical.

Normative aspects have already been dealt with (such as the vision of the AU, mandates and the continent’s ability to operationalise all organs of the PSC, including the division of labour). Some of these aspects still need to be tested for practicability, and such tests can only occur during actual peace operations.

The political aspect hinges on political will and commitment as acknowledged by Mingst (1999). Peacekeeping is an expensive undertaking that needs resources; therefore Juma (2004) highlights the need for a well-cultivated partnership with donor partners for it to be feasible.
Technical factors include deliberate moves to build capacity of PSC organs as well as sub-regional and national levels to complement each other.

Doctrinal development, interoperability as well as command structures need special emphases. As per a meeting by experts on policy formulation held in Addis Ababa from 28 November to 2 December 2005, guidelines were formulated to assist the different sub-regional bodies with further deliberations on their tasked areas of responsibilities\(^{14}\) (Mophuting, 2006). All these documents will be submitted to an African Chiefs of Defence Staff meeting in January 2007 for final review before adoption in February 2007 (Francisco, 2006). All these activities indicate that the ASF, though faced with challenges, is gaining ground. But despite this visible progress, some critics still claim that its fruition is a far-fetched vision.

Klingebiel (2005:41), for instance, questions the practicality of its implementation. He argues that the AU could never afford funding the PSC given member states’ weak economic conditions. He cites the financial difficulties of the AU mission in the Sudan as a case in point. Though it is a fact that some AU partners are willing to fund such missions, he questions how long they will continuously provide funding without extending some conditions in the operations of these missions. Cilliers and Malan (2005:18) also acknowledge the difficulties of funding and further view the “deficit in African planning and mission management capacity at headquarters levels” as another major impediment to the operationalisation of the ASF as well as to the limited national capacities of individual troop contributing nations. Another challenge is the fact that the ASF security architecture dictates that it will be dependent on sub-regional bodies for force generation, whereas such bodies are also required to provide forces to the UN missions, as well as missions in their sub-regions. These could impose a heavy burden on manpower resources of troop-contributing nations. The PSC is also criticised for its bias on the development of the military aspect of the ASF. De Coning (2005:41) observes that what is lacking within the ASF is the “need to equally develop the civilian and police dimensions of the ASF framework so that the multi-dimensional nature of contemporary peace operations can be fully integrated into the AU peacekeeping concept”.

\(^{14}\) Sub-regional bodies making up the five sub-regional brigades were tasked to further develop framework documents and a work plan that would guide deliberations in developing documents on: Doctrine, Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), Guidelines on Command, Control, Communication and Information Systems, Logistics, Training and Evaluation for the ASF.
This said, the ASF, as an establishment in an infant organisation, would take time to reach maturity. The ASF roadmap proposes a nucleus of PLANELM established at the AU HQ, PLANELM at sub-regional HQs, a decision by sub-regional organisations to establish standby forces, pledges from member states to contribute resources to these brigades, and verification of compliance by member states. All these steps have been done by all sub-regions, except the northern region, which somewhat shows a commendable level of commitment. The importance of the ASF, inter alia, is the fact that Africa will have the capacity to provide proactive efforts to deal with root causes of conflicts, to deepen the African Renaissance and shift from the paradigm of external dependency, and emphasise collective regional/sub-regional arrangements and burden sharing. A readily available ASF will hopefully also enhance obtaining UN mandates and in addition attract donors and funding. Most importantly, it is intended to provide for future quick reaction to prevent genocide and other crimes against humanity. The fact that countries’ armies train together sharing information will help to defuse potential explosive situations based on suspicion within sub-regions and the continent as a whole.

3.6 OTHER FEATURES OF THE CADSP

The framers of the CADSP recognised the importance of partnering with other stakeholders to enhance the viability of their intentions given the dire economic situation of the continent. In its preamble, the Solemn Declaration on a CADSP points out its relationship with the UN, and the PSC Protocol further acknowledges the role of the UN in the maintenance of international peace and security and the existence of sub-regional organisations as key players in continental security. On the other hand, Chapter VIII of the UN Charter legitimises the existence of regional arrangements and recognises the role they may play in international peacekeeping. This implies that the responsibility of the UN to maintain international peace and security is not exclusive. Though the realisation of the CADSP is a rather ambitious project, Chapter VIII of the UN Charter in effect encourages it, and thus the international community has an obligation to ensure its fruition. The UN Charter under Chapter VIII on the role of regional organisations, also allows the AU to seek support from the UN in terms of resources, finances, logistics, political and military support for the AU’s activities in the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and
stability in Africa (African Union, 2002:Article 17(2)). It is therefore important to consider these other bodies and how they impact on the overall progress of the CADSP.

3.6.1 AU Relations with the International Community

No single organisation is right for every single peace mission. In this regard, Baranyi and Mepham (2006:9) assert that the choice is not between an African and a UN response, but instead it should be realised that sub-regional bodies, the AU and the UN all have a crucial role to play in addressing peace, security and protection issues on the continent. The Solemn Declaration on a CADSP acknowledges the role played by the UN under Relations with the UN and other International Organisations. The Constitutive Act of the AU, Article 3(e), actually encourages international cooperation, in cognisance of the Charter of the UN and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (African Union, 2000:Article 3). Despite this acknowledgement, Powell (2005:23) observes that there is no formal relationship and a clear approach to task sharing between the AU and the UN. Article 17(1) of the PSC Protocol states, “the Peace and Security Council shall cooperate and work closely with the United Nations Security Council, which has the responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security”. On the other hand, the AU has the primary responsibility for peace and security in Africa. Kioko (2003:821) rightly questions what could happen if the UN is unwilling or unable to authorise an AU intervention as required by Article 53 of the UN Charter. Both the Constitutive Act and the PSC Protocol are silent on this important aspect, making leeway for the AU to sanction intervention possibly without prior UN Security Council approval. In any event, such situations have been witnessed in the Kosovo intervention by NATO forces in 1999 as well as ECOMOG in Liberia in 1990 where authorisation only came as post facto (Portella, 2000:3). With the explicit declaration by the PSC Protocol that AU member states are allowed to intervene in certain circumstances, it will be of interest to have a situation where the UN does not authorise such an intervention.

It could be argued that, as long as the AU recognises that the UN remains the only preeminent organisation responsible for international peace and security, it is expected that the AU member states will never go against international law and intervene without such authorisation. The author is merely highlighting the fact that where procedures or rules and regulations
are silent, arbitrary action is commonly based on self-serving interests. It could have been easier for the AU to spell out what format they would follow if they needed to intervene in a member state matter as stipulated by the PSC Protocol Article 4(j). According to Powell (2005:24), an interview between her and a senior AU official revealed that the official felt that “Africans know that if [they] have to wait for the UN, people will die”. This implies that the AU will act without UN authorisation if they feel that the situation requires immediate response. Cilliers and Sturman (2002:8) also argue that this ambiguity makes “sufficient leeway for the AU to sanction intervention without prior UN Security Council approval”. This view is supported by the decision of the AU Executive Council at the 7th Extraordinary Session, which pointed out that “… intervention of Regional Organisations should be with approval of the Security Council; although in certain situations, such approval could be granted after the fact in circumstances requiring urgent action” (African Union, 2005d:6).

Though the AU Executive Council implied legal intervention as per the provisions of Article 51 of the UN Charter, the same statement is open to abuse. The complexity of punishing the AU or some sub-regional bodies for violating international law could be equally cumbersome and a disruption of global peace. The most important relation with the UN is the fact that a UN-authorised mission (even though undertaken by the AU or sub-regional bodies) would give the mission legitimacy and credibility, which could be a passport for assistance from other partners. This is against the backdrop that the AU or sub-regional organisations cannot afford to fund a peace mission on their own. As Neethling (2006:99) rightly points out, in the past, the “extent of African peacekeeping was not limited by political will or the availability of troops, but rather by insufficient funding”. Recent peacekeeping experience revealed that the AU and its predecessor the OAU had difficulties funding even small or relatively small unarmed military observer missions from their own budget. In the case of Burundi the operational budget of AMIB was about US$110 million in 2003 against an AU budget of approximately US$32 million (De Coning, 2004:34).

Despite these documented inadequacies, the relationship between the UN and regional as well as sub-regional bodies has been encouraging. The Chiefs of Defence Staff recommended that the AU establish a partnership with the UN to enable the AU to develop and reinforce its strategic headquarters’ capacity through on-call planning, liaison and advisory teams.
They also recommended that training within the ASF should be conducted according to UN doctrine and standards. This would ensure that a mission headquarter structure can be easily handed over or incorporated into a UN peace support operation (African Union, 2003b). The UN has also been helping the AU to establish the ASF by sending officers to facilitate meetings. In February 2005, the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) set up a liaison cell at AU Headquarters to assist the AU in planning for the Darfur mission in Sudan (Powell, 2005:24).

The ASF is mirrored on the Standby High Readiness Brigade for UN Operations (SHIRBRIG)\textsuperscript{15} concept and hence gets technical advice from them when needed. This includes strategic planning, matching of troops with equipment from member states, and securing strategic air and sea-lift capabilities. Besides the UN, the AU has relations with the European Union (EU), which is mostly supportive in areas where the AU lacks capacity (Behrens, 2006:7).

The EU has been playing a significant role especially in providing financial support to the AU initiatives. The EU created the African Peace Facility (APF) to boost Africa’s ability to “bring peace to the continent by supporting African-led peacekeeping operations and long-term capacity-building for African institutions to carry out such operations” (Behrens, 2006:6). Military assistance for the AU is provided for within the framework of European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) Action Plan. But the EU has a common position as per decision 2004/374/CFSP 26 January 2004 that “the primary responsibility for prevention, management and resolution of conflicts on the African continent lies with Africans themselves”. In this regard, the EU helps the AU to build its capacity for peacekeeping so that member states can carry out peace missions themselves on the continent. In 2004, for example, the EU made US$92 million available for AMIS (Klingebiel, 2005:39).

The G8 also offers direct support in building the peace and security infrastructure of the AU. Amongst others, the G8 adopted the African Action Plan (AAP) to help NEPAD initiatives, which are linked to peace

\textsuperscript{15} SHIRBRIG was established in 1996 by 16 UN member states. It serves as a UN non-standing multinational brigade that can be mandated by the UN Security Council for rapid deployment on peacekeeping missions such as monitoring truce agreements, supervising the separation of forces, humanitarian assistance or engaging in other scenarios where agreements have been signed by parties in conflict.
and security (Powell, 2005:25). According to Brady et al. (2005:176), the G8 recognises the financial and logistical difficulties faced by many African nations when deploying troops and equipment throughout the continent, and therefore are committed to assist the AU to ensure that troops are ready to deploy and to prevent or diffuse conflicts, can promptly arrive where they are needed, and are properly equipped to undertake peace support operations. At the Avian Summit in 2003, the G8 shifted their focus from prevention of conflicts to military operations and agreed to work with the AU to establish the ASF by 2010. The following year at Sea Island, again the G8 recommitted themselves to building global capacity in peace support. It committed member states to train and equip 75 000 peacekeeping troops in regions of Africa by 2010 (Wilkinson, 2004).

The AU also cultivates partnerships with individual countries in an effort to boost its peacekeeping capabilities. Canada responded to AU calls by assisting both financially and logistically. It is also helping AMIS by providing helicopters as well as armoured vehicles (Brady et al., 2005:177). The Canada Fund for Africa was used to fund AU military observers that deployed in Burundi and the Comoros and political mediation missions in Burundi, Cote d’Ivoire, the Central African Republic and Madagascar. Additionally, Canada also helped the AU to establish the PSC by training staff in conflict analysis, negotiation and mediation skills (Fowler, 2004). Furthermore, the United States trained close to 9 000 African soldiers in peacekeeping through programmes such as Operation Focus Relief in 2000 and the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) and its successor the African Contingency Operations Training Assistance (ACOTA) (Fakier, 2005:20). Programmes, such as the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), also contribute to peace and stability by creating jobs and promoting development, an ingredient of peace and stability.

The French policy is driven by the Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping Capacities programme (RECAMPE). What is significant about RECAMPE assistance is the equipment storage depots located in Senegal, Gabon and Djibouti which house 9 armoured vehicles, 67 trucks, 3 ambulances and 3 repair vehicles, assault rifles, radios and uniforms which may be used by African troops for operations approved by the UN or the AU (European Union, 2004:23). The German government is providing communication equipment to the AMIS, and financial assistance (Brady et al., 2005:179). The UK assists African peacekeeping capacity through the British Military Advisory and Training Teams (BMATT) (Berman and Sams, 2000:267-
The UK also undertook an airlift operation, which moved 131 vehicles and 12 trucks into the Sudan to support AMIS (Brady et al., 2005:181). All these programmes focus on training, technical and maintenance assistance and in some instances, provision of field equipment. Though these relations are not directly linked to the AU, they provide a service that is directly linked to the AU. The peacekeepers trained through these programmes can be used to staff the ASF.

From the above discussion, it is clear that the AU will remain dependent on donor support for its peace operations. This kind of support is needed to empower the AU and its initiatives on peace and security, which helps build the AU peacekeeping capability. It is this relationship that complements the AU’s weaknesses, affording it better chances of successfully addressing the continent’s instability. It also allows Africans to deal with their own problems when provided with the required resources. The disadvantage that stems from such assistance as presented by De Coning (2006:41), is that such dependency may deny the AU the freedom to take independent decisions on some strategic, operational and even tactical aspects of peace operations. There is a need to find an appropriate balance between the AU and its partners’ interests in peace operations. At the moment, the AU is not in a position to dictate terms because of limited resources, and the fact that it is still building its peacekeeping capacity.

3.6.2 AU Relations with Sub-Regional Organisations

Article 16 of the PSC Protocol stresses that sub-regional mechanisms are part of the overall AU peace and security architecture. Article 7(j) of the same Protocol further reinforces this relationship by emphasising the importance of harmonising, coordinating and cooperating between the AU and the sub-regional mechanisms in peace, security and stability. This has advantages if one considers sub-regional proximity to conflict areas, which provides them with a better understanding of the dynamics, key players, and context-specific management and resolution options (Powell, 2005:19). Theoretically, this proximity allows for faster and less expensive responses to crisis areas than the UN. Sub-regional leaders may also have a greater stake in finding a peaceful solution than more distant powers; hence their participation is critical in some instances (Juma and Mengistu, 2002).

An important aspect that links the UN, AU and sub-regional organisations, according to De Coning (2005:39), is the informal division of roles that
emerged around sequencing peace operations. In this sequence, the AU or one of its sub-regional subordinates first deploys a stabilisation operation, which can be followed by a UN complex peacekeeping operation. In this case, the stabilising force must have rapid deployment capabilities, which are lacking in the UN. An example of this sequence was established in Burundi in 2003 and was repeated in Liberia, with ECOMIL deploying in 2003, followed by a UN operation (UNMIL) later the same year (De Coning: 2005:40). At the time of writing (2007), discussions were at an advanced stage to have AMIS replaced by a UN peacekeeping force pending consent from the Sudanese government. The advantage of this arrangement is that it draws upon the strengths of the UN, the AU and sub-regional bodies. The UN normally takes up to 90 days to deploy, whereas sub-regional organisations deploy more rapidly especially if they have been involved in brokering the ceasefire, but do not have the necessary staying power and multi-dimensional capability like the UN.

Sub-regional security mechanisms, as part of the overall AU-CADSP initiative, have an important role in maintaining peace and security because they form the foundation of the ASF. Though they are better placed to respond to conflicts in shorter times at less cost, they may compromise the neutrality and impartiality of the response. According to Ambassador Ibok (2000:7), “proximity generates tension and undermines the spirit of impartiality between neighbours, sometimes to the extent that neighbours become part of the problems”. Sub-regional organisations’ peace and security agendas may be shaped by regional hegemons promoting their own national interests. In a case where a regional hegemon is part of the problem, the situation may become too complicated to handle or fashion a regional response.

The downside of the AU and its sub-regional organisations is the lack of institutional capacity to adequately develop policies, and to plan and manage peace operations. Another constraint relates to the fact that the five sub-regional bodies have different security mandates: ECOWAS has a tradition of intervention whereas the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) is inclined to non-intervention. Such differences may affect a coherent Pan-African approach to conflict (Powell, 2005:20). Donor-driven initiatives further widen these differences between sub-regional bodies and the AU. If these donations are not well coordinated, they may tend to favour some sub-regional bodies rather than others, thus creating friction and inequalities in capabilities. Overlapping membership
also makes this problem worse as some states are present in more than one region such as being in SADC and IGAD at the same time like Tanzania and Angola (Baranyi and Mepham, 2006:6).

Sub-regional organisations already have agendas that transcend security cooperation to include economic integration and are in the process of establishing their own stand-by forces. To have them abandon this approach in favour of a continental agenda may be a challenge. For instance, with ECOWAS having successfully conducted peace operations, it has its own aspirations for leading a sub-regional force outside the scope of the ASF (Holt and Shanahan, 2005:20). ECOWAS has more experience in peacekeeping than the AU, which has only been active in Burundi and Sudan; hence they might feel they have better capacity in peacekeeping and prefer to keep the status quo.

Though the PSC Protocol and CADSP call for security cooperation between sub-regional organisations and the AU, there are no formal and clear division of labour and responsibilities for conflict prevention, management and resolution on the continent (African Union, 2005b:2). Powell (2005:21) observes that this problem is created by the fact that sub-regional organisations are unwilling to confer greater decision-making authority on the AU, partly because sub-regional organisations provide an alternative forum to exercise influence and to leverage greater institutional support than the AU, which has a larger and diverse membership.

In the final analysis, according to Holt and Shanahan (2005:18), African sub-regional organisations are viewed as the first point of contact for continental crises with the AU providing a continental perspective in consultation with the UN. If a sub-regional body has the capacity to intervene, should it do so by directly seeking the UN Security Council authority or via the AU PSC? If sub-regional organisations have to go through the AU, who would fund such mission? These issues need to be clarified for the AU to effectively carry out peace and security tasks without causing friction with the UN, sub-regions and other partners. With the structures of the AU in place, the next chapter will explore how successful

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16 As late as March 2005, the AU and sub-regional bodies could not agree on the modalities presented on a draft memorandum of understanding as regards division of responsibilities in the area of conflict prevention, management and resolution. The memorandum was deferred for further consultation.
the AU is in using these structures to overcome challenges to its peace and security architecture.

3.7 CONCLUSION

This chapter highlighted the AU’s mechanisms that are structured to effectively deal with peace, security and stability on the continent, which were absent in the OAU. Consequently, the point of departure was a discussion of the CADSP, whose organs are tasked, among others, with ensuring collective responses to both internal and external threats to Africa in conformity with the principles enshrined in the Constitutive Act. The PSC and its supporting entities, namely the Continental Early Warning System, the Panel of the Wise, the Special Fund and the ASF were furthermore discussed to underscore their roles in the maintenance of continental peace and security. The AU relations with the international community, and sub-regional organisations were also highlighted to illustrate the symbiotic relationship that exists between the AU and other stakeholders that could mitigate the AU weaknesses if it tackles peace and security alone.

From the above discussions, the importance and significance of the CADSP became apparent. The CADSP is more than just a peacekeeping initiative of the AU, but a strategy that is based on a set of principles, objectives and mechanisms that aim to reduce and eventually eradicate violent conflicts on the continent. For the first time, the continent has a common position and an action plan for the development of its peacekeeping capacity. Indeed the continent could not only be a source of troops for peacekeeping operations, but could be at the centre of determining the degree of success by its multidimensional contributions.

The development of a continental force through the ASF illustrates serious intentions by the AU member states to settle African problems through African means. With the simultaneous planning and development of sub-regional brigades, Africa should theoretically, have six brigades trained and equipped to UN standards by 2010 ready to tackle African conflicts and to bring peace and stability to the continent. The basic advantage of an ASF is the fact that the AU will have reliable knowledge of the general state of the armed forces in each of the sub-regions. The ASF will be supported by a Panel of the Wise, who will advise the PSC or the Chairperson of the
Commission on all issues pertaining to the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability funded through the Peace Fund. The above combination will utilise information gathered through both the continental and sub-regional early warning systems.

Though the CADSP is receiving political support from AU member states, some concerns still exist regarding implementation tools that could allow the AU to achieve such robust and ambitious objectives. In this regard, the AU recognises the significance of a sound partnership with international partners, who can complement the AU in areas where they are lacking, such as funding. As previously stated, peacekeeping operations are very costly endeavours that stretch beyond the AU budget. At the same time, it should be noted that the G8, the EU and individual countries have contributed significantly to the development of the AU security architecture in the form of finances, equipment and logistics as well as technical and political support, which has indeed moved the AU nearer to achieving its objectives.

The AU peace and security architecture offers a new set of proactive conditions whereas the OAU, its predecessor, had an unsatisfactory record in the field of peace and security as a result of its inhibiting principles of sovereign equality and non-interference in the affairs of member states. It is a reasonable conclusion therefore to state that the AU is better suited to tackle African insecurities than its predecessor because it has a less inhibiting Constitutive Act. It furthermore has a decision-making and implementing mechanism, the PSC, and operational tools such as the Early Warning System and the ASF to implement decisions by the AU. These mechanisms could also facilitate better funding, which the AU vitally needs to conduct its peace missions.

Finally, as observed by Neethling (2005:24), many practical issues and principles guiding interventions may not yet have been thrashed out at specific functional levels, but the CADSP certainly represents a meaningful advance in conceptual thinking concerning the parameters and principles of regional or coalition peace operations in Africa. As the saying goes “where there is a will there is a way”.
CHAPTER 4: THE AU: FROM DECLARATIONS TO OPERATIONAL REALITIES

4.1 INTRODUCTION

When the AU was launched in Durban, South Africa in July 2002, it was declared a different institution from the OAU. Its founders heralded it as a united, free and capable organisation that would see an end to civil wars, state-sponsored terror, torture and genocide as well as denying member states any violations of civil, political and human rights (Makoa, 2004:1). For this reason, great hope has been pinned on the AU by both Africans and their partners to bring peace and stability to the continent that has been characterised by conflicts for decades. Given the new organisation and the new tools that have been or are in the process of being established, it is hoped that the continent will at last experience peace and stability. Needless to say, hopes alone cannot guarantee peace and stability if the crop of African leaders has not outgrown the thinking that prevailed during the OAU era. Hope alone cannot stop conflicts, which continue to take the lives of innocent civilians and children. With Africa experiencing a new dawn in the field of peace and security, it is critical to establish whether the peace and security challenges of the OAU era are still prevalent. If they are, how effective will the AU be in dealing with these challenges?

The aim of this chapter is to evaluate the AU on the challenges that hindered the progress of the OAU in its efforts to restore peace and security on the continent. Challenges under discussion would be an overly limited mandate, lack of political will, limited capacity and experience in core conflict management areas, lack of financial resources, and the impact of international politics on African politics. In an effort to achieve the aim, the chapter commences by highlighting the two peace missions the AU undertook in Burundi and Sudan. The chapter gives an overview of each conflict followed by the AU peace missions in the respective countries. The final part of the chapter is an evaluation of the AU’s successes and/or challenges in the conduct of the two peace missions, using the generic peacekeeping challenges as a benchmark.

The significance of this chapter is that it explores the AU’s quest for an effective peacekeeping capability by actually considering practical challenges on the ground to determine whether the AU’s new disposition is breaking new ground in the peace and security arena. It examines how the
AU with its mechanisms is managing African conflicts given some pending challenges that confront the continent. The chapter attempts to verify whether the AU declarations and intentions on peace and security are feasible and practical or just a ploy to denote an outward departure from the old ways. The cases of Burundi and Sudan test many aspects of the AU’s capability and effectiveness. Another aspect explored in this chapter is the ability of the ASF to operationalise within the projected timeframes and to test the political will of African leaders to actually deploy the ASF in peacekeeping as an AU tool. Though the deadline for phase one of the ASF was June 2005, the AU has never called upon the ASF to intervene, instead it still calls upon individual member states for troop contributions. Consequently, the cases of Burundi and Sudan cannot be used to measure the ASF progress per se since individual states from different regions participated. Nonetheless, the two missions serve as indicators of current AU capabilities and constraints. The fact that the ASF has never been utilised, may indicate that its progress is slower than expected and contrary to the fact that sub-regional brigades are claiming considerable progress (as outlined in Chapter three). The influence of international politics is also tested especially in Darfur, where there has been an outcry for a UN mission to replace the AU. As rightfully acknowledged by the Chairperson of the Commission, the two AU missions were a test not only of its “…capacity to bring peace and security to the continent, but also as a test of the effectiveness of its partnership with the rest of the international community” (African Union, 2005c:7).

4.2 THE AU BEYOND LIMITED PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS

Since its launch, the AU has been involved in limited peacekeeping missions apart from Burundi and Sudan where the missions involved larger numbers of troops and the mandates went beyond just military observer tasks. The two missions will be used to evaluate how the AU is handling the generic peacekeeping challenges that were presented in Chapter one. The AU Mission in Burundi (AMIB) was chosen particularly because it was the first AU peacekeeping mission, and it provides a unique insight into the political and practical realities of mounting a peacekeeping operation. With deployment of approximately 3 335 personnel and an operational budget of about US$110 million in 2003, it represented a significant expense in the African peacekeeping context and especially when viewed against the AU budget of US$32 million in the same year (Neethling, 2006:99).
Furthermore, AMIB brought to the fore the element of civilian protection, which became part of the rules of engagement. Protecting civilians was a new responsibility and a new challenge to peacekeepers. The uniqueness of AMIB further lies in the fact that it transitioned into a UN peace mission in June 2004, thereby allowing a platform for an exploration of the dynamics surrounding division of responsibilities between regional organisations and the UN, which seems to be a blueprint for future operations. AMIB was also faced with the challenges of reconstruction and sustainable peacebuilding, which highlighted to the AU and its stakeholders the need to build capacity in that area. How well AMIB did, is debatable because there were many battles but the war is still being fought. One battle won is acknowledged by Powell (2005:34), namely that the main objective of AMIB was to create conditions stable enough for the UN Security Council to authorise a UN intervention. Since the UN took over from AMIB, it could be said that the objective was accomplished, but AMIB further brought to the fore challenges that need attention if the AU is serious about building an effective peacekeeping capability.

The African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) was additionally chosen because of its magnitude, which evidently tests the emerging capacity of the AU in executing political and military responses to an internal conflict. The conflict in Sudan drew some international attention, which made it an ideal testing ground for international influence on African-led peace missions and the way the AU itself responds to such influences. The Sudanese conflict also brings to the forefront two distinct areas of interest: that of humanitarian efforts to mitigate human suffering and the military aspect designed to create conducive conditions for conflict resolution and peacebuilding. The magnitude of the Sudanese conflict allows for a joint conflict resolution strategy from both the AU and its partners because the AU alone cannot afford to carry it out given the resources required for a task of this magnitude. This then allows for an opportunity to study the relationship between the AU and its partners in an actual peacekeeping environment. In essence, most possible challenges to peacekeeping and conflict resolution can be found in the conflict in Sudan.

In spite of the advantages of testing the AU through the two above-mentioned conflicts, it is also important to declare potential weaknesses that can be attributed to the premature testing imposed upon an emerging organisation. The various organs of the AU are still evolving and have not yet matured to a level where their effectiveness can be fully tested. The
PSC as the principal decision-making organ for conflict prevention, management and resolution is not yet seasoned enough to plan and execute large-scale peacekeeping operations. The Burundi conflict as well as the Darfur crisis engulfed the AU before its peacekeeping mechanisms were fully developed, thereby diverting its focus from institutional development and strengthening it to actual deployment. This said, the results of such an assessment may not necessarily reflect the true picture of the envisaged AU peacekeeping capability; and thus another assessment, possibly after 2010\textsuperscript{17}, is required to further validate AU peacekeeping intentions. On the same note, since the AU was involved in these crises, it is only logical to assess its performance in view of shaping its growth, but bearing in mind its developmental stage. The two conflicts are perceived as a test of the AU’s capacity to resolve African conflicts and its determination to fully implement the relevant principles stipulated in its Constitutive Act (African Union, 2005c:8). In both cases, the AU adopted a double-pronged strategy: an operational strategy centred on troop deployment, and the political strategy aimed at finding a durable political settlement. The scope of this research centres on the operational strategy since it has direct impact on peacekeeping, which is the gist of this thesis. To better understand the operational aspects of the AU and peacekeeping in Burundi, it is fitting to first elaborate on the background to the conflict.

4.3 BACKGROUND TO THE BURUNDI CONFLICT

Burundi was repeatedly wracked by conflicts since its independence in 1962. In 1993 a fully-fledged civil war raged in the country with enormous human and economic costs. This was after the assassination of President Ndadaye on 21 October 1993 by members of the Army in a coup attempt. The Hutus killed many Tutsis in a reprisal for Ndadaye’s death, and the Army, which was dominated by the Tutsis. Individual Tutsis, retaliated against the Hutus, rendering large areas of the country unsafe (Oketch and Polzer, 2002:85). Ndadaye’s replacement was also killed in a plane crash, which further fuelled the violence and ethnic divide. The violence continued to escalate until the Army staged a bloodless coup in July 1996, which saw Major Pierre Buyoya reinstated as interim president. Hutu movements emerged with their own-armed branches to fight what they perceived to be intentional domination and marginalisation by the Tutsis. These movements amongst smaller others included the National Council for

\textsuperscript{17} The deadline was set as 2010 for the full operationalisation of the ASF.
the Defence of Democracy/Conseil National Pour la Défense de la Démocratie (CNDD) and its armed group Force pour la Défense de la Démocratie (FDD), the Parti pour la Liberation du Peuple Hutu (PALIPEHUTU) and its Front National de Liberation (FLN) and the Front de Liberation Nationale (FROLINA). Tutsi militias also formed their own groups in support of the Army. The violence and underlying suspicion led to a deep sense of vulnerability within the two ethnic groups. The Hutus, who are demographically dominant, saw themselves as vulnerable to the political and military powers of the Tutsis, whereas the Tutsis considered themselves a threatened minority (Alusala, 2005:1).

Hutu rebels drew their strength from refugees who were scattered across the Great Lakes region, mostly in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Tanzania. During the days towards the demise of President Mobuto Sese Seko of the former Zaire, the governments of Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda sponsored rebels fighting the Kinshasa government. In return, the Kinshasa government supported the Hutu rebels fighting against the Burundi government (Ngoma, 2004). This made the situation complex and threatened the stability of the whole region.

In 1998, peace processes were spearheaded by former President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania and later former President Nelson Mandela of South Africa who handed over to Jacob Zuma, the then Deputy President (Oketch and Polzer, 2002:114). After two years of intense negotiations and international pressure, the government and warring parties signed the Arusha Agreement (Arusha Accords) on Peace and Reconciliation for Burundi on 28 August 2000. Subsequent negotiations led to the CNDD-FDD, the largest rebel group and the government signing a ceasefire agreement in December 2002. But another rebel group PALIPEHUTU-FNL refused to sign this ceasefire agreement and continued to wage limited attacks against the government. The ceasefire agreement of December 2002 provided that an African mission should conduct the verification and control of the ceasefire agreements (African Union, 2003c:18). Consequently, AMIB forces were deployed in May 2003 aimed at achieving synergy in peace efforts within the Great Lakes region by adding momentum to efforts to implement the agreements and to resolve outstanding issues (Aboagye, 2004:10). This deployment of AMIB is covered in the section below.
4.4 THE AU MISSION IN BURUNDI

The decision to deploy AU troops in Burundi was reached without any opposition within the AU body. This can be explained by the fact that African leaders recognised the importance of securing peace in Burundi in order to bring calm to the unstable Great Lakes region. Additionally, the call to deploy in Burundi was in line with the requirements of the AU Constitutive Act, specifically Article 4(j), which calls for intervention in response to grave circumstances such as killing of civilians (Sculier, 2003:9). Most importantly, the call for deployment was viewed as an opportunity for the AU leaders to showcase their departure from the OAU and its restrictive principles (Powell, 2005:35). It furthermore elicited much international enthusiasm as a possible model for leaving the resolution of African conflicts to African solutions.

Following the formal decision by the AU to deploy AMIB in February 2003, the Transitional Government and the AU signed a status-of-forces agreement on 26 March, which spelt out their commitments and obligations during deployment. The AU military observers began arriving in Bujumbura on 13 February and were deployed in March in their areas of responsibility (United Nations, 2003:4). On 2 April, the Central Organ of the AU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution mandated the deployment of troops from three countries, namely Ethiopia, Mozambique and South Africa. The total strength was calculated at 3 500 troops for an initial period of one year. South Africa and Ethiopia appointed the Force Commander and the Deputy Force Commander respectively, and Ambassador Mamadou Bah was appointed Special Representative of the AU and the political head of the mission (Boshoff, 2003). South Africa as the lead nation was tasked to facilitate planning and deployment of the troops. The rules of engagement (ROE) were based on International Law and the principle of self-defence. Where necessary, the Head of Mission in conjunction with the Force Commander through consultation with the mandating authority could adjust the ROEs (African Union, 2003a:3). National contingents had to be self-sustained for the first 60 days. At the initial stages of the deployment, the mission was just ordinary, not requiring special capability beyond the normal peacekeeping requirements.

The AMIB mandate comprised the following tasks:

- establish and maintain liaison between parties;
monitor and verify the implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement;
facilitate the activities of the Joint Ceasefire Commission (JCC) and technical committees for the establishment and restructuring of the National Defence and Police Forces;
secure identified assembly and disengagement areas;
facilitate safe passage for the parties during planned movements to designated assembly areas;
facilitate and provide technical assistance to the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) process;
facilitate the delivery of the humanitarian assistance, including to refugees and internally displaced persons;
coordinate mission activities with UN presence in Burundi;
provide VIP protection for designated returning leaders (African Union, 2003a:3).

The South African Protection Service Detachment of 700 troops, which had been deployed to provide security to leaders returning from exile in 2001, was incorporated into AMIB on 1 May 2003, thereby constituting the advance party. Both Ethiopia and Mozambique declared that, unless assisted, they had no resources to deploy on their own (Boshoff and Francis, 2003:43). The United States of America and the United Kingdom therefore supported their deployment on a bilateral basis (Cilliers, 2005:69). Mozambique only managed to deploy 230 troops in September, seven months after the mandate was approved, with financial support from South Africa, the US, the UK and France (Harsch, 2003:6). This was against the concept of operations of AMIB which called for deployment within 60 days after the provision of the mandate (African Union, 2003a:3). The mission of AMIB was to deploy within 60 days of the provision of a mandate to supervise, observe, monitor and verify the implementation of a ceasefire agreement, in order to further consolidate the peace process of Burundi (African Union, 2003a:2). Similarly, Italy and Germany made financial contributions to assist in the initial stages of the deployment. However, the lack of funds and the logistical difficulties encountered by AMIB, still forced the Chairperson of the AU Commission to appeal for more assistance by mobilising donor funds and logistical and technical assistance. At that point the AU operating budget was approximately US$32 million. In contrast, the AMIB budget was about US$110 million for the first year only (De Coning, 2004:23). African states were US$42 million in arrears, but the money was later paid off by Libya as a gesture of goodwill – an act based on the Libyan national interest (Hall, 2003).
As of December 2003, there were 2,645 AMIB troops, comprising 866 from Ethiopia, 228 from Mozambique, 1,508 from South Africa and 43 military observers from Benin, Burkina Faso, Gabon, Mali and Tunisia, deployed in Burundi (United Nations, 2003:4). Apart from Ethiopia, it was the first major peacekeeping deployment for both South Africa and Mozambique. Though their troops might have had training in peace operations, it was the first time these countries had to put their training to practical use. In June 2004, AMIB established the first cantonment site at Muyange (Bubanza Province).

In addition, AMIB continued to be responsible for protecting political leaders during the transition period. According to the mandate, the force had no responsibility for protecting civilians or for monitoring or reporting on human rights abuses. AMIB was only tasked to “facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid” to refugees and displaced persons (African Union, 2003a:5). After extensive debate, AMIB commanders decided that only in cases of massive killings based on ethnicity or in cases of genocide should their soldiers intervene to protect civilians. The Force Commander, who was responsible for implementing the mandate, drew up ROEs that specifically directed troops to provide protection to civilians in imminent danger of serious injury or death. Such actions still required troops to request permission from top military and civilian officers of AMIB before going into action (Sculier, 2003:10).

During routine movements, AMIB troops were occasionally escorted by Burundian Army soldiers, leading to the perception that AMIB was collaborating closely with the Burundian Army. This was so because Tutsis dominated the Burundian Army. The FDD went as far as accusing AMIB of complicity with the Burundian Army and, consequently, AMIB soldiers were fired upon on numerous occasions (Sculier, 2003:10).

Under the Arusha Agreements and other subsequent ceasefire agreements, government troops were to be restricted to their barracks or predetermined zones mutually agreed upon. Rebel combatants were to be gathered in cantonment sites. These measures were intended as the first steps towards implementing demobilisation and reorganisation of government security forces. But in the haste to move forward on cantonment, Burundian and AMIB officials left several important questions unanswered, such as how to define a combatant (Did a person have to be armed to be considered a
combatant? If so, with what kind of weapon?); how to verify the identity of the combatants; how to provide for children who were combatants, and how to deal with families of combatants (Sculier, 2003:11). This was a demonstration of the limited conflict management skills within the organisation.

AMIB was able to stabilise 95% of Burundi, facilitate delivery of humanitarian assistance, coordinate mission activities with UN presence and provide protection to returning leaders. It also established and maintained liaison between parties as well as monitor and verify the implementation of ceasefire agreements. In a nutshell AMIB did relatively well operationally, given its constraints.

South Africa, as the ‘lead nation’ during AMIB, can be credited with the success of the mission. Besides the fact that South Africa contributed the bulk of personnel and equipment, it also provided helicopters, communication equipment, medical support, transport and logistical supply lines to the entire mission at approximately US$100 million per year (De Coning, 2003:10). This support from a regional hegemon made it possible for the multinational force to project more force than would otherwise have been the case, thus facilitating continuation of operations even without immediate external donor support. In spite of these achievements, the contribution of AMIB to political and economic stability was limited. In addition, AMIB faced challenges at both national and organisational levels.

After the mandate was given for deployment within 60 days, Ethiopia and Mozambique could not deploy because of financial and logistical constraints. The AU as an organisation could not help financially or materially. This problem highlighted to other AU member states that countries that volunteer to contribute troops have to carry the burden of deployment themselves.18 The only assistance that came was from international partners. Without this support, Ethiopia and Mozambique could not have deployed. The fact that the assistance was through bilateral arrangements is also a concern indicating that the AU does not have formal arrangements to solicit assistance from donor countries. Though the AU’s

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18 Though the deployment was agreed upon by all AU member states, the AU as an organisation did very little to help the countries that had difficulties in deploying. The assistance that came was through bilateral arrangements. Even at operational level, the 60 days’ self-sustainability was unaffordable to the two countries, but they had to fend for themselves.
political will to sanction deployment was there, the will to follow through with action was lacking. The numbers deployed were not enough to cover the whole country and to provide the required civilian protection tasks. After deployment, AMIB worked closely with UN officials, therefore their shortcoming in terms of experience and skills were compensated. Operation AMIB therefore showed that the AU peacekeeping capability was immature, requiring substantial support from its partners in order to carry out peacekeeping missions on the continent. The AU dependence on international partners clearly depicts an organisation that cannot stand on its own. These voids were also visible in the forthcoming discussion on AMIS in Darfur.

4.5 BACKGROUND TO THE SUDAN (DARFUR) CONFLICT

Sudan is the largest country on the African continent, bordering seven conflict-prone states, and, as Jooma (2006:1) accurately observed, Sudan “… demonstrates most accurately the challenge of building a state in the absence of a nation”. Sudan is characterised by a crisis of identity fuelled by ethnicity, tribalism and religious affiliation. These manifest into economic exclusion and powerlessness that resonates at community, regional and national levels. The Sudan's triple conflicts – the south, west (Darfur), and the east, reflect these crises at varying degrees, exacerbated by struggles over natural resources (International Crisis Group, 2006). In the section below, only the Darfur region, which occupies the western part of Sudan and the areas where AU forces are deployed, is discussed.

For generations, the Darfur region of Sudan faced low-level conflicts between Arab nomadic herders and non-Arab farmers over resources. The crisis in Darfur is an internal conflict between rebel fighters (Sudan Liberation Army/Movement [SLA/M] and Justice and Equality Movement [JEM]) on the one hand, and on the other hand, government-sponsored Arab militias, commonly known as the Janjaweed, who fight as a proxy force and the government itself (Chin and Morgenstein, 2005:1). The alignment of the government with the Arab militias is perceived as oppressive, discriminative and an act of marginalisation of the region’s farming community (Behrens, 2006:11). Through this conflict, thousands of people have been killed and millions more displaced from their homes. A UN official described the crisis as the “worst humanitarian and human rights catastrophe in the world” (Powell, 2005:41). Because of these human rights violations and grave crimes against humanity, a number of non-
governmental organisations called on the UN to intervene in accordance with the requirements and the principle of the “responsibility to protect”, but nothing came to fruition. The conflict continued at low key and much obscured from the international community until the government started a massive ethnic cleansing campaign towards the end of 2003. But even then the international community proclaimed the slogan “African solutions to African problems” (Chin and Morgenstein, 2005:1).

From the beginning, Chad was involved in trying to resolve the conflict and a series of agreements were signed between 3 September and 4 November 2003 in an effort to reach a comprehensive ceasefire agreement. The magnitude of the conflict grew especially on the humanitarian front. The AU’s involvement in Darfur began as early as March 2004 through public statements expressing concern over the grave humanitarian situation in the area. It was against this background that a comprehensive ceasefire agreement was reached on 8 April 2004 under the auspices of the Chadian President, the AU and international observers (African Union, 2005c:1). The agreement, called the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement (HCFA) on the Darfur Conflict and a Protocol on the establishment of humanitarian assistance, set the stage for the termination of hostilities and the establishment of an AU-driven Joint Commission (JC) as well as a Ceasefire Commission (CFC) to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance.

During the PSC’s 10\textsuperscript{th} meeting on 24 May 2004, it authorised the Chairperson of the Commission to take all necessary steps to ensure an effective monitoring of the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement. The deployment of an AU Observer Mission and a protection force was suggested to support the CFC (African Union, 2005c:2). A follow-up meeting between the Government of Sudan, the SLM/A and the JEM from 27 to 28 May 2004 in Addis Ababa culminated in an Agreement on the Modalities for the Establishment of the CFC and the Deployment of Observers who were to be deployed in Darfur (African Union, 2005c:2). During the July 2004 AU Summit, the Assembly agreed to deploy over 300 troops from Nigeria and Rwanda to provide protection for AU observers in Darfur (Powell, 2005:43). Initially, the force had a limited mandate but it was later transformed into a peacekeeping force with a more robust mandate. The broader mandate facilitated the deployment of AMIS, which is discussed below.
4.6 THE AU MISSION IN SUDAN

The signing of the N’Djamena Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement provided the legal authority for the deployment of AU monitors in Darfur. An AU assessment mission to Darfur was dispatched between 7 and 13 May 2004 to assess the security situation in Darfur and to advise the AU Commission accordingly. Recommendations from these assessments led to the signing of two important documents between Sudan and the AU: the modalities for the establishment of CFC and the deployment of observers in Darfur on 28 May 2004, and the Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA) on 4 June 2004 (Appiah-Mensah, 2005:8). Consequently, an AU advance mission travelled to Sudan on 2 June 2004 with the mandate to secure and establish the headquarters of the CFC. On the 9th of that month, the AU flag was officially hoisted at the CFC Headquarters in El Fasher, signalling the beginning of AMIS (Human Rights Watch, 2006:8). According to Appiah-Mensah (2005:8), the first three AU MILOBs arrived on the 4th June with only one satellite phone linked to the AU headquarters, no vehicles or anything else. This indeed made their job almost impossible. The rest of the initially authorised MILOBs were assigned to their sectors in July and ordered to deploy by 25 July. In most sectors, there were no civilian administrative support structures; each Sector Commander was therefore given US$5 000 for essential logistical needs for his sector. Each sector was allocated four vehicles and two satellite phones. A month after the MILOBs deployment, the first batch of MILOBs protectors arrived, an infantry company from Rwanda and a composite company from Nigeria to bring the force to 300 (Appiah-Mensah, 2005:9). In the mean time, the security and humanitarian situation continued to deteriorate. Soon it was clear that the deployment of AMIS in terms of numbers was too few and too thin on the ground to effectively carry out their mandate in the context of the growing number of ceasefire violations (African Union, 2005c:1).

During the 3rd Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Governments held in Addis Ababa from 6 to 8 July 2004, it was decided that AU Military Observers (MILOB) be increased to at least 80 officers and the Protection Force to be deployed immediately. By October, AMIS had a total of 465 personnel, 310 deployed as protection force (African Union, 2005c:3). Still, the strength of AMIS, regardless of its efficiency and dedication, was unable to provide any effective monitoring coverage for an area the size of France, particularly as all the parties to the HCFA were violating the provisions they had signed.
The Chairperson of the Commission prepared a report that was presented to the PSC meeting on 20 October 2004 calling for a further increase of the AMIS force. It was agreed that the force should be increased to 3,320 personnel, 2,341 of them being military personnel including 450 military observers and up to 815 civilian police and appropriate civilian personnel (African Union, 2005c:3). However, in spite of the urgent need for these extra troops in the operational area, their deployment took over six months to complete. Amongst others, Appiah-Mensah (2005:8) lists difficulties with appropriate accommodation in the field, logistics, force generation from troop-contributing countries (TCCs) and an unwieldy bureaucracy at AU headquarters as well as lack of institutional expertise as having contributed to this delay in deployment.

From 10 to 22 March 2005, an AU-led assessment mission conducted an assessment in Sudan with a view to again enhancing the mission. The assessment mission observed that:

- while AMIS was making a significant difference in those areas in which it was deployed, there remained large areas that were beyond its reach;
- the assumption on which the Mission was planned and the general level of compliance with the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement had not been borne out;
- notwithstanding the fact that AMIS had nearly reached its authorised troop ceiling, it remained well short of being fully operationally effective; and
- while there was no need to change the existing mandate, the tasks within the mandate had to be reprioritised, with greater emphasis on creating a secure environment (African Union, 2005c:5).

Consequently, the assessment mission recommended that AMIS be increased again in two phases. The first phase was to increase the AMIS strength to its authorised ceiling of 3,320 by May 2005. The second phase was to expand AMIS to a total of 5,887 military personnel and 1,560 civilian police and civilian staff. After a review of these recommendations by the Military Staff Committee of the PSC, the PSC requested the Commission to increase the strength to 3,320 by May 2005 and further increase the whole AMIS strength to 6,171 military personnel and 1,560 civilian personnel by end of September 2005 (African Union, 2005c:5).
In order to implement the PSC decision to enhance AMIS within the specified timeframe, a special unit was formed, called the Darfur Integrated Task Force (DITF), within the Peace and Security Department to assist with planning, force generation, procurement of logistics and administrative support, and to liaise with partners to mobilise resources (African Union, 2005a:4). By 20 May 2005, AMIS deployment had reached 2,635 personnel, comprising 452 MILOBs and 1,732 protection force members, 40 CFC members/International Support Staff and 413 CIVPOL and 12 members of the Darfur Integrated Task Force (DITF) (African Union, 2005c:4). The DITF was based in the AU Headquarters. The mandate of the enhanced AMIS was inter alia to:

- monitor and observe compliance with the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement and all such agreements in the future;
- assist in the process of confidence building between the parties;
- contribute to a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian relief and, beyond that, the return of IDPs and refugees to their homes; and
- contribute to the improvement of the overall security situation in Darfur (African Union, 2005c:3).

The above mandate was carved out with the assumption that Sudan as a sovereign state would provide its citizens with protection including the people of Darfur as per the HCFA. It has since come to light that some civilians needed protection even from the Sudanese government itself. Based on the above mandate, AMIS activities on the ground included:

- monitoring, investigating and reporting of ceasefire violations;
- regular patrols to promote confidence and to establish a presence in some villages to facilitate the return of IDPs;
- patrol of specific areas to prevent acts of rape of women collecting firewood; and
- protection of NGOs and humanitarian agencies to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance (African Union, 2005c:3).

In July 2005, AMIS further enhanced its presence by deploying additional personnel, which pushed the total to 7,491 (6,171 military and 1,320 civilian police). But the setback caused by this increase was the fact that the increased numbers did not translate into an increase in appropriate equipment on the ground (Appiah-Mensah, 2006:4). AMIS depended entirely on donations from partners. In cases where cash was donated instead of equipment, the AU did not have procurement capacity for such
purchases. This problem was acknowledged by the Chairman of the AU Commission who admitted that “… in the area of procurement the AU neither has the logistical infrastructure nor the experience to handle bulk and urgent purchases, worth millions of dollars, for such large operations” (African Union, 2006c:16). However, some positive aspects came out of the increase in numbers.

The dramatic increase in the AMIS strength somewhat enhanced their efficiency on the ground against the many challenges they faced. After the strength increased, AMIS could relatively provide security for the international community in Darfur, particularly media personnel to carry out their duties. As a result, the protection force was more able to provide MILOBs with escorts during their patrols and investigations, including humanitarian convoys as well as to provide protection to unarmed civilian police (Appiah-Mensah, 2006:9). In addition, more ground was covered by AMIS troops translating into more protection to civilians by proximity. The UN Secretary-General acknowledged that “… in the areas where AMIS had deployed, it was doing an outstanding job under very difficult circumstances” (United Nations, 2005). However, as Sharamo (2006:52) observed, this did not prevent general insecurity due to AMIS’s inability to cover the whole region. Other factors remained a setback for the AMIS operation.

Infrastructural development that had been neglected for many years, exacerbated the AU problem of finding office space, and roads remained an obstacle to the full delivery of intended services. The lack of road networks forced AMIS to rely on air transport, which inevitably they did not have. AMIS has a fleet of 28 helicopters in its inventory, 25 of which are Canadian and the remaining 3 are from the Netherlands (Appiah-Mensah, 2006:5). This dependency means that AMIS cannot do much without the cooperation of these two countries. Additionally, because of restrictions from the Sudanese government, no military pilots were allowed in Darfur, and this further increased the military dependency on civilian capability (Behrens, 2006:15). Further relief for the lack of mobility was achieved when Canada donated 105 armoured personnel carriers (APCs) whose deployment was initially blocked by the Sudanese government.

Other operational problems that AMIS faced were self-inflicted. For instance, the AU conceded too much to the belligerents during bargaining of the modalities for AMIS operations. In terms of the HCFA, each party to
the HCFA provided permanent representation to all military observer-investigating teams. This meant that for every mission the MILOBs undertake, members of the rebel forces accompanied them. This compromised security and intelligence because these rebel representatives were in contact with their leaders in the field (Appiah-Mensah, 2006:12). In some cases, these party representatives whose lack of commitment was evident, affected the whole MILOB team and in some instances manipulated the outcomes of investigations (Ntema, 2006). Similarly, a report from Refugees International (Chin and Morgenstein, 2005) observed that “… belligerents [had] informers built into the CFC mechanisms”. These party representatives were on the payroll of the AU. The monthly allowances of these 96 representatives could have been used on other pressing issues of the cash-strapped organisation. Recommendations from Human Rights Watch (2006) strongly encouraged the AU to renegotiate in order to get rid of these party representatives. In spite of these shortcomings though, there were some positive aspects to the imbedded party representatives. They acted as facilitators in linking with field commanders thereby bringing some element of safety to the patrols.

AMIS also had some administrative problems, which can be blamed on inexperience and poor resources. Movement of mission personnel as well as rotation, for instance, was haphazard, and people were not received and taken to their mission areas according to pre-deployment planning and reception arrangements. In addition, rotation was not staggered to allow continuity in the mission area (Appiah-Mensah, 2006:13). According to an interview with Major Gilbert Ntema (2006), who was a military observer in AMIS, monthly allowances were always late, sometimes as late as two months. In addition, allowances were cut from US$120 per day to US$90 halfway through the mission. Some countries compensated their officers by paying the difference, but some did not, dividing the MILOB cadre and lowering the morale of those being underpaid (Ntema, 2006).

Another problem related to the kind of training that AMIS provided for its troops. Some course contents were not relevant to the operation. This observation was also acknowledged by Appiah-Mensah (2006:13) when he stated that it seemed like “… AU does not know what kind of assistance it needs from partners, hence development packages the partners provided was made without AU input therefore rendering such assistance useless”. Solomon and Du Rand (2006) concur that “… ad hoc arrangements with wealthy nations are not enough to guarantee political credibility, speed and
effectiveness”, the AU had to know what it needed first before asking for assistance. Another problem faced by the AU was the “… plurality of leadership and multiple centres of power, which often lead to lack of unity and synergy in the AU multinational force”.

A general consensus was that the AMIS mandate needs to be upgraded (International Crisis Group, 2006). Rice (2004) also commented that the “… AU force is critically undermanned and has an impossibly weak mandate, limited to monitoring rather than enforcing the nonexistent ceasefire and protecting only those people facing imminent threat within the force’s immediate vicinity”. Contrary to this view, the second Joint Assessment Mission report observed that the mandate was adequate; it just needed to be “… interpreted flexibly and robustly in order to maintain credibility, and provide the necessary degree of protection to civilians within capabilities” (Appiah-Mensah, 2006:10). In other words, the mandate was subject to interpretation based on capability and resources. This was unacceptable in a mission area because capability and resources should be aimed at addressing the problem on the ground, and the mandate was derived from the situation on the ground. If the situation on the ground warranted protection of civilians, then the AU had to arm AMIS so that they could protect civilians by a mandate that called for civilian protection.

According to Grono (2006:626), the AMIS mandate was largely an observer mission mandate. It did not allow AMIS to go out and proactively protect civilians. AMIS troops could only protect civilians when they were attacked in their presence, and only then if it felt that it had enough resources to intervene, and too often it did not (Grono, 2006:626). According to the International Crisis Group (2005:1), AMIS’s ability to protect civilians and humanitarian operations was hamstrung by limited capacity, insufficient resources and political constraints. A communiqué passed by AU officials on 12 November 2006, concluded that “… ceasefire violations, violence against civilians and banditry activities continue to occur in Darfur with impunity” (African Union, 2006b). If AMIS failed to protect civilians – let alone itself – from unprovoked attacks, it would have lost credibility and its presence in Darfur would have been jeopardised.

Another observation, which is worrying, is the quality of people TCCs sent to such operations, which greatly affected the effectiveness of the force. Appiah-Mensah (2005:17) proclaims that a few people in Darfur carried out their jobs of monitoring, investigating and reporting, while the “… majority
assume the role of operational passengers”. Furthermore, he points out the frustration expressed by the Force Commanders and Sector Commanders with the continuous influx into the mission area of personnel who could not read or write in the operational language, English, thereby making communication between some MILOBs impractical.

In general, some analysts have commended the work of AMIS given its constraints. As early as 2004, Jon Corzine, a Democratic Senator and Richard Holbrook, a former US Ambassador to the UN remarked that “… surprisingly, the strongest efforts to stop the fighting have come from the AU, which is facing the first test of its viability as an organisation …” (Corzine and Holbrook, 2004:A27). Most of such comments came at the initial stage of AMIS; critics are now (at the time of writing) pushing for a more robust force to be deployed in Darfur.

There is a general consensus and acknowledgement that, despite African pride and the progress and commitment it has shown in bringing stability to Darfur, it is not well seasoned to keep peace in Africa by itself (Sharamo, 2006:52). This view is shared by Susan Rice (2004), a former US diplomat who argues that the AU has done its best on the ground in Darfur, “… but the unfortunate truth is [that] the AU’s best is not yet enough”. This view has evoked an international call for an AMIS transformation to a UN mission. The Global Policy Forum, cited by Neethling (2006:104), decried that AMIS “has been left undermanned, poorly funded and ill-equipped to respond to the rapidly deteriorating conflict”. The UN also passed a resolution to take over the mission in Darfur, but the Sudanese government resisted the takeover.

With such an outcry from scholars, analysts, ordinary people and NGOs, it is a sign that the international community has not been satisfied with the results of AMIS. It has been a vote of no confidence on the AU and its AMIS operation. The initial praise of AMIS can be interpreted as that AMIS was only successful as a stabilising force for a limited time but not as a force to be engaged in a sustained multidimensional conflict. AMIS also has financial problems, limited capacity in management skills and is even unable to meet the authorised troop strengths for the mission. As Neethling (2006:108) rightfully argues: “… operations in Darfur once again underscore the financial and logistical challenges associated with peacekeeping and even suggest that the AU is too ambitious in its future plans concerning the deployment of ASF brigades in terms of the full range
of scenarios envisaged for the ASF”. Solomon and Swart (2004:10) also caution the AU against “developing overly ambitious structures and plans that it cannot effectively execute within its means”. In this regard AMIS could be effective as a military observer mission and a short-term stabilisation force. Having assessed the AU peacekeeping capability in the two conflicts, the next section explores whether the generic challenges present in the conflicts influenced the effectiveness of the peacekeeping efforts by uncovering how they impacted on the conduct of the missions.

4.7 GENERIC CHALLENGES TO PEACEKEEPING

Africa has many assets to fuel its success, yet as observed by Buyoya (2006:165), it faces barriers posed by among others, national sovereignty because of historical attachment to the nation state, bad governance of member states, pernicious effects of unchecked globalisation and ambitions of various foreign rivals with respect to the vast wealth that Africa has to offer. Overcoming these challenges is a process that will take years. The AU as a regional organisation is taking a leading role combating challenges that relate to peace and security. Having discussed AU peace missions in Burundi and Sudan, and the OAU peace mission in Chad, a set of challenges repeatedly stand out as more prominent than others. It is therefore now appropriate to evaluate AU successes against these common challenges to peacekeeping.

4.7.1 An overly limited mandate

In the OAU Charter, Article III laid down the principle of “non-interference in the internal affairs of states”. This impacted on intervention, which was prohibited and indeed sparingly carried out during the existence of the OAU. The AU Constitutive Act Article 4(g) mirrors the same principle, but adds some circumstances where intervention may be allowed. By implication, it prohibits individual states from interfering in the internal affairs of others, but allows for multilateral bodies to do so under specific conditions. The same article allows the AU the right to intervene in a member state pursuant to a decision by the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances as well as the right of a member state to request intervention in order to restore peace and security (African Union, 2000:5). These two remarkable clauses distinguish the AU from the OAU and lessen the limitations imposed by the non-interference article in both the OAU Charter and the Constitutive Act. With the restrictive clause out of the way, the
question hitherto is how successful the AU is in dealing with conflicts which were previously viewed as internal conflicts and thus beyond the OAU authority. In other words, is the AU still constrained to intervene in the affairs of member states because of its Constitutive Act?

To answer these questions, it is fitting to point out that the conflict in Burundi and the ongoing conflict in the Sudan both qualify as internal conflicts. In both cases, the UN could not deploy because the conditions were not acceptable as per UN standards to allow deployment. The fighting was fierce and ongoing, especially in Burundi where the ceasefire agreement reached was not inclusive of all warring parties. In the case of the Sudan, where there was a signed ceasefire agreement, all parties to the agreement were violating it at will. In spite of these situations, nothing restricted the AU from deploying. In fact, the host states somewhat welcomed the AU to assist in bringing peace to the respective countries. The minimal resistance from the host states represents a paradigm shift from the old practice where such conflicts were left to the troubled state to handle even though in most cases they had no capacity to do so. In addition, bilateral arrangements or ad hoc means, which were preferred, rather fuelled the conflicts.

Furthermore, the mandates authorising these peace missions allowed some form of interference in the internal political set-up of the host nations. For instance, AMIB was to “contribute to political and economic stability” of Burundi. This task cannot be achieved without some interference in the internal socio-economic set-up. It also represents a shift in the traditional peacekeeping effort of separating warring parties to actually getting involved within the political set-up without being accused of interfering in the internal affairs of a member state, especially by a regional body other than the UN.

Nevertheless, it cannot be claimed that such leverage did not come with some difficulties. In both missions the host countries refused the AU to explicitly state in the mission mandates that they would provide civilian protection. This was based on the fact that the host countries had the responsibility to provide such service to its citizens. Such provision was

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19 The last ceasefire signed before the AU deployment was on 2 December 2002 in Arusha, but the Palipehutu-FNL of Agathon Rwasa was not party to the agreement.
found to be wanting and biased, given the Tutsi-dominated Burundi Army and the Arab-controlled Sudanese Army.

The Sudan also threatened to withdraw from AU membership if the AU forced a transformation from AMIS to a UN mission (Anon, 2006b). In such a case the use of Articles 4(h) and (j) of the Constitutive Act would become invalid since they only work on member states. The shortcoming of the Constitutive Act is that, if a member state resigns from the organisation, then the AU’s ability to intervene stops, transferring the responsibility to the UN. Politically, such a situation would be difficult to be achieved. It can be said therefore that the challenges brought about by a limited organisational mandate were less experienced in Burundi and the Sudan as opposed to the OAU era where the mandate impacted on whether or not to intervene. The most noticeable limitation is the Sudanese government’s conditional consent to UN intervention. It is also highly probable that the AU deployment had some conditions as well, though they were not publicly debated.

### 4.7.2 Lack of political will and weak conflict management institutions

In African politics, political will is no longer a problem in authorising deployments, but it has indirectly become a major problem when it comes to pledges or contributions of troops to AU-authorised missions. As previously stated, the two missions of Burundi and the Sudan did not have any problems or objections during the authorisation stage. What is of concern is that the enthusiasm and commitment displayed during the authorisation of the two missions did not translate into sufficient action. Out of the 53 AU member states that authorised deployment in Burundi, only three countries actually contributed troops that made up the contingent. In the case of the Sudan, only South Africa, Nigeria and Rwanda initially contributed sizable contingents. Though not in the scope of this research, the situation in Somalia is facing a similar predicament. IGAD countries that initiated IGASOM are not willing to contribute troops even though they are the driving force in the pending deployment (African Union, 2006a:7). At the time of writing, other African countries are equally showing no interest in contributing troops though they openly acknowledge the need for deploying such a force. As of 30 January 2007, only Malawi, Nigeria and Uganda had shown interest to contribute about 4 000 of the 7 600 troops required (Goujon, 2007). As deployment was supposed to take place from the end of January 2007, this lack of interest from AU member states
evokes some pessimism whether the mission will be possible. This is especially surprising given that the AU is building an ASF with regional brigades to handle regional crises. It was expected that IGAD would be the leading body in the Somali crisis as Somalia is part of IGAD but nothing happened in practice. There is a growing trend that the same countries contribute troops while the rest only do so at their convenience.

The danger of this camouflaged political will is that it affects the overall performance of the AU. According to Aboagye (2004:14) AMIB’s logistical sustainment and funding were problematic because of the lack of substantive support from within Africa. AU member states cannot expect AU missions to be successful if they do not give support to the missions themselves, especially human support, which they have in abundance. It would be unreasonable to expect AU partners to provide the majority of material support as well as human support to AU-driven missions. Though it can pose logistical difficulties, more countries contributing fewer troops could help avoid overburdening a few countries having to provide troops to all missions. It is becoming apparent that in spite of peacekeeping experiences within African bodies, such as ECOWAS and SADC, the AU is unable to harness this experience in its peacekeeping missions. Troop contributions from potential contributors have been disappointing.

Another observation regarding African politics is the fact that the AU is a captive of the internal politics of member states. Sharamo (2006:53) asserts that “… due to fear of negative reaction by key member states, the AU leadership has not effectively dealt with the government of Sudan”. Africans have to set aside national agendas in the interest of regional and continental security. During an interview, the Botswana Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the AU, Zibane Ntakhwana, asserted that Botswana will only send troops to assist or quell conflicts in war-torn areas if under the auspices of the UN (Anon, 2007). This is an interesting statement from an AU member state, an organisation that is building its own peacekeeping capacity so as to enhance its ability to solve its own problems. Now they cannot deploy except under the auspices of the UN. If other AU member states feel the same, then the ASF concept is likely to fail.

The general lack of enthusiasm for troop contribution is possibly a sign that this line of thought is common amongst some AU member states. If so, this weakness has significantly undermined the AU’s response to the Darfur crisis because there is no political unity. Franke (2006:14) attributes this
weakness to tension emanating from the need to maintain full control over national capabilities in order to keep peace at home and the necessity to relinquish certain aspects of the command authority to a supranational body. Member states should give full support to AU peace structures and stop paying lip service and doing the opposite. The ongoing misunderstanding between the AU and the Sudanese government is a good example of this tension. Though Sudan is unable to exercise its authority in the country, it is equally limiting the assistance it could get from the AU by demanding conditional intervention, and thus influencing and limiting the mandate. Kent and Malan (2003:79) recognise this quagmire as they assert that for “… African states to allow the AU to determine on their behalf what constitutes a collective threat, will require faith in the transparency, accountability and representative nature of the decision-making process and overall management of the Commission”. At the moment, the AU member states are playing a “let’s wait and see” game, which negatively discredits the peacekeeping processes.

AU institutions are still immature, and it is hoped that with time the few people that are engaged in building institutional capacity will have experience to run AU missions more effectively. The immediate acceptance of AU involvement in both Burundi and the Sudan shows that AU institutions are respected and that countries have faith in them to solve their problems. Such faith can be interpreted in many different ways, but the fact that the AU is chosen to mediate in African conflicts over the UN is an encouraging gesture. This is a vote of confidence on the organisation’s conflict management institutions. Nonetheless, political will still needs to be more solid so as to translate ideals into reality. The political will displayed during the two missions was sufficient to get by, but insufficient to make the missions successful.

4.7.3 Limited capacity and experience in core conflict management areas

It will be unfair to expect the AU to have a fully-grown capacity and good experience in conflict management when it was only launched in 2002. But as Mtimkulu (2005:35) cautioned, “… when violent conflict erupts, it holds no sympathy for an institution still learning to walk the rough terrain of resolving conflicts”. The intentions must be acted upon in a visible way. The Solemn Declaration on a CADSP acknowledges the limited capacity in conflict management within the AU. Item V of the same declaration states
that “… recourse will be made to the UN to provide the necessary financial, logistical and military support for the AU’s activities in the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa …” (African Union, 2004:16). With this in mind, the AU can be regarded as a partner with other bodies, bearing in mind that the AU engages in missions with the expectations that it will be assisted.

When the AU deployed in Burundi, the first barrier was to airlift Ethiopian and Mozambican troops from their countries to deployment areas. This immediately shows a limitation in air transport capacity. There were other shortcomings, such as insufficient medical supplies, fuel and food supplies, which the South African government absorbed. In spite of all these voids, some good came out of AMIB. The deployment can be credited with stabilising certain parts of Burundi, though some parts remained hostile. Some cantonment sites were also protected as well as civilians. The biggest achievement was the fact that AMIB created conditions stable enough to allow the deployment of UN troops. Nevertheless, Aboagye (2004:14) concludes that the “contribution of the mission to political and economic stability was limited”. AMIB was not successful in all areas.

AMIB, for instance, never completely stopped ceasefire violations between the Burundian army and other warring factions nor was it able to disarm all the rebel fighters. This then meant that the mission could not effectively support disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration as dictated by the mandate (Powell, 2005:37). Civilians were not safe even amidst the AMIB presence because AMIB could not provide the necessary protection to all affected because of few troops on the ground. This lack of protection capacity meant that humanitarian agencies were hampered in their duties to deliver aid to the affected populations.

The inability of AMIB to fully realise its mandate can be attributed to the limited numbers of troops that AMIB had to deploy as well as the fact that there was no comprehensive ceasefire in place from the beginning. It is estimated that AMIB had to deal with approximately 25 000 combatants (Powell, 2005:37). When AMIB transformed into a UN mission, the strength was doubled; this in itself reflects the environment in which AMIB had to work in. AMIB deployment came some months after the AU was launched and the PSC was in its infancy, and hence there was no institutional capacity and know-how to support the deployment. Even the
soldiers who were deployed lacked proper training to protect civilians (Sculier, 2003).

AMIS also suffered a similar situation in terms of material support and human resources. Symbolic of their limited capacity, on 26 April 2005, the Chairperson of the Commission formally asked for logistical support from NATO and the EU: 116 armoured personnel carriers, 24 armoured ambulances, 16 helicopters, seven heavy-lift cargo aircraft, transport trucks and cars, and basic equipment such as tents and stoves (Monaco and Gourlay, 2005:12). This request indicates that AMIS had no logistical capacity except that which they acquired from partners. In addition, the International Crisis Group (2005:10) reported that there was a request for intelligence equipment and training, operational assistance in force preparation, deployment and sustainment. Apart from what came from AU partners, the AU only brought troops to the mission areas, a clear reflection of the lack of sufficient capacity within the AU peacekeeping effort.

4.7.4 Lack of financial resources

The basis of a peace mission is embedded in financial support. Finances can be translated into material support; finances to sustain troops through allowances – missions thus run on money. The AU has very little in its financial coffers. Until recently, the AU annual budget was about US$43 million. Contributions to the Peace Fund at 6% of state contributions amounted to only about US$2.5 million annually. Furthermore, the AU has a tendency of non-payments and in recent years regularly had about US$12 million in unpaid membership dues (Cilliers, 2005:70). Another major challenge is the lack of timely voluntary contributions from member states, which leaves the organisation continuously broke. Theoretically, this budget restricts the AU to small Chapter VI observer missions, although the AU has been engaged in Chapter VII-styled missions requiring substantial financial resources. In practice, this means that the AU is operating beyond its means.

The budget for AMIB was estimated at US$110 million for the first year but after fourteen months the total cost had reached US$134 million. AMIB lacked in-mission sustainability; hence administration and logistics were arranged with the TCCs through memorandums of understanding. TCCs were required to be self-sustained for 60 days, after which they were entitled for reimbursement from the AU Commission (African Union,
2003a). But with such a small budget how does AU reimburse TCCs? If TCCs are not reimbursed properly, it discourages would-be TCCs from taking part in AU missions. If all the financial requirements for a mission are from partners, can the AU claim to be in charge of such missions and take credit for them? Boshoff (2004:3) points out that AMIB’s lack of resources forced it to remain outside the process, limiting its activities to protecting convoys and providing food supplies. These are the realities brought about by financial constraints, a factor that is the AU’s biggest challenge. Most importantly as Sharamo (2006:54) observed, “lack of financial and logistical support has a dampening effect on the political will”. The AU needs to find a formula for funding its own missions, so that it can have more control over such missions.

The UN Mission in the Sudan had a budget of US$1 billion for 12 months, MONUC had a budget of US$746 million in June 2005, and the budget of the small UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea’s (UNMEE) is in the region of US$216 million. The operational cost of maintaining 67 military observers in Burundi from 1993 to 1996 was about US$7.2 million (Cilliers, 2005:70). The AMIS budget in 2005 was US$252 million but by August 2005 only US$79 million had been pledged, leaving a shortfall of US$173 million (Sharamo, 2006:53). These are the challenges of peacekeeping missions, and the AU’s budget is by far too small to cover such expenses. Its financial reliance on its partners is expected to last for many years to come. The question is: how long will the partners continue funding the AU with taxpayers’ money when so many conflicts are emerging on the continent? National interests of donor countries will play an important role in determining whether such assistance should continue. What will happen if this support stops? This financial environment is probably what made De Coning (2004:23) conclude that “the UN is the only institution that can coordinate the various multidimensional components needed to form a complex peacebuilding system”.

Alternative measures were discussed by AU member states on how to raise more funds for peacekeeping efforts, but no agreement was reached. Ideas included imposing a peace tax on African citizens, creating a Pan-African visa in which visitors to Africa pay a tax of US$10 or on imports from outside Africa (Wannenburg and Kajee, 2003:11). These failures mean that the AU will continue to depend on international financial aid, which has proven to be unpredictable and inconsistent. As acknowledged by the African Chiefs of Defence Staff, lack of central funding and reimbursement
for peacekeeping costs inhibit full participation of less endowed member states (African Union, 2003b:12). Too much dependence on external funding effectively put foreigners in the driving seat of African peace and security initiatives, development and deployment. This goes against the intentions of African leaders who feel that it is time for Africans to solve their own problems. Mtimkulu (2005:35) asks a very important question with regard to such dependency, “…does the AU have the right to its institutional pride and can it be accorded the recognition it deserves?” in terms of its role in Burundi and Darfur. The two missions demonstrated that AU peacekeeping efforts could not achieve much without financial support from foreign donors. Even regional hegemons like South Africa and Nigeria cannot afford to continuously support such missions alone and their absence from a mission predicts an immediate mission failure.

4.7.5 Impact of international politics on conflict management

Prendergast and Jensen (2006) bluntly put it that “… the stalemate over the deployment of UN peacekeeping operation to the ravaged region in Sudan can be traced directly to the international community’s failure to apply strong diplomatic and economic pressure on Sudan’s government and its officials”. But then the question is why? African politics are complex and with the US experience in Somalia in 1993, countries are cautious when dealing with African conflicts. Besides this fear to engage Africa in its affairs, some aspects, such as natural resources and national interest, can be viewed as having a serious impact on the international community’s ability to do more in Africa, especially in the ongoing humanitarian crisis in Darfur.

At state level, the world’s remaining superpower, the US, is expected to be playing a leading role in assisting the AU to succeed in its peace missions. Though US support is commendable, they lack in other aspects especially the political and economic front. Both former Secretary of State, Colin Powell, and the incumbent Condoleezza Rice visited Darfur and declared mass killings in Darfur, but little action is forthcoming in support of this declaration (Grono, 2006: 627). Unfortunately after declaring that genocide had been committed in Darfur, Colin Powell continued to state that “… no new action [was] dictated by [the] determination” since the US had done everything it could do to get the Sudanese government to act responsibly (Prendergast, 2006). In other words, this meant that the US was going to watch as civilians continued to die in droves, again raising the question
why? Analysts claim that they gave priority to a comprehensive peace agreement (CPA), which they assumed would end the conflict not only in Darfur but in the whole country (Powell, 2005:48).

Furthermore, analysts also assert that the Bush administration has a special relationship with the Sudanese government in the fight against terrorism. According to the International Crisis Group (2006), the Bush administration prefers to maintain the relationship rather than to pressurise the Sudanese government to abide by the 8 April 2004 agreement as well as to allow UN peacekeepers into the country. The US feels that pressurising the Sudan could jeopardise their access to information on terror from the Sudanese government. To support this claim, Grono (2006:628) asserts that in 2005 the Sudanese chief of intelligence was flown to the US to brief the Central Intelligence Agency. The same man is also thought to be one of the architects of the Darfur atrocities. In addition, the US, as a permanent member of the Security Council, had not allowed any strong resolution against the Sudan. It appears that human rights principles clash with post-9/11 counter-terrorism imperatives.

The UN as the ultimate body responsible for international peace and security has attempted to act against the Sudanese government but failed partly because of the composition of the Security Council itself. China, the largest importer of Sudanese oil, would block any resolution that threatens its oil supply (BBC News, 2006; Human Rights Watch, 2003). Russia is leery of UN intervention in civil conflicts because the Russians fear that if this becomes a precedent, it might eventually haunt them in the conflict in Chechnya, which is in its proximity (Grono, 2006:628). France does not want the Sudanese conflict to endanger the stability of Chad, which could disturb the flow of oil from Chad into France (Motsi, 2006).

Even the AU has difficulties acting boldly against the Sudan. The AU is operating in the Sudan with consent from the Sudanese government; therefore it is reluctant to push the Sudan too far for fear of being kicked out. Furthermore, a failure by the AU, which is trying so hard to prove that it can solve African conflicts, could spell a serious setback for the promising young organisation. With these limiting international politics,

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20 Though the US has been pushing for AMIS to be replaced by a UN Mission, the push is not enough because civilians are still being killed and no concrete decision has been reached yet to overcome the Sudanese government’s refusal to allow UN troops into the country.
the international community is shying away from confronting the Sudan head-on, instead it is focusing on humanitarian assistance and thereby addressing the result of the conflict and avoiding the causes. A senior UN official expressed his dismay by proclaiming that the action of the international community towards Darfur is like “keeping people alive with humanitarian assistance until they are massacred” (International Crisis Group, 2006). The UN only managed to pass a resolution to deploy a UN peacekeeping force in the Sudan in August 2006, but the resolution provides for conditional deployment pending the consent of the Sudanese government (United Nations, 2006b).

In spite of these hardships, there is no shortage of international support for building an African peace support capacity. The problem within Africa, according to Wannenburg and Kajee (2003:8), is indecision compounded by deep divisions among politicians over whether a given situation truly constitutes crimes of sufficient magnitude against humanity to warrant intervention. From Chapter three of this thesis, programmes such as the G8 Joint Africa Plan of Action, RECAMP, and ACOTA were highlighted as building peacekeeping capacity in Africa, but still the continent has limited capacity. This is a result of uncoordinated assistance rendered randomly to African states based on donor interests. Donors also assist at their convenience, which is sometimes too late to make any meaningful contribution to peace and security. The impact of international politics on the African context will always be a major factor as long as Africans cannot sponsor their own peace missions. Donors will always act in their own interests and not in African interests per se, and this will sometimes perpetuate conflicts.

4.8 CONCLUSION

The AU missions in Burundi and the Sudan provided the AU with a testing ground to move from the declaratory stage to an operational domain, a relevant test for its envisaged conflict management mechanisms. A few outstanding aspects characterise the two missions. Firstly, the AU was not hesitant to authorise and deploy troops in the two conflict areas, even though the Sudan had some restrictions in accepting deployment. Secondly, the host countries were not hostile to accept the AU interventions, unlike in the OAU era where countries preferred other bodies outside the OAU structures. Thirdly, the international community worked relatively well with the AU in spite of the fact that the AU is relatively new. Lastly, the
AU was somewhat successful tactically, given its limited numbers, and its shortcomings were related to capacity and not to its conduct in terms of the mission areas. The success of the transition of AMIB to the UN Operation in Burundi (ONUB) in June 2004 set precedence for future peacekeeping missions where deployment by regional organisations will precede a more resourceful UN mission.

The AU missions in Burundi and the Sudan reveal that the AU possesses some political will to follow through the commitments it had made to secure Africa. The two missions indicate that the AU could respond to crisis situations within the limits of its capacity and resources. More importantly, the AU is more flexible in deploying its troops even before termination of hostilities, which is a critical factor to stabilise conflict or potential conflict before any escalations. This is very important because it is in line with the so-called Brahimi Report’s recommendation for a rapid deployment force. In the two conflicts discussed, the situations could have worsened if the AU did not intervene when it did. The UN, which is tasked with the maintenance of international peace and security, was not prepared to take any meaningful action at that particular time. For a young organisation, these are commendable achievements, but some aspects clearly showed the need for a continued partnership with the international community.

In both missions, the protection of civilians was not sufficient to guarantee them safety all the time. Though this is not a traditional task of peacekeepers, when the need to do so arose, the AU peacekeepers were not in a position to carry it out in full. In essence, this task can only be achieved if the peacekeepers had numbers to cover the affected areas but also had the mandate to do so. In the cases of both Burundi and Darfur, such numbers were not there. This is proven by the fact that when the UN deployed in Burundi, they doubled the number of troops and other logistical requirements. Powell (2005:54) concludes that the mission under the AU lacked the requisite financial resources, operational and institutional capacity as well as training and expertise to fulfil its mandate as well as to provide meaningful protection to civilians. The restrictions imposed on the AMIS mandate by the Sudanese government hampered the effective protection of civilians in the areas. In any event, only civilians who lived in the vicinity of the AU troops were accorded protection. This therefore means that the AU requires extensive political and material support in order to deliver on its commitments to peace and security.
It is clear that the concept of an ASF is still far from being mature. Positive aspects have been pointed out as well as challenges to its operationalisation. Given the fact that the AU is only four years old, it can only be hoped that it will develop with time and learn from the challenges it faced in Burundi and Darfur. Most importantly, the AU will have to reconsider its future path, whether to develop a stabilising force or a multidimensional force, which as for now seems to be beyond African means. If the AU member states cannot come up with a system to fund African peacekeeping missions, its chances of fruition will be drastically reduced.

Peacekeeping as has been highlighted, is a global responsibility. Even though Africa is playing a leading role in African conflicts, it cannot effectively police the continent without the assistance of the international community. But this assistance should be on African terms not those of donors to avoid donors taking full responsibility of African initiatives. As pointed out by Sharamo (2006:54), “… the cultivation of a strong global political will is a critical resource to effectively keep peace”. The success of an AU peacekeeping effort could be achieved based on the quality of political will it gathers from member states. Such political unity could better garner support from the international community thereby closing the gaps in the AU peacekeeping efforts. Financial and logistical constraints have a negative effect on political will, and will remain a major obstacle to AU peacekeeping efforts as long as the AU cannot provide for itself. With all these hardships in the way of the AU’s peacekeeping efforts, maybe it is a sign that no individual organisation has the absolute leverage to keep peace in Africa; a collaborative global approach with a strengthened regional response is probably the best course of action at the moment.
CHAPTER 5: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

5.1 SUMMARY

The purpose of this study was to explore the quest for a more effective African peacekeeping capability and to assess whether the mutation of the OAU to the AU has been the answer to the problems of a constrained peacekeeping capability. This purpose was formulated against the backdrop of the AU’s precursor, the OAU, and the constraints that paralysed its effectiveness in peace and security management. The question that denotes the foundation of this study, is: \textit{what is different now that may underpin the realisation of an effective AU peacekeeping mechanism?} In this regard, the research traced the evolution of Africa’s conflict management efforts from the days of the OAU to the present position of the AU in an effort to affirm whether old challenges are still prevalent as well as to uncover any new mechanisms positioned to overcome past challenges in conflict management. This was done through a literature review and an analysis of Africa’s involvement in peacekeeping operations.

To facilitate this study, the following research question was formulated: \textit{Are the challenges encountered by the OAU still relevant in the AU era? If so, what is the AU doing differently to overcome these challenges and what is the likelihood of an effective African peacekeeping capability?}

The challenges encountered by the OAU and the AU in peacekeeping and efforts pursued to manage conflicts on the continent form the conceptual demarcation of the research problem, whereas the African continent and islands that form part of the AU form the geographic demarcation. Temporal demarcation relates to the period between the formation of the OAU in 1963 and February 2007. Some information, such as background to conflicts, have been included since these conflicts have direct bearing on the OAU and interventions by the AU and also highlights the environment of African conflicts.

The research methodology used is a descriptive analysis based on a literature study, factual data sources as well as interviews. Primary sources utilised were mostly policy documents from both the OAU and the AU. Unstructured interviews were conducted with conflict management practitioners. One of these was actually deployed as a military observer in Darfur and the other is presently deployed as an operations officer at SADC
HQ PLANELM. A telephonic interview was also conducted with a conflict management specialist at the Institute for Security Studies. The unit of analysis is the continental peacekeeping capability and the level of analysis is organisational. The limitation of the study relates to the age of the AU. Given that it was only established in 2002, it is rather premature to make a conclusive judgement on its future prospects because its peacekeeping mechanisms are still developing. Needless to say, it is equally important to trace the development of the organisation in order to identify any shortcomings as soon as possible and to come up with corrective measures whilst the determination and commitment are still high. For that reason, whereas it is early to reach final or definite answers on the future of the ASF, it is necessary to determine where the AU is heading in peace and security issues. Another limitation relates to the latest information on the progress of the sub-regional brigades because of the military nature of information on these brigades.

The significance of the study is that the conclusions reached could help government officials, military personnel, PSC personnel, sub-regional brigades staffs as well as other researchers to explore the likelihood of establishing an operational PSC that could meet its intended goals. These officials and researchers will be able to identify areas that need attention and to take corrective measures where necessary. For this reason, the study is valid and viable. Future research could be centred on specific brigades to assess the ASF better in view of the fact that the ASF is comprised of individual sub-regional brigades.

The study commenced by looking at the evolution of security cooperation in the African continent since the inception of the OAU. It reveals that during the post-colonial era, Pan-Africanism as well as decolonisation played a critical role in bringing states together culminating in the formation of the OAU in 1963. After independence, African leaders realised that freedom did not necessarily translate into peace and security as the continent was barraged by conflicts. Consequently, there was a realisation for a need for some continental system to assist in conflict resolution and management. A loose concept was incorporated in the OAU Charter, namely the Defence Commission, but it was not given any tools to manage or resolve conflicts that ravaged the continent. Those who felt the Defence Commission concept was inadequate, in particular Ghana, proposed an African High Command, which never materialised. The idea of a continental force was debated at different forums under different names, but the entrenched
concepts of non-interference, territoriality and sovereignty embedded in the OAU Charter, prevented any agreement to establish such a supranational military organisation.

Despite the resistance to a continental force, the OAU deployed an OAU peacekeeping force to Chad in December 1981. The peace mission was beset by many logistical and financial problems, including an unclear mandate and a lack of capacity by the OAU member states to run the mission successfully. However, a new tide came about in the 1990s after the demise of the Cold War. A sudden upsurge in conflicts forced the OAU to forge mechanisms to manage African conflicts in a more organised manner. During the Kampala Summit of 1991, African leaders called for more cooperation in security, stability, and development on the continent. Thus, a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution was formed in 1993 as a conflict-management tool, which then paved the way for the 1997 African Chiefs of Defence Staff agreement on a peacekeeping standby arrangement from each of the five African sub-regions. This became the foundation of the ASF, which was formally approved during the Third Session of the AU Assembly in July 2004. The ASF is composed of standby multi-disciplinary components with civilians and military components in their countries of origin, who are ready for rapid deployment at appropriate notice. At the same time, regionalism and regional responses became key issues in African politics emanating from Western disengagement from the continent.

The research further revealed that the groundwork for the African peace and security architecture is the CADSP, an umbrella concept envisioned to promote a common understanding among African states about their defence and security challenges. The CADSP establishes measures that harmonise collective responses to these challenges. The CADSP forms a strategy based on a set of principles, norms, objectives and mechanisms that are aimed at reducing and eventually eradicating violent conflicts on the continent. Its objectives are to be achieved through the PSC, a decision-making organ envisaged for preventing, managing and resolving conflicts. It comprises of the ASF, the Panel of the Wise, a Continental Early Warning System and a Peace Fund. In essence, the PSC has the authority to undertake peacekeeping, peacemaking and peace building through authorisation from the Assembly.
The study also uncovered an acknowledgment and recognition by the AU that dealing with peace and security issues is the responsibility of the UN. Consequently, there should be a mutual relationship between the two organisations and other international partners as well as sub-regional bodies. Despite this acknowledgment and recognition, the research could not find any document that formalises these relationships. As a result, the division of responsibilities in order to allow each party to master its roles is implied, but not explicitly written down.

The study further evaluated how the new AU peacekeeping mechanisms performed in Burundi and Darfur, and tried to establish whether there were any new challenges faced during these operations. At the same time, the research revisited the challenges of the OAU era and tested their presence in the two peacekeeping missions (in Burundi and Darfur). The study revealed that similar challenges that were encountered during the Chad operation existed in Burundi and Darfur, such as the inability to deploy enough troops, financial constraints, capacity shortcomings and the impact of external politics. Despite these challenges and limitations, conclusions can be made in the context of providing answers to the research question.

5.2 CONCLUSIONS

Are the peacekeeping challenges encountered by the OAU still relevant in the AU era?

Armed with the generic challenges to peacekeeping in Africa, a deliberate effort was made to ascertain the presence of such challenges in an actual peacekeeping mission undertaken by the OAU. It was against this backdrop that analysts, amongst whom Wiseman (1984), Walraven (1999), Berman and Sams (2000), Muyangwa and Vogt (2002), Neethling (2002), De Coning (2004) and Van Nieuwkerk (2004), singled out political will, limited mandate, lack of financial resources, limited capacity in conflict management, and international interference by external actors as contributors to the failures of the OAU in its past peacekeeping efforts. The peacekeeping mission in Chad, as the only large-scale peace mission on which the OAU ever embarked, was used for this purpose.

The study revealed that the Chad peace mission was first mandated to deploy 5 000 but the final number deployed was only about 3 000 troops. Of the six countries that had pledged troops, only three finally managed to
deploy; the rest failed because of one or more of the aforementioned challenges. The OAU membership did not even have consensus on the deployment. Some states perceived the conflict to be an internal affair, which did not require their involvement, a limitation borne by the design of the OAU Charter. On the operational side, the command structure was not well established, as the Force Commander was reporting to the Chairperson of the OAU instead of to the OAU HQ. The Force Commander, a Nigerian, only had control over Nigerian troops; the rest were controlled by their home countries. Even the SOFA that was supposed to be a neutral document, favoured the GUNT, a sign of inexperience and lack of conflict-management skills on the part of the signatories. Libya had troops in Chad while the super powers supported different factions and even African states had no common support. This assessment ascertained that the challenges identified by analysts were indeed a hindrance to peace operations in Africa. The research then focused on the AU peacekeeping operations to investigate whether the same challenges encountered in Chad were still hindering the organisation’s peacekeeping efforts.

An assessment of the AU’s performance in its peace missions in Burundi and Darfur, more than two decades after the Chad operation, revealed some similarities in the challenges encountered. The decisions to authorise deployment in either country were reached by AU member states collectively. Though the two conflicts were internal conflicts, the provisions of the AU Constitutive Act overruled sovereignty to support human security. In this regard, it can be concluded that the challenges emanating from a limiting mandate are lesser impediments in the AU Constitutive Act.

Three countries volunteered to send troops to Burundi, but only South Africa was able to deploy without immediate outside assistance. The other two, Ethiopia and Mozambique, only managed to deploy with backing from external donors through financial and logistical assistance. In the operational area, South Africa, as the lead nation, continued to support the two abovementioned countries logistically, which helped them to sustain themselves during the operation. The problem of an inability to deploy was a replay of the Chad mission where Benin, Togo and Guinea failed to deploy because of inter alia financial constraints. Like the Chad operation, AMIB also required more troops than the numbers that were deployed. Such strengths could not be reached because African countries lacked the requisite logistical and financial support; an increment only came after the
mission was handed over to the UN. This reality therefore revealed that the problem of finance and capacity remained.

In Burundi, there was not much influence from international politics; most of the political dialogue was handled by South Africa as the lead nation. On the ground, the chain-of-command, which reported to the AU HQ, was well established and the mission’s leadership comprised both military and civilian officials on the ground. In Burundi, where the contingent was smaller and led by a lead nation, some of the challenges were minimal, but in Darfur with a much larger contingent and no lead nation, the challenges were much more evident and prominent. In contrast, AMIS, which is much larger and more complex, experienced a lot more of these challenges. This might suggest that these challenges, particularly international influence, are less visible when there is a lead nation with some peacekeeping capability leading a peace mission.

The deployment in Darfur did not have a lead nation, and it was completely dependent on foreign donations. Donor countries airlifted the troops, provided them with accommodation in the mission area, and supplied them with the necessary equipment, medical cover, transportation as well as their allowances. When donations arrived late, the troops were not paid their allowances. Donations in the form of money were sometimes also a challenge because the AU did not have the capacity to procure required stores. Such heavy dependency sometimes came with conditions from donor countries, protecting their interests. The Darfur conflict proved to be a place where the dynamics of international politics converged resulting in very little being done except to watch the ineffectiveness of the under-resourced and understaffed AMIS troops. The international community wants the AU to be replaced by a more robust UN force, but Sudan and its allies prefer the presence of the AU. Some members of the UN Security Council have different interests in Sudan, hence making a consensus decision very difficult. Furthermore, the size of the AMIS-force deployed is very large by AU standards and poses a challenge to inexperienced AU commanders.

The answer to the question regarding the presence of old challenges is therefore affirmative. The AU still faces old problems even though some have evolved slightly in their stature. Political will, for instance, is no longer a major challenge in terms of making decisions to intervene, but acting on these decisions is proving to be a lingering issue. This is
exacerbated by a lack of capacity to do the job. Leaders may want to deploy, but if they do not have airlift capability, logistical support and financial assistance, their efforts may always remain wishes. Similarly, the Constitutive Act of the AU is more flexible, allowing more flexible mandates. The Constitutive Act allows member states to intervene in the affairs of other member states in certain cases. Furthermore, member states may request an intervention by the AU member states to restore law and order. Financial limitation remains the primary impediment to peacekeeping on the continent. International politics also continue to impact negatively on efforts by the AU to manage conflicts, especially where the donors are heavily involved. In a nutshell, it may be concluded that the challenges of the OAU era are still eroding the efficiency and capability of the AU peacekeeping efforts. It is also important to note that the level of the AU eminence depends on the way it carries out its peace missions. Thus, the credibility of the AU is based on its successes in such missions. At the moment, though, there is evidence that the AU is better structured for peace and security. Its successes have been limited, especially in large-scale operations.

What is the AU doing differently to enhance its peacekeeping capability?

When the AU was established, it deliberately took some steps to create conflict-management mechanisms intended to distance itself from the image of the OAU. The Constitutive Act itself is more flexible. It has more objectives aimed at improving democracy, human security, good governance, people’s participation and international cooperation. In stark contrast to the OAU Charter, the Constitutive Act allows intervention in the internal affairs of member states, and the AU may be requested to intervene by a member to restore peace. Additionally, the AU has a peace and security architecture that is envisaged to be a frontrunner in continental peace and security issues. This peace and security architecture is driven by the PSC that will be equipped with a continental standby force consisting of five sub-regional standby brigades of between 3 000 and 4 000 troops each and a sixth one located at the AU HQ. Furthermore, there will be between 300 and 500 military observers trained and ready to deploy on 14 days’ notice and a police standby capacity of about 240 officers. The ASF was designed to be deployed under six scenarios, the first three being small and mostly observer missions and the last three being more complex missions that may require substantial troop deployment.
To support the ASF, there is a Panel of the Wise, which will comprise five respected statesmen who have distinguished themselves and who have contributed positively in peace, security and development. The Panel of the Wise shall advise the PSC and the chairperson of the Commission on issues pertaining to the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability on the continent. They will, amongst others, be used to broker peace among warring parties or as links in dialogues between factions. There is also a Continental Early Warning System designed to collect data and to analyse it in order to provide appropriate early warning indicators on potential conflict areas. Sub-regional bodies will also have their early warning systems linked to the continental system. An account, called the Peace Fund, was set-up to allow member states, external donors or any volunteers to deposit money that will specifically be used to run peacekeeping missions.

The sub-regional brigades, except the northern Maghreb Union brigade, have made good progress in terms of building their capabilities to undertake peacekeeping missions in their regions. The SADC Brigade met all its phase one obligations and is planning to launch the brigade towards the end of 2007. The other sub-regional brigades also made progress in identifying their HQ, deployments of PLANELM, and allocation of budgets to their developments, which are all signs of commitment to deal with African conflicts. It is hoped that when all these mechanisms are fully functional, the AU will have better means to solve African problems. The above activities answer the question on what the AU is doing now to overcome the challenges of the past. With all these mechanisms fully developed and functional, the AU will have enhanced its peacekeeping capability and possibly eliminate all or some of the peacekeeping challenges it presently encounters.

What is the likelihood for an effective African peacekeeping capability?

The AU is still a relatively young organisation and its peacekeeping mechanisms are still growing. It is clear that the AU is a different organisation from the OAU, starting from its foundation, the Constitutive Act. There is currently more consensus among African leaders in African agendas than before. As a continental body, the AU is also more willing to tackle African problems than before. There is a stronger Pan-African bond that aims to break the cycle of violence, poverty and underdevelopment on the continent. This bond is driven by democracy and good governance. Previous attempts at security cooperation were disrupted by the notion of
state sovereignty that was entrenched in the OAU Charter. This has since changed, advancing the values of democracy, accountability and transparent politics. The efforts and mechanisms put in place under the PSC (though viewed by some as ambitious), demonstrate some form of determination and commitment. However, as previously noted, determinations, intentions and wishes alone cannot ensure the successful realisation of a body tasked with the mammoth responsibility of peace and security. Furthermore, the African continent reflects more conflicts than all others, and has the lowest gross domestic products in the world, which makes it susceptible to instability.

The challenges in peacekeeping discussed earlier can be overcome to a degree if the PSC develops to maturity and a source of financial support is found within Africa. Theoretically, as long as the AU cannot fund its own peace missions independently, it will never be in a position to determine the course of its missions. The research revealed that in Burundi, where the AU was lead by South Africa, a regional hegemon, the mission was more or less successful. The same cannot be said about Darfur, where donor countries dominate the path and progress of the mission. If the donors stop their contributions to AMIS, the mission will terminate immediately, as evidenced by the non-payment of allowances when donations are late. The pace and success of the mission is thus determined by these foreign contributions. It is evident that AMIS has surpassed the AU means to support the operation, as opposed to the AMIB mission, where the AU achieved better results because it was more or less within its capability. This is not to downplay the fact that AMIB was smaller than AMIS in terms of size and complexity, but if the AU can cope with missions the size of AMIB, maybe it should concentrate on such missions and avoid large-scale missions, which are beyond its capacity.

The likelihood of an effective AU peacekeeping capability cannot be realised if the AU is fully dependent on foreign donations. The question then is: *can the AU fund its own peace missions?* Given the present economic situation of the continent, this is very unlikely. The reality is that the African peacekeeping capability is very limited without external support. For the AU to build such a mechanism, it first has to formalise its relationship with the UN in terms of burden sharing. Though the AU recognises that the UN has the responsibility to maintain international peace and security, and that the AU’s responsibility is to augment the UN not to assume its responsibilities, the ambitious efforts of the PSC suggest a
different approach. An alternative approach could be to build a small holding force that could be deployed prior to the arrival of a more robust UN contingent, as was the case in Burundi. However, such an arrangement has to be agreed upon by all the stakeholders. The AU should know what it is expected to do and for how long. The current refusal of the Sudanese government to allow the AU to hand over the mission to the UN is a demonstration of the fact that the AU or its member states do not appreciate the division of labour between the two organisations. The AU experience in Darfur highlights the limitations of the PSC and renders its intentions rather ambitious. As is the case now, the AU does not have the capacity or resources to carry out a multidimensional peacekeeping mission for prolonged periods and it is unlikely that it will have such capability in the near future.

A possible solution could be found in a burden-sharing partnership with donors. The AU need to establish the degree of collaboration it wants with the UN and its other partners. This could include issues like whether the UN should put its assets at the disposal of the AU and sub-regional bodies and give clarity about what partners like the EU, NATO or any bilateral donors can provide. With no predictable, sustainable and coordinated system of assistance, the ASF faces a doomed future. At the moment, there are no institutional mechanisms for ensuring effective partnership and real burden-sharing between the UN, other willing donors and regional or sub-regional bodies.

It can therefore be concluded that for the AU to have an effective peacekeeping capability, it has to overcome the challenges of the past; at the moment, this has not been achieved yet. The problem of sovereignty was dealt with because the AU can intervene to restore peace and security or prevent genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. Capacity in conflict management can be built and gained through deployment, provided such deployments have the necessary resources. International politics will always be driven by donor states’ national interests, but it is hoped that restoration of peace will appeal to most donors and influence positively towards African objectives. The lack of financial resources remains the main area of concern, which is likely to render the AU peacekeeping expansion null and void. With its current limited budget, it is unlikely that the AU will manage conflicts independently and effectively in the short to medium term. However, in the final analysis, the intended operationalisation of the ASF presents an important and promising shift
towards realising a long-standing Pan-African ideal, and thus offers African leaders new and better prospects to deal with peace and security issues in a more constructive way than before.
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