THE JOINT MONITORING COMMISSION

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The Joint Monitoring Commission (JMC) was created to oversee the withdrawal of South African forces from the portion of Angola’s southern Cunene province in which they had operated for some time, and its re-occupation by the Angolan Armed Forces (Fapla). It was to ensure that neither Swapo nor Cuban forces moved into this area as the South African Defence Force (SADF) withdrew. The JMC consisted of SADF and Fapla headquarters (HQ) personnel and infantry from both armies to monitor the area concerned. It operated in southern Angola from February 1984 to May 1985.

The background

Tension between South Africa and Angola arose out of the presence of Swapo training, staging and logistic facilities in southern Angola.

Swapo began its terrorism in northern South West Africa (SWA) in 1966, the first attack occurring on 26 August. Swapo initially concentrated on Caprivi, which offered the easiest targets for operations from bases in Zambia. The emphasis gradually shifted to Swapo’s tribal home base, Owambo. This became more pronounced as the security situation in Angola deteriorated, easing access to Owambo from southern Angola. Zambia was also increasingly reluctant to allow operations from her territory.

By 1978 Swapo had effectively been required to leave Zambia and had also been driven out of south-eastern Angola by Unita forces which had become allied to South Africa after the MPLA seizure of power in Luanda in 1975. Swapo now concentrated almost entirely on Owambo, operating from bases in southern Angola, particularly in Cunene province.

Not surprisingly, this very favourable situation – a sanctuary and direct access to its tribal base – allowed Swapo to conduct an effective campaign of terrorism and sabotage in Owambo. By 1978 this situation had become unacceptable. The SA Government concluded that there was no option but to seize the military initiative and strike at the terrorists where they were at their most vulnerable – in their bases and staging areas inside Angola. Operations were not, however, aimed against Angola or the Angolan people.

The first visible result of this decision was Operation Reindeer in May 1978, against various Swapo facilities in the immediate border region and at Cassinga. Other lightning strikes at Swapo bases followed over the next eighteen months.

By 1981 this strategy was no longer efficient. Swapo had learned to disperse their facilities and, wherever possible, to “hug” Fapla bases in an effort to ensure against SADF attack. Swapo’s logistic system was also increasingly intertwined with that of Fapla, making it nearly impossible to hit the one and not the other.

South Africa adapted her strategy accordingly. The next major operation – Operation Protea – saw the SADF accept clashes with Fapla as inevitable and strike at several towns in which Swapo had facilities – dealing with Fapla as necessary. Another change was that infantry were left behind to hunt down Swapo elements in the affected area and to intercept Swapo personnel returning after the departure of the main SA force. The outcome of this strategy was that a portion of southern Angola was effectively occupied by elements of the SADF. Several major operations were also launched against Swapo facilities deeper inside Angola.

This strategy proved militarily effective but brought unacceptable political damage, thus finally forcing the SA Government to instruct the SADF to revise its strategy. The last of the major operations, Askari, was already heavily influenced by political considerations which delayed it, affected the tactics employed, and finally forced its premature termination.

By this time – mid December 1983 – the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) was well advanced in developing a new South African/United States political initiative on the question of SWA independence and how to arrange it. During a meeting in Europe, the SA Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr R.F. Botha, and the US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Dr Chester Crocker, had discussed this and how to achieve a Cuban withdrawal from Angola.

The opening move of the new initiative was to be a South African offer to withdraw her forces from
southern Angola in return for Angola ending her support for Swapo terrorism. It was hoped that this would set in train a series of improvements in the southern African political situation.

With the propaganda campaign against South Africa on the SWA question and, particularly, on the “occupation” of parts of Angola reaching new heights, it was decided to move the announcement of this initiative forward from 31 December 1983 to 15 December 1983, thereby preempting the Security Council debate on the SA/Angolan situation scheduled for 16 December. A letter outlining the SA proposals was delivered to the Secretary General of the United Nations on 15 December.

In essence, SA offered to withdraw her troops from southern Angola on 31 January 1984 if Angola would undertake that Swapo, the Cubans and Fapla would not exploit the resulting situation to the detriment of the security of SWA. The SA forces would be held out of Angola for an initial period of 30 days, which could be extended if Angola adhered to her side of the arrangement. SA went on to say that she was still prepared to begin implementing Resolution 435 as soon as the question of the Cuban forces in Angola had been satisfactorily addressed.

While both Swapo and Angola rejected this offer, it did defuse the Security Council debate to some extent and allowed the USA to adopt a more positive attitude on the SWA question. The debate on the SA/Angolan situation ended on 20 December with a demand for an immediate unconditional SA withdrawal, but without any mention of the mandatory sanctions against the Republic.

Angola now broke the news of Askari, claiming that it represented a South African invasion of Angola and calling for another Security Council debate.

By 3 January, however, the Angolan attitude had changed and President Eduardo dos Santos addressed an open letter to the Secretary General of the UN in which he declared that Angola would not oppose a 30 day truce beginning on 31 January as proposed by South Africa, provided that:

1. Swapo agreed to the truce;
2. South Africa withdrew all of her forces from Angola; and
3. South Africa undertook to implement Resolution 435 for Namibian independence within 15 days of the end of the 30 day ceasefire "without extraneous considerations in that context" – a clear reference to the "linkage" of a Cuban withdrawal to the SWA question.

Both South Africa and Angola now saw something to be gained from a negotiated settlement. Angola saw an opportunity to end the embarrassing and damaging South African operations into her territory. South Africa saw a possibility to improve the overall security situation in South West Africa.

On 8 January the SA Minister of Defence announced that the forces involved in Operation Askari would be withdrawn within a week – which they duly were. Dr Crocker meanwhile set about organising a meeting of the parties concerned and the Angolan Government issued a statement on 17 January saying that a 30 day trial ceasefire might indeed be possible – allaying doubts arising after a highly hostile Swapo statement on 11 January. Apparently intended to block any further talk of improved South African/Angolan relations, this had claimed that Askari had been aimed purely at Angola, not Swapo.

Dr Crocker and members of the Angolan Government held exploratory talks in Cape Verde from 18 to 20 January, from which he came away with Angolan assurances that they would prevent Swapo and the Cubans from entering the area to be vacated by the SADF, and would control Swapo. Dr Crocker passed these assurances on to South African Prime Minister P.W. Botha at Fleur du Cap and Mr Botha announced in Parliament on 31 January 1984 that South African forces were disengaging from Angola with effect from that day.

The JMC is born

The SA withdrawal was barely underway when intelligence indicated large scale Swapo infiltration through southern Angola into SWA. The situation was deemed sufficiently grave to warrant halting the disengagement until this problem could be resolved.

It had now become clear to South Africa that something more than the word of the Angolan Government would be needed before there could be enough confidence to allow the disengagement to proceed. Accordingly, Prime Minister Botha on 6 February 1984 proposed military
discussions between South Africa, Angola and the USA to "establish a proper framework for the disengagement of South African forces".

The Nkomati Accord had gone a long way to create the right climate for such a proposal. Within days, aides from all three countries were making the necessary arrangements. The South African Government had meanwhile ordered the disengagement to proceed and to be complete by 15 February, except for some 300 men who were to remain behind to monitor Swapo movements.

Angola’s suggestion of the Mulungushi conference centre in Lusaka was accepted and the format of the talks was agreed on. There were to be two meetings, an initial one over 13/14 February to find sufficient common ground between Angola and South Africa to draw up general principles to govern the disengagement process, and a follow-up conference a few days later at which the details could be worked out.

The initial meeting took place on the evening of 13 February. The South African delegation included the Chief of the Army (C Army) Lieutenant-General J.J. Geldenhuys and a Deputy Director of the Department of Foreign Affairs, Mr Dave Steward. The Angolan delegation included the Fapla Deputy Chief of Staff, Lieutenant-Colonel Ngongo Monteiro, and the commander of Fapla’s 5 Military Region – which more or less coincides with Cunene province – Lieutenant-Colonel Sabriaho Sequeira. The United States was represented by Mr Nick Platt of the State Department.

Angola initially adopted a tough attitude, demanding a unilateral SA withdrawal, whereas South Africa proposed a joint commission to monitor the process to ensure that neither Swapo nor Cuban forces exploited it. Lt Gen Geldenhuys, aided by some skilful mediation by Mr Platt, succeeded in having the South African view accepted, both sides finally agreeing that a joint South African/Angolan commission should be established as soon as possible to monitor the disengagement process. Nine specific points were identified and set down in the “Mulungushi Minute”:

1. Both sides agree that a joint South African/Angolan Commission will be constituted as soon as possible to monitor the agreement.
2. The first meeting of the Commission will occur in Lusaka on 16 February 1984.
3. The Commission, with a parity of forces from both sides, will be located at Ongiva, a mutually acceptable location within the area in question.
4. The Commission will be empowered to travel in the area in question as necessary at the behest of either or both of the parties.
5. The purpose of the Commission will be to monitor the disengagement process and to detect, investigate and report on any alleged violations.
6. The day on which both sides agree that the Commission is in operation on site, a thirty day period will commence which will conclude with the final withdrawal of all South African forces from the area in question, aside from those attached to the Commission and its joint monitoring teams.
7. Both sides agree that a symbolic American observer presence in the activities of the Commission will be useful.
8. The Angolan side reiterated its firm commitment to restrain Swapo as the disengagement proceeds, including no Swapo or Cuban presence in the recovered territory.
9. Both sides agree that the disengagement process, including the successful operation of the joint Commission, would be an important step in establishing conditions leading to the peaceful resolution of the region including the question of the implementation of UNSC Resolution 435.

Both sides came away from the meeting satisfied – South Africa had the concept of a monitoring commission accepted; Angola had a framework for the withdrawal of South African forces from her territory – something which the military situation would not have suggested was possible.

The follow-on talks would now be a largely military event with the Department of Defence assuming responsibility for the implementation and control of the proposed Joint Monitoring Commission.

Colonel J.M. Dippenaar was selected to command the SA component of the proposed JMC. He and his senior staff accompanied the Department of Defence delegation to the talks. The delegation was headed by Foreign Minister Botha as well as Defence Minister Malan and included Lt Gen Geldenhuys; Lt Gen P.W. van der Westhuizen, the Chief of Staff Intelligence; and Brigadier A.J.M. Joubert, the officer commanding (OC) Sector 10. The DFA team was
headed by Minister R.F. Botha and included Dr Brand Fourie and Mr Dave Steward. Other members of the SA delegation were the Administrator-General (AG) of SWA, Dr Willem van Niekerk; the Head of the National Intelligence Service, Dr Niel Barnard; and the Secretary of the State Security Council, Lt Gen A.J. van Deventer.

The talks began on the morning of 16 February and took the form of parallel political and military meetings, the latter being, in effect, the first meeting of the new JMC. Angolan officers present included Lt Cols Monteiro and Sequeira and Major Jose Maria, the Security Advisor to President dos Santos. The political discussions were between Ministers Botha and Malan on the South African side, the Angolan Minister of the Interior, Lt Col Alexandre “Kito” Rodrigues and Dr Crocker, under the chairmanship of Dr Kaunda.

The US delegation was headed by Dr Crocker and included Mr Robert Frazure of the US Embassy in London — who shuttled between the meetings with summaries, suggestions and conclusions, Mr J. Woods of the US Department of Defence and Col D. Parker, the US Military Attaché in South Africa.

Against initial expectations, the meetings took place in an extremely positive and co-operative atmosphere and consensus was quickly reached. Operational details, the precise functions of the JMC, the definition of the “area in question” (AIQ) and a broad timetable for the JMC’s movements, were finalised in the military meeting.

The Lusaka Agreement provided that:

1. A Joint Monitoring Commission should be established to monitor the implementation of the understandings set out in the “Mulungushi Minute” of 14 February 1984.

2. The Commission headquarters would move south by steps in accordance with the phased withdrawal of South African forces, the following locations for the JMC HQ being agreed upon – Cuvelai, Mupa, Evale, Ngiva and Oshikango.

3. The first meeting of the JMC in Angola would be held on 25 February 1984 at Cuvelai at 10h00 Angolan time, the two sides being represented by the commanders of Sector 10 (SA) and 5 Military Region (Angola).

4. The SA delegation would include the head of the SA component of the JMC, three officers who would be members of the JMC and an engineer officer nominated by Brig Joubert. The composition of the Angolan delegation would be notified through the United States and South Africa would use the same channel to notify Angola of where its helicopters would land.

5. Among the issues to be discussed on 25 February would be the composition of the JMC’s monitoring groups and the immediate removal of landmines on the Cassinga – Cuvelai road.

6. The JMC would commence operations on 1 March 1984 in Cuvelai and the phased withdrawal of SA forces would commence on the same date and be completed within 30 days. At the end of each week of operation the JMC would move to its next headquarters location as set out in paragraph 2 above.

7. The function of the JMC would be to monitor the implementation of the understandings set out in the “Mulungushi Minute”, including responsibility:
   (a) To ensure that there would be no SA forces excluding those attached to the JMC, to the north of the places where the JMC HQ would be from time to time.
   (b) To ensure that there would be no Cuban or Swapo presence in the area.

8. The area in question was defined as south of the imaginary line joining:
   Marientruss on the Cunene river, the villages of Iona, Onconcua and Otchinjau, a point immediately south of Cahama, a point immediately south of Mulondo, 10 km to the north of Cassinga along the Bale river and along the Cubango river to the SWA border.

9. Immediately after the 25 February meeting, a team of Angolan and SA experts would remove landmines from the Cassinga – Cuvelai road to allow the Angolan monitoring unit to move safely to the JMC from the Angola side.

10. The supervision and implementation of the agreement within the area in question would be carried out to the north of the JMC HQ by Angolan patrols and to the south by SA patrols. In the event of any allegation of a violation of the agreement by either or both of the parties, a joint monitoring team would be formed immediately to proceed to the loca-
tion of the alleged violation to investigate the allegation.
11. Whenever participation by the United States in any meeting of the JMC was required, it would meet near or on the SWA/Angolan border, at the request of both sides.
12. The JMC could carry out any additional functions which might be assigned to it by the governments of Angola and South Africa.

While this agreement was amicably reached, basic differences remained. Angola saw the JMC as a prelude to the implementation of UNSC Resolution 435. The South African view remained that free and fair elections in SWA would only be possible after a Cuban withdrawal from Angola. The statement issued at the end of the talks sidestepped this issue:

"On February 16, 1984 delegations of the People’s Republic of Angola, the Republic of South Africa and the United States of America met in Lusaka to discuss steps to further the process of peace in southern Africa.

The Angolan delegation was headed by Minister of Interior Alexandre Rodrigues, the South African delegation was headed by Minister of Foreign Affairs Mr R.F. Botha, and the American delegation was led by Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Chester A. Crocker.

Responding to President Kaunda’s assessment that a historic opportunity now exists to make progress, the conference achieved the following results:

- Creation of a joint South African/Angolan commission to monitor the disengagement process in southern Angola and to detect, investigate and report any alleged violations of the commitments of the parties.
- The first meeting of the Joint Commission took place in Lusaka on February 16, 1984. Further meetings will be held in other mutually agreed locations at the convenience of the parties.
- It was agreed that a small number of American representatives could participate in the activities of the Joint Commission at the request of the parties.

The delegates agreed that the task of the Joint Commission in the weeks ahead is to facilitate the successful completion of the disengagement process and to establish an effective cessation
of hostilities. The delegations are aware of the many complex and unresolved issues which must still be addressed in the search for solutions to the problems of the region. They agree, however, that the Lusaka meeting constitutes an important and constructive step toward the peaceful resolution of the problems of the region, including the question of the implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 435.

The participants express their deep appreciation to President Kaunda and the Government and people of Zambia for the generous hospitality and excellent arrangements provided in connection with the conference.

The South Africans went home confident that Angola had the intention to control Swapo in terms of the agreement. The Angolans went home confident that they could deal with Unita once the South African forces were withdrawn.

**Cuvelai – 16 February to 21 March 1984**

Col Dippenaar drew up his command appreciation on the morning of 17 February. The detailed appreciation of the disengagement plan was completed on 20 February. The SA JMC members flew to Ondangwa on 21 February and drove to Sector 10 HQ at Oshakati to see to the detailed administrative and logistic planning for the move to Cuvelai and to arrange for Cuvelai and the surrounding area to be secured and for initial infrastructure and the communications links needed to arrange the first meeting to be established, the SADF having accepted responsibility for these tasks.

Col Dippenaar held discussions in Windhoek with the GOC SWATF, Maj Gen George Meiring; the OC Sector 10, Brig Joubert and officials of the Department of Water Affairs and the SWA Electricity Commission. These concerned mainly the barrage and pumping station at Calaqueque on the Cunene, South Africa having accepted responsibility for their security until the withdrawal was complete.

**It was decided that:**

1. The scheme was to be maintained on a daily basis – South Africa to be responsible for the functioning of the wall plus sluices even though these were in Angola.
2. Sector 10 was to remain responsible for the protection of the scheme.
3. The removed water pumps were to be replaced over the period June to August 1984.
4. Four technicians were to remain permanently on site.
5. Stronger maintenance teams were to be deployed from time to time.
6. All liaison regarding the scheme was to be via Mr Coetzee (Water Affairs) in Oshakati, Mr Theron (Electricity Commission) in Ruacana and Brig Joubert.

The JMC presented its detailed operational plan to Maj Gen Meiring and Brig Joubert on the afternoon of 22 February. The plan was approved without major alterations.

An advance party of American technical personnel arrived in Windhoek on 22 February to set up the US liaison office as a base for four or five “observers” for the duration of the disengagement process. Angola had earlier indicated that US officials would not be welcome on Angolan territory.

On 19 February Brigadier Joubert despatched Major J.P. Snyman of 101 Bn with some 350 men to secure an area north-west of Cuvelai – which was occupied by Fapla – and to clear any mines in the area and to establish the necessary facilities. Major Snyman arrived at Cuvelai on 24 February, having had to lay 25 m Medium Girder Bridge over a river 16 km north of Mupa, and having detached a protection element for it. He selected a site south of abandoned Swapo positions which had been overrun during Askari.

As soon as the site had been prepared, Sector 10 HQ communicated the final arrangements (recognition markings, LZs, timings, frequencies) to the US office in Windhoek for transmission to the Fapla JMC component.

A final working group under the chairmanship of Lt Gen Geldenhuys was held at Sector 10 HQ on the evening of 24 February to discuss the finer details of the SA approach during the first meeting.

The SA component of the JMC and Lt Gen Geldenhuys’ group, which included Mr Dave Steward of the DFA, flew to Cuvelai at 08h30B on 25 February in four Pumas of 19 Squadron, arriving shortly before 10h00B. The Fapla component arrived a few hours later in three Alouettes correctly identified by red cloth streamers tied to the undercarriage. Their delegation included Lt Col Sequeira, OC 5 Military Region; Maj Xavier,
Fapla Chief of Artillery and chairman of the Fapla component of the JMC; Maj Pedro Sebastao, Political Commissar and JMC member; Maj Viera Diaz, Chief of Air Defence in 5 Military Region and Chief of Staff of the Angolan JMC component; Lt Dos Santos, JMC member and Mr Stone Carlos, a civilian interpreter.

The short introductory meeting was held in a "formal but friendly atmosphere, with no apparent hostility from either side". Both Gen Geldenhuys and Mr Steward delivered messages from their departments expressing concern over reports of 400-500 Swapo terrorists moving through the AIQ towards SWA. Lt Col Sequeira assured the South Africans that the Angolan government strongly disapproved of Swapo violations and would do everything in its power to prevent Swapo entry into the AIQ. The meeting ended at 14h15B and was followed by a cold buffet laid on by the SA team, after which Lt Gen Geldenhuys and his party returned to Oshakati.

The first formal session of the JMC followed after lunch. It was agreed that the primary mission of the JMC would be to:

1. Monitor the AIQ with regard to any violations by Swapo or a Cuban presence forthwith.
2. Monitor the AIQ with regard to the phased withdrawal of SA forces and re-occupation by Fapla over a period of 30 days.

The precise functions of the JMC were defined as follows:

1. The planning and execution of monitoring actions;
2. The spreading of the cease-fire message in the area;
3. Effective feedback into the situation to the different principals in the form of:
   (a) Daily situation reports;
   (b) Weekly reports;
4. The maintenance of communications with the different HQs, SA and Fapla forces in the area and monitoring teams;
5. Command and Control of the monitoring teams: It was decided that the SA and Fapla components of the monitoring teams would be commanded separately by their own officers – at no time was there any consideration of a joint monitoring force being commanded by one party only.
6. Recording of all incidents that are investigated according to a pre-planning agreement;
7. Location of all violations;
8. Investigation of all violations;
9. Execution of rectifying action in the case of a violation;
10. Monitoring of the withdrawal of SA forces according to the schedule;
11. Monitoring the gradual re-occupation of the area by Fapla forces;
12. Planning to get the Calueque water scheme back into operation: Col Dippenaar requested that the JMC concern itself with this issue but was advised that Angola had appointed an economic commission to liaise with the SA Government in this matter.

It was decided that the monitoring teams would be deployed at the JMC site but could be deployed throughout the AIQ as needed and would be allowed to monitor the whole area, although Fapla would be in control of the area to the north of the JMC site.

Other points discussed included the precise definition of the AIQ, the method of reporting and confirming violations and the location and composition of monitoring teams. It was agreed that only infantry would be employed in the monitoring teams, with each side deploying the equivalent of three infantry companies. Fapla intended to deploy two infantry and one commando companies. The teams were to be equipped with defensive infantry weapons only and Fapla could therefore not deploy anti-aircraft weapons and armoured personnel carriers as intended.

The Fapla delegation left Cuvelai at 17h30 on 25 February, Major Diaz and Mr Carlos remaining behind.

The Fapla monitoring force was due to arrive at Cuvelai with the JMC component at last light on 27 February and the JMC was to begin functioning at midday on 1 March. The Fapla column was, however, delayed – largely by mines – and by 27 February had only reached Jamba, where it was again delayed by a mine blast which killed four of its men. The schedule was therefore adjusted to allow for this delay.

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The SA monitoring force at this stage consisted of Bravo Company, 5 SAI; Golf Company, 32 Battalion and Alpha Company, Regiment Paul Kruger. The JMC was supported by a small element from 101 Bn and elements of 25 Field
A typical photograph of the daily joint conference.  
From left to right Cmdt P. Uys, Cmdt L. le Cruer, Col J.M. Dippenaar, RSA OC/chairman, Maj Carlos Alberts Xavier; Angola OC/chairman, Maj Pedro Sebastias.

Squadron (SAEC) and 5 Maintenance Unit stationed at the JMC site to provide protection and assist in mine-clearing and other engineering tasks. Two doctors from SAMS were also attached. The SAAF element consisted of two Pumas and a Mobile Air Operations Team.

The question of under whose command the JMC fell was resolved by placing it under C Army, all instructions from the Cabinet, DFA and C SADF going through him. DFA retained responsibility for the political aspects and Sector 10 HQ handled logistic, administrative and some operational matters.

The Fapla HQ elements of the JMC under Maj Xavier arrived late in the afternoon of 1 March and a short meeting of the JMC was convened for 16h15 with Col Dippenaar and Maj Xavier in the chair. A certificate prepared by Col Dippenaar commemorating the occasion, was read in Afrikaans and Portuguese and signed by the two officers. Col Dippenaar then suggested that the JMC troops be formally introduced to each other at a parade which was set for 11h00B on 2 March.

It was agreed that the monitoring teams would be deployed from first light on 3 March. The two chairmen then settled the basic arrangements which became a permanent feature of the JMC:

1. A specific meeting time (11h00B) for the daily meeting was set, to be changed only when circumstances demanded.
2. Fapla would supply a liaison officer who would be stationed in the SA JMC camp. These officers were changed over daily.

The first full meeting of the JMC ended at 17h00B on 1 March.

The main Fapla convoy arrived just before midnight and set up their base camp a few kilometers from the SA camp.

The joint parade was held on 2 March on the Cuvelai airstrip. Both sides had film and TV
teams present. The SA troops were marched on by the RSM of Sector 10 HQ, WO1 J.J. Jacobs, who had been appointed RSM of the JMC. The SA contingent was drawn up at the northern end, the Fapla contingent at the southern. Proceedings were opened by the SA side with a Scripture reading and prayer by the JMC chaplain Lt M.P. van Wyk. Maj Xavier and Col Dippenaar addressed the men and then the flags were marched on – the SA flag by the CSM of 5 SAI, Sergeant Bruce Webber, the Angolan flag by a junior officer and two escorts. The Angolan flag had been supplied by the SA component as the Fapla component did not have a flag available.

A full meeting of the JMC followed the parade. It was decided to deploy joint monitoring patrols to establish whether Swapo had indeed vacated the AIQ around Cuvelai, so that the JMC could move to Mupa on schedule. One patrol of 60 men from 32 Bn and an equivalent Fapla force would leave at first light on 3 March, travelling by road to 10 km east of Cassinga and patrolling on foot from there to the Bale river and then south. This patrol was planned to last for 14 days but would be recalled immediately if the JMC moved south on schedule. Another patrol of 100 men would go out on 4 March for 10 days, moving by road to a point 50 km due east of Cuvelai and then patrolling southwards along Swapo’s eastern supply route.

Maj Xavier raised the extremely sensitive issue of whether the Fapla elements of these patrols would be willing to fire on Swapo. It was finally agreed that, while every effort would be made to capture any Swapo personnel who might be encountered, the patrols would defend themselves as a group if attacked by Swapo. In the event of a contact with Unita, the SA element would not intervene and would only take action to ensure their own safety.

Another problem raised during the 2 March meeting was that of joint command decisions during patrols. The principle of separate command was retained, but co-ordinators were appointed (SA for the southern patrol, Fapla for the northern) who would be responsible for purely routine decisions such as the choice of routes, camp sites, etc.

This conference adjourned at 13h10B, Col Dippenaar inviting the Fapla component to dine with him on 3 March.

Brig Joubert and a team of aides from his HQ briefed the American delegation at Oshakati on 2 March. The American delegation was led by Mr W. Twaddel and included Col D. Parker (Army Attaché to the Windhoek office), Col J. Osgood (Defence Attaché) and Lt Col R. Caplinger (Naval Attaché). The SA delegation at Oshakati included Mr D. Auret of DFA who had been recalled from Bonn and designated the DFA representative to serve with the SA component of the JMC. He was flown to the JMC HQ after the meeting.

Even before the patrols set out, it became obvious that Swapo had not vacated the AIQ. Intelligence available to Sector 10 indicated a group of 50–70 Swapo moving between Jaula – Glima and Calema and also a large Swapo presence in the area around Cassinga. This was raised on 3 March by Col Dippenaar. Lt Col Sequeira, who had flown in from Lubango to attend the meeting, replied that Fapla had issued the relevant instructions to Swapo but that Swapo had communications problems and would require another week to clear the area. He also said that Fapla intended keeping Swapo north of a line from the coast south of Namibe past a point 50 km south of Lubango to Jamba and Cuchi. The OC 5 Military Region said that he intended taking a senior Swapo commander to Cassinga to ensure that the Swapo cadres there received their instructions to withdraw.

The SA team accepted this explanation, but voiced difficulty in understanding Swapo’s communications problem, as its units had field radios. Col Dippenaar also reminded the Angolans that the JMC would remain at Cuvelai until Swapo had vacated the AIQ and that the move to Mupa planned for 7 March would have to be delayed.

Concrete evidence of Swapo’s continued presence in the AIQ came on 4 March when a 32 Bn patrol clashed with a two-man Swapo patrol near Calueque. The JMC was immediately notified and sent an investigating team including photographers and TV men from both components. This incident was registered as the first official violation of the Lusaka Agreement.

Among other evidence of continued Swapo presence, there were reports that Swapo was openly resupplying its detachments from the main logistic base at Jamba. Another disquieting aspect of the situation was that Fapla had sent reconnaissance teams south of the monitor-
The SA Government sent Maj Gen du Plessis (Chief of Army Staff Operations) to Cuvelai on 6 March to deliver a message to the Angolans expressing the RSA's concern at these developments:

"The SA Government is concerned that matters concerning the proceedings of the Joint Monitoring Commission are not effecting the desired progress at the moment. Various incidents in the recent past have forced the SA Government to instruct the SA component of the JMC that until the situation as envisaged in the agreement has stabilised the SA Government considers the present facet of the JMC at Cuvelai as incomplete and the JMC will therefore not move from Cuvelai. The following are regarded as contrary to the terms of the agreement:

1. Fapla reconnaissance continues south of the liaison line, and this must cease.
2. The monitoring area, as agreed upon, is still occupied by Swapo, in fact there are strong indications that Swapo reinforcements are still moving southwards through the area. This movement must cease.
3. Swapo activities and logistical resupply in the area south of Cahama, in support of their activities still continues and must cease.
4. The main Swapo bases are being resupplied. This must cease.
5. The RSA Government is concerned with the delays in the JMC's activities in terms of the agreement, which are caused by the insufficient deployment of Fapla forces at the JMC. The RSA Government herewith directs a serious request to the Angolan Government to expedite this matter.
6. In conclusion: The visit by C Army, Lt Gen J.J. Geldenhuys, which was planned for 21 March 1984 is brought forward to 12 March 1984 in the light of the gravity of the situation."

The Fapla JMC component agreed to immediately have all Fapla patrols recalled from south of the monitor line and also accepted that the move to Mupa could not take place on 7 March as planned. 12 March was provisionally agreed on as the new date if the situation had improved by then.
In fact, the situation worsened, with both monitoring patrols finding first hand evidence of large Swapo concentrations to the east of Cassinga and Cuvelai. Another violation followed on 7 March when a 101 Bn patrol clashed with a Swapo group. On 8 March the northerly joint monitoring patrol came across a Swapo group 45 km east of Techametete transporting supplies south into the AIO in three vehicles. Four terrorists were killed in the ensuing clash. This incident was significant in that it demonstrated that Swapo was deliberately ignoring Fapla's request to withdraw. It also demonstrated that the Fapla troops would take an active part in such contacts. The latter did much to convince the SA component that Fapla were sincere in their efforts to get Swapo to vacate the area.

Col Dippenaar told Maj Xavier at the daily meeting on 9 March that the move to Mupa would not be possible on 12 March, as the situation was still unsatisfactory.

Lt Gen Geldenhuys visited the JMC HQ on 12 March and made it clear that the move could not take place until the following aspects had been resolved:

1. The Swapo presence in the AIO.
2. The continued resupply of arms and ammunition to Swapo forces from the logistic base at Jamba.
3. The reported introduction of AA weapons into Techametete by Fapla in contravention of the earlier undertaking that only infantry would be involved in the re-occupation of the AIO.

Lt Gen Geldenhuys' visit had no immediate effect other than that Maj Xavier immediately travelled to Lubango to discuss these issues with the OC 5 Military Region.

During the 72 hours 11-13 March there were 4 serious clashes between the northerly monitoring force and Swapo in the area approximately 20 km north-east of Bambi. The JMC patrol was mortared on 11 March 35 km south-east of Techametete; ambushed on 12 March 50 km south-east of Techametete; again mortared on 13 March and clashed later the same day with a Swapo reconnaissance group. The Fapla troops participated actively throughout.

Three further violations followed during 14-16 March, bringing the total to twelve by 16 March, including one for which SA was held responsible - two Impalas from Ondangwa having flown north of the monitor line near Cassinga on 9 March. The eleven Swapo violations caused the Fapla component a good deal of genuine frustration and led to greater efforts to bring Swapo under control.

Maj Xavier returned to the JMC HQ on the morning of 16 March and reported that he had visited the area north of the monitoring line with a number of Swapo commanders to inform Swapo of the position and enforce their compliance. He said that as of the afternoon of Saturday 17 March, Swapo would have moved north of the line to which Fapla had earlier committed itself. He stressed that Fapla would not allow Swapo to jeopardise the agreement between Angola and SA and said that he had been present when Swapo commanders had radioed the orders for their forward detachments to withdraw.

The SA component were now convinced that Fapla was doing its best to make the agreement function. Mr Auret signalled Mr Steward as follows on 16 March:

"It is my considered opinion that the responses presented by Xavier this morning to the problems raised by us in the past represent considerable progress, which will probably be confirmed by the meeting next week.

The co-operation between the two sides is very good and decisions taken here are based on joint agreement."

Several of the Fapla members had, however, privately expressed doubt whether Fapla could control Swapo. The improved spirit of co-operation was, nevertheless, cemented on 17 March by a dinner given by the South Africans.

The period 17–19 March brought only two violations, only one of which involved actual contact with Swapo. The joint monitoring patrols also reported freshly evacuated Swapo camps with spoor leading north. By the time Lt Gen Geldenhuys, Mr Steward and C SAAF (Lt Gen DJ Earp) arrived at Cuvelai on 19 March, the situation had improved so much that Col Dippenaar could recommend that the "30 day clock" be regarded as having begun on 18 March and that the move to Mupa could take place within 2 to 3 days.

The senior SA delegation received further assurances from Fapla concerning the provision of logistic support to Swapo, the compliance of Swapo's "special unit" with the withdrawal in-
A Puma helicopter lands in the bushes at Cuvelai. Base (RSA) can be seen in the background.

Instructions, and the question of AA weapons in Techamatete. It then conceded that the situation allowed a move to Mupa on 22 March, which date had been suggested by the JMC. It was agreed that the delegation would meet with a senior Angolan delegation headed by Lt Cols Monteiro and Sequeira on 28 March to re-evaluate the situation. Lt Gen Geldenhuys stopped off in Pretoria to brief Mr Twaddel and Col Parker.

On 20 March the JMC received confirmation from the patrols that the area around Bambi was clear of SWAPO and that all its bases and logistic points had indeed been evacuated.

The JMC left Cuvelai at 09h00 on 21 March by helicopter to reconnoiter the proposed site at Mupa, which had already been prepared by an advance party of engineers and technicians from the SA component and a logistic convoy from Oshakati.

**Mupa – 22 March – 15 April**

The move to Mupa on 22 March was difficult and extremely slow as a result of recent heavy rains and swollen rivers which held up road movement.

The first five days at Mupa proved exceptionally quiet. The SA component took the opportunity to replace its troops with three fresh companies from 32 Bn which arrived on 24 March. The FaplA component concentrated on resupplying its monitoring and re-occupation forces, deploying FaplA forces in the re-occupied area and re-establishing civilian administration there. By 27 March FaplA had deployed one battalion at Techamatete and one company each at Cassinga, Cuvelai and Mupa, the latter protecting the bridge there.

Despite the new co-operation, however, the SA component was still far from satisfied with the overall situation. While SWAPO had withdrawn from the northern part of the AIQ, SADF intelligence indicated the continued presence of large numbers of SWAPO on the SWA border. Specific intelligence concerned the presence of SWAPO's Alpha Battalion in the Cauno river area, logistic bunkers between Mupa and Nanuno, and a strong SWAPO presence in the Dova – Evale – Mulumba area. The latter caused particular concern as this would affect the safety of
the JMC itself. The SA component was also not convinced that the Fapla component had used all communications means at its disposal to warn the Swapo detachments in these areas to withdraw.

These reservations were expressed by Lt Gen Geldenhuys at the meeting on 28 March. This conference was chaired by Maj Xavier and Col Koen, and was attended by Lt Gens Geldenhuys and Gleeson, Maj Gen Meiring, Brig Joubert and Mr Steward on the SA side and Lt Cols Monteiro, Sequeira, Agostino Kalle and Maj Hendrick on the Angolan side. Lt Gen Geldenhuys discussed what concerned South Africa and said that the fact that the JMC had not detected any violations in the previous week was not an accurate reflection of the situation. He touched specifically on the presence of Swapo in the region south of Cahama, near Evale and in the central region just north of the border. He also went into the matter of Fapla not having used all communication means at its disposal—for example broadcast, pamphlets, skyshout—and mentioned the fact that POWs had reported that there was radio communication between the detachments and their regional HQs.

Both Lt Cols Monteiro and Sequeira agreed that the SA concerns were valid. Lt Col Monteiro said that there would have to be renewed contact between Fapla and Swapo, particularly with regard to Swapo activities in the triangles with their apexes at Techamatete and Cassinga. He also agreed that the move to Evale would have to be postponed until the situation had improved.

The conference then turned to the differences of opinion concerning the mandate of the JMC in terms of the Lusaka Agreement. The Angolan component disagreed with the last sentence of Paragraph 10 which, as drawn up by the South Africans, stated that the JMC teams could be deployed in the AIQ at the behest of either party to monitor compliance with the Agreement. The Angolan side believed that the teams should only be despatched to investigate specific breaches and not on general patrols. Consensus could not be reached on this matter and it was agreed to refer it to the American delegation for clarification. A provisional decision was taken to continue with general patrols by the JMC.

Other questions included the status of Angolan prisoners in SA and SWA, the return of captured Angolan war material taken in 1981 and 1983/4, and the allegation that SA was still supporting Unita. Lt Gen Geldenhuys pointed out that these matters did not fall within the JMC framework and it was agreed that both delegations would approach their government with a recommendation that a confidential meeting between Foreign Ministers Botha and Rodrigues be arranged as soon as possible to deal with these questions. The conference ended with agreement that another high-level conference should be held in some 10 days time to decide on the move to Evale.

The JMC now sent out five patrols:

1. From Cassinga in an easterly direction to Chiocu along the Cauindo river towards Cheletequera to check for the presence of Swapo’s Alpha Battalion. This patrol was delayed by a Fapla commander’s toothache which the SA component suspected was intended to give Swapo time to clear the area.

2. From the Calonga bridge south of Techamatete along the Calonga river towards a point north of Cuvelai.

3. From a point 64 km directly east of Mupa near Chifuafu towards Mulola.

4. Along the Cuvelai river between Mupa and Evale to determine whether it was safe for the JMC to move to Evale.

5. In the area north of the Mupa bridge to locate reported Swapo logistic bunkers.

The SA viewpoint regarding patrols was soon justified by events. On 28 March a monitoring patrol discovered 5 Swapo spoor 15 km N of Dova, heading SW. On 31 March the patrol in the Cassinga area discovered some 15 spoor two days old SE of the town and heading north. On 1 April a group of 20 Swapo terrorists mortared the SACC protection element at Calueque with 82 mm mortars.

After several days with no incidents, the Fapla components requested that the move to Evale go ahead. The SA component was not satisfied, however, and their doubts were underscored by three violations during 6–9 April. It was agreed to discuss the matter at the high-level conference which had already been arranged for 9 April. At this meeting the delegations were led by Lt Gen Gleeson and Lt Col Monteiro.

Lt Gen Gleeson undertook to provide the SA answer by the morning of Friday 13 April at the latest.
The JMC meanwhile reorganised its monitoring patrols. The two in the Cassinga and Cuvelai areas, which had completed their tasks, were trooped back to Mupa for a few days rest. The two patrols north and north-west of Nehone and north and north-east of Evale were left in place.

The deployment of patrols by road had in the meantime become almost impossible as a result of a combination of poor roads and the heavy rains which had flooded bridges – the heaviest rains on record for the region. All of the major rivers in the AIQ – Cunene, Calonga, Mui, Cuvelai, Caundu, Bale and Kavango – were in flood and Mupa could not be reached from the north by road because of a flooded bridge 14 km north of the town.

The monitoring teams were thus now completely dependent on air supply. Fapla’s ability in this regard was, however, almost non-existent because of the poor serviceability of their Mi-8 helicopters. This made it impossible to deploy the patrols in parity and Col Dippenaar requested that patrols of only SADF troops might be deployed where Fapla was unable to support its own forces. The Angolans acceded to this request and several purely SADF patrols were sent out east of Mupa between 9 and 12 April to monitor Swapo activity along the infiltration route Cassinga – Jaula – Gluma – Chifuafua – Mulola.

The period 9 to 13 April was also characterised by the large number of local civilians taking advantage of the peace to return to their homes in and around Mupa. The Fapla component encouraged this by organising food distribution. The SA component took this opportunity to establish better relations with the local population, to propagate the idea of the JMC as such and to point out that it was Swapo alone that was responsible for the ongoing conflict.

The SA Government had meanwhile decided that the move to Evale could go ahead as there had been no reported violations during 10–12 April, and gave the go-ahead in the afternoon of 12 April.

A JMC patrol was sent to reconnoiter Evale on 13 April and settled on a site some 2 km north of the town. On 14 April some 120 local civilians were addressed by members of the JMC team on the imminent arrival and the purpose of the JMC. A 32 Bn patrol remained in Evale to safeguard the selected site and a team of logistic personnel and technicians went to Evale on 15 April to prepare the base.

**Evale – 16 April–2 May**

The main JMC monitoring force moved to Evale on 16 April, the first days being taken up with attempts to solve the growing logistic problems of the Fapla component. Resupply by road on the Jamba – Cassinga – Cuvelai – Mupa route had become virtually impossible as a result of poor roads and flooding. The Fapla component therefore requested Col Dippenaar’s permission to fly supplies from Cahama by fixed-wing aircraft to the airfield at Ongiva and to move them from there to Evale by road. Col Dippenaar agreed to this provided the airfield could be properly reconnoitered by a joint monitoring team, as the JMC could not guarantee its security. A team was sent to inspect the airfield on 18 April and an AN-26 flew in from Cahama on 19 April. There was only one more flight, however, as Sector 10 could not guarantee the security of the airfield and there were reports of a Swapo presence in the area.

The Fapla contingent’s supplies were then moved by road from Cahama to Humbe, and from there by helicopter to Evale, two Mi-8s having been obtained on loan from Lubango.

These helicopters also allowed the Fapla component to achieve parity for the first time in several days. On 18 April a Fapla company was trooped out to join a 32 Bn company patrolling in the Cholombo/Bambi area 70 km north-east of Cuvelai. A Fapla platoon was trooped out to join the 32 Bn patrols in the Chifuafua shona 60 km east of Mupa between Mulola and Calema. The remaining two 32 Bn patrols which had been deployed without parity in the Nehone and Evale areas were recalled to Evale on completion of their missions.

On 17 April, Maj Xavier advised that the proposed meeting between the Foreign Ministers had been approved and could take place in Lusaka on 24 or 25 April. On 18 April he left for Luanda to assist with the preparations for this conference, leaving Maj Sebastao in command. Col Dippenaar left for Pretoria on 20 April to assist in briefing the SA delegation for the Lusaka meeting.

19 April had brought news of the first violation since the move to Evale – a contact between a SWATF patrol and Swapo 15 km south-south-west of Techipa. 21 April saw a second SWATF–Swapo clash SSW of Techipa, one terrorist being wounded and captured. He was later passed on to the JMC for questioning.
During the daily meeting on 22 April, a serious disagreement arose between the parties, Maj Sebastao differing from Maj Xavier in his interpretation of paragraph 10 of the Agreement. The SA component had requested the deployment of a monitoring patrol in the area between Chicussu and Cahama west of the Cunene river, where intelligence indicated a substantial Swapo presence. Maj Sebastao objected on the grounds that only Fapla was allowed to patrol north of the line and that joint forces could only be called in to confirm a detected violation. It was agreed to refer this dispute to the ministerial meeting for a final decision.

The Angolan delegation for the Lusaka talks comprised: Mr Rodriques, Minister for External Relations; Mr De Moure, Vice Minister for External Relations; Lt Col Monteiro, Fapla Deputy Chief of Staff; Maj Xavier, Head of the Fapla JMC; and Mr Neto, a member of the Fapla JMC. The SA delegation included Defence Minister Malan and the AG of SWA, Dr W. van Niekerk.

The talks were marked by "frank" exchanges on the matter of SA support for Unita – a Unita ambush of a Fapla convoy north of Cuvelai on the previous day highlighting the matter. South Africa denied that it supported Unita and counter-demanded that Angola cease its support for the ANC. The matter of a prisoner exchange (1 SA, 1 Cuban, 31 Fapla) was settled, the details of the exchange to be worked out by the high-level JMC conference scheduled to be held at Evale on 29 April. As regards the matter of patrolling the AIQ, the SA view prevailed. It was also decided that the 29 April conference should decide on the move to Ongiva.

The SA and Angolan delegations at the Lusaka meeting resolved their different perceptions of the situation in the AIQ amicably and agreed that the move to Ongiva could follow as soon as practicable – possibly on 3 May. They also reached agreement with regard to the POW exchange – the swap to be arranged by the IRC with the assistance of the GOC SWATF and the JMC.

The monitoring patrols deployed east of Cuvelai and Mupa for nearly three weeks were withdrawn on 27 and 28 April after finding no signs of Swapo in this traditional infiltration route area. This fact and the absence of any reported violations north of the line were used by the Fapla component to argue for a move to Ongiva. The SA component still wanted to monitor the area east and south of Cahama, which had not been monitored to date and in which it suspected a substantial Swapo presence. It was also greatly disturbed by documents found on a captured Swapo terrorist which indicated that Swapo had been instructed by Fapla that:

1. Swapo should avoid Fapla deployment in the AIQ.
2. Swapo vehicles should avoid moving within the AIQ.
3. Swapo need only "lie low" until the end of May when they would be able to proceed as normal with their activities within the AIQ.

Issues dealt with at the 29 April conference included:

1. Sector 10 would be allowed to complete its operation against Swapo currently in progress west of the Cunene, even though it was north of the east-west monitoring line running through Ongiva.
2. The size of the respective monitoring forces at the disposal of the JMC could be increased if necessary according to the JMC's requirements.
3. The Angolan complaint that overly long patrols caused the Fapla component logistic problems, was referred to be dealt with at JMC level.
4. The Angolans agreed to look into the matter of helicopter parity, as the Fapla component had experienced difficulties in troopng and supplying monitoring patrols, affecting the timely deployment of patrols.
5. It was agreed to proceed with the deployment of a patrol to the area east of Cahama even though this was north of the line.

The results of the conference were positive and immediate from the SA point of view. At 04h00B on 30 April a Fapla company left Evale for deployment with 32 Bn troops in the Chicussu area east of Cahama. Later the same day two Mi-8s arrived for permanent use by the JMC.

A JMC patrol was sent to Ongiva on 30 April to reconnoitre and secure the area. A site for the JMC was chosen 6 km south of the town and west of the tar road. As soon as it was secured, a combined logistic team arrived from Evale to prepare the base.

On 1 May the JMC HQ element visited Techamatete where Col Dippenaar met the Fapla commander and the civilian commissioner in control.
of the town to explain the JMC objectives to them. The JMC could also confirm that the anti-aircraft weapons had been removed from the town.

The JMC HQ element moved to Ongiva by helicopter on 2 May, the main force following on 3 May by road. The JMC was functioning by the afternoon of that day.

**Ongiva – The JMC Stalls**

After a promising first two months, Angola’s attitude to the JMC changed dramatically for the worse after the move to Ongiva. This may have been partly because the JMC had to a large extent already served its purpose for Angola – allowing the painless reoccupation of a large portion of her southern territory.

In the months following the move to Ongiva it became increasingly clear that the Angolans had neither the desire nor the ability to control SWAPO. There was daily evidence of collusion between SWAPO and FAPLA within the AIO. FAPLA also breached the spirit – if not the letter – of the Lusaka Agreement by covertly building up its conventional force levels in the AIO. Relations deteriorated almost to the point of the JMC breaking up.

An early indication of the changing Angolan attitude came on 4 May when the SA component invited senior Angolan officials to a meeting at Ongiva on behalf of Gen Geldenhuys to discuss the prisoner exchange and other issues. Vice Minister De Moura delivered a hardline speech accusing SA of “creating” Unita and saying that SWAPO was “a product of SA’s occupation of Namibia”. Peace, he said, would only return once South Africa had totally withdrawn from Angola. He also attacked SA over an SATV programme which had stressed the joint monitoring actions against SWAPO. JMC member Mr Neto apologised to the SA component for this speech the next day.

The damage caused by this speech was partly overcome by a successful visit to Mariental by Col Dippenaar, Majs Xavier and Sebastao and Mr Stone Carlos during 5/6 May to finalise the arrangements for the prisoner exchange.

After the JMC delegation had visited the prisoners and met with the Red Cross representatives, the following was agreed:

1. Place of the exchange – Ongiva airfield.
2. The Angolan prisoners to be split into two groups of 15 and 16 to be released two days apart.
3. The SA prisoner to be exchanged for the first group of FAPLA prisoners.
4. The Cuban to be included in either the first or second exchange.

The date for the exchange was first provisionally set for 14 May but various problems caused a delay to 22 and 24 May.

Evidence was meanwhile mounting of a concentrated SWAPO presence in the shallow area between the monitoring line and the SWA border. On 11 May an SADF patrol clashed with SWAPO 22 km north-east of Oshikango. Later the same day another patrol discovered a large munitions cache 15 km south-east of Chiede and an even larger cache was discovered on 16 May in the same area. The SADF had also expected the number of SWAPO incidents within SWA to decline once access through southern Angola was interdicted. Instead, the number was at an all time high during this period, reaching 20 incidents a week during May.

The growing SA concern was conveyed to the FAPLA component by Lt Gen Geldenhuys at Ongiva on 16 May. He emphasized that the JMC had reached a critical point and that no further progress was possible until the AIO had been cleared of SWAPO and Cubans.

The SADF was already beginning to be concerned as to what would follow the JMC once the border had been reached. There was after all no guarantee that Angola would not immediately renege on the Lusaka Agreement. Lt Gen Geldenhuys therefore proposed during the 16 May meeting that another ministerial meeting be convened as soon as possible to discuss the establishment of a “Joint Peacekeeping Commission” (JPC) to oversee future security arrangements along the border after the completion of the JMC’s mandate.

The SA component was notified on 17 May that the Angolan Government had agreed to a ministerial meeting in Lusaka on 21 May. The Angolan component attempted to get the JMC moved to Oshikango before the 21 May meeting, but the SA component refused to be swayed.
The Angolan delegation to Lusaka consisted of Minister of the Interior Rodrigues, Minister of Defence Col Mario Tonha, the Angolan Ambassador to Zambia, Vice Minister De Moura, Lt Cols Monteiro and Sequeira and the Secretary of Defence in the President's Office, Maj Jose Maria.

The SA delegation consisted of Foreign Minister R.F. Botha, Defence Minister Malan and the AG of SWA, Dr Van Niekerk. It put forward concrete proposals, suggesting that a JPC be established to control cross-border movement of Swapo and Unita by means of a system of joint border patrols, border posts and the joint investigation of border violations. The SA delegation further suggested that both states make a declaration undertaking that they would not make their territories available to organisations which would carry out cross border attacks against one another. Minister Botha also suggested a treaty concerning the Calueque/Ruacana hydroelectric scheme.

The Angolans responded that they would find it difficult to control Swapo by means of a JPC if Swapo was not involved in the peace process and if steps were not taken towards the early implementation of Resolution 435. They nevertheless undertook to refer the proposals to their Government for consideration.

The number of Swapo violations increased dramatically after the conference – five being registered in the last eight days of the month. This increase in the tempo of violations was accompanied by a marked deterioration in the relations between the SA and Angolan components. To give but one example:

Prior to a visit to Quiteve on 25 May, 19 Brigade (Fapla) HQ at Mulondo had warned the Fapla element at Quiteve to hide certain weaponry and to reduce the Fapla presence in the town to company strength for the duration of the visit.

On 26 May the Angolan component objected to the registration of violations 28-31 on the grounds that they had not been properly investigated – despite the fact that Swapo personnel had been captured. The Angolan JMC reports to Luanda also began to include statements like “The South African alleged violations are all spectre fabrications so as to delay their retreat”.

The unsatisfactory attitude of the Angolan JMC component and the lack of response by the Angolan Government to the South African proposals at the Lusaka conference, led Lt Gen Geldenhuys to cancel plans to attend a high-level conference at Ongiva which had been planned for 30 May.

On 31 May the Angolan component informed Col Hall that the SAAF would not be allowed any further reconnaissance flights over the AIQ as this had not been covered in the Agreement. Two flights had been authorised up to then.

Relations came under even greater strain during June, when there were 8 violations. Several incidents during June led the SA component to suspect that Fapla might have been actively co-operating with Swapo in the AIQ. On various occasions there were reports of Swapo terrorists wearing Fapla uniforms and one terrorist wearing a Fapla jacket was killed east of Namacunde on 6 June. A report on 19 June said that Swapo personnel in Fapla uniforms were present at Calueque, Mongua and even at the JMC in Ongiva.

The SA component further suspected that the Fapla component on occasion tipped Swapo off, allowing it to avoid detection. For example, a document found on one killed terrorist read: “On 19 June 1984 four Cadres of our group have...”
been caught by Fapla for we did not consult them before, anyhow they did not harm them, only warned them to consult each other when we want to approach the area which they are occupying."

From the beginning of June, the Angolan member of the JMC became critical and even devious in their dealings with their SA counterparts, where previously they had been co-operative and open. Examples of the changing attitude include:

1. Psychological pressuring of members of 32 Bn. Fapla commissars had been interrogating 32 soldiers concerning SA support for Unita, and the SADF and SWATF organisations. The 32 Bn companies were replaced by two companies of 201 Bn and one from the SACC with effect from 12 June.

2. Attempts to disguise the extent of the conventional Fapla build-up in the reoccupied areas of the AIQ.

3. Politicising, the local population south of the monitoring line, Fapla members addressed meetings as far afield as Calueque without informing the SA component. They also placed certain restrictions on the civilian population.

4. Anti-SA pamphlets and placards appeared in Ongiva on 3 June – distributed with the knowledge if not on the instructions of the Fapla JMC component.

5. Attempts to discredit the SADF monitoring forces – almost daily accusations of assaults and robberies which were then cited as SA violations.

Fapla also continued to refuse to accept the right of the JMC to patrol north of the line on a routine basis – despite the decision of the April conference. Early in June the Fapla component of a patrol near Dova was withdrawn when the commander decided to follow-up some 25 spoor headed in a northerly direction. On 26 June the Fapla component objected to the deployment of a JMC patrol in the Melunga area because this was north of the monitoring line.

By now the Lusaka Agreement itself appeared to be in danger, and the SA Government proposed another ministerial meeting in Lusaka. Angola agreed and the meeting was arranged for 2 July.

The delegations were led by the SA Defence Minister and the Angolan Interior Minister (Rodriques). The SA delegation raised the question of the rising tide of Swapo violations and the increasing doubts as to Angola’s willingness and ability to control Swapo. Minister Malan also enquired about Angola’s response to the proposals put forward by the RSA at the previous ministerial meeting in Lusaka on 21 May regarding the establishment of a JPC. Minister Rodrigues admitted the increasing violations and that Angola was having difficulty in controlling Swapo because Swapo was not involved in the peace process.

With regard to the South African proposals concerning the establishment of a JPC, Rodrigues replied that Angola accepted the idea of a permanent JPC to replace the JMC in principle, but that the details of such a commission would still have to be worked out by the respective parties – preferably at a high-level conference held at the JMC. A Calueque/Ruacana treaty was likewise accepted in principle.

SA found the Angolan viewpoint on the inclusion of Swapo in the peace process, the establishment of a JPC and on Calueque sufficiently encouraging to launch a concerted diplomatic effort during July to resolve the impasse on all three questions.

The Swapo question was accorded priority as the SA Government was aware that Swapo would have to be involved if long-term success was to be attained. A few days after the Lusaka meeting Lt Gen P.W. van der Westhuizen met Minister Rodrigues in Lusaka on the question of negotiations with Swapo. He informed Rodrigues that SA had no objection to the AG of SWA holding talks with Swapo on any questions affecting the political future of SWA and also that SA was investigating the possibility of a statement by SA and Swapo on the cessation of hostilities.

This meeting paved the way for the direct discussions between the AG and Swapo on the Cape Verde Islands on 24 July. SA had agreed to these discussions after stressing that:

1. There could be no possibility of any discussion of the implementation of Resolution 435 without a firm commitment on the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola.

2. The AG and Swapo could discuss, firstly the statements which both sides would convey to the Secretary-General concerning the cessation of hostilities and secondly Swapo’s peaceful participation in the democratic political process of South West Africa.
The talks with Nujoma lasted two hours but Nujoma claimed that he had not been informed of the conditions and said that Swapo would be prepared to cease hostilities only if both sides agreed to send messages to the Secretary-General of the UN requesting the immediate implementation of Resolution 435. Both President Dos Santos of Angola and President Perreira of Cape Verde expressed their disappointment at Swapo's stand during talks with Nujoma in Luanda on 30 July.

A few days after the Cape Verde meeting the SA Government prepared a draft statement on a ceasefire for despatch to the UN Secretary-General, but this attempt also foundered.

The failure of the South African attempts to include Swapo in the peace negotiations was mirrored by the lack of any real progress on the two other main issues raised during the July ministerial conference in Lusaka -- the South African proposals regarding a JPC and the proposed Calueque/Ruacana treaty. Both issues stalled primarily as a result of Angola's indecisiveness and prevarication.

The question of a suitable permanent peace treaty to govern Angolan/South African relations once the JMC had moved to the border was the main topic of discussions at a high-level conference held at the JMC HQ, in Ongiva on 11 July.

South Africa was represented by Lt Gens Geldenhuys, Gleeson and Earp, Angola by LtCols Monteiro and Sequeira. It was agreed that a committee representative of both countries should be established within the framework of the JMC to work out a concept peace and security agreement -- in effect similar to the RSA's initial proposals on the establishment of a JPC -- to replace the JMC on the expiry of its mandate. The South African members of the committee would be Brig Joubert; Col Hall, who had replaced Col Dippenaar, and Mr J. van Rensburg of the DFA who had replaced Mr Auret.

It was also agreed that the JMC should not move to Oshikango before the draft agreement on the proposed JPC had been approved by the respective governments. The first meeting of the Joint Committee tasked with drawing up draft proposals for a JPC was scheduled for 25 or 28 July. As this date drew nearer, however, Angola requested a postponement. The talks finally took place on 25 August at the JMC without any final decision being taken.

The day after the high-level conference at Ongiva on 11 July, the Angolan delegation flew to Ruacana for talks with Dr Van Niekerk to discuss the hydro-electric and water supply scheme. Dr Van Niekerk presented a draft agreement but again the Angolans prevaricated and the draft agreement remained a draft.
While the various high-level meetings did improve the atmosphere at the JMC, it was no nearer to Oshikango at the end of July than a month earlier.

Nine violations were registered during July, one being the responsibility of SA – a light aircraft having overflown Xangongo. The Swapo violations occurred both north and south of the line. On 4 August Col Jordaan requested Maj Xavier to hold further discussions with Swapo leaders to persuade them to leave the AIQ. By 12 August there had been a further 12 violations and Sector 10 had intelligence that a group of 119 terrorists was moving south through the AIQ along Swapo’s traditional infiltration route.

SADF intelligence also showed that Fapla was engaged in a disproportionate conventional build-up in the reoccupied portion of the AIQ. Equipment deployed included anti-aircraft guns, SAMs, radar systems and T-55 tanks. Lt Gen Geldenhuys and Earp authorised a photo-reconnaissance flight for 12 August to establish the accuracy of these reports concerning Xangongo, Cuvelai, Mulondo and Techamatete.

The acting OC of the Angolan component insisted on having this flight registered as a violation and the Angolans then began claiming increasing numbers of SAAF overflights during the next days – despite there not having been any.

These claims were a major point of discussion at the ministerial meeting between Ministers Botha and Rodrigues in Lusaka on 17 August, which had been planned to follow up the issues of the proposed JPC, Ruacana and Swapo violations. Little real progress was made, partly because the Angolans concentrated on the SAAF issue.

Mr Botha stated the South African attitude on this matter:

"The South African action was necessary to investigate reports obtained from Swapo prisoners of substantial Swapo activities in the area. In question as well as information that the MPLA was in the process of building up its forces in contravention of the spirit of the Lusaka Agreement and the assurances which the United States gave South Africa in January 1984, that Angola would not take advantage of the disengagement process to the detriment of the security of South West Africa. Because of the importance of these allegations for mutual confidence and the continuation of the Lusaka Agreement, it was considered imperative to investigate these reports.

The South African Government has been shocked to learn that Angola had indeed deployed modern armaments in the area which cannot possibly be used against Unita and which must therefore be construed as encouragement of and protection for Swapo’s designs to increase its violence against South West Africa and to return to Angola with impunity. South Africa has also learned to its dismay that a major southward movement of Swapo terrorists through the area in question is at present under way."*

On 19 August Maj Dias called an extraordinary meeting of the JMC and complained of a total of 83 overflights during 17/18 August as far north as Lubango. Further similar allegations were brought up over the next days. Col Jordaan warned the Angolans that their increasingly wild allegations were seriously affecting relations between the two components.

By the end of August the Angolan claims of SAAF violations had reached such proportions that Lt Gen Geldenhuys called a high-level conference for 2 September at Ongiva to discuss the matter. He categorically denied that there had been any overflights since 12 August and raised the questions of the Angolan deployments and the fact that of 63 registered violations only 3 had been the responsibility of the SA government. Lt Col Monteiro admitted the increasing number of Swapo violations but said that Fapla’s efforts to control Swapo were hindered by the internal war against Unita. The conference concluded with agreement that another meeting along the lines of the original Lusaka conference should be convened with a view to discussing the creation of a JPC.

Like all the other meetings, the 2 September meeting had little visible effect on the situation within the AIQ, although the atmosphere within the JMC did improve. The Angolan component now also showed a welcome change of heart with regard to the deployment of patrols north of the line. Thus on 9 September a joint patrol was despatched to the Cuamato, Mupa, Evale and Dova box to investigate reports of a Swapo concentration there, and later in the month patrols were sent as far north as Cuvelai. Nine violations were registered in both September and October.
The Angolans now seemed to show no hurry to get the JMC to move on. This led the SA members to wonder if the present situation did not in fact suit Angola – they had reoccupied most of their territory and could counter complaints about the Cuban presence with the argument that there were still SA forces in Angola. Also, while the JMC was on Angolan soil, there was little chance of an SA raid into Angola – leaving the bulk of Fapla free for deployment against Unita.

South Africa, on the other hand, was becoming increasingly frustrated by the lack of progress and was under ever-increasing pressure from the USA to finalise the JMC process. The US Administration itself had also been attacked for "deliberately delaying the SA withdrawal".

The result was a meeting of SA and US delegations in the Cape Verdes on 31 October/1 November. Dr Crocker informed the SA delegation that Angola had accepted the idea of a Cuban withdrawal in principle and that therefore the least remaining major obstacle to the final withdrawal of SA troops had been removed. The chiefly DFA SA delegation responded that direct follow-up negotiations with the Angolan Government to finalise the JMC’s activities would follow as soon as possible. This decision was made public by the DFA late on 1 November.

The completion of the disengagement process and the disbandment of the JMC – 1 November 1984 to 16 May 1985

A high-level conference was called for 19 November to discuss the final withdrawal of the JMC to Oshikango. The Angolan delegation merely proposed a ministerial meeting to discuss the date for the final move, Lt Col Monteiro contesting Gen Geldenhuys’ complaint about the increase in Swapo violations.

In view of the public expectations regarding this meeting, a statement was released:

“Delegations from South Africa and Angola led respectively by Gen J.J. Geldenhuys, Chief of the Army, and Lt Col Ngongo Monteiro, Deputy Chief of Staff of Fapla, met at the Joint Monitoring Commission Headquarters at Ongiva on 19 November 1984. They discussed the final move of the JMC to the SWA/Angolan border in terms of the Lusaka Agreement.

It was decided that a ministerial meeting between South Africa and Angola should be held as soon as possible to set the final date for the move of the JMC HQ to the border and to reach an agreement which would ensure peace and stability along the SWA/Angolan border after the completion of the JMC’s functions. It was also decided that technical experts from Angola and SA should meet as soon as possible to discuss matters affecting the Ruacana/Caluelle scheme.”

It was agreed that Angola would propose a definite date for this ministerial meeting. This Angola never did and the meeting did not materialise.

From November 1984 to March 1985 Angola effectively placed the JMC on the “back burner” and no real diplomatic activity took place in this regard. The atmosphere at the JMC had, however, once again improved and there were no difficulties in registering the violations of November (10) and December (7). The JMC now also reached a compromise regarding the parity of patrols allowing some purely Fapla JMC patrols to be deployed north of the line and some purely SADF JMC patrols south of the line, removing much of the earlier friction. Both components relieved personnel due for a rest during December.

The tempo of violations increased significantly in January as the annual Swapo rainy season offensive began. A total of 21 violations were registered during January – 16 between 21 and 31 January, over which period 19 terrorists were killed in clashes with reaction force teams of 101 and 201 Battalions. Although February brought only 9 violations, the South Africans’ concern regarding Fapla’s willingness and ability to control Swapo had again been raised.

By now South Africa was disillusioned with the JMC – Swapo infiltration was continuing, the Angolans’ intentions were far from clear and there was no progress on any of the major long-term issues. The SA Government decided on a last ditch effort to get the JMC functioning again.

On 7 March the Angolan component of the JMC approached Col Van der Merwe with the request that non-JMC Fapla elements be allowed to deploy against Unita south of the monitoring line. Fapla also wanted to increase its non-JMC force in the reoccupied portion of the AIQ. The argument was that Unita was operating against Fapla supply lines from two bases south of Ongiva to
such an extent that Fapla’s supply lines had been severed by ambushes in the Mongua area. This request was discussed in detail by Brig Joubert and the OC of 5 Military Region, Lt Col Kianda at a meeting at Ongiva on 13 March. It was then referred to C Army who consulted Mr Steward of DFA and then instructed the JMC SA component to inform the Angolans that as this request involved a major departure from the Lusaka Agreement, it would have to be discussed at a high-level conference.

This conference was arranged for 31 March with Col Van der Merwe and Captain Tony Azevedo in the chair and Lt Gen Geldenhuys and Lt Col Monteiro representing their respective countries. Mr Steward of the DFA was also present. Lt Gen Geldenhuys agreed to the Angolan request on condition that the SA component of the JMC be kept informed of the precise nature and location of these deployments so as to prevent clashes with SA troops. In return, he gained a concession in that the SA JMC troops would in future be allowed to be deployed north of the line as often as necessary.

The Angolan delegation would not, however, be drawn on the question of the proposed JPC or the other long-term matters, saying only that their government would respond through the British ambassador or the US Administration in due course.

The SA delegation came away with the strong suspicion that Angola was not really interested in continuing co-operation. This conference was a watershed as far as the South African attitude to the JMC was concerned. It was clear that the JMC had outlived its usefulness. While it did allow SA troops to remain in Angola, and while it did hamper Swapo to some extent, it had failed to prevent the annual Swapo infiltration and it was also clear that Fapla either could or would not control Swapo. This was emphasized by the further 12 violations during March.

The political disadvantages, on the other hand, were very clear – as long as South Africa had troops in Angola she would be branded the aggressor, and as long as the JMC dragged on, both the SA Government and the US Administration would be subject to constant attack on this issue.

In mid-April the SA Government accepted the
advice of the Minister of Foreign Affairs and decided to seize the political initiative by unilaterally withdrawing all SA forces from Angola and terminating the JMC. This decision was taken at Cabinet level on 12–13 April but was kept secret for the time being to maximise its publicity effect. It was announced at the 15 April JMC meeting by Col Van der Merwe:

"The RSA Government has finally decided to disengage from Angola. The SA forces at present north of the SWA border except for the troops at Calueque including the SA contingent at the JMC will commence disengagement with immediate effect. The disengagement will be completed on 17 April 1985."

The decision was communicated by letter to President Kaunda and the UN Secretary-General, and a statement was released by the Minister of Foreign Affairs:

"On 1 November 1984 the Department of Foreign Affairs announced the Joint Monitoring Commission would soon meet to discuss the completion of the disengagement process. At the envisaged meeting on 19 November 1984 it was decided that a Ministerial meeting between the Republic of South Africa and Angola should be held as soon as possible to set a final date for the move of the JMC Headquarters to the border and to reach an agreement which would ensure peace and stability along the SWA/Angolan border after the completion of the JMC’s functions. Those talks have not yet taken place but South Africa continues to be prepared to hold Ministerial discussions with Angola on the maintenance of peace and stability in the region and also with regard to the utilisation by the peoples of Angola and SWA/Namibia of the Ruacana/Calueque project.

The main factor which has delayed the final move to the border in recent months has been Swapo’s annual rainy season offensive. The rainy season is now drawing to a close and although Swapo has not abandoned its terrorist activities against the people of SWA/Namibia, its main infiltration attempt has been repulsed and it

During the parade on 1 March 1984 Col Dippenaar delivered a message to FAPLA soldiers while Maj Xavier, on the photograph, delivered a message to the RSA soldiers.
has suffered heavy losses. Despite Swapo's continuing activities, the South African Government has given instructions for the disengagement of the South African forces in the area in question from southern Angola to commence as soon as possible and to be completed this week. The security of the people of SWA/Namibia will, if necessary, be assured from SWA/Namibia. The security forces will not hesitate to take whatever action may be necessary, should Swapo step up its cross-border violence.

South Africa trusts that its decision to complete the disengagement process will enhance the prospects for peace in the region and will, in particular, be conducive to the withdrawal of the Cubans from Angola. Such a development would open the way to the realisation of one of the Lusaka Agreement's main objectives, namely the peaceful resolution of the problems of the region, including the question of the independence of South West Africa/Namibia.

Over the past 16 months South Africa has established a useful working relationship with the MPLA government, including no fewer than five bilateral Ministerial meetings. It hopes that this relationship will serve as the basis for growing dialogue aimed at the peaceful resolution of the problems of the region."

The Angolans were caught completely unawares by this South African move, which became obvious at the 16 April meeting between Maj Gen Meiring and Lt Col Sequeira. This meeting covered:

1. The date for the final disbandment of the JMC - the Fapla delegation requesting that the JMC continue for another 30 days after the move to Oshikango, whereas the SA Government had been prepared to let the JMC terminate with the move to the border.

2. Gen Meiring said that SA was still prepared to enter into a treaty concerning Calueque, but until such time it would maintain a small detachment of troops (approx 60) at Calueque; he requested that these troops be granted free road and air access.
3. Gen Meiring repeated the SA warning that the SADF would not hesitate to strike at Swapo in Angola if Fapla failed to control Swapo in the AIQ. Col Sequeira promised to relay this warning to his government.

4. It was agreed that, until a formal structure to replace the JMC could be agreed upon, the five border posts permanently manned by sector 10 troops could be used for regular contact between HQ Sector 10 and HQ 5 Military Region. This decision was subject to agreement by both governments.

5. Lt Col Sequeira promised to follow up the matter of a further Ministerial meeting as had been discussed on 19 November.

This was the last JMC meeting on Angolan soil. It was followed by a flag lowering ceremony and a banquet organised by the SA component. The SA forces immediately began dismantling the Ongiva base. At 10h30B 17 April 1985, some 450 SA soldiers who had been attached to the JMC marched across the border into SWA.

General Viljoen described the withdrawal as "a sign of hope" for the future of the region, admitting that "we do have to give up a certain amount of military advantage" but adding that the SADF cannot stand divorced from diplomatic and political efforts aimed at achieving peace in the region. The withdrawal, he said, created "a new opportunity in the area to further negotiations and not shooting".

The Angolan JMC component received permission from its government to move to Santa Clara across the border from Oshikango on 20 April. From 22 April JMC meetings resumed at the SADF base at Oshikango. This base only served as a tactical HQ during the day, the actual SA base being at Etale.

It was now no longer possible to register violations and the last was the discovery of a cache at Mucope by 201 Bn on 12 April, which was registered as the 127th violation of the stay at Ongiva.

On 19 April the Angolan government suggested via its JMC component that a Ministerial meeting be held at Maputo on 9 May to discuss the disengagement and the Ruacana/Calueque scheme. The SA Government was only too pleased to agree. Unfortunately this meeting proved to be little short of a fiasco. The SA delegation was headed by Minister R.F. Botha, while the Angolans downgraded their delegation which was headed by the Deputy Minister of the Interior Van Dunem instead of Rodrigues. Van Dunem simply informed SA that Angola was not interested in any further formal security arrangement and was not prepared to enter into any technical agreement or treaty over the Ruacana/Calueque scheme, and that Angola would look after the security there in future.

There was thus no option but to disband the JMC with effect from 16 May 1985.

This came as a bitter disappointment to the South Africans. They had seen in the Lusaka Agreement, the potential for eventually gaining the necessary sincerity from the Angolans to prevent Swapo action against South West Africa, from Angolan territory and had pursued the JMC's implementation with urgency and vigour. Using every opportunity during formal and informal discussions, the South Africans had argued the need and at times even pleaded with the Angolans for the continuation of the Lusaka Agreement to the mutual security benefit of both countries which would in effect have meant the removal of Swapo and the Cubans from the Area In Question and the withholding of SADF over-border action. The Angolans, however, insisted on the termination of the Agreement.
Gesamentlike Monitor Kommissie

Hiermee ondernem die RSA kontingent van die Gesamentlike Monitor Kommissie (GMA) dat:

1. die onderneming tussen die RSA en Angola regering in Lusaka, 14 en 16 Februarie 1984 geneem met vertroulikheid en onbespooktheid sal uitvoer.

2. die ondersoek en monitorering wat tussen die RSA en Angola regeringe op 14 en 16 Februarie 1984 geneem sal wees met die rigting en met die gedagte om vrede in hierdie land te bevorder.

3. die monitorings by die kontingent van RSA ter beheer van vrede en stabiliteit in hierdie land.