

BOOK REVIEWS/BOEKBESPREKINGS

Major-General JFC Fuller, *The Conduct of War 1789–1961*; a study of the impact of the French, Industrial and Russian Revolutions on war and its conduct.

Introduction

1 War has been part of Europe for many years and has been the constant occupation of her turbulent peoples. Nevertheless, not one of them since the Thirty Years' War has been so catastrophic as the wars of the present century. Yet the reason is not to be sought in war itself, but in its conduct as related to the great revolutions since 1789: the decay of aristocracy and the advent of democracy, the developments of industry and capitalism, the emergence of the masses and of socialism, the progress of science and the advances in technology, the growth of populations and the popular press, the decay of religion and ever-advancing materialism.

2. All these vast changes have recast civilization, and had their impacts on warfare been diagnosed, and the conduct of war shaped accordingly, there is no reason why the world of today should be in its present mess.

Review

3. To begin with, the limited wars of absolute kings, the last of which was the Thirty Years' War, gave way to unlimited wars which was reborn out of the French Revolution. The wars of Kings were at an end; the wars of peoples were beginning. We see the emergence of a new form of civilization, the child of the mating of Rousseau's idea of the 'general will' and the energy begotten by Watt's steam engine. Its institutions are still those of the old agricultural order of society, and its activities blindly grope towards those of a new industrial one. The tensions between the two set up violent oscillations; within the nations they lead to social upheavals, and between the nations to increasing animosities.

4. 'In embryo it is to be seen in the Napoleonic Wars, and its future is predicted in two absolute theories, the one on war as expounded by Clausewitz, and the other on economics as expounded by Marx. Both are utopians, and al-

though their premises are right, their conclusions are at fault. Clausewitz's insistence that war is a political instrument is the first of all military statecraft, but his equal insistence on the complete overthrow of the enemy vitiates the end of grand strategy, which is that a profitable peace demands not the annihilation of one's opponent, but the elimination or modification of the causes of the war. Marx was profoundly right when he insisted that, because man is a tool-using animal, the implements he fashions must necessarily influence the evolution of society, and the forms that society takes; but he was in error when he drew from this the conclusions that the forms could only be changed by means of the class struggle. While Clausewitz failed to see that peace was the ultimate aim in war, Marx failed to see that in the steam age the ultimate economic and social aims were to create an industrial society through an evolutionary and not a revolutionary process, because employers and workers are complementary and not antagonistic agents in production. Both set too much on violence which can enforce but cannot create.' p 310, 311.

5. 'The first of the wars of the evolving industrial civilization was the American Civil War. In greater part its origins were due to economic causes and its progress revealed the increasing dependence of armaments on industry and a decline in morality, because the old cultural ties were loosened by the amorality of advancing materialism. The war began as an urban-rural contest of factory versus plantation, and it ended by proclaiming Big Business the winner.' p 311.

6. 'The years which span the close of the American Civil War and the end of the century witnessed vast industrial developments both in the United States and Western Europe. Nation after nation became industrialized, and ever-increasing competition between them led to colonization on an unprecedented scale, and with it to violent international contentions. Nevertheless, to the detriment of internal tranquillity, changes in social institutions lagged behind industrial progress, and, in spite of the increased deadlines of weapons fashioned by industry, military theory remained much as it had been in the days of the muzzle-loader. Statesmen and soldiers continued to think in terms of bayonets and sabres, and it did not occur to them that in an industrial

age the factory had become the powerhouse of the barrack, as in the agricultural age the peasantry was the main source of fighting power. When toward the close of the century, oil as a new motive power and developments in the electrical sciences heralded in the second phase of the Industrial Revolution, little attention was paid to the radical changes they portended in the techniques of war.' p 311.

7. 'Thus it came about that, although the causes of the First World War were largely industrial and commercial, in 1914 the armies of all belligerents set out to fight the war with no clear idea of the sort of conflict they were called upon to wage, and only after complete stalemate had set in did they appeal to industry and science to haul them out of the quagmire of their trenches. Nevertheless, when due to the attrition of German industrial power and agricultural production by the blockade the war collapsed, instead of the victors seeking a peace in which its economic causes might be eliminated, they ignored them and got back to Big Business on 1913 lines, and, as a corollary, they returned in greater part to the military organizations which had led to the initial stalemate.' p 311, 312.

8. 'With the return to Big Business, the oscillations which had precipitated the war began to repeat themselves. While in Europe the nations were in revolutionary turmoil, industrial concentration developed in America rapidly. 'This centralization of wealth, which on the one hand increased productivity and on the other failed to build up the people's purchasing power to consume it, toppled over in the financial crash of 1929, and out of its debris Big Business began to pass into Big Government.' p 312.

9. 'In Russia this had already occurred when Lenin's experimentations in Marxism, which ruined production, forced him to introduce State capitalism and his New Economic Policy, and in Italy Mussolini had striven to build up the people's purchasing power in his Corporate State. Then, in 1933, both Roosevelt in America and Hitler in Germany set out to solve the self-same problem, the one by means of his New Deal and the other by means of his New Order. But none of these would-be economic messiahs could discover how to equilibrate consumption with production.' 'Quantity productions must rely for its success upon quantity consumption; and nothing ensures replacement like organized destruction.' p 312.

10. 'Lastly, in 1939, came the Second World War; there were many dead but no unemployed; consumption put the strain on production, and the urge to destroy led to a cataract of lethal inventions. The most outstanding were the development of atomic energy a new source of power, and the introduction of electronically controlled devices out of which emerged the techniques of automation. The purpose of the latter is progressively to substitute machinery for the human brain, as the purpose of Watt's steam engine and Daimler's internal combustion motor was to substitute machinery for human and animal muscle. With automation and nuclear energy the Industrial Revolution entered its third phase.' p 312, 313.

11. 'Nevertheless, when in 1945 the fighting ended with the explosion of the first atomic bomb, the problem of peace remained unsolved, and the state of wardom continued.' The balance of power in Europe was wrecked and the two economic powers, the USA and USSR, are now to compete in a world of physical stalemate created by nuclear weapons cold war. The basic difference between the politics of the Democracies and Soviet Russia is their outlooks on peace. To the one peace begins when war ends, to the other it is a continuation of war by every means short of actual fighting. 'The Democracies should be aware, as Clausewitz insisted, that the most decisive act of judgement a statesman can exercise 'is rightly to understand . . . the war in which he engages'. Because the age in which we are living is one of permanent emergency, this is equally applicable to peace. He should not, Clausewitz continues, 'take it for something, or wish to make of it something, which by nature of its relations it is impossible for it to be'. Unfortunately for the Free World, this is what its statesmen have consistently been doing since 1945.' p 319.

Conclusion

12. Trade has become a major weapon in the Communist world offensive. First it was the USSR, and now Red China has joined in an Asian trade onslaught, intended to capture markets and, with and through them, the minds of free men. The Communist drive is designed to undermine the economy and strength of the free world.

13. While the Western nations are moving away from private enterprise toward state enterprise,

the Soviet Union is moving away from state control to a freer social order. Will these two movements converge, or will they fight each other to the death?

Brig DS Hamman

Militêre Geneeskunde in Suid-Afrika (1913–1983). Militêre Informasieburo, 1983, 119 pp.

In hierdie omvattende werk word die geskiedenis van die eerste sewentig jaar van militêre geneeskunde in Suid-Afrika opgeteken en word dit toegelig deur interessante foto's uit die argiewe.

Hierdie boek vorm deel van 'n reeks publikasies van die Militêre Informasieburo wat handel oor die militêre geskiedenis van die Suid-Afrikaanse Weermag, sy eenhede en korpse. Die belangrike rol wat die reeks in die Suid-Afrikaanse Weermag vervul, word beklemtoon deur die feit dat daar by lede van eenhede 'n trots vir hul tradisies en prestasies deur kennis van die verlede gekweek word.

Dié werk is in Afrikaans geskryf en die taalgebruik is vloeiend, korrek en verstaanbaar. Dit is boeiend aangebied alhoewel die leser toegooi word onder 'n magdom van feite, wat net 'n bewys is van deeglike navorsing. Medewerkers aan MILITÊRE GENEESKUNDE IN SUID-AFRIKA (1913–1983) was genl-maj DP Knobel, kmdt CJ Nöthling, maj AE van Jaarsveldt, kapt AM Adlam, kapt TAP du Plessis, kapt ES Smith, kapt NJ van der Hoogt, lt JAJ Jordaan en Louise Brits.

Die boek belig ook 'n interessante fasset van die

SAW se Geneeskundige Diens naamlik hul uitsonderlike betrokkenheid by veldtogte in die buiteland. Die betrokkenheid van die Geneeskundige Diens in die Eerste Wêreldoorlog word bespreek en daar word onder andere gekyk na hul deelname in veldtogte in Suidwes, Oos-Afrika en in Europa. So ook kom die Tweede Wêreldoorlog aan die beurt en hul betrokkenheid in lande soos Oos-Afrika, Abessinië, Italië en Madagaskar word bespreek.

Daar is ook 'n hoofstuk oor die uniform, kentekens en vaandel van die Suid-Afrikaanse Geneeskundige Diens, sowel as 'n baie interessante hoofstuk oor die groei en ontwikkeling van die SAGD.

Die Geneesheer-Generaal, lt-genl NJ Niewoudt sê in die voorwoord tot die boek dat die Suid-Afrikaanse Geneeskundige Diens se getalle al hoe meer toeneem wat gepaard gaan met die daarstelling van nuwe formasies, eenhede, basisse en geboue. Hierdie toename dreig nou om die bydrae van die vroeëre bouers – hul kennis en rol in die ontwikkeling van die Geneeskundige Diens – verlore te laat gaan. 'Hierdie boek verseker nou dat dit nie sal gebeur nie en dat die ontstaan en verlede van ons Diens vir die nageslag behoue sal bly.'

MILITÊRE GENEESKUNDE IN SUID-AFRIKA (1913–1983) bevat 'n register, terwyl die persoon- en plekname geskei word. Hierdie boek is 'n baie volledige studie wat van groot waarde vir die historikus kan wees.

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