

SOME POSSIBILITIES IN COUNTER-INSURGENCY OPERATIONS

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Introduction

It is often held that there can be no 'military' solution to an insurgency. As a general rule this is probably true but it is rather dependant on what is understood by terms 'insurgency', 'solution' and 'military'. It is therefore probably worthwhile looking at these terms more closely. For the purposes of this paper these terms will be used in the following sense:

Insurgency — an organization or movement attempting to alter and/or overthrow the existing system in the state concerned, as well as, of course, the process thereof. Such a movement could have one or more of a variety of aims and intentions including the righting of perceived wrongs (social, economic or political); the seizing of power for a group, tribe, race or even an individual; the installation of a different social/political system (e.g. Communism) and even simple anarchy. Additionally, a foreign, perhaps neighbouring, state may be interested in a change of government or system to one more acceptable to itself and more amendable to its plans. Thus an insurgency may be essentially internal, although almost certainly organised and supplied and very often incited, from the outside, or it may amount simply to incursions by groups of terrorists, guerillas/bandits from across the border. Therefore, this term will be used to include everything covered by the German term *Kleinkrieg* as the tactics to oppose such operations are basically the same in all cases.

Solution — the defeat of the insurgency in that it is at least rendered incapable of further illegal operations or entirely eliminated *without the authorities having to give up or alter any part of their principles and basic policies*. An alteration of the latter would imply, at best, an incomplete victory, at worst, a defeat.

Military — all active operations aimed directly at defeating the insurgents, i.e. in-

telligence, police, army, etc. Indirectly aimed operations such as publicity, rehousing and counter organization programmes lie on the borderline. They could be seen as 'military' or also 'political' attempts at a solution. As, however, the usual idea of a political solution seems to be limited to either pre-empting the insurgency by/and/or giving in to it, these must probably also be considered as part of the military solution.

Having attempted to clarify the sense in which the above terms will generally be used in this article, two comments on the opening sentence must be made. Firstly, while a 'purely military' solution may be unlikely, there will almost invariably have to be a military component of the authorities' counter-insurgency programme. At its minimum level this would encompass the protection of the population and vital installations as well as the authorities themselves. It would also involve demonstrating to the insurgents that the authorities possess both the means and the will to take more direct action should attempts at an amicable settlement prove fruitless. Secondly, in some cases a 'purely military' solution may indeed prove feasible. Such cases would include that of an incursion by 'foreign' terrorists and operations in occupied territory. In the former case it would be made possible largely by the assumed friendliness of the population towards the authorities and their hostility towards the, as it were, invaders. A further factor would be the 'military' bias of the opponents' operations. In the second case the important factors would be the continuing unfriendliness of the population — the best the counter-insurgent could hope for is neutrality — and the transitory nature of the counter-insurgents' presence in the area. Thus his actions would be far less limited both in scope and nature than would be the case in home territory.

There is another point well worth touching on at this stage: several of the measures to

be suggested below are such as to provoke cries of 'but then would reduce us to their level!' Two comments: firstly, pray, on which but its own level can an insurgency be successfully combatted? Secondly, the measures concerned can in no way be compared to the moral and physical degeneracy of the terrorists. Unlike those, the of latter, these are aimed only at what are, in effect, combatants and stop very far short of what has become the rule for his behaviour.

At this stage, before moving on to counter-insurgency operations as such, it is worthwhile briefly considering insurgency in order to clarify what, in fact, it is that we are fighting.

The course of insurgency — outline

Many practitioners of both insurgency and counter-insurgency seem to feel that the course of an insurgency can be divided into several more or less distinct stages. While there are different opinions as to the number and exact definition of these stages, the mean would appear to comprise the following four stages:

- 1) Organization
- 2) Terrorism
- 3) Guerilla Warfare
- 4) Mobile Warfare.

A brief examination of each of these stages will attempt to illustrate the course of an insurgency's development.

1) **Organization:** During this stage the insurgency's main concern will be to build up both its political and its military wing. The emphasis will be on the former which will simultaneously be utilized to gain further recruits for both wings. Initially recruits will be drawn from the politically like-minded, later recruiting procedures can include political conversion, financial or other inducement, blackmail and terrorism. The political wing will also be involved in raising funds, gathering intelligence, creating support among the population, the press, within the security forces and the government and in suitable foreign countries. There will also be a determined effort to create hostility towards the authorities and operations of this

nature may well be the first sign of trouble perceived by the authorities.

Such operations will probably commence with a guarded (less guarded as it advances) press and publications (e.g. furthering an importation of suitable literature) programme. The aim of this and other operations would be not only to alienate the population from the authorities but also from the system, to alienate young from old, workers from employers and also the existing state from other countries.

A major aspect of this and the later stages will be a campaign to denigrate the security forces. This will include accusations of torture, individual and mass murders and, on a different tack, corruption and inefficiency. Where necessary, the appropriate physical evidence in the form of bodies and/or injuries may well be provided.

Determined attempts will also be made to infiltrate various organizations and bodies — particularly those youth or worker orientated as well as, for instance, the teaching profession and the 'media'. Apart from helping to further the above-mentioned alienation, such infiltration is also preparatory to the next phase of this stage. This phase involves a gradual (as a rule) increase in student demonstrations, strikes, riots, etc. The emphasis will probably be on 'peaceful' demonstrations or strikes for patently worthwhile and laudable causes, even if these are completely at odds with the insurgency's programme. This emphasis not only makes them easier to organize but also makes their prohibition and/or repression all the more abhorrent, the aim being, of course, alienation and general ill-feeling and mistrust. During the course of these demonstrations it may be felt necessary to take steps to provoke the authorities into a more violent reaction. The more extreme of these steps can range from spitting in a policeman's face or kicking him in the groin to acid filled light-bulbs and razor-blade studded potatoes and gloves as well as so-called 'sap gloves' — loaded with lead shot. These measures have the particular advantage of a low profile relative to television cameras and reporters in general — particularly given a friendly press. Should these measures prove insufficient, or anyway at a later stage, the in-

urgency will move onto stoning, clubs, Molotov cocktails and even sniping. Possibly the most important thing to remember about this stage, is that the operations started during it will almost certainly be continued right throughout the course of the insurgency.

2) Terrorism: This stage will comprise operations including bombings with and without prior warning, minings, ambushes, specific assassinations, kidnapping, the seizing of hostages, robberies and riots apart from an intensified application of the stage one operations. It serves several purposes:

- (i) To provide both the command and the military wing with experience and training.
- (ii) To finally harden and commit recruits by having them commit serious crimes, preferably before witnesses.
- (iii) To terrorize selected elements of the population or the population as a whole into co-operation or at least neutrality.
- (iv) To shake the population's faith in the authority's ability to protect it.
- (v) To demonstrate this same inability to the outside world.
- (vi) To panic the authorities into excessively repressive measures.

Operations of this stage may well be initiated in the urban areas, particularly within and in the vicinity of slum areas which provide sanctuary for the terrorists. The use of these also brings with it benefits such as added rich/poor alienation, scenes of persecution and repression of the poor slum dwellers, etc. During later stages of the insurgency the nature of operations within the urban areas may well remain terrorist as other operations are difficult to carry out there. Another factor of these operations is that the insurgents may very well attempt to place responsibility for the more distasteful acts of terrorism on the security forces.

3) Guerilla Warfare: This stage is reached when the insurgents decide that they are strong enough to initiate minor actions against army units as well as expanding terrorist attacks into major sabotage operations. This stage will almost certainly be initiated in and largely remain limited to, the rural areas as these are best suited to such operations. The operations of this stage will

include attacks on police stations, small army outposts and communications as well as ambushes of military and other traffic and patrols. It will also include a form of terrorism against the rural population who may well have been spared earlier attacks. Apart from those mentioned with regard to the previous two sections, the aims of the operations of this stage will include:

- (i) Causing the army to abandon the worst affected areas or, alternatively to concentrate in them leaving apparently unaffected areas at the mercy of the insurgency.
- (ii) As an alternative to (i) above or even to some extent in conjunction with it, to cause the army (and other security forces) to dissipate its strength thus
 - (a) losing control in most of the country and
 - (b) laying itself open to defeat in detail during this or the next stage.

However, the main aim of operations in this stage will be to consolidate the insurgency in one or more selected areas. An attempt will be made to drive the authorities from these areas and thus to gain complete or near complete control over both the territory and the population, thus creating (or consolidating) a strategic base for the insurgency. Apart from the obvious morale and publicity effects, such areas can now be used to set up and train not only further terrorist and guerilla bands but also regular units. Such an area will very probably be set up near a border so as to facilitate the free movement of personnel and supplies to the insurgents.

4) Mobile Warfare: This stage involves semi-conventional operations designed to defeat the opposing forces militarily and to seize final control of the country as a whole. Thus operations will probably but not necessarily be initiated from within the insurgency's strategic bases. An important aspect of this stage and, to some extent the previous one, is that the insurgency's publicity/propaganda campaign will begin to change. The attacks will no longer be on any and all authority but rather they will be aimed directly at the opposing structure. This is necessary in order to facilitate control of the country after the expected victory.

In closing this section there are a number of aspects worth emphasizing:

(i) Throughout its course the insurgency is to a great extent dependant upon the support or at least the neutrality of the population. Not only does the population supply recruits, foodstuffs, clothing and shelter, but it is also an extremely important part of the insurgency's intelligence system, particularly in the vicinity of its bases and camps — and, for that matter, in the vicinity of the army's. Hence the emphasis upon the winning over or terrorizing into co-operation of the population. Further, it is important for the insurgency to alienate the population from the authorities, not only to rob the latter of its support, but also to demonstrate the authorities' lack of credibility and legitimacy both internally and in the eyes of the world.

(ii) The 'stages' of an insurgency will almost certainly overlap and blend into each other rather than being clearly distinct. Particularly the operations of the first two stages will tend to be continued throughout the course of the insurgency. It is also quite possible for the insurgency to be in different stages in different parts of the country.

(iii) The insurgency may well succeed or be defeated in any one of these stages. Similarly it may skip one of them altogether. However, the defeat of the insurgency in one stage may not be a decisive one — it will be prepared to adopt a lower profile and to revert to a previous stage.

(iv) It must at all times be remembered that many of the insurgents and their supporters (active or passive) as well as, for instance, other countries, may well sincerely believe in the declared aims and intentions of the insurgency and also believe that these are indeed the real aims thereof; quite regardless of what the aims of the instigators and leaders are.

Having outlined the threat, let us now proceed to an overview of counter-insurgency followed by a more detailed look at its course and possibilities.

Counter-insurgency — overview

Upon detecting the development of an insurgency, the first step is to determine the type of insurgency and the stage that it has

reached. Both of these factors will affect all following actions. A simple incursion or an insurgency almost purely externally mounted and with minimal internal support will obviously require different counter-measures to a, as it were, 'home grown' one. If nothing else, the former will probably be easier to deal with and the reaction may even fall largely within the ambit of the Foreign Affairs Ministry. The declared aims of the insurgency are also important determinants of the reaction — particularly with regard to propaganda and psychological operations. In some cases it may be possible to pre-empt an insurgency without the authorities sacrificing their principles. The real aims of the insurgency will not only affect the scale and type of the reaction but may also give clues to

(i) the instigators and supporters and
(ii) the likely operations. These aims can also be utilized for propaganda and to help the Foreign Affairs staff to convince friendly states.

The importance of determining the stage of the insurgency is quite easily apparent in that it will obviously affect the counter-measures required and possible. The first, organization, stage is probably the insurgency's most vulnerable one as it is not yet prepared and is, perhaps, still open to infiltration. The problem here lies in the difficulty of accurately detecting an insurgency during this stage and, having done so, convincing the press, the public and the world of the danger and the necessity of the measures taken to counter it. The successful detection and elimination of an insurgency during this stage will require, above all, an effective intelligence system and the means to use what intelligence is made available. Both requirements are usually not easily met within a democratic system, the reasons for this will become clear in a later section. However, if at all possible, it is best to smash the insurgency during this stage as this can save much bloodshed, destruction and suffering.

During the next two stages the insurgency has become obvious to everyone, but it is still very difficult to come to grips with given the restrictions concomitant with democracy and true liberalism. The difficulties regarding counter-measures during these

stages are much the same as those relative to the first stage. It is only in the later phases of the third stage that the armed forces have a real opportunity to act. During these stages the security forces will quite possibly have to limit themselves to gathering information, harassing the insurgency and protecting, or attempting to, the population, government and installations. Attempts should be made to either force the insurgency back to stage one or to entice it into moving into stage four prematurely thus giving the armed forces the opportunity they need. The final stage, if reached according to the insurgents' plan, will probably result in victory for them as the security forces will by then be both too weak and too dispersed to offer much serious resistance. The latter's only choice then will be either to accept defeat or to themselves become insurgents.

Immediately upon receiving intelligence of an impending insurgency, the authorities should set about preparing or consolidating their strategic base(s). This will require a massive propaganda/publicity programme, possibly improvements in administration, services and the administration of justice and an intensive effort at counter-organization. This latter term refers quite simply to the organizing of the population into groups and clubs of virtually any type and then attempting to link these up with each other and the authorities, thus providing the people with a set of loyalties which are, in all probability, at odds with the insurgency and its real, if not its declared, intentions. Joining such clubs, etc. must, however, remain voluntary if the result is not to be counter-productive. The government should also immediately launch into a programme for gaining and keeping friends in the outside world. These are not only important as a source of aid and assistance, but also as a source and proof of legitimacy and respectability, as, indeed, are the strategic/popular bases. Considerable efforts will also have to be made to prevent disaffection within the administration and security forces.

A major effort will also have to be made throughout the course of the insurgency to open the eyes of those well meaning persons and bodies who, in their incredible naïveté, believe every insurgent accusation against the authorities in general and the

security forces in particular. Generally seen as above board and well meaning, such people are almost a greater danger than the insurgency itself — their particular metiér being the sapping of morale. Some, of course, may be neither well-meaning nor naïve.

In closing this general overview, the great importance of good intelligence and the maintenance or at the very least, the contesting of the initiative must be underlined. As long as the counter-insurgent has the initiative he can keep the insurgency on the run, force it to change stages — and be ready for the new stage and, in the end, win.

Following on to the above general overview, the next sections will attempt to give a more detailed look at some of the possible counter-insurgency operations. For the sake of continuity and clarity, they will follow the stages of insurgency outlined above. However it must be emphasized that they too overlap and blend into each other. In recognition of this each section will only deal with those possible operations which are more or less new — i.e. were not mentioned before, although they may well also have applications in earlier stages. Most operations will from the time of their introduction run right through the course of the campaign — albeit modified to suit changing conditions.

Stage one insurgency — counter-measures

In this and the following sections dealing with counter-measures to the various stages of insurgency, those steps that can be taken by the government and the civilian authorities generally will be dealt with first. Thereafter those steps that can be taken by the Intelligence Services, the Police and the Armed Forces. Before proceeding to details it must be made clear that the average democratic state must consider itself lucky if it uncovers an insurgency in this the first stage.

A) General: The first steps to be taken by the government and civilian authorities have already been mentioned. Responsible heads of departments, local authorities, members of the security forces and friendly states must be informed as soon as possible of the

fact that something may occur in the near future. How much information is given to whom will depend largely on the Intelligence Services' estimates of political reliability. Legislation already in the pipeline that may serve to pre-empt the insurgency should be speeded up and in some cases new legislation may be introduced. However, such steps must on no account be precipitate so as not to warn the insurgents. Further, all such measures should be very carefully reconsidered and perhaps delayed or dropped once terrorism or some other form of pressure has begun to be applied. To carry on with such measures then can only be interpreted as a reaction to the pressure applied, leading to the simple but perhaps erroneous conclusion that such methods are valid. This could also weaken the authorities' stand in the eyes of the population and the world at large.

Efforts can also be made to improve administrative procedures and services in those areas where it may be necessary, hoping thereby to reduce any discontent, perhaps even create some loyalty and, anyway, establish closer contact with the population. Simultaneously a start can be made with efforts at counter-organization as mentioned above. Initial preparations for the regroupment¹ of parts of the population could also advantageously be made during this stage.

As soon as sufficient information on the insurgency is available to form a reasonably accurate opinion as to its structure, origin, aims and strength, a start can be made with a publicity and propaganda campaign. Such a programme's aims would be twofold:

- (i) to popularise the authorities and the existing system and
- (ii) to denigrate the insurgency, its members and its aims.

If suitable, its declared aims can be attacked and/or ridiculed. Above all, however, its real intentions should be exposed to the full glare of publicity and suitably attacked. Similarly, its supporters and its reliance on them can be a suitable target. However, such a programme must build up very gradually so as to avoid alarming the insurgents, panicking and/or saturating the population. A programme of this nature must also be as subtle as possible and must at all costs avoid fab-

rications as these are all too easily detected and disproved to the discredit of the authorities. Similarly, particularly during this stage, every effort should be made to avoid withholding news as this could lead to similar results if exposed. The programme would not only involve the media but could also be expanded to include literature, entertainment, art and a 'whispering campaign'. In fact, to be really effective it would have to include all of these. Falling between this and the counter-organization effort, would be operations aimed at countering the insurgency's attempts at alienation.

B) Intelligence: The intelligence services will bear the brunt of this stage of the campaign as the other elements of the security forces will in all probability be unable to come to grips with the enemy. Their main functions will be the normal ones of collecting, collating and disseminating intelligence. Additionally they should attempt to infiltrate the insurgency and/or to subvert some of its members. This may be rendered difficult as the insurgency, still being small, will probably have very intensive and effective security measures. However, this difficulty may be offset by the fact that it is still recruiting thus it should be possible to have it come to and recruit the infiltrator. Similarly, at this stage the insurgency probably still comprises mainly idealists who are not easily subverted. However anyone infiltrated or subverted at this stage has a very good chance of rising to an important position within the hierarchy in later stages, particularly if he remains passive for a time.

Other operations can include the sabotage/doctoring of discovered arms or supply caches. The resultant difficulties will sap confidence and morale as well as creating distrust between the insurgency and its suppliers. Such operations should not, however, be overdone so as to avoid creating suspicion. They could range from doctored foodstuffs via mixing petrol with paraffin for lamps and tampering with medical supplies to the placing of instant detonation fuses in e.g. every tenth handgrenade, etc. The preference here would be to the infliction of illness or injury, not death, the former having

1. E.g. into fortified villages/strategic hamlets or even to a different area altogether if the area concerned cannot be held.

the added advantage of sapping morale and straining logistics. The intelligence services can also create some havoc by the supplying of false information, particularly the type designed to create mistrust. Thus a leader of the insurgency could be made to appear as a police-informer by, for instance paying him more or less secretly, or, less subtly, by rewarding him publicly. Other 'misinformation' could be aimed at frustrating the insurgency's later efforts. Such operations would go hand in hand with the tightening up of security generally and a rechecking of all security clearances.

If enough information becomes available during this stage to ensure the destruction of the insurgency, it may be possible to take the necessary steps. However, until that time is reached, it is better to let it continue in what has, after all, more or less become 'the open' rather than driving it further underground and out of sight. This doctrine would not rule out some harassment in co-operation with the police, however. Further, some extra-legal operations may prove beneficial both in eliminating certain key members of the insurgency and in sowing suspicion. Needless to say such operations would need to be suitably disguised and the necessity for them carefully weighed.

C) Police: The police force is rather limited in its capabilities versus an insurgency — particularly during this stage. This limitation is largely due to its relation to the concept of the rule of law which must be kept intact at all costs. However the police can utilize its records and its own intelligence and informer systems together with those of the intelligence services and other departments (e.g. statistics, social welfare, or immigration,). The police can also use this stage to make their preparations for future identity card systems, checkpoint networks as well as for the possible regroupment of parts of the population.

More actively, the police can help harass the insurgency by, for instance, prosecuting in even the most trivial cases when a suspected insurgent or supporter is involved, holding on suspicion, taking in motorists (suspects only) for I.D. checks after minor motoring offences and similar. Such harassment can also be conducted by, for instance

health and fire department officials. Given some co-operation by the prosecutors, it may well be possible to remove some members of the insurgency from circulation for some time. The police's main functions will thus lie in preparation and co-operation with the intelligence services. The most obvious feature of the latter lies quite simply in arresting and bringing to trial members of the insurgency against whom sufficient evidence is available. There are two limitations that come into play here, however:

(i) Particularly during this stage it may prove wiser not to prosecute anyone in connection with the insurgency in order to avoid warning the latter of its detection.

(ii) In certain special circumstances it may be desirable to waive prosecution (even for other crimes) in order to:

- (a) encourage further desertions/surrenders,
- (b) reward individuals for their co-operation and to protect them from retribution and
- (c) specifically avoid warning the individual's compatriots.

An opposite situation could also arise where it might be desirable ostensibly to prosecute so as to

- (a) create alarm within the insurgency,
- (b) protect an informer or
- (c) clear an infiltrator.

An important point here is that throughout the course of operation stringent measures will be necessary to prevent the suicide (following instructions) and/or assassination (by the insurgents) of prisoners. This danger will be greatest prior to interrogation and trial as, afterwards, the insurgency can no longer achieve anything thereby.

In order to deal with the type of situation outlined above it may well prove necessary to modify certain laws and/or to grant the police in particular, certain new powers. The modifications required would be to make provision for detention without trial (subject to certain conditions and judicial supervision), the suspension of habeas corpus in certain cases and alterations concerning the rights and procedures for arrest, holding for questioning, search and seizure and evidence (both with regard to the admissibility and giving

thereof). These powers, in order to be of use, must be made available independent of the declaration of a state of emergency — which action has many consequences and may not always be desirable or even practical. To guard against misuse, these powers must, of course, be subject to safeguards — but not so hedged about with the same as to be useless.²

The major field of direct action for the police will lie in the control and subduing of demonstrations and riots. While every effort should be made to keep a low profile at first, the means and the will to strike effectively and quickly must be available. In many cases immediate drastic action can avoid later bloodshed. Available equipment can range from truncheons via water cannon to tear and the more effective nausea gas. In some cases firearms may have to be used. Should this become necessary it may be best to shoot at selected and indicated individuals, preferably the agitators, than just into the crowd. Volleys fired over the heads of crowds tend to be ineffective as they encourage the latter's belief in their own invulnerability. When possible the intending rioters should be intercepted close to their gathering point and dealt with then. It may also be possible to clear the area and bar the press thus removing the main point of the riot. While every effort must be made to avoid the use of even the minimum of violence for as long as possible, two factors should be borne in mind:

- (i) A sharp shock administered early can be very valuable.
- (ii) The riot control force should not be expected to expose itself to injury and possible death without the equipment to defend itself and the permission to use it.

In closing it is worth considering the possibility of utilizing one crowd or group to neutralize another, good intelligence work and some astute bargaining may well be able to achieve this.

A final point is the necessity of the co-operation of the judiciary. This applies particularly to the question of sentences. Nothing is more demoralizing to the security forces than to risk their lives to apprehend someone who then receives a paltry

sentence. This also has the opposite effect upon the insurgency.

D) Armed Forces: During this stage the armed forces are extremely limited as regards their capability for action. All they can really do is to gradually shift the emphasis of training of the regular and reserve units to irregular warfare and start building up self-defence units. These last are tricky, however, as they should only be started in areas likely to be held so as to avoid a loss of confidence and, for that matter, equipment. Given sufficient intelligence the army might be able to initiate a border closure programme in order to cut off supplies to the insurgency. Some increase in patrolling and aerial and maritime reconnaissance may be practicable but this must be disguised in one or another way if it is not to warn the insurgents. The armed forces could possibly expand their operations in the civic action field although they would have to be very careful to avoid a dissipation of their resources and the exposure of small detachments to attack. Otherwise, they are generally limited to updating maps and doctrine, carrying out some terrain reconnaissance, preparing plans for regroupment and security operations and, of course, improving their own security arrangements.

In closing this section it is again worth emphasizing the desirability of destroying the insurgency during this stage. But such an attempt should only be made given near certainty of success. Any operation that merely warns the insurgency without destroying or at least critically damaging it would only worsen the situation. Failing such an opportunity, every effort must be made to avoid warning the insurgency — rather let it reveal itself in its own time: unaware that it is expected and prepared for, that it has been infiltrated and subverted. In dealing with the next stages of operations only changes in the picture described above will be covered as most of these operations will continue, increasing in intensity as soon as the insurgency has re-

2. A difficult problem! One solution could be for actions taken under such powers to be subject to judicial review at a later date.

vealed itself or sufficient intelligence and capability is available to decisively defeat it.

Stage two insurgency — counter-measures

With the beginning of this stage the insurgency has moved into the open and counter-measures can thus be intensified and some new ones or different versions introduced. In some cases it may of course still be advisable to conceal the fact that the authorities know about something or other until action has been taken — for similar reasons as before. The difference now lies in the fact that waiting too long in the hopes of more or better information or opportunities can lead to more deaths than would have been caused by the forgone opportunities had the security forces moved earlier. Thus, if anything, even more concentrated thought must be applied to the whole strategy.

A) General: No attempts should now be made to pre-empt the insurgency except in regard to those of their aims not yet the subject of common knowledge. At all costs the impression of giving way under pressure must be avoided. Plans for possible regroupments can now be carried further and the populations of some smaller villages in isolated areas could already be moved without too much disruption and thus reducing the work load later, when such operations will have to be carried out in the face of guerilla opposition. Diplomatic and political moves should be continued and intensified. It may prove possible to import experts in anti-terrorist or even anti-guerilla operations. Such a course is, however, fraught with many political difficulties and should therefore be approached warily.

B) Intelligence: The intelligence agencies must continue with the same operations as before only more intensively. Now, also, it is no longer important to conceal the fact that operations are taking place, thus more general attempts at gathering information may be used. For instance apart from relying upon various modern surveillance equipments, it will now be possible to tap some lines officially from the post office. Similarly, exchange operators, after

careful vetting, can be requested to eavesdrop on calls at random in the hopes of picking up a stray item of information. If anything, it is now more important than ever to evaluate and disseminate intelligence quickly — any delay may cost lives.

Extra legal operations will by now possibly have become not only more acceptable but also more important and, perhaps, a little easier due to the lower secrecy requirements. It may even be feasible to set up a counter terrorist organisation although this involves many moral and legal problems as well as creating the difficulties with regard to past, current and future loyalty that the authorities have been trying to create for the insurgency, for the authorities themselves. In some cases these disadvantages may, however, be worth accepting in return for the problems created for the insurgency. It is important to note that such operations are not intended to terrorise any part of the population but the insurgents themselves. It may prove worthwhile activating some of the infiltrated personnel at this stage in order to both speed up the flow of information as well as to interfere with the insurgency's operations.

C) Police: The police will also intensify all its operations but with the proviso that police patrols or officers on traffic duty should be covered so as not to present an easy target for terrorists. As far as possible normal duties should be carried out and the image of the policeman as 'friend and helper' should be maintained — but not at the expense of dead policemen. More active police measures might include raids on the advice of the intelligence services or based on their own or other information. In particularly hard hit areas raids might also be conducted at random. This would also be the stage at which to introduce snap checks at road blocks, inspections of personal identification and searches of individuals and their bags, cases, etc. at random and as part of a specific plan one might go as far as Colonel Trinquier's idea of having one man in every family or small group responsible for the actions of its members, one man in a building or street responsible for these men and so on. This combined with a rigorous application of the other methods mentioned could be extremely ef-

intelligence services and its quick and efficient evaluation and the dissemination of these results now assumes even greater importance.

C) **Police:** The police may have some of the pressure taken off them during this stage although terror operations are likely to continue at least in the larger urban centres. Rural police will be involved in the regroupment process and will have to co-operate with the army and self defence units. At some stage it may well become necessary to withdraw police personnel from those areas not dominated by the security forces. Simultaneously, administrative personnel will probably also have to be withdrawn. Rural police operations will be greatly hindered by guerilla operations and the police should largely content itself with maintaining law and order within the strategic base. Particularly in the new 'strategic hamlets' or whatever it is decided to call them, the police can be used to enforce curfews and checks.

D) **Armed Forces:** During this stage the military and particularly the army really have an opportunity to act. The army's main task will be the protection and consolidation of its strategic bases. This will involve some garrison work although much of this can be handled by the self-defence units. The manoeuvre units should concentrate on holding the perimeter of these areas and on thoroughly clearing the interior by means of patrols, ambushes, sweeps and 'nomadizing' — that is long term patrols/surveillance teams covering an area on foot and possibly under cover. Liberal use can be made of helicopters for reconnaissance, mobility and casevac.

While these operations are continuing, some elements of the army and, where applicable, the other two services, should attempt to create unease among the insurgents in the remainder of the country. These operations are intended to prevent the formation of an insurgent strategic base. Whether or not he can form a popular base is not within the army's control — that depends on the success of previous counter-organization and propaganda efforts. It may be possible to utilize left behind self defence units as guerillas in guerilla country — i.e. counter guerillas to further this end. The major operations of this type would probably be large sweeps,

search and destroy missions, patrols, ambushes, sudden air-cavalry or paratroop raids on suspected insurgent bases and, perhaps, air attacks on identified targets. Simultaneously the army should attempt to keep the borders shut.

Once the strategic bases have been secured the army can turn to expanding its control outward from there. In the selected areas important towns and communication centres can be occupied and screened and cleared. Thereafter surrounding villages can either be occupied or cleared and the population regrouped into more easily defended localities. Counter-organization will prove very important here. Surrounding areas must be saturated with patrols and surveillance sweeps. If possible such an operation could be preceded by one or more major sweeps. While this is going on it will be necessary to keep the insurgents occupied in other areas so as to prevent any reinforcement or, for that matter orderly withdrawal. Thus sweeps, etc. must continue. Automated ambushes and forbidden zones could also be used in less populated areas and perhaps, within or on the perimeter of newly occupied areas. The army will thus attempt a step by step re-taking of the country. The other two services must help as best they can, the airforce being the most useful in this respect. It can supply ground support, transport, reconnaissance and surveillance operations. Also leaflet drops, propaganda broadcasts, etc. In strongly riverine countries the navy can help keep up communications, move units and hamper insurgent movements. Elsewhere it will be limited to preventing seaborne resupply.

The most important units of these operations will be the infantry biased ones. The armoured and mechanized units will be of most use in the sweeps and for road patrols and convoy escort, the artillery in a normal, if adapted, role. However, every attempt should be made to find ways and means of using these heavy weapons against the guerillas for it is in these that the regular forces have their greatest superiority over the guerillas — sending small parties of infantry out after small parties of guerillas may not be the only or even the best way of doing it. This aspect deserves more study.

fective but is, perhaps, somewhat drastic. The police will of course also be involved in investigating cases of terrorism in co-operation with the intelligence services. Their forensic laboratories and print files will become particularly important during this stage. Thus while the intelligence service is mainly concerned with gathering intelligence on and infiltrating and undermining the insurgency, the police's major task will be to create a climate of uncertainty for the insurgents — as well as absorbing many of their blows. Initially the police will probably also have to protect the fire, ambulance and other services. As the situation deteriorates, this will become the responsibility of the army.

D) Armed Forces: The armed forces will still be limited in their functions but the army could, for instance, be used to saturate certain areas and thus make terrorist operations difficult and risky. It is essential, however, that troops do not present themselves as targets by moving around in small groups. At this stage it may also be possible and necessary to mount a thorough border-closure operation. This could range in intensity from thorough patrolling to a system of electrified and floodlit fences 'overwatched' by radar and other surveillance devices and covered by mobile groups. Automated ambushes may also merit serious consideration. It may also be possible to identify rural areas thought likely to serve as future guerilla bases. Frequent, but irregularly timed patrols and, possibly, sweeps, though these can further unsettle the insurgency. The training, equipping and screening of self-defence units can also be stepped up. Initial on-the-spot preparation could now also be made for regroupment operations. The use of forbidden zones, particularly along the border or around terrorist infested areas may also prove effective — particularly given modern sensors and a heli-borne quick force.

As was the case in the previous stage the only hope for a victory during this stage lies in the intelligence field. Failing this the security forces can only harass the insurgency and attempt to force it back into stage one. Alternatively it may be possible to deceive it into proceeding to stage three prematurely — i.e. before it has any form

of strategic base in the rural areas and, perhaps, in areas where the army is ready and waiting. Such a move would depend largely on the feeding of false information, the use of decoys and the action of infiltrated intelligence personnel or subverted insurgents.

State three insurgency — counter-measures

The reaching of this stage probably signifies a considerable feeling of confidence within the insurgency although it could also come about as a result of a complete failure of terrorism, which is of course an important determinant of all counter measures, particularly psychological operations.

A) General: This is the moment where the final decisions on which areas to hold at all costs and which, perhaps, to give up temporarily must be taken — at the very latest.³ The emphasis must be on controlling the bulk of the population, food and other resources and territory in that order. Once this decision has been taken, the work of regroupment can begin seriously and efforts at counter-organization must be greatly stepped up — if necessary at the expense of those areas not considered part of the essential strategic base. Other operations would, of course, continue.

B) Intelligence: The main change as regards the intelligence services would lie in the greater importance of their rural operations. It may also be possible to set up counter-guerilla groups similar to the counter-terrorists, although the former may be more within the ambit of the army. The earlier comments with regard to the 'doctoring' of captured dumps are particularly important now. Similar methods can be used on deserted guerilla camps, villages evacuated during regroupment operations, etc. — again possibly more an army operation. The intelligence service should provide special intelligence and interrogation teams to the army to operate with its patrols and other units. Alternatively it should provide suitable training to army personnel. The quick passing of information by the army to the

3. In some cases, of course, it may not prove necessary to give up any territory at all, even temporarily.

During this stage it may be possible to force a conclusion in military terms — the guerillas may be decisively defeated. However, the most important aims of operations during this stage must be

- (i) to survive,
- (ii) to keep the initiative or at least contest it,
- (iii) to stop the insurgents obtaining a secure strategic base and
- (iv) failing a victory over the guerillas, to tempt them into stage four prematurely and thus serve them up to the army's heavy units on, as it were, a silver platter. Probably the most important thing to remember is for the authorities and particularly the army not to allow themselves to be dispersed all over the countryside. The recipe for success is a methodical, thorough spreading-out coupled with distracting and disturbing raids and sweeps.

Stage four insurgency — counter-measures

If this stage has been reached at the place and time desired by the insurgency, the authorities face a bleak future. Should the attempt suggested above have succeeded, however, they may look forward to near certain victory.

A) General: Here the emphasis will now be on standard civil defence measures as well as on reconstruction and reorganization. Other operations will, of course, continue. At this time it would be advisable to adjust the propaganda and publicity campaign so as to reduce to a minimum the post-conflict personal bitterness and hatred. Even more than before, attempts should be made to encourage surrenders and desertions and these should be reintegrated into the community as quickly as possible.

B) Intelligence: The intelligence operations should continue as before with maximum use now being made of any remaining infiltrators and subverted insurgents at all levels. There will also now be a need for more conventional military intelligence.

C) Police: Apart from those operations already discussed, the police will now be largely involved in restoring law and order and in re-establishing itself in its old image

and position. Once again some liberties may have to be taken with the course of justice in recognition for services rendered.

D) Armed Forces: The armed forces are now faced with a threat very close to the one they were initially trained and equipped to fight. This is the stage where, unless they are too dispersed and/or run down, they should be able to bring all their advantages to bear and to secure victory. This also presupposes, however, that specialist and heavy units have not been disbanded or reorganized to suit irregular warfare — should this be the case the advantage might well lie with the other side.

The description of operations, during this stage has been based upon the assumption that the security forces are indeed in a position to secure victory either as a result of stage four being reached prematurely by the insurgents or as a result of good policy keeping the army together in the face of adversity.

Conclusion

In closing let us again consider some of the most important points and also discuss briefly a singularly apposite allegory. Probably the most important aspects of counter-insurgency operations are the following:

- (i) Early recognition.
- (ii) Good, well and promptly disseminated intelligence.
- (iii) The maintenance of the initiative.
- (iv) A methodical approach combined with a willingness and ability to see and grasp opportunities.
- (v) The reinforcing and establishing of strategic bases.
- (vi) An effective publicity campaign.

Preferably the intelligence system, the necessary police powers, the security consciousness and the basis for counter organization should be present before the insurgency starts.

This is, however, highly unlikely in a democratic state. Thus much will depend upon the speed with which these can be provided.

It would be better if there were no discontent for an insurgency to feed upon, but once it is in the open, reforms are out of place and too late. It is after the defeat of the insurgency that the authorities must show themselves magnanimous and generous. It is also essential to help the population to forget the bitterness and hatred of such a, in effect, civil war — while remembering the lessons.

Finally we come to Chairman Mao's idea of the guerilla as a fish in a sea of people. This well describes the latter's dependence upon the population and has, on occasion, been used as a basis for various descrip-

tions of counter-measures: angling, deoxygenating the water, removing the water altogether and less common, an application of the commercial 'vacuum-cleaning the oceans' concept. This, latter, could be taken to represent the use of heavy weapons and conventional units. But all these methods assume the counter-insurgent to be outside the water. Surely this is false, the counter-insurgent is as much a fish as the insurgent and this simple fact must guide him in his activities at all times.

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