

die bou van slagskepe, sy agterstand op see in te haal.

Aanvanklik, omstreeks 1921, was die vernaamste funksies van die Duitse marine o.m. om die staatkundige rus en orde in die kusgebied te handhaaf, om die skeepvaartroetes en -verbindings langs die kus oop te hou en om werksaamhede soos opmetingswerk, die vervaardiging van seekaarte, die opstel van weer-en handelsvlootberigte en die herstel van seekabels te verrig.

Soos in latere fases van die geskiedenis van die Duitse marine in die tydperk tussen die twee wêreldoorloë is die beskikbare personeel, materiaal, tegniek e.d.m. in ooreenstemming met die opgawes in vredes- en oorlogstyd aangewend.

In die beginjare was, as gevolg van die beperkings wat aan die Duitse marine opgelê is, hierdie take beperk, maar dit tref die leser telkens dat, ten spyte van hierdie omstandighede, voortdurend aandag aan die buitelandse magsverhoudings en -beleid gewy is.

Kenmerkend is, in bovermelde verband, o.m. die volgende uitsprake van 1926:

- a. Die grootste gevaar in die wêreld is die Sjinese wat, oor ongeveer vyftig jaar, 'n uittog sal gebruik om hul invloed uit te brei.
- b. Aangesien die Bolsjewisme die grootste vyand van die kultuur van Europa is, is Rusland noodwendig die grootste vyand van Duitsland.
- c. Engeland is tans die leier van die kultuur van die Aandland. Indien Engeland as gevolg van die Kommunisme of deur die afvalligheid van sy kolonies beswyk, is die gevaar dat Europa kommunisties word groter as onlangs. Engeland het die Kommunistiese gevaar besef, en bygevolg is die vriende van Rusland Engeland se vyande [pp. 67-68].

Op hierdie en ander wyses het die Duitse marinestaf sy vinger op die pols van die wêreld gehou en is elke koersverandering noukeurig geregistreer. Aangesien kragtens die verdrag van Versailles die daarstelling van 'n Duitse marine-akademie verbied is, en die Duitse marineleiding andersyds gevoel het dat so 'n inrigting onontbeerlik vir wetenskaplike opleiding en -navorsing is, het 'n aantal vooraanstaande personelede van die

akademie hulle op geskiedskrywing toegelê. Op dié wyse het o.m. die reeks **Der Krieg zur See 1914-1918** ontstaan waarvan die latere adm. Erich Raeder die deel **Der Kreuzerkrieg in den ausländischen Gewässern** in 1922 tot 1923 geskryf het [pp. 96-97].

Gerd Sandhofer het, deur 'n pantserkruiser te ontwerp wat binne die perke van die verdrag van Versailles geval het, maar in stryd met die bepalinge van die Washingtonse ooreenkoms was, in die rigting van verdere uitbreiding en versterking van die Duitse oorlogsvloot gewerk.

Met hierdie vloottoevoeging, waarvan van 1920 tot 1928 verskeie ontwerpe vervaardig is, begin die heropbou van die Duitse vloot [p.83] en, vanaf 1933, die Duitse strewe om — nadat die weiering insake gelykberegting tot Duitsland se uittrede uit die Volkebond gelei het — 'n grootskaalse vlootbouprogram aan te pak [1934-1945] en die strewe om met Engeland tot 'n vlootooreenkoms te kom.

Adm. Erich Raeder, het skepties teenoor Hitler se beleid in bogenoemde verband gestaan en is in die loop van die volgende jare in die gelyk gestel.

Daarna het Duitsland, in die aangesig van Engeland se sterk seemag, wat nou as 'n bedreiging beskou is, in 1938-1939 besluit om die Z-plan, wat die bou van slagskepe behels en uit adm. Raeder se vlootkonsepsie voortgevloei het, deur te voer.

Ten tye van die uitbreek van die Tweede Wêreldoorlog was die Duitse marine, gewikkel in 'n bouprogram wat met dié van voor 1914 vergelyk kan word, nie slag gereed nie. Ten spyte hiervan was die Duitse marine vasberade om nie werkloos te bly nie, maar tot die einde voort te gaan om — op dié wyse — 'n herhaling van 1918 te voorkom.

Hier is slegs 'n paar aspekte van kapt. Güth se belangrike publikasie genoem. Dit is 'n belangrike bron van kennis, nie alleen in verband met Duitse marine-aangeleenthede nie, maar ook met betrekking tot Duitse, internasionale en wêreldaangeleenthede. Ook in dié bestek gesien, is **Die Marine des Deutschen Reiches 1919-1939** 'n onmisbare bron van onskatbare waarde. Dit geld nie uitsluitend vir die student in die militêre geskiedenis nie.

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**LIVIOUS: Hannibals tocht over de Alpen.** Fibula — Van Dishoeck, Bussum, 1972, pp. 136. With illustrations.

As one of the classical historians and as an outstanding example of the historical activities and opinions of the Annalists in relation to the task of historical writing, Titus Livius [Padua, 59 B.C. — Padua, 17 A.D.] has retained his importance to this day.

This applies also in regard to his lively descriptions of historical military occurrences of note during the Second Punic War [218 — 201 B.C.], particularly as they affect Hannibal's plan of campaign and the execution thereof.

Closely allied thereto are the political aspects of the struggle for supremacy in the Mediterranean Sea area between the emergent Roman Empire and the trading Republic of Carthage. The outcome of this political and military struggle, climaxed by the aforementioned war of 218 — 201 B.C., marked the commencement of the Roman domination of the world.

All credit is due in my opinion to the translator, Dr. W. P. Theunissen, of the description by Livius of a part of the war in question, in that he draws attention in his introduction to the merits, as well as the less satisfactory characteristics of Livius as an historian.

Where he does this in the light of modern concepts regarding historical writing, interesting divergencies are revealed. As in the case of his contemporaries, Livius employed no scientific formulae and undertook no documentary studies. On the other hand, he did employ the principle of source comparisons in certain instances, adopting a very critical attitude in this regard. In addition, one should remember that Livius wished to inspire interest in the past by means of his historical writing and in so doing, to stimulate patriotism, while aiming at his goal of laying stress on the greatness of Rome.

I am appreciative of Livius as a linguistic artist and in my opinion the author, in his translation, has succeeded in maintaining throughout, that dignified tone and mood which are particularly obvious in the oratory conjured up from the mouths of the chief characters.

The Carthaginian Hannibal, son of the familiar Hamilcar, was the military strategist and

executive of the offensive against Rome, whom we learn to know as a leader of substance who understood perfectly the art of employment of the essential elements of strength, evaluation and the combined tactical utilisation of the separate arms [infantry, artillery and naval forces].

The reader furthermore learns to know Hannibal as a born orator. He was a military leader who, in the hour of victory or on the eve of a decisive battle, could inspire and encourage his soldiers by psychological play on their mental attitudes. He was in truth the grandmaster who understood perfectly the secret of tugging at the heartstrings of the inner man.

A striking example of this mastery is revealed in his address to instil courage into his troops, preparatory to the commencement of the crossing of the Alps, when he declared to his men: "No territory reaches up to the Heavens, men are able to cross these mountains." [p. 54].

In the same context and also viewed from a psychological angle, Scipio's address prior to the crossing of the Tacinus [p. 67 **et seq**] can be adjudged as a masterpiece in oratory.

Returning to the campaign itself, we can view the following descriptions by Livius as highlights: the Battle of the Tagus, the siege and capture of Saguntum [Sagunto], the address delivered by Hanno in the Carthaginian Senate, the visit of the Roman senators to Carthage, the enunciation of Hannibal's plan of campaign, the crossing of the Rhone, and the description of the Battle at the Trebia [p. 83 **et seq**].

There remain, other than in regard to the sequence of events — the author has compiled a reliable chronology on pp. 129 — 131 — a number of questions which will presumably never be answered with certainty. The most important are undoubtedly the divergent extant opinions in regard to the route taken by Hannibal over the Alps. Did he cross via the Mont Genis, the Little St. Bernhard, the Great St. Bernhard, the Mont Genève or the Pass of Argentière? [p. 62]. In the footnote 162 [p. 112] Dr. Theunissen, after supporting his contention with facts, comes out in favour of Mont Genève.

Another problem is the duration of the crossing, namely 15 or 19 days, which is satisfac-