

‘GETTING HERE FROM THERE’: TRAUMA AND TRANSFORMATION IN CANADIAN MILITARY EDUCATION

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**“Human history becomes more and more a race between
education and catastrophe”**

H.G.Wells, *The Outline of History*, p.1169

Introduction

In early 1997, the Canadian Minister of National Defence publicly issued an excoriating report that roundly condemned the poor state of leadership, ethics discipline, professional knowledge and education in the Canadian Armed Forces particularly among officers. His public exposure stemmed from a series of traumatic events that occurred in the four previous years. The most damning one had been the appalling revelation that some soldiers of the Canadian Airborne Regiment, then on a peacekeeping mission in Somalia, had beaten to death a young Somali teenager. The trail led right back to senior officers in Canada and there was evidence of a cover-up. The embarrassed government was forced into appointing a top level Somalia Commission of Inquiry¹. Then, in the next several months, followed revelations recorded on camera of grotesque initiation rites and racism in airborne units and others. The usually complacent and unmilitary Canadian public was shocked and indignant.² The government promptly disbanded the Canadian Airborne Regiment. How, many asked, did the Canadian Forces get here from its excellent performance in past decades? It had fought well in both World Wars, in Korea and had served with great distinction in the many United Nations missions since that time. Canadians, after all prided

themselves believing that their forces were the humanitarian ‘honest northern brokers’ and perhaps the world’s best peacekeepers.³

The answer to the question is both short and long term; it involves how the Canadian military evolved in the particular circumstance of the country’s history, no one step of which signalled the harmful outcome. It is also the story of moments of rapid change producing new scenarios to which Canada’s soldiers seemed reluctant or incapable of responding. And the accumulative causes came not from just the soldiers but from socio-political factors.

One starts with the contemporary events of the 1990s that most singularly exposed the plight of military education.⁴ The ‘nineties were tumultuous years in Canada and the world. The Soviet Union suddenly collapsed; the Cold War abruptly ended. The old enemy was gone and so was the comfort for armies of knowing what type of conflict they were likely to fight. There was increasing globalization, a proliferation of non-government organizations (NGOs) and rapid technological change all of which produced a so-called “revolution in military affairs”(RMA). This perplexing “ post modern world” seemed to validate Francis Fukuyama’s “end of history” or even that the old Westphalia state system had collapsed and been replaced by chaos in a new uni-polar world.⁵

Historically, most Canadians have little interest in their military forces because there has seldom been a direct threat. So at the end of the Cold War the public wanted their peace dividend. Anxious to reduce an astronomical national debt and traditionally not defence-minded, the politicians agreed. The Liberal government cut the Armed Forces personnel from 90,000 to less than 60,000. Rust out and shortages of equipment were obvious. Even though the service people did remarkably well in increasingly difficult theatres like the Gulf War, Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo, Rwanda, East Timor and a host of others over the 10 years, the commitment-capability gap widened; morale declined and numbers dwindled. ‘More with less’ was the catch phrase. The defence budgets were slashed from over 12 billion dollars to just over 9 billion by 1995. Canada stood 133rd out of 182 in defence spending relative to GNP—closer to Luxembourg’s than a G-7 nation bordering on three oceans!⁶

At the same time, military education and Officers’ Professional Development (OPD) schools too were significantly down-sized. The National Defence College, the supposed strategic level facility was abruptly terminated. Staff schools were closed. The two sister schools of the Royal Military College (RMC), College Militaire Royal in Quebec and Royal Roads on the west coast were quickly shut down; RMC Kingston was reduced by about 15 percent and then became the sole educational body, and more cuts followed. These, of course, were traumatic in themselves. But generally, the public approved especially as the Somalia Commission of Inquiry ground on with its

revelations. Then in 1997 came the defence minister's public charges of failures in military leadership, discipline, ethics and professional knowledge. All of it led back to matters of education and of how and what soldiers should learn.

In preparing his report, the Minister used four prominent and militarily knowledgeable civilian university educators as advisors. While they arrived at their findings separately, with one voice they told the Minister how ineffective current military education was. To quote the blunt words of Jack Granatstein, one of them, "The CF [Canadian Forces] has a remarkably ill-educated officer corps, surely one of the worst in the Western world." Only half of the Canadian Forces officers held undergraduate university degrees. Moreover, less than eight percent held higher degrees.⁷

Failures in Education and Leadership

If disturbing, these facts are relevant. It seems that in comparative terms, Canadian officers as a group are not as well educated as their contemporaries in other armed forces. Recent US studies, for instance, show a much higher level. Normally, American officers must have a master's degree before they can be promoted beyond the rank of Major.⁸ Moreover, in the Canadian military what focus on higher education has existed, is primarily in the technical fields, especially those with immediate, practical applications. There has been little apparent official emphasis on liberal education or in the humanities and social sciences. As Prof. David Bercuson, another of Young's advisor's put it:

Canadian Officers today are weak in history, theory and the practical application of military strategy. Moreover, there is a dearth of both strategic thinking and forward planning generally. Almost all-Canadian military intellectual activity concentrates either on the practicalities of doctrine, on tactical matters or on administration.⁹

The Roots of Education and Training

While the Minister's report described the symptoms and effects and ordered specific treatment, it did not address all of the causes. To understand the long path toward the crisis in military education one has to start with the accumulations of history and first with the development of military education itself. Military education has been slow to evolve at the same rate as its civilian counterpart. Some of the reasons reside in the nature of war's development itself. The 'heroic warrior' concept - the legacy of the ancient Greeks - associated the military more with muscle, individual prowess and patriotism than things cerebral like education.¹⁰ A highly trained soldier became associated with a highly educated one. Mounting technological advances in weapons put a premium on knowing how to use them.¹¹ Field experience added to the impression

that those who had often been to the wars knew all there was to know. In turn, this symbolized the tension between theory and practice and is further manifest in the roles of education and training. The question then what is training and what is education presents a true conundrum because both are vital to the same profession.¹²

Soldiers themselves have often been the greatest inhibitors for military education. Hierarchical discipline, fixed procedures, uniform action and a need to deal with immediate and dangerous reality without time for abstraction discourages them from stepping into the unknown. There are two ways that make change in military circles. One is what military historian, Theodore Ropp, described as the “last traumatic experience” syndrome wherein only some disaster forces the issue;¹³ the other is the incremental pressure of socio-political and technology innovation. And the latter usually causes the former.

Nevertheless, since the late 16th century, advances in military technology led inevitably back to education as surely as the efficient military use of gunpowder forced military personnel to study physics and chemistry. By the 1700s, growth in state organization and bureaucratic efficiency and the development of national monied economies widened the factors effecting war’s outcome. Later advances in western liberal thought established ideas such as the social contract between citizens and states, the nation-in-arms and the possibility of restraining conflict through codified law and international convention. Such concepts cultured a demand for more and different military education. In the 20th century, totalitarian dictatorships - militaristic in thought and well-developed industrially - showed what carnage a technically efficient and tactically well trained mass army could reek on the world when fired by nationalist and racist doctrine. The professional soldiers sometimes became willing pawns at the hands of dictators - still extremely important but isolated from politics and society and limited in horizon by increased training and the absence of a truly liberal education. Some of this even extended to the democracies. Clemenceau thought that war was too important to be left to the generals but the spectre of a nuclear Armageddon showed that it was too important to be monopolized by any one interest group. In short, soldiers had to be as well educated as the civilians lest they become mere superbly trained automata to the defence scientists and strategic think-tank experts. Indeed, warfare of the last six decades, whether conventional, cold war, peacekeeping or now asymmetric, has placed new and more challenges to what the military needs to know and how they must act. Contemporary soldiers are confronted by a bewildering range of civil, cultural and political factors foreign to their traditional martial skills. They must be knowledgeable and analytical with it all to do their jobs; and to use Sir Michael Howard’s phrase, they must have a “liberal conscience.”¹⁴

If one believes that military education has utility, then one must accept three basic assumptions. The first is, as Samuel Huntington asserts, soldiering has evolved into a profession which is characterized by particular technical knowledge, higher education and doctrines and by values, ethos and codes of conduct. That soldiers are armed automatically raises concerns about their relationship to society and their need to appreciate and understanding of what they serve.¹⁵ To do so they must be educated in a particular way.¹⁶ In short, education is not a panacea but it is the *sine qua non* of military effectiveness. The second assumption is, as Clausewitz identified nearly two centuries ago, the existence of a sacrosanct and symbiotic trinity of the military, the government and the people; break it and the entire society might be in danger. Significantly, if Canadians are an “unmilitary people”, the links have been fragile at best.¹⁷ The third assumption is that there is a difference between education and training. Put simply, **training** is a predictable response to a predictable situation. **Education** on the other hand is a “reasoned” response to an unpredictable situation – which is critical thinking in the face of the unknown. Modern soldiering demands that both education and training reside together, and are absolutely necessary. But they are fundamentally different.¹⁸ The Canadian Forces (CF) have not been immune to the general nature, development and assumptions of military education and they have added a few spins of their own.

Historical Baggage to World War II

For Canada’s soldiers, historical baggage is a major determinant in developing their attitudes toward and practices of military education. There are many paradoxes endemic to Canada that complicate military development. The country is so large, has such a severe a climate, and is so rich but has few immediately useable resources, human or physical, that it is both unassailable and indefensible.¹⁹ Public perceptions of threat were and are rare. Always junior partners in very large alliance systems such as the French and British Colonial Regimes or now the American Empire, the senior partners never demanded much of our soldiers beyond our field skills. Part-time volunteer citizen-soldiers serving only localities were all that the government or the people wanted or seemed to need. Canadian soldiers have never had to be much more than technically and tactically good and only when called to battle. The militiamen knew what side of the tree from which to fire a musket; they could build bridges, haul supplies; bring a native savvy to any problem or storm Vimy Ridge. And so Canadians militiamen established high military reputation on these limited functions.²⁰

Over time Canadians conjured this into a “militia myth” that part-time soldiers were the country’s best line of defence. But this view also contributed to a further stunted horizon.²¹ The effects were poor peacetime preparation in training and education. As for the general public’s view of the military, it was seldom concerned or

interested. Traditionally, Canada remained safe because of the Monroe Doctrine, the Royal Navy and time and distance.²² In the two great wars of the 20th century, as a junior ally, Canada contributed magnificently her brave but limited manpower, her natural and industrial/technical resources and her tactical prowess. But significantly, the war direction, strategy and priorities were determined by others.²³ In time, these facts gave Canadians, both in the military and out, a hard to overcome tactical and technical mind-set.²⁴

Until the Second World War, Canada's military had few professional development facilities beyond the unit level. What soldiers learned at the higher levels was mostly "experiential" in someone else's force.²⁵ The Royal Military College (RMC) was established in 1876, but its few graduates did not go into the Canadian regular force. Typically, Canadian officers were commissioned in British service.²⁶ Only by the 1920's was a very small selection of senior officers chosen to attend the first strategic level military school in Great Britain, the Imperial Defence College - for there was not such things in Canada. There, they learned all about the strategic thinking of the British Empire but little about Canada.²⁷

History after World War II

After the Second World War, the military schools expanded considerably, as increasing professionalism and size demanded. But, the educational content remained a poor second to an ever increasing and more sophisticated training and technical preparation. There were two potential exceptions. The first was RMC, which re-opened in 1948 as a tri-service college. In the next decade, it became a university in its own right with a charter from the Province of Ontario. Soon this experience was repeated with the creation of two smaller sister colleges, Royal Roads on the West Coast and College Militaire Royal (CMR) at St Jean, Quebec. While all three were representative nationally and with CMR better prepared to give expression to French Canada in the armed services, the Department of National Defence did not allow these colleges to educate more than 25 per cent of the total officer corps. Hopefully the civilian post-secondary schools would supply the rest, but that was not the way it turned out due to the need for rapid forces expansion and public disinterest.

The other potential exception was the National Defence College (NDC) established in 1948, supposedly it was to be the senior "Canadian Joint Services Staff College." But its creators did not consider it a strategic school - only one to train a supply of senior personnel "to co-ordinate civil and military operations in a national effort."²⁸ Furthermore, attendance was not a required part of senior officers' education or career progression.

Significantly, when press reports suggested that the new Canadian “National Defence College” would be similar to the British Imperial Defence College and to the US National War College, the Canadian Chief of the General Staff made it clear he wanted his senior officers to continue to go to British or American strategic schools.²⁹ This dependence on allies to get higher strategic development - perhaps a sign of a residual ‘colonial cringe’ - hinted at an uncertain future for NDC. It also meant that there would be no Canadian high level military forum developing a unique national strategy or producing informed general officers capable of advising politicians or countering alliance strategies.³⁰

The Cold War and Living with Uncle

Right after the Second World War, the Canadian government - a bit wary about the military’s expansive post war plans - wanted the forces returned to the traditional minuscule pre-bellum level dependent on a militia. But as usual with Canada, events beyond its control abruptly changed things with the sudden onset of the Cold War and then the United Nations action in Korea in 1950. In turn, these “traumas” created a rapid force expansion with its immediate demand for many more officers. Hurriedly created Officer Candidate Schools took direct entry candidates right out of high school. It seemed right, for Canada’s military proved to be better than most. And there was no evidence that a higher education was necessary to do the things in the field that training accomplished and the allies in NATO and the United Nations liked.³¹ The majority of officers therefore remained without higher education. Furthermore, RMC quickly became the place to get the engineering specialists and so the entrance requirements and the curriculum was geared towards an applied technical education as first among the equals. In general then, because Canada’s Forces had been historically oriented to ‘task means’ and not to ‘goal ends’, its view of education was similarly ‘need-and task-driven.’ It confirmed the already well-established historical emphasis on things technical and tactical rather than on liberal education concepts and a unique Canadian strategy. And in the late 1950s, why should it not be thus! The forces did very well what its government directed and what its allies expected. Besides, the education level of the CF was not much different than the rest of Canadian society of the time ...yet.

In these same early Cold War years, new forms of all of the old historical paradoxes confirmed Canada’s tactical and technical military being. Now the United States made all of the strategic decisions. In Canada, there were precious few informed civilian military analysts to give real debate. Canadian universities, then as now, showed little interest in the study of things military unless there was a handsome financial subsidy. Naturally “unmilitary” Canadians, like their governments, rightly were concerned more about national development and social programmes such as the St Lawrence Seaway project or a national ‘medicare’ scheme. Yet, troublesome signs

emerged in the sixties. Canadian governments had trouble meeting sky-rocketing costs and technological change. The public was divided on having a nuclear role; some wanted to practice only conventional soldering in NATO and others preferred peacekeeping and disarmament in the UN. The soldiers favoured the conventional war alliance scenario because it produced a comforting professional identity and made real contributions. Having none of its own, the military had only familiar alliance doctrine to espouse. The common Soviet enemy was as present and dangerous as ever. With good interoperability with foreign friends, Canada's soldiers got to know and use the latest equipment, share high quality training, and to practice operations in formations higher than brigades. As long as Canadian governments did not define or co-ordinate a clearly different defence and foreign policy, then the military professionals had every right to place their faith in this modernized version of conventional 'tactical-technical' thinking within NATO and NORAD (North American Air Defence Agreement).³²

But steadily gaining momentum in the late sixties was government unwillingness to support an expensive defence posture aimed at the European alliance. The Liberal government's imposed military unification, integration and civilianization - likely done as much to get control of the military whom they suspected of being too "interoperable" with the Americans as it was to reduce costs-added to the forces' trauma.³³ Indeed, morale plummeted, and some have argued that in the 18 months after these 'reforms of 1968', over 26,000 personnel departed the services with 13,142 quitting prematurely. Some say that it was an intellectual decapitation as the brightest and the best left.³⁴

Sensing Problems

Yet, there were a few senior officers in the CF who realized that the officer corps' education was not adequate for the changing times. In 1969, the Chief of the Canadian Defence Staff, General Jean Allard, asked Major General Roger Rowley, to investigate the efficacy of Officers' Professional Development (OPD) in light of the government's order to unify Canada's three separate military services. After a thorough investigation, Rowley concluded that there were serious weaknesses. Cutting to the chase, he said that there was neither a mature guiding "system", nor appropriate levels of education in the officer corps. When General Allard read the report, he warned ominously:

It matters little whether the Forces have their present manpower strength and financial budget, or half of them, or double them; without a properly educated, effectively trained, professional officer corps the Forces would in the future be doomed to, at the best mediocrity; at the worst, disaster.³⁵

But in the 27 years that followed not much was done with Rowley's assessment.³⁶ In fact, between 1969 and 1995, the Canadian Forces had no less than six major reports on the need to reform professional development. All pointed to the "absence of an underpinning philosophy and conceptual framework for OPD beyond the issues of military tactics".³⁷ In turn, the soldiers themselves were active but indecisive; they "cherry-picked to oblivion rather than implemented" each report, and the Forces were so busy, and generally getting things done well enough, that the politicians did not get involved in matters of military education even if they thought about it.³⁸ There were also other contributing factors.

Other Contributors to the Problems

One of these was the simultaneous emergence of another of the Canada's military paradoxes: bureaucratic management processes that ultimately eclipsed traditional leadership. If higher military education was necessary, now the "coveted" MBA and MPA became the new educational panacea. But this only confirmed the task-technological preference.³⁹ Moreover, many in the Canadian Forces still saw little need for higher education, especially in the combat arms. Consequently, hard pressed commanding officers would not send their officers to graduate schools for fear of going without.⁴⁰ Only the technical support services encouraged their officers to do so. Canadian attendance at the many alliance technical and command and staff schools increased, and so the dominance of foreign ideas in Canadian service remained. This convinced one RMC professor in 1970 to publicly lament that senior Canadian officers suffered from lack of a "command intellect".⁴¹

To some degree, the Canadian 'regimental system' and inter-service rivalries contributed to the stunting of military education. It was 'tribal' with three line 'tribes' in cut-throat mutual competition. As senior officers' careers take them to Ottawa's National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ), that competition likely continues there. Perhaps this is why over the years there has been no unified education policy coming out of NDHQ.⁴² For the few who managed to get a chance for such higher education, or more likely for those who earned it on their own in spite of the system, not being in the regiment to train often meant not advancing on the merit list. For them, promotion was difficult.⁴³ Higher education was not conceived of as a way to develop the minds of officers to be responsive to unpredictable or unconventional situations especially at the higher levels of strategy.⁴⁴ Frustrated, many of the well-educated simply left the service, and they continue to do so.⁴⁵ As one commentator said of this brain drain, in industry when a specialist leaves one firm he is not lost to the industry - when an expert leaves the armed forces he is lost forever.⁴⁶

Contributing to the situation was, and still is, the nature of Canadian Forces' career management. They have had a cadre of military career managers for years. But

for at least two decades they have had a most difficult task. Overworked and undermanned and having to juggle competing demands of diminishing human and financial resources with increasing operational tasking like peacekeeping, these managers scrap planning to fill holes.⁴⁷ Neither is an educational philosophy there to guide them. Consequently, education is undervalued in career development. Sometimes, recent postgraduates are not posted into after-degree employment which takes advantage of their hard earned degrees; other times where they do get in the correct slots, their seniors do not know how to use this brain trust – some say it frightens them. In all, this is tantamount to institutional anti-intellectualism.⁴⁸

Flaws in the Senior Schools

In the case of National Defence College, in due course, its graduates were too few, its curriculum lacked academic rigour (and therefore credibility); its candidates were not always well selected as the very best; less than fifty percent of NDC graduates were ever promoted and its short ten months term was too busy with a constant parade of speakers, much tourist-like travel and very little personal study or reading.⁴⁹ By 1992, the criticism was very strident.⁵⁰ For good or bad, it was closed in 1994.

As for the three colleges of the Canadian Military College system, over the years, they maintained a high level of university education for those who attended. But being allowed to produce no more than about twenty-five per cent of the total officer requirement, their foot print was not large enough to set the standard for education in the Forces. And there were some internal problems. Besides funding issues, all three colleges were mutually competitive in programmes. The cut-throat competition led to duplication and stifled educational innovation⁵¹. Rather than education conceived as a holistic entity, it was driven by 'task-need' demands of military occupations. RMC, for instance, produced a far larger number of engineering graduates than in the sciences or arts. As a result tensions between faculty divisions heightened as they seemed to be competing more and more for what they deemed their share of the ever diminishing resource pot.

Certainly the military outside the colleges thought that not enough good old fashioned military training was in the curricula, so they tried to ignore them.⁵² The anti-intellectualism also took the form of charges that the high cost of the military university system compared to civilian universities was outlandish. These outside critics thought it would be cheaper to just let the civilian institutions educate the few specialists one really needed in the services.⁵³ This unsettling financial assessment turned out to be wrong, but it was made often.⁵⁴ There was also a smouldering dissatisfaction from the operational branches that they were not getting the Colleges' graduates soon enough and that they knew too few military things for having spent four years at a military institution. Sometimes the cadets were accused of being arrogant

'ring-knockers' who did not fit into the appropriate military culture.⁵⁵ Finally, RMC was dragging its feet on innovative educational programmes such as continuing studies. For two decades, it did not get involved in theses until the late 1990s in spite of the clear bottom up demand and well-advanced civilian university programmes.⁵⁶

In the seventies and eighties, the Canadian Forces College at Toronto turned out competent, solid Command and Staff graduates quite capable of taking their place in the heady but conventional military worlds of NDHQ: Ottawa or the alliance in Europe or the United States. However, it was not meeting the changing military conditions and the demands for a better OPD. The Command and Staff Course only reached a minority of the "majors", in part because there was no mechanism of distributed education. Often the college wanted its graduates to be given university credit for completing the course. But some instructors had little academic qualification either to teach or to be masters of portions of the content; there seemed to be no attempt to make sure that they were, save that they were chosen for their service experience more than any other thing. The curriculum stuck pretty well to the conventional alliance doctrine and allowed little room for exploring anything uniquely Canadian. A student's time was jammed with visiting speakers and there was little mind-stretching, in-depth reading and writing. Examinations were restricted. Syndicate discussions demanded little academic preparation and one wondered if anyone ever failed.

The Civilians' Force Reforms

In looking back on the 30 years before the Defence Minister's reform fiat of 1997, it is clear that many in the armed forces were well aware that there were serious problems in OPD. Real financial difficulties and apparent government neglect of the CF did not help. Yet every one tried to heal something. Fixes, when they appeared, came as a sort of spontaneous curricular acupuncture. Such ad hoc treatment caused the educational and training limbs to twitch in different directions, often independently. But in the last decade the "traumatic experiences" accumulated very quickly, the Somalia tragedy being the most immediate and offensive catalyst. And so, in 1997 with the military seemingly unable to reform, an impatient Minister of National Defence - the spokesman for the civilian-political sector - ordered it to be done; he also appointed an independent 'watchdog' to make sure it was.⁵⁷ Clearly, he did not trust his senior officers to do the job themselves.

From 1997 on, he declared, all officers were to have a university degree upon commissioning and those serving members who did not have one were given a limited time to get it. Other important directives varied from a complete curriculum and governance review at RMC to the establishment of an ethics and leadership centre there and the creation of new courses at CFC: Toronto directed at the professional development of senior and general officers.⁵⁸

Transformation of What and How Soldiers Learn

One of the most fundamental questions in the ministerial reform movement was ‘what should an officer candidate learn? Its concomitant was ‘how to avoid the limitations that were brought about by the long technical and tactical bias and the isolation from the Canadian community’. The answer was liberal education. Rowley had said it in 1969; special OPD investigator, Lieutenant General Robert Morton had repeated it in 1995:

To perform well, officers must be trained and educated to master the art of war. A foundation of military skill is essential, as is the ability to think creatively and to reason critically. Officers must acquire a comprehensive understanding of the political, economic, social, cultural and military issues and trends that may effect the security of Canada...the nation can accept nothing less.

The defence minister consequently ordered that each graduate must have “a broad based education, well grounded in the sciences and the humanities, with special emphasis being placed on the development of values, ethics and leadership skills needed to prepare officers for responsibilities and service to their country.”⁵⁹

This is not to say that even before the 1997 ministerial directions, some of the elements within the CF were already doing important things on their own. For instance, for a long time, RMC as an accredited university had not only been offering excellent education; it already had a vibrant graduate school in engineering. But this was not the case for the arts, especially in subjects relating to the study of the profession of arms and society. Nor was it the case for having billets identified for the sake of increasing the general educational level of the Forces. In spite of the large ‘bottoms-up’ demand, national headquarters had sponsored few students. And so on its own initiative, the College decided to take education to where the clients were: their work place. In 1992, RMC began to teach postgraduate courses from their War Studies master’s programme off campus anywhere it could find the resources and the military audience to do so. Today, there are more than 260 registrations in the masters' courses and a dozen in the residential doctoral programme at Kingston. Moreover, the subject was what many dedicated soldiers wanted: it related directly to the study of the profession of arms. These paths are open to regular and reserve forces and a select number of civilians and foreign officers .

The War Studies success helped RMC embark on other post and undergraduate continuing education programmes starting in early 1996. Currently, the College has about 3,000 undergraduates taking courses part-time coast to coast and overseas from Bosnia to the Far East. As well as having conventional programmes, Continuing Studies created a new undergraduate degree pattern aimed at the profession of arms

similar to the graduate War Studies - a Bachelor of Military Arts and Science (BMASc). They also credited certain CF training courses. The outreach project is highly sensitive to the posting demands of service personnel, something that civilian universities did not do as easily if at all. It uses whatever means is effective to deliver this education to the work place, be it correspondence, traditional lectures or electronic.⁶⁰

While all of this was well in train, the Minister's reform dicta produced a close scrutiny of RMC's undergraduate curriculum during 1997-1998. It was done by a committee headed by a former Chief of the Defence Staff, General Ramsay Withers. Assisted mostly by a number of prominent civilian educators, Withers concluded that RMC must constitute the 'heart and soul' of the officer corps' education.⁶¹ To do so, a "core" programme was created comprising 30 percent of what all cadets studied. The mandatory subjects were military history, civics, military law, Canadian military history, military theory and strategy, international relations, leadership and ethics, information technology, and emerging technologies. Mathematics and science subjects were to be well represented.⁶² Most of the stipulated core courses had been offered for years, but only the arts graduates were getting most of it.

Pointedly the committee blamed much of the educational failures on the military attitudes outside RMC and not on the College. Once again, it was the old dichotomy between education and training, the reconciliation of which was absolutely fundamental to reform. One way to do this was also to increase to 30 per cent of the faculty the number of serving officers teaching at the College. But it also made it clear that they had to be university qualified. NDHQ would have to make sure that the appropriate post graduate educational opportunities would be given the new military teachers.⁶³

But RMC cannot and does not want to be the sole provider of higher education for the military. Withers' committee clearly saw RMC graduates as the standard bearers of officership. In order to set that standard in the officer corps, the College must increase its graduates to 40 per cent of the total CF officer needs. This number still leaves the majority to be obtained from the civilian institutions. By having the dual civil-military officer production system there will be strong and healthy links between the military and societal imperatives necessary for a well-rounded, well-educated Armed Force in a democratic society.⁶⁴

Contact with civilian universities remains very important. In pursuit of this, RMC sees itself well positioned to act as advisor, even a broker, in helping Canadian Forces members get to a civilian university or to Kingston. At the moment, the Continuing Studies programme has several cooperative agreements with universities across the country. RMC recognizes other institutions' credit towards our degrees and

they the College's.⁶⁵ With a university charter granted by the Province of Ontario and subject to its Ministry of Education's audit standards like all other Ontario higher educational institutions, RMC is viewed as an integral part of the university community and so military education gains civilian respectability.⁶⁶

The New Vision of Leadership and Education

Of course military education does not end at RMC; nor does it begin there. The Minister's 1997 orders, however, produced a new and fruitful effort at National Defence HQ to establish the guiding vision of Canadian Officership. In February 1999, the Chief of the Defence Staff struck a special committee on OPD independent of the chain of command. By early 2000, this team of well-educated officers from all services headed by a "believer" committed to reform, Lt Gen Romeo Dallaire, produced that vision statement. It is called "Canadian Officership in the 21st Century- OPD 2020: Statement of Operational Requirement."⁶⁷

The vision is an officer corps that is fully professional, aware of its responsibilities to the nation, and which manifests those qualities and ideals inherent in the military ethos upon which military effectiveness depends. It calls for men and women who are outstanding leaders who demonstrate superior intellectual capacity based on broad liberal education. They will be dynamic in thought and action capable of dealing with uncertainty and ambiguity, innovative and proactive. They will operate effortlessly in a technological and information rich environment and be committed to life-long learning.⁶⁸

Dallaire's group specified eight fundamental deficiencies in professional development, the first of which was general education. This was quickly followed by its sub-sets: leadership theory and practice, technological and operation competence, knowledge of civil-military relations and the Canadian way of life, the theory and structure of conflict, acceptance of bilingualism and pluralism in Canada and, finally, a concept of operations to implement the new vision. Clearly military education means far more than simply being educated.⁶⁹

Transformation could only be accomplished two ways: first, add educational institutions along side RMC or create new ones. Dallaire's team recommended several things. Among these were the establishment of an over-arching governance and coordinating professional development body in the form of a virtual defence academy; then there was to be a military leadership institute, and a war college-type strategic and national security facility for the formation of very senior officers. The second important recommendation was the establishment of a forces-wide all ranks core-curriculum applicable to all stages of a career. The content closely followed RMC's, and it was

clearly meant to a life-long learning process.⁷⁰ However incomplete, most of these ideas have been put into action.⁷¹ Lets look at few of these reforms.

More Reforms

After the closures in 1994, the only other major professional development school left was the Canadian Forces College: Toronto. Improvements at CFC followed quickly. For instance, many of the instructors at the rank of Lieutenant Colonel or higher now must hold a Masters degree.⁷² The Command and Staff courses have been revamped and include a higher level of strategic and Canadian security studies. Integration of education and training with RMC has now reached the point that RMC grants university credit towards a Bachelor of Arts or Master of Arts in various degree patterns for officers passing the Canadian Forces College's courses. Indeed the educational quality of the new command and staff course was high enough to have RMC grant a professional degree - A Master of Defence Science to all CFC graduates who meet RMC's university standards.⁷³ Moreover, the government's Ministry of Education evaluated the new degree and assessed it equal to civilian university standards.⁷⁴

Indeed, for over the past two years with the active participation of RMC and experts from civilian universities, the Canadian Forces College, is delivering a three month and six month course aimed at the highest ranks. The Advanced Military Studies Course (AMSC) and the National Security Studies Course (NSSC) represent the first obligatory educational requirements for studies in war fighting and strategy for promotion to general officer. They are geared to a graduate level university performance and, to use General Romeo Dallaire's phrase get senior officers "to think out of the box". Just finishing their fifth iteration in 2004, these mandatory programmes ensure that Canada's generals will have the formal professional military education vital to their position and responsibilities.⁷⁵

Canadian Forces College: Toronto has also added to their faculty civilian academics with doctorates in Military History, Politics and Anthropology to help augment the expertise of the military instructors. And there will be more. The College's library resources have improved tremendously, especially the electronic 'Information Resource Centre', described by professional librarians as world class.⁷⁶ Now all that CFC has to do now is to reciprocate with some accreditation toward the Command and Staff course for officers who cannot attend Toronto, but who hold appropriate RMC graduate degrees. Other military forces do it.

Still there was also a clear need to have some sort of a co-ordinating and regulating body that could bring all of the professional development needs and facilities together - that is the concept of a Canadian Defence Academy (CDA). It is an idea long

encouraged by many previous investigations. Resident at RMC and with direct access to the Chief of the Defence Staff, it was stood up in the spring of 2002. It defines and harmonizes the vision of common professional development and education” for all members of the Canadian Forces, regardless of their rank, branch of service, occupation or location”. Under its purview are RMC, the Canadian Forces College: Toronto, the equally new military Leadership Institute, all recruiting and training and a variety of other similar agencies.⁷⁷

The new Canadian Forces Leadership Institute (CFLI) was created to help solve the chronic leadership and ethics problems through high level expertise and research. Also resident at RMC and under the governance of the Academy, the institute is responsible for leadership issues and doctrine concerning the profession of arms and military ethics and ethos. Currently headed by a naval Captain with a doctorate in psychology, his well-educated and diverse team is both civilian and military. It maintains constant links with its counter-parts in the civilian universities and often commissions these experts for specific study. At the moment it is on the verge of publishing the first comprehensive manual on the Profession of Arms in Canada, and is in the advanced stages of drafting a comprehensive CF Leadership Doctrine Manual.

One should say a few words about these pioneering and critical studies. In the former, the Canadian Profession of Arms is articulated for each member at their appropriate rank level as being characterized by “expertise”, “identity” and “responsibility” under government direction and control. The military ethos is defined as the spirit derived from all these as well as from Canadian values that binds the profession of arms together. When combined, these articulate the professional character as “Duty with Honour.”⁷⁸ The mode of all leadership will be the transformational or ‘value-based’ kind rather than one of hierarchy and discipline.⁷⁹ It must be derived from the leader’s appreciation of civic, legal, professional and ethics values which collectively guide his or her ‘conduct’ to inspire confidence, trust and well-being.⁸⁰

There are many other improvements going on elsewhere. Importantly, on other Canadian Forces bases, many commanding officers are now obliged to encourage all ranks to take advantage of either civilian universities or RMC’s part-time studies programme. Their willingness suggests that the necessary cultural change is taking place in the Forces’ leadership. Part of this is practical help. For instance, now DND will give education cost rebates up \$20 thousand for a career total for those who successfully complete university and other post secondary courses. Significantly, providing higher education is also seen as a “quality of life” issue aimed at improving conditions on military bases. For instance, spouses can take applicable courses.

The traditional high level Canadian Forces training is also being modified and co-ordinated to meet certain education requirements; it is therefore double-hatted and cost effective for soldiers who have only a relatively short career time to be both well-educated and well-trained. At the same time, there has been evidence that the old “culture” is not gone completely.⁸¹ Jurisdictional jealousies, ‘certificatism’ or ticket punching attitudes crop up from time to time, all of which also points out the difference between education and ‘quality’ education. But things have improved remarkably.

Conclusion

In the end, the trauma and transformation of Canadian military education has been no short term affair. The long passage to the crisis of the 1990s was subtly incremental and rooted in Canada’s historical development. No one step clearly indicated a wrong destination. Little military threat paradoxically coupled with a sense of indefensibility created a dependence on alliances to make up human and material shortfalls. Successful and comfortable inside such arrangements, Canadians felt they needed nothing more than a small citizen militia that had a good native savvy at technical and tactical things. Besides, war was usually far away. Allies expected and asked little. There was no reason most of the time to have or think about higher military education or what it was or should do. When the various crunches came, Canada’s friends supplied the larger ideas, much of the direction and some of the material. In many ways, this was a simple reflection of the larger civil society and government which had few military concerns and not much knowledge.

But conditions changed. Since the Boer War Canada’s troops have gone abroad in larger numbers in the name of an alliance. It demanded increasing professionalism starting with the lowest orders. Never big enough to be decisive in coalitions, Canadian soldiers made their ‘functional’ contributions. They were low enough that an appreciation of true professional needs became stalled at the tactical level. Excellence in training was confused with education. Field experience overshadowed critical thinking, and applied technical skills usurped an understanding of liberal education and strategic concerns. As the tempo of commitment picked up in the Cold War period, paradoxically it both confirmed the old historical postures of alliance dependence and technical-tactical functionalism, and let loose forces that would deny them. Identifying those latter forces had little import for soldiers because of the nature of their professional development, the fact that they were so transfixed on NATO or interoperability with the USA or increasingly busy with peacekeeping. And they were buoyed at their own success because they were good at what they did. At the same time, the military started to fall behind and lose touch with their civil society, not realizing that by the late 1970s most Canadians had much higher level of education

than they did. Constantly abroad and then isolated on those huge and remote Canadian bases and always training did not help. They did not appreciate that for some years many Canadians were less and less comfortable with the large and expensive NATO commitment or following too uncritically allied strategies.

Then the Cold War unexpectedly ended and conventional warfare gave away to a welter of asymmetric conflicts. For Canada, many technologies outstripped affordability. All of it threw into doubt traditional Canadian military practices and the professional qualities needed to function in the new order. Savaged by budget cuts and galloping deployments, the military experienced a heightened “soul and role” trauma trying to understand it all. Yet it seemed indecisive in rectifying a problem that it knew existed. The end of the “race between education and chaos” came in the tragedy of the Somalia Affair. Frustrated with its senior soldiers’ outdated ideas, obfuscations and apparent dithering, an impatient civil government acted with its full authority. It ordered a transformation of military and professional development with new visions of leadership, socio-political understanding, professional knowledge and critical and strategic thinking. The achievements of these are well on their way. But in looking back on how Canada’s soldiers got ‘here from there’, future observers would be wise to know about and look at wider and larger issues of history before trauma forces transformation.⁸²

¹ For the most recent and the best analysis of the scandal surrounding the Canadian Airborne, its history, and Somalia cover-up, see Lt Col. Bernd Horn, “Bastard Sons”, doctoral dissertation, War Studies, RMC, 2000. Also refer to David Bercuson, **Significant Incident: Canada’s Army, the Airborne, and the Murder in Somalia**, Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Inc., 1996.

² There were all kinds of newspaper stories on the scandals, but perhaps the most representative was the “pot-boiler” assessment by Scott Taylor and Brian Knowlan, **Tarnished Brass**, Toronto: Lester Publishing, 1996 and **Tested Mettle**, Ottawa: Esprit de Corps Books, 1998.

³ Minister of Public Works and Government Services of Canada, **Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia**, Ottawa, 30 June 1997. The most convenient way for the researcher to get at all aspects of the Somalia report is the CD-ROM, “Information Legacy: a Compendium of Source Material from the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of the Canadian Forces to Somalia” produced by the above department.

⁴ Major General Roger Rowley, chairman, **Report of the Officer Development Board**, Department of National Defence, March, 1969, vol. 1, pp iii-vi. (Hereafter cited Rowley Report.)

⁵ Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History,” in **The National Interest**, no. 16, summer, 1989, pp.3-18. Lt Col. Bernd Horn ed, **Contemporary Issues in Officership: a Canadian Perspective**, Toronto: CISS, 2000, p. 2. James Roseneau, **Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier**, Cambridge: CUP, 1997 discusses the effects of fragmentation and globalization on international security and state organization.

⁶ Joel Sokolsky, “The Politics of Defence Decisions at Century’s End,” in Lt Col. Bernd

- Horn and Stephen Harris, eds, **Generalship and the Art of the Admiral: Perspectives on Senior Canadian Leadership**, St Catherines: Vanwell Publishing, 2001, p.342.
- 7 DND, "Report to the Prime Minister on the Leadership and Management of the Canadian Forces" by The Honorable M. Douglas Young, PC, MP, Minister of National Defence and Minister of Veterans Affairs, 25 March 1997.
- 8 "Professional Military Education: An Asset for Peace and Progress" a Report of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Dick Cheney chairman, Washington D.C. March, 1997. pp.15-16. (Hereafter cited Cheney Report). Dick Cheney, now Vice President of the United States and former Secretary of Defense in the George Bush administration, notes that between 90 and 96% of all US Lt Cols and Cols hold advanced degrees. In Canada it was in 1997 only about 7% for all the CF.
- 9 "A Paper Prepared for the Minister of National Defence by D. J. Bercuson, PhD, FRSC, University of Calgary," 25 March, 1997, p. 16. (Hereafter cited Bercuson Report).
- 10 Robert O'Connell, **Of Arms and Men: A History of War, Weapons and Aggression**. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 47-9 and 107.
- 11 W. H. McNeill, **The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Forces and Society Since A.D.1000** Chicago, Chicago University Press, 1982 and O'Connell cited above cover the effect of technology, integrated economies and the growing efficiency of the state, all of which ultimately focus on what man can 'learn'.
- 12 See the introduction by Gregory Kennedy and Keith Neilson (eds) in their **Military Education: Past Present and Future**, Westport: Praeger, 2002, pp. ix-xiii, and John B. Hattendorf, "The Conundrum of Military Education in Historical Perspective", in *Ibid.*, pp.1-12.
- 13 Theodore Ropp, "The Military Officer and his Education in the Next Quarter of a Century" in **Signum**, special issue on military education, vol. iii, no.283, Aug.1976, pp.1-16. The conference took place 14-17 June that year. The author was present.
- 14 Michael Howard, **War and the Liberal Conscience**, London: Temple Smith, 1978, cover the growth of the liberal conscience from the 15th century. Also see O'Connell and McNeill's works cited above.
- 15 Samuel Huntington, **The Soldier and the State: the Theory and Practice of Civil Military Relations**, New York: Vintage Books, 1957, p.57 and chapters 1 and 2. Also see L.D. Laswell, **The Analysis of Political Behavior**, New York: 1947, p.152. For a good analysis of the development of the professional Canadian Force, see Stephen Harris, **Canadian Brass: the Professional Army, 1860-1939**, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988.
- 16 Andrew J. Goodpaster, "Educational Aspects of Civil-Military Relations," in Andrew J. Goodpaster and Samuel Huntington, eds, **Civil-Military Relations**, Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, ND, pp.29-32.
- 17 Karl von Clausewitz, **On War**, translation by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976, p.89. Also see David Jablonsky, **Why is Strategy Difficult**, Carlisle, Penn US Army War College, 1995 has a useful interpretation of the trinity. The best example of the consequences of the disconnect of the trilogy is the Vietnam War. Bercuson **Report**, pp.20-21
- 18 Morton **ORDB Report**, vol 1, p.xvi
- 19 Desmond Morton, "Defending the Indefensible: Some Historical Perspectives on Canadian Defence, 1867-1987", in **International Journal**, XLIII, autumn, 1987, pp.627-644.
- 20 On the militia, see Harris, **Canadian Brass**, chapters 1-3 and Desmond Morton, **Ministers and Generals: Politics and the Canadian Militia, 1867-1904**, Toronto: 1970.

- 21 On Hughes as the epitome of the militia soldier, see Ronald G. Haycock, **Sam Hughes: the Public Career of a Controversial Canadian, 1885-1916**, Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier Press, 1886. Also see the study of Hughes as a Canadian General: R. G. Haycock, "Sir Sam Hughes – a Canadian General - Why bother!" in Lt Col. Bernd Horn and Stephen Harris, eds, **Warrior Chiefs: Perspectives on Canadian Military Leaders**, Toronto: Dundurn, 2000, pp.17-41.
- 22 Carmen Miller, "Sir Frederick William Borden and Military Reform, 1896-1911" in the **Canadian Historical Review**, vol. L, no.3, Sept, 1969, pp.265-284, and Desmond Morton, **Canada and War: A Military and Political History**, Toronto: Butterworths, 1981, p. 44.
- 23 Robert Bothwell and William Kilbourn, **C.D. Howe, a Biography**, Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1980, chapters 9, 10 and 11.
- 24 Desmond Morton recounts that when he entered College Militaire Royal in 1954, his family joked that he was destined to be Canada's first field marshal. As he says, his life changed direction. But there were many other in the military who retained the belief that in every kit bag there was a field marshal's baton - and who could blame them. However, it takes more than training, as Morton points out. See Desmond Morton, "The Political Skills of a Canadian General Officer Corps," in Horn and Harris, eds, **Generalship and the Arts of the Admiral**, pp. 361-372.
- 25 For an early assessment of military education in Canada, see F.J. Dixon, "Military Education in Canada," in J.C. Hopkins, ed, **Canada: an Encyclopedia of the Country**, vol iv, Toronto, 1898, p.444. It was a short entry. Also see G.F.G Stanley's chapter on military education in Hector Massey, ed, **The Canadian Military: a Profile, 1867-1970**, Toronto: Copp Clark, 1972.
- 26 R.A. Preston, **Canada's RM**, pp.119-120. There were too few officer billets in the Canadian Permanent Force, and, according to Preston's research, early Canadian governments did not want to antagonize the Militia whose political lobby was, and would remain substantial. On Girouard, see **Ibid.**, pp.110-111 and 110n.
- 27 John Swettenham, **McNaughton**, Toronto: Reason Press, 1968, vol 1, pp.229-236. While at IDC, McNaughton was concerned about Canadian sovereignty, but it seems not about developing strategic thinking out side of the imperial realm.
- 28 DND, Directorate of History and Heritage, "Chiefs of Staff Committee, **Minutes**, 394th meeting, 26 June 1947. Min.7, D. Hist File 73/1223/1302.
- 29 **Ibid.**, 400th meeting 4 Sept 1947, min.30 and **Ibid.**, 408th meeting, 9 Dec 1947, min. 4.
- 30 Writing in 1971 L Motiuk in "The Officer Corps, the Armed Forces and the Future", in **Papers from Contributors to the Study of Professionalism in the Canadian Forces**, commissioned by R Adm. R.W. Murdoch, CDEE, Sept, 1971, noted in append. K that the officer corps 'still bears the stamp of its colonial heritage' and is "disposed to obtain its strategic and military doctrine secondhand from mother countries, large neighbors or dominant allies."**Ibid.**, p.25)
- 31 Douglas Bland, "Military Command in Canada", in Horn and Harris, eds, **Generalship and the Art of the Admiral**, pp.124-133 from 1950 to 1959 the CF grew from 30,000 to over 120,000 regulars.
- 32 For a tour de force on Canadian defence history, see the several volumes of James Eayrs, **In Defence of Canada**, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, various dates, especially vol. iii, **Peacemaking and Deterrence**, 1972 and vol. IV. **Growing Up Allied**, 1980.
- 33 W Harriet Critchley, "Civilianization and the Canadian Military," in B.D. Hunt and R.G. Haycock, eds, **Canada's Defence: Perspectives on Policy in the Twentieth Century**, Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman, 1993, pp. 226-241, and Douglas Bland, "Controlling the

- Defence Policy Process in Canada: White Papers on Defence and Bureaucratic Politics in the Department of National Defence”, in **Ibid.**, pp.211-225.
- 34 Desmond Morton, **Canada, and War**, p.186
- 35 Foreward by Jean V. Allard in **Rowley Report**, vol.1, p.iii
- 36 Lt Gen Robert W. Morton, chairman, **Report of the Officer Development Review Board** for the Chief of Military Personnel, NDHQ, August, 1995. (Hereafter cited Morton Report.)
- 37 Morton, **ODRB Report**, vol.1 p.16. After the 1969 Rowley report note the following: DND documents **Report of the Study on Professionalism in the Canadian Forces**, Ottawa: CDEE, P-5000-47, 1972, the Leonard **Report** Mar 1977 cited in fn. 51 below; MGen C. G. Kitchen, **Out service Training for Officers** ADM (per), March 1985; Col David Lightburn, **Senior Officer Professional Development**, CPD April 1986; and Lt Gen. R.J. Evraire, **General and Senior Officer Professional Development in the Canadian Forces**, Oct 1988. There are others!
- 38 William McAndrew, “Canadian Officership: an Overview”, in Horn and Harris, eds, **Generalship and the Art of the Admiral**, fn. 60, p.66
- 39 Bercuson, **Significant Incident**, pp.103-104. McAndrew and many others concur in the deleterious effect of an overwhelming emphasis on business management rather than leadership. He says one should “reject the common assumption that officers are merely business executives in uniform, and the more senior of them CEOs. The two professions may share common characteristics, but ends and purposes are not among them. One has a bottom line and limited liability: the other has unlimited liability with a profit and loss statement reckoned in soldiers lives. The difference is fundamental”. In Horn and Harris eds, **Generalship and the Art of the Admiral**, p.54
- 40 Col Howie Marsh, “Command Challenges in the 21st Century”, in Horn and Harris, eds, **Generalship and the Arts of the Admiral**, pp.189-210.
- 41 Doug Bland, “Military Command in Canada,” in Horn and Harris, eds, **Generalship and the Art of the Admiral**, pp.121-136. Adrian Preston, “The Profession of Arms in Post War Canada, 1945-1970,” in **World Politics** xxiii, January 1971, pp.189-214.
- 42 Bercuson, **Significant Incident**, p.126 for his analysis of the ‘regimental system’ in Canada, see **Ibid.**, pp.116-129. Conversation with between Doug Bland and the author, June 1999.
- 43 Brig Gen, Ken C. Hague, “Strategic Thinking General/Flag Officers: the Role of Education,” in Horn and Harris, eds, **Generalship and the Art of the Admiral**, pp.517.
- 44 Lt Gen. R.J. Evraire, **General and Senior Officers Professional Development in the Canadian Forces**, October 1988, p.75. See his discussion on pp.36-48. Hereafter cited as the Evraire **Report**.
- 45 Granatstein **Report**, p.20 and Ropp in **Signum**, p.4. Ropp worried in 1976 that if higher education was not earned by an officer at the cadet level that the training and technological demands of their later career would turn off their “critical lamps” and that war colleges- as they stood then with their syndicates of “rap sessions”, parades of speakers and often unqualified staff -had little hope of rekindling anything. **Ibid.**, p.6
- 46 Motiuk in **Papers from Contributor to the Study of Professionalism in the Canadian Forces**, p.27.
- 47 Evraire **Report**, pp.79-88. Note Gen Evraire’s discussion on the “experiential” fascination that the CF has in trying to make personnel ‘for all seasons’ through short postings and ‘on the job’ training instead of developing areas of expertise beyond the operational ones. Specifically, he notes a lack of education in “defence policy” areas. And of the difficulty of career advancement (promotion) for an officer who opts for these

studies.

48 Gen Morton, **Report** 1995, p.16.

49 Cited in Ropp, **Signum**, p.6. That was 1976; Seven years earlier Rowley had pointed to the flaws and offered a solution part of which was to hook it directly to senior officers' development and have a national Canadian military university. See Rowley **Report**, vol.1, pp.84-85. By 1989, there was substantial debate about its educational usefulness in OPD. See Lt Col. David Harries, "The National Defence College of Canada" in the **Canadian Defence Quarterly**, vol.17, no. 2 1989, pp.40-42 and Lt Col. J.A. English, "Whatever Happened to the National Defence College?" unpublished mss. By early 1993, English's criticism had reached the national level in **Maclean's Magazine**. Also see S.M. Davis, "Development and National Characteristics of National Defence Colleges - as a World Wide Phenomenon," doctoral dissertation, Queen's University, 1979.

50 J.A. English, **Lament for an Army: the Decline of Canadian Military Professionalism**, Toronto: Irwin, 1998, p.104. Dr English notes that the NDC toured 41 days in Canada and 89 outside the country. The entire course was 44 weeks. **Ibid.**, pp.79-105.

51 Minister of National Defense, **Report of the Ministerial Committee on the Canadian Military Colleges**, pp.33-34. In addition to OPD studies beginning with General Rowley's in 1969, there have been at least another eight which studied the college system alone between 1976 and this ministerial committee in 1993. Little action was done on any of them at the policy level, likely because - as this report says - there was no government policy on military colleges and what they should do for the CF. **Ibid.**, pp.3 and 7. This committee also wanted to keep all three colleges open, increase the percentage of officers educated in them, and, like Rowley a quarter century earlier, incorporate all three under a single university banner with an over-all governance and policy from the cabinet level.

52 For instance, NDHQ. ADM (PER) , Academic Development Task Force, **Report on the Academic Development at the Canadian Military Colleges**. 29 March 1977, recommended doing away with the eight honors and general specialized arts degrees, in French, English History and the like, and replacing them with a single one in military and strategic studies. Only chemical engineering was to be stopped in that division, (p.5). The task Force went on to propose that there should not be 'a dual entry scheme' instituted - that is there should be no separate arts entry at RMC to the existing engineering entry for all applicants that would "do so at the expense of the CMR production of engineers". (p.5). They wanted 52% of all university directed recruits to the CF to be enrolled in engineering, 25% in sciences and 23% in arts. No wonder, the chairmen of the task force, A.C. Leonard, Dean of Engineering at RMC cautioned his members "not to reveal anticipated decisions that might create undue concern among the faculty". (p.2) It did that! Generally speaking much of Leonard's recommendations were vigorously objected to by RMC faculty and rejected or diluted by the Advisory Board. See Preston below. Here after cited Leonard **Report**.

53 Richard A. Preston, **To Serve Canada**, p.134.

54 Peter Dunnnett, **RMC Academic Costs and Civilian University Costs: a Production Function Approach**, Kingston: RMC, 1997. They are comparable when one looks at the provincial subsidies and the estimated cost charged by a civilian institution if they had to pay for the RMC four pillar approach that DND considers necessary. Then there is the matter of military culture.

55 Richard Preston cites an interesting example of this. See note below, pp.128-129.

56 Richard A. Preston, **To Serve Canada**, pp.123-141. Preston details the travails of RMC during the 70s and 80s in the constant rationalization of the CMCs by NDHQ. He also

points out that the Branch Advisors knew little about education and only thought about it in terms of immediate task-driven practical application: “ they had only a smattering of knowledge derived from RMC calendar descriptions. They did not think of courses in terms of potential for intellectual development.” **Ibid.**, p.133. This author remembers well the attitude of a few of his colleagues toward continuing education in the 70s: it wasn’t real education for a proper university and it only meant more work and no more resources. The University of Manitoba showed more initiative than the CMCs and therefore got the CF continuing education contract **Ibid.**, pp.151-154 in 1973. Consequently, RMC only did local “radius” extension education until the War Studies MA programme began to offer its PG courses at other centres across the country in 1992.

57 DND, “Minister’s Monitoring Committee on Change in the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces,” **Interim Report, 1998**, Hon John Fraser, chairman, p. iii. The body was set up in October 1997. (Here after cited Minister’s Monitoring Committee, **Report.**)

58 Young **Report**, 1997, p.17

59 **Ibid.**, p.42. For a very interesting discussion see Major (Dr) D.M. Last, “Educating Officers: Post Modern Professionals to Control and Prevent Violence,” draft of a working paper submitted to the Special Advisor to the Chief of the Defence Staff, Oct. 1999. A version of this is published in Horn, **Contemporary Issues in Officership: a Canadian Perspective**. chp 1.

60 For a thorough explanation of the rationale for Continuing Studies and BMASc, see A.J. Barrett and B.J. Plant, “A Model for Undergraduate University Education for Trained and Experienced Professional Students,” unpublished paper, Kingston: RMC, 1996. Also see DND, CFRETS, The Officer Professional Development Review Board-Working Group, **Final Report**, 31 July 1996, .pp.12-13. This was the ‘ways and means’ committee for Morton’s ODRB. It had no civilians on it. Like Morton, it did not agree that all officers must have a baccalaureate upon commissioning - but only when one became a “Colonel/Captain (N)”. **Ibid.**, p.12. RMC’s Dean of Science (later to be the first Dean of the CS) and the Dean of Arts had insisted that they attended the ODRB-WG meetings when matters of education were discussed. They were the only ones save one other officer who thought that degrees were necessary at commissioning.

61 **Ibid.**, pp.i, ii and 24

62 “Balanced Excellence: Leading Canada’s Armed forces into the New Millenium”, **Report of the Board of Governors Study Group: Review of the undergraduate program at RMC, 30 April 1998**. Gen Ramsey Withers, chairman, pp.1 and 14. Hereafter cited Withers **Report**.

63 **Ibid.**, pp.35-40 and rec. 29. The Arts Division needed seven officers with doctorates to meet the 30%. Since there were then not that many or even available such qualifications needed to acquired. NDHQ is in 2003 finally sending officers to RMC to get their doctorates.

64 Minister’s Monitoring Committee, **Second Interim Report, 1999**, pp.40-44. Fraser wrote “RMC must be congratulated and supported in its role as the academic standard bearer of the CF” (p.4). He also noted that “despite the push for increased liberal arts military education the Canadian military are still acting under the assumption that such subjects as geomatics engineering are true military education fare but history or anthropology are not.”(p.43). Withers **Report**, pp.29-30 and H-2.

65 The outreach programme for RMC was arrived at by both conviction and necessity. The College simply does not have the resources to do it all. Furthermore, academic credibility and forging a place in the consciences of the civilian academic community are ways of

- finding a place a nation not normally inclined to think of the CF in such societal terms. See **Ministers Monitoring Committee**, 2nd report, pp. 40-44 and Withers **Report**, pp.1, and 25-6.
- 66 On the 'vision' of RMC as CF's university see Dr. John Scott Cowan (Principal of RMC), "RMC and the Profession of Arms: Looking Ahead at Canada's Military University," in the **Canadian Military Journal**, vol. 2, no.3, Autumn 2001, pp.1-8.
- 67 "Canadian Officership in the 21st Century, OPD2020: Statement of Operational Requirement", Lieutenant General Romeo Dallaire, Special Advisor to the CDS on Officers Professional Development, Spring 2000, draft, p.6.
- 68 "Executive Summary, Canadian Officership in the 21st Century, OPD2020, Statement of Operational Requirement", p.1.
- 69 The two official statements on OPD are "Canadian Officership in the 21st Century (Officership 2020)" Feb. 2001 and "The Canadian Forces Non Commissioned Member in the 21st Century (NCM Corps 2020)", Jan. 2003. They can be seen at <http://www.cda-acd.forces.gc.ca>. Click on Canadian Forces 2020 Vision.
- 70 OPD 2020, Statement of Operational Requirement, pp.i-iv.
- 71 Lcol Bernd Horn, "A Timeless Strength: The Army's Senior NCO Corps", in **Canadian Military Journal**, vol.3, no. 2, summer, 2002, pp.39-48.
- 72 Morton **ORDB Report**, pp.50-53 and Minister's **Report to the Prime Minister**, pp.16&17, recmdn.18,19 and 20.
- 73 W.D Macnamara, **Report on the Command and Staff Course as a Professional Graduate Program**, May 2000. This assessment was commissioned by RMC's Dean of Continuing Studies as part of the on-going accreditation effort of ODD with CFC. The new degree is a 'professional' one as opposed academic and is not intended in itself to qualify a recipient for doctoral admission: it is to recognize higher level professional accomplishment, but can be accredited towards an academic masters degree such as War Studies.
- 74 RMC, Ron D. Weir, Dean of Graduate Studies and Research to Ms Carolyn Filteau, Co-ordinator Council of Ontario Universities, 23 May 2001, document 1050-20-1(DGSR).
- 75 W.D. Macnamara, "Intellectualism in the General Officer Corps," in Horn and Harris, eds, **Generalship and the Art of the Admiral**, p.503. For detailed descriptions of the various CFC courses, see their web page at: www.cfc.dnd.ca.
- 76 For a very good analytical synopsis of the philosophy and creation of the AMSC and NSSC programmes at CFC: Toronto, see Lt Col. Randy Wakelam, "Senior Profession Military Education for the twenty-first Century," in the **Canadian Defence Quarterly**, autumn, 1997, pp.14-18.
- 77 See the CDA web page at <http://www.cda-acd.forces.gc.ca> for a full description of the Academy.
- 78 DND, Canadian Leadership Institute, **Duty with Honour: the Profession of Arms in Canada**, advanced copy, pp.12-28.
- 79 "Looking Back: Canadian Forces Leadership Problems and Challenges Identified in Recent Reports and Studies", paras. 48-52, by Karol Wenek, Project Director CF Leadership Doctrine, June 2002, unpublished CFLI paper; also see his companion paper on the Canadian environment likely to influence leadership issues : "Looking Ahead" Contexts of Canadian Forces Leadership Today and Tomorrow", July, 2002, unpublished CFLI paper.
- 80 **Ibid.**, CFLI, Karol Wenek, Project Director CF Leadership Doctrine, "Leadership in the CF - first draft", 2003.
- 81 On the nature of Canadian military culture, see Dr A.D. English's "Understanding

Military Culture: A Canadian Perspective - A Discussion Paper", written for the Command/HFCS Section, Defence and Civil Institute of Environmental Medicine, 23 February 2001. A very informative presentation.

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See Charles Moskos, John Allen Williams and David Segal, eds, **The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces After the Cold War**, New York: Oxford University Press, 2000, especially the opening chapter by the editors, "Armed Forces after the Cold War", and Frank Pinch's chapter 9 on Canada, "Canada: Managing Change with Shrinking Resources."