Scientia Militaria - South African Journal of Military Studies

Editorial

Evert Kleynhans — Fri, 21 May 2021 09:56:29 +0000

The South African security predicament: making sense of the objective realities

Abel Esterhuyse — Fri, 21 May 2021 00:00:00 +0000

This article reflects an effort to make sense of the objective realities of the South
African security predicament. The objective realities on the security agenda are rooted
in the practical reality of experience and are open for public discussion, debate and
speculation. These realities are informed by the threats facing South Africans on a
daily basis. Government provides security with subjective content to the extent that
political power demarcates the threat agenda, prioritises the items on the threat agenda,
and foots the security bill. Since the creation of the Union in 1910, South Africa has
had to find a balance between the security realities emanating from three key security
domains – irrespective of the ruling entity: security threats from outside Africa, those
threats facing the country from within Africa, and security threats from within the
borders of South Africa. The article aims at a scholarly demarcation of some of the most
critical, important, and key features of the South African security agenda using these
three domains as a framework for discussion. On a secondary level, the discussion also
critically reflects on the ability of the human security paradigm to address the South
African security predicament.

Promoting psychological adaptation among navy sailors

Charles H Van Wijk, Jarred H Martin — Fri, 21 May 2021 00:00:00 +0000

The mandate of the Institute for Maritime Medicine (IMM) is to support and enhance
the operational performance of sailors of the South African Navy during maritime
operations, while also ensuring positive long-term mental health outcomes of sailors
who serve their country at sea. To achieve this, the IMM proposes to re-orientate the
mobilisation and demobilisation programmes used for ship-based maritime operations
towards a predict-and-promote (P&P) approach, to enhance the psychological adaptation
of sailors to the emotional demands of deployment as well as to support more adaptive
forms of mental health resilience, both before and after sea-going operations.
First, this article aims to present the proposed P&P approach for enhancing
psychological adaptation during and after seaward deployments, with a specific focus
on assessing personal emotional regulation (ER). For effective implementation, this
approach is contingent on several clinical assumptions about ER in the operational
environment, namely: the absence of significant psychopathology; the stability of
the ER measure; the role of dispositional factors in operational adaptation; and the
availability of population-specific normative data, which act as an interpretative guide
of ER profiles for sailors. The second aim is to consider support for these assumptions,
using previous experience during the mobilisation and/or demobilisation of ships
involved in maritime operations. Support was found for all four assumptions, indicating
the clinical and operational utility of the P&P approach at the IMM broadly, and the
assessment of ER for sailors in particular.

Hypersonic weapons and the future of nuclear deterrence

Eben Coetzee — Fri, 21 May 2021 00:00:00 +0000

It is widely accepted today that hypersonic weapons pose insurmountable challenges
to nuclear deterrence. Although speed has always been a critical factor in warfare, the
development of hypersonics provides unprecedented advantages in terms of the speed
and agility of missiles. The increase in the speed and agility of hypersonic missiles
drastically reduces the response time of nuclear states, encouraging the pre-emptive use
of force. Two arguments inform the latter claim. The first holds that the speed and agility
of hypersonic missiles are likely to render existing and future missile defences obsolete.
The second contends that the failure of missile defences coupled with the reduction
of the response time of nuclear states encourages the pre-emptive use of force. Where
nuclear states are unable to field survivable second-strike forces, the stability of nuclear
deterrence becomes highly problematic. Besides these arguments, the dual-use nature of
hypersonic weapons ostensibly increases the risk of nuclear escalation. Against this bleak
assessment, in this article, the author questions the destabilising effects of hypersonic
weapons on deterrence stability, arguing that nuclear deterrence is – and is likely to
remain – deeply stable. A thoroughgoing consideration of the strategic implications
of nuclear weapons provides optimism about the stability of nuclear deterrence in
the face of the development of hypersonic weapons. Two arguments are advanced in
support of the continuing stability of nuclear deterrence. First, missile defences have
(and are likely to remain) inefficacious, with the development of hypersonic weapons
merely reinforcing (rather than establishing) this fact. Second, a would-be aggressor
contemplating the pre-emptive use of force would have to believe that it could destroy
all of an adversary’s nuclear force before any can be launched.

The German attack on the Witboois at Hornkranz, Namibia, April 1893

Petrus Hendrik van Rooyen — Fri, 21 May 2021 00:00:00 +0000

For many, when the Namibian struggle for liberation is mentioned, the struggle for
liberation by the South West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO) comes to mind.
For others to the south of Namibia, it recalls images of a border war and incursions
into Angola to ‘stop SWAPO’, the latter seen as a communist pawn directed and armed
by the Soviet Union and Cuba. More than that is seldom asked about or seen in terms
of the bigger historical collage. The brutal era of German colonisation is habitually
overlooked. The Namibians’ struggle for liberation lasted nearly a century. It started
through, for example, the massacre or battle, depending on your view, in April 1893.
This previously poorly researched story about which little is written is told in this article.

The South African National War College military history staff ride as a deep learning experience

James Jacobs Jacobs, Johan Wassermann — Fri, 21 May 2021 00:00:00 +0000

In this article, based on a study rooted in interpretivism, the South African National
War College military history staff ride, as an education and training method related to
the curriculum of the senior staff programmes since 2002, is discussed. The education
and training process, with specific reference to the staff ride to military battle sites and
the associated application of the theory of operational art, were researched according
to the tenets of the theory of deep learning. While using the historical–comparative
method during the staff ride enabled the majority of the students to determine which
viable options were available to the commander, not all students were necessarily able
to relate deep learning to critical thinking. Consequently, in certain instances, surface
learning tended to dominate simply because that was the educational world into which
the students had been socialised. Furthermore, the facilitation process did not always
fully serve the students by completely weaning them off learning habits associated with
surface learning. Consequently, while being able to claim some deep learning successes
using the staff ride, continuous reflection and educational interventions are needed
to maintain the successes achieved and to use these as a building platform for deep
learning during future staff rides.

A reassessment of the tank battle between 4th Armoured Brigade and Panzerregiment 5 during Operation Crusader in North Africa on 19 November 1941

Andreas Biermann — Fri, 21 May 2021 00:00:00 +0000

Operation Crusader took place in the wide context of an integrated, multi-service
theatre-level offensive operation in the Western Desert and the Mediterranean from
October 1941 through to January 1942. Seen through this lens, Operation Crusader was
simply the Army and the Royal Air Force component of a multi-service theatre-level
offensive conducted by Allied forces. The operation ended with an almost complete
defeat of the Axis troops, the lifting of the seven-month siege of Tobruk and the retreat
of the surviving Axis forces to a position on the border of the colonial provinces of
Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, in central Libya.
Operation Crusader was the first army-level offensive undertaken by the Allied
forces in World War II, lasting from 17 November 1941 to 15 January 1942.355 The
aim of Operation Crusader was to trigger a large-scale tank battle with Axis tank forces
outside the besieged desert port of Tobruk in Libya, to destroy the Axis armoured
forces, and to pave the way to lift the siege of Tobruk, which had been conducted by
the Axis forces since April 1941. Operation Crusader was the first step in a set of three
operations expected to lead to the clearing of the North African coast from Axis forces
and subsequently allow an invasion of Sicily in 1942. The battle was the largest tank
offensive conducted by Allied forces in either World War I or World War II until the
Second Battle of El Alamein in late October 1942. It was characterised by a number of
tank battles between the Axis forces under the command of General der Panzertruppen
Erwin Rommel and Allied infantry and armoured forces under Lieutenant-General Alan
Cunningham and then Lieutenant-General Neil Ritchie, who fought under the overall
direction of General Claude Auchinleck, the Commander-in-Chief Middle East. 356 357
The conduct of the battle showed weaknesses in the doctrine of British armoured
forces, but it ultimately ended in a victory for the Allied forces. This article analyses
the first clash of British and German tanks during Operation Crusader and provides a
new perspective on the performance of an experienced British cruiser tank regiment,
which calls into question the overall assessment of how British armour performed
during the battle. The re-assessment provided in this article is in particular related to the
performance of both sides in the battle and the performance of both sides against their
tactical objectives on the day, as well as the comparative losses in tanks. The article covers the first engagement of British 4th Armoured Brigade with German
armour during the opening stage of Operation Crusader between 17 and 20 November
in which it managed to thwart a German counterattack. Utilising primary documents,
such as war diaries, messages and reports, this article provides a new perspective on the
established view of the battle that also affects our view of the performance of British
armoured units at regimental level during this period of the Desert War. The article
presents a reassessment of comparative tank combat performance in the early phase
of Operation Crusader by analysing the first engagement between Allied and German
armour with a view to correcting misconceptions that have until now clouded the
historical record, such as the one expressed in General Auchinleck’s despatch on the
period, “But our tanks and anti-tank guns were no match for the German, although
they were fought with great gallantry:”.358 It also considers hitherto unused primary
evidence to shed new light on the losses in tanks suffered by both sides during the battle,
and considers how the opposing forces performed in the context of their operational
objectives.

Ratels on the Lomba: The story of Charlie Squadron

Jean Pierre Scherman — Fri, 21 May 2021 00:00:00 +0000

Ratels on the Lomba bursts onto the page like a shot from a cannon, full of dramatic
scenes of warfighting, with blood flowing and where bullets are pinging off armour
plates. It is, however, far more than just another book on the Border War (1966–1989). If
you are looking for a feel-good book, describing how the valiant South African Defence
Force (SADF) fought and won, then look elsewhere. This book tells the story of a small
sub-unit, fewer than 100 men strong, from the perspective of the soldier on the ground,
where the bullet meets the meat. It reads more like a horror story than like a war story
– but we will get back to that.

Soldaat en mens

Abel Esterhuyse — Fri, 21 May 2021 00:00:00 +0000

In most paradigm militaries of the world, there seems to be an expectation for a
general to write and publish his or her biography as soon as possible after retirement
from active duty – a type of ‘first duty’ in retirement. These biographies are often critical
for militaries, much like in the medical, law and clerical professions, to grow their body
of knowledge and empower the next generation of soldiers. For armed forces in general,
military history of this nature has always played an important role in the geographical
and cultural contextualisation and shaping of their doctrine. Without a sound and
comprehensive military historical foundation for the development of their doctrine,
militaries remain dependent on the imported knowledge base of paradigm militaries.

The opportunist: The political life of Oswald Pirow, 1915-1959

David Katz — Fri, 21 May 2021 00:00:00 +0000

Finding a mainstream South African publisher for an academic work on South
African history is a daunting prospect for an author. Doing so when it involves a niche
topic on an obscure personality in a forgotten period of South African history can be
even more disheartening. Praise for Protea Book House, who backing Mouton, have
provided a mainstream publishing vehicle to bring a fascinating period of our history
back into the public domain. Works such as The opportunist: The political Life of
Oswald Pirow, 1915–1959 might otherwise have remained inaccessible to the general
public, either residing in the rarefied atmosphere of academia or gathering dust on a
shelf in a university library as an academic print. The hard truth is that well-researched,
peer-reviewed and skilfully written works of history do not necessarily translate into
bestsellers, and in most cases, the opposite is true. Publishers with a keen eye on their
bottom-line have a set of criteria designed to maximise profit, which often clashes with
the lofty standards demanded by academia. For that reason, it is always welcome when
a work such as this book by Mouton manages to bridge the academic–popularist divide.

Gunship Over Angola : The Story of a Maverick Pilot

Anri Delport — Fri, 21 May 2021 00:00:00 +0000

“Most war stories”, according to Hynes, “begin with a nobody-in-particular
young man, who lives through the experience of war, to emerge at the end defined
by what has happened to him.”443 One such “nobody-in-particular young man” was
national serviceman 74257684BC Private Stephen Pierre Joubert, born on 3 July 1958
in Chingola, then Northern Rhodesia.444 Since the age of five, he and his family lived
in Pretoria. He had a typical childhood in most respects.445 Barely seventeen years
old, he, like many other young men, reported for national service. One year later,
in 1977, he stood in a “perfectly pressed” uniform with “buttons and badges [that]
sparkled like diamonds” in a large room in a nondescript building at the South African
Airforce (SAAF) Gymnasium in Valhalla, Pretoria.446 Facing him was an intimidating,
expressionless collection of brass seated in a semicircle. It was Joubert’s second Pilot
Selection Board interview for the Pupil Pilot’s Course. Among the brass was the
legendary aviator, World War II and Korean War veteran, then chief of the SAAF,
General Bob Rogers. The general asked the first question, “[h]ow long have you wanted
to be a pilot?” Joubert responded, “[s]ince I stopped wanting to be an ice cream seller,
sir!”447 Two years later, “on an early November day”, 21-year-old Joubert with wings
pinned to his chest stepped onto AFB Ondangwa in South West Africa, now called
Namibia.448 The events that followed changed him forever. It was as Hynes notes, “out
of that nobody, war has forged a self”.

The Battle of Bangui: The inside story of South Africa's worst military scandal since Apartheid

Evert Kleynhans — Fri, 21 May 2021 00:00:00 +0000

The Battle of Bangui has assumed near mythical proportions within South Africa,
and specifically in the South African National Defence Force (SANDF). During the
battle that occurred in March 2013, a small force of crack South African troops engaged a
7 000-strong Seleka rebel force in an effort to stem their advance on Bangui – the capital
of the politically unstable and resource-rich Central African Republic (CAR). Over the
course of two days, the South African force fought a number of gallant actions and
inflicted heavy casualties on the advancing rebel forces. However, the South Africans
could not hold out indefinitely, especially against overwhelming odds and after taking
some casualties during the ensuing fighting. Moreover, they soon found themselves
surrounded in their makeshift base within Bangui, where they were ultimately forced to
negotiate a ceasefire with the Seleka rebels. Following the ceasefire, the South African
contingent returned to South Africa, and so began the process of trying to make sense
of the rationale to deploy SANDF troops to CAR, and what exactly happened during
the so-called ‘Battle of Bangui’. Most importantly, the country, the defence force, and
the respective families, had to come to grips with the unnecessary loss of South African
lives in a seemingly distant corner of Africa.