

Scientia Militaria

South African Journal Of Military Studies

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Editorial

The South African National Defence Force (SANDF) is at a crossroads. The defence budget stands at 0,8% of the gross domestic product (GDP), a far cry from the 2,0% of the GDP set as a precondition for the 2015 Defence Review to be implemented. South African President Cyril Ramaphosa has in October 2019 once again emphasised the importance of the SANDF as a tool in domestic operations, both in border policing and in support of anti-crime operations on the Cape Flats. However, as pointed out by a defence commentator – for which budget? The SANDF is overstretched, and there is a mismatch between the allocated budget and the tasks at hand. There is an urgent need to find ways of making the SANDF sustainable and to stop the decline, which was identified in the 2015 Defence Review. In simplified terms, either the budget informs and drives the tasks, or the tasks dictate the budget. For some time, it seemed that South African defence policy has done neither, and, as is well known, no strategy will lead you everywhere, or more precisely nowhere. The new parliament, with its newly constituted Joint Portfolio Committee on Defence, has a unique possibility of changing years of political will to make hard choices on the future South African defence policy. The lack of direction given to defence by the political masters has left the defence force in steep decline and levels of operational readiness have moved beyond critical levels. At the end of the day, the lack of funding will cost lives, both due to failing and obsolete equipment, but also due to the lack of funding for basic training and exercises. It is high time that an honest debate on the future role and tasks of the SANDF be initiated, which includes scrutinising the constitutional mandate, the ability of the SANDF to support South African foreign policy through the deployment of troops in multilateral peace missions, and increasing numbers of domestic tasks be given to the SANDF. The SANDF is currently caught in a situation where – for various reasons – it is incapable of implementing the recommended human resource reforms, changing its top-heavy force structure, and thereby reaching a goal of a leaner and more efficient and professional military force.

In this issue of *Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of Military Studies*, Vol 47, No. 1, 2019, the articles draw on history to examine contemporary issues around war and conflict or to focus on the interface between the military and civilian spheres. The articles individually and as a combined body provide an essential source of influence for all involved in military planning, education, operations and management.

Dirk Kruijt, in his contribution on civil–military relations in Latin America, provides a number of lessons on the dualism between the professional and the political army. Latin America has historically been plagued by military coups and the military ‘correcting’ the politics. Kruijt argues that the military often explains their involvement in politics as a consequence of the necessity to correct and transform their vanguard role in politics and society. The findings in the article have a wider use than merely Latin America, and similar analysis could be used to describe the role of the military in other parts of the world.

Pieter Labuschagne, in his article on small wars and people's wars, shows how Carl von Clausewitz's concepts of limited and absolute war are useful tools for explaining the different objectives of the opposing forces during the South African War 1899–1902, and then the subsequent divergent views and motives that led the conflict to transform into a full-scale conflict.

In the article by Janet Szabo about the last years of the Apartheid state's wars on the Angolan border, the author illustrates how a change in tactics and operations by the South African Defence force (SADF) – moving from a mobile force operational strategy to positional battle against an opponent with superior numbers – changed the fortunes of war for the SADF forces.

In their contribution, Robin Blake and Yolanda Spies highlight how an increased focus on non-coercive defence diplomacy (NCDD) is key to pre-empt conflict. Sustainable peace remains elusive in Africa and beyond. In the article, they argue that, if applied in a timely and coordinated manner at early stages of conflict development, the escalation of conflict can be avoided, and human lives be spared.

In the article by Gavin Cawthra, the focus is on military officers' education. In a case study of the Southern African Defence and Security Management Network (SADSEM) between 2000 and 2010, it is shown how this unique regional network tried to build capacity in ten Southern African Development Community (SADC) countries to enhance university-based quality military education. The article shows that even though not all ten institutions survived, the SADSEM network left a lasting institutional legacy and capacity.

In the article by Tshikani Lewis Khoza, Nombeko Mshunqane and Simpiwe Sobuwa, the focus is on lived experiences by military healthcare workers during external deployments. Despite being an integral part of military operations, the authors found that healthcare workers often lack the needed equipment to undertake and perform their duties effectively during deployment. The SANDF continues being deployed to multilateral peace missions but faced with significant financial and operational readiness constraints, central capabilities such as those of combat medical capabilities remain constrained.

In their contribution, Kgomotso T Matjeke and Gideon AJ van Dyk report how the increased number of single-parent households affects work satisfaction in the SANDF. Their study investigated how the frequent foreign and domestic deployments affect the stress and work satisfaction levels amongst single parents. The study found that there is a direct result of work–family conflicts and work–family enrichment on work satisfactory levels amongst single parents, and that there is a need to ensure that unit commanders and military psychologists provide more support for single parents among the SANDF personnel.

The Editor
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MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN LATIN AMERICAN POLITICS

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Abstract

During the last two centuries, the military in Latin America has been involved in politics in a characteristic duality of professionalism and political ‘calling’, by political armies of the right and the left. In both cases, a kind of ‘military mystique’ prevails, but its content is different. In both cases, the military justifies its involvement as a consequence of its necessary correcting and transforming vanguard role in politics and society. The two characteristics of dual functions (internal and external security) and dual pathways (professionalism and political missions) are a revolving theme in this article.

Introduction: Political armies

Latin America is a continent of political soldiers and military politicians. The military profession is often a prelude to a political career. During two centuries of independent republics, the militaries have been important, decisive and intermittently ruling political actors. In the nineteenth century, *caudillos* (military officers with an armed entourage) took power as military rulers, but from the early twentieth century onward, not individual strongmen but the military institution itself became a key power broker in almost every country. In this article, I follow the evolution and transformation of the Latin American military in politics and society.

During the entire twentieth century, very few inter-state wars were fought in Latin America. At best, one real war, the Chaco War between Bolivia and Paraguay, was waged in the 1930s. Maybe one should add the rather reduced campaigns of the El Salvador–Honduras conflict in the 1960s and the Falklands conflict in the early 1980s where a British expeditionary force defeated an Argentine army detachment. Most wars were prolonged, but loose sequences of relatively insignificant military skirmishes, whatever their number of casualties. Inter-state conflicts were in fact localised micro-wars, generally extended frontier disputes. Latin American countries do not have external territorial enemies in the sense of aggressive competitive states. Nobody thinks seriously of modern, large-scale warfare scenarios between, for instance, Brazil and Guyana, Argentine and Uruguay, Mexico and Guatemala.

This means that militarism in a conventional sense – meaning the predominance of the military institution and its key ideological constructs in shaping national life because of real or perceived external security threats² – is much less visible throughout modern Latin American history. In fact, the soldiering of the Latin American military

has been confined largely by its acting in internal social and political conflict. There is a long tradition of military involvement in persecuting and combating internal enemies, by internal warfare and counterinsurgency campaigns. In that sense, the Latin American military has demonstrated its proclivity to act as the guardian of the nation, as protector of the state against all its threats and all its enemies, sometimes opposing external ones, but generally combating enemies within.

As a stabilising force, as disinterested arbiter, as a protecting power of the constitution and as guardian of national development, the military intervened in political matters, thus becoming ‘political armies’³ After the 1980s, democratic transitions have diminished the influence of the higher echelons in the military. In part, this has meant a move towards conventional, apolitical professionalism as the Latin American military sought new roles in a redefined national, regional and global security environment. However, a much more prominent trend has been the militarisation of law enforcement in a context of what Arias and Goldstein typified as ‘violent democracies’, a scenario where a variety of non-state actors were engaged in armed disputes in smaller or larger territories.⁴

In this historiographic article, I report on the origins and evolution of the Latin American military in politics.

- What were and are the main characteristics of military political involvement?
- How does one explain the explosion of military dictatorship in eleven Latin American countries?
- What was the power base of the military muscle?
- What about the dual military role of persecuting internal enemies and confronting external threats?
- What was the role of para-military deployments?
- Who are the ideologues?
- What is the role of the so-called ‘military intellectuals’?
- What is the legacy of the military dictatorship and/or military co-government of the right and the left?
- How does one explain the persistent preference for military presidents in uniform or after retirement?
- How should one interpret the manifold new missions in peacetime and democracy?
- Is there a risk of recurrent political involvement of the military echelons, this time as executive instrumentalisation after a presidential self-coup or an eroding democracy?

I will also refer to the changing context of democracy facing insecurity at the end of the twentieth century until the present. What are the new security challenges being faced and how do they influence the orientation and role of their military institutions? I will argue that some of the new present security problems once again draw the military into domestic tasks and roles. To what extent is this only a consequence of security policies of democratically elected civilian governments? Or does it still mean the actual existence, or the potential threat, of political militarism, even by civilian invitation?

Characteristics

In the colonial Portuguese captaincies in general, as well in the Spanish vice-kingdoms, the first military organisations were militias formed by landlords and their subordinated tenants. The Iberian kingdoms also sent small military and naval contingents. Iberian military and local militias were engaged in three complementary tasks: fighting and controlling the native indigenous population, defence against European buccaneers, and frontier skirmishes between rivalling Spanish and the Portuguese colonisers. The principal military deployment was campaigning against 'wild' and rebellious indigenous warriors who assaulted colonial villages or tried to re-establish indigenous empires. Loveman who reviewed the nineteenth-century constitutions and organic laws in Spanish America and Brazil, concludes that these provided the armed forces with a legal role expansion far beyond conventional defence tasks.⁵ Analysing the regimes of exception in nineteenth-century Latin America, he uses the term "constitutional tyrannies".

Political armies emerged during the last decades of the nineteenth century and re-appeared between the 1930s and the 1950s. Especially during the Cold War, military juntas (commanders of the army, navy and air force) were time and again collective heads of state and governments in most countries in the region. The Latin American military corporate ethos, in their own terms, the military mystique, which implied a certain calling and moral responsibilities (*mística militar* in Spanish and Portuguese), had legitimising notions. Civilian politicians will emphasise that military men and women are sons and daughters of the nation. Military ideologues will underline the relationship of unity, even kinship, between the military and the national population. However, they are especially inclined to formulate these bonds in terms of fathers of the *Patria*, implying the need to protect the nation and its basic interests, which in its turn justified the necessity of intervention in times of crisis. It also means a sometimes benevolent and sometimes punitive stance with respect to the civilian population in terms of fathers versus children, adults versus adolescents, strong leadership versus weak followers.⁶

One can discern persistent beliefs.⁷ Firstly, the military as institution claims a certain 'birthright' (sometimes real; at other times supposed), which enables it to perceive the national interests and destiny unmistakably and to define the strategies for national development.⁸ Then there is the idea of non-political competence in matters of planning, technology and efficiency, in which militaries are specially trained to acquire proficiency. Thirdly, there is the conviction that officers are selected because of their

aptness for unselfish sacrifice ('we give our life') and special military virtues such as discipline, valour, rectitude, self-denial and patriotism. Fourthly, militaries represent par excellence the vigorous unity of the nation, and they have the willpower to achieve and sustain it notwithstanding hardship and danger. Lastly, the militaries are inclined to believe that civilian politicians represent at best class interests instead of global national welfare. Thus, civilians are divided, self-interested and maybe corrupt, and in any case inadequate, in times of crisis. Military leadership as the ultimate protectors of the nations is oriented to stability and resolve.

Institutional coups

The paradoxical duality of military professionalism and political 'calling' has been an ongoing theme over the last 75 years. I will make a distinction between political armies of the right and the left. In both cases, a kind of military mystique prevails, but its content is different. Political armies of the right are in general heavy-handed, repressive regimes (dictatorships or civil-military governments) supporting elite and middle-class interests and repressing 'enemies of the nation'. But political armies can also gyrate to the left (pro-poor military governments with popular support) while implementing reformist political projects intended to favour the poor, underprivileged and excluded. The military institutions of eleven Latin American countries established long-term military-led governments between 1964 and 1990:

- Ecuador (1963–1966, 1972–1978),
- Guatemala (1963–1985),
- Brazil (1964–1985),
- Bolivia (1964–1970, 1971–1982),
- Argentina (1966–1973, 1976–1983),
- Peru (1968–1980),
- Panama (1968–1989),
- Honduras (1963–1966, 1972–1982),
- Chile (1973–1990),
- (Uruguay, 1973–1984), and
- in El Salvador, the military governed de facto between 1948 and 1984.⁹

When the long period of military governments came to its end in the late 1980, the military concern for the fate of the nations only diminished and became more latent, but it never disappeared.

Security doctrines and military intellectuals

Latin American geopolitical scholarship was shaped in the late nineteenth and the early twentieth century, when most regional governments invited European military missions to train the officers' corps and to create armies by force of selective conscription.¹⁰ Their influence lasted until the Second World War. After 1945, US military assistance imported its own brand of geopolitical preferences.

The Cold War reinforced the US hegemony in military- and security-related assistance to Latin America. This development aid was originally mostly military, gradually combined with support from the new American intelligence community (especially the Central Intelligence Agency [CIA], afterwards also the Drug Enforcement Administration [DEA]). Under the US umbrella thesis of 'continental security', the complementary domestic thesis of 'national security' merged with the geopolitical Latin American military tradition. The authors of these theses were a new brand of Latin American officers, 'military intellectuals' of the staff schools and training institutes.

In countries such as Brazil, Chile and Peru, these intellectuals provided coherent ideologies in which the formal role of the armed forces was expanded: from defence against territorial attacks and foreign enemies to an active contribution to national development with the identification of problems and threats, solutions for overcoming development obstacles, civil–military planning and solutions. Future Chilean President, General Pinochet, published his geopolitical lectures in the 1960s and 1970s, as did future Peruvian Prime Minister and Minister of Defence General Mercado Jarrín. His future colleague as Minister of Defence in Guatemala, General Gramajo, followed his example in the 1980s. In fact, the functions of geopolitical scholar, intelligence director, military strategist, military intellectual and military president or prime minister were an integral part of the career moves of leading military in Brazil (Golbery do Couto e Silva¹¹), Chile (Pinochet¹²), Peru (Mercado Jarrín¹³) and Guatemala (Gramajo¹⁴).

Three of the Latin American countries deeply affected by their military governments in Brazil, Guatemala and Peru, created influential study centres, where military intellectuals lectured, wrote, thought and prospered. These academies were established both for military officers (colonels and brigadiers) and for civil servants (senior technocrats, entrepreneurs, academics, labour leaders and journalists). The Brazilian and Peruvian higher civil military schools, the Escola Superior de Guerra (ESG), and the Centro de Altos Estudios Militares (CAEM) were created in the late 1940s and early 1950s, long before the military coups of 1964 (Brazil) and 1968 (Peru). Their ideological influence on the mystique of the subsequent military governments is undeniable.¹⁵

The ESG was created in 1949, and was modelled after the US War College.¹⁶ From its inception, the ESG highlighted the need for a strong army presence in planning, economic development, industry and agriculture to overcome underdevelopment

in Brazil. Fostering a civilian elite of competent planners and technocrats at the ministries and supporting national and regional entrepreneurship was also considered a core necessity. Their acknowledgement of and conformity with the ideas of Brazilian national security were considered essential. Golbery, the chief theoretician, emphasised national unity and productive capacity of the entire nation as vital. In the 1960s, the emphasis on counterinsurgency and irregular counter-guerrilla warfare (more than strictly territorial defence) gradually increased, eventually to reach 222 versus 21 hours of study in 1968. Eminent military and civilian professors, even ministers in function, augmented the prestige of the ESG.

The CAEM was created in 1950. Its founder, General Marín, a nationalist rather than an anti-communist or pro-American, turned on the UN regional office ECLAC (United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean) in Santiago de Chile where Prebisch and his colleagues had launched concepts like ‘underdevelopment’ and ‘centre-periphery’. By the end of the 1950s and the early 1960s, the alumni wrote theses dealing with topics such as development planning for the Amazon region, and Andean agriculture. In the 1960s, the CAEM staff lectured on ‘integral development’ and the leading progressive scholars, on history, anthropology, philosophy and political ideas. In fact, nearly all the colonels who prepared the Velasco coup of 1968 were members of Velasco’s advisory group, were previously intelligence officers, and then put in charge of the counterinsurgency operations against the guerrilla movements in the mid-1960s. They secretly convened in study groups where they discussed the ideas of Peruvian Marxist historian and anthropologist Mariátegui, and decided that not the guerrilla members, but the landed elite were the real enemies within. They further argued that they needed a series of structural reforms as the only remedy against poverty, exclusion and imperialism, the real causes of the insurgency.

In Guatemala, the Centro de Estudios Estratégicos Nacionales (Centro ESTNA) was founded in 1988, as a think-tank of the Fundación para el Desarrollo Institucional de Guatemala (DIG). Contrary to its predecessors in Brazil and Peru, it was established as a post-civil war civil–military graduate school. It functioned during the period of military tutelage until the late 1990s.¹⁷

Military of the right

In many countries of the region, the Cold War was a period of persecution, repression and civil war. Military coups became institutionalised.¹⁸ The first institutional coup took place in Peru in 1962. But the most important one was the military takeover in Brazil, in 1964.¹⁹ This latter coup was planned after explicit consultation with the national elite and with US government representatives.²⁰ The Brazilian example gave rise to a sequence of Latin American dictatorships, afterwards known as ‘national security regimes’, of right-wing military army leaders where a succession of military cabinet members in military or civil–military governments was arranged by internal promotions within the army, the navy and the air force.²¹

Many of these regimes were at war with their own society, persecuting 'enemies within' and in some cases, explicitly engaged in internal warfare. Their ideology was one of fervent anti-communism, the product of 'exotic theories', according to Argentinean army chiefs. They fought counterinsurgency wars against 'subversive' or 'terrorist' adversaries, real (members of guerrilla movements) or imagined (the leadership of trade unions and peasant associations, left-wing writers and students, journalists and priests). In the case of Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay, and especially Central America, the counterinsurgency campaigns took the form of dirty warfare: state terrorism, including widespread torture, assassinations and disappearances, even amounting to genocide (in the case of Guatemala).²² In Brazil and the Southern Cone countries, repression was carried out not only to deal with known adversaries, but also to instil fear within society. Open civil war in Central America followed the same basic pattern of conflict leading to an even much larger number of victims.

The military muscle of the dictatorships was based on three components: control over the national system of intelligence and security forces, the predominance of the military over the police forces, and the already mentioned military missions of local and regional development in remote areas. Of these three factors, control over security and intelligence was the most important. The internal wars against subversion were conducted by an array of parallel services: military intelligence, the security organs, the police, para-military groups and death squads and combinations thereof. As the backbone of the counterinsurgency operations, the intelligence and security systems expanded to such a degree that their official and unofficial ties with paramilitary units became difficult to distinguish.²³

The use of paramilitary forces as auxiliary deterrent and local enforcement could take grotesque forms. Semi-governmental vigilantes, such as the AAA (Argentine Anti-Communist Alliance or Triple A) in Argentina, two parallel paramilitary forces in El Salvador, and particularly the Self-Defence Patrols (PACs) in Guatemala, terrorised their countries. At the height of the counterinsurgency campaigns in Guatemala, the army forcefully incorporated more than a million indigenous 'civil patrol members', probably half of the entire indigenous adult male population, out of a national population of nine million.²⁴

In addition, elected presidents of countries engaged in guerrilla warfare made ample use of paramilitary formations. In the late 1980s and the 1990s, during the counterinsurgency operations of the Fujimori government against the Maoist guerrilla group, Shining Path, the Peruvian Army eventually armed around 400 000 indigenous paramilitary troops (*ronderos* in Peruvian Spanish), operating under authority of the local commanding officers. Their presence was the decisive factor with respect to the victory over this guerrilla group.²⁵

Over many years, the Colombian Army maintained close ties with private armies, regional paramilitary forces that were finally unified into the umbrella organisation Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC). The most recent report of the Colombian Centro de la Memoria Histórica attributes 70% of the victims of massacres to the campaigns of the army and the paramilitary forces.²⁶

During the Cold War, the military right was supported by the United States. The United States had already established a tradition of political policing by military intervention in the Americas. According to the database of Becker, between 1890 and 2009, the Americans intervened 62 times with regular troops, Special Forces, covert action operators and paramilitary forces.²⁷ There was at least a state of complicity – Operation Condor, an intelligence, death squad and dirty warfare cooperation structure between the intelligence services of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay.²⁸ Less documented is the role of Argentina in intelligence and dirty warfare support in Central America, before the United State took over.²⁹

Coups and coup efforts of militaries of the right did not completely cease in the twenty-first century. In 2002, a coup against elected leftist President Chávez of Venezuela eventually failed after several days. In 2004, after a period of conflict between armed groups and the Haitian security forces, leftist elected President Aristide was ousted by US forces and set on a plane to the Central African Republic. In 2009, Honduran military forces captured leftist elected President Zelaya, and flew him to Costa Rica. In 2010, police and military officers tried to remove leftist elected Ecuadorean President Correa. He was liberated by loyal military.

Maybe the Honduran coup was the most explicit and violent removal of an elected president. Zelaya, a rich landowner, evolved during his government term to a leftist ‘spokesman of the urban and rural poor’ who flirted with the idea of an alliance with Cuban and Venezuelan politics to become a member of the string of other ALBA countries of Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua and several smaller Caribbean island states.³⁰ His adversaries discovered ‘communism’ within the presidential palace. A 60% increase in the national minimum salary decreed by the President was the limit. The cardinal and retired army generals were invited to comment on radio and TV on the dangers of communism. Right-wing opponents and the military leadership started negotiations about the convenience of a corrective coup. The military staff asked a donation of US\$ 10 million; the Honduran elite could however only amass US\$ 5 million in cash on short notice and the generals happily agreed.³¹ The coup was, in strictly military terms, a success. However, politically it resulted in disaster. All member states of the Organization of American States (OAS) reacted with dismay. The appointed interim government became a regional pariah and had to organise new elections.

Military of the left

Military men are not inevitably inclined to the political right. Throughout the entire twentieth century, there were revolutionary lieutenants and captains. In the 1920s, rebellions erupted by young officers who in later years were characterised as the ‘Military Youth’ in Brazil, Chile and Ecuador.³² Also in later decades, Military Youth in Central America participated in rebellions with reformist agendas.³³ In 1960, young lieutenants in Guatemala with a nationalist and anti-imperialist agenda overthrew a military dictatorship and, after its failure, organised the first guerrilla groups in that country. In 1982 and 1983, young officers were instrumental in the

overthrow of the two merciless dictators, Generals Lucas García and Ríos Montt. In 1972 and 1979, they were the actors behind the two last military coups in El Salvador before the civil war. It was a desperate effort to prevent large-scale guerrilla warfare.

More renowned were the governments of nationalist-leftist military leaders who used the armed forces to implement anti-oligarchic and anti-imperialist nationalisations and pro-poor social reforms after World War II. Many of them and their younger military ministers were of lower middle-class backgrounds or the precarious urban working class.³⁴ They were elected or staged a coup and sought legitimisation by elections and/or by mass organisations. Colonel Arbenz (1950–1954) in Guatemala was the first one. He was elected president, maintaining his army rank, and initiated an Agrarian Reform while nationalising American property. His political successors, Generals Velasco Alvarado in Peru and Torrijos in Panama, headed institutional coups in the same year, 1968.

Like the Velasco government in Peru, Panamanian army chief Torrijos announced a social reform programme for the benefit of the poor.³⁵ Both were passionate nationalists with sympathy for the underprivileged. Both defined themselves as military reformers with a special mission to break the power of the economic and political oligarchy, to restore national control over the economy, and to carry out social reforms, implemented by the armed forces. Here is a quote from a discourse by Torrijos (that could have been uttered by either Velasco or three decades later by Chávez):

I am a soldier of Latin America who lives his daily life in the barracks since I was seventeen years old. That gives me the right, and knowledge, to treat a delicate, complex and sensitive subject [...]. Since 1959, the year in which, utterly remarkably in our century, a guerrilla triumphs over a regular army in Cuba, at the peak of the period of McCarthyism, military schools began to analyse a problem that had not been recognised previously. What had happened in Cuba? And why? [...]: social terror, terrorism, 'exotic theories'. No, no, the real breeding ground for these so-called exotic theories is [poverty and] misery. The real cause is the lack of schools, the lack of provision of potable water, the lack of a national development programme [...]. Many common soldiers, sergeants and lieutenants, men who live in the same [circumstances of] misery in which ordinary people live, realise quickly that their rifles should be targeted at those who enslave [...].³⁶

Military reformism was not restricted to Panama and Peru. Other army chiefs followed suit and adopted similar, albeit more modest, programmes: in 1971 in Bolivia (Generals Obando [1969–1970] and Torres [1970–1971]) and in Ecuador (General Rodríguez Lara [1972]). In retirement, several of the reformist military founded an NGO (non-governmental organisation) for progressive former officers.³⁷

At present (March 2019), we may be witnessing the emergence of a new variety of political armies in a new ideological dress, that of nationalist and anti-imperialist ‘socialism-of the twenty-first-century’. In 2010, for instance, Bolivia’s armed forces declared themselves a “socialist, anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist institution”, in full support of President Morales’ Plurinational State of Bolivia and the political ideology of the ruling MAS (Movement for Socialism) government.³⁸ As in Bolivia and Peru, Venezuelan army officers are recruited from lower middle-class or labour-class families. Lieutenant Colonel Chávez, son of schoolteachers and educated by his grandmother, a life-long devotee of Bolívar and admirer of Velasco and Torrijos, staged a coup in 1992. The coup failed.³⁹ When he was released from jail, he campaigned for presidential election in slums and rural villages. Like Velasco and Torrijos, Chávez was embedded in the military revolutionary mystique that supposes the indivisible unity between people and the Army. In his own words:

We can say that it is like the formula of water: H₂O. If we say that the People are the oxygen, the Armed Force is the hydrogen. Water doesn’t exist without hydrogen.⁴⁰

During the fifteen years of Chávez’s presidency (1999–2013), his political trajectory demonstrated a deepening radicalism.⁴¹ A new constitution in 1999 established the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. He survived a (failed) coup in 2002 and a (failed) general strike organised by heterogeneous alliances of opposing military and political leaders. After purging the armed institutions, he eventually founded his own political party, a mixture of leftist political parties and social movements.⁴² His political management reflects a mixture of mass movements and use of the armed forces in civilian administration. In the mid-2000s, Chávez started expanding his reach, emphasising his ‘socialism of the twenty-first century’: a large series of domestic social and economic ‘missions’, headed by trusted military and loyal civilians. The Venezuelan armed force, now the ‘National Bolivarian Armed Force’, gradually became the executive instrument of the president.⁴³ Between 2008 and 2015, the armed force’s budget grew from 1,06% to 4,61% of the gross domestic product (GDP). Military personnel increased from 117 400 in 2010 to 197 744 in 2014 (from 40 to 63 per 10 000 citizens). In 2015, the number of (auxiliary) people’s militias stood at 365 046 organised in ‘integral defence areas’ and ‘military strategic defence regions’ under military command.⁴⁴

The social and political divide in Venezuela, already visible during Chávez’s last years, became catastrophic under his successor Maduro’s presidency (2013–present). After elections in January 2016, the opposition dominated parliament, but in May 2016, the government declared an emergency situation and organised elections for a Constituent Assemblée that de facto took over all parliamentary functions. Since then, the president rules by decree. Civilian ministries and management functions were increasingly transferred to the military.⁴⁵ Military officers in active service or in retirement occupied key cabinet positions. Important sectors and strategic public instruments, such as tax collection, budgeting, public contracts and tendering, purchases and acquisitions of the public sector, public imports, control over the public banks and the superintendence of banks are all managed by military officers as well.⁴⁶

Already under Chávez, the National Bolivarian Armed Forces were a powerful instrument, acting as both the right arm (defence and internal security) and the left arm (in charge of ministries, the ‘missions’ and economic management) of the president.⁴⁷ The military also entered the realm of essentially civilian administration. Chávez’s successor, civilian President Maduro, extended this system of selecting only fierce Chavista military loyalists. General Vladimir Padrino, commander-in-chief in 2013, was made Minister of Defence in 2014 and remains in charge until the present. Confronted with political mayhem and economic calamity, Maduro systematically transferred executive power to the military echelons. Currently, General Padrino oversees national defence, manages the national economy, at the same time monitoring all other social missions and is the de facto cabinet prime minister. The Armed Forces control 51% of the entire national budget.⁴⁸ They also are in charge of the most vital cabinet positions: Defence, Interior, Justice, Alimentation, Housing, Public Works, Transport, and Electricity. The situation became even more complicated when in January 2019, the new president of the (original) parliament, Juan Gaidó, declared himself interim president. At present, Venezuela has two parliaments and two presidents. However, the Military High Command staunchly supports President Maduro (March 2019). The regime’s future is strongly dependent on the loyalty of his military supporters.

Democratic transition and nostalgia for military leadership

The implosion of the Soviet Union, the transition of China as an emerging state capitalist power, and, of course, the wave of democratic transitions in the region ceased to sustain the national security doctrines of the Cold War era. With the exception of Colombia (where one guerrilla movement is still fighting) there are no armed insurgency movements with a politico-military agenda left. At present, Latin America and the Caribbean are ruled by elected governments. However, except for Argentina, all democratic transitions in Latin America were accompanied by explicit amnesties or pardon legislation. This created – and still causes – an impunity problem with respect to human rights violations committed by the security forces during the dictatorships. Special legislation and the easy delegation of judicial processes to the military justice system favour the practice of relative immunity in Brazil, Colombia, the northern triangle of Central America, Peru and other countries.

With the return to democracy in Latin America, a kind of civil–military accommodation process took place. Political militarism was abandoned, but the phenomenon of military politicians did not disappear; in some countries it was only modernised. In general, the Latin American and Caribbean electorates maintain a weak spot concerning soldiers in politics and former military strongmen of the left and the right. I already mentioned the case of President Chávez in Venezuela between 1999 and 2013. The region even witnessed the election of the presidency by former conservative dictators as doctored democrats: In Bolivia, former dictator General Banzer won the presidential elections in 1998. In Guatemala, Banzer’s colleague, former dictator General Ríos Montt, was invested with the Presidency of the national Congress in 1999. His party had won the elections, and President Portillo figured

as his figurehead while Rios Montt coordinated the cabinet. In 2010 and 2015, two times putchist and ex-dictator Bouterse, condemned drug dealer (in The Netherlands) and accused of torture and murder by a military tribunal (in Suriname), won the presidential elections of Surinam. Again in Guatemala, former General Pérez Molina was elected president in 2011. Campaigning under the banner of law and order, and heavily supported by the national billionaire elite, he, his vice-president and his key cabinet members went to jail for corruption in the last year of his term.

Notwithstanding previous experiences under military dictatorships, the public's confidence in the armed forces remained high. In most public opinion polls in the region (a consistent phenomenon in the yearly reports of the Latinobarómetro for twenty years), the confidence in institutions is, in descending order:⁴⁹

- the churches – 66%;
- the armed forces – 50%;
- the police – 38%;
- the electoral institutions – 32%;
- the government – 26%;
- the judiciary – 28%;
- the parliament – 25%; and
- the political parties – 17%.

At least in part, the continuous prestige of the military is explained by the development tasks that the military traditionally performs in garrisons and deployments in remote areas: infrastructure, medical service, and sometimes transport in emergency situations.

Conclusions: New military security missions and ‘unconventional’ counterinsurgency

In Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela, civilian governments formally established internal security missions to the armed assigned by presidential decrees and/or parliamentary legislation to the Armed Forces to act in new missions of internal security and development. The development missions are an extension of the already mentioned civilian assistance missions in remote or underdeveloped and faraway regions. The new missions refer to environmental issues, protection of the biodiversity, role expanding as key actors in ‘civil defence’ and assistance in natural disasters.⁵⁰ Emphasis is also put on participation in peace missions. During the last decades, military contingents of many Latin American countries participated in foreign peace missions, operating under a United Nations mandate. These missions are continued to the present.⁵¹ From 2004 on, Brazil and Chile headed the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH).⁵² Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Peru created special peacekeeping schools.⁵³

Other recent missions are not related to external defence or internal development. After the democratisation of the entire region and the end of civil wars in Central America and the Andean countries (Colombia and Peru), new waves of violence and new armed actors appeared in the form of local mini-wars in *favelas* (low- and middle-income, and unregulated neighbourhoods in Brazil), popular neighbourhoods and rural corridors of drug trafficking. In many countries, civilian governments and parliaments provide binding legislation to the armed forces to act in new missions of internal security, to ‘assist the police’ or even to assume command of the operations against cartels and crime syndicates, youth gangs, and urban vigilantes. However, rough military and police detachments, private security companies and violent law enforcement agencies are also the actors or partners in the so-called ‘new violence’ in Latin America.⁵⁴

Between 2000 and 2017, more than 2,5 million Latin Americans have been killed by violence, generally by intentional homicide. In 2012, Latin America’s citizens represented only 8% of the world’s population; however, they produced 33% of the world’s homicides in 2012, and this trend is not declining.⁵⁵ With the exception of drug-related violence in Colombia, Central America and Mexico, Latin American violence is predominantly urban. According to the Mexican NGO Seguridad, Justicia y Paz, from the 50 most lethal cities of 300 000 inhabitants or more in the world in 2016, 42 are in Latin America (and one, Kingston, in the English-speaking Caribbean).⁵⁶ Of these Latin American cities, 19 are in Brazil, 8 in Mexico, 7 in Venezuela and 4 in Colombia. Caracas is the most violent city with 130 assassinations per 100 000 inhabitants. Most of the victims live in urban peripheries, are male, young, non-white, and killed by firearms. This ‘new warfare’ was not limited to urban territories, but quickly expanded to rural areas in Colombia, Central America and Mexico.

The presence of drugs, the cultivation, transformation, commerce and smuggling of cocainepoppy and marihuana, produced an expansion of violence by non-state and state actors, and in some countries caused more victims than in the decades of civil wars. The focus on the ‘war on drugs’ implies a permanent intertwining of US anti-drug agencies and national police and military forces. This imposes a militaristic approach to the drug problem. After 9/11, this has been strengthened by the fusion of the ‘war on drugs’ and ‘war on terror’ discourses that engage with the connection between drug trafficking and armed actors that challenge the violence monopoly of states in the region. However, as we will illustrate below with a few examples, this militarisation of internal law enforcement has not (yet) led to the impending re-militarisation of politics, but has rather accentuated the intrinsically violent nature of democracy in Latin America.⁵⁷

Reluctantly or not, given the absence of external warfare, Latin American armed forces have assumed a multiplicity of internal security missions:

- the military as provider of internal security;
- the military as parallel police force;

- the military as principal actor of internal warfare, be it against ‘terrorists’ or ‘organised crime’;
- the military as pacifier in slum wars;
- the military as the ultimate resort against gang lords in the drugs corridors.

Eventually, one can observe a reciprocal process: the militarisation of the police with ‘Special Police Forces’ trained in urban warfare and armed with heavy weaponry. Even the language of these ‘civilian missions’ is embedded in soldiers’ semantic: the **war** against crime, the **war** against terrorists, and the **war** against drugs. Some of the new missions are far-going role extensions. However, all new missions are being requested or at least permitted by democratically elected governments and are based on legal charters. This is a fundamental difference in comparison with the decades of military dictatorship where hidden and veiled intelligence and security operations were executed by paramilitary forces and death squads, without constitutional or legitimate mandates.

What is, however, beyond legitimacy is the phenomenon of coups by invitation or self-coups by elected presidents. In the recent past, the self-coup by elected President Fujimori in Peru (1991) was extremely successful. Afterwards, he governed by decree and was re-elected in 1995 with an overwhelming majority of 64%. His colleague, elected President Serrano in Guatemala, followed his example, but his self-coup failed. The military was divided over its consequences and along with mass demonstrations against the take-over decided to transfer power to the Congress. The negotiated coup in 2019 against Honduran President Zelaya technically succeeded but the new government was tainted, and the country was transformed into an international pariah until externally controlled elections had been organised.

Venezuela under Maduro is another case of contention. After legislative elections in December 2015, the president was confronted by a new parliament (Assemblée) in which the opposition had won a two-thirds majority. The president organised elections for a new Constitutional Congress, the opposition boycotted elections, and Maduro won a devoted membership. He transferred all legislative functions to this new body, and in 2017, organised contested elections for municipal mayors and state governors. The incumbent president was re-elected for a second six-year term. In his cabinet, all key functions were consigned to loyal generals. All strategic public institutions – tax collection, budgeting, public contracts and tendering, purchases and acquisitions within the public sector, public imports, control over the public banks and the superintendence of banks – were managed by junior generals and colonels. In fact, the armed forces were the regime’s right arm (executive functions) and the left (repression by the military National Guard)

A completely new situation has arisen in Brazil. During the impeachment procedure against President Rousseff, politicians of the right and the left invited the military high command to pronounce political statements. Initially, the answer was negative, but in the subsequent process against former president Lula, the general staff voiced their

preferences. Prior to and during the presidential elections in 2018, far-right congressman, Bolsonaro's, a former army captain who repeatedly expressed his admiration for Brazil's military dictatorship, announced his plan to appoint the military in key posts and to clean the country while dealing with his adversaries. At present (March 2019), it is too early to predict the political course of the country. Bolsonaro's own party has only a small number of seats and he will have to accommodate politically close and distant allies to rule with a majority in Congress. His veiled bidding to the armed forces to co-govern, however, opens the way for the military in politics. The last word about the future of Latin American political Armies has not been spoken yet.

Endnotes

- ¹ In a previous version, this article was presented as a keynote address at the Conference of the International Sociological Association, Research Committee on Armed Forces and Conflict Resolution (RC01), Fundação Getulio Vargas, Rio de Janeiro, 24–27 September 2016. In this contribution, I draw on D Kruijt. *The political influence of the Latin American military*. Working paper no. 30. Amsterdam: Centre for Latin American Research and Documentation. October 2017. <http://www.cedla.uva.nl/50_publications/pdf/cuadernos/30-Cuadernos_Working_Paper-Dirk_Kruijt.pdf> Accessed on 18 November 2018. I thank Kees Koonings for his critical review of former drafts.
- ² See M Kaldor. *Beyond Militarism, Arms Races, and Arms Control*. Essay for the Nobel Prize Centennial Symposium. London: Social Science Research Council, 2001.
- ³ See K. Koonings & D Kruijt. "Military politics and the mission of nation building". In K Koonings & D Kruijt (eds), *Political armies: The military and nation building in the age of democracy*. London: Zed Books, 202, 9-34.
- ⁴ See ED Arias & DM Goldstein (eds). *Violent democracies in Latin America*. Durham: Duke University Press, 2010.
- ⁵ See B.Loveman. *The Constitution of Tyranny. Regimes of Exception in Spanish America*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1993.
- ⁶ Even masculine versus feminine. Guatemalan General-President Romeo Lucas García (1978–1982) considered democracy as 'feminine'. He was toppled by young officers who staged a coup and handed over power to General Rios Montt.
- ⁷ See K. Koonings & D Kruijt, *op. cit.*
- ⁸ See B Loveman. *The constitution of tyranny: Regimes of exception in Spanish America*. Pittsburgh, PA: Pittsburgh University Press, 1993; for Brazil, see FD McCann. *Soldiers of the Pátria: A history of the Brazilian Army, 1889–1937*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004. For Central America, see B Arévalo de León. *Del Estado Violento al Ejército Político: Formación estatal y función militar en Guatemala (1524–1963)*. Guatemala: F & G Editores, 2018.

- ⁹ See Loveman, Brian. ‘Military Government in Latin America, 1959–1990’, in *Oxford Bibliographies*, 28 October 2011 <<http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199766581/obo-9780199766581-0015.xml>> Accessed on 22 August 2017
- ¹⁰ A Rouquié. *The military and the state in Latin America*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1987, 95.
- ¹¹ See Silva, G. do Couto e. *Planejamento estratégico*. Rio de Janeiro: Livraria José Olympio, 1981. [initial surname]
- ¹² See A Pinochet Ugarte. *Geopolítica* (2nd ed.). Santiago de Chile: Editorial Andres Bello, 1974.
- ¹³ See E Mercado Jarrín. *Seguridad, política, estrategia*. Lima: Estado Mayor General del Ejército, Departamento de Relaciones del Ejército, 1975.
- ¹⁴ See HA Gramajo Morales. *Tesis de la Estabilidad Nacional*. Guatemala: Ministerio de la Defensa, Editorial del Ejercito, 1989.
- ¹⁵ For Brazil, see RA Hayes. *The armed nation: The Brazilian corporate mystique*. Tempe: Arizona State University, 1989 and T Skidmore. *The politics of military rule in Brazil, 1964–1985*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1988. For Peru, see V Villanueva. *El CAEM y la revolución de la Fuerza Armada*. Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos and Campodónico Editores, 1972 and D Kruijt. *La revolución por decreto. El Perú durante el gobierno militar*. Serie Democracia y Fuerza Armada 9. Lima: Instituto de Defensa Legal, 2008.
- ¹⁶ See AC Stepan. *The military in politics: Changing patterns in Brazil*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1971, 171 ff.
- ¹⁷ Three of the founding board members of the Fundación DIG were former president Arévalo (1944–1950), who initiated the period of the “Guatemalan Spring” and was succeeded by Colonel Arbenz; President-General Arana, who crushed the guerrilla of the 1960s, and afterwards was appointed ambassador to Nicaragua’s dictator Somoza and eventually ruled the country as elected president between 1970 and 1974; and General Gramajo, Minister of Defence (1987–1990).
- ¹⁸ For a recent characterisation of this type of coups, see F Lehoucq & A Pérez-Liñán. “Breaking out of the coup trap: Political competition and military coups in Latin America”. *Comparative Political Studies* 47/8. 2014. 1105–1129.
- ¹⁹ See C Castro, MC D’Araujo & GA Dillon Soares (eds). *Visões do golpe. A memória militar sobre 1964*. Rio de Janeiro: Relume-Dumará, 1994 and C Castro, MC D’Araujo & GA Dillon Soares (eds). *Os anos de chumbo. A memória militar sobre a repressão*. Rio de Janeiro: Relume-Dumará, 1994.
- ²⁰ See R Dreifuss. *1964. A conquista do estado. Ação política, poder e golpe de classe*. Petrópolis: Vozes, 1981.
- ²¹ And the Carabineros in the case of Chile.

- ²² According to the Comisión para el Esclarecimiento Histórico (CEH), the UN Truth Commission in Guatemala; see CEH. *Guatemala. Memoria del silencio. Volume I*. Guatemala: United Nations Office for Project Services, 1999.
- ²³ See here M Esparza, HR Ruttenbach & D Feierstein (eds). *State violence and genocide in Latin America: The Cold War years*. Abingdon: Routledge, 2010 and J Mazzei. *Death squads or self-defence forces? How paramilitary groups emerge and challenge democracy in Latin America*. Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2009.
- ²⁴ According to the author's interview with former peace negotiator Héctor Rosada-Granados (Guatemala City, 14 April 2010); see also D Kruijt. *Guerrillas: War and peace in Central America*. London: Zed Books, 2008, 31–32) and ME Vela Castañeda. "Perpetradores de genocidio: Aproximaciones históricas y sociológicas desde el caso Guatemala". *Nueva Sociedad* 246. July–August 2013. 167–169.
- ²⁵ See M Fumerton. *From victims to heroes: Peasant counter-rebellion and civil war in Ayacucho, Peru, 1980–2000*. Thela Latin America Series. Amsterdam: Rozenberg, 2002.
- ²⁶ National Centre for Historical Memory. *Basta Ya! Colombia: Memories of war and dignity*. Bogota, 2016, 43 ff.
- ²⁷ See M Becker *History of U.S. Interventions in Latin America* , <https://www.yachana.org/teaching/resources/interventions.html> > Accessed on 16 August 2017
- ²⁸ See JP McSherry. *Predatory states: Operation Condor and covert war in Latin America*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005. The Clinton administration declassified numerous state department documents.
- ²⁹ However, see AC Armony. *Argentina, the United States, and the anti-communist crusade in Central America 1977–1984*. Athens, OH: Center for International Studies, Ohio University, 1997 and J Rostica. "La Confederación Anticomunista Latinoamericana. Las conexiones civiles y militares entre Guatemala y Argentina (1972–1980)". *Revista Desafíos* 30/1. 2018. 309–347.
- ³⁰ ALBA is the Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América (Bolivarian Alliance for the People of Our America).
- ³¹ Author's interview with Víctor Meza, at that time minister of the interior of President Zelaya (Tegucigalpa, 26 and 27 October 2010). For a more detailed analysis, see L Salomón. "Political system, armed forces and interruption of constitutional order". In Red de Seguridad y Defensa de América Latina. *A comparative atlas of defence in Latin America and the Caribbean*. Buenos Aires, 2010, 240–241.

- ³² In Copacabana, Rio de Janeiro, a movement of *tenentes* (lieutenants) revolted asking for electoral and political reforms in 1922. In 1924, *tenentes* in São Paulo and Rio Grande do Sul took up the cause of opposition movements; their rebellion lasted several years (McCann *op. cit.*, p. 259 ff.). In 1924, in Chile, a military committee of young officers protested low salaries and revolted against Congress requiring immediate social legislation. A military reformist junta was installed, and a short-lived socialist republic was even proclaimed. In 1925, in Ecuador, the League of Young Officers rebelled against the repressive government and accelerated social legislation and ‘protection for the proletariat’; a second coup in 1931 ended this reformist experiment; see PE Ospina Peralta. “La alineación inestable. Origen y consolidación de un Estado transformista: Ecuador, 1920–1960”. PhD thesis. University of Amsterdam, 2016, 142 ff.
- ³³ A Martín Álvarez. “The long wave: The revolutionary left in Guatemala, Nicaragua, and El Salvador”. In A Martín Álvarez & E Rey Tristán (eds), *Revolutionary violence and the new left: Transnational perspectives*. Abingdon: Routledge, 2017, 223–245.
- ³⁴ Rouquié presents an overview of the background of the officers of significant Latin American armies in the 1980s and concludes that, maybe except for the Argentinean army, officers’ recruitment slowly had been focused on the lower middle classes (Rouquié *op. cit.*, pp. 84–93).
- ³⁵ For a very detailed analysis of Velasco’s legacy, see C Aguirre & P Drinot (eds). *The peculiar revolution: Rethinking the Peruvian experiment under military rule*. Austin, TX: The University of Texas Press, 2017.
- ³⁶ M Zárate & D Vargas (eds). *General Omar Torrijos de Panamá y de la Patria Grande*. Caracas: Editorial Trincheras, 2011, 255–261.
- ³⁷ The Organización de Militares para la Democracia, la Integración de América Latina y el Caribe (ORMIDELAC) (the Organisation of Military Officers in Favour of Democracy and Integration of Latin America and the Caribbean).
- ³⁸ See *El País*, 16 November 2010. The journal quotes Bolivian army chief General Cueto, whose public declaration at the Colegio Militar en La Paz was shared by a visibly emotional President Morales. MAS is Movimiento al Socialismo (Movement towards Socialism), an alliance of several parties and social movements.
- ³⁹ Here I draw on chapters 6 and 7 of D Kruijt. *Cuba and revolutionary Latin America: An oral history*. London, Zed Books, 2017.
- ⁴⁰ L Bilbao. *Chávez y la Revolución Bolivariana. Conversaciones con Luis Bilbao*. Santiago de Chile: Capital Intelectual S.A. and LOM Editores, 2002.
- ⁴¹ Here I draw on R Gott. *Hugo Chávez and the Bolivarian Revolution*. London: Verso, 2005 and S Ellner. *El fenómeno Chávez, sus orígenes y su impacto (hasta 2013)* (2nd ed). Caracas: Fundación Centro de Estudios Latinoamericanos Rómulo Gallegos and Centro Nacional de Historia, 2013.

- ⁴² The Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela (PSUV, the United Socialist Party of Venezuela).
- ⁴³ About the new emerging military ideology, see M Anselmi. *Chávez's children: Ideology, education and society*. Lanham: Lexington Books, 2013.
- ⁴⁴ According to Red de Defensa y Seguridad de América Latina. *Atlas comparativo de la defensa en América Latina y Caribe*. Buenos Aires, 2016, 210–215, these ZODI (Zonas de Defensa Integral) and REDI (Regiones Estratégicas de Defensa Militar) were created by Chávez.
- ⁴⁵ For details, see C Tablante & M Tarre. *El gran saqueo: Quiénes y cómo se robaron el dinero de los venezolanos*. Caracas: La Hoja del Norte, 2015, 260–266.
- ⁴⁶ For a detailed analysis, see F Ramos Pismataro & RF Rodríguez. ‘Venezuela y la revolución perpetua’, *Razón Pública*. 25 July 2017. <<https://www.razonpublica.com/index.php/internacional-temas-32/10423-venezuela-y-la-revoluci%C3%B3n-perpetua.html>> Accessed on 26 July 2017.
- ⁴⁷ The intelligence services (Servicio Bolivariano de Inteligencia Nacional, SEBIN).
- ⁴⁸ Transparencia Venezuela. *Empresas propiedad del estado en Venezuela. Un modelo de control del Estado*. September 2017, 7. <<https://transparencia.org.ve/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Empresas-propiedad-del-Edo.-2017-TV-sin-linea-de-corte.pdf>> Accessed on 11 April 2018.
- ⁴⁹ The order is calculated on the basis of the average scores between 1995 and 2016; the scores of 2016 are mentioned in the text (Latinobarómetro. *Informe 2016*. Buenos Aires: Corporación Latinobarómetro. 2016, 32–33, <<http://www.latinobarometro.org/latNewsShowMore.jsp?evYEAR=2016&evMONTH=-1>> Accessed on 6 May 2017.
- ⁵⁰ In the majority of countries in the region, these missions have a constitutional (in Bolivia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Peru and Suriname) or at least a legal base (in Chile, Colombia, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Guyana, Nicaragua, Mexico, Paraguay and Venezuela). Protection of the environment and assistance in the case of national disasters (earthquakes, hurricanes, flood disasters and tsunamis) are considered a regular supporting role of the Latin American and Caribbean armed forces (D Kruijt & K Koonings. ‘From political armies to the ‘war against crime’: The transformation of militarism in Latin America’. In A Stavrianakis & J Selby (eds), *Militarism and international relations: Political economy, security, theory*. Series Cass Military Studies. Abingdon: Routledge, 2013, 99.
- ⁵¹ Here I draw on WA Sánchez Nieto. ‘Brazil’s grand design for combining global South solidarity and national interests: A discussion of peacekeeping operations in Haiti and Timor’. *Globalizations* 9/1. 2012. 161–178. doi: [10.1080/14747731.2012.627719](https://doi.org/10.1080/14747731.2012.627719). Probably the first Latin American peace mission was the Battalion Peru, an army unit dispatched by Peruvian President-General Velasco as peacekeepers after the Yom Kippur War between Israel and Egypt.

⁵² Brazil initially deployed 1 300 military, other Latin American countries (Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay) sent smaller contingents; approximately 9 000 Latin American soldiers participated.

⁵³ The Latin American Association of Training Centres for Peace (*ALCOPAZ* by its *Portuguese and Spanish acronyms*) is based in Rio de Janeiro.

⁵⁴ About this complex situation, see ED Arias & DM Goldstein (eds, *op. cit.*), K Koonings & D Kruijt (eds). *Violence and resilience in Latin American cities*. London: Zed Books, 2015 and R Muggah & K Aguirre Tobín. “Citizen security in Latin America: Facts and figures”. Strategic paper no. 33. Rio de Janeiro: Igarapé Institute, April 2018.

<<https://igarape.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Citizen-Security-in-Latin-America-Facts-and-Figures.pdf>> Accessed on 25 April 2018.

⁵⁵ R Muggah & K. Aguirre Tobón, 2018. *Citizen security in Latin America: Facts and Figures*. Rio de Janeiro: Igarapé Institute, Strategic Paper 33, p.1-2.<<https://igarape.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Citizen-Security-in-Latin-America-Facts-and-Figures.pdf>> Accessed on 28 January 2019.

⁵⁶ Seguridad, Justicia y Paz, *Metodología del ranking (2016) de las 50 ciudades más violentas del mundo*, <<https://www.seguridadjusticiaypaz.org.mx/biblioteca/prensa/send/6-prensa/239-las-50-ciudades-mas-violentas-del-mundo-2016-metodologia>> Accessed on 21 February 2018.

⁵⁷ see ED Arias & DM Goldstein (eds), *op. cit.*

SMALL WARS AND PEOPLE'S WARS: A CLAUSEWITZIAN PERSPECTIVE ON THE SOUTH AFRICAN WAR, 1899–1902

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Abstract

The theorist and strategist Carl von Clausewitz developed core theoretical concepts on war, including that war is merely an extension of politics by different means, and that the integration of morality and rationality functions as a driving force in a people's war. Clausewitz envisaged the idea of war in its absolute perfection ('beautiful wars') as a regulative ideal, which formed part of his framework on small wars and people's wars. The aim of this article is to demonstrate how Clausewitz's theories on small wars, and their transformation into people's wars, are still valuable when analysing and contextualising historical events and battles. The value of Clausewitz's theories on small wars and people's wars is demonstrated by applying them to the general characteristics of the South African War of 1899–1902. The way Clausewitz differentiates between the underpinning reasons for war, and between 'limited' and 'absolute' war, is specifically relevant for understanding the different tactics which commanders adopted in the field of battle. The theoretical distinction that Clausewitz makes between the objectives of two opposing forces could clarify why the British Empire and the two Boer Republics went to war. The same distinction might explain the motives and the impetus that gave rise to divergent views, and how the subsequent conflict developed into a full-scale war.

Introduction

General Carl von Clausewitz (1780–1831), an avid analyst of small wars and people's wars, is generally acknowledged as one of the greatest writers on the theory of war. This is an astonishing achievement, especially as he wrote only one major work during his career, *On War* [*Vom Kriege*]. This publication represents the culmination of his theories, which he himself referred to as "a shapeless mass of ideas".⁵⁸ Yet, despite Clausewitz's modesty, he had an undeniably dominant global impact on theories about war for an extended period. The American strategist, Barnard Brodie, made the bold statement that Clausewitz's "work is not simply the greatest, but the only book about war".⁵⁹ In the field of academics, many prominent scholars and experts on international relations and strategic studies, including Raymond Aron, have attached significant prominence to Clausewitz's theories in their textbooks.⁶⁰

As Scheipers indicates, it was inevitable that in recent reconfigurations, the contextualisation of Clausewitz's theories on war would distance him from the twenty-first-century theoretical-strategic context.⁶¹ Herberg-Rothe refers to studies since the 1990s, where influential writers on the theory of war have argued that Clausewitz's theories are no longer applicable, not only in relation to contemporary conflicts, but also in general. Van Creveld (1991) is even more forthright in describing Clausewitz's theories as harmful, while Keegan (1993) goes so far as to describe Clausewitz's ideas as destructive.⁶² The common denominator in criticisms of Clausewitz's theoretical propositions is their focus on conventional wars between two 'regular' armies. The authors point out that in the modern era, the character and fabric of war are multifaceted and involve a wider range of role players, including non-state actors. than.⁶³

It is conceivable that Clausewitz's contribution to the theoretic-strategic aspects of warfare will lose some status; yet, despite his theories falling out of favour, his theoretical insights remain enduring and remarkable, and should be understood and appreciated in the appropriate historical context. His ideas are still relevant, even though military conditions and warfare have modernised and transformed beyond all recognition. Contemporary developments do not warrant the proposal that his ideas be dismissed out of hand. If Clausewitz's writings were to become redundant because of global changes and modernisation, then Aristotle's theories on the state should similarly be dismissed for having been based on a comparative study of ancient city-states situated around the Mediterranean in about 300 BC.⁶⁴

Daase labels the criticisms against Clausewitz "intellectual ignorance."⁶⁵ He points out that even authors who defend Clausewitz, attack his critics rather than pointing out his analytical strengths. Daase explains that the new forms of warfare underscore Clausewitz's contemporary relevance, and that his ideas on 'small wars' allow a sophisticated approach to political violence.⁶⁶ Within this scope, contrary to some contemporary views, Clausewitz's theoretical propositions still have relevance and value, specifically in helping to differentiate between 'small wars and 'people's wars' It is thus the purpose of this article to demonstrate how his theories on small wars, and their transformation into people's wars, make a valuable contribution to any analysis that aims to contextualise historical events and small wars.

Aim of the article

It was pointed out in the introduction that Clausewitz's thoughts on small wars and people's wars remain contemporary and relevant as analytical tools. The aim of this article is to demonstrate the value of Clausewitz's theories by applying their general characteristics as a theoretical construct to explain the dynamics and inherent facets of the South African War of 1899–1902. The South African War displayed multiple dimensions for analysis because it was conducted between two unequal opponents – the mighty British Empire and two smallish Boer Republics (the South African Republic [Transvaal] and the Orange Free State Republic) and between a modern professional army and a militia or a 'people's army'. For the Boer Republics, it was a war on *their own territory, for their freedom and independence* – which Clausewitz deemed the most beautiful type of war.

The value of Clausewitz's views and theories on small wars and people's wars is that these theories and views offer additional, intriguing strategic and military insight into the defining aspects of the South African War. His eighteenth-century theoretical conceptualisations find an echo in the salient features of that war more than a century later. The distinction Clausewitz draws between the underpinning reasons for war and the differences between 'limited' and 'absolute' war necessitates a focus on the different tactics adopted by the respective commanders. Clausewitz's eighteenth-century theoretical disposition and the distinction he made in terms of a war between a professional army and a 'people's army' is invaluable for the analysis undertaken in the study on which this article reports.

According to Scholtz, Clausewitz's reference to a *Landwehr* is a concept that could be equated with the concept of a civil force or a 'people's army'. The civil force is an extraordinary voluntarily force consisting of the whole of society, with all their physical and inner strength, their assets and goodwill – these assets form the basis of the *Landwehr*.⁶⁷

The theoretical distinction between the objectives of the two opposing forces makes it possible to explain why the British Empire and the two Boer Republics went to war in the first place. That same distinction explains the impetus that led to divergent views forming, and the way the subsequent fighting developed into a full-scale conflict.

Structure of the article

The stated aim of the article is to expound how Clausewitz's theories could be applied to facets of the South African War. The aim is to explain how a people's army fought a people's war, for their independence and freedom, which sprang from the concept of aestheticism as a combination of morality/passion and reason.

The next subsection will outline the distinction between limited and absolute war, with reference to the difference between the strategic approaches of the British Empire and the Boer Republics. The differences will be explained with specific reference to the aim of the British Empire to extend its imperial policy and, in direct opposition, the Boer Republics' aspirations for complete emancipation from British domination.

The next subsection provides an outline of the inner individual motivation of the average Boer in the militia, having morality as a defining trait. The resolve of the Boer militia was strengthened by a unique blend of morality and rationality, coupled with strong religious convictions. It is also explained that subsequent events during the war progressively undermined the rational and later moral beliefs of the Boers to continue fighting. In the conclusion of this article, final comments are offered to explain that the events, such as the Boer defeat at Paardenberg and the surrender of 4 000 men, served to demoralised the Boers, and started the process of abandonment of a concerted resistance against the professional British army.

Theoretical underpinning

The level of intensity shown by those individuals who fought a people's war to secure their own independence and freedom, sprang from the concept of aestheticism. The aesthetic disposition shows efficacious interaction between morale/passion and reason as a central tenet, and in this instance, it provided the driving force energising the men on the battlefield. Those who fought on this basis were imbued with the ideals and moral disposition to defend their own soil vigorously.⁶⁸ In Clausewitz's theoretical assumption, the 'most beautiful of wars' thus relates to the intrinsic presence of moral and aesthetic elements that are inherent in those willing to defend their motherland against invading aggressors. Clausewitz emphasises that small wars transform from partisan wars into people's wars if they are underpinned and supported by a combination of reason (rationality) and morality, which legitimises and propels citizens' resistance.

Within a broader context, an illustrative comparison can be drawn between the political and military-strategic positions of the two Boer Republics at the beginning of the nineteenth century when their independence and very survival were at stake on the one hand, and the situation in Prussia a century earlier on the other. Clausewitz's views on Prussia's political and strategic challenges included his notion of a people's war as involving citizens defending their country/nation against an aggressor.⁶⁹ In the two former Boer Republics, the same salient features of a people's war were present when Afrikaners fought to preserve their independence and maintain their sovereignty. In terms of the Clausewitzian aesthetic context, the forces of the two republics were imbued with a sense or an awareness of the legitimacy of their course of action, based not only on rational grounds, but also on an interrelationship with morality.

During the first few months of the war, the two Boer Republics were able to draw on strong feelings of unity and solidarity in defence of their sovereignty. Their defence was underpinned by a moral justification of their cause, based on firm notions of morality and rationality. The Boer militia were convinced they were fighting 'for the right reasons' and 'rationally believed' in their own military prowess. It was this combination of morality and rationality that motivated and united the Boer militia and, for them, legitimised their struggle. These strong convictions resulted in remarkable victories during the last few months of 1899 over the British forces at Colenso, Stormberg and Magersfontein. However, the defeat and capitulation of General AP Cronjé at Paardenberg on 27 February 1900 (Majuba Day) was a watershed and turning point in the war. The demoralising effect of the surrender of almost 4 000 men was a devastating blow to the Boer fighters. In the weeks following this loss, the interrelationship between rationality and morality that had underpinned and legitimised the Boers' war up to that point was shattered by the surrender at Paardenberg and the strategic blunder made by the two presidents during the aftermath of the battle.

Paardenberg represented another watershed juncture in the history of the Boer militia. It manifested as a split between those who wished to continue and those

demanding a ceasefire or a halt to the fighting. The division amongst the Boer militia pitted the diehards (*bittereinders*) (who believed that the war should continue on rational and moral grounds) against the ‘joiners’ (Boers who, as the name suggests, joined the British forces in various capacities), and the ‘hands-uppers’ (those raising their hands in surrender) who harboured opposing views. This bitter split resembled the start of a civil war, in that a number of Boers were killed by the actions of the ‘joiners’ – their erstwhile compatriots – and for decades after the war, this betrayal reverberated through the districts.⁷⁰ The division that occurred eroded the moral fabric of a people’s war and fragmented the solidarity of the two republics, rendering them unable to resist the invaders as the war progressed. As Warwick indicates, there is little doubt that in legal terms, the ‘joiners’ were regarded as wartime traitors.⁷¹

Distinction between the Clausewitzian ‘limited’ and ‘absolute’ war and perspectives on the South African War

In a letter to the German philosopher Johann Fichte in 1869, Clausewitz outlines his perspectives on the broad spectrum of war, comparing the notion of the ‘most unfortunate of wars’ (seen from the perspective of the occupying powers) with the ‘most beautiful of wars’ (in which people fight on their own territory for their freedom and independence).⁷²

From this proposition, Clausewitz then deduces the tendency of fighting to escalate to absolute war – a process which he terms the ‘dialectics of the contest’⁷³ He postulates that it is unavoidable that when one side attempts to dictate the law to another with the intention to enforce its will, there will be a reciprocal action, which will then logically lead to an escalation and ultimately an extreme form of warfare, i.e. absolute war.⁷⁴

In terms of Clausewitz’s theoretical thinking, the motivating factors in each form of war differ fundamentally. The difference between the two strategic approaches is that the underpinning motive of the occupying force is to fight to eliminate the opponent’s political independence, while the defending force fights to preserve its freedom and independence. In the event of the defender being unable to repel the occupier, the former is compelled to fight to obtain favourable terms to secure peace.⁷⁵ In addition to studying the differences between two opposing commanders’ strategic approaches, Clausewitz emphasises the importance of understanding their ultimate aims as well as the strategies they used.⁷⁶

Daase refers to Clausewitz’s definition of small wars as the application of organised and unorganised violence by non-state actors against military forces to harass and exhaust the enemy’s army in order to change its policy.⁷⁷

An important aspect is Clausewitz’s differentiation as both these wars (‘small wars and people’ war) being the opposite of absolute war. To this end, Clausewitz refers to the seventeenth-century tradition of German philosophical and aesthetic discourse (see earlier) to emphasise the fundamental importance of the integration or

interrelationship between passion and reason as an underpinning factor in small wars and people's wars. At that time, Prussia's survival was at stake, and the importance of integrating logic and fervour was paramount, if the Prussians wanted to repel the danger of the invading German forces.⁷⁸

Clausewitz makes a clear distinction between absolute and limited war: the former aims to eliminate the enemy's political independence, while the latter hopes to obtain favourable terms of peace. To this end, Clausewitz urges a commander to know whether he is fighting "the kind of war that is completely governed and saturated by the urge for a decision or one that approximated rather to 'a war of observation'"⁷⁹

The compelling reasons why the British Empire and the two Boer Republics went to war in 1899 differ on a fundamental level from the aforementioned Clausewitzian classification. The British Empire engaged in war because it was the next logical step in its imperial policy, following the Anglo-Transvaal War of 1880–1881. That war had resulted in humiliation for the British and the annihilation of General Colley's forces at Amajuba. The British government's imperialistic perspective ideologically dominated and defined its outlook on international relations during the nineteenth century. In direct contrast, the Transvaal Republic had clearly stated its ambitions for complete emancipation from British domination, which was given further impetus by the discovery of gold on the Witwatersrand. The advantages of an influx of money to the Transvaal Treasury reinforced the republic's autonomy, and this was disconcerting for the expansive hopes of the British imperialists.⁸⁰

The republic's impetus to strive for complete emancipation from British rule was thus incompatible with the imperialists' policy and ambitions to establish supremacy over most of Southern Africa. The Transvaal's separatist policies and dreams were disquieting to the imperial leaders, who envisaged the possible future impact thereof on the British colonies of Natal and the Cape. This predictably led to a widening of the rift. The Boer leaders, Presidents Paul Kruger and MT Steyn, realised after the collapse of the Bloemfontein Conference on 5 June 1899 that no solution regarding their differences with the British government, other than capitulation, was possible. The failure of these talks made the two Boer presidents realise that their independence was a stake, and that only war would preserve their independence from Britain's imperialistic policies.⁸¹ It was during the failed Bloemfontein Conference that Kruger blurted out to the British High Commissioner, "it is our country that you want".⁸²

The Boer leadership realised they would have to resist the British Empire's imperialistic agenda through armed struggle; yet, in spite of their awareness of the threat posed by the British, the Transvaal Republic's preparation for the upcoming war was restricted and rather limited in scope. Jan Smuts, Attorney General of the Transvaal Republic, was tasked with drafting a memorandum as a basis for preparing for the looming war. To this end, he provided the government with a blueprint for political, economic and military action. Smuts adopted a propagandistic/diplomatic approach to the war, being of the opinion that many subjects of the British Empire were antagonistic towards their rulers. He believed their loyalty was divided, and that

this would weaken the efforts by the empire to subdue the republics. Smuts was also of the opinion that the empire and the imperial structures were overextended and would be tested if compelled to wage a drawn-out war in Southern Africa.⁸³

Smuts was, in the light of the two variables, propagandistic and diplomatic, in favour of a propagandistic approach intended to stir up the populace in the two British colonies, Natal and the Cape, to oppose the war. He also believed that the Afrikaners in the two republics and in the two colonies could fight a 'people's war'. To this end, he suggested in his memorandum that a firm economic policy be adopted, with increased output in the agricultural and manufacturing sectors, to supply materials to boost the war effort. These measures needed to be supported by increased gold production, which would boost the Treasury and enable it to finance the war. In terms of strategy, he believed the Boer forces should go on the offensive from the outset against the British forces assembled across the border in the colonies of Natal and the Cape. Smuts believed the Boer forces should immediately grab the initiative and gain the upper hand, particularly in Natal, and that the railway line between the Cape Colony and Rhodesia should be sabotaged to prevent British aid arriving from that quarter.⁸⁴

In a Clausewitzian context, the available manpower in the two Boer Republics constituted a people's army (militia) – the ideal force for a people fighting on its own territory for its freedom and independence.⁸⁵ The Boer forces formed the purest kind of nation-in-arms, with only a very small permanent attachment, mostly made up of police and artillery: about 600 state artillery members and 1 400 state police (Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek Politie [ZARP]) in the Transvaal and fewer than 400 artillery troops in the Orange Free State. All other military sources were drawn from the civilian population in the two republics as a militia force. Each district was subdivided under two to four field cornets who then elected a commander (commandant) when war was declared. The selection of a commander rested mainly on his popularity and family connections, rather than his military ability.⁸⁶

The defects of the Boer military system were also one of the strong points of its system, because individualism, personal initiative and the paramountcy of the individual and small groups had always been the strength of the Boer militia. The individual Boer was someone capable of thinking and reacting for himself, able to respond on an individual basis to dangerous situations. However, this characteristic disposition was admittedly better suited to scattered forces fighting on their own terms than within a larger unit. The shortcoming of individuals thinking independently was that they tended to act unilaterally and intuitively – the overall strategy of the larger force therefore suffered accordingly.⁸⁷

The initial restricted mobilisation of the Boer militia demonstrated that their leadership approached the conflict as a limited rather than an absolute or an absolute war. On the eve of the war, the Boer forces deployed a force of around 35 000 men, which represented only 65 per cent of the joint capacity of the two republics. This raises the question why the commanders did not employ the full might of the men

available from the outset, to provide a 'killer blow' to their foe. The Boer leaders' initial strategy was to cut off any reinforcements from the empire by attacking the existing forces in Northern Natal, and ensuring that they would not receive help from the mainland. It would, however, have been strategically advantageous to employ more men from the start and achieve the objective more swiftly by adopting stronger offensive strategies. That hesitation – especially on the part of older generals such as PJ Joubert and AP Cronjé – led to periods of inactivity, and the Boers' initial successes petered out in drawn-out sieges. The opening campaign, which had resulted in spectacular victories during Black Week in early December 1899, was not followed up. During the subsequent weeks, the Boer initiatives stagnated as they assumed defensive positions or remained immobile, and were unable to overwhelm the fortified positions at Kimberley, Mafeking and Ladysmith.⁸⁸ Attempts at the large-scale recruitment of Boer sympathisers and a subsequent uprising in the Cape Colony largely failed. Initial Boer successes at maintaining defensive positions, such as on 11 December 1899 at Magersfontein, strengthened the perception that it was the ideal strategy to follow. Eventually, however, it was the immobility of the Boer forces which led to their defeat at Paardenberg – a pivotal battle, which saw the tide turning against the two Boer Republics.⁸⁹

The two opposing sides' dissimilar reasons for waging war became more apparent immediately after Cronjé's forces surrendered. In the Clausewitzian idiom, the difference lay in their ultimate objectives: either to eliminate their opponent's political independence (absolute war) or fighting to maintain their own independence (people's war).⁹⁰ After the setback of Cronjé's surrender, the Boer leaders, Presidents Kruger and Steyn, opted to adopt a two-pronged strategy. They decided they would follow the route of international diplomacy, while attempting to re-energise the commandos. The presidents cabled the British Prime Minister, Lord Salisbury, on 5 March 1900, expressing profound sentiments about the war by unambiguously stating their desire for peace, but only on the basis that they retained their independence. Kruger and Steyn stated in their cable that if the intention of the British government was to destroy the sovereignty of the two republics, the Boers would fight to the bitter end.⁹¹ In his response to the communication, Salisbury once again made clear the intention of the British government by stating that it was not prepared to accede to the demands of either the South African Republic or those of the Orange Free State.⁹²

The Boer leaders were clearly disappointed by the response, although they were politically naïve in assuming that the British government would cede to their request directly, now that the tide of the war had turned in its favour after being humiliated during the opening campaigns. The two presidents, in their communication to the British government, also made overtures through diplomatic channels to Germany, the United States of America, the Austrian Empire, Belgium, France, the Netherlands, Italy, Russia and Switzerland to intervene in the war, with a view to establishing peace. They further sent abroad a diplomatic team, consisting of A Fisher, AD Wolmarans and CJ Wessels, to negotiate directly with the major powers to intervene⁹³ or assist in the war effort.⁹⁴

Clausewitz on individuality and the reasons for fighting the war: a theoretical and philosophical perspective

In the preceding subsection, the individuality of the average Boer serving in the militia was singled out as a strength within a more restricted form of war. The Boer militia were motivated in their struggles and in fighting their opponents by their unique strengths and their strong inner belief in the righteousness of their struggle. The history of all citizens' wars (i.e. people's wars) shows that a nation achieves infinitely more by vitalising individual energies than by relying on artificial forms of motivation. In this context, the contributing factor is the moral and intellectual strength of the individual. In the case of Prussia, it was individuals' inner strength that served to ignite the country's resistance and success in a people's war. In his writings, Clausewitz emphasises to the Prussian officers that the strength of individuals in small wars is the deciding and determining factor when victory is at stake. Reinforcing this is the tactical capacity of the individual in a people's war: in aesthetic terms, having morality as a defining trait (an aspect which is absent from most professional armies).

Although Clausewitz abhorred war and the cruelty of it, he continued to refer to "beauty of war"⁹⁵, driven by his strong belief in the value of aesthetics. He formed this perspective as a result of the influence of Immanuel Kant and Friedrich Schiller. Kant emphasised that knowledge based on experience involves three faculties: sensibility, imagination and understanding. The notion of understanding allows an individual to compartmentalise experiences according to rational concepts. According to Kant, the characteristic feature of the aesthetic experience is therefore that it initiates a process in which sensibility (morality) and understanding enter into a free play of harmonious activity in which neither gains the upper hand, but one furthers the other and vice versa. This clearly indicates that rationality (as understanding) plays a central role in the aesthetic experience of morality, without it (rationality being the ultimate arbiter).⁹⁶

Kant's idea of beauty comprises a number of features. Beauty is a concrete experience, which is sensual without being linked to immediate interests (such as sexual desires). It is also social. The experience of beauty has a vitalising effect on all human faculties in so far as people enter into a free play of harmonious activity. More important to Kant is the fact that the beautiful was the symbol of the morally good and that the concept of morality inhabits the realm of rationality.⁹⁷ However, Kant emphasises that morality cannot be experienced through the senses, because moral notions (such as freedom) cannot be derived in a rational way. The reason is that moral notions lack empirical demonstrability. In this sense, the experience of beauty is the counterpart of the concept of morality. The first is empirical without arriving at a rational concept; the second is conceptual, but devoid of empirical content. It is against this background that Clausewitz's notion of the most beautiful war should be understood and interpreted. It is the morality and the moral value of the people who participate in a people's war that motivate them to defend their territory. Clausewitz believes a people's war can overcome any other art of war, because it is the closest to the most perfect form of warfare.⁹⁸

In the Clausewitzian idiom, freedom is the next central theme to define the most beautiful of wars, as it focuses the motivation and moral fabric of those who fight for freedom and independence. For Schiller, “beauty is the only possible expression of freedom in appearance”.⁹⁹ This builds on Kant’s aesthetic theory, which established a link between beauty and freedom. That link exists in the sense that the experience of beauty liberates the individual from desire, while beauty forms the morality in a framework in which freedom plays a central role.¹⁰⁰

Within this equation, it is crucial, however, to understand that there are dangers in overvaluing rationality over morality and vice versa. Clausewitz argues that Prussia’s elites masked their fears as rational decisions and, as a result, became paralysed and incapable of action. He points out that fear paralyses reason whereas courage embedded in morality energises it. In many societies, freedom is stifled and unable to break out of the corruption of the state (elites). A lack of education also asphyxiates the attainment of individual freedom. The answer to this impasse is to create a holistic, aesthetic state in which individuals are regarded as whole beings, both rational and sensible, because they operate from inclination rather than from duty. Only in the aesthetic state and within its beauty is it possible to bring together the universal and the individual, the will of the whole and the nature of the individual.

Using this Clausewitzian lens, it is possible to deduce that during the South African War, the Boer militia and diehards integrated morality and rationality. They believed on a moral and a rational level that their battle and continued resistance against the imperial powers were both justified and legitimate. Within this unique blend of morality and rationality, their strong, individual religious beliefs played an important role. The South African Republic under Paul Kruger’s leadership closely resembled a theocratic state, with the church in a central and dominant position acting as a moral compass. In addition, the Boer leaders believed on rational grounds that they could counter the British war effort as they had done so emphatically during the Anglo-Transvaal War of 1880–1881, when they relatively easily caught the imperial forces on the back foot. The Boer leaders and militia were, as a result, in high spirits during the opening weeks of the war, which gave them the capacity to resist and even repel the British forces. They believed they were occupying the moral high ground, and rationally argued that prolonging the war would prompt the international community to intervene on their side in reaction to the ‘immoral war’ imposed on them by the British government. The rationale was that a protracted war would tire the British forces, leading to more favourable peace terms for the Boers.¹⁰¹

The perfect balance between rationality and morality, which underpinned the South African War for the first few months, was severely tarnished after Cronjé’s surrender. The initial reinforcement of and confluence between rationality and morality that had motivated and reinvigorated the Boer militia to achieve spectacular successes were slowly drained as the war dragged on. The red-letter day when the momentum swung was 27 February 1900, when two major setbacks occurred. On this date, the British forces first managed to break through the Boers’ defensive lines at Pietersshoogte on the Natal line, and Cronjé on the western front capitulated despite commanding a

force of 4 000 men. That loss was destined to have the most devastating impact on Boer morale, subsequently undermining their rational belief in their own military prowess. The Boers argued that, if a Boer general with almost 4 000 men surrendered, what positive outlook was there for the two republics?¹⁰² General Piet de Wet, who had witnessed the surrender, conceded that the defeat and loss of almost ten per cent of the absolute Boer force crushed morale.¹⁰³

After this, the British forces' unimpeded progress became a stark reality, with overwhelming numbers supported by superior artillery moving into the south-west Free State. The demoralised and shrinking numbers of Boer militia were unable, but also unwilling, to unite to oppose this absolute onslaught. On a moral level, there was a definite notion amongst their ranks that to carry on with a seemingly fruitless war against an overwhelming enemy was pointless, because it seemed to have only one logical and rational outcome.¹⁰⁴ The dispirited Boer militia began melting away in the face of the advancing British war machine, having been stripped of the very disposition, morality and rationality, which had energised their war effort. Increasing numbers began questioning the wisdom of continuing with the war.

On 11 January 1902, Commandant Vilonel wrote a letter to President Steyn in which he referred to the continuation of the war as needless and devastating to their own people. Vilonel warned that he and other officers would be compelled to take up arms against fellow Boers in a civil war, if the fighting continued.¹⁰⁵ His viewpoint was rooted in a strong rational and moral position, because he argued that the outcome of prolonging the war while women and children suffered in concentration camps was, in fact, an immoral position to take. General Piet de Wet took a similar position, which created a rift between him and his brother Christiaan.¹⁰⁶

The Boer leaders, notably Presidents Kruger and Steyn, did their utmost to reinstate a strong sense of morality in their forces, to ensure that they stayed on the battlefield. At every available opportunity, these leaders appealed to their men on moral and religious grounds to unite and resist the invaders. Kruger travelled to Bloemfontein on 5 March 1900 with just that aim, addressing a large assembly of men and women at the station. He urged them to fight in the name of their trusted God, reminding them that if they truly believed in God, they would be able to defeat the might of the British Empire. He referred to those who laid down their arms and returned to their farms as not being true believers.¹⁰⁷ Kruger's speech was deeply grounded in religion. Rather than restoring the morale of the fighters, there was the growing realisation of a bitter reality: the Boer forces were slowly succumbing in the face of the pressure exerted by the British war machine.

In early 1900, the sad loss of the integrated rationality and morality that had underpinned and motivated the Boer effort up to that point was vividly and cruelly exposed on a road south-west of Bloemfontein. On 6 March, President Kruger took position next to the road after the British forces had broken through at Poplar Grove. He was hoping that by directly appealing and encouraging the retreating and demoralised Boer forces he would be able to stop them from fleeing and would convince them

to offer resistance. Kruger encouraged the combatants to make a stand and defend Bloemfontein, the capital of the Free State. He encouraged them to fight for their independence and reminded them that they would be victorious if they stood together. However, a large section of the burghers merely shook their heads – to them, their farms were more valuable than any capital city. Kruger angrily raised his walking stick and desperately instructed the Pretoria police to shoot at the retreating burghers, but to no avail – a steady stream of former fighters drained away from the front. The undisputed fact was that, morally and rationally, their spirits were broken.¹⁰⁸

The retreating Boer forces and the fall of Bloemfontein on 13 March 1900 served as confirmation that the attackers had the upper hand. The zenith was reached when the Transvaal government decided not to defend Pretoria. General Smuts, in response, asked if Pretoria was not worth fighting for, what was? What would be the point of continuing with the war?¹⁰⁹ The Clausewitzian notion of the beauty of war as the prerogative of those who fight for their independence on their own soil, imbued with the integrated strength of morality and rationality, was now just a distant and sad memory. On moral and on rational grounds, the ‘joiners’ and, to a lesser extent, the ‘hands-uppers’, were no longer prepared to support the Boers’ war efforts. They argued that the republics had already been annexed, and that peace would end the suffering of the women and children in the concentration camps.¹¹⁰

However, not all burghers who abandoned the battlefield did so on moral and rational grounds, nor did they all take a principled stand on the matter. One noteworthy group was disloyal to the Boer cause, led by JG Fraser of the Free State Republic Assembly and former presidential candidate and doctor, BO Kellner, the mayor of Bloemfontein, who sympathised with the British and handed over the keys to the city to Lord Roberts. A significant portion of burghers were merely disinterested in prolonging the war. In the opinion of the *bittereinders*, they were cowards who no longer wanted to make an effort to keep fighting, and saw their farms and possessions as more important.¹¹¹

The Boer forces fragmented into three significant groups, the die-hards or *bittereinders*, the ‘joiners’, and the ‘hands-uppers’ (who resided either with their families in the concentration camps or on their farms). This fragmentation was significant, given the small number of combatants who initially took a stand. During the last six months of the war, 5 464 ‘joiners’ fought on the side of the British and were opposed by only 17 000 *bittereinders*. If the number of Boer prisoners of war is taken in account, close to 20 000 ‘hands-uppers’ had opted to abandon the struggle and the quest for freedom.¹¹²

This split between the die-hards and the ‘joiners’ or ‘hands-uppers’ was, however, not exclusively rooted in the interrelationship between or combination of morality and rationality, but it does explain why the *bittereinders* persisted with the struggle: they believed in the justness of their cause. This split amongst the Boer ranks is comparable to a civil war, because it developed in a battle between *bittereinders* and a superior British force supported by erstwhile fellow burghers/combatants.

On 24 October 1949, a Mrs AC Meyer wrote to *Die Volksblad*, recounting some of the incidents during the war when women on farms were molested by black soldiers while the local 'joiners' hid on the fringes of the unit, too ashamed about possibly being recognised. This sheds light on the treatment of the 'joiners' after the war, and the people's deep contempt for and resentment towards them.¹¹³

Concluding remarks

In this article, the argument was made that in true Clausewitzian fashion, the Boer militia were a people's army fighting for independence on home soil. In this idiom, in their struggle against a powerful foe, the burghers were imbued with vitality thanks to the powerful interrelationship and integration between rationality and morality. This strong dual motivating force propelled them into the battle and gave them an advantage against a professional British army, which was fighting on different terms.

As explained here, the Boer defeat at Paardenberg and the surrender by almost 4 000 fighting men demoralised the Boer fighters, dramatically unravelled their moral fibre and made them question their sense of rationality. The trickle of dispirited and demoralised men who abandoned the war became a stream and later a flood. The rolling momentum of the British advances drained the available manpower of the Boer militia and diminished any hope of negotiating from a position of strength.

The fundamental question is whether the demoralising effect of the loss of integrated morality and rationality could have been prevented. It is doubtful that the Boer Republics would have been able to stand their ground in the long run, given the empire's limitless resources and manpower. However, the Boer leaders had neglected numerous opportunities to gain the initiative. In Natal, General Piet Joubert refused to allow fighters on horseback to strike at the British forces who were defeated and scrambled back to Ladysmith. He could have delivered a devastating blow in a manner which would have resembled the 1881 victory at Majuba, and that would have energised the burghers. In similar fashion, the Boer leaders were unable to translate defensive positions into an offensive advantage at Magersfontein, where they had put the British on the back foot by attacking their vulnerable opponents.¹¹⁴ The British forces were at the mercy of the advancing Boers, who could have captured and seized their artillery and provisions, which would have been a devastating logistical tactic and a blow to British morale.

Even the defeat at Paardenberg, where Cronjé was forced to capitulate, offered an opportunity to regain the initiative and secure the fortunes of the republics. In the aftermath at Paardenberg, Lord Roberts's army was strategically and logistically paralysed, his soldiers tired, lacking food, and supplies of ammunition and fodder for the horses were at a low. A strong counterattack had a 'turn-around' potential, which the Boer leaders were unable to exploit.¹¹⁵

However, the pinnacle of strategic blunders occurred on 5 March, when the two presidents, Kruger and Steyn, delivered their peace initiative to the British

government. Their political, military and strategic naivety was exposed in their belief that the British government would settle for peace (after losing many men at the beginning of the war) precisely at the juncture where the British were gaining the upper hand. If the successes during Black Week had been followed up with one or two more victories, the presidents would have been in a position to negotiate for peace from a position of strength.

Efforts at international diplomacy, led by Dr WJ Leyds, who had been sanctioned to convince European nations to intervene on behalf of the Boers, were also undermined because at that stage, the republics' war efforts were faltering. In international relations, it is uncommon for an international power to intervene in a lost cause; hence, their reluctance to support the burghers. However, the most damaging impact on the Boers' morale and their rational disposition was that the peace initiative created the impression that the two presidents viewed the war as a lost cause, and that their men were incapable of winning. The peace initiative left a tangible impression that the two Boer governments assumed the war was unwinnable; therefore, they were no longer prepared to continue fighting. The poorly timed peace initiative did much to dent the burghers' willingness to continue fighting and contributed to the sense of hopelessness that took hold of fighters in the field.¹¹⁶ In the end, the combination of rationality and morality, which had energised the men early, on was the determining factor that deflated the war effort and divided the nation.

Endnotes

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- ⁹³ *Ibid.*
- ⁹⁴ *Ibid.*
- ⁹⁵ *Ibid.*
- ⁹⁶ *Ibid.*
- ⁹⁷ *Ibid.*

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- ¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*
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Evaluating the final military phase of the Border War in South-Eastern Angola 1987 -1988

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The SABC

Abstract

The assessment of the final military phase of South Africa's border war in southern Angola from 1987 to 1988 in terms of victory or defeat is not without controversy. The mobile engagements on the Lomba between the South Africans (in support of UNITA) and the Angolan armed forces (FAPLA), saw a clear victory for the SADF when assessed in terms of achievement of objectives, equipment captured and destroyed as well as enemy casualties. South Africa's offensive manoeuvres on the Chaminga River - particularly regarding the Angolan 16th Brigade as more recent information indicates - were also successful in inflicting significant losses of men and equipment and damaging morale. However, once the SADF switched from mobile warfare – which allowed it to effectively engage the Angolans who had superior numbers – to positional warfare against larger numbers of Angolan and Cuban forces in well-prepared and defended positions at Tumpo opposite Cuito Cuanavale, the picture changed. Tumpo can thus be regarded as a stalemate. South Africa had achieved its objective of preventing UNITA's annihilation and inflicted sufficient losses on FAPLA. But it had not managed to completely dislodge the Angolan and Cuban forces from the east bank of the Cuito River.

Introduction

Although 30 years have passed since the final military phase of South Africa's Border War in south-eastern Angola in 1987 and 1988, the facts are still largely unknown and as a result, frequently misrepresented. The events have been portrayed variously as a decisive defeat for the South African Defence Force (SADF) and therefore a colossal victory for the Angolan and Cuban forces; a stalemate or a tactical withdrawal by the SADF.

While politicians, soldiers and the general public favour accounts of epic battles, resulting in decisive victories or defeats, the reality – particularly in this case – is not as clear cut. British military historian Michael Howard suggests that because war is sporadic and clearly defined – unlike politics or economic activity which are ongoing and constantly evolve - there are clear criteria for success or failure.¹¹⁷ In evaluating victory or defeat, strategists frequently refer to defeat mechanisms and use terms such as annihilation, attrition, dislocation (rendering the enemy's strength irrelevant) and exhaustion.

Attrition focuses on killing soldiers and destroying equipment until the enemy can no longer fight. Dislocation focuses on the state of mind of the enemy leadership,

while disintegration targets the will of combatants and disrupts their ability to function as a cohesive body.¹¹⁸

Hans Delbrück, the 19th-century German military historian, drew a fundamental distinction between strategies based on the annihilation of an opponent and those aimed at exhausting the enemy through manoeuvre so that he accepts the conditions of surrender.¹¹⁹ Former United States Air Force officer and air power theorist, Colonel John Warden, in his five rings theory of strategic military attack, and the British military historian and theorist, Basil Liddell Hart, in his strategy of the indirect approach, indicate that one, well-placed attack can cause so much psychological damage as to have a decisive strategic effect regardless of the physical damage.¹²⁰ The Prussian general and military theorist, Carl von Clausewitz, cites the improbability of victory and unacceptable costs as additional grounds for making peace.¹²¹ Defeat mechanisms for an attack and a defence also differ.¹²²

This article will assess the engagements of 1987 and early 1988 in terms of victory or defeat at tactical and operational level. It will look at the statistics (losses of men and equipment of both FAPLA and the SADF) and whether this had a significant impact on both sides' abilities to achieve their objectives, as well as morale and command and control functions. It will however not deal in any detail with the diplomatic and political processes which have been widely covered in other works.

Early South African involvement in southern Angola


South Africa's involvement in southern Angola since Operation Savannah in 1975 was driven and escalated by regional and international Cold War politics. What began as a clandestine operation to assist the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) recover its lost territory, intensified over the years as the then Soviet Union, Cuba and several other former East Bloc countries stepped up their involvement in support of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and the South West African People's Organisation (SWAPO) which was then fighting for Namibian independence from South Africa.¹²³

After 1976 when South Africa withdrew from southern Angola following international pressure, SWAPO emerged stronger than before. It had the additional advantage of a safe haven in southern Angola from which to operate following an alliance with the MPLA which allowed SWAPO to move closer to the People's Armed Forces of Liberation of Angola (FAPLA) bases.¹²⁴

South Africa needed UNITA's continued presence in the south-eastern Cuando Cubango province to ensure that its counter-insurgency operations against SWAPO were confined and that they were unable to cross into the Caprivi or Kavango from Angola. Between 1978 and 1987, the SADF conducted numerous small-scale and several larger hot pursuit operations against SWAPO (Reindeer 1978; Sceptic 1980; Protea 1981; Askari 1983/84). Although these were largely successful, FAPLA continued to support SWAPO.¹²⁵

From 1983 with Operation Karton, a pattern began to emerge, and this became clearer with operations Wallpaper (1985) and Alpha Centauri (1986). FAPLA focused on destroying UNITA through planned attacks on its stronghold of Mavinga. This was critical as it could be used as a springboard for an assault on UNITA's headquarters at Jamba. The attacks were launched from Cuito Cuanavale which was situated on the Old Portuguese Road and close to the only bridge over the deep and fast-flowing Cuito river. The settlement also had a vital airfield.

Following FAPLA's Operation Second Congress in 1985, UNITA appealed to South Africa for help. This led to a merger of the counter-insurgency fight and the Angolan civil war and a direct confrontation between South Africa and the Cubans and Soviets.¹²⁶



Angola ups the ante


In July 1987, FAPLA launched Operation Salute to October. This was a repeat of its failed 1985 Operation Second Congress. However, it included more powerful anti-aircraft weapons to counter the SADF's dominance of the air space (this made SADF ground operations more challenging) and other modern Soviet equipment never before seen by the West. This had been re-routed from Afghanistan where the Soviets were withdrawing.¹²⁸ Operation Salute to October aimed at the annihilation of UNITA in the south-east, the destruction of its supply routes from neighbouring Namibia to central Angola, the taking of Mavinga and finally, capture of Jamba.¹²⁹ An additional motivation for a successful attack was securing a stronger negotiating position at talks which US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Chester Crocker, was preparing for from June.¹³⁰

FAPLA's elite forces, comprising four reinforced brigades of 11 400 men, plus 62 Soviet military advisers, as well as SA-8 and SA-13 surface-to-air missiles, 80 tanks and artillery would make up the attacking forces.¹³¹ The 16th and 21st brigades would move east from Cuito Cuanavale and then head south and towards Mavinga.¹³² The 47th and 59th brigades would move south and south-east respectively towards Mavinga. The 13th, 25th and 66th brigades defended Cuito Cuanavale. The 8th Brigade, which was later strengthened following SADF and UNITA attacks, moved supplies and equipment from Menongue, 192 km to the west, to Cuito Cuanavale.¹³³

The SADF had been expecting an attack since early 1987 after South African military intelligence intercepted a letter from Angolan President Jose dos Santos asking an American lobby group to prepare officials in the US for an attack on UNITA.¹³⁴ In response, they launched Operation Moduler on 13 August 1987.

South Africa answers with Moduler

Operation Moduler saw the start of the high-intensity conventional battles pitting the SADF and UNITA against the Cubans, Soviets and FAPLA. It was fought along the Lomba River and between the Lomba and Chambinga rivers. One of the key political aims was to put pressure on Angola to negotiate with UNITA.¹³⁵



Terrain and climate were to play a major role in the SADF's mobility.¹³⁶ This became a decisive factor in later operations. Retired Major General Roland de Vries, who was the Officer Commanding 61 Mechanised Battalion Group (61 Mech) and participated during operations Moduler (1987) and Prone (1988) says that because of the nature of the terrain, the SADF deliberately planned their operations to keep

FAPLA guessing and attack them where they were most vulnerable, or when they were least expecting it – for example at night.¹³⁷ As time was a critical factor for the SADF, the focus was on speedily breaking down FAPLA's morale and its ability to attack Mavinga.

With growing international pressure, South Africa's operations in Angola had to be limited in terms of duration and objectives.¹³⁸ South Africa's leadership was very reluctant to incur casualties and loss of equipment. It was also highly unlikely the superpowers would allow the country to wage a protracted conventional war against the Angolans, Soviets and Cubans for fear of the fighting escalating and drawing them in.¹³⁹ This desire by both South Africa and Angola to avoid an escalation is also evident in the fact that there was no formal declaration of war from South Africa and that both sides largely left each other's strategic-level logistics alone.¹⁴⁰ The Cuban-Angolan forces also did not attempt to cut the South Africans off from their support bases in Rundu and Mavinga.

Initially Moduler's objectives were very modest and focussed on providing limited support to UNITA to enable it to repel the FAPLA offensive. Assistance was limited to four companies of infantry from 32 Battalion, a 127 mm multiple rocket launcher (MRL) battery and 120 mm mortar troop and special forces.¹⁴¹

By mid-August it was clear that the initial force was insufficient. The SADF decided to increase it to full brigade strength, establishing 20 Brigade, and both 32 Battalion and 61 Mech were authorised to be used offensively. On 24 August, a special forces team from 4 Reconnaissance Regiment mounted Operation Coolidge to destroy the bridge over the Cuito River. However, it was only badly damaged. The emphasis on the bridge was to hit FAPLA where it was weak and cut its logistic and communication lines. However, this action had no long-term military effect; while no heavy equipment could cross the river, FAPLA were able to move other supplies by barge or helicopter.¹⁴² As FAPLA followed the highly centralised Soviet system, Cuito Cuanavale was used as a communication, command and support hub with its air strip and the only road and bridge over the Cuito River, making it a vital choke-point.

By the end of the first phase of Moduler on 5 October, the SADF had achieved an important victory on the Lomba, using manoeuvre tactics. This saw the extensive destruction of equipment, as well as large numbers of casualties, causing FAPLA to flee in disorder. Major Igor Zhdarkin, a Russian who served in Angola from 1986 to 1988, details the fear and flight of FAPLA in the face of the SADF attack.¹⁴³ The SADF had annihilated the 47th Brigade (it was removed from the Angolan order of battle) and reduced the 21st and 59th brigades to around a third of their original strength.¹⁴⁴ FAPLA's losses included:

“61 tanks, 53 BTR-60 armoured personnel carriers, seven BMP-1 infantry fighting vehicles, 23 BRDM-2 reconnaissance patrol vehicles, 20 BM-21 rocket launchers, a sophisticated Soviet SA-8 missile system (captured intact), 1 059 dead and 2 118 wounded. South African losses stood at 17

dead, 41 wounded, and three Ratel infantry fighting vehicles, two Casspirs, one Bosbok spotter aircraft and one Seeker unmanned aerial vehicle destroyed".¹⁴⁵


Bridgland estimates that UNITA, essentially a guerrilla force and lacking formal records, lost around 1 000 fighters between June and 4 October 1987.¹⁴⁶ For the South Africans, the G-5 155 mm towed guns and anti-tank Ratels proved to be the game-changers.¹⁴⁷ De Vries also puts it down to superior tactics, command and control and use of terrain.¹⁴⁸

The FAPLA offensive against Mavinga had been halted without achieving any of its objectives. They had also suffered significant losses of men and equipment, which damaged morale. The four brigades, which had been defeated on the Lomba, were now retreating back to Cuito Cuanavale. The decision by senior South African military and political leaders to implement offensive plans for phases two and three of Moduler underlines this victory and is an indication that morale and expectations were high on the South African side. The political leaders now gave the SADF carte blanche and authorised the use of tanks to destroy FAPLA east of the Cuito and ensure it could not launch another attack against Mavinga in the next year.¹⁴⁹ However, not all officers agreed with the decision to extend Moduler. One vocal opponent was Commandant J.J (Bok) Smit, the Officer Commanding 61 Mech, who was replaced during the further phases.¹⁵⁰

FAPLA were now withdrawing to defensive positions to their rear that they had occupied almost two months earlier. However, they were still able to prepare for another attack on Mavinga. The 16th and 21st brigades were deployed at the source of the Chaminga River, while the 59th which included elements of the smashed 47th Brigade as well as a tactical group, were between the Vimpulo and Mianei rivers.¹⁵¹

South Africa's turning manoeuvres on the Chaminga

The SADF's objective was now to prevent FAPLA regrouping and launching another offensive on Mavinga by creating a mobile battle between the Lomba and Chaminga rivers and engaging and destroying the FAPLA brigades one by one.¹⁵² FAPLA's single brigades on the move and in relatively unfamiliar territory were deemed extremely vulnerable and easy to annihilate, especially while the memories of the encounters with the SADF and the fate of the 47th Brigade were still fresh. The South Africans identified the 16th Brigade as their first target and attacked on 9 November 1987. This was seen as strategic to FAPLA's command axis, logistics line and route to the Chaminga bridge.¹⁵³ Also if it could be destroyed, the 59th and 21st brigades further east would be easy to attack and pick off. However, despite inflicting severe losses on the brigade, South Africa decided to break contact, allowing it to reorganise and cross the Chaminga bridge - the only escape route open to the brigades in the south - and so escape the fate of the 47th Brigade.



Leon Marais, commanding the SADF combat group that led the attack on the 16th Brigade, indicates his mission was to cripple the brigade, not annihilate it. He pointed out he did not have sufficient force levels: he had a mechanised battalion group with two mechanised companies and an under-strength 32 Battalion company against FAPLA's brigade and at least one T-55 tank company in a defensive posture. The strength was 1:3 in FAPLA's favour. Marais says that despite criticism of the decision to break contact, the 16th Brigade was unable to carry out significant operations during the rest of Moduler.¹⁵⁴ Insufficient force levels were to plague the South Africans during most of their engagements against FAPLA in the following months and were directly linked to their failure to fully achieve their objectives.

More recent information translated from Russian, appears to vindicate Marais. It suggests that the 16th Brigade “could no longer function as a co-ordinated formation under a single command”.¹⁵⁵

Although the SADF undertook further attacks on the retreating brigade, minefields, terrain, weather and bad luck worked against them.¹⁵⁶ Despite the South Africans' attempts to stop them, the 59th, 21st and 25th brigades were all able to cross the Chaminga bridge. Although FAPLA were only reacting to SADF actions, the brigades were still able to withdraw and the 59th and 21st brigades linked up ensuring that once again the SADF failed to fully achieve its objectives.

However, FAPLA suffered significant losses: about 525 FAPLA soldiers were killed, 28 tanks, ten BTR-60s, 85 logistics vehicles and three anti-aircraft missile systems were destroyed.¹⁵⁷ The SADF also failed to prevent the brigades escaping

north. SADF documents also indicate that despite the set-backs, the Angolans put up a fight.¹⁵⁸ This was a clear indication that FAPLA had improved command and control systems and that morale was rising.

At this point the SADF was also losing momentum – an indication that it was failing in its objective to exhaust the enemy through manoeuvre. The soldiers were exhausted and frustrated that they could not stop FAPLA, plus the two-year conscription for most members of 61 Mech and 4 SA Infantry Battalion in Angola would end in December (making them reluctant to engage in further fighting that could see casualties), and the equipment needed replacing and repairing.¹⁵⁹ However, the time between engagements allowed FAPLA to regroup and resupply, both of which had a positive impact on morale.

But the SADF still had options. These included: bringing in more troops and equipment and moving west of the Cuito River (the current force would be withdrawn); exchanging troops in line; using existing forces in Phase Four. The last option was chosen because officers believed that FAPLA was 70 per cent defeated east of the Cuito.¹⁶⁰ It appears that the SADF underestimated FAPLA's resilience and also the response from the Angolan leadership and Cuba as subsequent developments were to show.

The SADF leadership decided to stage one final attack on FAPLA over the Chambinga high ground, north of the Chambinga River. Through this they hoped to put sufficient pressure on FAPLA to withdraw across the Cuito River to Cuito Cuanavale on the west bank and open meaningful negotiations.¹⁶¹ There was also concern that after 10 December 1987, because political negotiations had reached a decisive point, international pressure could be exerted on South Africa to withdraw at the end of the month.¹⁶²

The attack, which began on 25 November, marked the beginning of the end of the mobile warfare approach and the start of one of attrition which defined subsequent operations Hooper and Packer. The delay had again enabled FAPLA to pull back, regroup and prepare their defences with 300 Cubans deployed in support.¹⁶³ FAPLA were no longer passive victims of attrition, dislocation and disintegration – they were able to prepare a response indicating they knew they had options and how to use them to their advantage.

Numbers favoured the defenders as did the terrain. De Vries notes: "FAPLA now defended terrain north of the Chambinga, which was extremely difficult to attack frontally with mechanised forces in the face of concentrated artillery and air power."¹⁶⁴


According to Scholtz, FAPLA had five brigades totalling 4 000 to 5 000 men and about 40 tanks, while the SADF had about 3 000 men and 13 tanks.¹⁶⁵ FAPLA had good indirect fire support and as they had moved back towards their own logistics, they had stretched the South African supply lines.¹⁶⁶ The South Africans called off the attack as an accurate artillery bombardment, dense bush and a minefield had slowed

them down and restricted their ability to manoeuvre. When Operation Moduler ended on 5 December 1987, it had halted the FAPLA offensive on the Lomba, inflicting significant losses and forced FAPLA to retreat to almost where their offensive had started around five months earlier. However, the South Africans had not been able to destroy the FAPLA brigades east of the Cuito

The loss of momentum once again allowed FAPLA to regroup, recuperate and bring up reinforcements and new equipment and to prepare the defences at Cuito Cuanavale and Tumpo for SADF attacks launched during operations Hooper and Packer. FAPLA were also now on familiar ground of their own choosing and their morale had improved.¹⁶⁷ As the SADF was no longer able to exhaust the enemy through manoeuvre, it opted to deploy observers and leave artillery in place with a protection element to discourage renewed FAPLA attacks to the east.¹⁶⁸

The focus on Tumpo

In withdrawing to the area around Tumpo, the defenders were stronger than the attacking forces. FAPLA were now reinforced by battle-hardened troops who had faced the SADF on the Lomba and Chambinga. Scholtz assesses Operation Moduler as “a victory on points, not a knockout.”¹⁶⁹ While UNITA remained as a buffer against SWAPO infiltration into Kavango, FAPLA were still a threat to UNITA in the east, plus they now had a stronger motivation to resume the failed Salute to October at the first opportunity.



FAPLA had set up defences in Tumpo composed of three layers. The first, occupied by the 21st, 25th and 59th brigades was anchored on the Cuatir River in the north, and the Chambinga in the south. The second, occupied by the 16th and 66th brigades and Tactical Group 2, was anchored on the Cuito-Dala confluence in the

north and the Cuito-Chambinga confluence in the south. The third, occupied by the 13th Brigade, a Cuban battalion and a divisional anti-aircraft brigade, was west of the Cuito River and centred on Cuito Cuanavale. Control of the artillery had also been centralised.¹⁷⁰ In addition, Angolan President Jose Dos Santos had given permission for Cuban leader Fidel Castro to personally take over operational command. Castro sent his elite 50th Division to Angola, as well as more tanks and mechanised infantry to Cuito Cuanavale.¹⁷¹

This situation made a further South African operation necessary to clear FAPLA from the area between the Cuatir and Chambinga rivers so that UNITA could hold the terrain east of the Cuito. Recent research in the Department of Defence archives has established that the SADF was specifically ordered not to fight to take Cuito Cuanavale; occupation was only considered as an option if the Cubans and FAPLA withdrew.¹⁷² The first full-scale South African attack of Operation Hooper began on 13 January 1988. Bridgland notes that the SADF and UNITA forces had been re-organised ensuring that around 2 000 men and 24 tanks would move from the east of the Cuito to take on five FAPLA brigades east of the river as well as three to the west.¹⁷³

The attack focused on the 21st Brigade's position with the objective to clear FAPLA from the area east of the Cuito and north of the Dala. Again the statistics were in the SADF's favour: FAPLA lost about 150 soldiers, seven tanks were destroyed and five captured, two rocket launchers and three 23-mm guns were destroyed. UNITA suffered four dead and 18 wounded while South Africa reported one damaged Ratel and one soldier wounded.¹⁷⁴ The 21st Brigade abandoned its positions which were then occupied by UNITA. But despite these impressive statistics, the SADF was unable to exploit its gains because of insufficient troop and tank numbers, making it a draw operationally.

However, by the end of January the 21st Brigade reinforced by elements of the 8th Brigade had pushed UNITA out. In contrast to FAPLA's disorder and flight on the Lomba, this indicated not only improved morale and ability to fight as cohesive units, but also better communications and command and control. The South Africans were not able to properly exploit the gap in the Angolan defensive line or use manoeuvre tactics to exhaust and dislocate their opponents. FAPLA were also improving their defences east of the Cuito through minefields and defensive artillery positions and conducting night operations.¹⁷⁵ These had previously been the SADF's strong point.

In response, Cuban leader Fidel Castro ordered the best Cuban pilots, about 200 advisers, a tactical group of tanks as well as artillery and mechanised infantry to the front.¹⁷⁶ To avoid a similar breakthrough to the one involving the 21st Brigade earlier, the 59th and 25th brigades were ordered to pull back to better fortified positions.

Tumpo stalemate

With the re-occupation of the 21st Brigade's position, further SADF action became necessary. Unfavourable weather and logistics delays put the attack off until 14 February, again giving FAPLA time to prepare.¹⁷⁷ Now the SADF's effort was on the 59th Brigade – the strongest force in the centre of the outer defences – as they felt if this brigade withdrew, this would force the 25th Brigade to the south and the 21st Brigade in the north to pull back into the Tumpo Triangle.¹⁷⁸

With this action which saw the 59th Brigade cross the Cuito and the 21st Brigade withdraw to Tumpo, the SADF had almost achieved its objective. Now FAPLA and the Cubans only controlled a small, but very well-defended area around Tumpo on the Cuito's east bank. In the fighting the two brigades lost around 230 soldiers, nine tanks, four BRDMs, seven 23-mm guns, five BM 21s and one SA 9. The SADF archives indicate 32 Cubans were also killed. The South Africans lost four 61 Mech members while 11 from 61 Mech and 4 SAI were wounded. Two Ratel 20s, two tanks and one Ratel 90 were damaged.¹⁷⁹ The SADF again handed the positions over to UNITA.

In Tumpo, FAPLA was now sacrificing terrain to strengthen its position and hold the SADF off, thus buying time. In the smaller area, the SADF had to attack FAPLA head-on and in an area where they were expecting to be engaged. The SADF was now breaking its rules applied successfully in Operation Moduler of attacking where the enemy was weak and where it least expected to be hit. FAPLA had now forced the SADF to change tactics and fight on its terms, indicating a stalemate was on the cards.

At Tumpo, FAPLA and the Cubans now had the advantage over the South Africans. Their strength lay in positional warfare and larger numbers. They were also fighting in an area of their choosing, closer to their own logistics and had cleared the vegetation to establish interlocking fields of fire and laid substantial minefields. They were unlikely to be driven out easily.¹⁸⁰ Unable to take advantage of their strength in manoeuvre, the South Africans were incurring casualties and damage to equipment without achieving their objectives. This, plus the length of time the SADF was in Angola would in the long run affect morale, while its ability to exhaust FAPLA and the Cubans through attrition was also reduced.

The terrain of the Tumpo Triangle is worth noting. Scholtz and Bridgland have described it as being about 30 square kilometres, bordered on three sides by rivers making it easily fortified. The western side of the Cuito River, which is higher than the east bank, provided excellent citing for artillery emplacements.¹⁸¹ From these heights there is a clear view across the flat and almost treeless area known as the Anhara Lipanda which is about four to six kilometres wide and stretches to the start of the Chaminga high ground.¹⁸²

While the main focus of the South Africans' efforts was on a direct confrontation at Tumpo, there were smaller, clandestine efforts by 32 Battalion and special forces to disrupt FAPLA's command and control and logistics west of Cuito Cuanavale.

However, because of their size and small troop commitment, these did not have significant impact.

Because FAPLA still retained a bridgehead at Tumpo, the SADF believed a further attack was necessary to prevent renewed operations being launched against Mavinga and Jamba. The first of South Africa's three Tumpo engagements began on 25 February. This established a pattern whereby the South Africans were held at a distance – through minefields and artillery fire – and not able to engage FAPLA and the Cubans directly.¹⁸³ This meant they were no longer able to exhaust FAPLA and destroy their equipment. However, the South Africans were now spending longer in Angola without achieving their objectives, affecting not only troop morale but also convincing the leadership that the initial objectives would have to be scaled down when, not if, the SADF withdrew.¹⁸⁴

In this attack, the SADF encountered a minefield, alerting FAPLA to their presence, who in turn directed heavy artillery fire on the South African positions. The G-5 guns were unable to respond because of Soviet MiG fighters which provided air cover.¹⁸⁵ Only 32 Battalion, early in the attack, came into direct contact with FAPLA or the Cubans.¹⁸⁶ The attack failed, again increasing FAPLA's morale.

The second attack on Tumpo began on 1 March. Its objective was to destroy the Cubans and FAPLA at the bridgehead or drive them west over the Cuito River and destroy the bridge.¹⁸⁷ Again the attack failed due to minefields and stand-off artillery fire. This marked the end of Operation Hooper and the main force withdrew. Once again, the SADF was frustrated in achieving its objectives and had to exercise other options to see that its gains were not reversed. A small force – less than 1 500 – plus artillery were left in place to prevent FAPLA pushing east from Tumpo to re-occupy the 59th Brigade's positions or threaten UNITA.¹⁸⁸

At this point, the SADF leadership was becoming concerned at the length of time the troops had spent in Angola. This raised the inevitable question of withdrawal and how it could be done in a way that did not benefit either FAPLA or the Cubans and did not sacrifice the SADF's gains.¹⁸⁹ This also marked a critical movement in the international negotiations as the focus shifted from the battlefield to the negotiating table. In an unprecedented direct offer to the Soviets in early March, Defence Minister Magnus Malan stated that if they agreed to install a genuinely non-aligned government in Angola, his government would not push for it to be friendly to South Africa.¹⁹⁰ Although nothing concrete came of this overture, it set the scene for direct negotiations with South Africa amid the recognition that the implementation of UN Resolution 435 and South West African independence should be linked to Cuban withdrawal from Angola – a point the South Africans had long been insisting on. This shift in the political arena is clearly indicative that although South Africa had not achieved all its military objectives, it had certainly not been defeated militarily and was therefore able to negotiate from a position of strength.

It was against this backdrop, that the third and final attack on Tumpo (Operation Packer) took place on 23 March 1988. The SADF felt that FAPLA still posed a threat to UNITA and following a morale boost from the two successful defences of Tumpo, would try to move east again. The SADF also had evidence that FAPLA wanted to take control of the Chaminga high ground.¹⁹¹ The attack was planned despite criticism and definite scepticism among several senior SADF officers and those who were tasked with its planning.¹⁹² The plan was similar to that of the failed 1 March attack. This would mean the SADF had to attack along a predictable route where FAPLA were anticipating an attack. The Angolans and Cubans had effectively used terrain to limit the South Africans' options.

Once again the South Africans were unable to close with the enemy, held at a distance by minefields and heavy, accurate artillery fire. Three SADF tanks were severely damaged by mines. These were the only ones lost in Angola. Although instructions had been issued at the start of Operation Moduler to ensure that no soldier or equipment fell into enemy hands, the tanks were not destroyed. General Andreas "Kat" Liebenberg ordered that they be recovered later, thereby handing the Cubans and FAPLA a propaganda coup when they recovered them.¹⁹³

After several hours of fierce fighting, the SADF once again withdrew – suffering no casualties - without completing their objectives to drive the Cubans and FAPLA from the east bank. This unsuccessful attempt also convinced the leadership that it would not be possible to take Tumpo without high casualties and many more troops – both of which they were not prepared to risk. While FAPLA and the Cubans could record this as a tactical victory, it is worth noting that they did not follow this up with a counter-offensive against the South Africans.

Although Operation Packer ended on 27 March 1988, this did not see the South Africans withdraw from the area completely. Under Operation Displace, a smaller force of around 1 000 conducted deception actions such as laying extensive minefields between the Chaminga and Cuatir rivers and carrying out other actions to give the impression the force was still at brigade strength.¹⁹⁴ One example was artillery strikes on FAPLA attempts to repair the bridge over the Cuito on 29 March.¹⁹⁵

Operation Displace only ended in August when conventional fighting in Angola ceased. Then the last South African soldiers withdrew to South West Africa. This operation effectively kept the Cubans and FAPLA guessing as to the South Africans' intentions. At least 12 FAPLA brigades remained tied down at Menongue and west of the Cuito in case South Africa staged another attack either on Tumpo from the south, or on Cuito Cuanavale.¹⁹⁶ The South Africans also used the threat of further attacks and their presence in south-eastern Angola as an effective bargaining chip in the ongoing political negotiations.¹⁹⁷

Conclusion

Although the SADF was swiftly able to fully achieve its objective of halting FAPLA's advance on Mavinga during the first phase of Operation Moduler, further attacks during the latter part of Moduler were only partially successful despite a campaign of attrition, dislocation and annihilation. In this regard, while the physical damage the SADF was able to inflict on FAPLA and the Cubans were impressive, these numbers only provided part of the picture. De Vries gives a succinct summary: on the Cuban and Angolan side 4 085 soldiers died, while more than 194 pieces of armour, 92 pieces of other military hardware, 9 MiG combat aircraft and 9 Russian helicopters had been destroyed. The South Africans lost 47 soldiers, three Olifant tanks, five Ratels, five other types of vehicle, 1 Bosbok light reconnaissance aircraft and two Mirage combat aircraft were destroyed. UNITA lost around 3 000 fighters.¹⁹⁸

The South Africans' loss of momentum provided FAPLA with critical time to regroup and re-arm. When the South Africans were halted at Tumpo (Operations Hooper and Packer) this also provided an all-important boost to FAPLA's morale and again allowed them to re-organise and re-arm. Here Castro's intervention was critical to strengthening command and control and adjusting tactics to enable FAPLA to hold off the SADF (exchanging terrain for time), thus boosting morale. For the Angolans, they also reaped the benefits of being the underdog, by drawing Cuba in to become actively involved in the fight. The fact that the SADF was unable to take Tumpo was also a significant boost for the Angolans after their defeat on the Lomba and rout on the Chambinga. The more time the South Africans spent in Angola trying to achieve their objectives not only undermined their soldiers' morale, it also posed political risks and raised the prospect of escalating the conflict – neither of which were acceptable.

The fact that after March 1988, South Africa was able for several months to continue to deploy troops and conduct deception operations around Tumpo is a clear indication that it had not suffered a resounding tactical and operational defeat at the hands of Cuban and FAPLA forces. For the Cubans and FAPLA, the fact that they had not been able to eradicate UNITA and drive the South Africans out of the country, was an indication that they would continue to bleed unless they negotiated. This indicates a stalemate.

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NON-COERCIVE DEFENCE DIPLOMACY FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION

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Abstract

Since the end of the Cold War, the practice of defence diplomacy has received much attention, as has the proactive prevention of conflict. However, the preventive diplomacy of defence forces – something that is implied in the literature – has been less well articulated. This article addresses the theoretical lacuna by means of a pivotal qualification: the conceptual demarcation is narrowed down to non-coercive defence diplomacy (NCDD). NCDD is based on the principles of transparency, reputation and integrity and, per definition, it eschews violence or the threat thereof. It is therefore an exclusive subset of the wide range of international defence cooperation (generically referred to as ‘defence diplomacy’) in which defence forces engage. When NCDD activities are synchronised with the early stages of conflict development, the escalation of conflict is avoided. This is because NCDD requires of defence forces to conduct their cooperative international relations in a manner that promotes confidence and trust: essential elements of security that are integral to sustainable peace. Within the realm of diplomatic statecraft, the potential agency of defence forces in the prevention of conflict therefore warrants more strategic attention. It is especially required in Africa, where stable peace remains elusive and post-colonial military influence in intra- and inter-state politics has been mostly problematic.

Keywords

non-coercive, defence diplomacy, conflict prevention, confidence and security building measures, preventive diplomacy, Africa, peace.

Introduction

In the 21st century, there is a global trend for government institutions to be more accountable and transparent to the publics they serve. Defence forces – whose agency is the primary focus of this article – are no different. A significant number of them are transforming to meet the exigencies of the changing international environment, and to achieve their *raison d'être* better, namely to protect their states from violent conflict.

The resolution of conflict is an interdisciplinary concern in the humanities, and its management is a global imperative. This preoccupation reflects in both military and diplomatic instruments of foreign policy. The link has always been there: diplomats negotiating the beginning and ending of wars, and military commanders morphing into astute diplomats. It is not a new phenomenon for foreign policy actors to incorporate military elements into diplomatic processes, nor is it unheard of for defence forces to use diplomacy. As a result and across the world, the military–diplomacy relationship features prominently in policies and strategies of defence forces.

In this regard, defence forces also practice ‘preventive diplomacy’. The latter term was presaged in Article 99 of the United Nations (UN) Charter, but for the duration of the Cold War, the concept was not fleshed out, either in theory or in practice. Subsequently, new approaches in security studies emphasised *human* rather than *state* security and transcended the traditional conceptualisation of international security. Changes in the nature of war, notably the preponderance of intractable, intrastate conflicts with regional spill-over, made it necessary to avoid myopic, linear approaches to conflict resolution.

The more holistic and longer-term consideration of conflict management brought to the fore the necessity for proactive *prevention* of conflict. It was eloquently addressed in Egyptian statesman Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s 1992 “Agenda for Peace”, prepared at the start of his term as UN Secretary-General. Boutros-Ghali defined preventive diplomacy as “action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur”.²⁰⁰

In the ensuing decades, preventive diplomacy received much attention, but the role of defence forces has been less well articulated. Indeed, the conceptual underpinnings of the defence–diplomacy conflict prevention nexus are under-researched and under-theorised. The utility of defence diplomacy is not in question; what is unclear is *how* (in a descriptive-analytical sense) and *when* (in an exploratory sense) defence diplomacy can contribute to conflict prevention. A more nuanced approach to defence diplomacy requires examination of the life cycle of conflict in order to extract conceptual markers for the timing and nature of proactive strategy, including the development of confidence-building measures (CBMs) prior to the onset of violent conflict.

The study on which article is based addressed the theoretical lacuna in the literature by means of a pivotal qualification. The conceptual demarcation was narrowed down to non-coercive defence diplomacy (NCDD). Excluded from the discussion will be conflict management processes, such as deterrence, threats and armed coercion, even if these are accepted measures used by defence forces to suppress, regulate and limit conflict. Very little substantive research on NCDD specifically is evident in the literature.

Our perspective is not exclusively Afro-centric, but it is influenced by the realities of our continent, which is beset by unresolved conflict. Post-colonial Africa has experienced significant militarisation of national politics and, as democratisation gains traction around the continent, it is essential that the dynamic presence and resources of defence forces be channelled into a positive new direction – that of conflict prevention. Conflict prevention has manifested in a few cases at domestic level, such as –

- South Africa during its first democratic elections in 1994;
- Egypt during the Arab Spring of 2011;
- Zimbabwe during 2017 when Robert Mugabe was forced from power; and
- both Algeria and Sudan in 2019, during civil society challenges to autocratic presidencies.

There is however much potential for the diplomacy of defence forces to play a wider, inter-state role in the prevention of conflict.

The aim of our article is to explain the nexus between defence diplomacy and conflict prevention with a pertinent focus on NCDD. The article begins by explaining the context of defence diplomacy. We question the intuitive assumption that defence diplomacy is intrinsically non-coercive, and explicitly draw a distinction between coercive defence diplomacy and NCDD within a conflict prevention setting. This is followed by an analysis of conflict prevention, with reference to the conflict development model proposed by Christopher Mitchell.²⁰¹ This is done in order to identify the link and relationship between NCDD activities – collectively operationalised as confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) – and how these potentially contribute to conflict prevention, together with an analytical framework. Our article concludes with three key findings concerning the utility and agency of NCDD in the prevention of conflict.

Defence, as diplomacy

In the contemporary era, diplomacy is undertaken by most government departments in support of shaping and implementing foreign policy.²⁰² Defence ministries are a case in point, and their de facto diplomacy at international level has become known as ‘defence diplomacy’. According to Gregory Winger, the term was first used by the British government during the 1990s, but it is not a recent practice.²⁰³ At bureaucratic–institutional level, the French introduced the attachment of military personnel to diplomatic missions in the Napoleonic period, during the early 1800s. They did so in order to monitor military developments in their host countries, and the utility of the practice soon saw it emulated by other European countries.²⁰⁴ It took much longer, however, for the term ‘defence diplomacy’ to assume prominence in the international relations and military lexicon. This only happened during the 1990s, when defence forces across the world had to re-examine their roles in the nascent post-Cold War world order. The most obvious change was a shift away from a narrow focus on forging alliances against a common enemy to a wider mission of improving relations with former or potential enemies.²⁰⁵

Defence diplomacy found particular traction among member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in response to the profound change in defence relations with former communist states in Eastern Europe. From their side, Warsaw Pact countries were also attempting to normalise defence relations with former adversaries. These changes, and defence forces’ novel role in establishing relationships

based on trust and mutual confidence, have not been limited to Europe. In Asia and Latin America (and Africa, but to a lesser extent), defence ministries have played key roles in promoting civil–military relations and implementing security sector reform in post-conflict states and states in democratic transition. Peacekeeping, peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction and development (PCRD) incorporate multilateral defence diplomacy as an adjunct to bilateral defence relations.

Multilateral defence relations have also become a hallmark of regional integration projects. Within the catchment area of the European Union (EU), the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) and other regional organisations, defence ministries have pooled military strategy and institutionalised the type of regular trans-governmental interaction that was previously the exclusive mandate of diplomats. Regional institutionalisation of defence diplomacy improves the management of regional relations more generally, and at a grassroots level, promotes the sharing of Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) efforts and Peace Support Operations (PSO).

Based on their assessment of the contribution of defence to Southeast Asia’s regional security architecture, Tan and Singh cite the example of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ (ASEAN) regional defence forums and institutions.²⁰⁶ These include the Five Power Defence Agreement (FPDA), ASEAN’s Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM) and the ADMM-Plus.²⁰⁷ The various associations provide strategic depth to ASEAN’s broader policies, afford constructive engagement among member states, and facilitate collective understanding of the strategic cultures that feed into the regional project.

In Africa, the regional integration of defence relations has been a Pan-Africanist ideal since Kwame Nkrumah advocated for an ‘African High Command’ in the late 1950s. Yet, at a practical level, this has not materialised. The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) was notoriously ineffectual in matters of conflict resolution, and its successor, the African Union (AU), has since its inception in 2002 struggled to capacitate the various components of its African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). The most successful institutionalised defence cooperation on the continent occurs in West Africa, where the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has presided over several successful peace processes in the region. A recent example is its January 2017 intervention in The Gambia. Following decades of rapacious authoritarian rule, civilian anger erupted after incumbent President Jammeh refused to accept electoral defeat. With civil war seemingly imminent, ECOWAS launched ‘Operation Restore Democracy’, and promptly restored order in the country, after which the regional body oversaw (as it continues to do) a peaceful constitutional transition.

At global level, the proliferation in multilateral defence diplomacy has underlined the sheer scope and complexity of challenges to state security that have emerged over recent decades. In the process, defence ministries across the world have been compelled to widen and deepen their practice of defence diplomacy. However, the

vagaries of the concept have become problematic. Winger cautions that it “not only lacks a meaningful definition, but has been contorted and stretched to the extent that it is now both descriptively vacuous and analytically hollow”.²⁰⁸ The contemporary allure of defence diplomacy therefore risks its depiction as “an expedient catchall label”.²⁰⁹

In order to ensure a balanced assessment of defence diplomacy, its generic meaning must be distilled by means of an additional typology. The essence of this typology is to question the intuitive assumption that defence diplomacy is intrinsically non-coercive, and therefore to draw an explicit distinction between coercive defence diplomacy and NCDD within a conflict prevention setting.

A coercive–non-coercive dichotomy is implied when the qualifying adjective is used in strategy documents. South African official policy documents, for instance, explicitly use the concept ‘non-coercive defence diplomacy’.²¹⁰ To this effect, in 2011, the Defence Secretariat Plan identified for the first time the use of military instruments non-coercively and as a “particular type of qualitative defence diplomacy”.²¹¹ However, the policy documents do not explain why this qualification is necessary, how the two variations might differ, or what the link is to conflict prevention. The distinction therefore requires further clarification.

In a conventional sense, it could be argued that defence-as-diplomacy is intrinsically non-coercive and nothing else. The problem is that security literature abounds with references to ‘coercive diplomacy’, which conjures up the idea of a terminological extension into the realm of ‘coercive defence diplomacy’.²¹² Coercive diplomacy involves the pursuit of diplomatic objectives through communication of threats, even the limited use of force. Even so, for many diplomatic scholars, the concept is problematic because it implies a unilateral and aggressive foreign policy. Coercive Diplomacy therefore deviates from the essentially pacific and reciprocal nature of diplomacy. This is why See Seng Tan prefaces his chapter on military diplomacy with the caution, “[m]ilitary diplomacy has often been described as an oxymoron. Militaries exist to wage wars or deter them by force whereas diplomacy involves the use of negotiation and dialogue to achieve national goals.”²¹³ In similar vein, Calvet de Magalhães insists on theorising diplomacy as opposed to any semblance of military force – the two options serving as extremes on a continuum of foreign policy instruments.²¹⁴ For Calvet de Magalhães, as for many other scholars, coercive diplomacy is an incongruous construct, a contradiction in terms, which blurs conceptual parameters and professional mandates.

To add to the confusion, scholars differ (as do governments) in their conceptualisation of defence diplomacy. Often, the phrase ‘military diplomacy’ is used instead. Tan says that, while a distinction between defence and military diplomacy should be maintained, the lines are becoming so blurred that it is difficult to draw a clear boundary between the two.²¹⁵ Indian scholar Raja Mohan makes a more attractive distinction, defining military diplomacy as “interaction and exchanges between the uniformed services”.²¹⁶ Defence diplomacy, on the other hand, is a broader and more

inclusive concept. According to Mohan, it amounts to “activities undertaken by the entire defence establishment, including its civilian bureaucracy and the research and development establishments”.²¹⁷ As such, defence diplomacy refers to the practice whereby any member of a defence establishment who has official contact with a counterpart, defence institution or international organisation, establishes, broadens or deepens defence relations, including preventive diplomacy, in support of foreign policy objectives. Based on the aforesaid and for the purpose of this article, the overarching and broader concept – that of defence diplomacy – will be used.

In practice, defence diplomacy “runs the gamut from the significant to the mundane” as Jim Rolfe suggests.²¹⁸ Included here are –

- bilateral and multilateral contacts between military and civilian officials;
- the appointment of defence attachés to serve in diplomatic missions (or their secondment to multilateral organisations);
- the conclusion of defence cooperation agreements;
- the training of defence and civilian personnel;
- the provision of expertise and advice on defence-related matters;
- the conduct of ship visits and other military-related exchanges;
- the staging of training exercises; and
- the provision of military equipment and technical expertise.²¹⁹

Proponents of defence diplomacy, such as Cottey and Forster, suggest that it supports political commitments for cooperation, fosters common interests, promotes cooperation between defence forces, and demonstrates transparency to limit misunderstandings.²²⁰ We posit that the net result of these actions is *conflict prevention*, provided such actions are non-coercive and synchronised with conflict development, as we will discuss in due course.

As can be expected, there are detractors as well. Nick Bisley cautions that defence diplomacy has limitations in regions such as Asia, which are characterised by entrenched political cleavages.²²¹

At domestic level, there are also many pitfalls that need to be avoided or managed with prudence. In her assessment of the 1998 United Kingdom (UK) Strategic Defence Review (SDR), Alice Hills identifies the flaws of defence diplomacy, in particular its linkages to Security Sector Reform (SSR).²²² She emphasises that successful defence diplomacy must be integrated with programmes of other government departments and with other policy instruments for conflict resolution. If this is not done, defence diplomacy can be a source of friction between government departments over competition for scarce resources.²²³ Peter Leahy points out that defence diplomacy is time-consuming while not always yielding results,²²⁴ while Brendan Taylor cautions that its benefits are nebulous and difficult to quantify.²²⁵ At another angle, Hugh White

dismisses the concept as little more than a public relations exercise by defence forces to reassure society of their security during times of peace. He rejects outright the notion that military officers might resolve complex international political problems, i.e. presume to practice diplomacy simply through “soldierly plain-speaking”.²²⁶

However, not all theorists hold such puritanical views of (defence as) diplomacy. Anton du Plessis argues that diplomacy is a vehicle for communicating and facilitating the full range of foreign policy actions: political, economic, cultural as well as military.²²⁷ He explains that when diplomacy is used in a military context, its techniques could range from non-coercive to coercive in the situational context of both cooperation and conflict. The idea of ‘smart power’ – a strategic fusion of hard and soft power, as articulated by Joseph Nye – aligns with this more malleable interpretation of diplomacy.²²⁸

Nevertheless, coercive diplomacy is widely seen as a high-risk policy option that may have unintended consequences, and its utility in averting an escalation of conflict or achieving a de-escalation in existing levels of conflict, is limited.²²⁹ By extension, it can be deduced that ‘defence as diplomacy’ has restricted efficacy when it manifests as coercive defence diplomacy. The alternative, NCDD, therefore deserves special consideration in the context of conflict prevention.

Conflict prevention

According to Christopher Hill, conflict prevention is a “common thread which holds the (international) system together as it shows how interests and ideals can be yoked to each other”.²³⁰ Surprisingly, though, interpretations of conflict prevention are fraught with contestation. A precise definition is required in order to assess its “promise and limitations”, as Michael Lund observes, and to provide clarity for practical, coherent policy guidance.²³¹

For the purpose of this article, conflict prevention is interpreted as ‘the prevention of an escalation to violent (i.e. involving the use of military force) confrontation’. It therefore occupies a very specific position in the broader context of conflict management. The assumption is not that (all) conflict can be eliminated. After all, conflict is an inevitable and pervasive human phenomenon. The challenge, as Chadwick Alger notes, is to develop procedures for distinguishing between disruptive (violent) conflict and constructive conflict.²³² The timing and location of related activities are critically important; hence, the need for an early warning capacity to identify which conflicts have the potential to become violent, or to determine whether a particular conflict is moving towards a violent phase.²³³

The imperative of decisions on timing and opportunity in the course of proactive conflict management – conflict prevention, specifically – necessitates a closer look at the life cycle of conflict. Various studies have been done on the structure of conflict, with different descriptions of its development stages. Among them is Lund’s ‘life history of a conflict’ and the ‘hourglass model’ used by Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and

Miall to contextualise what they describe as “conflict transformation, settlement and containment”.²³⁴ We will, however, use Christopher Mitchell’s ‘conflict development model’, in which he demarcates the progression of conflict through three distinct stages: incipient, latent and manifest conflict.²³⁵ This model is particularly useful as it provides a purposive framework that permits the synchronisation of the conflict stages with the associated NCDD activities.

A central theme in Mitchell’s analysis (as indeed in conflict studies, generally) is that of goal incompatibility. Divergent values and resource scarcity could ultimately lead to conflict, and the earliest stage in this process – an inchoate phase that Ramsbotham et al. describe as “the emergence of differences” – is referred to by Mitchell as “incipient conflict”.²³⁶ Without the benefit of hindsight, this stage could be difficult to diagnose, and even parties to the conflict might not recognise its existence. Consequently, incipient conflict is often ignored until there is escalation to a major catastrophe or widespread carnage.²³⁷

Incipient conflict escalates when the parties consciously recognise their goal incompatibilities and begin to consider alternatives. This stage, which Mitchell labels “latent conflict”, does not necessarily have to be articulated or verbalised explicitly.²³⁸ However, it is characterised by tension and suspicion and polarisation between the parties.²³⁹ Sporadic violence might take place, and parties typically ensure deterrent military capabilities at this stage, because they perceive one another as enemies.²⁴⁰

The third stage in the life cycle of conflict is what Mitchell refers to as “manifest conflict”.²⁴¹ This occurs when a party takes identifiable action towards achieving its goals while simultaneously forcing the adversary to abandon or modify its behaviour. In this late stage of conflict, violence predominates and requires a different form of mitigation, namely conflict management. This involves limiting the spread of violence and bringing about a cessation in hostilities.²⁴²

For the purpose of this article, the first two stages of conflict, namely incipient and latent conflict, are the dominant albeit not the exclusive loci and foci of conflict prevention. The latitude for political and other options will decrease unless preventive action is taken, as Ramsbotham et al. maintain; hence, the positioning and alignment of conflict prevention with these development stages.²⁴³

Based on and aligned with his conflict development model, Mitchell postulates that pre-manifest remedial actions constitute conflict avoidance during incipient conflict, and conflict prevention during latent conflict.²⁴⁴ From his perspective, the latter is found when conflict attitudes and perceptions over recognised goal incompatibility are addressed. Although explicitly directed at latent conflict, conflict prevention by implication focuses on the goal incompatibility that underlies the conflict situation and is therefore linked to incipient conflict. On the one hand, international conflict avoidance has preventive implications to the extent that it inhibits the development of widely shared, over-arching or ‘super-ordinate’ goals. Such goals not only preclude narrow interests but also increase cooperation amongst adversaries by uniting them around a common purpose.²⁴⁵ On the other hand, the avoidance of malign goal

incompatibility is an act that prevents conflict from progressing to a new level or even entering a next cycle. Furthermore, the processes of conflict prevention do not restrict conflict to an incipient threshold but also extend it into the domain of latent conflict.

At this point, it is important to note that incipient as well as latent conflict is part of what is now widely referred to as “negative peace”.²⁴⁶ The more nuanced conceptualisation of peace was introduced by Johann Galtung who observed that peace could not be defined simply as the absence of violent conflict.²⁴⁷ Even without overt violence, so-called ‘peace’ might be unstable (negative); hence, the compelling idea that stable (positive) peace needs to be nurtured or ‘built’. This imperative was emphasised in a June 2015 report by the UN High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO), which declares, “[p]eace processes do not end with a cease-fire, a peace-agreement or an election. Such events constitute merely a phase, rather than the conclusion, of a peace process. In fact, they may be times of great vulnerability”.²⁴⁸ The reoccurrence of violent conflict after peace agreements in South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Central African Republic, Côte d’Ivoire and Mozambique are just a few of the many examples of negative peace that has prevailed in Africa.

The implication is that conflict does not necessarily develop in a linear manner. It could move through (potentially self-perpetuating) cyclical patterns, become dormant, diffuse into secondary proxy wars, or link into other conflicts. Conflict behaviour, a complex interplay of action and reaction, has a tendency to become increasingly harmful and coercive when parties ‘mirror-image’ each other’s actions. A related consideration is that conflict – despite its proclivity to escalate – does not always develop sequentially through all the identified stages. It could remain suppressed during the incipient or latent stages, and as Mitchell points out, manifest conflict might even be inhibited indefinitely as a result of an adversary’s overwhelming coercive power.²⁴⁹ Here the warning of Hill that preventing conflict during the incipient stage could suppress rather than resolve conflict should be kept in mind.²⁵⁰ On the other hand, restricting conflict to a pre-manifest stage could prevent its degeneration into a vortex of recurring violence. The development of conflict is affected by the emergence of new issues and involvement of new stakeholders, and these dynamics add to the complexity of conflict resolution. Moreover, conflict formations are interlinked, as Ramsbotham et al. point out.²⁵¹ The ‘communicable’ nature of conflict means that local and regional conflicts almost invariably acquire an international profile, unless they are resolved timeously and comprehensively.

The non-linear nature of conflict development, and the fact that any stage of conflict could serve as roots for another conflict, explain why conflict prevention is part of post-conflict strategies as well. As Boutros-Ghali put it in his seminal Agenda for Peace, “the concept of peace-building as the construction of a new environment should be viewed as the counterpart of preventive diplomacy ... preventive diplomacy is to avoid a crisis; post-conflict peace-building is to prevent a recurrence”.²⁵² Incipient conflict can therefore reoccur after the ‘end’ of manifest conflict and in the wake of ostensible peace deals, if the peace that has been achieved, is negative.

Boutros-Ghali made it clear that any reduction in the likelihood of conflict between states requires the creation of trust. This necessitates deliberate confidence building in situations where there is no shared understanding of the conflict. Prevention of conflict is based on identification of the causes of tension and suspicion, and implementation of appropriate responses to promote mutual interests.²⁵³ Positive incentives are of critical importance in preventive diplomacy, as Peter Jakobsen and Alexander George contend, and this implies the use of confidence-building measures to establish trust and certainty between parties to the conflict.²⁵⁴ This prevents intra- or interstate disputes from escalating into violence, and when escalation does occur, CBMs could limit the extent of violence.²⁵⁵

CBMs are specifically designed to modify behaviour. They are based on transparency and involve verifiable activities that establish predictable behaviour to prevent, manage and resolve crises that have the potential to escalate into violence.²⁵⁶ The Organization for Security and Co-operation (OSCE) in Europe, for example, makes extensive use of CBMs.²⁵⁷ The purpose is to avoid uncertainties among states, which might cause an intentional or unintentional escalation of hostilities. Related activities could be formal and informal; unilateral, bilateral and multilateral; military and political; and could be state-to-state as well as non-governmental activities.²⁵⁸

Siân Herbert distinguishes between two types of CBMs that prevent conflict escalation: military/security versus humanitarian, social and cultural.²⁵⁹ Both types, in line with the OSCE viewpoint, can be used in all phases of a conflict cycle.²⁶⁰ Stefan Wolff cautions however that the use of CBMs is dependent on and therefore varies in accordance with the time frame.²⁶¹ In the short term, they are designed to prevent conflict escalating into violence; in the medium term, they promote trust through increased contact; and in the long term, they pave the way for meaningful and sustainable conflict settlement.

Several decades of theory building on conflict resolution have underlined, without contestation, the critical importance of prevention. Yet, as the HIPPO report points out, it “has not been sufficiently invested in”, even though “[t]he prevention of armed conflict is perhaps the greatest responsibility of the international community”.²⁶² This is a deficiency in international organisations, as it is in individual states’ defence diplomacy. It is to the latter that we will now turn.

Preventive defence diplomacy

Defence diplomacy and conflict prevention interact against the backdrop of what Ronald Barston describes as “a complex and evolving” relationship between diplomacy and security.²⁶³ The utility value of defence diplomacy is that it forestalls countries from becoming adversarial. It does so by reducing tension, preventing issue escalation and facilitating information flow, which enhance mutual understanding of interests and capabilities.²⁶⁴ As discussed earlier, the idea of defence diplomacy implies both coercive and non-coercive activities. The coercive element can be detected in literature on preventive diplomacy also. Boutros-Ghali, for instance,

noted that preventive diplomacy requires CBMs as well as early warning (“based on information gathering and informal or formal fact-finding”), and added, “it may also involve preventive deployment and, in some situations, demilitarized zones”.²⁶⁵ Lund builds on Boutros-Ghali’s thesis and widens the discussion on the recourse of preventive diplomacy to military options.²⁶⁶ He divides these military approaches and tools into two groups, namely “[r]estraints on the use of armed force” and “[t]hreat or use of armed force”. As part of the second category, he lists:

- deterrence policies and security guarantees;
- maintaining or restoring local or regional balances of power; and
- the use or threat of limited force.

It is clear that these options are essentially coercive, and therefore of limited utility for our analytical framework.

Lund’s first category, “[r]estraints on the use of armed force”, likewise includes some examples of defence actions that could be deemed coercive: the pre-emptive use of peacekeeping forces to deter and contain; demilitarised zones, safe havens and peace zones; as well as arms embargoes and blockades. On the other hand, he also includes options that are evidently non-coercive:

- arms control regimes (including monitoring);
- CBMs;
- non-aggression agreements;
- non-offensive force postures; and
- military-to-military cooperation.

Conducting defence diplomacy to prevent conflict from becoming violent requires the associated activities to take place “in vulnerable places and times”, i.e. during times of unstable peace.²⁶⁷ This implies that it should happen during the early (incipient and latent) stages of conflict. As soon as differences emerge, it is fitting to initiate activities, such as the establishment of military-to-military cooperation, to eliminate or mitigate differences.

Considering the aims of defence diplomacy and to ensure that incipient conflict does not escalate into latent conflict (or that latent conflict does not escalate into manifest conflict), defence diplomacy activities must be synchronised with conflict development stages. Crucially, these activities must exhibit behaviour that –

- serves common interests;
- supports mutual political commitments;
- promotes cooperation in the defence environment; and
- assists in modifying conflictual behaviour.

Key to this process is the mutual building of confidence. Activities must be geared towards eliminating differences and contradictions before polarisation occurs to address goal incompatibility and to encourage constructive behaviour and dialogue.²⁶⁸

When diplomacy is used in the context of CBMs to prevent conflict, it focuses on similarities rather than on differences, and in this way, misunderstandings are clarified and uncertainties are reduced. Against the backdrop of defence cooperation, when CBMs involve security-related activities, which build confidence, they are referred to as confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs). CSBMs continue to be used with varying degrees of success to defuse tension and reduce the potential for violent conflict. Their use has been instrumental in reducing the potential for conflict between nuclear power rivals India and Pakistan, inter alia over Kashmir and the Siachen Glacier; and to reduce tension and prevent an ‘accidental’ escalation in the use of force between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and its nemesis, Taiwan.²⁶⁹

Most defence forces undertake activities to promote defence cooperation with selected partner states. Since these activities fall outside the realm of warfare and combat operations, and mainly take place during periods of relative peace and stability, they can be construed and operationalised collectively as CSBMs. Included are:

- entering into formal agreements;
- conducting joint combat simulation exercises;
- providing training;
- high-level, working and ship visits;
- holding seminars;
- intelligence exchanges and early warning information dissemination;
- establishing common doctrine and procedures;
- deploying defence attachés;
- procuring or supplying armaments and technology;
- providing HADR;
- sports and cultural exchanges; and
- even prisoner exchanges.

Similarly, the OSCE also operationalises the following categories of what it terms ‘CSBMs’:

- annual exchange of information;
- defence planning;
- risk reduction;

- military contacts;
- prior notification of certain military activities;
- observation of military activities, such as land, air and naval exercises when the force level exceeds 13 000 troops;
- the exchange of annual calendars of military activities;
- constraining provisions, such as placing a limit on the number and sizes of exercises by countries;
- measures to ensure compliance with and verification of the provisions;
- regional measures for security cooperation, such as agreements that promote transparency; and
- reducing the risk of military conflict.²⁷⁰

In this respect, Lund concurs that CBMs are among a number of military tools to prevent conflict.²⁷¹ Similarly, Ackermann is of the opinion that CBMs have specific utility in what she terms “operational or structural prevention”.²⁷²

Not all commentators consider confidence building to be part of defence diplomacy. For instance, Cottey and Forster state, “[a]rms control, non-proliferation and confidence building do not fit within the definition of defence diplomacy.”²⁷³ In contrast, the Indonesian Ministry of Defence identifies CBMs as central to their conceptualisation of defence diplomacy, particularly for bilateral and multilateral engagement.²⁷⁴ This validates the notion that defence diplomacy can be utilised for building confidence.²⁷⁵ When used non-coercively, defence diplomacy not only builds confidence but also contributes to conflict prevention.

At policy formulation level, several states have ventured into the defence diplomacy–conflict prevention nexus. Justin Fris recounts how, in 1993, the Australian Minister of Defence linked the need to engage regional nations, maintain relations with alliances, and confirm a commitment to international peace and security to Australian defence.²⁷⁶ In 1994, the German Ministry of Defence went a step further and recognised that ‘military-political’ cooperation with former Warsaw Pact countries was a core mission to detect and resolve conflict before it escalated to military confrontation.²⁷⁷ Defence diplomacy similarly featured as a core mission in the UK’s 1994 SDR in which it was defined as the provision of “forces to meet the varied activities undertaken by the Ministry of Defence to dispel hostility, build and maintain trust and assist in the development of democratically accountable armed forces, thereby making a significant contribution to conflict prevention and resolution”.²⁷⁸

Canada followed the example of the United Kingdom by adopting defence diplomacy as official policy in 2005, describing it as a defence tool for shaping the international environment to contribute to stability by building relations.²⁷⁹ In the 2012 Spanish defence diplomacy plan, defence diplomacy is described as –

The various international activities based mainly on dialogue and cooperation, carried out bilaterally by the Ministry of Defence with our allies, partners and other friendly countries to promote the accomplishment of defence policy objectives in support of Spanish foreign policy.²⁸⁰

These international activities comprise security sector reform, reinforcing security and defence capabilities, and – notably – conflict prevention. Whereas Canada and Australia are ambivalent about the nexus, the United Kingdom and Spain specifically link defence diplomacy to conflict prevention. The comprehensive description thereof by Germany, as earlier mentioned, emphasises the importance of detecting and resolving conflict before it escalates and places former enemies foremost in the integrated military-political context.

Nevertheless, Sidney Bearman warns that it is “naïve” or “misleading” to suggest that conflict could be prevented by military-to-military contacts built through defence diplomacy, as today’s friend may be tomorrow’s foe.²⁸¹ Bilateral and multilateral defence diplomacy and related activities can be used for preventing conflict but not in isolation from the political and foreign policy objectives of a government. To be sure, defence diplomacy is not an all-encompassing panacea for preventing conflict, as its utility is restricted to defence-related areas. While defence diplomacy has a general connotation, its utility in conflict prevention must be conceptually elucidated.

An analytical framework for non-coercive defence diplomacy as conflict prevention

A few authors have explicitly linked defence diplomacy and conflict prevention. Rolfe is of the opinion that, because defence diplomacy develops trust and enhances constructive relationships, it also contributes to conflict prevention and resolution.²⁸² Based on a wider conceptualisation, Du Plessis provides a framework that contextualises the use of defence diplomacy as part of peace strategies and conflict prevention.²⁸³ Hence, Rolfe and Du Plessis agree that defence diplomacy is used for conflict prevention, to the extent that it is non-belligerent, pacific-persuasive, grounded in trust, based on common interests and constructive relationships, transparent, and inclined to defence reform and cooperation. Some facets of this nexus, however, must be articulated emphatically to indicate *how* and *when* defence diplomacy contributes to peace and prevents cycles of violent conflict.

Defence diplomacy for preventing conflict manifests at various levels and in a number of ways. The utility of these levels and ways lies in allaying fears and suspicions of former or potential enemies that have their origins in historical perceptions, political differences or tangible disputes, such as territory or maritime zones.²⁸⁴ This means that defence diplomacy, in a bilateral or multilateral mode, must be coordinated and employed at strategic, operational and tactical level when dealing with and preventing conflict. The suggested framework (see Table 1) has preventive diplomacy as its primary point of departure. Accordingly, defence diplomacy is

positioned as a means (i.e. a particular type of diplomacy) within the process of preventive diplomacy. In addition, the emphasis is specifically on NCDD during periods of pre-manifest (incipient and latent) conflict, although with the inclusion of a qualified preventive role in respect of manifest conflict.

In this respect, NCDD establishes, nurtures and expands defence ties to change conflict situations, attitudes or behaviour to engender trust and confidence, and it relies on the will of the parties to acknowledge and resolve differences associated with pre-manifest conflict. Nevertheless, NCDD is not without preconditions. First, emotional orientation towards partners and allies must be trusting, pacific, credible, collaborative and transparent. Second, discordant goals are inevitable in international relations implying that NCDD using confidence-building to modify behaviour must be ongoing. In essence, NCDD calls for pragmatism rather than idealism. NCDD cannot be used in all circumstances – it is not a blanket solution, it does not replace coercive defence diplomacy, and it is unlikely to be effective when there are deep and entrenched political differences between states.

As an over-arching concept, NCDD can therefore play a role by altering conflict perceptions, reducing aggression and resentment while the deliberate use of CSBMs could reduce mistrust and suspicion. In the context of defence diplomacy responses and activities, CSBMs are classified into five sequential categories, namely bilateral and multilateral dialogue; the conclusion of agreements; information exchange; establishing defence ties at diplomatic level; and providing tangible substance to undertakings by participating in defence cooperation programmes. It is nonetheless of crucial importance that activities in support of NCDD be synchronised to prevent disputes from arising before conflict intensifies and becomes violent. This means that specific activities are used at specific times and at specific levels for specific purposes, as represented in Table 1 as a concept-based framework for linking NCDD and conflict prevention.

NCDD has its primary utility during incipient and latent conflict; hence, the need for a uniquely designed early warning system that focuses on the indicators of both. NCDD therefore adopts two approaches that follow in sequence to mitigate incipient and latent conflict. The first is conflict avoidance, which is intended to keep levels incipient; and the second is conflict prevention, which is intended to keep levels latent (or to reduce it to the incipient level).

Conflict avoidance during the incipient stage primarily focuses on establishing defence ties, starting at the highest level and deepening the ties to functional levels. The purpose is to build relationships both formally and informally in bilateral and multilateral environments. Horizontal networks are established as a foundation, where possible drawing on historical commonalities. (France does this masterfully, as is evident from its extensive defence-related influence in the African Francophonie.) Hegemony and domination are deliberately avoided as these are at odds with non-coercion, which emphasises building trust and credibility. A particular activity during this stage is joint NCDD research and training, especially in a regional context, as

this maximises the use of scarce resources and also fosters common approaches to avoiding conflict and embedding shared values.

Relations are deepened for preventing conflict during the latent stage, specifically using CSBMs to modify behaviour by orientating defence forces towards collaboration and cooperation. In this way, meaning and substance are given to the relationships established during the incipient stage.

<p>CONTEXT Pre-manifest conflict stages</p>	<p><i>Incipient conflict:</i> conflict is largely subliminal and the parties might even be unaware of its imminence. However, there are vestiges of goal incompatibility. <i>Latent conflict:</i> parties acknowledge the existence of mutually incompatible goals and begin considering alternatives.</p>	
<p>RESPONSES</p> <p>Non-coercive preventive diplomacy framework</p> <p>Bilateral and multilateral strategies to prevent the escalation of conflict</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Non-coercive defence diplomacy (NCDD)</p> <p>Discordant goals are inevitable in international relations implying that NCDD using confidence building to modify behaviour is ongoing. Activities must support political objectives, must not incite or stimulate incompatibility, must focus on congruency, and must ensure that behaviour remains within mutually agreed boundaries, which preclude violence.</p>	
	<p style="text-align: center;">Non-coercive defence diplomacy conflict approaches</p>	
	<p style="text-align: center;">Pre-manifest conflict stages</p>	
	<p style="text-align: center;">The incipient conflict stage</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">The incipient conflict stage</p>
	<p style="text-align: center;">Conflict avoidance</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Conflict prevention</p>
	<p>Relations are established with the defence forces of partner countries and organisations to prevent an escalation from incipient to latent conflict. Related NCDD activities are aimed at:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • identifying goal incompatibility or emerging differences; • identifying and pursuing complementary goals; • establishing common values and interests; • pursuing broader objectives of cooperation and trust; • supporting mutual political commitments; • ensuring expectations regarding cooperation are kept within reasonable limits; • promoting transparency by revealing intent and capability; • allaying aggression, mistrust and suspicion; • changing perceptions concerning defence activities that may be construed as belligerent; • using prevention to keep incipient conflict within acceptable levels according to agreed parameters; and • eschewing coercion as an alternative to prevent a maligned conflict spiral. <p>In support of the above, it is essential during this (incipient) stage to establish a foundation for NCDD that concentrates on defence diplomacy research and training. It can be conducted bilaterally and multilaterally to develop common doctrine regarding NCDD for conflict prevention. It can also be pitched at an epistemic level by facilitating revolving-door exchanges between the defence force and research institutions or think tanks that specialise in defence diplomacy and conflict prevention</p>	<p>Relationships with the defence forces of partner countries and organisations are further broadened and deepened using CSBMs to modify behaviour. The purpose is to maintain conflict in its pre-manifest stages.</p> <p>Activities associated with defence diplomacy in a non-coercive mode include a combination of the following:</p> <p><u>Bilateral and multilateral defence dialogue</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • conducting high level and working visits; • servicing and monitoring defence cooperation agreements; and • establishing and participating in formal structures for bi- and multilateral defence consultations at regional, continental and international level. <p><u>Bilateral and multilateral defence agreements</u></p> <p>Deliberating, agreeing, concluding, signing and ratifying:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • memoranda of understanding (MOU) on defence cooperation; • nonaggression agreements; • arms control agreements (including monitoring); and mechanisms for dispute resolution. <p><u>Defence-related information exchange</u></p> <p>Facilitating information flow concerning early warning. Early warning in this sense requires a unique approach as it is directed at identifying the indicators of incipient and latent conflict rather than the manifestation of violent conflict. Because of the sensitivity of information exchange, the creation of suspicion and hostility must be carefully avoided. All efforts should be made to ensure –</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • transparency in methodology; • clarity in terms of the mutual security agenda that is pursued; and • consensus concerning appropriate remedial action. <p><u>Establishing and maintaining defence ties at inter-governmental and intra-governmental levels</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • appointing defence attachés to strategically selected states and organisations; and • appointing specialist advisors at national and sub-national level to other government departments and agencies. <p><u>Conducting bilateral and multilateral defence cooperation programmes in support of agreements</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • training defence and civilian personnel, including the deployment of training teams and other experts; • providing military equipment and technical expertise; • conducting ship visits and other military-related exchanges; • conducting training exercises; • joint patrolling and ceasefire monitoring; • hosting cultural and sporting events; • supporting HADR; and • hosting conferences and seminars on issues of mutual interest.

Conclusion

The study on which this article is based set out to explore, in the first instance, the idea of defence as diplomacy. The practice of de facto diplomacy by armed forces is gaining traction worldwide, and is fuelled by democratisation of intrastate as well as interstate politics. It is important to keep in mind, however, that within the hierarchy of foreign policy, the international relations of defence forces remain a subset of broader diplomatic statecraft. Diplomacy can be shored up with military threat (amounting to coercive diplomacy) but that particular diplomatic–military nexus is not the equivalent of defence forces employing diplomatic tools. In both instances, defence forces implement (rather than formulate) foreign policy. For the purpose of our research, we were particularly interested in the agency of defence forces, when the diplomatic goal is *conflict prevention*.

Three findings resulted from our theoretical contextualisation. The first is that the conceptual variables – defence diplomacy, conflict and its prevention, even the very notion of peace – are contested, and present a problem of definition. For descriptive-analytical purposes, it was therefore necessary to settle on stipulative meanings and accounts. The second finding is that the defence diplomacy–conflict prevention nexus is seldom theorised as such, despite evidence in the literature of implicit links when one or the other is theorised. The third – and related to the second – is that defence diplomacy is not specifically theorised from a *non-coercive* perspective. Considering its assumed utility for preventing conflict, NCDD therefore required further clarification.

NCDD is based on the principles of transparency, reputation and integrity, and non-violent methods. It entails convincing, persuading, negotiating or behaving in a manner that serves common interests and values, it supports mutual political commitments and it promotes defence cooperation. As such, it focuses on former or potential adversaries (rather than on current opponents in an adversarial relationship) as well as on existing or potential allies and partners. NCDD is an alternative to the use of force and thus essentially different from coercive defence diplomacy. It establishes, nurtures and expands defence ties to change situations, attitudes and behaviour, and it engenders trust and confidence. These attributes bestow on NCDD distinct agency in conflict prevention.

Conflict prevention denotes an element of timing, and therefore NCDD and its associated activities, specifically CSBMs, must be synchronised with the first two stages of conflict development, namely incipient and latent conflict. Ostensible peace can be negative (the continent of Africa is rife with examples!) and this means that NCDD is essential to safeguard incipient conflict from escalating into latent conflict, and inhibiting latent conflict from escalating into a manifest form. A conflict ‘climate change’ is thus effected through the elimination of differences and contradictions before polarisation occurs, or if polarisation has already taken place, through changing conflict attitudes, perceptions and behaviour. In summary, it can be deduced that when NCDD is used proactively during incipient or latent stages of conflict, it plays a role in promoting positive peace.

The scope and space available in this article did not allow for an in-depth study of the theoretical framework, and it is recommended that more research be done to determine the parameters and indicators of NCDD. The differences between and overlap of non-coercive and coercive defence diplomacy, the transition of the one to the other, and the implications of this transition should be examined, inter alia. Case study application is also essential. The topic has global application because, as a policy instrument, NCDD is accessible to all states, regardless of their relative power. This bestows on NCDD much potential as a tool of soft power. Middle powers, such as Canada, Sweden and South Africa, have carefully nurtured their soft power profile, and indeed their international identity, based on a conflict resolution track record.

From our own vantage point, the role of defence forces in Africa deserves special attention. These forces have been politically prominent (and often maligned) in the post-colonial dispensation, but their potential to prevent conflict is a largely untapped resource. The crafting of NCDD policy frameworks and investment in training to allow for its implementation are therefore essential. At a normative level, NCDD also resonates with the historically important integration agenda of the continent and its various sub-regions. This begs a much more vigorous research agenda than the current study.

Endnotes

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MILITARY AND SECURITY EDUCATION FOR REGIONAL CO-OPERATION

A CASE STUDY OF THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEFENCE AND SECURITY MANAGEMENT NETWORK

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Abstract

This article first summarises approaches to military and security education at tertiary levels for officers and senior security officials, identifying some institutional and conceptual issues, before moving on to a fairly detailed case study of the Southern African Defence and Security Management Network (SADSEM). In its institutional form, from 2000 to 2010, SADSEM was a unique experiment in building a regional network of universities providing training and education in security studies, promoting regional security co-operation and integration and working closely with security forces and governments in the Southern African region. Although it mostly worked in English, it also carried out education and research in French and Portuguese, established an institutional base in ten Southern African Development Community (SADC) nations and delivered programmes in all the then 15 of them. Its activities included providing training and education for defence and security management, civil-military relations, peacekeeping and peacebuilding, policy support and the building of scholarly capacity through regional co-operation. Today SADSEM activities are restricted mainly to an annual security review conference, but its real legacy is in the institutions and capacities it built within several Southern African countries, although not all survive. SADSEM kept a low profile because of extreme sensitivities in Southern Africa around security issues, and this is the first attempt to examine its experience in the context of higher-level security education and training.

A note on methodology

Much of this article consists of a somewhat phenomenological reflection based on the author's forty years in security studies, security education, policy support and capacity building in Africa. Where necessary or possible it is supported by documentary references. The SADSEM files are not publicly available but can be accessed via the author.

Introduction

Around the world militaries increasingly expose their officers to university environments and give them the chance to gain higher degrees, as do intelligence

agencies and to a much lesser extent police services. Partly this is to make them better practitioners, partly to help with retention, since they will have a recognised qualification – usually funded by the state - after they leave, which often is at a relatively early age. Many jobs into which military and security officers might go (especially in international organisations) now require a master's degree to progress beyond a certain level. In any event modern military and security operations require much more than training in traditional martial skills.

Military and police officers are also increasingly involved in international peacekeeping²⁸⁶ (especially cases mandated by the UN), which is especially political and complex. The skills and knowledge required at the higher levels require an understanding of international relations, the global security system, politics, social analysis, ethnography, management, conflict resolution and much else. All UN and regional peacekeeping operations require both political and military expertise, interaction between civilians and the military and hence an understanding by military officers and senior security officials of international, regional and local governance issues, at the very least.

Peace missions may be a special case, but more broadly in modern democracies, military leaders need to understand wider issues, especially policy, finances and budgets, civil-military relations, international relations and management. These issues will be dealt with in more detail later.

It may be argued that the skills listed above are only relevant in times of peace or in non-operational contexts. But security forces are usually, perhaps always, deployed in response to problems – and problem-solving requires high intellectual capabilities. Moreover, war is arguably one of the most complex of human endeavours, and one of the most unpredictable. Staff planning and strategy cannot be a substitute for thinking oneself out of the 'fog of war' (to use Clausewitz's famous phrase). Flexibility and nimbleness of thought are equally as necessary at senior military level as traditional qualities of bravery (and ruthlessness), discipline, loyalty and logistical competence.

Education of course does not necessarily translate into military success. The US has one of the most educated officer corps in the world – 82.8 per cent of officers had at least a bachelor's degree in 2010²⁸⁷ – but the US military's record in recent wars is not very convincing. What is probably more important is not education itself, but the type of education given, which should lead to a critical-thinking capability and an understanding of the social and political context in which any conflict is taking place.

Approaches to security education²⁸⁸

There are a number of models for the education of senior officers and security officials around the world. This research focuses on education and makes a distinction between education and training. Some professions, such as medicine and engineering, do not necessarily recognise this difference, and indeed the dividing line between the two is not always clear. It is said that 'training is for certainty whilst education is for uncertainty'.²⁸⁹ In the early 1990s, when sex education was being introduced into

South African schools, a senior officer from the old South African Defence Force perhaps but it best, when he told me that he didn't mind his kids undergoing sex education but he would most certainly object to sex training!

At higher levels of education, whatever organisational models are used, it is generally the case throughout the world that recognised civilian experts, drawn from the academy or civil society, are used alongside qualified military personnel to deliver certain subjects or topics. This is mainly because the competencies involved require a mastery of conceptual and methodological approaches, complementing operational competencies. Also, uniformed personnel do not – and probably should not – make full-time careers in the academy.

Higher education for military officers often takes place at staff colleges, but as Last et al have pointed out in this journal many if not most of these are not 'university-like' which requires that they offer bachelor's and master's-level degrees, backed by research and publications.²⁹⁰ Globally, only about 20 per cent of military colleges fit into this category, and only seven per cent of police colleges. Police training is usually just that, training not education (in countries with a gendarmerie they tend to occupy a middle ground between military education and police training). It is unclear why the police lag so far behind the military in this regard, when intuitively one would assume that because police are more integrated with civilian life they would be better placed to pursue higher education.²⁹¹

Another option for educating officers in the security services is to offer graduate or post-graduate degrees awarded by universities (which may be delivered through military colleges or at university campuses). Existing degrees in management or policy or international relations, for example, can be used or adapted to military and security service requirements. This option is increasingly common, at least in countries where the requisites are available within existing national or local (and sometimes private) university curricula.

Universities have a mandate to issue degrees, which are usually legitimate if not always credible. Many national or local universities may have the essential administrative and academic capability to award their own degrees appropriate for an officer corps, sometimes in cooperation with a military academy. This is the case in Sudan and Rwanda. In many other cases, military academies or similar institutions issue degrees, as in India and Pakistan, using both civilian and military lecturers (Mukerjee 2017). In the dying days of Robert Mugabe's presidency, Zimbabwe's parliament went further, approving the establishment of a 'military university' (to be named after the president). But the resources for this were completely lacking (personal correspondence with Centre for Defence Studies).

In Europe and the US, dozens of non-military universities offer degrees in security studies, military studies or related issues, many of which are targeted in part at senior security practitioners. No doubt the universities have their own institutional and financial interests in this market – and in most of the world tertiary institutions are increasingly market-oriented.

There is another important factor that has enabled civilian tertiary institutions to deal with security issues. Approaches to security have been broadened since the end of the Cold War and military officers have to engage with a wide range of issues related to the widening of concepts of security (social, economic, political, environmental). While it is not primarily their job, they also have to understand the discourse around human security which underpins the security policies of many states these days (in which the referent level and the priority for security is not the state but people). These of course are issues traditionally more the provenance of civilian than military experts.

A somewhat older discipline, that of peace studies (for example as offered at Bradford University and the UN University of Peace in Hiroshima) has also gradually become more elided with security studies.

Strategic studies, once defined rather narrowly as ‘the use of force within and between states’ (Buzan 1983:3) and somewhat fixated (understandably during the Cold War) on nuclear warfare has developed an expanded mandate (including ‘terrorism studies’, now a field in its own right with literally hundreds of books having been written since 9/11).

All these disciplines are increasingly interrelated and overlap. This has led if not to confusion, at least to diffusion within the academy. It is entirely possible to study the same security-related issues for degrees with widely diverging nomenclature (ranging from war studies to peace studies).

A internet search will throw up options for masters qualifications such as a ‘masters in international security studies’ (universities in Italy and the Czech republic), ‘defence, security and crisis management’ (France) ‘diplomacy and international security’ (Lebanon), ‘strategic and arms control studies’ (Russia), ‘military studies’ and ‘defence and security management (South Africa) and so on. Further, these qualifications fall under a range of different faculties and schools – law, management, politics, international relations, economics, social studies to name just a few.

Some of the degrees are co-accredited by two or more universities and programmes are shared. Another option - used in Ethiopia, for example - is to “buy in” (usually with donor money) a complete master’s degree, from a university in a ‘donor country’, which offers what is regarded as a suitable curriculum. In principle, the idea in many countries seems to be to build indigenous academic expertise, so that in time courses can be run by a local university issuing its own qualifications. This has happened in Indonesia and remains an aspiration in Lebanon (Chuter 2016).

Add to this the large number of military academies, which usually fall directly under ministries of defence or the armed forces, and it clear that the opportunities of higher education in fields directly relevant for senior officers and senior police and intelligence forces are extremely wide. Usually such academies pitch at colonel or brigadier level at an inter-service level and are aimed at educating aspirant generals. At a lower level (usually major) many, if most, countries have institutions typically called war colleges or command and staff colleges. These tend towards training at the

operational level but may also have some strategic foci and ‘are the first place we find curricula routinely requiring critical thought, reading, research and problem solving beyond tactical military situations’.²⁹²

Africa

South Africa by far leads the way in terms of tertiary-level security education. Many of the options discussed above have been implemented for some time: a war college, a defence college and a military academy run by the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) and in the case of the military academy, accreditation and research and teaching support from the University of Stellenbosch, leading to a Bachelor of Military Science (BMil). Security related degrees are also available at other state-established universities, notably the University of Pretoria (strategic studies).

Elsewhere in Africa, the only countries with anything approaching this academic wealth are Kenya and Nigeria.²⁹³ The South African Military Academy in Saldanha Bay, the Nigerian one in Kaduna and the Kenyan one in Nakuru all offer degrees accredited by universities in their respective countries and teach in English with a combination of uniformed and civilian lecturers.

In Africa, as elsewhere in the world, staff colleges and military academies are increasingly supplemented by peacekeeping training centres, which, although they do not usually offer degrees do include, at least on their flagship programmes, the kind of self-directed learning characterised by reading, critical thinking and sometimes research. The key institutions in Africa are the Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre in Harare (which is somewhat moribund), the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre in Accra, the Peacekeeping Training Centre in Pretoria and the International Peace Support Training Centre in Nairobi. All of these teach in English.

Regional and international co-operation

On the most senior national officer education courses, at military academies and universities, learning places are made available for participants from other countries – sometimes only for allies or regional partners or countries perceived to be ‘neutral’ or non-threatening, sometimes more widely. In universities, these are often made open to any applicants, whatever their institutional or national affiliations; in defence colleges or other state-controlled institutions it is usually by invitation only.

Although there is some inter-service co-operation between universities and academies in different countries, this is normally on the basis of a functional division of labour and specialisation. What is less usual, in fact surprisingly lacking, is the construction of a consciously regional approach to converge or harmonise the education of senior security practitioners from various countries in a given inter-state region or trans-national security regime.²⁹⁴

Of course, major powers often offer their education and training programmes to allies (the US in Latin America, France in its former colonies, NATO in Eastern and Central Europe to note the most prominent recent examples) but this is not the same as building a regional capacity in which resources are shared and indigenised.

The most important global security co-operation regime (primarily of course a mutual defence arrangement) is NATO, but even here there is little coordination at higher education levels, except on bilateral bases. At least one proposal has been made to set up a NATO combined approach to professional military education, involving military academies in the various NATO member states and universities, with the aim of fostering 'an elite of officer-scholars' (Wilton Park 2013:1). This would entail the systematic linking of education, training and research, but it would need to take into account 'national cultural, political and ethical barriers' and would include distance education and massively open online courses (MOOC). This proposal seems to be aspirational and will in any case take some time to implement even if the modalities can be agreed, not least because NATO countries have cut expenditure on military education by 30 per cent in the five years following the economic crisis of 2008.²⁹⁵

The case of the Southern African Defence and Security Management Network (SADSEM)²⁹⁶

In the context of this background, this paper now turns to the case study of the Southern African Defence and Security Management Network, a security educational initiative that eventually linked all the then 15 countries of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), mainly through national universities. This appears to a fairly unique case although it has not attracted much, if any, academic attention in that it worked mostly behind the scenes given the sensitivities of Southern African governments around security issues, particularly if foreign donors are involved. SADSEM was based on universities but worked closely with national security structures, focused on indigenous knowledge, developed common regional curricula, operated in three former colonial languages, and was linked to the SADC regional security co-operation and integration project. It did not reach its full potential. In the words of Andre du Pisani 'SADSEM was a visionary and all-too-rare epistemic network that did not quite flower into an epistemic community'.²⁹⁷

International influences

In 1993, when the SADSEM project had its genesis, South Africa - indeed the whole Southern African region - was on the cusp of profound change. This affected defence policy and the armed forces as much as anything else. The almost simultaneous end of apartheid and the end of the Cold War necessitated and resulted in a security sector transformation or reform (SSR) process, a reconfiguration of military and security education, civil control of the military and a strengthening of regional security collaboration. It also required a that a new approach - a new paradigm - was developed to replace the militaristic 'total strategy' of the apartheid regime and to lay the basis for collaborative regional security. This was found in the 'widened security' of Barry Buzan and in the human security of the UN Development Programme.²⁹⁸

Although it was home grown, the South African transformation experience was affected by international influences – ‘widened security’ and human security in particular. Somewhat later this was supplemented by the raft of issues which the UK in particular promoted as Security Sector Reform (SSR), amounting in effect to ‘good governance’ for the security sector. The SSR concept was promoted vigorously through educational, policy and research agendas, initially in Eastern and Central Europe and later in Africa. SSR had political objectives and was strongly underpinned by ideological assumptions, but at the time it was mostly accepted not only as a normative agenda, but also as a universal and rational one.

There was a high level of co-operation between the European post-Cold War and Southern African post-apartheid initiatives. Although there were major differences in approach, ideology and ways of working, the fact that most of Southern Africa inherited, for better or worse, British-style institutions and approaches to the management of security made exchanges of views with UK scholars and practitioners fairly easy. (The ministries of defence in Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa are modelled on those of the UK). There were extensive intellectual exchanges between Southern African and UK scholars in the early 1990s, and these continue. Furthermore, the South African military education system was increasingly evolving along the lines of that in the UK (albeit with a different content). A British advisory team still remains at South Africa’s peacekeeping training centre.

From the outset, SADSEM was primarily funded by the Danish government, and this also provided for intellectual exchanges between Danish and Southern African scholars and practitioners. SADSEM scholars and practitioners paid a number of visits to the UK and Denmark to study security management institutions there and security education approaches. SADSEM also made early contact with scholars working on security elsewhere in Africa, which became an important influence.

Above all, SADSEM sought to develop an indigenous capacity for security scholarship and practice, first in South Africa, then in the Southern African region and to some extent elsewhere in the continent. I will trace how this evolved (usually organically), before turning to a consideration of SADSEM’s programmes, projects and achievements and then considering its limitations and limited legacies.

Origins and institutional architecture

SADSEM had its origins in the South African transformation process. Specifically a need was identified to train and educate a cadre of both civilians and military officers to staff a new ministry of defence and to ensure civil control and oversight of the military.

An ANC-aligned group exploring post-apartheid security policy, the Military Research Group, raised funds from the Danish government for this purpose and training programme was set up at a new public management school, the School of Public and Development Management, modelled as a miniature version of the Kennedy School at Harvard.

In practice this programme became an important locus for developing a new ethos for the new national defence force and oiled the cogs of integration between seven disparate armed formations that came to constitute the South African National Defence force (SANDF).

The programme initially focused on civil-military-relations but also promoted new conceptual approaches to security and explored regional security options, carrying out amongst other things a comparative international survey of regional security arrangements such as the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, ASEAN, ECOWAS and the Gulf Co-operation Council.

It was realised that civil control of the military was also a challenge in other Southern African countries that were transitioning from war to peace, from one party to multiparty systems or from nominally command economies to market driven ones. Further, it was thought that the conceptual frameworks developed by the programme could contribute to the evolution of co-operative security in the region.

From the outset, the organisers were determined that work in Southern Africa should be carried out on the basis of institutional partnerships between universities, and that this needed to be done incrementally and be linked to capacity building. The reality was that as result of state centric securitisation in the region, outside of South Africa and Zimbabwe and possibly Namibia, academics and civil society had been almost completely excluded from dealing with security issues ... and many security practitioners had an anti-intellectual bent.

It was thus necessary to build capacity with the academy by re-tooling established academics to enable them to engage with security issues, as well as building a new generation of security scholars and empowering security officers to deal with academic issues. This is dealt with later.

To ensure effective communication with governments and the relevance of the programme, an advisory structure was set up, consisting of representatives of all the SADC governments, military officers, national security advisors, ministers, secretaries for defence and the like. It would be unfair to say that SADSMM did not take this structure seriously, after all it was essential to its functions, but in reality it offered little in terms of ideas but much in bureaucracy.

How was the network set up? Not easily. Snowballing helped. Identification of partners was a complex process, involving individuals and institutions. Individuals were usually identified as those who had sufficient academic and political credibility and had engaged, however peripherally, with security issues. But they had to have the ability to take their institutions with them. These transformative individuals came from various academic traditions: political studies, governance, public administration, history. The historians proved to be most insightful. (The author is convinced that history and geopolitics is the key to understanding security rather than the disciplines of political studies and international relations, but that is another matter.)

Over the years this interaction between individual academics, their institutions and the national security services, resulted in the network.²⁹⁹ A kind of ‘variable geometry’ developed, in that there was no uniformity between the partners, some of which were university departments, some semi-NGOs³⁰⁰, some programmes, going by different names ranging from strategic studies, through peace studies to defence studies. The partners met at quarterly steering committee meetings hosted by partners in-country on a rotational basis and chaired by the hosting partner. This ensured common ownership and worked well – all decisions were taken by consensus after the usual lobbying and not once was a vote required. Funds were allocated on an equitable basis and all partners presented narrative and audited financial reports to the Steering Committee. The whole structure and its programmes were supported by a small permanent secretariat at the Centre for Defence Studies at the University of the Witwatersrand, which also acted as the nodal point for interaction with donors and the receipt and distribution of funds.

SADSEM was determined that the network would not be one of individuals but of institutions. Further, it had to be linked to governments, regional structures such as SADC and the African Union. As time went on SADSEM assisted in the construction of the African Security Sector Network (ASSN), which was intended to be a ‘network of networks’ in that similar structures to SADSEM would be set up through Africa, or at least in West and East Africa, and the Horn. This is another story since it became very difficult to realise, but it was part of ‘master plan’ (if one can swallow such a concept) between the SADSEM leaders and those from West, East and the Horn. Relations with the African Union were mainly ad-hoc and pursued through policy conferences, workshops and personal consultancies.

Training

One of the key activities of SADSEM was what might be considered as ‘in-service’ training. Short executive courses, usually of five day’s duration, were delivered in-country, usually entirely for nationals from the country concerned, which aided in free exchanges. Lecturers, however, were drawn from throughout the SADSEM network since there was seldom capacity in any given country to cover all the topics required.

These executive programmes were of various types (which evolved over time and according to demand): Defence and Security Management, Managing Multi-National Peace Missions, Parliamentary Oversight of Defence (for parliamentarians as well as military and police officers), Civil-Military Relations and Security Sector Governance (which was essentially about Security Sector Reform but the term ‘reform’ was disliked by some countries who associated it with a Western agenda).

Whatever the type of course, attendees were always a mix of uniformed personnel (armed forces, police and prisons), government officials (including intelligence officers and parliamentarians), academics and civil society leaders. This was a deliberate effort to break down the ‘silos’ of security and develop a national discourse on security. In evaluations, participants usually remarked that the composition of the participants was just as important as the content, as in many countries such interactions had never occurred.

Curricula were developed by the network as a whole at regular workshops with inputs from academics and practitioners alike. Programmes were fairly standardised but with provision made for national issues and some flexibility: core modules were mixed with optional modules chosen by the organisers according to national requirements.

Of course, quite extensive preparation was required, usually done by the host partner using a set of 'Standard Operating Procedures' developed by the network and involving the identification of participants, lining up the facilitators, making arrangements for funding and payments (keeping per diems to an absolute minimum!), finding a university, government or private venue etc. Funding for courses was set at a standard rate as long as 30 participants were enrolled but quite often these funds were supplemented (often in kind) by relevant government departments, and attendance at some courses reached over 70.

Decisions as to which courses would be run, where and when were taken by the Steering Committee by consensus. As time went on, a tendency developed to run programmes outside of the national capitals, to reach provincial officials, to 'take people away from their offices' and also to save costs.

Programmes were held in all 15 SADC countries but not evenly so: more courses were held in Zimbabwe, the DRC and Namibia for example and only a few in the Indian Ocean Islands (in part this was because of the size of the constituencies). Over the duration of the project over 100 executive courses were delivered with around 4 000 people trained, approximately half of whom were uniformed, a quarter from government a quarter from civil society.

Participants on the Executive Courses were not assessed and only certificates of attendance were issued. However, once a year, always in Johannesburg for cost reasons, a month-long certificate programme was held on one of the five 'types' (Peace Missions, Security Sector Governance etc). These were more intensive courses and usually involved simulation exercises, field visits, training in research, the use of libraries and the internet and so on. Students were assessed through exams, essays and group work.³⁰¹ Lectures were almost always in English but Portuguese and French interpretation was provided as well some material in those languages. International lecturers from SADSEM partners abroad were also used. The certificate was a flagship programme (and a rather expensive exercise given that only 50 students – usually from all of the SADC member states – could be accommodated).

There is a well-known debate in educational circles about the value of short courses. Generally the academic jury finds that such programmes add little value. Whilst they might contribute to individual advancement, they make little contribution to organisational progression. But it may be that in certain contexts, for example in countries emerging from repression or conflict, a certain 'switching on the light' or even epiphany might happen on such courses, particularly if they act not so much as information-giving exercises as information-sharing and confidence and trust-building ones.

This is reflected in the evaluations of the SADSEM executive courses, and especially the month-long certificate courses. With regard to the latter 96 per cent of participants felt that the programme had benefited them as an individual, 99 per cent thought that it ‘had enhanced my understanding and knowledge of defence and security management’, but most importantly 87 per cent agreed that the course had ‘helped improve the performance of my organisation’

In any case, by 2009 SADSEM had moved on from short-course delivery (although some of these continued) towards developing institutionalised post-graduate degree programmes in security. These will now be examined.

Education

From its inception, SADSEM had a vision of developing post-graduate degrees in security to be delivered across Southern Africa to contribute to the stabilisation of civil-military relations and the evolution of collaborative or even common security, on the basis of shared norms and epistemes.

The dream was to set up a common ‘masters degree in security’ that would be offered at several Southern African universities. In the flush of post-cold war regional integration, similar projects had been launched in Southern Africa in the fields of policy and political economy, for example (SAPES for example). All had failed, despite lavish donor support. The reasons for failure were manifold, but included the enormous costs of delivering conjoint programmes between universities, national sensibilities, personal ambitions, and the intractable bureaucratic problems in harmonising the accreditation criteria of disparate national universities.

So SADSEM settled on a long-term project to morph the short courses into a variety of security-related degrees at the universities which potentially had the capacity to deliver such programmes. This would constitute a cognate universe of post-graduate qualifications but not a centralised one. First off the blocks was the University of Zimbabwe, that had developed a post-graduate diploma and masters (and PhD) in war studies, modelled during the post-independence honeymoon with the UK on the programmes at King’s College, University of London. This predated SADSEM and was sustainable, producing compelling research and credible graduates.

In South Africa, there were (and still are) well-established, intellectually sound, degrees accredited by Stellenbosch University, in part through the Military Academy at Saldanha, as well as very sound offerings at the University of Pretoria. SADSEM should have made more to build on these, but there was some historic enmity between many of the other Southern African Universities and the Afrikaans universities, who were seen as promoters of South Africa’s destabilisation campaign against neighbouring countries. Despite well-intentioned efforts on both sides, this crack took a long time to seal.

The first real effort to amalgamate the intellectual products of the SADSEM short programmes into post-graduate degrees took place at the then Graduate School of Public and Development Management (now the School of Governance) at the University of the Witwatersrand. This was in part achieved by merging existing degrees in governance with the security ‘modules’ developed by SADSEM. After all, it was argued, in so far as possible defence and security should be governed in the same way as any other department of state – although the exceptions (secrecy and command-and-control for example) are important.

Thereafter, the Universities of Namibia, Mzuzu, Botswana, and Kinshasa³⁰² started to proffer post-graduate degrees in security studies (with different nomenclatures) based in large part on the curricula developed by SADSEM. No effort was made to harmonise curricula, although there were workshops (funded by the UK) to discuss common problems and also address issues of teaching and learning methodology, particularly in relation to hierarchical organisations.

The presumption is that these post-graduate initiatives will be sustainable, in large part because of the argument offered at the beginning of this article, that it is necessary for any modern officer corps (and their civilian equivalents) to be qualified and enabled to cope with twenty-first century security challenges. More prosaically, degrees are funded not usually by fickle donors, but by motivated students themselves (or by their employees, although if they fail they often have to pay back).

Research

In part to indigenise its curriculum and develop local cases studies, as well as to contribute to policy development (and help to advance the careers of SADSEM academics in line with the ‘publish or perish’ ethos of the academy) SADSEM initiated a international research projects. These took the form of multi-country consultations to develop agendas and research questions, to carry out field research and case studies and to calibrate the results. Several multi-country seminars and conferences on relevant issues were also arranged, as well as bi-lateral exchanges between countries such as Nigeria, Ghana and Denmark. Topics were wide-ranging, often driven by policy challenges – terrorism, Indian Ocean security, conflict management for example. But some were broader and longer term, for example on civil-military relations in Africa, or security and development in the continent. In addition, academics and (quite often practitioners) attached to SADSEM carried out their own individual research. The resulting output of these activities was several books, book chapters, conferences papers and the like – well over 200 academic products (for an almost complete list, at least until 2008, see CMI).³⁰³

Scholarships and internships

As part of the process of ‘re-tooling’ academics to deal with security issues, the academic capacities of uniformed and civilian senior officials in government, and to produce a ‘new generation’ of security experts in the region, SADSEM administered

– through its Steering Committee – a limited scholarship programme and was also able to access international scholarships. Efforts were made in particular to enrol very senior officials in study programmes (these were not usually successful as candidates tended to be recalled by their governments) but through-put for younger scholars was more successful. Potential students were also sent on short-course diploma or certificate programmes. In all cases, scholarships were not tenable overseas (in part due to costs but also for political reasons) but were redeemable at Southern African institutions.

While the results were at best mixed (and the resources available very limited), nevertheless something of a ‘new generation’ of researchers evolved, and many recipients of such scholarships went on to lecture on SADSEM programmes.

Policy development

Foreign donors are understandably keen to argue that their interventions lead to policy change, but this is almost impossible to prove. Even a well-thought-out policy document with apparent buy-in by policy actors will not necessarily lead to any behavioural change. SADSEM did play a fairly prominent role in crafting national and multi-governmental policies on security in Southern Africa – national white papers on defence, policing, intelligence, border protection and the like. It also contributed to SADC wide policies on defence and security-cooperation, maritime security, parliamentary co-operation, conflict resolution and so on, always in co-operation with governments and sometimes with other organisations. Individual members also played quite important roles in some of the conflict resolution issues (Lesotho, Madagascar, DRC). But it would be impossible to claim that these interventions led to either positive or negative outcomes. At best, it can be conjectured that the network’s insistence on building sound civil-military relations and in bringing together civilians and military personnel in confidence-building exercises may have dampened enthusiasm for military coups in South Africa (successful ones of which have been absent in Southern Africa except in the pathological case of Lesotho and the ‘coup-that-was-not-a-coup’ in Harare in 2017).

Relations with SADC’s formal inter-governmental structures were also always rather fraught. Of all the sub-regional security co-operation organisations in Africa SADC is perhaps the most averse to non-state (or non-member state) interventions. Perhaps this is because the memory of colonialism is so recent and that sovereignty in so many countries was very hard-earned as a result of the violent struggles against settler colonialism. More than once it was put to me by senior officers from Angola or Zimbabwe that the imperialists aimed to win back through politics what they had lost on the battlefield. On the whole SADC refused to accept donor funding for security programmes or for its security structure, the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security. This made it very difficult for SADSEM to officially partner with SADC on the basis of joint programmes.

This problem was perhaps best (although somewhat obliquely) diagnosed in the major evaluation of SADSEM carried out by the Norwegian-based Christian Michelsen Institute (CMI) in 2009:

- A first observation is that the level of donor-funding allocated to or through SADC and the Organ directorate in Gaborone remains very small. It is mainly provided by
- Germany which provides funding for technical advisors in the Secretariat ...
- The reasons for the small amount of funding going through SADC has mainly to do with SADC's refusal to accept such funding in this area [security] as well as limited ability to absorb such support ...
- A second observation is that donors generally have much more funding available for SADC and intergovernmental organisations, but they are currently unable to disperse it.
- A third observation is that it may be more difficult to ensure aid effectiveness in external funding to the peace and security sector compared to other thematic areas.³⁰⁴

Although diplomatically coded, the picture is clear and this inevitably placed a limit on SADSEM (as a largely donor-funded body) from fully evolving its relationship with SADC, despite the existence of formal memoranda of understanding and the like. A closer relationship was developed between SADSEM and the SADC Parliamentary Forum, but the latter was a toothless body which the SADC heads of state ignored.

Assessment

As can be seen from this account, SADSEM was quite a unique experiment in constructing a security training, educational and research regime build on universities but working with governments and security establishments. It was overtly normative but sought always to develop indigenous capacities and to take account of local conditions and possibilities.

In the end it did not achieve full maturity (in part for reasons expounded in the section above and when (rather generous) donor funding started to evaporate after the global financial crisis of 2008, the network was much reduced. Large parts of it survived, however, mainly because it had been built through institutions not individuals, and had achieved sustainability through academic programmes. In at least five of original core ten member countries, institutions and programmes remained active at the time of writing and the network still carried out a limited number of activities across the whole region (including the research and production of an *Annual Southern African Security Review* linked to a regional conference).

Du Pisani has argued that high levels of trust were built in a most difficult field and that SADSEM succeeded 'to the degree that it was able to marshal meaningful political, normative, intellectual and institutional capacities'. It further demonstrated

something that some might disagree with, ‘that the best form of scholarship is networked and based on collaborative works’.³⁰⁵

There was a window of opportunity in South Africa that allowed this – transitions from war to peace, from authoritarianism to democracy and from command to market economies, as well as an existing security complex based on a hegemonic power coming to peace with itself– an environment that may be difficult to find again.

Key informants over the years (the views here are of course the author’s alone)

Coelho, J-P. (Professor, Eduardo Mondlane University, Mozambique)

Du Pisani, A. (Professor, University of Namibia)

Fisher, L. (Former Chief of Defence, Botswana)

Luhango, J. (Senior Lecturer, Mzuzu University, Malawi)

Macaringue, P. (Former Chief of Defence, High Commissioner to South Africa, Mozambique)

Molomo, M. (Professor, University of Botswana)

Phiri, B. (Professor, University of Zambia)

Van Nieuwkerk, A. (Professor, University of the Witwatersrand, South Africa)

Endnotes

²⁸⁵ Professor Gavin Cawthra researched this article while he was Chair in Defence and Security Management at the Wits School of Government, University of the Witwatersrand, South Africa. He now works as an independent consultant. gavincawthra548@gmail.com

²⁸⁶ Peacekeeping terminology varies, but the term (alternatively ‘peace missions’) includes a wide range of activities including military stabilisation and post-conflict peacebuilding. All such operations are multinational and usually involve military, policing and civilian activities, whether mandated by the UN or carried out by ‘coalitions of the willing’.

²⁸⁷ *3 Huffington Post* 11/09/2012

²⁸⁸ I am grateful to David Chuter for his insights into these issues and in particular for a seminar on this topic that he delivered at the Wits School of Governance in 2016.

²⁸⁹ Wilton Park. ‘Connected Forces, Educated Minds: Transformation and Professional Education’ Conference 13-15 May 2013.

²⁹⁰ Last, D., Melifeonwu, D., Osemwegie, L. ‘Security Education in Africa: Patterns and Prospects’, *Scientia Militaria* 43(1), pp 17-44.

- ²⁹¹ A possible answer lies in the relative privileging of the military over the police in the security hierarchy in most societies, but this will need further exploration. It should also be noted that in most countries the air force tends to be better educated than the navy, and the navy than the army. This may be due to the relative levels of sophisticated technology used in the various arms of service.
- ²⁹² *Op Cit* p 23.
- ²⁹³ *Op Cit*.
- ²⁹⁴ The term ‘region’ is used in different ways, but here it refers to interstate organisations set up for multidimensional or security regions in line with Chapter VIII of the UN charter. These may operate on a continental level like the African Union or a ‘sub-regional’ level like the Southern African Development Community.
- ²⁹⁵ Wilton Park. *Op Cit*. p 2.
- ²⁹⁶ Much of the material in this section is drawn from reports to donors, evaluations, minutes of SADSEM meeting and interviews with SADSEM personnel, as well as the author’s personal experience (he was the founder of the network and co-ordinated it until the end of 2008). Referencing has therefore been kept to a minimum.
- ²⁹⁷ Du Pisani, A. ‘SADSEM: History of the Network and its Role in the Current Setting’, *Annual Regional Security Dialogue*. Maputo: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (unpublished). 2017.
- ²⁹⁸ Buzan, B. *People, States and Fear*. Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf. 1981.
- ²⁹⁹ At its peak, the network consisted of *Centro de Estudos Estrategicos de Angola*, the Centre for Strategic Studies at the University of Botswana, the *Chaire UNESCO* (Chair in Peace Security and Good Governance) the University of Kinshasa in the DRC, the Centre for Security Studies at Mzuzu University in Malawi, the Centre for African Studies at Eduardo Mondlane University in Mozambique, the Department of Political and Administrative Studies at the University of Namibia, the Centre for Defence and Security Management at the University of the Witwatersrand in South Africa, the Centre for Foreign Relations in Tanzania, the Department of History at the University of Zambia and the Centre for Defence Studies at the University of Zimbabwe.
- ³⁰⁰ ‘Semi’ in the sense that they were not entirely autonomous of governments and were partly funded by them.
- ³⁰¹ It is not clear what this signifies, but in assessments the contingents from Mauritius and Zimbabwe were invariably amongst the top 5 or 10 students, and those from South Africa and Namibia in the bottom 5 or 10. The highest-marked student was always from Mauritius or Zimbabwe, except once when the top student was from the Seychelles. As the Mozambican and Angolan students wrote and were assessed in Portuguese or French, and therefore had to be assessed by a different set of lecturers, it is difficult to include them in this comparison.

- ³⁰² Kinshasa was perhaps the last place one would expect to find academically sound, conceptually dense, non-partisan, up-to-date examples of security studies. The author spent more than a day with post-graduate students (all dressed in shirt-and-tie and all male) reviewing at least a dozen masters proposals or semi-complete theses which exhibited all of the above attributes, as well as a profound understanding of Congolese particularities.
- ³⁰³ Christian Michelsen Institute. *Promoting Defence Management and Security Sector Reform in Southern Africa: An Assessment of SADSEM's Achievements, Impacts and Future Challenges*. Bergen: CMI 2009.
- ³⁰⁴ Christian Michelsen Institute. *Op Cit.* pp 56-57.
- ³⁰⁵ Du Pisani. *Op Cit.* p 12.

PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: LIVED EXPERIENCES OF EMERGENCY CARE PROVIDERS DURING EXTERNAL DEPLOYMENT

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Abstract

Military emergency medical care in support of mission personnel in operational areas serves as a vital element of peace support operations, as it ensures the maintenance of the human resources deployed in mission areas. Although the South African National Defence Force is facing significant financial constraints, it is becoming increasingly mobile, as South Africa continues to pledge military and diplomatic assistance in the African continent to maintain peace and stability, promote development and provide security. Consequently, when deployed abroad, military emergency care providers face unique challenges.

The aim of this paper is to describe the lived experiences of Gauteng-based emergency care providers in delivering emergency medical care amid resource constraints during external deployment. The descriptions were extracted from a larger study titled “exploring lived experiences of Gauteng-based military pre-hospital emergency care providers during external deployment”. The research was conducted using a qualitative, exploratory research design and was guided by a phenomenological approach.

The findings indicate that Gauteng-based military emergency care providers often did not have enough equipment or appropriate transportation to perform their duties during external deployment. As a result, they are hindered from providing quality care to ill and injured patients.

Key words: Military experiences, external deployment, emergency medical care

Introduction

Peace support operations are categorised as peace building, peace enforcement and peace-making, peacekeeping or, collectively, peace support.³⁰⁶Peace support operations are conducted in support of diplomatic efforts to restore and maintain peace in conflict areas often under unfavourable political and economic conditions to accomplish political objectives determined on a diplomatic level and to provide a means of achieving a political solution to problems through the use of military

force.^{307,308} Operations are carried out within the guidelines and boundaries set by the United Nations (UN), the African Union (AU), guerrilla forces and other parties once consent has been granted by the host country to deploy peacekeepers in their territory. These guidelines are important in respecting and promoting the sovereignty of UN member states.³⁰⁹

Healthcare services provision in support of mission personnel in operational areas forms an integral part of peace support operations. These services ensure the physical and mental wellbeing of deployed personnel, the maintenance of human resources and the preservation of life, whilst also reducing the morbidity and mortality of the soldiers deployed in mission areas.³¹⁰ Accordingly, the duties entrusted to military emergency care providers include rendering emergency medical care (EMC) and primary healthcare, as well as evacuating casualties resulting from peace support operations.³¹¹

A study by Shilcutt highlights that the provision of healthcare services in support of mission personnel in operational areas also offers a strategic military advantage that military commanders can use to win battles in that, by saving the lives of the severely injured and treating those with minor injuries, they may continue fighting.³¹² As the fourth arm of service of the South Africa National Defence Force (SANDF), the core aim of the South African Military Health Service is to provide multidisciplinary health care, which includes EMC, to members of the SANDF and their dependents during peacetime, wartime, military operations, disaster relief and humanitarian operations.^{313,314}

Although countries such as Central African Republic (CAR) have been in a state of civil war and instability even before the cold war and still continue to this day, the post-cold war era in Africa has been engulfed with ethnic cleansing, revolt and rebellion against dictatorships and one-party states previously installed by the colonial governments. This led to civil war in many African states such as Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Liberia, Angola, Burundi, Sudan, Nigeria, Chad and Somalia.¹⁰ While some countries went into full-scale civil war, in others guerrilla leaders became warlords and continued the plunder of the natural resources whilst exploiting the masses. This fuelled South Africa's entry into peace support operations in Africa under the auspices of the UN. As international communities such as the United States of America and France continue to decrease their military presence in Africa, so South Africa has pledged military and diplomatic assistance in maintaining peace and stability, promoting development and providing security in the continent.^{315,316} This has led to the SANDF increasing its presence in remote geographical areas in an effort to meet their mandate, all the while facing significant financial constraints.^{317,318} Financial constraints, which result in resource constraints, present military emergency care providers with unique challenges when deployed externally and, hence, warrant a unique approach to the provision of prehospital emergency care.³¹⁹ Additionally, the provision of EMC amid resource constraints is a lived experience of externally deployed military emergency care providers.³²⁰

The aim of this paper is to discuss the descriptions of the lived experiences of Gauteng-based emergency care providers providing EMC amid resource constraints during external deployment. The descriptions were extracted from a larger study titled “exploring the lived experiences of Gauteng-based military pre-hospital emergency care providers during external deployment”. The study aimed to explore and describe these lived experiences of Gauteng-based military prehospital emergency care providers (PECPs) when providing EMC when deployed abroad.

Method

The study was conducted using a qualitative, exploratory design guided by social phenomenology. According to Creswell, a phenomenological approach is used to describe what a population experiences and how they interpret their experiences of a particular phenomenon.³²¹ According to Polit and Beck, exploratory designs illuminate the way in which a phenomenon manifest.³²²

The study was conducted within four South African Military Health Units based in Gauteng Province, namely, 7 Medical Battalion Group, Area Military Health Unit Gauteng, 8 Medical Battalion Group and the School for Military Health Training, during August 2016. The data was obtained from semi-structured, in-depth individual interviews held with eighteen (n=18) PECPs enlisted in the South African Military Health Service based in Gauteng. Written informed consent was obtained prior to the interviews being conducted. Purposive, random sampling was used to obtain 25 participants from the 276 PECPs who provide military EMC in Gauteng. The purposive sampling method employed a type of non-probability sampling where the decisions in relation to the individuals to be included in a study are taken by the researcher.³²³ The researchers used eligibility requirements as contained in the inclusion criteria and assessed them by using the participant sign-up form, as advised in a paper by Morgan and Given, to purposefully select 55 participants who had been deployed externally from the four units.³²⁴ Accordingly, a sample of 25 participants was randomly selected using the Microsoft Excel randomisation tool. As a result of data saturation, data collection was terminated after 18 participants had been interviewed.

Participants had to be full-time members of the SANDF with a minimum of two years' experience and should have been externally deployed. These participants were chosen as they could provide a comprehensive account of their experiences as PECPs during external deployment. The data collection tool was pre-tested prior to data collection with three PECPs working at the Area Military Health Unit in KwaZulu-Natal. The pre-testing gave an opportunity to refine the interview skills and to ensure that the interview questions were appropriate.

Ethical clearance to conduct the study was provided by the higher education institution through which the study was undertaken (IREC 45/16). Gatekeeper permission was granted by the 1 Military Research Ethics Committee (IMH/302/6/01.02.2016) as well as Defence Intelligence (DI/SSDCI/DDS/R/202/3/7).

Thematic analysis was used to analyse the data. This involved searching for themes that emerged which were key to describing the experiences of PECPs working at the South African Military Health Service, Gauteng. The process of thematic analysis started when themes were noted during data collection, continued while data was transcribed and ended when the themes were reported. Data was transcribed verbatim and the transcripts uploaded onto NVivo Computer Aided Qualitative Data Analysis Software. The researchers familiarised themselves with the data by reading the transcriptions repeatedly whilst listening to the original audio interviews to check for accuracy. The researchers also noted down and brainstormed their initial ideas, which allowed them to immerse themselves in the data.^{325,326,327}

Initial codes, some of which were established during data collection, were produced from the data and organised into nodes in NVivo. Further codes emerged during the data analysis as the researchers immersed themselves in the data. When all the data had been coded, the codes identified were combined in NVivo to form broader themes –some forming the main themes and some the sub-themes, and some were categorised still further within the sub-themes.

Results

With regard to experience, the study identified that 12 participants had between six to ten years, two had between 20 and 25 years and another two had between 11 and 15 years. The remaining two participants had between three- and five-years' experience.

Five themes emerged from the interviews that were conducted. However, this paper discusses only the results related to the themes “Resources” and “Political situation during external deployment” and the subthemes within these themes. “Resources” here refers to the tools and equipment that military emergency care providers require to perform their duties during external deployment. However, the theme “Political situation during external deployment” refers to the political state of affairs in the host country during the external deployment period. The two subthemes that emerged with regard to the theme “Resources” were “limited resources” and “unique casualty transportation”. The four subthemes that emerged regarding the theme “Political situation during external deployment” were “political will of the host country”, “civilian hostility”, “gaps between what the mandate authorises” and “prolonged casualty evacuation times”. Although in the main study, five subthemes emerged within the theme “Political will of the host country”, this paper omits the subtheme “gaps between what the mandate authorises” as it provides no pertinent information to achieving the aim of this paper.

Resources

Limited resources

The majority of participants indicated that they had been poorly resourced during external deployment and that they often lacked the essential lifesaving equipment that

they required to do their jobs, and thus they had to improvise when providing their patients with EMC. One participant described their experiences as follows:

I encountered a lot of challenges because we were using the ambulance that side that didn't have equipment. The only equipment I had was my medical bag, with the medication [which] I stocked mo [Sesotho: here], here in South Africa before I left [Participant 10].

Another combat medic highlighted that the equipment that was available was outdated and some of it was damaged:

So, you go to external deployment your, you, I'm going to find the same equipment that I saw 2013 or even before is still in there. It's broken, we are fixing. So, I understand they say medical equipment is expensive but it's a must have ... so, if we can get equipment then everything, I think, will be fine. Medical bags, you go there, I'll find the same bag I was using 2011, not even 2013, I'm still going to find the same medical bag [Participant 1].

There were also challenges involved in receiving equipment that had been ordered. It was also found that PECPs often had to purchase supplies such as medication using their own funds in order to ensure EMC provision. One participant stated:

There was a point at which we had to buy from our own pockets as emergency medical care providers, including the doctor; we had to pop out some money, buy vacoliters and admin sets because we didn't have but, otherwise, we just, literally, medication and equipment, because when we do our inspection you find that we, we are supposed to have certain things at the sickbay but then we do not have and it's not promising [certain] that we, we can get those things within the period that we are deployed for [Participant 14].

The participant also highlighted the practice of borrowing equipment from other bases during inspections to mislead inspectors regarding the current state of preparedness:

The minute you get there, I just felt like they forget about you, like I said previously about the equipment and, every time when we have inspection, we need to borrow from a certain base just to make as if we have everything, but we didn't really have everything because, after that inspection you return that. So, what are you left with, basically, you're not combat ready [Participant 14].

Unique casualty transportation

This study revealed that participants had to use combat vehicles to transport patients owing to the shortage of ambulances. One participant reported that:

My second one was in Sudan where we didn't have ambulances at all, we had to use mambas [armoured personnel carrier]; caspirs [armoured ambulance] were there as ambulances but they were unserviceable... So, we had to use mambas which are a transport that transports troops to the bush for patrols... it's not an ambulance. If I had an emergency, it was much of a hassle [Participant 10].

While another participant reported:

Even the vehicles, sometimes the vehicles, you find one vehicle there, other vehicles are broken and then you must utilise other means of transport when you are there, not even your specific marked medical vehicle, you must use the combatants' vehicle to move around [Participant 3].

The combat vehicles are not suitable for patient care and are not marked with either the Red Cross or the Red Crescent and, hence, do not comply with the requirements of the Geneva Convention for the transportation of patients.

Political situation during external deployment

Political will of the host country

Participants highlighted that a lack of political will of the host country often causes delays in the provision of supplies and a lack of resources. They reported that logistical flights were not given landing rights, which delayed the arrival of supplies and resources. One participant reported that:

If you want to get medicine into a certain country you must wait for, for that peoples' foreign affairs members to allow, sometimes, an aeroplane into the, the country. That's why, sometimes, there are, sometimes, there are challenges because, sometimes, you get medic, uh, the support, uh, the supporting things like medicine or equipment, sometimes you get it little bit late, but that doesn't mean SAMHS doesn't support you. The thing [cargo aircraft] is on the ground, it stands at the airport, but it can't, for example; maybe land in that country because of the, uh, landing rights of certain countries [Participant 16].

Another participant reported that:

Whenever we need to get, eh, our, our parcels from South Africa here you find that they tell you that there are no flights that are allowed to land that side, so, sometimes, also with the, with the support maybe, eh, eh, the things like the logistical things that we needed, it was also a challenge, like, to get because, like, eh, the Sudanese, the way they operate is totally different to the way we operate ... [Participant 18].

One participant also highlighted that, at times host countries used religious observances as a justification for providing low political support to the mission:

The only thing that we were having challenges about it was, eh, medication, shortage of medication but we managed to deal with the medication that we had, so we were using what we have, like, for instance, let me just make an example with ops medics, uhm, you find that you have, you don't have enough, eh, equipment or you don't have equipment, you'll improvise, so whatever that we were having that side, we used it because we were told that we have challenge with the plane to go from here to Sudan. Those eh, eh, eh, things that the Sudanese are doing, like, uh, there mustn't be any plane in because of these Ramadan things so... [Participant 2].

Civilian hostility

Participants reported that their lack of resources within the mission areas led to them taking the initiative to equip themselves and consequently exposing themselves to financial exploitation by the local population. One participant reported that:

I mean, it was terrible, even if you have to buy the medication you must go in there and then you are not allowed and you must go in and check what you need and then some way, somehow, because we are foreigners they were giving us less, eh, we were buying medication – very high, highly expensive, ja [Participant 15].

Prolonged casualty evacuation times

The findings reveal that PECPs often cared for patients for prolonged periods in the pre-hospital setting without essential lifesaving resources. One participant described their experience as follows:

...sometimes you get stuck and then you have to stay overnight away from the base. Eh, sometimes you get ambushed, for instance, nhe, and then still you can't go back to the base and then some of the patients need medication right there and then and then, when it comes to emergency drugs, unfortunately nothing [Participant 9].

...transportation, it's a challenge, most of the times with own forces it's very far from the base because we drive long distances to do your laers [Afrikaans: laager], like to transport trucks and all that, so the challenge was the resources and transportation, mostly [Participant 17].

Combat medics also experienced prolonged waiting times to obtain authority to evacuate casualties by air. One participant reported that:

when I got injured..., I waited for two weeks for the chopper to come and take me to the level two hospital [Participant 10].

Due to prolonged waiting times to obtain authority for air evacuation, military commanders often resorted to road transportation to get the job done:

It will take you two days to transport the patient to, to a hospital, you see, because the terrain and also the transport, because you cannot transport the patient from where we were situated with the mamba, for a distance of about 300 kilos [kilometres], you see, you will drive for five days. It was a challenge [Participant 18].

Discussion

The lived experiences of the resource constraints reported by the PECPs responsible for providing EMC during external deployment give an indication of the challenges emergency care providers may encounter when deployed during peace support operations in the sub-Saharan African region. Under these conditions, such resource constraints are an obstacle to the effective provision of EMC to ill and injured patients. In addition, this adversity is further exacerbated when host countries offer inadequate political support to the mission.

The participants in this study reported that they often have insufficient equipment to perform their duties. Sigrí and Basar assert that operational resources such as healthcare equipment are often scarce during external deployment.³²⁸ Similarly, studies by Chapman *et al* and Mark *et al* concur that resource constraints are a common challenge for military emergency care providers.^{329,330}

It remains the sole responsibility of the deploying countries to equip their soldiers with the necessary tools, resources and logistics.³³¹ However, it is the host country's responsibility to ensure that peacekeepers have freedom of movement within their borders, which is essential for deploying countries to ship resources and logistics to their deployed soldiers.³³² Financial constraints and budget cuts in the home country may be a contributing factor to the lack of resources that is experienced by emergency care providers during external deployment. Conversely, host countries offering little or no political support to the mission present another major contributing factor to the lack of resources.³³³ These factors result in management on the ground having to resort to deception. For example, as reported by participants, during inspections equipment is borrowed from other bases in order to trick the inspectors into thinking that the emergency care providers are fully equipped, combat ready and UN compliant. This deception has the negative effect of delaying the supply of equipment to mission areas because senior management and policymakers believe the soldiers on the ground to be fully equipped. Consequently, deployed emergency care providers' skills and capabilities are underutilised, and this contributes to the ongoing practice of deploying poorly resourced emergency care providers to the field. In addition, the participants reported that the equipment that is available is often outdated and in poor condition, which further impedes their ability to perform their duties effectively and efficiently.

The participants described a lack of political will by a host country during deployment which delayed the delivery of resources and supplies to the peace support force. They reported that, during their peace support operation, sustenance flights were often not given landing rights by the host country and this delayed much needed

resources and supplies. Dandekar and Gow assert that a lack of political will presents an obstacle to a peace support force achieving its mandate during a peace support operation.³³⁴

They also reported that the host country denied airspace to all flights during Ramadan. A study by Sigri and Basar noted that, during external deployment, deployed military personnel experience hardships owing to a lack of knowledge of foreign cultures, including religion.³³⁵ Without proper planning and the placement of alternative measures this may result in delays in casualty evacuation to definitive care, therefore strategically disadvantaging military commanders as they may have lesser combat ready troops in their disposal. It may therefore be irrefutable to state that the overall success of a peace support operation depends not only on diplomacy and political momentum but also being well equipped and most importantly planning, improvisation and being able to adapt.^{336,337}

Moreover, participants recounted that during external deployment some military emergency care providers felt that, in view of the lack of resources, their only alternative if they were to perform their duties was to purchase lifesaving medication from local pharmacies using their own money. Then they would at least be able to provide much-needed emergency care to the ill and injured. This signifies not only the will and determination of military emergency care providers to provide emergency care to the ill and injured despite their circumstances but also the degree of resource deficiency that currently exists for deployed emergency care providers.

Participants also reported that their initiatives to equip themselves consequently led to exposure to financial exploitation by the local population. This may, however, be the result of economic stagnation, unemployment and poverty.³³⁸ Moreover, their initiatives are not without strategic consequences. It is important to note that peace support operations are characterised by ever evolving unconventional guerrilla tactics that are not only limited to sniper fire, improvised explosive devices, landmines, but include booby-traps to achieve military objectives and increase peace keeper and civilian casualties.³³⁹ Therefore the initiative taken by emergency care providers to equip themselves may also make them vulnerable to enemy intelligence operatives by exposing their weakness of resource deficiency. Their vulnerability may lead to a high risk of exposure to unconventional enemy attacks especially as a result of the booby-trapping of purchased items not only by improvised explosives but also weaponised chemical and biological agents.³⁴⁰ Moreover their vulnerability may result in civilian casualties as enemy forces may perceive civilian merchants as aids and informants to the peacekeepers.

It is also important to note that in a conflict that results in a collapsed healthcare system, local regulatory bodies that enforce policies have also collapsed.³⁴¹ Therefore there may be no pharmaceutical regulations, which may result in improper storage and handling of medicines. This may result in adverse drug reactions and decreased efficacy during use, which may prolong treatment times, decrease survival to discharge rates, increase the need for referrals to tertiary facilities and therefore have

a negative impact on emergency care and survival rates, which ultimately results in lesser combat ready soldiers fit for active duty.³⁴² Purchasing medications from the black market may also encourage free enterprise in an economically unstable and lawless environment by increasing demand, which promotes profitability from the sale of counterfeit goods and exposes patients receiving emergency care provided by these emergency care providers to counterfeit medicines which are harmful to their health. Moreover, it will also increase the workload and overall threat to peacekeepers as it may encourage the formation of organised crime syndicates specializing in the distribution of medications. These syndicates may utilise their proceeds to increase the funding available to militias to purchase weapons of war, improve their technological capabilities, advance their campaigns, sustain their logistics and supplies and therefore advance their cause even further. This may therefore have a negative impact on the overall success of the peace support operation. Additionally, it may pose a further challenge to humanitarian relief organisations, military personnel and military emergency care providers by increasing the occurrence of ambushes by these militias who use violence to seize the humanitarian relief from the convoys transporting the resources required during the humanitarian assistance operations.³⁴³

There is also an indication that there is a lack of understanding of the roles and capabilities of deployed emergency care providers by other deployed healthcare professionals. A participant reported that available emergency medications are at times reserved for health care workers who are stationed in static health installations such as sickbays at the base. This results in emergency care providers, who are at the forefront and usually with peacekeepers at the time of injury, being underutilised as they do not have the necessary tools to care for the injured at the time of injury. This may therefore adversely affect morbidity and mortality rates of the injured during ambushes and enemy contact.

A further resource deficit reported by emergency care providers was that of transportation. Participants described how they sometimes had to use combat personnel carriers for casualty transportation. These findings are similar to those of Chapman *et al* who also found that military emergency care providers use unique casualty transportation during external deployment.³⁴⁴ Emergency care providers also sometimes have to use combat vehicles which are not marked with a Red Cross or a Red Crescent owing to the shortage of ambulances which, according to them, is the result of poor maintenance. This is a serious issue because these emergency care providers may not be protected when using an unmarked vehicle as it is not possible to identify them as medical personnel.³⁴⁵ Moreover, the use of armoured personnel carriers such as mambas and caspirs, which are equipped with heavy weaponry, may result in military emergency care providers losing protection under the Geneva Convention. According to the International Committee of the Red Cross protocols supplementing the Geneva Conventions resolutions of 12 August 1949, the use of such vehicles is in violation of the responsibilities of medical personnel, which stipulate that these personnel may only carry light weapons for self-defence.³⁴⁶ The participants also reported that these armoured personnel carriers are not designed for managing and evacuating casualties and thus do not provide a favourable environment for patient care, nor do they comply with Geneva Convention requirements in respect of casualty evacuation.

Conclusion

It is important that the SANDF develop cost-effective and sustainable strategies and means to equip deployed emergency care providers. The SANDF should also raise awareness amongst commanders and other healthcare providers on the importance of emergency care within peace support operations. This will improve the quality of care provided to the ill and injured during external deployment and will also ensure that more South African peacekeepers return home to their families alive and well after heading the call to build a better African continent. Moreover, it will provide a strategic advantage to their role in peacekeeping operations in Africa and assist local populations in these war-torn African countries to receive quality prehospital EMC, thereby increasing the quality of life and thus support nation building.

Limitations

Access to military emergency care providers was challenging owing to their military commitments. This paper was based on research conducted on a military population based in Gauteng only and thus excluded those in other provinces. Accordingly, the paper discusses only the descriptions of the lived experiences of Gauteng-based emergency care providers of the resource constraints faced during external deployment for the purposes of land-based peace support operations.

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Disclaimer

The content is solely the responsibility of the authors and does not necessarily represent the official views of the South African National Defence Force, the South African Military Health Service, Durban University of Technology or the University of Pretoria.

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FACTORS INFLUENCING WORK SATISFACTION OF SINGLE PARENTS IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN NATIONAL DEFENCE FORCE: AN EXPLORATORY STUDY

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Abstract

There has been a documented increase in single-parent families over the years. Various causes, such as divorce, death, irresponsible fathers and choice, to mention but a few, contribute to this increase. Since 2005, the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) has been partaking in various peacekeeping missions on the continent. The deployment of the SANDF is, however, not limited to cross-border activities. The SANDF also deploys its soldiers within the country in border control operations. While some soldiers are deployed within and outside the borders of the country, others remain in the home bases to continue with daily tasks. These soldiers usually work from 08:00–16:00, Monday to Friday. There are instances, however, where they need to work beyond the normal working hours and over weekends to participate in training exercises or even as a result of being deployed. Because of their single-parent status, these soldiers face inherent military challenges as well as role-related ones, which may influence their work satisfaction.

The research reported here aimed to investigate the relationships between stress, work–family conflict, social support and work–family enrichment (WFE) in terms of work satisfaction of single parents in the SANDF.

The sample consisted of 200 regular force SANDF soldiers (comprising 101 single parents and 99 dual parents). All the questionnaires utilised in this study were found to be reliable in an African military sample. Structural model analysis conducted through PLS 3 revealed that only three of the four documented challenges influenced single-parent work satisfaction. Stress did not influence satisfaction, while a lack of social support, work–family conflict (WFC) and WFE influenced work satisfaction. Social support was found to have a moderating effect on work satisfaction while WFC and WFE had a direct influence. These results support the view that commanders need to be sensitised to allow more social support for single parents, and military psychologists could enrich single parents with support programmes.

Introduction

The military has proved to be a crucial part of any country or state.³⁴⁷ Notwithstanding its significance, the military has been referred to as a greedy

institution.³⁴⁸ The military has always been an organisation that demanded of, rather than gave to, those who enjoyed its employment.³⁴⁹ It is further an organisation that dominates and places heavy expectations upon the lifestyles of military members and their families.³⁵⁰ Additionally, the military expects to be prioritised while family and personal circumstances are made the second priority to accommodate the goals, objectives and missions of the military. The military does not only take from service members; it offers them economic and social support to compensate for the sacrifices they make. For example, the military contributes financially when a member moves, and provides support when a soldier is deployed or whenever military personnel come across challenges that are inherent to their jobs or consequences of the job.³⁵¹

Families have transitioned from the traditional profile of two married heterosexual parents to homosexual and single parents.³⁵² In addition to the 'normal' family, the military currently also consists of single-parent families, dual-career families as well as same-sex parent families. The change in families is not only found in the military.³⁵³ Such changes can also be seen in the civilian community.³⁵⁴ A study by Minotte indicates that, although there were similarities between civilian and military communities regarding the increasing number of single parents at the time, the civilian community consisted of a majority of female single parents while six out of ten single parents in the US Air Force were male.³⁵⁵

The above-mentioned figures are expected to change as more women are recruited.³⁵⁶ For example, in 2011, female soldiers made up almost 26,6% of the SANDF compared to the previous all-boys force. Out of 18,5 million children in South Africa, 12,4 million are raised in single-parent homes with the majority living with the mother.³⁵⁷ The SANDF does not have exact figures for single-parent soldiers, nor is it accurately aware of whether members have dependants or not. Generally, the cause of inaccurate statistics stems from the failure by members to disclose their parental status.

Various causes, such as divorce, death, irresponsible fathers and choice contribute to single parenthood and its increase.³⁵⁸ Generally, single parents are primarily made up of more women than men.³⁵⁹ When translated to the world of work, the rise in single parents means that more and more organisations employ single parents and will continue to do so in future. The SANDF is not excluded from these organisations. Literature purports that single parents experience challenges, such as stress, a lack of social support, WFC as well as a lack of WFE.³⁶⁰ These challenges directed the current study, which explored whether the challenges influence the work satisfaction of single parents in the SANDF.

Minotte reports that single parents have unique challenges, which will be explained shortly. It should be noted that these challenges are added to the generic ones that all military members experience, such as stress, long periods away from home, the threat of death, instability, ambiguity and the uncertainty of what could happen next during deployment.³⁶¹ Single parents have been reported to face challenges such as difficulty in integrating work and family demands, a lack of adult support in parenting and a lack

of time to meet all the demands placed upon them.³⁶² Such challenges influence one's well-being and work satisfaction.³⁶³ Work satisfaction is defined as "the cognitive appraisal of a person's work situation or a person's well-being in the work context".³⁶⁴ Well-being further explains the satisfaction that one experiences from one's career as well as from one's well-being in the work environment.³⁶⁵ Seeing that soldiers face specific challenges that are linked to their work and because single-parent soldiers face even more challenges compared to their colleagues who have a partner with whom to share responsibilities, it was expected that experiencing difficulties would influence their work satisfaction.³⁶⁶

Research problem

An important implication of the relationship between the military and military families is that when a person joins the military, the entire family serves.³⁶⁷ The reason for this is that, whatever takes place between the military and a soldier, whether positive or negative, has a profound impact on the family. Having a demanding job, such as soldiering, and looking after children, can be strenuous for a soldier.³⁶⁸ A working parent is faced with dividing his or her resources between the work and family domains, managing stress experienced in the work environment, and preventing harmful spill-over into the family environment. Having a partner with whom to share responsibilities, makes a difference and increases coping.

Work satisfaction as a life domain plays a significant role in the general well-being of individuals.³⁶⁹ When an individual is satisfied with his or her work, his or her well-being is expected to improve, which is ultimately expected to lead to higher commitment or performance. In addition to the challenges that SANDF single parents have been reported to come across, their roles and responsibilities are expected to influence their work satisfaction.³⁷⁰

Most challenges are outcomes of single-parent participation in work, i.e. WFC, work stress and/or a lack of WFE. Work seems to be at the root of most challenges that single parents encounter.³⁷¹ Paradoxically, single parents need work to function successfully. Work is a source of belonging and development for them. Work further equips single parents with financial resources, which grant them the opportunity to elicit child care and household support and to pay for counselling sessions, which may furnish them with stress coping strategies, to mention but a few. Financial resources gained as a result of work further allow single parents to develop new skills in the work environment, which may help them function more optimally in the family environment and improve their WFE than without work.

This study aimed to contribute and add to the literature by providing an understanding of the research of work satisfaction for single parents in the SANDF. The primary aim of the study was to investigate the relationship between stress, WFC, social support and WFE, as factors that influence the work satisfaction of single-parent soldiers in the SANDF. In doing so, specific research questions were formulated.

- Is there a relationship between stress and work satisfaction?
- Is there a relationship between social support and work satisfaction?
- Is there a relationship between work–family conflict (WFC) and work satisfaction?
- Is there a relationship between work–family enrichment (WFE) and work satisfaction?
- Is there a relationship between social support and stress?
- Is there a relationship between WFE and stress?
- Is there a relationship between social support and WFC?
- Is there a relationship between social support and WFE?
- Is there a relationship between work satisfaction and WFC?

The remaining part of the article is divided as follows: the literature review, the research, methodology, data collection, results and discussion of results.

Literature review

This section will cover and explain all the concepts on which the study was based, as found in the literature.

Work satisfaction

Work satisfaction is defined as “the cognitive appraisal of a person’s work situation or a person’s well-being in the work context”³⁷² Lent, Brown and Hackett conceptualised work satisfaction through the social-cognitive theory.³⁷³ This perspective unifies subjective and psychological well-being through which cognitive, social, behavioural and affective variables are determinants of global life and domain-specific satisfaction.³⁷⁴ The essential elements are discussed briefly below.³⁷⁵

- Work–educational satisfaction

Work satisfaction is assessed through overall feelings about an individual’s job or his or her feelings about a certain job aspect, e.g. the work itself or rewards. The social-cognitive perspective demands adherence to theory-consistent guidelines, which dictate that predictors must be tailored to dependent variables along significant dimensions, such as the time frame or content.³⁷⁶

- Goals and goal-directed behaviour

The relationship between goals and satisfaction depends on the extent to which an individual focuses on and progresses towards reaching such goals. Goal-directed behaviour allows an individual to activate personal agency towards life and domain-specific satisfaction. The promotion of work satisfaction depends on the extent to

which individuals can set goals, pursue them and perceive efforts as useful in obtaining their goals.³⁷⁷

- Work conditions and outcomes

Certain work conditions, such as stress, conflict and overload, determine the level of satisfaction in the work environment. A determining factor for satisfaction is the perception that the individual holds towards his or her work environment. The effect of work conditions is as severe as the individual perceives it to be. As expected, there will be a difference in individual perceptions as per individual characteristics.³⁷⁸

- Personality and affective traits

The Big Five personality factors have been researched in relation to work satisfaction.³⁷⁹ Factors such as conscientiousness, extraversion and neuroticism have been found to correlate with job satisfaction, which is a dimension or facet of work satisfaction. In addition, Connolly and Viswesvaran found a link between job satisfaction and negative and positive affect.³⁸⁰ Research into this has, however, been contradictory, and additional research is needed to reach consensus.³⁸¹

- Self-efficacy

Self-efficacy is conceptualised as an individual's belief about his or her capability to perform behaviours necessary for the achievement of work goals. Self-efficacy is directly linked to job satisfaction, which is a contributing factor to work satisfaction.

- Goal-relevant environmental supports, resources and obstacles

Specific environmental variables play a key role in the achievement of individual goals and objectives. Variables such as material and social support promote individual satisfaction. The presence of environmental constraints and the absence of supports reduce satisfaction in the workplace.

Work satisfaction amongst military forces seems to be poorly researched. At the time of the current study, the authors could not find any literature indicating the level of work satisfaction in the SANDF, particularly for single parents, in relation to stress, social support, WFC and WFE. This research is therefore expected to make a contribution in this regard and to clarify the level of work satisfaction amongst single-parent soldiers in the SANDF.

Stress and single parents

Lazarus and Folkman define stress as “a relationship with the environment that the person appraises as significant for his or her well-being and in which the demands tax or exceed coping resources”,³⁸² Several studies have been conducted focusing on stress and work satisfaction. Most literature points to a negative relationship between stress and work outcomes.³⁸³ Stress takes away one's engagement, commitment and ultimate performance in the workplace.³⁸⁴

Moreau and Mageau observed that, in their study, the majority of individuals who worked in highly stressful occupations experienced low levels of work satisfaction. In addition to the low levels of work satisfaction, the authors found that individuals in demanding work contexts experienced high levels of psychological difficulties, which were manifested in the form of stress and psychological distress.³⁸⁵ Moreau and Mageau also noted that one of the contributing factors to low work satisfaction in such work environments was the lack of supervisor and colleague support, which had a negative influence on employee well-being.³⁸⁶ There is therefore a need to enhance the amount of research evaluating stress and work satisfaction in the military. The little work satisfaction literature that is available focuses on the relationship between work satisfaction and job satisfaction. An understanding of work satisfaction draws its distinction from job satisfaction. Although they are both work-related outcomes, job satisfaction is merely a component of work satisfaction.

Based on the negative relationships that have been documented between stress and work satisfaction, as well as social support and work satisfaction in work environments, such as protection and security, which are as stressful as the military, it can be expected that the relationship between stress and the work satisfaction of single parents will bear similar results. The majority of single parents do not have adequate support systems, which could result in their inability to function in both their work and life domains successfully.³⁸⁷ It appears that in order for one to survive in an environment as demanding as the military, social support is a necessity.

Social support

Social support is defined as “information leading a person to believe that they are cared for and loved, esteemed and valued and integrated within a network of communication and mutual obligation”.³⁸⁸ For one to obtain a deeper understanding of social support, a broad description of the various perspectives to bear in mind is needed.³⁸⁹

In the context of this study, social support was evaluated through the perceptions that individuals hold (i.e. social support is subjective). The appraisal perspective describes social support in terms of the extent to which single parents perceive whether or not they receive support and the level of support they receive from their environment.³⁹⁰ In this instance, the environment refers to personal relationships and the organisation. When individuals are not overwhelmed by their stressful environments, they react positively to them and cope. When single parents experience stress, their appraisal of the stress situation and the resources available to them (i.e. social support) allows them to react to the situation and cope positively.

The majority of research conducted regarding social support and satisfaction in the work domain focuses on social support and job satisfaction. The studies indicate a positive relationship where social support has either an incremental or a moderating effect on job satisfaction.³⁹¹ Job satisfaction is a facet of work satisfaction. Building on the aforementioned, the authors are of the opinion that there will be a positive relationship between social support and work satisfaction.

Work–family conflict

Greenhaus and Beutell define WFC as “a form of interrole conflict in which role pressures from the work and family domains are mutually incompatible in some respect”.³⁹² The conflicting relationship between work and family seems bidirectional, meaning that work can influence family and vice versa.³⁹³ According to Greenhaus and Powell, WFC occurs when participation in a particular work activity interferes with the involvement in a competing family activity or when work stress has an adverse effect on behaviour within the family domain.³⁹⁴ For example, WFC may occur when a soldier is appointed in a promotional post, which will require him or her to commit more hours or travel more than before. On the other hand, WFC is experienced when stressful or disturbing issues in the family have a negative overspill into the work domain.

WFC has been found to have a significant impact on work satisfaction. According to Porfeli and Mortimer, the work satisfaction of individuals depends on their perception of the extent to which work can support their families rather than personal values or goals.³⁹⁵ In the same vein, Mauno, Ruokolainen and Kinnunen found that supportive relationships, more specifically social support in the form of supervisor support, led to reduced WFC.³⁹⁶ Supervisor support led to the increased utilisation of family-friendly benefits without fear of negative consequences. Due to the inherently demanding nature of the military, WFC can be said to be a negative factor regarding the relationship between the military (unit) and the soldier’s family.³⁹⁷ The combination of stable families and well-integrated groups leads to a positive spill-over from the family into the work environment.³⁹⁸ This combination is the opposite of WFC and leads to its reduction. Supportive leaders could ensure there is little WFC, which can be expected to contribute to the increase of work satisfaction.

Work–family enrichment

Work–family enrichment (WFE) is defined as “the extent to which experiences in one role improve the quality of life, namely performance or affect in the other role”.³⁹⁹ Enrichment takes place when the resource gains in Role A directly or indirectly improve performance in Role B. WFE is the positive side of the mostly negative work–family interface. It builds on the notion of positive spill-over.⁴⁰⁰ To explain further, WFE occurs when resources, such as skills, perspectives, flexibility, physical, social capital and material resources generated in one domain, improve the performance in the other domain or influence the psychological state or affect.⁴⁰¹

The majority of literature explains WFE as a positive construct.⁴⁰² This means it has an empowerment quality within it or it could be utilised by organisations to decrease conflict within the work and family interface.⁴⁰³ Hunter, Perry, Carlson and Smith evaluated the practicality of applying WFE in team-based organisations. The results indicated that WFE could be successfully applied in organisations as individuals who work in teams benefited more from WFE than individuals who worked independently. Employees who operated in teams were found to benefit from

both work–family enrichment and from family–work enrichment.⁴⁰⁴ Furthermore, WFE was found to be a mediator in the relationship between team resources and satisfaction. Such findings allow one to assume that WFE can be applied successfully in the military, more specifically within the SANDF, and could have a positive impact on the satisfaction and well-being of single parents.

WFE could be a valuable resource for empowering single parents, especially those in the military.⁴⁰⁵ In most cases, the relationship between the military and the family is characterised by WFC. Having a resource that balances the scales in this relationship could go a long way in maintaining a positive interaction between the two. When single parents transfer skills learned in one domain to the other, this creates a level of understanding and appreciation between the domains.⁴⁰⁶ As WFE has been linked to work-related outcomes that constitute work satisfaction, it can be expected that the more WFE single parents achieve, the higher the likelihood that their work satisfaction will increase. WFE can thus be expected to be an influential factor towards work satisfaction. Figure 1 below indicates the proposed model of work satisfaction for single-parent soldiers in the SANDF as rooted in the theoretical discussion and which formed the model that was tested during the empirical research.




Figure 1: The proposed model of work satisfaction for single parents in the SANDF

Research Methodology

This section of the article outlines the research methodology followed in the study.

Research design

The research design adopted for this study was non-experimental in nature, with the quantitative research method applied.

Babbie and Mouton define sampling as “the process of selecting observations”.⁴⁰⁷ The convenience sampling method was used. A total sample of 200 participants (101 single parents and 99 dual parents) was selected from 2 Field Engineer Regiment, School of Engineers, 35 Engineer Support Regiment and 1 Construction Regiments through the convenience sampling method. Etikan, Musa and Alkassim say that convenience sampling is also referred to as haphazard sampling, which is a type of non-probability or non-random sampling by which individuals who meet particular practical criteria are included in the study.⁴⁰⁸ Such criteria can range from availability to willingness to participate. Although the convenience sampling method lends itself to vulnerabilities, such as bias, its advantages outweigh the disadvantages. The technique has advantages, such as affordability and practicality as well as the availability of participants.⁴⁰⁹ The criteria applied for the current research were suitability, availability and willingness to participate.

Measuring instruments

The following instruments were used in the study.

- Perceived Stress Survey 10 (PSS 10)410

The survey comprises 10 items. Items were designed to indicate the extent to which respondents regard their lives to be overloaded, unpredictable and uncontrollable. Each item is rated on a five-point Likert-type scale ranging from 0 (never) to 4 (almost always). Positively worded items (items 4, 5, 7 & 8) are reverse scored, and the ratings are summed, with higher scores indicating higher levels of perceived stress.⁴¹¹ Questions in the scale were designed in a general manner, which meant that they are free of content that is only applicable to a specific subpopulation. This allows the scale to apply to any population within any work environment. In the current study, the survey reported alpha and test–retest coefficients of 0.85.⁴¹²

- Medical Outcomes Study (MOS) Social Support Survey413

The MOS Social Support Survey is a self-report measure that consists of 20 items.⁴¹⁴ Development of the scale was guided by the most important dimensions of support as found in social support theories. The scale was developed to illustrate the most functional dimensions of social support, which are emotional/informational support, tangible support, affectionate support and positive social interaction. Items are measured on a five-point Likert-type scale, which ranges from 1 (none of the time) to 5 (all of the time). The survey has an overall reliability of above 0.90.⁴¹⁵

- Work–Family Conflict (WFC) Scale416

The WFC scale is a self-report measure consisting of 18 items assessing six conceptually and empirically distinct dimensions.⁴¹⁷ Responses to all items are made on a five-point Likert-type scale (where 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree). The internal consistency of each of the six dimensions is estimated with alpha coefficients. In the current study, the reliabilities for each of the six dimensions

exceeded the conventional 0.70 level of acceptance:

- time-based WIF (work interference on family) – 0.89;
- time-based FIW (family interference on work) – 0.94;
- strain-based WIF – 0.93;
- strain-based FIW – 0.92;
- behaviour-based WIF – 0.94; and
- behaviour-based FIW – 0.93.⁴¹⁸

In the current study, the overall scale exceeded the 0.75 alpha coefficient.⁴¹⁹

- Satisfaction with Work Scale (SWWS)420

The SWWS can be utilised within any organisational context to indicate an individual's satisfaction with his or her career.⁴²¹ The scale further indicates the extent to which people are involved in their work, and the degree to which people intend to leave the organisation. The SWWS consists of five items.⁴²² The scale was adapted from the Satisfaction with Life Scale.⁴²³ During validation, the test–retest reliability of the SWWS was 0.75.⁴²⁴ The instrument uses a seven-point Likert-type scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).

- Work–Family Enrichment (WFE) Scale425

The WFE Scale is a self-report measure, which consists of 18 items and six dimensions measured on a five-point Likert-type scale (1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree).⁴²⁶ In the current study, the internal consistency of each of the six dimensions was estimated using alpha coefficients. The reliabilities exceeded the conventional level of acceptance of 0.70, namely:

- work to family development 0.73;
- work to family affect 0.91;
- work to family capital 0.90;
- family to work development 0.87;
- family to work affect 0.84;
- family to work efficiency 0.82; and
- the full scale 0.92.⁴²⁷

Data Collection

Before commencing with data collection, ethics clearance was obtained from the Stellenbosch University ethics bodies, i.e. the Departmental Ethics Screening Committee (DESC) and Research Ethics Committee (REC). Permission was also sought from and granted by the General Officer Commanding of the South African Army Engineer Corps as well as the General Officer Commanding Defence Intelligence. Before data was collected, the purpose of the research was explained to participants, which included an explanation of the confidentiality of participation.

Participants were informed that their participation in the study was voluntary and they could withdraw at any point without any negative consequences. Participants were requested to complete a consent form, which indicated their informed willingness to participate in the study. The duration of completing the questionnaire (i.e. maximum 60 minutes) was explained to participants beforehand. All ethical requirements as stipulated by Stellenbosch University and the Health Professions Council of South Africa (HPCSA) were followed strictly.

Statistical Analysis

STATISTICA 12 and partial least squares (PLS) with the software SMART PLS 3 were used to analyse the data. A 5% significance level ($p < 0.05$) was used as a guideline for determining significant relationships.⁴²⁸

Results

The results of the study are provided and explained in this section.

Descriptive statistics

The results showed that the sample comprised 28% female and 72% male participants. The sample consisted of Africans (85%), coloureds (11%), whites (3,5%) and Asians/Indians (0,5%). Participants' ages were distributed as follows: 8% was 24 years and younger, 52% was between 25 and 34 years, 18% was between 35 and 44 years, and 23% were 45 years or older.

Reliability analysis

The reliability of the various scales was estimated for this sample. Cronbach's alpha was applied to measure reliability. Table 1 provides the reliability of the various scales, and is followed by a discussion of their alpha coefficients.

Table 1: Scales reliability coefficients results

Variable (scale)	Cronbach's alpha (α)
Perceived Stress Survey 10	0.69
Medical Outcomes Study Social Support Survey	0.95
Work–Family Conflict Scale	0.78
Work–Family Enrichment Scale	0.88
Satisfaction with Work Scale	0.83

Reliability analysis returned acceptable and significant Cronbach's alpha levels, ranging from 0.69 to 0.95, were found. All the scales were deemed appropriate and fair in line with the study sample.

Correlation analysis

A correlation of 0.80 to 1.00 is referred to as a high correlation and acceptable, a correlation of 0.60 to 0.79 is referred to as moderately high and acceptable, a correlation of 0.40 to 0.59 is referred to as moderate, a correlation of 0.20 to 0.39 is referred to as low, and any correlation below 0.20 is disregarded.⁴²⁹

Table 2: Spearman correlations between the variables of interest

From variable	To variable	Spearman r	p
Stress	Work satisfaction	-0.22	0.00
Social support	Stress	-0.22	0.00
WFE	Stress	-0.35	0.00
Social support	Work satisfaction	0.17	0.02
Social support	WFC	-0.20	0.01
Social support	WFE	0.40	0.00
WFC	Work satisfaction	-0.34	0.00
WFE	Work satisfaction	0.48	0.00
WFE	WFC	-0.27	0.00

The results show low to moderate relationships between variables. Only two relationships of interest between variables were found to be significant (i.e. between social support and work satisfaction, and between social support and WFC).

To confirm the reliability and validity of the model, composite reliability and average variance extracted were conducted. In PLS, a reliability coefficient of 0.70 or higher and a validity coefficient of 0.50 are preferred.⁴³⁰ The R-squared is calculated to measure the variance proportion explained by PLS components. PLS values can be from 0% to 100%. The higher the R-squared value, the higher the model fit. Table 3 below provides results from the aforementioned PLS analyses. This is followed by a discussion of the results.

Table 3: Results overview of the model

Variables	R-squared	Composite reliability	AVERAGE
Social support		0.96	0.65
Stress	0.14	0.76	0.37
WFC	0.09	0.85	0.55
Work satisfaction	0.32	0.88	0.66
WFE	0.16	0.91	0.71

The R-squared results indicate how the model explains a good deal of the percentage in the independent variable. Table 3 indicates that stress ($r^2 = 0.14$) only explains 14% of variance to the structural equation modelling (SEM) model fit, WFC ($r^2 = 0.09$) only explains 9% of variance to the SEM model fit, work satisfaction ($r^2 = 0.32$) only explains 32% of variance to the SEM model fit, and WFE ($r^2 = 0.16$) only explains 16% of variance to the SEM model fit. Based on Table 3, all latent variables met the 0.70 level of acceptance for composite reliability (i.e. 0.76 to 0.96). Based on Table 3, only four latent variables have acceptable average values. Stress (0.37) failed to meet the required threshold of 0.50.

Following the reliability and validity overview of the model, the measurement and structural model were computed. Table 4 below provides results for the measurement model.

Table 4: Measurement model

Path	Estimate	Bootstrap lower	Bootstrap upper	Significant
Social support > MOS10	0.74	0.66	0.82	yes
Social support > MOS11	0.75	0.68	0.81	yes
Social support > MOS12	0.72	0.63	0.79	yes
Social support > MOS13	0.81	0.75	0.85	yes
Social support > MOS14	0.81	0.74	0.86	yes
Social support > MOS15	0.80	0.74	0.85	yes
Social support > MOS16	0.78	0.71	0.84	yes
Social support > MOS17	0.77	0.69	0.84	yes
Social support > MOS18	0.81	0.76	0.86	yes
Social support > MOS19	0.81	0.74	0.87	yes
Social support > MOS2	0.61	0.51	0.70	yes
Social support > MOS20	0.79	0.72	0.85	yes
Social support > MOS3	0.73	0.64	0.80	yes
Social support > MOS4	0.72	0.63	0.80	yes
Social support > MOS5	0.78	0.71	0.83	yes
Social support > MOS6	0.67	0.55	0.76	yes
Social support > MOS7	0.79	0.71	0.85	yes
Social support > MOS8	0.78	0.70	0.83	yes

Social support > MOS9	0.79	0.71	0.84	yes
Stress > PSS1	0.68	0.51	0.77	yes
Stress > PSS10	0.74	0.61	0.82	yes
Stress > PSS2	0.72	0.59	0.79	yes
Stress > PSS3	0.77	0.65	0.83	yes
Stress > PSS4	0.08	-0.21	0.34	no
Stress > PSS5	0.36	0.01	0.59	yes
Stress > PSS6	0.67	0.51	0.77	yes
Stress > PSS7	-0.23	-0.49	0.06	no
Stress > PSS8	0.11	-0.21	0.39	no
Stress > PSS9	0.74	0.62	0.81	yes
WFE > family to work affect	0.72	0.57	0.82	yes
WFE > family to work development	0.78	0.66	0.86	yes
WFE > family to work efficiency	0.65	0.48	0.78	yes
WFE > work to family affect	0.87	0.82	0.90	yes
WFE > work to family capital	0.86	0.80	0.89	yes
WFE > work to family development	0.86	0.81	0.90	yes
WFC > behaviour interference with family	0.72	0.58	0.80	yes
WFC > behaviour interference with work	0.70	0.57	0.79	yes
WFC > strain interference with family	0.81	0.73	0.86	yes
WFC > strain interference with work	0.65	0.48	0.77	yes
WFC > time interference with family	0.71	0.59	0.79	yes
WFC > time interference with work	0.57	0.38	0.72	yes
Work satisfaction > SWSS1	0.80	0.71	0.86	yes
Work satisfaction > SWSS2	0.8	0.72	0.85	yes
Work satisfaction > SWSS3	0.87	0.82	0.90	yes
Work satisfaction > SWSS4	0.79	0.71	0.85	yes
Work satisfaction > SWSS5	0.59	0.46	0.7	yes

Table 4 above indicates variables that were included in the model and shows whether they were significant or not. Only WFE and WFC were composed of dimensions, which contributed to the latent variables. Stress, social support and work satisfaction were measured as latent variables. Social support and work satisfaction had significant coefficient levels and relatively high estimates. The latent variable, stress, however, only had seven significant items with high levels. PSS 4, 7 and 8 were insignificant and had low values (i.e. 0.08, -0.23 and 0.11 respectively). WFE consists of six dimensions that were used as manifest variables to measure the latent variable. All six dimensions were found to be significant with relatively high values ranging from 0.65 to 0.87. WFC consists of six dimensions, which were used to measure the main latent variable. All six dimensions were found to be significant with relatively high values ranging from 0.57 to 0.81.

Table 5: Structural model

Path	Estimate	Bootstrap lower	Bootstrap upper	Significant
Social support > stress	0.00	-0.17	0.18	No
Social support > WFC	-0.10	-0.25	0.64	No
Social support > work satisfaction	0.01	-0.12	0.17	No
Social support > WFE	0.41	0.29	0.53	Yes
Stress > work satisfaction	-0.09	-0.24	0.59	No
WFC > work satisfaction	-0.20	-0.33	-0.61	Yes
WFE > stress	-0.38	-0.54	-0.251	Yes
WFE > WFC	-0.24	-0.42	-0.09	Yes
WFE > work satisfaction	0.42	0.23	0.55	Yes

The results in Table 5 indicate various relationships and directions between variables. The path from social support to stress was positive but insignificant. The path from social support to WFC was negative but insignificant. The path from social support to work satisfaction was positive but insignificant. The path from social support to WFE was positive and significant. The path from stress to work satisfaction was negative but insignificant. The path from WFC to work satisfaction was negative and significant. The path from WFE to stress was negative and significant. The path from WFE to WFC was negative and significant. The path from WFE to work satisfaction was positive and significant. Figure 2 illustrates the results as established in the PLS structural model.




Figure 2: PLS structural model results

Discussion of results

This section of the study covers a discussion of results provided in the previous section.

Correlation results

The results between stress and work satisfaction showed a low but significant negative correlation ($r = -0.22$; $p = 0.00$) and were accepted in accordance with the criteria stipulated.⁴³¹ These results are in agreement with previous research results, which emphasised the negative relationship between stress and work satisfaction or outcomes.⁴³² These results emphasise the need that military psychologists could support single parents with stress management programmes to support better work satisfaction. The results between social support and stress showed a low but significant negative correlation ($r = -0.22$; $p = 0.00$) and these results were accepted in accordance with the criteria stipulated.⁴³³ These results are in agreement with previous results, which emphasised the positive nature of social support.⁴³⁴ When social support increases in an individual's life, stress – among other challenges – decreases; hence, the negative relationship.

The results between WFC and social support showed a low but insignificant negative correlation ($r = -0.20$; $p = 0.01$) and were rejected in line with the criteria as stipulated.⁴³⁵ These results were contradictory to results found in previous research studies where the negative relationship between social support and WFC was established.⁴³⁶ The results of the relationship between social support and WFE showed a moderate and significant positive correlation ($r = 0.40$; $p = 0.00$) and were accepted in line with the stipulated criteria.⁴³⁷ These results are in line with results from previous research, which emphasised the positive and supportive nature of social support.⁴³⁸ Results of the relationship between social support and work satisfaction showed a negligible and insignificant positive correlation ($r = 0.17$; $p = 0.02$).⁴³⁹ These results are contradictory to results found in previous studies, which emphasised the relationship between social support and work satisfaction or outcomes.⁴⁴⁰

Results of the relationship between WFC and work satisfaction showed a low but significant negative correlation ($r = -0.34$; $p = 0.00$) and were acceptable in accordance with the criteria stipulated.⁴⁴¹ The results were in line with results from previous WFC studies, which emphasised the negative influence that conflict between work and family demands has on work-related outcomes.⁴⁴² The results between WFE and WFC showed a low but significant negative correlation ($r = -0.27$; $p = 0.00$) and were acceptable according to the criteria stipulated.⁴⁴³ The results were in line with some of the previous research results, which emphasised the positive nature of WFE and the positive influence it has on the work–family interface.⁴⁴⁴ The results of the relationship between WFE and stress showed a low but significant negative correlation ($r = -0.35$; $p = 0.00$) and were accepted based on criteria as stipulated.⁴⁴⁵ These results were in line with some of the previous research results, which emphasised the positive nature of WFE and the way its availability could lead to a reduction in stress experienced.⁴⁴⁶ The results of the relationship between WFE and work satisfaction showed a moderate and significant positive correlation ($r = 0.48$; $p = 0.00$) and were acceptable according to the criteria stipulated.⁴⁴⁷ These results are in line with some of the results from previous studies, which emphasised the positive nature of WFE and the positive influence it has on work satisfaction or outcomes.⁴⁴⁸

Measurement model analysis

The quality of the measurement model was tested by setting the parameter estimates using the bootstrap technique with intervals set at the 95% level.⁴⁴⁹ The bootstrap method also allows for the testing and estimation of path coefficient and estimate levels.⁴⁵⁰ Positive and significant results were found for social support, stress, WFC, WFE and work satisfaction. Based on the reliability and validity values of the items, reliability and validity were confirmed for all the constructs.

Structural model analysis

The interaction between variables of interest was tested using the PLS structural model analysis. The path coefficient results confirmed that WFC and WFE each had a direct non-mediated effect on work satisfaction. Although no direct effect

from social support to work satisfaction was established, the path coefficient results revealed that social support had a mediating effect on work satisfaction through WFE. WFC influences various life- and work-related outcomes ranging from organisation commitment to turnover, job dissatisfaction and satisfaction with life.⁴⁵¹ While WFE occurs when resources, such as skills, perspectives, flexibility, physical and social capital and material resources in one domain (work) improve, life in the other domain (home) will also improve.⁴⁵² This is also an opportunity where military psychologists could contribute with programmes to minimise WFC and support WFE for better work satisfaction of members.

Concluding Summary

According to the structural model results, the work satisfaction of SANDF single parents is directly and significantly influenced by WFC and WFE. Stress does not have a significant or indirect influence on single-parent work satisfaction. Social support was revealed by the structural model to have an indirect and significant influence on work satisfaction through WFE. WFE proved to be a strong predictor of work satisfaction. Efforts towards increasing WFE can be expected to increase the work satisfaction and well-being of single parents in the SANDF. The incorporation of these results in support programmes and planning will allow the SANDF to provide accurate and effective support services to single parents. Military psychologists and social workers could develop programmes for stress management, social support, sport days, family weekends and WFE. This in turn would increase the work satisfaction of single parents, which would lead to their improved effectiveness in both the work and home environment.

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Book Reviews

MOZAMBICAN CIVIL WAR: MARXIST- APARTHEID PROXY, 1977-1992 (Cold War 1945-1991)

Stephen Emerson

Great Britain: Pen and Sword Military.

2019. 128 pages

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When discussing the Cold War, the Berlin Blockade or the Cuban Missile Crisis frequently comes to the fore. What is often under-researched is how this ideological struggle for influence between Moscow and Washington was repeatedly played out across the African continent. Whilst superpower rivalry drove the United States and the Soviet Union to secure new allies and strategic access to mineral resources in Africa through economic and diplomatic means, it had a dark underbelly. The darker dimension of superpower rivalry in Africa as reflected in the use of military measures: awarding allied African governments with military aid packages, covert military assistance and training whilst undermining those African governments hostile to the donor's interests through support for rebel forces in those countries. Whilst these superpower proxies advanced the interests of their benefactors, they often exacerbated existing societal and political cleavages in the country contributing to the chronic instability with which post-independence African states had to contend. In the case of Mozambique, shortly after replacing the former Portuguese colonial authorities, the Machel government made several mistakes in attempting to create a more inclusive economy, a government that served all its citizens, and the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) movement enamoured with the socialist ideology. In the process, it alienated large segments of Mozambicans – including traditional leaders and the Catholic Church. In this volatile environment, the Mozambican Resistance Movement (RENAMO) emerged.

This book tells the story of RENAMO from its origins in 1977 as a creation of Rhodesian intelligence against Zimbabwean insurgents using Mozambique as an operational base to its patronage by Pretoria in the 1980s to it developing its own indigenous roots amongst ordinary Mozambicans. By 1992, the Mozambican civil war ended peacefully with negotiations in Rome. The price for Mozambicans was horrific war and suffering for sixteen long years. One million Mozambicans were killed and millions more were made refugees or were internally displaced. The economic infrastructure also lay in ruins – ruins, from which Mozambique have scarcely recovered.

Meticulously researched, incisive, using previously unexplored archival resources and scores of interviews with veteran Rhodesian and Zimbabwean officers, former FRELIMO and RENAMO soldiers – including interviewing RENAMO leader Afonso Dhlakama – Emerson provides fresh insights into the Mozambican civil war, merging personal insights of protagonists with the broader strategic landscape. What emerges is an objective account of the civil war from the deep personal insights of the various protagonists – regional and national – whilst the civil war raged. Whilst the focus is on the conflict between FRELIMO and RENAMO itself, the book is contextualised within the broader context of the Cold War explaining the motivations of the United States and Moscow, the fragility of post-independence African states, the Southern African strategic environment and the machinations of Salisbury and Pretoria in getting involved in the Mozambican theatre.

Whilst academics would find this account of tremendous importance, Emerson provides much more than a novel historical account of the civil war. Policymakers would find the insights of strategic importance when seeking to learn lessons for ending contemporary conflicts. For instance, Emerson's account of RENAMO's lack of political acumen and its highly centralised decision-making process, which created needless obstacles in the negotiations between the parties is superb. FRELIMO, meanwhile, too easily dismissed RENAMO as merely a foreign proxy or bandit movement. In the process, the legitimate grievances driving the insurgency were not dealt with, preventing negotiations from taking place earlier. On the more positive side, the fact that opposing parties shared similar backgrounds created the necessary empathy needed for rapport and trust to develop. Such was the case between Zimbabwe's former President Robert Mugabe and Dhlakama who were both guerrilla fighters, Shona speakers and Catholic educated. Following their meeting in Malawi, Mugabe told the RENAMO leader, "You have your dignity and you know what you are fighting for." The meeting between the Zimbabwean president and the Mozambican guerrilla set the basis for constructive talks, which were to lead to the historic August 1992 peace negotiations, which concluded Mozambique's brutal civil war.

Emerson's book is a veritable tour de force and should find its way in the curriculum of any course focusing on Africa issues of peace and security

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Book Reviews

COLD WAR 1945 – 1991

BIAFRA GENOCIDE, NIGERIA: BLOODLETTING AND MASS STARVATION, 1967 – 1970

Al J Venter

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2018

127 pages

Maps, photographs

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The book begins with an introduction in which the author recounts the colonial history. He maintains that the average Nigerian does not like to be reminded of the fact that, until 1960, Nigeria was ruled from London. The author acknowledges the progress made by Nigeria in infrastructure –schools, clinics, hospitals, administrative centres, rail links - which made him compare Nigeria (as the “African pearl”) with India, which he describes as the “jewel in the British Crown”. The author identifies the bloody counter-coup of July 1966 as a major event which led to the Biafran War following hostilities that led to the death of people of Southern Nigerian origin, the majority of whom were from the Igbo tribe. In the process, the Nigerian Civil War started and marked “one of the first times Western countries were awakened and deeply affronted by the level of the suffering and the scale of the atrocities played out in this corner of the African continent” (p. 11). Perhaps, this justifies Venter’s choice of the title of the book. In his opinion, the efforts made by “friends of Biafra” to send relief materials to the “beleaguered state” did not meet the aims as most of the relief aircraft were used for ‘arms smuggling’. Hence, “most of the people who died in the war either starved to death or were debilitated that their frail bodies were unable to counter infection or disease” (p. 15). This lends credence to the position of RN Ogbudinkpa, in *The economics of the Nigerian Civil War and its prospects for national development* (Enugu: Fourth Dimension Press, 1985), where he insists that many people died in the war as a result of starvation and not military activities. However, despite the difficulties associated with wartime environments, Venter, like most journalists who covered the war, was in Biafra until the end of the war.

In Chapter 1, Venter attempts a discussion of the Biafran War which he sees as a spill-over effect of the amalgamation policies of the British colonial government, which transformed into a civil war within seven years after independence. He maintains that at the onset of the war, the Nigerian army had a small professional force which was characterised by poor leadership, poor coordination and poor administration. However, one of the strategies adopted by Yakubu Gowon (the Nigerian Head of State during the War) was the economic blockade in which all Biafran ports were blockaded and “within months, the conflict degenerated into one of the most brutal tit-for-tat wars of attrition Africa has seen since the end of World War II (p. 23). Venter recognises that although the Biafran armed forces were in no way comparable in strength, firepower or manpower to what the central authority in Lagos was able to put into the field (p. 24), the Biafrans were able to put up counter-offensives mostly in the rainy seasons against federal offensives in dry seasons.

Chapter 2 opens with a description of the events of 19 July 1966, when the first fight broke out in Lagos, after the second coup or what is widely referred to as the ‘counter-coup’. As is known with coups, the moment the military took over power, they occupied all the government machinery, including editorial offices of all the country’s newspapers, making it difficult for the events to be reported. The chapter ends with a statement that, because of intimidation from the military, people became cautious even as secret recruitment and training of young Ibo males were going on in the Easter region.

Chapter 3 gives an account of the early stages of the actual war, taking into consideration the tactical mistakes, which led to a series of disasters in the attempt by the federal army to overrun some Biafran towns, which changed hands either for Nigeria or for Biafra at different times in the course of the war. The author maintains that, although the federal government had hoped to starve Biafra into submission, “it was force of numbers that ultimately made them victorious” (p. 40). Venter identifies the presence of mercenaries on both sides of the war although he claims that, due to administrative misunderstandings between the Biafrans and the mercenaries, the latter had little influence on the outcome of the war. However, despite the numerical advantage of the federal army over Biafra, Ojukwu was able to cash in on Gowon’s miscalculation and launched an offensive aimed at taking Lagos, which was absolutely empty (troop-wise) as the federal army was concentrated on the other side of the Benin River. The Biafrans were however unable to grab the victory, which was almost in sight as a result of the activities of Brigadier Banjo who was seen as a ‘traitor’. It was the Midwest Invasion and the attempt by the Biafrans to overrun Lagos, which transformed the war into a total war and the aggressive recruitment by Gowon, thereby increasing the Nigerian army.

In Chapter 4, the author discusses the inordinate will to survive among Biafrans despite been surrounded by the enemy. As the war raged, the cost of essential commodities became high and even the nightly flights into Biafra could not meet the supply needs of several million people cut off from the outside world by the blockade. However, there were dozens of home industries, which supplemented the relief materials brought in by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Joint

Church Aid and others. Venter remarks that, “it was agreed afterwards that Biafra’s ability to survive was due largely to the remarkable competence of the ordinary Biafran” (p. 54).

Chapter 5 discusses the personal attributes of the leaders of the dyads –Gowon and Ojukwu. Gowon was a good man who earned the support of the British against Ojukwu who was not in the good books of the British. In fact, Ojukwu was detested by the British who saw him as “stubborn and opinionated” (p. 71).

In Chapter 6, the author acknowledges the direct or indirect involvement of foreign powers – in favour of Nigeria in the Nigerian-Biafran War. The Biafrans did not waste time in organising a rag-tag air force, which brought in military supplies from South Africa and Portugal even before the war had been declared formally. Biafran aircraft were mainly obtained through hijacking of Nigerian aircraft, which gave the former air superiority over the latter at the beginning of the war. The Biafran Air Force launched several attacks against the Nigerian Navy, which was charged with the responsibility of enforcing the blockade of Biafra. In a bid to weaken the Biafran dominance in the air, Nigeria turned to the Soviet Union, Great Britain, Sudan and other sympathising countries for aircraft. However, when Nigeria gained air superiority, and with the wartime policies of Gowon, Biafra resorted to night flights, which ensured the supply of military hardware and relief materials by the Joint Church Aid, the ICRC and other ‘friends of Biafra’. The flights were undertaken by mercenaries from other countries who were arranged into the 4th Commando Brigade, which was notorious for its offensives in the Onitsha and Owerri sectors of the war. However, the inability to reach an acceptable compromise on the mode of supply of relief materials to ‘dying Biafrans’ by the federal government and Biafra led to the continuous flow of weapons into Biafra by way of night flights until the end of the war. Venter acknowledges “there were approximately sixteen mercenary pilots hired by the Nigerian Air Force comprising the British, South African, French, Australian, Polish and possibly one or two nationalities” (p. 82) who flew the Russian MIG fighters and other aircraft. On the Biafran side, Count von Rosen created what was called an “instant air force” for the near-planeless Biafra (p. 88) comprising mercenaries from different countries that supported Biafra. These mercenaries flew the Biafran Minicons which were among the smallest modern aircraft built at the time, and other aircraft acquired by Biafra in the course of the war.

Chapter 7 discusses the mercenary component of the war in which the author maintains “quite a number of mercenaries headed to Biafra once the war started and included soldiers of fortune from many European countries, South Africa, Rhodesia, Australia, Canada and Britain as well as one or two Chinese Nung fighters” (p. 97). In another statement, the author argues that there were actually more mercenaries active with the Biafran forces than are given credit for because Ojukwu did not want the mercenaries to take the glory of Biafran exploits. Despite the unfriendly weather conditions, unspecified tropical diseases and ‘friendly fire’ accidents, to which the mercenaries were prone, a good number of them “continued to arrive in the embattled enclave even after Biafra suffered its first defeats” (p. 98). However, Ojukwu managed to cultivate ties with several groups of freelance aircraft operators from Europe, the

United States, South Africa, Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) and with arms merchants from France, Holland, Germany, China and several European governments including France, Portugal and Spain in a bid to provide his miniscule army with just about all it needed, always at a price (p. 103).

Chapter 8 of the book gives an account of what the author terms - 'the Air Bridge'. Venter describes the activities of mercenaries from different parts of the world who were involved in the war on the side of either Biafra or Nigeria. The author points out that, despite the attendant risks to which the mercenary airmen were subjected, such as incessant bombings, explosions, losses in crews and machines, lack of routines, such as routine 'duty' or 'flight times', the mercenaries kept on fighting possibly because they were assured of their payment. In fact, one of the mercenaries – Jim Townsend – once noted that crews were paid in American dollars – cash-in-hand and nothing as mundane as cheques. This worked for many operators, the majority of whom did not have bank accounts. In this chapter, the author relates a 1995 interview by the BBC with one of the aviators, Fred Cuny, an American World War II disaster relief veteran, who disclosed how he got involved in the Nigerian Civil War and how they referred to Biafra as "the world's largest flying zoo" (p. 112), where "a mixed bag of people" (p. 112) operated in favour of either Biafra or the Nigerian government.

In Chapter 9, the role of the British in the Nigerian Civil War is aptly described. The author highlights the politics that characterised Britain's 'clandestine' involvement in the war. In British political circles, the Biafrans were classed as "pariahs", "a group of unprincipled rebels [who] were potentially damaging to British interests in Africa, Nigeria especially" (p. 114). As a result, it was necessary to prevent Ojukwu from achieving his dream of an independent Biafra, which was thought in British circles would have a spiral effect in different African countries that were experiencing or had experienced factional differences. Furthermore, Venter maintains "Whitehall's link with Moscow in a bid to destroy Biafra did not help matters" (p. 114). He continues, "it was obviously Nigeria's immense oil resources that gave the Nigerians, the British and Lagos's newfound ally, Moscow. However, even when the British rejected requests by Nigeria to be militarily involved in the war, the former urged Gowon to seek what was termed a 'peaceful' solution. In the end, however, it was obvious that the supply of military hardware to Lagos by London greatly aided Gowon in the war. Venter avers "a word about the one weapon which arguably caused the most damage to Biafran forces in their defence of Eastern Nigeria was the FV601 Saladin, a six-wheeled armoured car [which] cut through Biafran defences like butter" (p. 120).

AJ Venter's work can be appreciated better if read together with works such as Ogbudinkpa *op. cit.* and JC Korie (ed). *The Nigeria-Biafra War: Genocide and the politics of memory*, (Amherst: Cambria Press, 2012). Venter provides an important contribution to the burgeoning historiography on the Nigeria-Biafra War. It is yet another eyewitness account by a freelance reporter during the war. Venter's book is an interesting read for military and war studies students and scholars.

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Book Review

OMEGA, OOR EN UIT: DIE STORIE VAN 'N OPSTANDIGE TROEP

François Verster

Evert Kleynhans

Stellenbosch University

Cape Town: Tafelberg

2016, 252 pages

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War narratives are in essence categorised as a distinct literary kind of its own. In his masterpiece *The soldier's tale: Bearing witness to modern war*,⁴⁵³ Samuel Hynes argues that mankind is generally curious about war. Hynes contends that it is often easier to respond to one man and his 'war', than to try to comprehend the overwhelming statistics associated with modern wars – especially in terms of the overwhelming numbers of soldiers, battles and casualties. For Hynes, it was important to “understand what war was like, and how it *feels*, we must ... seek the reality in the personal witness of the men who were there”.⁴⁵⁴ As such, the recording of the personal narratives of soldiers are extremely important. These narratives, however, can be subdivided into two broad categories depending on differing needs – the need to report and the need to remember. Accounts that fall into the reporting category generally comprise letters, diaries and journals that are kept as the war unfolds. The value of these sources is varied, but in essence, they offer immediacy and directness in recording the personal experience of war. The second category comprises memoirs. Memoirs are indeed much more reflective in nature, in that they are written years after the actual experience of war. Moreover, memoirs give a selective overview of “what the young self did, what happened to him, what changed him”.⁴⁵⁵

In 2016, Tafelberg published François Verster's *Omega, oor en uit: Die storie van 'n opstandige troep*. Verster's book broadly falls into the category of a reflective memoir, in which the author details his experiences as a national serviceman in the former South African Defence Force (SADF). From basic training at Oudtshoorn, to his deployment as a primary school teacher at the Omega Base in the Caprivi, the author records both the highs and lows of his time in uniform. The book is definitely not your run-of-the-mill 'Border War' memoir. As a genre, 'Border War' memoirs are generally written by a distinct mnemonic community, which includes some amateur historians and journalists, a large group of former national servicemen and a swathe of retired generals. This mnemonic community is more often than not concerned with the actual fighting, and rarely reflects on their personal experiences during the war.⁴⁵⁶

Verster's approach in *Omega, oor en uit* is, however, distinctly different from the mainstream 'Border War' memoirs. Verster's account of his time in the SADF indeed details his journey from innocence into experience, in which he both questions and tells the story of his military experience in an effort to discover its true meaning. All in all, it is an attempt to set the war, and at times his own life, straight. The book comprises fourteen key chapters, in which the reader is regularly transported from Verster's then present – an archivist at the Cape Archives Depot and later at Naspers – to the past – a national serviceman in the SADF. The text is rich and descriptive, and offers a fresh perspective on several social aspects underpinning life as a national serviceman on the so-called 'Border' – such as leisure time utilisation and the provision of education, for example. Unfortunately, the anecdotal account of life at Omega becomes rather repetitive at times, particularly the constant moaning and fault-finding of a self-proclaimed *opstandige* (rebellious) *troep*. Whether or not the author was in fact *opstandig* during his national service is a matter left open for debate. Nevertheless, Verster's account of his time as a national serviceman is commendable, in that it offers a counterpoint to the majority of drum and trumpet accounts available on the 'Border War'.

All in all, *Omega, oor en uit* is definitely worth reading. Verster succeeds in what Hynes proposed in *The soldier's tale* – he offers an honest account of what his 'war' was like, how he felt about it, and, most importantly, how it affected him. The book is recommended for inclusion into university course material, particularly modules that deal with the wider milieu of war and society. If more former national servicemen perhaps followed Verster's approach, an entire different history of life on the 'Border', and readjustment to civilian life, will appear.

Endnotes

⁴⁵³ S Hynes. *The soldier's tale: Bearing witness to modern war*. London: Pimlico, 1997.

⁴⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. xii.

⁴⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. xiv.

⁴⁵⁶ A Wessels. "Half a century of South African 'Border War' literature: A historiographical exploration". *Journal for Contemporary History* 42/2. 2017. 42.

NOTES TO CONTRIBUTORS

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