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Editorial

From a defence and security point of view, the first half of 2022 has been largely overshadowed by the Russian invasion of Ukraine towards the end of February. This marked a drastic escalation in the Russo–Ukrainian War, which started as far back as 2014. In February, following the Russian recognition of the Donetsk People's Republic and the Luhansk People's Republic – two self-proclaimed statelets in the Donbas controlled by pro-Russian separatists – the Federation Council of Russia authorised the use of military force. This prompted Russian troops to enter both territories overtly when President Vladimir Putin announced a so-called 'special military operation' under the pretext of demilitarising and de-'Nazifying' Ukraine. The Russian invasion was initiated by several missile and airstrikes that hit across Ukraine. These were followed by a large ground invasion of the territory from multiple axes. The Ukrainians, in response to this overt act of aggression, and under the stern leadership of President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, offered staunch resistance on all fronts. At the northern front, in particular, the Ukrainians were able to stem the Russian advance towards the capital Kyiv, while Russian forces made several gains in the south and east of Ukraine. Throughout the invasion, the Ukrainians had shown a strong resolve in halting the Russian invasion, and by doing so caused considerable losses for the Russian forces. The war has also been marked by great acts of heroism and dogged persistence – especially by the Ukrainian defenders in the abandoned factories in Mariupol.

While the Russian invasion has been widely condemned internationally as an act of aggression, there appears to be no end in sight yet for the war. The Ukrainians in general have received overt support from the West, bar of course their active involvement in the war. This support includes political solidarity, as well as considerable economic and military support – particularly in the form of up-to-date weaponry, training and even intelligence sharing. The international community have also utilised economic sanctions and propaganda efforts against Putin and Russia. Unfortunately, none of these can detract from the large-scale human suffering and devastation evident in Ukraine – which continues to grow each day that the war continues. This is compounded by several reports of Russian war crimes committed in the Russo–Ukrainian War between 2014 and 2022.

It is evident that military practitioners and academics will keep on monitoring the Russo–Ukrainian War with great interest as it develops over the coming months. The war also provides several insights in terms of the changing face of modern warfare and international relations – particularly in terms of superpower competition, hybrid or conventional warfare, force structure and employment, defence policy, military

alliances, doctrine, and intelligence and coalition operations, to name but a few. These issues will be hotly debated over the coming months and years, irrespective of the outcome of the war.

While the international geopolitical focus has been squarely fixed on the events in Eastern Europe, the Far East and Pacific Rim regions continue to be marked by increasing tension. Of particular concern is the recent Chinese security pact with the Solomon Islands, which could lead to a Chinese military presence – and even a naval base – in the South Pacific. This development is of course particularly worrying for Australia, since this move by China would directly threaten matters related to defence and security in the South Pacific region. The brazen testing of a new intercontinental ballistic missile system, as well as a short-range multiple rocket launcher by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) in March 2022 was also noted. These tests once more occurred in direct violation of the international sanctions imposed against the DRPK and could derail any hope of sustained and substantive dialogue with the United States, Japan and the Republic of Korea. If further provocations by the DPRK are left unaddressed, especially amidst their growing rocket and intercontinental ballistic missile arsenal and capabilities, the geo-political situation in the region could continue to deteriorate. The military tension between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and Taiwan also continues to simmer. This includes continued breaches of Taiwan's air defence zone and the ever-present threat of a full-scale invasion of the island nation. Our attention remains fixed on these regions with the hope that the situations are soon brought under control through constructive dialogue and mediation.

In Southern Africa, the focus remains on the operational deployment of Southern African Development Community (SADC) and Rwandan forces to the ungoverned territory of Cabo Delgado in northern Mozambique to combat the Ahlu-Sunnah Wa-Jama (al-Shabaab)-linked insurgency. While it is generally reported that forces of the SADC Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) have scored several successes during the counterinsurgency operations, and in particular Operation Buffalo between October 2021 and January 2022, the troika of the security organ of the SADC approved the extension of SAMIM for a further three months until mid-July. The apparent reduction in insurgent attacks has further enabled SAMIM to move from a Scenario 6 to a Scenario 5 mission – which is a shift from a pure interventionist force to that of a force organised for complex and multidimensional peacekeeping. This change in mandate of course necessitates the reinforcement of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) contingent deployed to Mozambique, which to date has mainly consisted of special forces. The apparent success of SAMIM once more calls into question issues such as post-conflict reconstruction and development, the re-establishment and maintenance of law and order, the provision of basic services and, above all, dealing with the key drivers of the insurgency in the first place. If these matters are not addressed adequately by the Mozambican government in the long term, the security situation in Cabo Delgado may never stabilise – despite increased force levels. The South African deployment as part of SAMIM also provides an interesting lens through which to investigate issues relating to doctrine, force structure and design, military operations, defence policy and alliances among others.

Back home in South Africa, large-scale flooding in KwaZulu-Natal and the Eastern Cape prompted the deployment of SANDF elements in humanitarian relief operations. In this capacity, they assisted the South African Police Service and emergency medical services to render aid and assistance where needed. It is also notable that, during the period in question, the SANDF received its first batch of Military Skills Development System (MSDS) recruits for basic military training in March 2022. This is the first MSDS intake since 2020, following the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic. Unfortunately, the SANDF remains severely over-stretched and critically underfunded while trying to uphold its constitutional mandate, despite the near constant calls on the organisation to ensure internal stability and to help with relief work while at the same time ensuring the defence and security of South Africa.

In this issue of *Scientia Militaria*, Vol. 50, No. 1, 2022, the articles consider both historic and contemporary issues associated with war and conflict, as well as defence and security-related matters. As always, it is hoped that these articles will provide key insights and act as a source of influence for individuals involved in the broader ambit of military planning, operations, management and higher education.

The article by Charles Van Wijk argues that the presence of psychological resilience appears to confer positive personal benefits, and may be particularly advantageous for individuals working in isolated, confined and extreme (ICE) environments – such as the South African Navy (SAN) and, in particular, navy diving and submarine settings. The article aims to identify contextually adaptive 'resilient' personality and coping profiles in such contexts. Van Wijk did this by correlating scores on measures of resilience with scores on measures of personality and coping, using specialists identified as good adaptors. In this article, Van Wijk presents psychometric profiles of contemporary personality and coping styles. By using bivariate correlations, resilience-associated, context-specific, diver and submariner personality and coping profiles were identified. The findings by Van Wijk show that the resilient profiles appeared well suited to their respective environments.

In the article by Dries Putter and Susan Henrico, it is argued that global changes in technology have always shaped the intelligence collection environment. With communications being revolutionised by mobile technology, such as recording, geo-positioning and photography, collection and distribution are ubiquitous. Smart mobile communication technology is also the driver of social media everywhere, at all ages, whether state or non-state, and non-stop. More recently, Social Media Intelligence (SOCMINT) became a key content domain for exploitation by the intelligence community. Initially, many organisations viewed (and some still do) SOCMINT as an Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) tool. Putter and Henrico state that, when considering the South African intelligence landscape, the concepts of democracy, transparency and intelligence oversight are calibrating factors to bear in mind along with the national legislative framework governing the use of SOCMINT locally. It then becomes clear that issues, such as the right to privacy, imply that SOCMINT is probably no longer covered by the scope of the OSINT definition, and that intelligence organisations collecting social media content and producing SOCMINT should adhere to the

legislative framework governing the collection and use of social media content and the production of SOCMINT. The authors argue that SOCMINT and OSINT should be separate collection domains for better protection of the imperative of the right to privacy and national security requirements in a balanced manner by means of unambiguous national regulation in the interest of the citizen.

In his article, Akali Omeni reports on corruption mechanisms within the naval and maritime sector of Nigeria. The discussion begins with an examination of the disappearance of the vessel MT *African Pride* in October 2003, and the author shows that, far from being a one-off incident, it was indicative of the opportunism and criminality that naval operations within the oil-rich Niger Delta attracts. The Nigerian Ports Authority and the Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency constitute other case studies of maritime industry corruption examined by the author. He argues that such cases highlight the exploitation of relations between the Nigerian Navy and the civil maritime sector. Overall, the article identifies and discusses patterns of corruption mechanisms employed. These include the support of illegal oil bunkering, illicit agreements and contracts, unsanctioned oil tanker relocations, malfeasance in arms deals and other areas, and multiple instances of public office abuse.

The article by Sean Filmalter and Rigard Steenkamp suggests a framework for information and communication technology (ICT) projects that may address the discord of traditional project management, which is required for ICT projects within defence institutions. Filmalter argues that this problem is underlined by the pace of technological development, and the current problem of compromised project management. He states that, globally, no specific project management methodology is prominently suitable for solution delivery within defence institutions. The aim of his study was therefore to address this evident problem by the development of a framework for the project management of ICT projects for defence institutions. Filmalter in particular focused on the ICT function of the South African Department of Defence, which he used as a case study for the study on which his article reports. Ultimately, his conceptual framework proposes a hypothetically workable approach for the project management of ICT projects in defence institutions.

In her study, Arunjana Das applied moral foundations theory to explore the role played by moral claims in the eventual dismantlement of the South African nuclear deterrent capability. She argues that South Africa is the only country in the world that successfully acquired a nuclear deterrent capability in the form of six nuclear devices – and dismantled them completely. Das shows that some of the explanations given are strategic reasons, such as the removal of the Soviet threat after the Soviet collapse in 1989, the end of superpower rivalry in Africa, South Africa's increasing isolation on account of apartheid, pressure from the United States, and concerns about undeclared nuclear technology falling in the hands of a new black-led government. The author states that, while these factors potentially contributed to the eventual dismantlement, the worldwide campaign led by domestic and transnational movements, which sought to make moral claims by connecting the cause of anti-apartheid to that of anti-nuclear also probably played a key role.

In the final article, Hendrik Snyders reconstructs the early life and career of Arthur William ('Artie') Tully – a largely forgotten name in South African military history. Snyders shows that the Australian-born Tully, a professional boxer by trade, joined the republican forces during the South African War (1899–1902) while working on the Witwatersrand. After he was captured at the Battle of Vaalkrans, Tully became a prisoner of war on Diyatalawa in Sri Lanka (formerly Ceylon). After the Peace of Vereeniging, Tully – portrayed by his brethren as a traitor – rekindled his boxing career and established himself in Singapore, Southeast Asia, working as a bookmaker, turf commission agent and mine-owner. While Tully's visit to Australia – after a thirteen-year absence – was largely ignored, just like his legacy in post-war studies, Snyders shows that Tully, like thousands of others, remained an obscure figure of the South African War. While South Africans ironically continue to celebrate the contribution of a range of other foreign participants in the war, for unknown reasons, they continue to ignore or remain blissfully unaware of the contribution of this Australian to South African history. Against this background, Snyders reconstructed the early life and career of Tully with a view to end his obscurity in history.

A selection of book reviews by David Jacobs, Carl Punt, Willem du Plessis, Jan-Ad Stemmet, Anri Delport and Evert Kleynhans concludes this issue of *Scientia Militaria*.

The Editor
Evert Kleynhans

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Psychological profiles of resilience in extreme environments: Correlating measures of personality and coping and resilience

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Abstract

The presence of psychological resilience is believed to confer positive personal benefits, and may be particularly advantageous for individuals working in isolated, confined, and/or extreme environments. The study reported here aimed to identify contextually adaptive psychological profiles of resilience in such settings. This was done by correlating scores for measures of resilience with scores for measures of personality and coping, using South African Navy specialists who were identified as good adaptors. As resilience profiles may differ across contexts, two highly specific samples were used, namely navy divers and submariners.

This article presents psychometric profiles of contemporary personality and coping styles. Then, using bivariate correlations, resilience-associated, context-specific, diver and submariner personality and coping profiles were identified. Their resilience profiles appeared well suited to their respective environments.

Some differences were observed between the typical personality descriptions and the resilience profiles identified, with a number of possible reasons forwarded to understand this. Firstly, there were some concerns regarding the validity of the measures in the local cultural context; secondly, context-specific resilience may be expressed differently from resilience in general society; and thirdly, contemporary profiles of specialists may reflect current organisational processes in addition to psychological factors.

In terms of practical application, while the identification of resilience profiles may also have value for selection purposes, it could be particularly useful for mission preparation, through the training of context-relevant coping skills.

Introduction

The study on which this article is based aimed to identify contextually adaptive personality and coping profiles associated with resilience, to guide deployment in isolated, confined and extreme (ICE) environments. Resilience refers to the process of adapting well to challenging psychological demands.[2] The concept has been researched extensively in ICE environments, particularly in military settings, and established scales are available to measure resilience. Similarly, personality profiling, as well as coping profiling, have also been researched extensively in ICE contexts, with established scales also available to measure these two constructs.

'ICE environments' refer to settings characterised by hostile external conditions, exposure to a range of often unique context-specific physical, mental and social stressors. These require engineering technology to maintain human survival.[3] Examples of ICE settings include underwater habitats, spacecraft, remote weather stations, and polar outposts. Within the military, navy diving and submarine service are both considered extreme environments, because of their unusual demands, the use of technologies to support life, and the advanced training required to operate safely underwater.

The demands imposed by specific ICE environments are well described, as well as the idea that a specific kind of psychological profile is required to cope well in such contexts.[4,5,6] There is a long history of personality profiling in specialised military settings, often involving the selection of military personnel for special duty assignments, such as aviation, submarines, or naval diver training.[7] In the context of maritime ICE environments, personality descriptions have been developed for both navy divers and submariners.[8,9,10] Context-specific coping profiles have also been reported for these two groups.[11,12] For example, navy divers display a propensity for adventurousness, a strong sense of self-agency, and low trait anxiety, and rely on active coping while rejecting avoidance coping.[4,7] Submariners display a strong sense of self-efficacy, meticulousness and constructive group orientation (i.e. can get along with others), and also rely on active coping while rejecting avoidance coping.[4]

To illustrate how context influences coping, divers typically use acceptance as a coping strategy. This is often associated with the generally short-term nature of diving operations, where acceptance only needs to facilitate coping for a short period, and can thus be maintained successfully. During typically longer submarine operations, crew members often use positive reframing and religion as coping strategies, rather than acceptance.[4] These strategies are associated with more inward-focused coping, and appear suited to long-duration missions, where acceptance-as-coping might be difficult to sustain.

Historically, studies developing profiles have generally sampled experienced personnel, who have spent some time in their particular domain, and then used the identified personality traits to describe the *typical* profile for that domain. As participants were generally thought of as successful in their respective domains (e.g. successfully managed exposure to ICE conditions), their typical profiles have traditionally been considered as adaptive-in-context. Using this reasoning, it is often believed that the typical profile is also the *ideal* or *desired* profile, as these individuals have been operating in their ICE environments for some time (thus making it an 'adaptive' profile). Such psychological profiles have then been used to guide selection of new recruits into the field, in turn risking perpetuating the profile in any subsequent samples.

It could be argued that a *typical* profile is not necessarily an *ideal* or *desired* profile. For example, Suedfeld and Steel describe the personality paradox in capsule habitats, namely that most volunteers applying for anything as challenging and unusual as space or undersea habitats tend to score toward the upper end of any scale of thrill-seeking, adventurousness, and similar dimensions.[1] Paradoxically, life in capsule environments (e.g. submarines) is characterised by stimulus invariance (monotonous

routine, boring tasks, being cooped up with the same unvarying group) interspersed with only occasional excitement. Thus, volunteers most likely to end up in specifically ICE capsule environments may potentially not be suited optimally to such environments. The same may apply to other high-risk ICE activities, for example long-term deployment to an international space station or polar outposts. Volunteers would have personality traits supportive of risk-taking and adventurousness, but the actual demands of the environment may require great technical proficiency and corresponding meticulousness, or particularly good interpersonal skills, or the patience to tolerate confinement.

Further, all ICE environments place high demands on long-term psychological adaptation, which then raises the question of whether any *typical* profile would necessarily also be the profile reflecting optimal *resilience*.[13] In other words, would profiles developed by traditional means inevitably yield traits that would reflect high resilience to the demands of ICE environments? The relevance of this question is supported by previous studies with navy specialists, which suggest that the typical personality profile was not always associated with the profile reflecting optimal resilience.[14]

Psychological resilience is defined as the process of adapting well in the face of adversity, trauma, tragedy, threats or significant sources of stress.[1] Dispositional resilience, referring to that personal quality that allows people to overcome hardships and even thrive in the face of it, have been operationalised in constructs such as sense of coherence, hardiness, mental toughness and locus of control, reside in the positive psychology domain, and have previously also been applied to ICE environments.[15,16,17,18,19,20,21]

Psychological hardiness is a widely researched construct within resilience literature. It is defined as a personal worldview, which is fairly stable over time, and comprising the following interrelated components:

- commitment (vs. alienation) – referring to the ability to feel deeply involved in the activities of life;
- control (vs. powerlessness) – the belief that one can control or influence events of one's experiences; and
- challenge (vs. threat) – the sense of anticipation of change as an opportunity to foster personal development.[17]

Hardiness is a psychological orientation associated with people who remain healthy and continue to perform well under a range of stressful conditions.[22,23] Hardy individuals – that is, persons with a strong sense of commitment, control and challenge – appear to be more resistant to the adverse effects of personal and environmental stress than less hardy individuals. As a personality variable, hardiness appears to be largely distinct from the Big Five personality dimensions.[24,25]

An extensive body of research supports the notion that hardiness protects against the ill effects of stress on health and performance among a wide variety of civilian and military occupations and contexts.[26,27,28,29,30,31,32,33,34] Hardiness has been implicated as a resilience factor across cultures.[35,36] It is thought to decrease the negative effect of stress through

a combination of underlying cognitive, physiological and behavioural factors, which include very specific coping strategies (e.g. active coping rather than avoidant coping responses).[24,37,38]

A related construct, termed mental toughness (MT), was partially derived from the theoretical foundations of hardiness, and extended the theory by adding a fourth component to the three dimensions of hardiness, namely confidence.[18] MT is moderately associated with other psychological constructs associated with mental health, and is strongly associated with behavioural perseverance.[18,39,40,41,42,43] Scores on MT scales have been related to both coping strategies and performance in military contexts (e.g. problem-focused rather than avoidance-coping responses).[40,44,45] MT correlates significantly with the Big Five personality dimensions, with the exception of openness to experience, although there are concerns whether MT can be regarded as a truly dispositional trait.[41,44,46]

Many of the constructs in the resilience literature have their own associated measuring tools. The Dispositional Resilience Scale (DRS) has been used extensively in military and non-military samples,[25,29,47] with the 15-item self-report version (DRS-15) tapping into attitudes regarding commitment, control and challenge.[48]

The Mental Toughness Questionnaire (MTQ) items are aggregated to six dimensions, with the 18-item self-report version (MTQ-18) providing an overall score for mental toughness.[18,49,50] The application of the DRS-15 and MTQ-18 in the South African (SA) military context has recently been reported.[49]

Rationale and aims

If psychological hardiness confers positive personal benefits in the face of potentially adverse physical, social and mental demands, then its presence may be particularly advantageous for naval specialists working in ICE environments. This returns to the question of whether a particular psychological profile could be considered resilient in a particular environment, i.e. whether it would be possible to identify ideal or desired personality and coping profiles associated with resilience in specific contexts.

As mentioned, earlier research with navy specialists suggested that the typical personality profile may not necessarily be associated with profiles reflecting optimal resilience.[13] Previous studies reported general correlations between both the DRS-15 and MTQ-18 and the Big Five personality factors (see Table 1), suggesting that personality factors may be associated with resilience. However, it is not clear how this association would be expressed in terms of the requirements of specific potentially demanding contexts. In other words, would the nature or degree of association between personality factors and resilience be influenced by specific ICE settings? The previously reported correlations appear to suggest that a personality profile reflecting optimal resilience – contingent on environmental context – could be described.

Table 1: Published correlations between the DRS-15 and MTQ-18, and the Big Five personality traits

Scale		*E*	*A*	*C*	*N*	*O*	*Source*
DRS-15	Total scale	.11*	n.s.	.18*	-.25*	n.s.	Bartone et al. (2009)[23]
DRS-15	Total score	.41*	.24*	.28*	-.38*	.40*	Kardum et al. (2012)[57]
DRS-15	Total score	.61*	.41*	.50*	n.s.	.39*	Loche (2017)[60]
MTQ-18	Total score	.37*	.32*	.41*	-.74*	.14	Delaney et al. (2015)[45]
MTQ-18	Total score	.49*			-.61*		Curran (2017)[59]

* p<.01

Note: E=extraversion; A=agreeableness; C=conscientiousness; N=neuroticism; O=openness to experience; n.s.=not significant

The study on which this article is based therefore aimed to identify contextually adaptive psychological profiles associated with resilience for deployment in ICE environments. Psychological profiles here refer to the dual domains of personality and coping. The study explored associations between resilience and other psychometric descriptions of specialist groups by correlating scores for measures of hardiness and MT with scores for measures of personality and coping. As resilience profiles may differ across contexts, the study used two highly specific samples, namely navy divers and submariners, for whom good resilience has traditionally been reported.[13]

Methods

Participants

The sample consisted of South African Navy (SAN) divers and submariners on active duty, who were recruited during their annual occupational health assessment. The study was conducted according the principles set out in the Declaration of Helsinki (2013). Written informed consent was obtained; the study was also part of a larger project with Institutional Review Board approval. In accordance with study parameters, all data were anonymised prior to analysis. The data were collected over a period of three years, and sample sizes are indicated for each analysis.

All participants included in the final sample were considered good adaptors, based on a number of criteria:

- all participants had to have completed at least two years of operational experience after qualification – indicating adaptation in their respective extreme environment;
- participants were required to have no organisational record of poor psychological adaptation in their respective specialist environments;
- participants had to submit positive supervisors' reports, including a recommendation for continued use in their field; and

- participants had to provide positive self-reports of good coping (obtained during their annual medical examinations).

The 125 divers (6.4% female) had a mean age of 27.7 years (± 5.7, range 20–48), while the 213 submariners (25.4% female) had a mean age of 31.6 years (± 6.7, range 23–51). The divers all had 12 years of formal schooling, while the submariners had a further one to eight years of additional vocational training.

Measures

Hardiness was measured with the DRS-15, which was used in its standard format.[46] The DRS-15 is scored on a four-point Likert-type scale, with higher scores reflecting greater hardiness. Good psychometric properties and criterion-related validity across multiple samples have been reported, including a Cronbach's α reliability coefficient of .82 for the total scale, and .71 for a general SA Navy sample.[26,46,49]

Mental toughness was measured with the MTQ-18.[18] It is scored on a five-point Likert-type scale, with higher scores reflecting greater MT. High test–retest reliability, high internal consistency, and good validity have been reported, including a Cronbach's α reliability coefficient of .70 for the total scale, and .88 for a general SA Navy sample.[18,38,49]

Personality was described with the State-Trait Personality Inventory, Trait version (STPI-T) and Big Five Inventory (BFI-44), while coping styles were described with the Brief COPE (BC) scale. The STPI-T measures personality traits according to the emotional disposition model, and consists of 40 self-report items – scored on a four-point scale – that measure dispositional anxiety, curiosity, anger and depression in adults.[51] Hardiness has previously been (negatively) correlated to dispositional anxiety and anger.[24]

The BFI-44 measures personality traits according to the five-factor model.[52,53] The scale was constructed to allow quick and efficient assessment of five personality dimensions when there is no need for differentiated measures of particular facets. It consists of 44 self-report items with short phrases and relatively accessible vocabulary, rated on a five-point scale.[51,52] Hardiness has previously been positively correlated to extraversion and negatively correlated to neuroticism.[24]

The BC is a 28-item self-report inventory designed to assess coping responses across 14 coping domains.[54] Ratings for each item are made on a four-point scale, and higher scores represent greater endorsement of coping strategies. Hardiness has previously been positively correlated to active coping and negatively correlated to avoidance coping.[24]

Data analysis

The personality and coping profiles of the sample were reported using descriptive statistics. Internal consistency of the resilience scales was examined using Cronbach's α coefficients. There were no significant gender differences on either the DRS-15 or MTQ-18, and the rest of the analysis combined the scores of women and men in each

speciality. The association between resilience and specific personality and/or coping profiles were thereafter explored using correlational statistics. Due to a technical error, correlations between the MTQ-18 and BC were not available.

Results

The combined sample DRS-15 produced a marginally acceptable Cronbach α of .66, while the MTQ-18 produced a more acceptable Cronbach α of .87. The psychometric profiles of the SAN specialists are presented in Table 2. Both groups – divers and submariners – scored high on the DRS-15 and MTQ-18 compared to norms, suggesting good psychological resilience.[38,39,47]

Table 2: Personality and coping profiles of navy divers and submariners

	Divers			Submariners		
	N	M	SD	N	M	SD
STPI-T						
Anxiety	125	14.01	3.0	212	13.20	2.9
Curiosity	125	29.93	4.1	212	31.54	4.7
Anger	125	16.14	3.6	212	15.05	3.6
Depression	125	13.56	3.0	212	13.35	2.9
BFI-44						
Extraversion	125	3.63	0.5	212	3.78	0.6
Agreeableness	125	**4.32**	0.5	212	**4.45**	0.5
Conscientiousness	125	**4.33**	0.5	212	**4.43**	0.5
Neuroticism	125	**1.86**	0.6	212	**1.67**	0.5
Open to experience	125	3.67	0.4	212	3.76	0.4
Brief COPE						
Self-distraction	125	3.14	1.7	194	3.19	1.7
Active coping	125	**4.89**	1.3	194	**5.01**	1.2
Denial	125	**1.04**	1.4	194	**0.88**	1.3
Substance use	125	**0.13**	0.5	194	**0.10**	0.5
Use emotional support	125	3.46	1.6	194	3.93	1.6
Use instrumental support	125	4.25	1.6	194	**4.60**	1.4
Behavioural disengagement	125	**0.38**	0.9	194	**0.33**	0.8
Venting	125	1.96	1.5	194	1.97	1.3

Positive reframing	125	4.42	1.4	194	4.48	1.4
Planning	125	4.65	1.4	194	4.97	1.2
Humour	125	2.85	1.9	194	2.45	1.9
Acceptance	125	4.26	1.4	194	**4.46**	1.4
Religion	125	3.91	1.9	194	4.27	2.0
Self-blame	125	**0.64**	0.9	194	**0.56**	0.7
DRS-15						
Total score	125	35.26	4.6	213	36.72	4.3
Cronbach's α	125	.65		213	.66	
MTQ-18						
Total score	123	70.41	9.3	189	71.98	8.2
Cronbach's α	123	.87		189	.86	

Note. Means in bold identify the contemporary typical profile, of this sample, for each specialty.

The SAN specialists displayed very similar contemporary personality profiles, scoring in the direction of healthy emotional disposition across the four STPI-T subscales, and with Big Five personality profiles characterised by average scores for extraversion and openness to experience, higher scores for agreeableness and conscientiousness, and lower scores for neuroticism.

The coping profiles of divers was characterised by the use of seven specific coping strategies, and those of the submariners by the use of nine specific coping strategies. Unsurprisingly, in both groups there was a reliance on engagement – in other words, active coping – as an endorsed strategy, and a clear non-endorsement of avoidant coping strategies.

Bivariate correlations between the DRS-15 and measures of personality and coping are presented in Table 3. The hardy profile was associated with the typical STPI-T profile reported in Table 2. Further, all five BFI-44 factors were associated with hardiness, which differed somewhat from the typical profile reported in Table 2. Seven of the nine markers of the typical submariner coping profile (see Table 2), as well as an additional two markers (namely use of emotional support and religion), were associated with hardiness among submariners, suggesting that these coping styles work to the benefit of these individuals. In contrast, only a limited number of markers from the typical diver coping profile (see Table 2) were associated with hardiness among the navy diver sample, with acceptance showing the strongest correlation. Across both samples, correlations with coping domains were, while significant, generally very modest.

Table 3: Bivariate correlations between DRS-15 total score and measures of personality and coping

	Divers			Submariners		
	N	*r*	*p*	N	*r*	*p*
STPI-T						
Anxiety	125	-.437	<.001	212	-.455	<.001
Curiosity	125	.404	<.001	212	.333	<.001
Anger	125	-.212	.017	212	-.333	<.001
Depression	125	-.498	<.001	212	-.388	<.001
BFI-44						
Extraversion	125	.295	.001	212	.402	<.001
Agreeableness	125	.408	<.001	212	.440	<.001
Conscientiousness	125	.581	<.001	212	.515	<.001
Neuroticism	125	-.551	<.001	212	-.521	<.001
Open to experience	125	.453	<.001	212	.414	<.001
BC						
Self-distraction	125	-.099	.270	194	.093	.196
Active coping	125	.202	.024	194	.303	<.001
Denial	125	-.117	.194	194	-.147	.051
Substance use	125	-.054	.553	194	-.181	.012
Use emotional support	125	.068	.448	194	.243	.001
Use instrumental support	125	.138	.125	194	.340	<.001
Behavioural disengagement	125	-.230	.010	194	-.184	.010
Venting	125	-.124	.170	194	.161	.052
Positive reframing	125	.144	.110	194	.222	.002
Planning	125	.080	.373	194	.305	<.001
Humour	125	.008	.929	194	.100	.164
Acceptance	125	.305	.001	194	.398	<.001
Religion	125	.141	.116	194	.162	.024
Self-blame	125	-.193	.031	194	-.130	.072

Bivariate correlations between the MTQ-18 and measures of personality are presented in Table 4. Like the DRS-15 profile, the MTQ-18 was associated with the typical STPI-T profile reported in Table 2, and with all five BFI-44 factors, which again differed from the typical profile reported in Table 2.

Table 4: Bivariate correlations between MTQ-18 total score and measures of personality

	Divers			Submariners		
	N	r	p	N	r	p
STPI-T						
Anxiety	123	-.684	<.001	188	-.678	<.001
Curiosity	123	.613	<.001	188	.577	<.001
Anger	123	-.379	<.001	188	-.563	<.001
Depression	123	-.687	<.001	188	-.653	<.001
BFI-44						
Extraversion	123	.145	.110	176	.337	<.001
Agreeableness	123	.175	.052	176	.367	<.001
Conscientiousness	123	.297	.001	176	.490	<.001
Neuroticism	123	-.369	<.001	176	-.503	<.001
Open to experience	123	.247	.006	176	.180	.016

The SAN submarine personality profile that best reflected resilience was characterised by low scores for dispositional anxiety, anger and depression, and high scores for dispositional curiosity, as well as high scores for the extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, and openness to experience factors, and low scores for the neuroticism factor. Their coping profile best reflecting resilience was characterised by the use of active coping, emotional and instrumental support, positive reframing, planning, acceptance and religion, and the non-endorsement of substance use and behavioural disengagement.

The SAN diver personality profile that best reflected resilience was also characterised by low scores for dispositional anxiety, anger, and depression, and high scores for dispositional curiosity. However, their Big Five resilience profile was not unanimous. DRS-15 correlations suggested that high scores for the extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, and openness to experience factors, and low scores for the neuroticism factor were associated with resilience. MTQ-18 correlations suggested that only high scores for the conscientiousness and openness to experience factors, and low scores for the neuroticism factor were associated with resilience. Their coping profile best reflecting resilience was characterised by the use of active coping and acceptance, and the non-endorsement of behavioural disengagement and self-blame.

Discussion

This study aimed to identify contextually adaptive psychological profiles associated with optimal resilience for deployment in ICE environments. In this regard, personality and coping profiles associated with resilience were identified for both submariners and navy divers.

The resilience-associated profile in this sample of maritime specialists was characterised by low dispositional anxiety, anger, and depression, and high dispositional curiosity, as well as high degrees of extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, and openness to experience, and a low degree of neuroticism. This description follows previous reports of comparable correlations of resilience measures of dispositional anxiety and anger, and extraversion and neuroticism.[24] A similar emotional disposition has previously been shown to support wellbeing and was considered protective of mental health.[55,56] Given the isolated, confined and/or extreme environment into which these maritime specialists may deploy, healthy emotional disposition and low neuroticism would be positive resources for emotional self-management (i.e. protect mental health). Furthermore, the strong association with conscientiousness could be expected in a safety critical environment with reliance on life-support technology. This trait is closely related to the reported meticulousness of submariners, who work in an environment where mistakes cost lives.[4,8,13] The association with agreeableness would facilitate good interpersonal management in confined spaces, where the constructive management of relations is critical for psychological adaptation.[2,3,5,57]

The SAN specialists showed much stronger correlations between resilience scores and the Big Five factors compared to those reported for both West Point students and general population samples (see Table 1),[23,58] which may suggest an inherent personality requirement in the ICE context. This supports previous findings implying that very specific personality profiles appear particularly adaptive in these relatively unique environments.[9,11,13,56,58]

Although the personality profiles associated with resilience for divers and submariners were generally similar, it was noteworthy that they reported different coping styles associated with resilience, which could possibly be attributed to their different deployment and work environment demands.[4] For example, the presence of active coping and the absence of behavioural disengagement (i.e. withdrawal) were prominently correlated to resilience across both specialities. This association has previously been reported in related groups,[24,37] and has also been observed among international diver and submariner samples.[11,59]

Furthermore, resilient submariners additionally endorsed positive reframing, acceptance and religion as coping strategies, reflecting internal or 'cognitive' approaches to coping. These strategies may be particularly useful to facilitate resilience in the context of submarine operations where practical measures of coping with chronic stressors may not always be available (i.e. when on extended patrol). The requirement of sustaining coping across longer missions in demanding contexts may thus activate the use of internal mechanisms to cope.[4] Submarine patrols of longer duration are often associated with an increasing sense of social isolation, making internal strategies particularly appropriate.[4] The association of hardiness and use of emotional support among submariners can also be understood in terms of their deployed environment. The physical context of close personal interaction in a submarine, together with an acknowledged reliance on each other to meet the demands of a hostile external environment, facilitates opportunities to draw on the emotional support of the group.[4]

Resilient divers additionally endorsed acceptance, and disregarded self-blame, as coping strategies. As mentioned earlier, divers' use of acceptance may be particularly suitable to the typically short-term nature of stressful diving operations, while their previously reported high confidence and self-esteem could explain their non-use of self-blame as a coping strategy.[4]

Some differences were observed between the known group or typical profile of the divers and submariners – as described by the BFI-44 and the BC – and the identified resilience profile. This apparent contrast between the actual and resilience personality and coping profiles could be hypothesised to be influenced by a number of factors.

Firstly, although the SAN currently applies no occupational-specific psychological selection, at least some of the older participants may originally have been selected into their respective occupational groups based on typical profiles (a practice that the SAN employed in the past). The actual profiles may thus reflect previous selection biases.

Secondly, in spite of their earlier use in South Africa, neither the DRS-15 nor the MTQ-18 might be an accurate measure of resilience in the SA cultural context (the same argument could also apply to the BFI-44). Although it has been translated into a number of languages and is used successfully across the global north, the underlying components of the DRS and/or MTQ may not translate easily into the cultural context of a developing country, such as South Africa.[28,34,57,60,61,62] Support for this concern was found in three indicators in the findings:

- the DRS-15, as a scale, displayed poor internal consistency, and may not be a useful measure of resilience locally;
- the unusually high scores of the DRS-15 and MTQ-18 found here (see Table 2) are not unexpected for a specialist group, but a recent study reported that a general SAN sample also scored much higher than comparable international norm groups,[49] and this unexpected finding raises doubts about the validity of these scales; and
- the two instruments are also brief scales, which provide a limited assessment of resilience, whereas extended measures may provide more accurate reflections of actual resilience.

Thirdly, the ICE context of these specialists may pose unique demands that require specific traits or behaviours that are not necessarily associated with resilience in general society or even in the general military. Earlier studies described very specific personality profiles for divers and submariners and others in ICE environments. Very specific coping styles and strategies have also been described in specific ICE contexts.[8,10,11,56,58,63] These strategies are, for example, an over-reliance on active problem-solving skills and a rejection of behavioural disengagement (i.e. avoiding, withdrawing or giving up). Such strategies may be very important when living and working in settings requiring life-support technology to maintain survival, but may not always be equally important in other circumstances. Resilience profiles in ICE contexts may thus look different from resilience profiles in other, everyday contexts. Support for the concept of context-

specific resilience could also be inferred from the observation that associations (and the strength of correlations) between personality factors and resilience differed between the maritime specialities reported here and other samples outside ICE environments.[23,57] Resilience traits, it appears, are contingent on context.

Lastly, various organisational processes involved in the recruitment and/or retention of naval personnel in the SA context may create opportunity for individuals with different-from-expected general resilience profiles to enter and remain in military specialities. For example, recent research suggests that socio-economic factors, additional to psychological factors such as interest or aptitude, might be significant contributors to employment choices of navy divers.[64]

Typical, contemporary, psychological profiles – in the context of ICE environments – are often considered ideal profiles, and are thus used to guide recruitment and selection of personnel. However, the findings reported here suggest that such profiles may not necessarily be the most optimal resilience profiles in each respective context. This brings a challenge to the extent to which traditional or known group profiles should be used to guide recruitment or selection of personnel for missions in ICE environments. For example, one implication of this study is that following the typical profile, attention would traditionally be placed on three of the Big Five factors, while their association with hardiness suggests that attention should be paid to an individual's score across all five factors. The DRS-15 and BFI-44 are brief scales, and generally not considered comprehensive enough for selection purposes. However, the principle remains, namely that reliance on known group or typical profiles – in this case of navy specialists – may neglect other equally important factors, such as dispositional resilience or specific coping repertoires.

A limitation of the study was the lack of a control group consisting of designated 'poor adaptors' to allow comparison between the traits of those who successfully adapt to their contexts, and those who do not. Furthermore, successful adaptation was inferred, and although a number of criteria were used to make this inference, more specific indicators may be required to describe successful adaptation more accurately.

Future studies could explore the extent to which *resilience* profiles, whichever way they are determined, should be considered *desirable* profiles and used to guide entry into any ICE mission. This could be done by, among others, extending the analysis by correlating personality and resilience scores with actual behavioural outcomes during and after ICE missions. Such behavioural outcomes could include markers of general or mental health, and/or indicators of coping (whether according to a subjective self-report or possibly a more objective peer report), and/or measures of performance (work or social functioning), and/or other indicators of personal experience. Such a wide range of markers may facilitate a more nuanced understanding of the interplay between personality and coping profiles, and personal resilience and psychological adaptation in ICE contexts, than previous limited-focus analyses.

With research on-going, two practical applications, with demonstrated success to enhance resilience, could continue to be implemented.[65,66] Firstly, in the current context

where limited resources impact on operational deployments, it remains imperative to foster sense of purpose and belonging. Having a sense of purpose is associated with greater endorsement of preventive health behaviours and improved morbidity and mortality. Likewise, a sense of belonging (to military unit or other social groups) protects military service members from developing adverse psychological reactions following deployments. Secondly, it is worth to consider extending the practice to embed resilience resources within high-stress work places to include ICE environments. There is widespread evidence that embedding mental health providers and behavioural health technicians – who have operational and cultural competence specific to the military context – enhances psychological health among service members and leaders. Of particular interest is that many embedded military resilience/mental fitness programs are effectively implemented by trained "lay" personnel rather than highly educated mental health professionals, making program implementation more flexible and less costly.

Conclusion

The study on which article reported set out to explore contextually adaptive psychological profiles of resilience in unusual settings. It did so by correlating scores for measures of resilience with scores for measures of personality and coping, and identified psychological profiles reflecting resilience, for both SAN diving and submarine settings as examples of ICE environments.

The researcher concluded that the expected, typical profiles were not wholly associated with resilience profiles. This has a number of implications. Firstly, resilience may need to be understood contextually, where optimal resilience profiles may differ across settings with divergent psychological demands. Secondly, traditional profiling of groups operating in ICE environments – for purposes of developing reference profiles for use in recruitment or selection – may not necessarily be successful in identifying the most resilient individuals for such applications.

These findings might have value for mission selection purposes, in guiding the assessment of candidates to enhance mission success, as well as individual wellbeing. More importantly, the context-dependent nature of resilience might be a particularly useful consideration for mission preparation, by guiding the training of context-relevant coping skills.

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ENDNOTES

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Social media intelligence:
The national security–privacy nexus

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Abstract

Globally, changes in technology have always shaped the intelligence collection environment. South Africa is no exception. The emergence of satellite imagery had a significant influence on geographic intelligence (GEOINT) capabilities and, similarly, the emergence of the telegram and later the telephone had an equally significant effect on the signals intelligence (SIGINT) environment. With communications being revolutionised by mobile technology, such as recording, geo-positioning and photography, collection and distribution are ubiquitous. Smart mobile communication technology is also the driver of social media everywhere – at all ages, for state and non-state purposes, non-stop. More recently, social media intelligence (SOCMINT) became a key content domain for exploitation by the intelligence community. Examples of the successful exploitation of SOCMINT can be found internationally. It would be surprising if South Africa is not yet a statistic in terms of this phenomenon. Initially, many organisations viewed (and some still do) SOCMINT as an open-source intelligence (OSINT) tool. However, when considering the South African (SA) intelligence landscape, the concepts 'democracy', 'transparency' and 'intelligence oversight' are calibrating factors to bear in mind. It is also important to consider the influence of the national legislative framework governing the use of SOCMINT in South Africa. It then becomes clear that issues – such as the right to privacy – mean that SOCMINT is probably no longer covered by the scope of the OSINT definition and that intelligence organisations collecting social media content and producing SOCMINT should adhere to the legislative framework governing the collection and use of social media content and the production of SOCMINT. This article argues that SOCMINT and OSINT should be separate collection domains to protect the imperative of the right to privacy and national security requirements in a balanced manner by means of unambiguous national regulation in the interest of all citizens.

Keywords: social media, social media intelligence (SOCMINT), open-source intelligence (OSINT), national security, intelligence, privacy, POPIA, RICA, South Africa

Introduction

Social media can no longer be regarded as a niche technology or social interaction enabler. It is mature to the point of being weaponised – with the current usage thereof in the Russia–Ukraine war a case in point[67] – the naïve intent of the developers of some or all the current social media applications aside. Social media in the contemporary age is a significant enabler of social cohesion, cultural diversification, trade, security and access to and interaction with almost everything. Significant portions of the daily lives of people, young and old, are dedicated to interaction with one or a variety of social media applications. This might not seem to be very problematic from a developmental perspective. However, when the other side of the nexus is introduced – security and its older brother, national security – then the conversation becomes complex. Social media applications and the content thereof are currently utilised to its capacity by international alliances, individual countries and individuals in support of their preferred protagonist in the Russia–Ukraine war:

> Social media has become a primary source of information for news-hungry audiences around the world trying to make sense of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. At the same time, it's being used by the governments of Russia and Ukraine to set the agenda for wider media reporting. Official Russian government accounts have been found to be amplifying pro-Russia disinformation on Twitter. Meanwhile, the Ukrainian government has taken to the platform to appeal to its two million followers for support.[68]

Defining social media also still seems to be problematic. Social media is inclusive of another construct – social networking.[69] Social networking can be defined as "a community that forms around a common interest",[70] whereas social media is inclusive of "social networks, blogs, wikis, podcasts, fora, content communities and micro-blogging".[71] Considering these descriptions, the problem around the need for privacy (or exclusion of those not part of the 'common interest') and the need for transparency about such 'common interest' from a security perspective, are easily imagined. The above-mentioned problem or social dilemma can only be regulated with contractual agreements and legislation.

Today, and progressively towards the horizon of time, social media both enables social interaction and facilitates insecurity on an international scale. Social media is instrumental in building social cohesion around common interests, but it also facilitates the destruction of social cohesion when manipulated by state and non-state actors with dubious intent. This fact can best be illustrated by referring to the current Russia–Ukraine war, which has polarised the international community yet again into West vs East or democratic vs authoritarian or communist. Social media will never be regarded as just another platform for conversation, but rather as the 'go-to' platform to shape narratives within every state power domain to secure national interest. It is thus a primary national intelligence enabler.

The article introduces, for the benefit of the uninitiated to this phenomenon, social media intelligence (SOCMINT)[72] and presents arguments about the possible impact social media data, information and knowledge (henceforth referred to as 'content') have on the intelligence community, privacy concerns and national security. Assisting the reader to differentiate between SOCMINT and open-source intelligence (OSINT) – a key objective of this article – the discussion is expanded into relevant semantics within the SOCMINT–OSINT debate. This also serves to highlight the requirement for robust legislation to regulate the use of SOCMINT as a process and product. The article introduces a fundamental differentiating element between SOCMINT and OSINT – citizens' right to privacy in a nexus with national security imperatives of states. The second objective of the article is to consider leading international SOCMINT regulations as a benchmark of how this national security–privacy nexus within the SOCMINT–OSINT debate informs an introductory discussion about the SA legislative framework, which is central to the regulation of the use of SOCMINT within the SA context. The article does not constitute a legal opinion, but rather an opinion about what South Africa must consider for an enhanced balance of the national security right to privacy nexus within the context of the SOCMINT–OSINT debate.

The birth of SOCMINT

Accepting the existence and maturity of the internet[73] and the World Wide Web application, a significant by-product of this globally distributed communication and content storage capacity is social media. Britannica (2021) provides a very apt description of the internet, namely "a system architecture that has revolutionized communications and methods of commerce by allowing various computer networks around the world to interconnect"[74]. An important fact not to miss is that Britannica (2021) estimated that, by 2020, more than 4,5 billion people had access to the internet – and consequently to all associated applications. This figure will grow exponentially. It is the urge of individuals to communicate that drives the proliferation of social media applications and their use. The internet and now ubiquitously used World Wide Web applications are most probably the most powerful communication tool known to humankind. This holds incalculable potential for intelligence operations but similarly, and in parallel, an almost uncontrollable communication medium for (national) security threats. A recent example is the tremendous influence that social media had and still is having on health intelligence. While governments are trying to influence their citizens positively to vaccinate, so-called 'anti-vaxxers' are spreading a different picture via social media. It is clear that social media can have both a positive[75] and a negative effect on the spread of information about health issues.

The acronym 'SOCMINT' was coined by Omand, Bartlett and Miller in 2012[76] who argue:[77]

> In an age of ubiquitous social media it is the responsibility of the security community to admit SOCMINT into the national intelligence framework, but only when two important tests are passed. First, that it rests on solid methodological bedrock of collection, evidence, verification, understanding

and application. Second, that the moral hazard it entails can be legitimately managed.

Ten years on, SOCMINT is significantly influencing political, socio-economic and national security dynamics to the point of facilitating instability. Such instability was experienced during the Arab Spring campaigns (2010-2011[78]), not necessarily due to access to social media, but rather facilitated and developed using social media.[79] Senekal (2018) provides a short summary of such influence –

> Twitter, for example, is used by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Al-Sham, currently known as Daesh) (ISIS) and by Al-Qaeda's affiliate, Al-Shabaab. By 1999, almost every known terrorist group had a presence on the internet and during the 2011 Egyptian Revolution 32 000 new groups and 14 000 new pages were created on Facebook from within Egypt. Significant mass demonstrations where Twitter played an important role include the civil unrest in Moldova in 2009, the Iranian election protests of 2009–2010, the Tunisian Revolution of 2010–2011, the Egyptian Revolution in 2011 and the Occupy Wall Street (OWS) protest, which took place in the autumn of 2011 in cities around the world. Locally, a lot of conversations around recent movements such as #RhodesMustFall and #FeesMustFall also took place on social media and especially on Twitter.80

Brown, Guskin and Mitchell (2012) state, "[s]ocial media indeed played a part in the Arab uprisings. Networks formed online were crucial in organising a core group of activists, specifically in Egypt. Civil society leaders in Arab countries emphasised the role of "the internet, mobile phones, and social media"[81] in the protests. Additionally, digital media have been used by Arabs to exercise freedom of speech and as a space for civic engagement."[82] These examples could be expanded into a significant volume of pages when the current war in Ukraine is brought into view from the perspective of SOCMINT and the use of OSINT. Several other researchers have investigated this phenomenon. The instability and change facilitated by social media are not the focus points of this article, but rather the implications of SOCMINT, operationally and legally. Several years after the article by Brown et al., (2012)[83] and Smidi and Shahin (2017) concluded:

> [T]he bulk of the research contends that social media enabled or facilitated the protests by providing voice to people in societies with mostly government-controlled legacy media; helping people connect, mobilise and organise demonstrations; and broadcasting protests to the world at large and gaining global support. Some scholars, however, argue that social media played only a limited or secondary role, which ought to be viewed alongside other social, political, economic and historical factors.84

Social media therefore has an incontestable influence on national security issues. This could be viewed solely from a negative perspective, but a more prudent approach would

be to consider both opportunities and threats associated with social media within the context of national security and intelligence. Consideration of these factors should inform conversations about mitigation of threats and exploitation of opportunities within a national legal framework. In South Africa, such legal framework is still in the infant stage of development. This results in possible uncertainty about the impact on the use of SOCMINT by SA intelligence agencies. First, let us delve into potential SOCMINT semantics and opportunities on offer by this ubiquitous technology and software.

Critical semantics

A question could be raised whether SOCMINT is open-source intelligence (OSINT). Hassan argues, "OSINT sources are distinguished from other forms of intelligence because they must be legally accessible by the public without breaching any copyright, patents or privacy laws."85 Social media stores and provides access to considerable amounts of content; yet vast volumes of such are privileged, i.e., protected by personal passwords and administrative rights as well as copyright protection agreed to in application terms of reference.

> Frequently, 'unrestricted' data on these public social media sites is restricted by individual privacy settings; for instance, Facebook notifications by an individual are accessible to only those within the individual's peer group if the privacy setting is established in such a manner. However, SOCMINT, by definition, accesses all such data without considering privacy. This places a greater emphasis on SOCMINT's instructions for dealing with individual privacy than that of conventional OSINT searches. Even though OSINT does intrude on individual privacy when it stores search information made by individuals, such as the information that is sought when searching for a location on an Internet map. However, SOCMINT's intrusion is far more incisive than [that of] OSINT, because it monitors people in the most obtrusive manner and in their most unaware state – when they are interacting and relaxing in their online social comfort zone.86

SOCMINT is therefore not a new phenomenon. However, SOCMINT is still regularly assumed part of OSINT. Considering the perspectives already aired, SOCMINT can probably not be regarded as OSINT, and hence the conversation about the legal basis for SA intelligence services and agencies to gain legitimate access to the content of social media in support of national security imperatives.

In an article in the *Daily Maverick*, it is stated how the SA government is using content from social media accounts, claiming that it is used against security threats. The data are bought from surveillance companies, who in turn bought it from social media companies.87 If a significant part of such data were privileged (i.e., access authority required), the question could be raised whether SOCMINT can be viewed as OSINT (no access authority required) or rather as a new collection discipline with its own set of rules that consider the ethical and legal requirements of privacy. From a definitional perspective – OSINT is outlined and characterised as "information that is publicly

available to anyone".[88] Constantin-Sorin (2019) argues that this includes "traditional media (newspapers, radio, television, etc.), public data (government reports, official data, etc.), web communities and personal reports".[89] Key to this definition is the construct of publicly available, which is different from having account access.

One perspective defines SOCMINT as "information gathered from social media sites and the tools employed to analyse this data [and] focuses on understanding and forecasting behaviours, crises, and events".[90] This definition provides little insight into the level of intrusiveness and does not differentiate SOCMINT from, for example, OSINT. A more widely articulated perspective is that SOCMINT can be defined and characterised as –

> [T]he process of identifying, collecting, validating and analysing data from social media sites and accounts using nonintrusive and/or intrusive methods to develop intelligence that reduces the unknowns in the decision process[91] [and/or] with the aim of developing products for national security.[92]

Key to this definition is 'accounts', which implies access authority required or privacy or privileged content. The differentiation is therefore focused on the process rather than on the products generated.

The confusion about whether SOCMINT can be regarded as an OSINT discipline possibly originates from the fact that some might regard content that is openly shared on social media platforms as 'publicly available to anyone'. When considering the OSINT definition by Lowenthal and Clark,[93] some of the elements of SOCMINT are contained in the OSINT definition. However, when considering the explanations provided by Davis (2015)[94], Ivan, Iov, Anamaria, Codruta and Nicolae (2015)[95] and Constantin-Sorin (2019)[96] it is no longer clear whether SOCMINT can be grouped within the OSINT discipline. In short –

> SOCMINT [in other words the process of collection and exploitation] can be deployed on content that is private or public, while OSINT is about strictly publicly available content, such as articles, news sites, or blog posts, published in print and on the open internet and clearly intended and available for everyone to read and watch. SOCMINT requires more specific regulation, policies and safeguards that take into account the very unique and specific nature of social media: a privately-owned space (i.e., owned by private companies) where people share freely.[97]

Consideration should be given to both international and legal aspects governing the use of social media as an intelligence source before drawing any such conclusions. This distinction and classification should inform future policy decisions about the mandates of intelligence services and agencies, as well as subsequent organisational restructuring (if required) and resource allocations. No matter how academics and experts eventually agree on a universal definition of SOCMINT, the phenomenon provides several opportunities. There are, however, also some moral and ethical issues.

SOCMINT and privacy

Without wandering into the never-ending maze that is constructed from morality and privacy, arguments are forwarded by Rønn and Søe (2019) with regard to the duality of social media.[98] These authors contend that social media has both a public and private character and where these two domains overlap, it creates a 'grey zone'. It is exactly this grey zone constructed of private content within a public space that separates OSINT from SOCMINT. Entry into this grey zone will require the verification of credentials, which separate it from the domain of OSINT. Rønn and Søe (2019) argue further:

> Although the information can easily be accessed, the pressing question is whether and under which circumstances it is morally permissible for government authorities to gain access to personal social media accounts and exploit the information for safety and security issues.[99]

Rønn and Søe (2019) refer to the opinions of Herman Tavani[100] about the types of privacies ("informational privacy is just one of four distinct kinds of privacy, the others being physical/accessibility privacy, decisional privacy and psychological/mental privacy"[101]) pointing out that information privacy is not a monolith within questions of morality.

> Informational privacy is often described as the ability to control or restrict access to one's personal information. Hence, in informational privacy it is personal information (or personal data) which people have a right to or an interest in having protected[102]

People also have an interest to protect the other 'rights to privacy'; yet society accepts that these will be violated by the state (within the parameters of national legislation) if such privacies pose a danger to the individual and/or to national security. The public spaces are also monitored with camera technology whilst monitoring the movement of both vehicle and people traffic through the streets in order to have a very quick response to incidents of terrorism perpetrated by (for example) knife-wielding psychopaths in the United Kingdom.[103] These psychopaths will have all their rights violated by the state once in custody – without public outcry, forgetting that individual privacy in public spaces was violated with surveillance by the state in order to provide some level of security. This cannot possibly be different for state surveillance of social media (cyber spaces) in order to have a reasonable response time for the purpose of security within the context of national interest. Yet, people seem to be less accommodating when it comes to their Facebook profile, Google browsing history or Twitter feed, forgetting that they hand over hard-earned private funds to the state revenue collectors to fund the state national security mandate. This nexus between public safety and individual privacy concerning the collection and exploitation of SOCMINT could be balanced with robust public consultation and unambiguous legislation because it is also in the public interest (as taxpayers) to get the security benefits locked up in SOCMINT opportunities. Such a balance should specifically consider the implications of state surveillance that is conducted "with or without evidence or reasonable suspicion – that is, whether the

surveillance is targeted or not".[104] Rønn and Søe (2019) write, "it might be morally permissible to access social media profiles in cases where the officials have a reasonable suspicion of criminal behaviour, it is much more morally problematic if the surveillance is conducted on random citizens".[105] Public dismay about intrusions on privacy by the state is thus less about what may be revealed than about being perceived as a criminal or national security threat. The fact that informed consent locks the state out of the available social media content does not minimise such perceptions of criminality of national security threat; it probably increases it. This dilemma could potentially be mitigated by robust legislation.

Privacy in cyberspace is therefore about securing legitimate access to personal content.[106] It could also mean legitimate access to private content by the state if legislation allows and regulates such access with unambiguous parameters of such legitimacy. The restriction of access to private content in cyberspace (typically in the social media space) is therefore a question of assigning or legislating for 'informed consent'[107] for the use of personal information. Such consent could be assumed implicit in legislation that allows the state to access personal content for the purpose of national security because in democratic societies, such as South Africa, the government is elected by the people to develop and protect the interests of the people.

> [W]e have to consent to others gaining access to our personal information. Informed consent is a central concept when addressing the question of informational privacy on social media platforms. Users give the specific platform their consent to allow the companies to access and use their personal information which is available on the specific platform. However, if it is possible for the platforms to infer new personal information, as argued above, it becomes difficult if not impossible to restrict access to and control over the flow of such information.[108]

SOCMINT opportunities

To support the proposition that social media is a social common with SOCMINT opportunities not yet experienced since the advent of intelligence as a construct, DataReportal (2022) rated Google first, YouTube second, and Facebook third as the world's most visited webpages, with Instagram and Twitter amongst the top ten[109] in October 2021. Facebook alone "had 2.910 billion monthly active users in October 2021" awarding it first place among social media applications, internationally.[110] The importance of Facebook, as a SOCMINT content goldmine, is in the broad approach the application has to social interaction. Facebook provides a platform that allows users to disclose any personal data and preference in virtually any media format. This results in in-depth conversations, photo sharing and video conversations, geo-positioning disclosure (checking in) and access to (unless blocked) friend networks. Before D-Day landings during World War II, the allied intelligence services used postcards and photographs taken during holidays to construct an accurate picture of the (then) current state of the area targeted for the landings.[111]

> The request [for such postcards and photos] came in 1942, with Brits desperate to help the war effort sending in 30,000 packs of pictures of the French coast within just 36 hours. Incredibly, by 1944, 10 million holiday snaps and postcards, hotel brochures, letters and guidebooks had arrived by post. [112]

It took the allied intelligence services approximately two years to amass 10 million items that graphically illustrated some part of the targeted landing area. In contrast, and significantly so, during 2013 (almost a decade ago now), Facebook achieved 350 million photographs daily.[113] To take it to a meta-level, *circa* 2020, it was said that the "chances are you see (and forward) some of the more than 3.2 billion images and 720,000 hours of video shared daily".[114] It is difficult to describe in words the opportunity locked up in that volume of content. This figure does not include the SOCMINT in text conversations and personal data continuously available and updated. The force multiplier or exponential enabler that should be noted with this vast mega volume of SOCMINT is that it is available on any smart device, anywhere and anytime, and now coming to the user via cloud services.

Contextually, with access to this amount of content – continuously updated – intelligence organisations worldwide can construct detailed target profiles without placing these organisations in harm's way during content collection or sacrificing plausible deniability – as would be the case when using human intelligence (HUMINT). A meta-perspective underscores the opportunities that SOCMINT facilitates:

> [To] contribute decisively to public safety: identifying criminal activity; giving early warning of disorder and threats to the public; or building situational awareness in rapidly changing situations. As society develops and adopts new ways to communicate and organise, it is vital that public bodies, including law enforcement and the intelligence community, keep up with these changes.[115]

This scenario is currently operationally active in the Russia–Ukraine war. Heidi Swart (2021) writes, "[y]ou can download your personal information – over 50 data categories – stored since you first joined. Posts, messages, tags, pokes, searches, the friended, the unfriended, login locations, facial recognition data."[116] The portfolio of information categories collected and available on each individual Facebook user can be found on the Facebook application under the Help section[117] (a link is provided in the endnotes). If you have access to this, then those more capable within the cyber domain certainly also have access to this information. Facebook (amongst several other very popular applications) therefore provides intelligence services and agencies with vast volumes of content on all possible indicators with which threat profiles can be constructed. The SOCMINT opportunity load is so extensive that the National Guard in Russia (Rosgvardia) is training Russian Army specialists as SOCMINT operations[118] specialists. The Rosgvardia commander-in-chief rather candidly notes, "[t]he creation of the National Guard is an answer to the threat posed by techniques of so-called non-violent resistance."[119] From a very pragmatic perspective, SOCMINT therefore provides

a credible source of content that could be used for the execution of national security threat detection, according to the Russians. Russia is a member of BRICS; so is South Africa. The BRICS partnership is consequently a perfect vehicle of international co-operation to exchange expertise on the matter of SOCMINT. However, in view of the recent Russia–Ukraine war and the considerable support Ukraine is getting from the international community, it would be ill advised for South Africa to support Russia with any kind of intelligence if South Africa is going to maintain a neutral position in this conflict.[120]

A similar, but different application within the intelligence environment, China's Social Credit System seek to regulate an individual behaviour-based score on the back of various social interaction activities.[121] Without getting into ethics and morality and questions about good and bad behaviour, a more relevant question within the context of this article would be what this has to do with SOCMINT. The answer and opportunity for intelligence organisations are that individuals are vetted continuously on as many aspects as possible within the parameters of the software and those regulating it. Over time, this should offer a platform that provides transparency about those that are trustworthy and those that are still working to get to that level. Very contentious? Not really, as national financial credit organisations do similar vetting, albeit more focused on financial management behaviour. The more incentive there is for the citizenry to live as 'good citizens' in the social media space, the more trustworthy the social media content therefore becomes to the point where it supports SOCMINT as an A-level source.

Social media is also used effectively in humanitarian operations. Crowdsourcing is an example where the public could provide real-time information on what is happening on the ground in a crisis.[122] Crowdsourcing has already been used effectively to outline areas where maps of such areas were, for instance, outdated.[123]

Another opportunity is locked up in the ability to manipulate content online and almost real-time as part of deception (a primary function within the counter-intelligence stable). The downside is that every opportunity available to state intelligence organisations is also available to every other state and non-state actor with adversarial intent. Several of these are classified as national security threats.

When considering the social media characteristics as discussed by Stegen, the usefulness of social media as a non-kinetic weapon is not a bridge too far. When affordable, user-friendly, interactive content is available with no state censorship in play (implying that distributed content "is not verified and false information can spread in this manner"[124]) – adversarial or malicious activities can be directed at targets of any size. This can be achieved by a variety of threat actors ranging from bored and/or inquisitive children to sophisticated terrorist and/or extremist organisations.

SOCMINT national security threats

The constant flux of societal dynamics of which Bauman (2006)[125] speaks, and which is quoted by Stegen (2019)[126], drives opportunity and threat. Changes within society are natural phenomena and have many drivers, such as the creation of knowledge and

technology. Change itself is not necessarily the threat, because change can be very healthy – a case in point is the 1994 leap into democracy in South Africa. That change was not driven by social media because social media did not exist yet. In contrast, the changes associated with the Arab Spring revolutions (2010-2011) might have had normal political and socio-economic triggers, but abnormal change propagation enabled by social media.[127] Although the triggers might have been typical during the Arab Spring, the effective mining of social media content could have revealed the tempo of the need for change, the planned tactics, the leadership involved, amongst several other aspects. Intelligence analysts would use the typical - *who, what, where, when, how, what thereafter and with what effect- type* of questions to support their analysis. Social media content collected from, for example, Facebook could have provided significant content to each of these questions. Other national security threats that could typically use the capabilities provided by social media are the spreading of fear through terrorism and extremism, subversion, deception and misinformation from the covert action playbook through the spreading of deep-fake content that could influence the outcome of an election or the credibility of national leadership. For example, espionage, through the posting of simple and/or coded content, enables the discovery of new technology, movement of armed forces, infrastructure vulnerabilities, resource shortages, human rights abuses, to name but a few.

International regulation of SOCMINT

International intelligence organisations seem to be perplexed and, in some cases, hamstrung by the legislative protection of privacy within the context of social media. This is of obvious concern to these organisations since their mandate to provide the state (and by implication the citizenry) with early warning about impending (national) security threats and various social media applications could be used as a legitimately privileged (and encrypted) communication medium between state or non-state threat actors.

An example noted by Hassan (2020)[128] of transnational data protection legislation is the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) of 2018 promulgated by the European Union.[129] Ben Wolford[130] is of the opinion that the GDPR, comparatively speaking, constitutes a significantly robust data security regulation. The GPPR was promulgated to guarantee personal data security EU-wide, with noteworthy financial sanction power as deterrent to any prospective data collector. The GDPR is a logical extension of the European Convention of Human Rights (1950) that pursues personal privacy.[131] In the 1950s, up until the advent of the internet, such a guarantee might have seemed plausible. This prospect changed significantly with the development of the now mature World Wide Web and its associated social media platforms. Hence, there is stronger regulation by the EU, i.e., the GDPR. Ironically, it was a privacy dispute with Facebook that triggered the development and promulgation of the GDPR.[132] In fact, according to Wolford (2021)[133], the GDPR applies to any entity that processes any personal data of any EU citizen, a truly transnational privacy regulation. This obviously has far-reaching implications for the operationalisation of the SOCMINT construct, since the successful execution of SOCMINT is premised on access to social media content. The GDPR

could also be perceived as a deterrent against the United States breaching the privacy of European citizens premised on the fact that most of the social media platforms originate from the United States.

At risk of entering a discussion about the entire GDPR regulation, it is worth mentioning the data protection principles contained in the regulation (Article 5(1–2)), namely:

> Lawfulness, fairness and transparency – Processing must be lawful, fair, and transparent to the data subject. Purpose limitation – You must process data for the legitimate purposes specified explicitly to the data subject when you collected it. Data minimization – You should collect and process only as much data as absolutely necessary for the purposes specified. Accuracy – You must keep personal data accurate and up to date. Storage limitation – You may only store personally identifying data for as long as necessary for the specified purpose. Integrity and confidentiality – Processing must be done in such a way as to ensure appropriate security, integrity, and confidentiality (e.g. by using encryption). Accountability – The data controller is responsible for being able to demonstrate GDPR compliance with all of these principles.[134]

The very first principle is already problematic for the intelligence organisation that seeks to maintain secrecy of its intent and targets. For the same reason as the first, the second principle is also contentious within the domain of intelligence collection and the complexity of national security. The third principle is aligned with the responsibility of intelligence collectors. The fourth principle, however, is out of kilter with how intelligence processors manage their content. They would typically hold onto that content for as long as possible and hopefully be able to keep on updating the content to keep it relevant. Security, integrity and confidentiality of the collected data are not hampering factors. However, because several of the principles are not aligned with how intelligence organisation's function, the last principle cannot be guaranteed. This briefly illustrates the privacy–national security nexus.

Social media legislation could be perceived as widening the chasm between the two competing social imperatives, i.e., privacy as a human right and security as a human right. The right to privacy according to the GDPR are –

- The right to be informed
- The right of access
- The right to rectification
- The right to erasure
- The right to restrict processing
- The right to data portability
- The right to object
- Rights in relation to automated decision making and profiling.[135]

Again, it is clear how these rights obliterate the potency of SOCMINT within the context of national security.

When considering the treatment of SOCMINT as an intelligence content domain, the United States experiences similar popular resistance against the surveillance of US citizens' social media. Law enforcement agencies use private service providers, such as Media Sonar, to survey social media and then just buy the data for SOCMINT purposes.[136] This resulted in social media companies, such as Facebook, Twitter and Instagram, adding specifications to their terms and conditions that explicitly prohibit the release and use of their data for surveillance purposes.[137]

Then there is the abuse of the privilege by the state. Heidi Swart (2017) positions this in a statement - "we as citizens have no way to effectively watch over government's use of all-seeing cyberspying technologies."[138] All democracies grapple with this social dilemma. For South Africa, the dilemma is currently quite vivid due to the state capture saga. Let us therefore consider the specifics of the SA legislative framework governing the use of social media content.

South African legislation affecting the regulation of SOCMINT

Social media is not a foreign concept to South Africa. The following statistics illustrate graphically use of the various social media applications within South Africa:

Figure 1: Most used social media platforms in South Africa, users aged 16 to 64 (mid-2021)
Source: BusinessTech (2021)[139]

Comparatively speaking, South Africa is therefore not different concerning the trends in social media usage. South Africa has also attempted regulating access to and usage of personal information available due to state and non-state organisational process requirements for registration, authentication and transparency. This does not differ from the attempts by certain European authorities and countries further afield (for example

France) to secure and guarantee privacy. Let us now review the relevant South African legislation that attempts to guarantee privacy as a constitutional right and legislation that mandate the SA intelligence services and agencies to conduct intelligence operations in national interest.

Collectively, the following legal frameworks are intent on addressing the mischief associated with the protection of information. The question is: how does this affect the state mandate to use all available social media content in terms of the SA Constitution and the Protection of Personal Information Act 4 of 2013 (the POPIA) in the interest of SA national security and security within international co-operation?

South African intelligence legislation

During (or ideally before) a national security dilemma or simply in the national interest, SA intelligence services and agencies hold legislative mandates to furnish state decision-makers with relevant and in-time intelligence. SOCMINT is one, and developing into a significant source of content that, once processed, could provide the intelligence products that could inform robust national security-related decisions. SOCMINT is also a relatively cost-effective intelligence collection method. Questions to be considered in this regard are:

- Which SA legislation affects the use of SOCMINT by SA intelligence services and agencies?
- Does SA legislation provide crisp guidance on the use of SOCMINT within the domestic national security context?
- Does the legislation also provide sanctions for transgression?

First, let us consider the SA (national security-related) intelligence mandates as legislated.

The Constitution[140] provides for the establishment of intelligence services in Chapter 11 (s 209–210): "(1) Any intelligence service, other than any intelligence division of the defence force or police service, may be established only by the President, as head of the national executive, and only in terms of national legislation."[141] The establishment of the South African State Security Agency (SSA) brought together the National Intelligence Agency (NIA) and the SA Secret Services under central command.[142] The National Strategic Intelligence Act 39 of 1994 (as amended)[143] and the Defence Act 42 of 2002 establish the respective SA intelligence services and agencies that are tasked with national security intelligence functions.

Section 2 of the National Strategic Intelligence Act 39 of 1994 describes the function of the intelligence services and agencies as to collect and process "intelligence" that would enable responses to an identified "threat or potential threat to the security of the Republic or its people".[144] The following contextual definitions of intelligence are applicable –

"'counter-intelligence' means measures and activities conducted, instituted or taken to impede and to neutralise the effectiveness of foreign or hostile intelligence operations, to protect intelligence and any classified information, to conduct security screening investigations and to counter subversion, treason, sabotage and terrorism aimed at or against personnel, strategic installations or resources of the Republic;

'crime intelligence' means intelligence used in the prevention of crime or to conduct criminal investigations and to prepare evidence for the purpose of law enforcement and the prosecution of offenders;

'departmental intelligence' means intelligence about any threat or potential threat to the national security and stability of the Republic which falls within the functions of a department of State, and includes intelligence needed by such department in order to neutralise such a threat;

'domestic intelligence' means intelligence on any internal activity, factor or development which is detrimental to the national stability of the Republic, as well as threats or potential threats to the constitutional order of the Republic and the safety and the well-being of its people;

'national security intelligence' means intelligence which relates to or may be relevant to the assessment of any threat or potential threat to the security of the Republic in any field;

'national strategic intelligence' means comprehensive, integrated and estimative intelligence on all the current and long-term aspects of national security which are of special concern to strategic decision-making and the formulation and implementation of policy and strategy at national level."[145]

Every definition emphasises the use of intelligence for the purpose of national security threat responses within the context of state and human security paradigms, i.e., decisions, policy, strategy, planning, and others. The SSA mandate therefore relates to the provision of pre-emptive intelligence to the SA government of –

[Any impending] domestic and foreign threats or potential threats to national stability, the constitutional order, and the safety and well-being of our people. This allows the government to implement policies to deal with potential threats and better understand existing threats, and, thus, improve their policies.[146]

The mandate for military intelligence functions is no different; it just has a particular focus on military operations with the same national aim – "'domestic military intelligence' means intelligence required for the planning and conduct of military operations within the Republic to ensure security and stability for its people".[147]

It should be noted that no detailed description of the type of intelligence is provided, i.e., the primary collection disciplines – OSINT, SIGINT, HUMINT, GEOINT, signals intelligence (SIGINT), measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT) and SOCMINT. It is assumed that all the intelligence content domains are included in the definitions above and that the state (i.e., SSA and defence intelligence) will utilise all the content from any of these domains to assess the "threats or potential threats to the constitutional order of the Republic and the safety and the well-being of its people"[148]. There is, however, other more recent legislation that needs consideration when it concerns the right to privacy as per the SA Constitution.

Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision of Communication-related Information Act (RICA) 70 of 2002 as amended[149]

RICA was promulgated to curb mischief that relates to the interception of communication.[150] This communication must take place on specified radio frequencies within the frequency spectrum, and RICA is positioned to regulate the telecommunication industry that does not "have the capability to be intercepted. RICA was also promulgated to regulate "certain communication-related information",[151] typically by means of the Office for Interception Centres (to be established). Thus, the intent of RICA is clear."[152] RICA would have provided the state with broad legislative cover to conduct intelligence operations within the SIGINT and SOCMINT domains. However, RICA also seeks to regulate how intelligence services and agencies go about their business. This was found wanting by the Constitutional Court, leading to the SA Constitutional Court ruling on 3 February 2021 that the Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision of Communication-Related Information Act (RICA) is unconstitutional. The court argued that it did not provide "adequate safeguards to protect the right to privacy". According to BusinessTech[153], this happened after Sam Sole, a journalist who had been placed under surveillance by the SSA, challenged the constitutionality of the act. The Constitution Court believed communication interception and surveillance based on the provisions of RICA comprise a "highly invasive violation of privacy, and thus infringes on section 14 of the Constitution".[154] The court did acknowledge that state surveillance is of importance, but that the right to privacy was coupled to the right to dignity. This attests to the conceptualisation by Rønn and Søe (2019) that privacy is a cluster phenomenon, i.e., the various types of privacy invariably affect each other in an integrated manner.[155]

This Constitutional Court ruling sets a precedent for intelligence operations within the domain of SOCMINT and would typically want SOCMINT operations to be a last resort. However, not all communication is equal. When an intelligence organisation decides to intercept voice and social media communication platforms such as WhatsApp, Telegram and Twitter, it might become problematic from a 'right to privacy' perspective. These types of social media have strict password and encryption protection (informed consent controls) and can probably not be regarded as public domain or OSINT. RICA is, however, not the only SA legislation that was promulgated to regulate mischief involving the communication sector, its users and the security sector.

Protection of Personal Information Act 4 of 2013 (POPIA)[156]

The POPI Act (POPIA) has very similar wording and structure to that of the European GDPR. The mischief that the POPIA (section 1) is endeavouring to regulate comprises infringements on the right to privacy, the flow of information domestically and "across international borders", lawful processing of personal information, and recourse where this was infringed upon.[157] POPIA (section 4) provides the parameters for the lawful use of personal information. Typically, principles of accountability, openness, quality safeguards, limitations for processing, and participation of the individual are addressed and then dealt with and addressed in various other sections of the POPIA.[158]

The rights of everyone in terms of personal information and exclusion are addressed in POPIA (sections 5 and 6). Without being trapped in a discussion about what the individual rights to privacy are, let us focus on what is excluded by the POPIA. Section 6 addresses exclusions of particular importance. Within the context of this article, these are reflected in section 6(1)(c)(i) –

> 6. (1) This Act does not apply to the processing of personal information –
> (c) by or on behalf of a public body – (i) which involves national security, including activities that are aimed at assisting in the identification of the financing of terrorist and related activities, defence or public safety; or (ii) the purpose of which is the prevention, detection, including assistance in the identification of the proceeds of unlawful activities and the combating of money laundering activities, investigation or proof of offences, the prosecution of offenders or the execution of sentences or security measures, to the extent that adequate safeguards have been established in legislation for the protection of such personal information.[159]

A specific calibration of this exclusion for national security purposes is section 6(2), which points the reader to the Protection of Constitutional Democracy against Terrorist and Related Activities Act 33 of 2004 (section 4), "Terrorist and related activities".

The POPIA (section 7) refers to the "Exclusion for journalistic, literary or artistic purposes", which is also outside the discussion about SOCMINT and intelligence organisations and their operational needs. However, with the exclusions expressed in POPIA (section 7), another channel of access to SOCMINT is opened to intelligence organisations that are experts in HUMINT collection. It is also common knowledge that some of the most capable intelligence organisations have journalism as their core business. Partnerships between intelligence organisations and media organisations are common.

From an SA perspective, personal information disclosed and distributed via social media is in the public domain, but that does not automatically render such information free to use. That use is regulated by the POPIA.[160] The state, however, retains the right to access and process personal information – including social media content – for the purpose of securing the nation against specified national security threats.[161,162] The only caveat is that the SA intelligence services and agencies are responsible for the promulgation of

departmental regulations – or "adequate safeguards"[163] – to prevent the abuse of this privilege extended by POPIA. The effectivity of such regulations (if in existence) has not yet been tested in court.

Criminal Procedures Act 51 of 1977 (as amended)

The relevance of the Criminal Procedures Act[164] is in the authorisation of surveillance of individuals. This includes the surveillance of individual social media accounts. It thus remains an issue of the right to privacy and whether that right carries more weight than the 'wellbeing of the nation' from a national security threat perspective.

Recommendations

Omand offers two approaches to the implementation of SOCMINT regulation. One avenue would be with 'open SOCMINT', which is characteristically non-intrusive in nature due to the requirement for consent to access any social media account[165]. If such consent cannot be secured, further use of any account content becomes restricted from a privacy perspective.[166] There is thus a reasonable expectation by the user that private content will remain just that. Content that is collected by 'open SOCMINT' is therefore essentially OSINT, and organisations that collect such content should be expected to be, from a UK perspective –

> [As] transparent as possible that:
>
> - all such collection, retention, and sharing policies are publicised and justified
> - the reason why the information is collected is publicised
> - the information commissioner should monitor the development
>
> of this form of information processing to ensure that it conforms with the principles of the Data Protection Act [2018], including being fairly and lawfully processed in accordance with individuals' rights.[167]

The second avenue could be with "intrusive interception and surveillance"[168]. The first avenue does not seem to pose much challenge in terms of regulation, and essentially refers to OSINT. However, the second avenue is the approach that separates SOCMINT from OSINT. For this avenue to be institutionalised in legislation and departmental policy, Omand (2012) envisages six principles, providing a first-order regulatory foundation for SOCMINT collection and exploitation:

> [1] [T]here must be sufficient, sustainable cause; [2] there must be integrity of motive; [3] the methods used must be proportionate and necessary; [4] there must be right authority, validated by external oversight; [5] recourse to secret intelligence must be a last resort if more open sources can be used; [and 6] there must be reasonable prospect of success.[169]

Principle 5, alluding to the use of SOCMINT as a last resort, is counter-productive. Because social media is currently (and will be in future) the first choice for communication

it would be prudent for intelligence services and agencies to make SOCMINT their first port of call.

Somewhere between the need for privacy and national security there consequently should be a Venn diagram moment that provides space for the articulation of policy recommendations that protect the user from the state and the state from the user. Lever (2016) [170], Rønn and Søe (2019)[171] and others conceptualised some nuanced arguments about the privacy–security nexus. Lever (2016) argues from the perspective of democratic rule that states must have the ability to "hold associations to account for their actions" [172], merging the right to privacy and the mandate to provide security into a requirement for operational freedom within the limits set by legislation (which invariably will be based on issues of ethics, morality, rights and freedoms). She further states:

> Constraints on privacy are necessary to protect 'the rule of law', because we cannot form, pass, judge and execute laws democratically without devices such as the secret ballot, or legal rights of confidential judgement, information and association, which enable people carefully to explore alone, and with others they know and trust, what they should do as citizens. Our legitimate interests in privacy are not negligible, or inherently of lesser importance than our interests in security.[173]

This is further calibrated by the contention that individual "interests in privacy, then, can be varied and inescapably tied to our sense of ourselves as moral agents. They are not, therefore of obviously lesser importance than our interests in self-preservation – individual, or collective".[174] "Public acceptability lies at the heart of any form of intelligence collection, and this can only be secured if SOCMINT is properly used and properly authorized."[175] SOCMINT and OSINT should therefore be separate collection domains to protect the imperative of the right to privacy and national security requirements better and in a balanced manner by means of unambiguous national regulation in the interest of the citizen.

Conclusion

South Africa is a very large producer, distributer and consumer of social media content from both a public and a state intelligence perspective. Intelligence services can benefit – and are probably already benefitting – from the use and exploitation of SOCMINT. However, there is a growing concern from the public about the negative consequences that such collection and exploitation could have on an individual's right to privacy. This is also an international concern.

Given the legal complexities of SOCMINT, it is proposed that SOCMINT should be viewed as a new collection discipline, and South Africa should embark on a process to provide clear legislative guidelines for the collection and exploitation of SOCMINT. South Africa is (at present) still in the unique position to use SOCMINT and could use SOCMINT in intelligence collaboration with international partners that do not have that liberty. Due regard should be exercised in this regard because of the effect such sharing might have on possible international relations.

From a state mandate perspective, SA intelligence services and agencies are clearly mandated within several distinct pieces of legislation to conduct all aspects of intelligence domestically and in foreign locations. Considering the existence and acceptance of SOCMINT, as a 'relatively new' phenomenon when compared to the rest of the primary collection disciplines (OSINT, SIGINT, HUMINT, GEOINT, MASINT), SA intelligence services and agencies are permitted to mine and exploit social media content to produce SOCMINT for the purpose of decision-making within the context of national security. Such actions are calibrated by specifications in the POPIA.

Grounded in the fact that the SOCMINT content volume is considerable and expanding exponentially, South Africa should establish, within its respective intelligence services and agencies that specifically manage collection and exploitation of SOCMINT, policy guidelines for the use of SOCMINT that distinguish between what can be defined as OSINT and what is quintessentially SOCMINT. It would also be incumbent on these organisations to ensure that robust construct definitions are included in departmental policy, stipulating the differences in requirements for the legal usage of OSINT vs SOCMINT. Those differences do exist and should be formalised post haste. Recommended in this regard is that SOCMINT be conceptualised and institutionalised in departmental policy as the product of privileged (i.e., access authorisation required) social media content analysis, whereas OSINT is the product of analysed public content (i.e., no access authority required). The primary difference is locked into the legislated imperatives of privacy versus national security; hence, the SOCMINT–OSINT nexus.

Consideration should be given to govern the collection and exploitation of SOCMINT by means of (possibly) several operating principles that ensure maximum protection of privacy without eroding the mandate of the state to ensure national security. Such principles could include requirements for a clear legal case showing cause and evidence of operational response proportionality. These issues should be in an executive order (the format of which could be described in legislation) to ensure boundary management and oversight. As with requirements for covert action operations, a successful conclusion of the operation should be achievable with clear consequences spelled out if the operation fails.

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
Beyond *African Pride*:
Corruption mechanisms in the Nigerian Navy and maritime sector

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Abstract

This article reports on corruption mechanisms within the Nigerian Navy and the maritime sector in Nigeria. Beginning with an examination of the disappearance of the vessel MT *African Pride* in October 2003, the article shows that, far from being a one-off incident, the disappearance was indicative of the opportunism and criminality that naval operations within the oil-rich Niger Delta attracted. The Nigerian Ports Authority (NPA) and the Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency (NIMASA) constitute other case studies of maritime industry corruption examined here. Such cases highlight the exploitation of relations between the Navy and the civil maritime sector. Overall, the article identifies patterns of corruption mechanisms employed. These include the support of illegal oil bunkering, illicit agreements and contracts, unsanctioned oil tanker relocations, malfeasance in arms deals and other areas, and multiple instances of public office abuse.

The military and corruption in independent Nigeria: A brief history

Corruption in the Nigerian military is an institutional feature that goes back to the formative years of the institution as a professionalised force since Nigerian independence in the 1960s. Moreover, what eventually emerged as the more recognisable forms of corruption today – such as bribe-taking from civilians, unsanctioned civil–military contracts and support of maritime criminality by civilian actors – originated as abuse of military positions and appointments. Before that, corruption and unprofessionalism manifested in the more benign form of unusually close relationships between certain senior military personnel and the civil authorities. Indeed, these unsanctioned relationships between military personnel and civilian authorities and sectors, which underpin much of the analysis discussed in this article regarding the Navy and the maritime industry in Nigeria, warrant an inspection within the formative years of the military during the First Republic (1960–1966).

At the time, especially at the highest ranks and amongst the older senior officers, the political interests of the military and the interference in promotions and postings meant these were becoming increasingly compromised, with many senior army officers already too friendly with influential politicians. For example, Lt Col. Abogo Largema the pioneer Commanding Officer of 4th Battalion of the Nigerian Army was reportedly close enough to Chief Samuel Ládòkè Akíntólá, Premier of Western Nigeria and one of the Nigerian First Republic's most senior politicians, to train him in the use of firearms.[176] Some

friendships between politicians and the military had even more depth to them. The Sardauna of Sokoto, Sir Ahmadu Bello, was said to have an unusually close friendship with Brigadier Ademulegun.[177] Indeed, according to Lt Col. Ejoor, Ademulegun (who was the 1 Brigade Commander) and Sir Ahmadu Bello (who was both the head of the Northern People's Congress and the Premier of Northern Nigeria) were so close that, upon visiting Ademulegun on one occasion, Ejoor (who did not recognise the Sardauna) found Sir Ahmadu Bello sitting on the living room carpet. Ademulegun was nowhere to be found. Upon being introduced to this person as the Sardauna of Sokoto and the Northern Premier, Ejoor was said to have given Sir Ahmadu Bello a "trembling handshake", and then "staggered out of the backdoor and disappeared in utter confusion".[178] Such fraternisation between the older generation and the political elite did not sit well with young officers, such as Kaduna Nzeogwu, who wanted a clear and professional separation between the politicians and the army.[179] Indeed, institutional corruption and the unease caused by political misuse of the military was one of the reasons cited by Nzeogwu and the other disgruntled officers who staged the 15 January *coup d'état* that brought a bloody end to the First Republic in 1966.[180]

Far from being a mere footnote within the history of the military institution in Nigeria, this theme of corruption and a lack of professionalism not only endured; it spread across the three service branches. In the decades that followed, as the coup culture of the military and praetorianism saw it claim the centre of political power and refuse to let go, the institution practised corruption with impunity. Moreover, by the 1980s, corruption and its practice in Nigeria had gone from bad to worse.

Between 1985 and the return to democratic rule in 1999, successive military regimes were blighted by corruption and repressive governance.[181] Neopatrimonialism and personalisation of government rule underpinned the spread of corruption across the military, civil society and the private sector.[182] Indeed, at a time, corruption in Nigeria was said to be the "national culture".[183] The scale of corruption during the 1990s is reflected in the Pius Okigbo Report, which noted that about $12 billion in an oil windfall, accrued by the Nigerian government during the 1990 Gulf War, could not be accounted for by Babangida's military regime.[184]

Matters arguably got even worse during the Abacha regime. Shortly after the dictator had died in 1998, a panel was set up to recover the looted funds of his military government between 1993 and 1998. The committee found that senior military leaders, but civilians too, in cahoots with the government, embezzled billions of dollars during the Abacha regime.[185] In addition, General Sani Abacha himself, who died before facing the charges levelled against him, was accused by the Obasanjo government of personally stealing at least $4 billion.[186]

Even Nigeria's last military regime, led by General Abdusalami Abubakar (1998–1999), was indicted by the Christopher Kolade Panel in its report, which accused the regime of "awarding, massively inflated, contracts, licences, awards, etc., usually to firms in which top echelon of the regime had substantial interests, causing a sharp drop in the country's external reserves".[187]

As evidenced above, corruption within the Nigerian military was not a navy-only phenomenon. However, this article focuses on the Nigerian Navy service branch specifically. The article reports on the pathology of institutional corruption within the Navy, the close links between corruption in the Navy and the maritime industry, and how the Navy exploited its relations with the civil authority and maritime sector, which further engendered unprofessionalism and corruption.

Background: A history of corruption and unprofessionalism in the Nigerian Navy

Before corruption allegations brought the naval institution to new lows past the turn of the century, the Nigerian Navy nevertheless was the primary tool of military statecraft of the government in the quest to adopt an outward-looking foreign policy posture during the military interregnum. The interventions of the Navy within the military interregnum during the 1990s were a way for Nigerian military juntas to project their military power in support of regional allies.[188] During peacekeeping missions by the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in Liberia, the Nigerian Naval Force, led by the amphibious warship, the NNS *Ambe* and two of the three FPB 57 Class Patrol/Missile Boats of the Navy, the NNS *Ekpe* and the NNS *Damisa*, for instance established a beachhead against rebel forces of Charles Taylor in the Freeport of Monrovia in August 1990; thus, becoming the first successful amphibious landing by a black African navy in a peacekeeping operation.[189] Moreover, over the lifetime of peacekeeping missions in Liberia and Sierra Leone, the Nigerian Navy transported troops, equipment, armaments and *matériel* and provided occasional artillery support from the coast against rebel positions inland.[190]

Indeed, along the lines of the aforementioned antecedents, and as a former Nigerian Chief of Naval Staff (CNS), Vice Admiral GTA Adekeye points out the history of the Nigerian Navy presents an institution that surpassed practically every other black African navy at the time.[191] Yet, not unlike the other service branches of the Nigerian military, depending on at which point in history the Navy was being examined, the establishment could look impressive (such as within the aforementioned amphibious landing). On the other hand, the Navy could appear practically unfit for operations. One example is that of Operation Sea Dog (1985), when the limited capacity of the Navy to conduct joint operations with the Army and Air Force was exposed.[192] Another was evidenced in 2004, during Operation Takute Ekpe, which, as Rear Admiral Geoffrey Yanga puts it, "was a virtual failure for reasons of technical complexities, lack of joint training and communications".[193] Moreover, quite aside from such operational challenges, as this article will argue, the Nigerian Navy had an entrenched and longstanding pathology: institutional corruption.[194]

One aspect of this corruption – as it relates to the Navy specifically – is intuitive to identify. After all, the unique position of the Navy sets it apart as a service branch that could employ both large and small waterways to control, relocate and transport oversized cargo. The same maritime capabilities meant that, within specific theatres where resources were otherwise non-lootable – such as crude oil in the Niger Delta –

naval officials who went rogue extracted considerable rents from their illicit dealings. Such institutional corruption was a pathology that went to the most senior ranks of the Navy.

Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos points to corrupt practices within the Nigerian Navy as being "on record"[195], noting that this record goes back to the illicit substance abuse trade as far back as the 1980s and in theatres as diverse as India and the Freeport of Monrovia, during the Nigerian Army-led ECOMOG mission to Liberia in the 1990s.[196] However, over the next decade, institutional corruption in the Nigerian Navy would reach new and higher levels. This would come as allegations of crude "oil bunkering"[197] assistance, illicit deals, abuse of power in its dealings with the NPA, and even unsanctioned movement of large oil vessels were made against senior naval officials.

Beginning with a detailed study of the *Africa Pride* case and other specific examples of unprofessionalism and corruption within the naval institution in Nigeria, this article will demonstrate the extent to which corruption is entrenched within the highest echelons of the Nigerian Navy, as well as the wider maritime institution in that country. The disappearance of the Russian oil tanker, MT *African Pride*, constitutes a milestone within the debate on government-enabled maritime criminality in Nigeria and is arguably the most infamous account of corruption within the Nigerian Navy. Indeed, so significant was the event that its actions led to members of the National Assembly staging sit-ins in protest for the first time in the history of the Navy history.[198]

The disappearance of the *African Pride*: A case study of corruption in the Navy

A 30 000-tonne Russian tanker, *African Pride*, was initially intercepted on the high seas within Nigerian territorial waters on 8 October 2003.[199] The incident occurred near the Forcados oil export terminal of Royal Dutch Shell. Upon interception by the Nigerian Navy, *African Pride* was found to have 11 000 tonnes of crude oil, loaded as cargo without a manifest and authorisation. Consequently, the 13-man Russian crew of the ship were arrested and transported to a Lagos court for trial, on suspicion of engaging in illegal "oil bunkering".[200] According to Human Rights Watch, the practice of illegal "oil bunkering", which was rampant in the Niger Delta particularly at the peak of the insurgency there, involved –

> The illegal tapping directly into oil pipelines, often at manifolds or well-heads, and the extraction of crude oil which is piped into river barges that are hidden in small tributaries [creeks]. The crude is then transported to ships offshore for sale, often to other countries in West Africa but also to other farther destinations.[201]

The Nigerian Navy intercepted, boarded and detained the *African Pride* as it attempted to leave Nigerian territorial waters, in an operation orchestrated by the NNS *Beecroft*, the largest operational base of the Navy.[202] The Commander of NNS *Beecroft* was Navy Captain Peter Duke, who had operational command of the mission that detained the *African Pride*.

After the vessel had been safely shepherded into dock, Rear Admiral Francis Agbiti – who at the time was the Chief of Training and Operations of the Navy , and so superseded Peter Duke's operational command of NNS *Beecroft* – was ordered by the CNS to release the impounded vessel into police custody. Agbiti, however, refused to do so. Shortly afterwards, the *African Pride*, still with its valuable cargo on board, disappeared.[203]

Events surrounding this 'disappearance' of a 30 000-tonne sea vessel led the Nigerian House of Representatives to launch an inquiry. As a result, three rear admirals, the equivalent of two-star generals and a very senior Nigerian military rank, were implicated and faced charges regarding the missing vessel.[204] Including Agbiti, those indicted were Rear Admiral Antonio Bob-Manuel (Deputy Commandant, Armed Forces Command and Staff College, Jaji-Kaduna) and Rear Admiral Samuel Kolawole, Flag Officer Commanding (FOC) Western Naval Command.[205]

One of these officers, Antonio Bob-Manuel, was acquitted. The remaining two, Rear Admirals Francis Echie Agbiti and Samuel B Kolawole, were found guilty under a military court – Agbiti, of "negligence and disobedience", and Kolawole of "negligence, disobedience, lying and, the more serious crime, of conspiracy".[206] Both naval officers were dismissed.[207]

However, in the Supreme Court case, *Rear Admiral Francis Echie Agbiti v. the Nigerian Navy*, Agbiti's conviction was overturned on appeal in February 2011.[208] The overturning of the original court-martial decision was based on technicalities. The first technicality was that Major General Akpa and Air Vice-Marshal Odesola, the two non-naval members of the military court that convicted Agbiti, were his junior "by two days" and so could not pass sentence on their senior, according to Nigerian military court-martial rules.[209] The second technicality was that two of the ruling naval officers were evidentially biased against the rear admiral. Specifically, Rear Admiral Ajayi, "was known to have disliked Agbiti from old",[210] whereas Rear Admiral Oni, the military court's other senior naval officer, was responsible for "sponsoring a publication", against Agbiti, the *Insider Weekly* magazine even as the court-martial was ongoing.[211] Vice Admiral Joseph Ajayi, who was the Chief of Defence Intelligence in the Nigerian military at the time of the trial, dismissed these objections as detracting from the evidence against the accused.[212]

Despite the merits of Agbiti's plea that the Supreme Court dismiss the verdict of his court martial as a "nullity"[213], for many Nigerians and external observers, the whole affair was soured. Public and external disappointment stemmed from the fact that, whereas both naval officers were convicted, neither was sentenced to gaol or even fined, at the least.[214]

The relative leniency of dismissal from the Navy seemed a slap on the wrist of Agbiti and Kolawole, considering the criminal nature of the offence in question. This "merely compounded the cynicism felt by many ordinary Nigerians that there was much more to this case than met the eye, that it represented just a tiny part of the sprawling underworld of bunkering and smuggling".[215] Indeed, that the two convicted admirals got off so "lightly without being sent to jail" did not reflect well on the view of criminality and

corruption within the Navy.[216] This was more so the case after Nigerian lawmakers had described the involvement by the Navy in the *African Pride* fiasco as "a national embarrassment" and a "shame" that belonged to the military interregnum, not to a democratic Nigeria that operated under the rule of law.[217]

Public suspicions of a broader conspiracy and a potential government cover-up seemed validated after Bob-Manuel's allegations that the brother of a former defence minister attempted to bribe him with a sum of £60 000 to release the *African Pride*. This allegation was given credence because Bob-Manuel was, at the time, the FOC within a coastal sector into which the *African Pride* had passed in the process of its "disappearance".[218]

Parliamentary attempts to resolve the *African Pride* case nevertheless led to enduring questions around corruption in the Nigerian Navy. At the very least, the initial verdict by the court martial came as "a harsh indictment of the navy itself".[219] At worst, the incident revealed with evidential clarity what many had suspected for a while – "that top navy officers were deeply involved in bunkering".[220] The markers were numerous and, for the integrity of the Navy as a professional military institution, damning. First, according to military prosecutors, Rear Admiral Francis connived to attempt the release the *African Pride* from Navy custody the same day the vessel was detained. Furthermore, even as the vessel remained in custody three weeks later, its illegal cargo of crude oil was siphoned and towed to a different ship some three weeks later. Two naval ratings had to do this, junior seamen[221] who had received a "welfare package", a payment from a senior officer to subordinates, to offload the crude oil cargo from the *African Pride* to a different vessel on the night of 31 October 2003.[222]

Second, court papers from the Navy court martial were categorical: Rear Admiral Kolawole was the senior Navy official who allowed Russian nationals "to visit the ship without authorisation and that he later ensured there was no guard on board the ship when it disappeared around 10 August 2004".[223]

Third, documents that would have shown that the Navy had conducted an illegal activity were allegedly altered, removed and destroyed by the duo of Rear Admirals Agbiti and Kolawole, following the disappearance of the *African Pride*.

Fourth, two naval ratings, Suleiman Atan and Jonathan Ihejiawu, in providing witness to the court martial, stated under oath that they were bribed with a sum of ₦250 000 each (around US$1 850, worth less than half that today) "to escort the MT African Pride from Lagos harbour to the high seas where its cargo was transferred to a waiting ship"[224]. The empty cargo was promptly replaced by seawater by the junior naval officers, who also said that one Lieutenant Commander Mohammed Abubakar was the one who paid them for this task on 31 October 2003. Atan and Ihejiawu also declared, again under oath at the court martial, that Lt Commander (Cdr) Abubakar passed on payment the aforementioned "welfare package" from the "Big Boys" in the Navy, down to them.[225] The theme of 'welfare' within the military institution in Nigeria refers to informal sums of money typically given by senior officers to subordinates.

The aggregation of the above points leads to a strong indication of institutionalised corruption at the highest levels of the Nigerian Navy. In his verdict, Rear Admiral Joseph Ajayi, the president of the court martial, noted that both Agbiti and Kolawole, despite being a part of the same naval institution, had to be convicted because "no matter how painful, we shall be failing in our responsibility if the appropriate punishment is not meted out".[226] Indeed, due to the court-martial proceedings, "for the first time ever", there was now "official confirmation of long-held suspicions that top navy officers were deeply involved in bunkering".[227]

Nor was this the only instance. One report notes that corruption is so entrenched in the Navy that testimony to the *African Pride* inquiry suggests "that the overall head of the navy may himself have been involved in bunkering" as an extremely lucrative criminal enterprise.[228] Specifically, Vice Admiral Sunday Afolayan, CNS, was accused by Navy Captain Peter Duke, formerly in charge of guarding arrested ships, of forcing him to release a vessel, the *Molab Trader*, detained for illegal oil bunkering. Captain Duke[229] was the Naval Officer Commanding in charge of the NNS *Beecroft*, and found himself at the centre of the *African Pride* witness hearings at the House of Representatives.[230]

The Navy Chief, who was indicted by the House of Representatives Committee on the Navy, denied these allegations.[231] Afolayan responded by accusing Duke of "wanting to collect big scalps after being found guilty of falsifying documents and negligence of duty in a recent court-martial".[232] In any event, Duke's accusations against his superiors in the Navy may well have cost him his career. He progressed no further in the Navy, retiring as a captain before going into the private sector.[233]

Another critical incident that occurred around the same time as the disappearance of the *African Pride*, was the case of another missing oil tanker, the MT *Jimoh*. In September 2004, this vessel went missing from naval custody, leading to comparisons with the *African Pride* case. The MT *Jimoh* nevertheless reappeared weeks later at Dutch Island, not far from Port Harcourt in Rivers State, with a freshly painted name, MT *Lord*, emblazoned on its side. Like the *African Pride*, the blame was initially pinned in the Navy, who in turn blamed the police for their part in the fiasco. Suspicions being directed at naval officials were hardly unusual in this instance. After all, similar to the *African Pride* case, the chances of a large vessel like the *Jimoh* 'disappearing' from naval custody and then reappearing repainted and in proximity to several naval installations in Port Harcourt – without any illicit activity from within the Navy – were unlikely. With respect to senior naval officials implicated with the missing MT *Jimoh*, the most notable of these was the former Minister of State for the Navy, Dr Olu Agunloye.[234] Agunloye would subsequently swear to an affidavit in the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, in which he denied "any major link with the missing vessels".[235]

Agunloye would admit that he knew of Rear Admiral Bob-Manuel's statement given to the House of Representatives as part of the latter's deposition, which stated that a former minister pressurised Bob-Manuel into releasing one of the ships, the MT *African Pride*. However, Agunloye claimed that he was unaware that the "former minister" in question was supposedly him, until newspapers reports alluded to the link.[236]

The scale of the scandal involving the naval institution was such that, on 23 September 2004, a parliamentary committee investigating the case convened, making allegations of bribery involving senior figures. Furthermore, with naval officers "trading accusations" around the disappearance, parliamentary committee chairman Anthony Aziegbemi expressed disappointment at these developments, pointing to both incidents as episodes "that belonged to the old Nigeria".[237] On its part, the Navy would attempt to save face in noting that it was responsible for recapturing the vessel and arresting three people on board.[238]

Parliamentary officials were not the only ones to allude to naval corruption, as part of a broader phenomenon that exploited instability in the oil-rich Niger Delta region. Indeed, the institutional corruption in the Navy, both as an outcome and as a secondary driver of criminality and instability in the Niger Delta, has also been alluded to by its own officials.

For instance, in replacing Afoloyan as Chief of Staff of the Navy, Rear Admiral Ganiyu Tunde Adegboyega Adekeye highlighted the moral challenge of fighting illegal bunkerers in the Niger Delta area and the pressure under which senior naval officers were to assist criminality in what was essentially a cash cow for those officers so inclined. In Adekeye's own words –

> [I]t has been extremely difficult, we had always been under pressure by bunkerers from within and outside the Niger Delta region. They wanted us to yield to their request which has been against the interest of the economy of the nation.[239]

In another example coming from the apex of the Navy institution in Nigeria, the CNS, Vice Admiral Ibok-Ete Ibas, admitted to "the involvement of Naval personnel in illicit oil bunkering and theft in the country".[240] Vice Admiral Ibok-Ete Ibas conceded that, whereas the Navy had made gains in fighting illicit oil bunking, naval personnel still colluded with criminal elements "to sabotage this effort".[241]

Accounts such as these lead to a sobering and conflicting conclusion of the Navy institution in Nigeria. On the one hand, the development, restructuring and professionalisation of the Navy, since its early days as a small colonial boat force, are undeniable. As was mentioned in the background section of this article, at a time, the Navy was the most potent maritime force in black Africa and the pride of the country. Moreover, the Navy continues to be the foremost tool of military statecraft in Nigeria, as far as strategic force projection beyond Nigerian territorial waters is concerned.

Yet, on the other hand, the rich history of the Navy has been tainted by credible allegations of institutional corruption, which goes all the way up its ranks and extends into the broader maritime industry. By its own admission, the prominent rule of the Navy in anti-piracy operations against oil bunkerers in the Niger Delta has created an environment for many naval personnel to turn rogue and collude with criminal elements.[242] Moreover, the sheer number of general officers and flag officers – at a time, there were six times as many such senior officers as there were operational ships for them to command[243] – is, in

itself, an institutional problem. Still, to capture the extent to which corruption across the maritime sector has enabled corruption within the Navy, it is vital to analyse the naval issue within the broader context.

For example, whereas the unusual disappearance and reappearance of crude oil tankers seized by the Navy tended to catch the public interest, other instances of malfeasance often slid under the radar. More specifically, the sheer scale of illicit deals within the maritime sector, which often involved the Navy, meant that the cases that made it to the courts or anti-corruption tribunals were scarcely the total of such dealings.[244]

One such illicit dealing linked to the maritime sector was the infamous Shaldag contract[245]. This defence procurement from 2010 saw the Israeli shipbuilder, Israeli Shipyards, win a $25 million contract to deliver two fast assault boats to the Nigerian Navy. The problem with the Shaldag contract was that, at the time of procurement for the Navy, these boats were no more than $5 million each. This meant that a gap of $15 million existed within the transaction, which was shared by a range of people. The exact workings of how such sharing took place remain unclear. What is clear, is that Israeli police "established that the middleman, Amit Sade, received $1.47 million in what is now termed [a] brokerage fee". Moreover, three others were facing trial in Israeli courts over this deal.[246]

Corruption is an issue endemic across Nigeria, including within the tri-services, i.e. the army, navy, and air force. The Navy does not operate in a vacuum, and any rents extracted from illegal oil bunkering require a network of corrupt officials in the public, military and private sectors. With Nigeria often ranked amongst the most corrupt nations in the world,[247] such a network that facilitates naval corruption is far from a stretch. Furthermore, as the Center for International Maritime Security suggests, it is only possible to understand institutional corruption in the Nigerian Navy by examining the broader picture of corruption in Nigeria as a whole.[248] Indeed, the extent of this link, evidenced by case studies that highlight the indictment of corrupt senior government officials, warrants further examination.

Corruption in the broader maritime industry

Whereas the Nigerian Navy is the principal maritime agency in that country, several security sector agencies also operate within the maritime space. These include the Nigerian Maritime Police, which is a Nigeria Police Force branch, "with jurisdiction in the territorial inland waters, ports, and harbours",[249] the NPA and the NIMASA, which we shall discuss in detail. Moreover, additional agencies including the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency, and the Director of Public Prosecutions all possess "specific maritime components".[250]

Recognising the various actors within the Nigerian maritime space is important. As De Montclos points out, it is not just Navy personnel who "inform pirates and militants on the location of boats and the value of their cargo"; customs officials, as well as ports authorities are all in on this racket[251]. A substantial paper trail is left behind when a large

vessel transports cargo from one location to another along a major maritime route – a paper trail that Nigerian Navy officials alone cannot possibly conceal.[252]

Moreover, such an expanded network of corrupt officials has been known to provide criminal syndicates and coastal pirates with bills of landing. These legal documents are typically issued by a carrier to a shipper. They detail the type, quantity and destination of goods transported along a given maritime route.[253] A bill of landing can only be acquired by a senior navy officer, suggesting complicity within the higher echelons of the institution.

Similarly, corruption within the maritime industry in Nigeria has also led to the highest levels of this sector. For example, Navy Commodore (Cdre) (ret.) Bode George, a former one-star general within the Nigerian Navy, who later went on to serve as the chairman of the NPA, was first indicted in 2005 by the Nigerian Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC).[254] The charges were dismissed. However, George had a history of allegations against him, going back to his days as a military governor of Ondo State, during the military interregnum (1988–1990).[255]

When interviewed in July 2002, Asiwaju Bola Tinubu, who was Lagos State Governor, was deeply critical of George, noting that the former military governor should face criminal investigation based on "his activity in Ondo State".[256] In Tinubu's words:

> The likes of Bode George have achieved nothing except military barrack activity. They have never governed before, he was put in Ondo just to go and look at the record. There is nothing to show for his tenure except embezzlement, corruption and abuse of power. Bode George and his fellow travellers who believe in military arbitrariness have to be told in clear terms that their time has passed, we are under democracy now.[257]

Whereas the conviction of George as the NPA chairman was indeed upheld in the courts, Tinubu's allegations should be taken with a pinch of salt and regarded as altogether spurious, insofar as they were neither proved nor evidence-based. Nor was it all one-way traffic: George himself levelled similar allegations of corruption against Tinubu as the governor of Lagos state. Furthermore, the People's Democratic Party, the ruling party at the time, rebuked Tinubu for his personal attacks on George, telling the governor to "address issues, not personalities".[258] Such allegations of corruption against political figures are far from unusual in Nigeria. The analysis presented in this article is restricted to the Navy, but this should not be seen as a marker that corruption by government workers in Nigeria is limited to the Navy.

Nevertheless, as it turned out, George would find himself facing official allegations of corruption decades later, as chairman of the NPA. In August 2008, the EFCC, under its new head, Farida Waziri, again had Bode George arrested with four others.[259] Amongst the charges levelled against the former Navy general were disobedience to lawful order, conspiracy, abuse of office, "contracts splitting" and alleged illicit awarding of contracts worth some ₦84 billion during his tenure as chairman of the NPA.[260]

On 26 October 2009, Cdre (ret.) Bode George was found guilty in the Nigerian courts and, along with four others, was sentenced to 28 years in gaol.[261] This sentencing was hailed as a 'landmark'' ruling by Justice Joseph Olubunmi Oyewole, who handed down the sentence.[262] As many feared would happen, that sentence was however drastically reduced to 30 months in October 2009.[263] Fact remains, the disgraced Bode George, former director at the Nigerian National War College, served time in prison.[264]

A caveat is worth appending to this analysis of Bode George's role within high-level corruption at the NPA. George just happened to be a retired naval officer, and later NPA chairman, who was convicted and so fits within the narrative of exposed high-level corruption in the Navy and maritime industry. Corruption, both within the military and across civilian society, is too widespread for a few case studies to approximate the full picture. As one interviewee at the CLEEN Foundation put it, "for every corrupt official found out, dozens more are probably doing the same thing and getting away with it".[265]

A final instance of corruption within the Nigerian broader maritime sector was evidenced in the case of NIMASA. Formed on 1 August 2006, NIMASA was established via a merger of the National Maritime Authority (NMA) and the Joint Maritime Labour Industrial Council, former parastatals of the Federal Ministry of Transport.[266] NIMASA provides both port authority and flag administration, but has a comprehensive set of operational functions and "in fact functions much like a coast guard".[267]

The NMA, which served as the predecessor of NIMASA, was established by the Shipping Policy Decree of 11 May 1987.[268] The NMA took on some of the duties conducted by the early Nigerian Navy (there remains some duplication of tasks in this regard, such as search and rescue, monitoring of marine pollution, sea dumping and spillage in Nigerian territorial waters, as well as inspections).[269] Through the NMA as its progenitor organisation, NIMASA therefore has a history that goes back to the military interregnum, although civilians have always headed the organisation. NIMASA has its own fleet of vessels as well as air assets for search and rescue operations.[270]

Over the years, however, NIMASA is said to have been "transformed from an industry's hope to a warehouse for political cash",[271] a holding organisation with a high turnover of chief executives, individuals referred to as "journeymen who are usually in a hurry to spend money on projects with little value to the shipping community".[272]

More maritime corruption case studies: NIMASA's 'journeymen' and gunboats from Norway

As an example in this section, convicted Delta State Governor, James Ibori, recommended the director general of NIMASA, Raymond Temisan Omatseye, for nomination in 2008.[273] Two years later, in living up to his mentor's expectations, Omatseye had defrauded NIMASA to such a degree that he was arrested by the EFCC "over allegations of fraud, contract inflation, and financial mismanagement".[274] In 2016, Omatseye was sent to gaol for five years as a consequence of a ₦1.5 billion scam.[275] Yet, in 2017, the former NIMASA director general was set free when a different court reversed his initial conviction.[276]

Omatseye's replacement as director general of NIMASA, Patrick Akpobolokemi, was, quite ironically, "a close friend" of Government Ekpemekpolo, popularly known as 'Tompolo',[277] who was said to have become "a regular face in the agency [NIMASA] soon after Akpobolokemi's appointment".[278] Tompolo was a leading figure[279] of the violent militant group, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta and is considered one of the most important militant figures within the Niger Delta conflict.[280] Tompolo was also prolific in the procurement of arms, and a war planner respected even by Nigerian military officials tasked with ending his militancy.[281]

Frequent NIMASA visits by Tompolo, whose militants spent years "kidnapping oil workers, attacking oil fields, blowing up pipelines" and fighting the Nigerian Army and Navy,[282] led to a multi-billion naira contract awarded to Global West Vessel Specialists Nigeria Limited, a company owned by Tompolo.[283]

In 2014, reports emerged that Tompolo, using a linked company, Global West Vessel Specialists Nigeria Limited, struck an £8.1 million deal to purchase former gunships, "including the 2,530-tonne KNM Horten – from Norway via the U.K.-based CAS-Global".[284] Given Tompolo's history, this deal that was allowed by both the Nigerian and the Norwegian governments, appeared unusual. Indeed, in Norway, the deal became the subject of a publicised parliamentary investigation, with the Norwegian Ministry of Defence forced to issue an apology for sanctioning the purchase.[285] That there were illicit dealings involved is beyond question. As part of the enquiry, three Norwegian civil servants were indicted on corruption charges linked to the sale. Furthermore, two UK businessmen were also accused of offering a bribe to a Norwegian official.[286] In May 2021, one of the Norwegian officials involved, Bjørn Stavrum, was sent to prison for five years in connection with payments by CAS-Global to him to help finalise the purchase.[287]

Stavrum, an *orlogskaptein* (OF-3, Lt Cdr-equivalent) of the Norwegian Navy, was said to have been offered bribe payments of $242 000, spread across three sums, throughout 2014.[288] This was to help obscure the fact that the gunboats would eventually be acquired by Tompolo.[289] Nevertheless, by ignoring the significant potential risks around the sale of ex-military vessels to GWVSL, both the United Kingdom and Norway "were downplaying the possibility that Tompolo might challenge the government again".[290] A Norwegian member of parliament, Erik Skutle, aired the broad political disquiet around the sales fiasco when he asked, "[d]oes this mean that anybody can buy these boats, as long as they sign a declaration? Even terrorists? How on earth could this happen?"[291]

Along these lines, speaking during a parliamentary disciplinary committee enquiry into the sale of the battleships, Norway's Chief of Defence, Admiral Haakon Stephen Bruun-Hanssen, admitted in May 2015 that Norwegian military officials failed in their "diligence before selling the decommissioned ships" to Tompolo.[292] And Bruun-Hanssen's predecessor, General Harald Sunde, who was Norwegian defence chief when the sale was made, also apologised, noting his disappointment around the sale, but also blaming the breakdown of due diligence on the part of the Norway Defence Ministry in terms of a reorganisation at the logistics organisation of the defence department. This

reorganisation occurred at about the time when the deal was made and might have been responsible for any red flags around it being missed.[293]

Nigerian lawmakers were much less vocal about the sale, even though the purchase of the gunboats from Norway would have required an export license from Norway's Ministry of Foreign Affairs.294 Moreover, given Tompolo's history as a militant fighting against the Navy in the creeks, Akpobolokemi's alleged association with this individual, culminating in the purchase of gunboats, is significant. The ties between these two men became more evident after the workings of the Norwegian boat deal came into the public domain in December 2014. It was then that the director general of NIMASA, Patrick Akpobolokemi, noted that the gunboat purchase was conducted within the instrument of a public–private partnership, in conjunction with the Nigerian Navy.[295] The Navy, Akpobolokemi said, re-armed the vessels to assist NIMASA. In Akpobolokemi's words:

> As an arm of the government responsible for maritime safety, security and regulations amongst others, we work in conjunction with the Nigerian Navy and other relevant security agencies to use their men and arms to patrol and provide safety of the country's waterways, as mandated by the global body, the International Maritime Organisation (IMO). […] It is the Navy that has fitted their guns on the vessels to aid their policing of the maritime domain.[296]

Akpobolokemi served as director general of NIMASA until the following year when President Goodluck Jonathan lost the election and was discharged by the new president, Muhammadu Buhari, some six weeks after coming into power, in July 2015.[297] That same year, Akpobolokemi was arrested by the EFCC, while in court.[298] In 2017, Akpobolokemi was arraigned by the EFCC in an ₦8.5 billion fraud case.[299] Furthermore, in 2019, he was further accused by a prosecution witness at a Federal High Court of laundering ₦138 million.[300]

As of late 2021, Akpobolokemi remained under trial, with the Federal High Court in Lagos still taking depositions. As part of the extended corruption ("criminal breach of trust") trial against NIMASA officials, Nigerian Navy Captain (ret.) Ezekiel Bala Agaba, who was at the NIMASA Directorate of Intelligence gathering during Akpobolokemi's tenure as director general, was jailed for seven years.[301]

The pattern of impunity in the Nigerian maritime industry continues. In May 2019, another NIMASA director general, Calistus Obi, was "convicted for knowingly converting and laundering ₦ 136 million meant for the corporation".[302] In November 2020, the EFCC re-arraigned Haruna Baba-Jauro and others on a charge of over ₦304 million fraud.[303] Haruna Baba-Jauro succeeded Akpobolokemi as director general of NIMASA.

The list of convictions and allegations within the highest levels of NIMASA, the political narratives around these convictions and allegations, and the question of financial and economic crimes by officials in power, mirrored those within the Navy discussed earlier. These multiple instances indicate corruption within the Nigerian maritime sector, which

itself facilitates the same pathology within the presence of the Navy in the Niger Delta. Moreover, the link between the Navy and corruption cases within the broader maritime industry is also directly evident in the Norway gunboat purchase case, in which NIMASA identified the Navy as re-arming gunboats that should not have been purchased to begin with.

Furthermore, corruption within NIMASA also saw other service branches involved, such as in the money laundering trial of a former Chief of the Air Staff, Air Marshal Adesola Amosu (ret.) and others. Within the trial, it was alleged by a prosecution witness at a Federal High Court in Ikoyi, Lagos, that NIMASA credited ₦3 billion to the Nigerian Air Force (NAF) and that those funds, within the NAF Special Emergency Operations Account domiciled in Zenith Bank, were diverted to Amosu's personal use.

Alongside Amosu, the EFCC also launched proceedings against Air Vice-Marshall Jacobs Adigun, a former NAF Chief of Accounts and Budget, and Air Cdre Owodunni Olugbenga, a former NAF Director of Finance and Budget, for their alleged roles in the laundering of some ₦21 billion of NAF funds.[304] Furthermore, between September 2014 and April 2015, NIMASA supposedly paid out ₦8.5 billion to the Joint Task Force (JTF) Operation Pulo Shield, the military operation countering insurgency by the armed militias in the Niger Delta.

The payment was broadly described as an "operations enhancer"[305]. Yet, over 70 per cent of the allocation (some ₦6.2 billion) was "handed over to an unknown 'Private Citizen'. No one also knows what happened to the balance – ₦2.3 billion".[306] However, Major General Emmanuel J Atewe (ret.), a former JTF Operation Pulo shield commander, stood trial for allegedly embezzling defence and security funds to the sum of around ₦8.5 billion received by the operation from NIMASA. Atewe was charged along with Akpobolokemi, the former NIMASA director general, and two other NIMASA staff, Josephine Otuaga and Kime Engonzu.[307]

Conclusion

This article considered a range of cases of corruption, illicit dealings, abuse of office and malfeasance in the Navy and broader maritime industry in Nigeria. The MT *African Pride* case arguably remains one of the most infamous instances of naval corruption within the higher echelons of the Navy. Nevertheless, this article showed that, to understand the nature and extent of corruption within the Navy and maritime sector, one has to look beyond such cases and investigate the relationships between both sectors, navy operations and even indicted personalities.

From its origins as largely benign relationships between senior military personnel and public officials, malfeasance in the military institution evolved into abuse of power and full-blown and large-scale corruption. Senior Nigerian military personnel and military generals, in particular, "form an important part of the contracting gang stealing from the country through defence and security contracting".[308] In 2018, no fewer than eight senior military and former military personnel were indicted by the EFCC or otherwise recommended for prosecution.[309] Furthermore, in July 2016, the Third Interim Report

of the Presidential Committee on Audit of Defence Equipment Procurement from 2007 to 2015 by the investigative committee instituted by President Muhammadu Buhari, indicted no fewer than 18 senior military officials who played roles in military procurement, within the period under review.[310] The recommendation was that these individuals be further investigated.[311]

Whereas there was just a single direct reference to NIMASA within the above-mentioned panel report and no reference at all to the Navy, this article has shown the extent to which corruption is nevertheless entrenched in the Navy and the broader maritime industry. Indeed, as one report from the Anti-Corruption Resource Centre points out, "corruption is pervasive in the Nigerian maritime security sector and facilitates the very crimes that the Navy should be countering, such as smuggling, piracy, and oil theft".[312]

Even so, the forecast is not all gloomy. During military rule, corruption occurred with impunity. Over the past few years, this seems to have changed. The indictment of senior naval officials, the imprisonment of a former NPA chairman and officials, and ongoing EFCC cases against top NIMASA officials, including Akpobolokemi, are all developments that indicate maturity of the Nigerian justice system and a willingness to prosecute officials in high office. Moreover, the EFCC and the Navy appear increasingly willing to work closely together in the fight against corruption. In January 2022, the Navy handed over the impounded vessel, the *MTT4*, its cargo, and suspected crude oil thieves on board to the EFCC.[313] Such close partnerships between the military and the Nigerian anti-graft agency may be interpreted as a marker that the former is now more determined than before to follow the rule of law to the letter – something that could not always be said of the military in Nigerian history. Whether such progress and relationships will translate to more transparent naval practice and an end to the longstanding culture of corruption in the Nigerian Navy remains to be seen.

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Towards a project management framework for ICT projects in defence institutions

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Abstract

A framework for information and communication technology (ICT) projects may address the discord between traditional project management and that which is required for ICT projects within defence institutions. The problem is underlined by the pace of technological development and the current application of compromised project management. Globally, no specific project management methodology is prominently suitable for solution delivery within defence institutions. The aim of this research was to address the problem by development of a framework for the management of ICT projects for defence institutions.

The research methods used to address the problem were twofold with respect to a descriptive study. Secondary sources were utilised to describe a thorough background to the problem, and secondly, a descriptive case study was used. The ICT function of the South African Department of Defence (DOD) was used for the case study. A synthesis of the data from these sources guided the development of a framework. The final outcome was the development and enlightenment of a conceptual framework for the management of ICT projects after considering the unique challenges of the military, while reviewing relevant project management methodologies. In conclusion, the conceptual framework proposes a hypothetically workable approach for the management of ICT projects in defence institutions.

Keywords: defence institutions, command and control, DOD, framework, ICT, methodology, project management, process.

Introduction

The Department of Defence (DOD is mandated in terms of section 200(2) of the Constitution, to defend and protect the Republic of South Africa (RSA), its territory and its people.[316] It is required to do this in a sustainable and affordable way by adopting project management to achieve business objectives. Projects in the South African Department of Defence (DOD) are done in very structured hierarchies and processes as detailed in the Defence Acquisition Process (DAP) 1000 and the most recent version of the Defence Acquisition Handbook (DAHB) 1000.[317] The current process used, as defined in the DAP 1000, was designed for the strategic acquisition of weapon systems, including material, components, product sub-systems and products that form part of an

integrated military capability.[318] Neither of the above-mentioned documents specifically addresses information and technology communication (ICT) projects. However, this has created a menacing gap and the need for a management process specifically suited to the DOD, which is apart from but corroborative with the DAP 1000 and DAHB 1000.[319,320]

Research has highlighted the development of project management as a science, which has been known in construction work from as early as the time of the Egyptians. Typically, project institutions are project-driven with clear characteristics such as defined command and control (C^2) structures and hierarchies, as well as objectives that are understood by all.[321] The Project Management Learning Group points out that there are fundamental differences between project-driven and non-project-driven institutions. Project-driven institutions (matrix structures) are deemed mature, while non-project-driven institutions (functional structures) are still viewed with scepticism. ICT institutions are seen to be hybrids of the two structures, where both project-driven and non-project-driven parts have to be considered.[322] Traditionally, defence institutions are non-project-driven, as they follow functional structures; however, with a strong move away from this since the 1960's.[323]

Generally, ICT is the accepted term given to all technologies for information and communication, and under this umbrella, we would find a broad range of constituent items, such as integrated computing, which consists of computer hardware, software and middleware, as well as data processing platforms.[324,325] Hashim supports the claim that the use of ICT has increased, regardless of size or mandate, and exploiting the potential of technology has become important.[326] ICT enables the execution of various activities of an institution by capturing, storing, retrieving, transmitting and processing data or information.[327] Internationally, militaries are vigorously utilising ICT as a strategic capability and, as established by Gartner, ICT has not only been identified as a future component of warfare, but also as a mechanism utilised in order for institutions to run smoothly.[328] This notion highlights the aspect and significance of ICT, as it is becoming progressively prominent internationally.[329,330]

As highlighted, defence institutions are traditionally not project-driven and tend to use conventional management methods that lack objectivity while not accounting for complexity, leading to failures.[331] The high failure rate of ICT projects in defence institutions, such as the DODDOD, is alarming and underlined by the current Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR) sounding an alarm that, even with a surge in ICT investment, ICT projects continue to fail.[332]

As all projects are considered to be living and evolving as they progress, project management is required to be fluid, supportive and responsive in how the activities and milestones are completed. What sets project management apart from conventional management is the deliverables and finite timespan.[333] This is specifically true in the DOD with burdensome processes. The general changes experienced by global institutions and the unique nature of the military call for project management to be increasingly utilised as the solution for achieving objectives.[334,335] The effectiveness of project management is determined by numerous factors related to methodologies, social conditions within

which the project team operates, level of authority, effective communication, degree of top-management assistance, ownership and experience.[336,337]

Nicholas and Steyn (2001) define project management as the application of "project knowledge, skills, tools, and techniques to execute project activities to achieve project goals as per the project definition".[338] The definition by these authors is supported by Burke, who adds, "to meet stakeholders' needs and expectations".[339] The requirement for a relevant definition for DOD project management for ICT projects is fundamental. It is therefore crucial to define the term 'project management' for ICT projects for the DOD as:[340]

> Project management for ICT projects is the application of specialised skills and processes to manage projects for both information technology, computing platforms, resources and supporting infrastructure in support of the business objectives of the DOD.

The study on which this article reports explored the development of a conceptual project management framework utilising existing methodologies for ICT projects in defence institutions. The research problem, methods used and results of the study follow next.

The problem

Projects and project success are high on the agenda of defence forces although they are non-project-driven institutions. Project failure – especially in ICT projects – is common due to the compromise of traditional and professional project management.[341] The increased pressure for procuring and maintaining new ICT technologies and of trying to keep abreast of the evolving nature of warfare and changing objectives, have led to the identified need to manage and execute projects in a different way.[342] The lack of upscaling agility in current project management processes within defence institutions, particularly the DOD do not cater optimally for ICT projects with respect to the effective delivery of solutions.[343] This indicates a need for an adapted project management approach for ICT projects within defence institutions.[344] Integrating proven ICT project management methodologies may develop into such a framework to address the challenges.

Research methods

There are numerous advantages to having different, merged or integrated methodologies. Although some authors divert from traditional approaches to support the mindful distinction between qualitative and quantitative research, others, such as Plowright, are strongly inclined to support integrated methodology frameworks.[345]

To address the current research problem, the descriptive study used two methods, namely a descriptive literature study and a case study. Descriptive research is utilised to describe the characteristics of the phenomenon being investigated and looks at what the current status and characteristics being researched are.[346] A review of relevant literature on the subject of ICT project management and its associated methodologies and ICT

concepts was undertaken to address the uniqueness of managing ICT requirements through projects.

Furthermore, a descriptive case study was used within the ICT institution of the DOD to examine the current practice of managing ICT projects. Case study research was used as an encompassing method within the contextual situation of the DOD.[347] Case study research is elementary in that it highlights the significance and impact of the context under examination, which also investigates certain progress in real life within the context.[348] Case studies are often expounded upon as exploratory research, and are used where there are few theories or a deficient body of knowledge as was the case of the DOD with the application of project management for ICT projects.[349]

The synthesis of the data from the two sources guided the development of a conceptual project management framework for ICT projects. The conceptual framework is by definition not cast in stone and will need further testing, development and validation to become a model.

RESULTS

The results from the descriptive literature study and the descriptive case study are presented to indicate the primary components prioritised to be included in the conceptual project management framework for ICT projects. This implies that the current weaknesses of the phenomenon are highlighted with a suggested solution. A summary of these solutions are represented in the conceptual project management framework.

The descriptive literature study

Defence institutions

Military projects begin with a required capability, which is normally identified by government or changes in the strategic focus of the defence force to address the rejuvenation or replacement of current or obsolescent equipment.[350] The ever-changing strategic environment creates the need to adapt and have an alert and balanced force that can execute its mandate in line with the national security requirement in the best way possible.[351]

Internationally, as well as that in South Africa, the military environment is unique in the way the attributes of the people and the military structures provide indicators towards how things are done. The military is a fully-fledged community with various professions – from drivers to soldiers, etc., just like any civilian community or workplace.[352] The obvious difference, however, is that the military is focused specifically on military operations that include all the relevant support elements. Bushell states that the key value that is important for militaries is C^2 with clearly defined functions and the sound management of the resources.[353] C^2 is essential and brings about responsibility, authority and accountability to support commanders.[354] Therefore, C^2 is deemed a critical part of application of military activities and project management.

Projects demand a special kind of management

Single or sporadic project activities require different management approaches, while projects need professional project management as underpinned by the Project Management Institute.[355] Nicholas differentiates between projects for operations and project management. Projects for operations are very different from job or assembly line type operations and thus it is crucial to understand the need for a special type of management. In reality, projects require evolved management techniques and institutional forms as they are unique, utilise multiple professions, and are usually temporary activities.[356]

Project management addresses the need for a single person running a project, who is independent from the normal chain of command. A project manager becomes the nodal point for a project to integrate the different professions, while focusing on delivering the intended solution within the scope of the project.

Project management methodologies

In venturing into the comparison of the identified project management methodologies, not all would be suitable, and therefore a combination of some could be proposed as an option in defining a unique project management approach for ICT projects in defence institutions. The methodologies considered were the 'scrum methodology', 'eXtreme programming', 'adaptive project framework', COBITv.5 and 'six sigma'. There are numerous ICT frameworks available, such as ITIL, CMMI and TCM et cetera, but for the purpose of this article, they were not considered, as the focus was on ways to address the situation sequentially. The four methodologies selected are those used particularly by the DOD (see Table 1) and were considered best suited, as they are structured and suitable for large institutions, create the required audit trail, allow for objectives to be achieved, and can be aligned to the DOD C^2 structures.

Table 1 highlights the analysis and comparison of the advantages and disadvantages of the identified methodologies. The DOD utilises specific methodologies for managing its projects; thus, PMBOK® (Project Management Body of Knowledge), process-based project management, PRINCE2® and benefits realisation are those best suited to be utilised by drawing on their advantages and therefore applied by the DOD.

Table 1: Comparison of the identified project management methodologies used by the DOD[357,358,359,360,361,362]

Methodology	Comparison
PMBOK	**Advantages**: • PMBOK, like PRINCE2, is an internationally recognised methodology and is widely used in the United States. • PMBOK applies an international standard to the waterfall method (sequential flow), and is a concise methodology that can be used to manage large projects. • This methodology supports work in a standardised way across departments and institutions. • PMBOK brings about standard terminology and practices to project management. **Disadvantages**: • PMBOK, like PRINCE2, is not suitable for smaller institutions who want to work at a faster pace and is complicated due to the methodologies conciseness.
Process-based project management	**Advantages**: • Improved project processes, which in turn increase value and benefits of the project, results are delivered at reduced costs. • Project alignment with the strategic vision of the institution. • Institutions gain flexibility, and processes are cross-cutting in that they reach different services within the institution. • Project roles and responsibilities are clearly defined to support the achievement of the goals of the institution. • There is optimised use of resources, which in turn reduces management and operational costs. • This process supports improvement, in that deficiencies are quickly identified, and the associated risks reduced. **Disadvantages**: • When implemented, this approach implies change for traditional hierarchical institutions and thus change management is crucial for success. • This methodology must be applied to the whole institution and not just single entities.

PRINCE2	**Advantages**: • PRINCE2 is the most-used methodology in the world and thus tried and tested. • There is common and understandable terminology for all projects. • It maps out phases of large projects from beginning to end, highlighting what will be delivered. • There is a focus on extensive documentation, which allows for lessons learnt and auditing of projects. **Disadvantages**: • Like all waterfall methods, PRINCE2 is very rigid in that nothing will take place unless the preceding step has been implemented. • It is not for small projects or institutions that do not have the time or resources to manage projects. • The extensive amount of documentation creates a disadvantage as changes are hard to accommodate, and documents must be redone, tying up resources that could hamper progress and delay deliverables.
Benefits realisation	**Advantages**: • Benefits realisation supports the success of projects that bring about change due to the focus on the added value the project brings. • It provides a practical 'framework' for ensuring real results. **Disadvantages**: • Institutions do not find this method easy, as managing benefits formally is a problem in institutions, as shown in the literature as reasons why projects fail. • Members within institutions do not always understand what benefits versus objectives are, as the achievement of objectives leads to the realisation of benefits. • The structuring of benefits realisation needs to be simplified and made clearer for a better understanding of the methodological process to be followed. • Accountability for benefits is not formally defined. • This method needs the active management of project plans.

Source: Authors' own compilation

The comparisons presented give an overview of the identified project management methodologies and indicate that some, such as PMBOK and PRINCE2, follow a waterfall method that was created to manage increasingly multiplex projects. The waterfall method is a chronological approach that is intensive and no headway can be made unless a previous stage has been completed. The disadvantage of a waterfall method is that it does not permit much room in project deviations as demanded by the fast pace of ICT.[363,364] In the examination of both PRINCE2 and PMBOK, it was found that both are arduous frameworks suitable for defence institutions.[365,366] The results of process-based management and benefits realisation emphasise vital features in that process-based project management is strategic and methodical for evolving and refining processes, thus focusing on the benefits to achieve performance.[367,368] Similarly, benefits realisation also emphasises the results, but by defining, planning and structuring. Benefits realisation provides the tools to corroborate projects delivering tangible outcomes in support of strategic objectives.[369,370] Both can be applied within a defence institution, as they allow for flexibility in managing the speed of ICT development, but retain the focus on the value that the ICT project must bring.

The project communication hub

Communication is identified as a primary success factor that may apply to all project methodologies with high stakes and high scope, and may be even more crucial in large bureaucratic institutions, such as the defence industry.[371] Leading authorities, such as Kerzner (2017), and Nicholas and Steyn (2008) define project management as the art of directing and integrating human and other resources throughout the unique project life cycle.[372,373] As previously stated, the project manager must integrate work efforts to achieve project objectives by bringing together people into a cohesive team working towards a common result. The project manager, team and project management system are the features that distinguish project management from other traditional forms of management.[374] The importance of project communication is therefore emphasised as critical to project success, and it is one of the primary roles of the project manager.[375]

Nicholas and Steyn provide a useful overview of the integration role of the project manager in terms of providing direction, decision-making and being the project communication hub.[376] The project manager is the central figure in the project office. Nicholas refers to the project office as the physical hub where projects are coordinated, and mentions that the effectiveness of project institutions depends on this.[377] The project manager will therefore need several communication mechanisms for integrating the efforts of all project stakeholders effectively throughout the entire project life cycle.

Challenges of ICT projects

Clements and Gido state that projects are set out to achieve an objective of delivering a unique solution through a particular set of associated tasks.[378] At institutional level, a project is defined as the effort that is related to the complexities within the institution. Hence, projects require the involvement of various activities, such as integration, co-ordination and accountability, under the auspices of the project manager. As stated

above, a project is always aimed at fulfilling the objectives or strategic needs of the institution, such as advancements and obsolescence of technology or equipment.[379] Thus, at the strategic level of institutions, project management is often the mechanism and competitive edge for strategic roll-out with respect to institutional goals and objectives.[380] Stoshikj, Kryvinska and Strauss, supported by Cohen and the University of California, identify project management roles within institutions as central, and thus project management has been repositioned in line with the fast-paced nature of the ICT space.[381,382,383] If projects are not managed properly and in an organised manner then, as Bushell argues, all initiatives will be prone to capability, schedule and cost risks.[384] Competent and experienced project managers are crucial in the defence industry due to the slowness caused by red tape and as Kerzner maintains, ICT projects are the most difficult to manage due to changes in specifications, demanding agility and responsiveness.[385]

The DOD case study

In this second part of the article, the DOD case study on ICT projects and project management is discussed. The primary measures used to study this case were secondary sources (reports and literature) and the first author's experiential knowledge and observation over several years as an employee of the DOD.

It is required of the DOD to provide, prepare and employ supported military capabilities to meet the needs of South Africa.[386] The structure of the DOD enables the execution of its mandate in all its entities.[387] However, with this in mind, like all defence institutions the DOD works within a formal C^2 approach. This approach brings with it a dilemma between the autonomy of project participants and their role within the routines and efforts of the institution. The challenge to work in the DOD is further enhanced by budgeting constraints, which have an effect on operations, resulting in the total defence mandate not being met. Currently, the DOD is battling underfunding and an operational 'overstretch' that further compromise its projects.[388] Highlighted in the Department of Defence Annual Performance Plan for 2019 is the fact that the worsening of facilities and the lack of rejuvenation of required technologies and information systems was due to a reduction in budgets.[389,390] This may threaten the viability of several projects due to the high risk of project failure. On the other hand, it may be possible to consider, accept and approve some important projects with high constraints if a highly skilled project team is appointed.

Although a defence institution is not project-driven, as previously discussed, ICT projects need special attention since neither the DAP 1000 or DAHB 1000 can handle or manage ICT-related projects due to the speed of the changes they bring. This emphasises the need for an adapted project management framework.[391,392] The ICT institution of the DOD is responsible for all ICT that is common or transversal, while unique ICT that is embedded in weapons systems is excluded and managed under the DAP 1000 process as part of Category 1 Matériel (DOD, 2017:16).[393] There is therefore a clear need for a formal process for the management of DOD ICT requirements in order to comply with applicable government and DOD policies, ICT industry standards and best practices. By

recognising the unique nature of ICT in general and what informs ICT requirements, makes it impractical for the DAP 1000 to be rigidly enforced.[394,395] The implication of changing the ICT processes for ICT projects will position DOD ICT to enable its business quicker, to align to ICT effectively, to manage its ICT requirements, and to save unnecessary costs while improving management accountabilities.

DOD projects

As previously discussed and brought to the fore, the DOD uses a project management methodology to achieve its business objectives by directing resources throughout the duration of a project.[396] This approach is supported by Blythe, who states that the principles and practices of project management are relevant in transforming the institution to undertake its actions with accountability and transparency while such principles and practices are suited to address the problems experienced.[397]

Within DOD project activities, there is a dilemma between self-determining requirements of participants and their role within the C^2 routines and efforts, as underpinned by Fernandes, Ward and Araujo who state that there would always be conflict between what the institution wants and the opportunities for adopting project practices for future projects.[398] What is noteworthy is that defence institutions, such as the DOD have started to maximise the use of project processes in the last few years to enable effective decision-making and delivery of strategic projects.[399] Recently, the significance of project management has become crucial in providing modernisation in defence industries, which face many issues, such as continuous monetary cuts. Due to the ever-shrinking defence budgets, project management becomes more important than before.[400] Many institutions adopt project management for productivity purposes, which indicates that project management as a methodology is best suited to address the support processes for capabilities and product systems, enhancing the potential of the institution to achieve its mandate.[401] Authors, such as Blythe and Conforto, Amaral, Da Silva, Di Felippo, Simon and Kamikawachi, state that questions have been raised about project success in defence institutions, such as the DOD, although they have been successful on numerous occasions.[402,403] With this in mind, the question posed is whether the DOD is really able to adopt pure project management to execute its objectives, as there is mounting concern that projects are not delivering the required capabilities.[404]

ICT capability for the DOD

The introduction and implementation of capabilities are not always managed as projects. The activity of managing products across the five primary stages known as development, introduction, growth, maturity, and decline is defined as life cycle management.[405] The use and definition of life cycle management in the DOD is similar to that of ICT requirement management.[406,407] The importance of ICT capability management is therefore being recognised in that it must be managed with a unique process, as stated in the DAHB 1000, to deliver solutions timeously.[408]

The DOD defines capability in terms of equipment, facilities and services to fulfil obligations, roles, functions and tasks.[409] The capabilities of the DOD can be described

in terms of the basic elements of the acronym POSTEDFIT (personnel, institution, support, training, equipment, doctrine, facilities and intelligence).[410] In considering an ICT capability being managed as an ICT project, consideration must be given to the make-up of the ideal project team to be responsible for the management of the solution delivery with respect to the capability for a stakeholder.[411] This crucial decision should be in the hands of the project manager with the support of the project sponsor.

An adapted process for the DOD must be proposed and the description of it formulated to support delivery of ICT capabilities through ICT projects.[412,413]

ICT requirements management in the DOD

The field of ICT is often conducive to inconsistent actions that have spread internationally, affecting the amount of money spent. While this picture has improved through project management and process improvement actions, stakeholders are still of the opinion that ICT projects remain dependent on antiquated methods. The authors Dekkers and Forselius believe that, as part of the ICT industry, all stakeholders need to address antiquated methods, taking actions to change the way things are done.[414]

As far back as 1998, managing ICT projects has become an important issue that was highlighted in the 1998 Report of the Presidential Review Commission. The Commission brought to the fore the need that ICT should be granted the same importance as the management of other resources and published findings and recommendations in this respect.[415] ICT is performing a role as a strategic enabler for the delivery of systems and solutions in the public service, so much so that the Department of Public Service and Administration (DPSA) developed the Corporate Governance of ICT (CGICT) Policy Framework. Through this policy framework, the DPSA requires the various organs of state to implement the policy framework as part of their governance procedures.[416] The accountabilities and responsibilities in the framework thus ensure that the DOD is able to align the importance of ICT services and support delivery with the institutional objectives while implementing sound ICT management practices. Within the DOD an ICT institution is responsible for enabling the department by means of ICT systems and support. The support encompasses numerous separate ICT products and services that are integrated into ICT capabilities over their life cycle and across all lines of DOD business.[417] Again, it is necessary to emphasise that some of these solutions need to be managed as projects due to their stakes and scope.

It has become apparent that there is a noticeable need for a process for ICT requirements to be able to comply with policies, ICT industry standards and best practices. With the focus on applying life cycle management on ICT requirements, the DOD could provide ICT capabilities cost-effectively with potentially reduced risks. As highlighted in the current initiative to update the DOD ICT Strategy, the structures for ICT do not display a life cycle management approach.[418] If the structures are changed, the impact will be felt in the current way ICT projects are managed. The ICT requirements process has a number of levels with each area of responsibility within the process allocated to another entity within the ICT institution, and a centralised decision point throughout that creates

the tendency towards long and arduous processes.[419] Clearly defined functions, roles and responsibilities, as well as processes have to be ensured, so that that life cycle management takes place effectively and efficiently to mitigate the risk of ICT project failure. The potential result of changing the ICT structure and processes will ensure enablement of the DOD ICT requirement is delivered fast and cheaply to stakeholders, while improving accountabilities.

DOD ICT project management

In the management of projects, the most important planning documents of any project are the statement of work (SOW), the work-breakdown structure (WBS) and specification requirements.[420] In many cases, the project stakeholders do not know what they need, making the management of projects more complicated. Needless to say, a project has no chance of success if the requirements are inadequate or incorrect. To address this problem, the DOD has attempted to provide a standardised approach through the DOD ICT Requirements Management Instruction, which aims to clarify the authority and responsibilities of the ICT stakeholders, gaining their commitment and supporting the delivery of ICT solutions to the DOD.[421] With the rapid changes in technology, the present arduous processes are having a negative effect on the management of the ICT projects of the DOD and thus warrant a rethink of how ICT projects are managed.

The DOD is aware of the problems and shortcomings it experiences in its ICT institutional structure and processes, which hampers the delivery of effective ICT projects. Even with an ICT requirements management process, the DOD is still troubled by issues in its ICT projects due to dwindling capacity, organisational structure and reduced resources. Therefore, the use of agile and responsive project management for ICT projects is crucial to meet the need for timeous reaction to technologies, opportunities and threats. This was part of meeting the stated requirement of the RSA Defence Review of 2015 with respect to the project management methodology for ICT projects of the DOD.

Factors that influence project management in the DOD

Any project institution will be affected by positive and negative forces that must managed by the project team. In the DOD there are many factors that influence projects across the levels of the institution that have the potential to affect the institution.[422] The factors can be grouped into two distinct categories, namely enablers and barriers. Schnittker, Marshall, Horberry and Young state that enablers and barriers are widely defined as anything that helps or impedes the successful achievement of project and other objectives within an institution.[423] According to Vaghefi, Lapointe and Shahbaznezhad, notable individual factors are those that are associated with willingness, motivation and ability to transfer knowledge.[424] These authors furthermore draw our attention to the reality that institutional factors are intrinsically linked to structure and culture. The impression is therefore that the levels of co-operation between the rigidness of the institutional form and individuals could obstruct or assist in the delivery of ICT projects.[425] The challenge to create a project team will depend on the project leadership focusing on project success regardless of the distractions and challenges. This is related to the project management

office and elements of organisational culture that emphasise project loyalty over military sentiment in the framework. This will demand an independent project culture that will be immune to negative military barriers.

There is increased support that leadership and processes, especially those which are encompassed by the current forms of C^2 within the DOD infrequently leads to optimal results. Institutional structure and C^2 approaches affect projects, project managers and project resources; therefore, there is a need to optimise how projects are managed.[426] By continually addressing barriers, rigidity could be reduced. The implementation of proposed activities could therefore support each other and have a universal effect in promoting ICT requirements and managing business change across the institution. However, the success of the DOD to manage ICT projects remains dependent on agreement and acceptance by top management to accommodate the appropriate project management methodology as proposed by the framework.

Altering processes in the DOD

It is well known that the military depends on rules and structure in order to function in battle, giving rise to the sense that militaries are rigid and inflexible. Defence institutions learn through the collaborative experience of their members, and transfer this knowledge to policies, doctrines and procedures. Based on these experiences, the DOD needs to adapt to the changing world within which it finds itself.[427]

As a bureaucratic institution, the DOD tends to create barriers which need to be removed.[428,429,430] Institutional agility in the DOD is needed to overcome these barriers and to drive change through process management to achieve collaboration between individuals and the rigour of form to support ICT projects in delivering the required outputs[431,432] The result of this is that the DOD tries to find a better understanding of processes and strategies to improve how they do things.[433,434] The DOD could therefore improve considerably and could take advantage from a redesigned or different project culture and approach to managing ICT projects. In doing so, the DOD needs to exploit the knowledge and skills of the collective to reinvent itself. The DOD, like many militaries, operates within a clear and structured C^2 paradigm. There is difficulty in breaking away from this, thus reducing any chances of success in most transformational change efforts. [435,436] This difficulty may remain in place, but with certain selected ICT projects, a matrix-type project institution can be very effective, provided that a competent project team is appointed.

It is noteworthy that there are many strong points in the DOD for managing projects. As previously mentioned, the DAP 1000 and DAHB 1000 are substantial guides for the project management of weapon systems.[437] The direction given is structured allowing for approved deliverables throughout the process, even given a dwindling budget. It is therefore crucial that the uniqueness of ICT is the main consideration when looking at appropriate project management methodologies used for different projects.

Results of the knowledge extracted from the literature review and case study

Table 2 reflects a consolidated summary of the knowledge extracted from the literature review linked to the case study leading to the conceptual project management framework defined in the next section.

Table 2: Comparison of the identified project management methodologies used in the DOD

Literature study	DOD case study
Projects demand a special kind of management. Clearly, any project must have a qualified and experienced project manager. ICT projects in the defence industry is no exception (regardless of being non-project-driven), although the military environment has unique challenges. This aspect is noted as the required knowledge that must be installed within the portfolio and project layers of the framework as well as the embedded knowledge of the project manager.	**ICT capability of the <u>DOD</u>.** ICT is identified as a capability. With this understanding then the ICT requirement to the product must be managed through the requirements life cycle. As defence institutions operate and maintain numerous ICT capabilities, some need to be managed as projects, and it becomes prudent that defence institutions utilise a unique project management methodology (as proposed in Figure 1) that will address ICT projects across their life cycle from both experience and theory. This component is defined as part of the benefits that have been achieved and the institutionalisation of portfolio and/or project management in the framework. The chosen methodologies reflected in Table 1 bring about their own unique advantages, specifically for large institutions to support the success of ICT projects and change of focus by providing a practical 'framework' for the realisation of benefits.

Literature study	DOD case study
The project communication hub. To integrate project activities, the project manager must be an excellent communicator in multiple terms. This is crucial in the military environment where functions become isolated entities. This component is integral to the skills and education of the project manager and separately highlighted as the communication hub in the project management office (PMO). This aspect is integral to both the C^2 and management layers of the framework.	**Altering processes in the DOD**. Communication and collaboration are required to move from a rigid C^2 doctrine to a process that can harness the collective to support the military while achieving success. This is noted in the framework by focusing on the institution that will use processes according to what the project management office and ICT enablement needs are and aligning all layers to the objectives set. As discussed in Table 1, a common and understandable project management methodology is required, which in turn will lead to the success of ICT projects, irrespective of the challenges faced.
Challenges of ICT projects. To manage ICT projects, institutions need to be adaptable change agents. This characteristic is especially important in a defence institution because specification and technology changes need to be accommodated with short lead times. Project management simply has to realign to changes to meet the value that the project and the institution require. Agility as well as communication is integral with the skills of the project manager as the integrator and change agent. It is also integral to the feedback loop in redefining needs, while being supported by the monitoring and control activities against the objectives set.	**Factors that influence project management in the DOD**. Clearly, defence institutions are affected by numerous factors that often work against proper project management. In suggesting a project culture, the proposed framework makes it clear that some ICT requirements must be managed as projects within an independent project management culture and methodology. The discussion in Table 1 highlights this fact by drawing on the fact that projects must focus on bringing about change with the focus on added value.

Literature study	DOD case study
	Management of ICT requirements in the DOD. The governance of ICT projects, whether delivering a once-off solution or a need for ongoing life cycle management, becomes crucial within the organisational culture in clarifying clearly defined functions, roles and responsibilities. This would allow defence institutions to support their ICT enablement objectives clearly and without confusion and/or resistance from all stakeholders. The experience of the people as well as the theory around roles and responsibilities will drive this. This is noted in the framework by applying governance that would address roles and responsibilities as well part of the alignment to higher authority. As projects reach closure, project management support is withdrawn, which creates a challenge of alignment. This must be addressed in the organisational culture of the framework in that it is catered for through continued portfolio management. The methodologies discussed in Table 1 are internationally recognised, and thus provide a common understanding for all by mapping out ICT projects and highlighting what must be delivered. There is a definitive focus on improved project processes to increase value while reducing risks for failure during the auditing of projects.
	DOD ICT project management. The ICT requirements must be reflected in the SOW and the remainder of the process must be part of managing the project. The most important features of a project are the SOW, WBS and requirements specification. As the military environment is not project-driven, the problems and shortcomings in its current ICT institution structure and processes, hamper the delivery of effective ICT. This component is therefore clearly noted in the framework defined as 'ICT project planning documents' (with reference to ICT requirements reflected in the SOW and others) setting clear activities that need to be followed to ensure that the required ICT enablement is delivered. In supporting this, Table 1 highlights the need for standard practices, optimised use of resources, and extensive documentation.

| Literature study	DOD case study
Project management methodologies. As the military comprise large institutions that were well suited to waterfall type methodologies, technology has made it important to rethink project management methodologies by looking at agility and the realisation of business objectives. This aspect is integrated into all the layers of the framework as no single methodology reigns supreme. The combination of the dimensions (applicable to the DOD case) of the four selected methodologies included in the framework (Figure 1) will be highlighted in the next section.	**DOD projects**. It is clear that the principles of project management must be applied to projects and not be overshadowed by the C^2 of the defence institution. Projects must be allowed to maximise opportunities while meeting the needs of the institution. Defence institutions must become more project-driven than they currently are and this must be done at the core of C^2 justifying the need for this to be addressed in the framework. This aspect is noted in the framework by making the layers of project management part of C^2 as highlighted by the analysis of process-based project management, PMBOK and PRINCE2 in that they support alignment and common understanding of work across the institution, as well as being widely used (see Table 1).

The results of the descriptive study, as described in Table 2, are combined and reflected in the conceptual project management framework (Figure 1) for ICT projects described in section C.

Conceptual project management framework for ICT projects in defence institutions

The strong focus of the framework is on a separate project organisation culture (based on project leadership), ICT projects (derived from business objectives), the project management office (PMO), a project organisation (adapted to each project requirement), and the systems development process and project solutions. The framework incorporates the three levels of project management causes of project success based on Nicholas (2001) with respect to participants (A), communication, information sharing and feedback (B), and the project management systems development process (C).[438]

Figure 1: Conceptual project management framework for ICT projects in the DODDOD

Source: Authors' own compilation

The conceptual project management framework for ICT projects (Figure 1) is described in this section. This culminated from the results of the descriptive case study and advantages depicted in Table 1 for the identified ICT project management methodologies. The conceptual project management framework has the following layers, dimensions and documents:

- **Defence institution strategic vision**. The strategic vision of the defence institution is the capacity to establish purpose to determine long-term milestones as a firm foundation to direct the development of defence mandates supported by ICT projects.

- **Business objectives and projects**. This is the measurable results derived from the strategic positioning of the defence institution that must be achieved. The objectives will provide the identification and prioritisation of ICT projects, which include the level of resources that will be allocated. The conceptual project management framework for ICT projects in the DOD will support the achievement of business objectives in a sustainable and affordable way.

- **Project management office (PMO) (A)**. Defence institutions should structure project management offices to ensure ICT enablement needs are aligned to the objectives set and the benefits they must deliver. The participants within this office are top management, the project team, stakeholders and, most importantly, the project manager, i.e. the person who will manage ICT projects in the DOD by using the conceptual project management framework. An agile

project manager should therefore be an excellent communicator, which is crucial in the military environment where functions become isolated entities. To ensure this, the correct training, skills and knowledge of the project manager and team members are crucial, as they are the communication hub in the PMO. This aspect is integral to both the C^2 and management layers of a defence institution.

- **Project organisational culture (B)**. Project organisational culture is an important influence on the success of a project. Defence institutions are affected by numerous factors that often work against proper project management. The proposed framework makes it clear that ICT projects must have an agile, independent project management culture and methodology that are installed as part of the total organisational culture and not only the current practiced form of just C^2. This is highlighted by the circle (C) that encapsulates project management activities (5). This project management culture must have clearly defined roles, functions and responsibilities that are not only assigned to the project manager, but to the team as well. Aligning governance to authority without breaking down independence, a project culture will be ensured. It must be stated that, as ICT projects reach closure, project management support is withdrawn, and this is addressed in the project organisational culture of the framework through continued portfolio management to ensure life cycle management throughout by means of monitoring the benefits achieved, communication, information sharing and feedback.

- **ICT enablement objectives**. The principles of project management are applied to ICT projects so that ICT enablement objectives are not overshadowed by C^2. Part of the principles is that ICT enablement requirements must make good business sense with a clear return on investment. ICT requirements must then be defined and documented correctly to determine the activities. Through this, ICT enablement requirements are reflected in the SOW and the documented process, such as the WBS, as part of managing the project. Defence institution structures and processes hamper the delivery of effective ICT and therefore the framework includes the ICT project planning documents as enabler in the systems development process to ensure timeous and accurate delivery. Similar to the agility focus in elements 3 and 6, the arrows outlining the circle allow for agility in action and lessons to be applied.

- **Project management systems development process (C)**. The principles of project management are applied here and, as mentioned above, are not overshadowed by C^2. This part highlights the move towards a project-driven institution in that the processes are encompassed as part of the organisational culture, ensuring that ICT projects can maximise opportunities while meeting the needs of the institution as key factors to project success. Typical linear waterfall methodologies are inappropriate for ICT; therefore, it is required that projects must be adaptable to change. Short lead times are required to be built into the processes and are denoted by the continual feedback circle as well as the lines interlinking the phases of project management.

- **Project solutions and outcomes**. This dimension refers to project success in terms of time, cost and performance. Benefits are achieved when ICT projects have delivered the desired changes. The quality ICT solution or service is delivered to meet the stakeholders' expectations. With the termination of a project or delivery of a solution, life cycle management takes over. It is required that the deliverables of ICT projects be managed through to redundancy for renewal to take place. This leads to the definition of a new ICT enablement requirement for project initiation. Return on investment will be measured to ensure that the efficiency of ICT deliverables does not lose value and if so, a timeous decision can be taken through the agility in the process.

Conclusion

It is widely argued that the development and progress of ICT pose challenges to traditional methods of practiced project management, especially within defence institutions. The challenges brought by ICT to current project management processes further the notion that ICT projects are known for their high failure rates. A dual approach was utilised with respect to a descriptive study. The data from the secondary sources, as well as the DOD as the context, were synthesised in the development of the conceptual framework. The top four methodologies, namely PMBOK, process-based project management, PRINCE2 and benefits realisation as applied by the DOD, were best suited for the purposes of the study. The methodologies were applied as best practices to add structure to the conceptual framework to allow for adaptation and improvement without changing how the DOD manages its ICT projects.

Therefore, in conclusion, this study spearheaded the effort to bridge the gap in generic project management methodologies as practiced, and ICT projects, taking into consideration the context of a defence institution within which ICT projects are managed. The result was the development of a blended approach in the form of a conceptual project management framework for ICT projects in the DOD. It is anticipated that result presented in this study will be helpful and insightful to the DOD and wider defence institutions.

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Role of moral foundations in the nuclear disarmament of South Africa

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Abstract

South Africa is the only country in the world that successfully acquired a nuclear deterrent capability in the form of six nuclear devices and dismantled them completely. Explanations include strategic reasons, i.e.: the security conditions of the country changed subsequent to the removal of the Soviet threat after the Soviet collapse in 1989 and an end to superpower rivalry in Africa; the increasing isolation of South Africa on account of apartheid; and, pressure from the United States, and concerns about undeclared nuclear technology falling in the hands of a black-led government. While these factors potentially contributed to the eventual dismantlement, the worldwide campaign led by domestic and transnational movements that sought to make moral claims by connecting the cause of anti-apartheid to that of nuclear disarmament likely played a role. In the study reported here, I applied moral foundations theory to the South African case to explore the role played by moral claims in the eventual disarmament.

Introduction

South Africa is the only state to date that has developed nuclear weapons – and subsequently has given them up. Why would states that have explored or made progress towards acquiring nuclear weapons abandon these efforts? It is puzzling that, in spite of having the technological capacity to acquire nuclear weapons, certain states have forfeited this potential military advantage, and reversed course. Potential government inertia against changing or terminating policies that already exist makes such reversal of course even more puzzling. The literature presents a range of explanations for reversal, namely:

- strategic interests (regional and international security, alliances with nuclear weapons states);
- economic interests (costs of the programme, sanctions);
- domestic interests (domestic interest groups, public opinion); and
- norms (international non-proliferation norms).

Although this research could account for a number of cases, it left unexplained important cases, thereby rendering contemporary opportunities for nuclear disarmament under-exploited.

I found that moral claims, as a type of normative claims, could account for nuclear reversal by South Africa. Scholarly and anecdotal evidence in other areas shows that moral claims have an effect.[439] Such claims have been a part of the discourse surrounding nuclear weapons for a long time, and there is evidence of their existence in a few states that engaged in reversal. International and regional legal regimes prohibiting entire classes of weapons, such as landmines, cluster munitions, and chemical and biological weapons, involved the use of moral claims.[440] Although nuclear weapons are a different class of weapons, we can learn lessons from how moral claims contributed to state action in such prohibitory regimes. This research has policy significance, since if we find moral claims to be effective, there are direct implications for addressing future proliferation threats.

I apply moral foundations theory (MFT) from the literature on moral philosophy and social psychology to explain how moral claims contributed to conditions that led to nuclear reversal by South Africa. I argue that moral claims can contribute to creating circumstances leading to nuclear reversal under the following conditions: when there is increased moral alignment between the state and reversal advocates, or in the absence of moral alignment, when advocates engage in accountability or leverage politics by appealing to an external authority or audience, or the domestic electorate. I conceptualise 'nuclear reversal' as a state moving from a higher to a lower stage in the proliferation process.[441] 'Moral claims' are conceptualised as value-based statements, demands, or assessments with a claim to universal validity.[442]

I use MFT to assess how various actors (the state and transnational activists) use moral foundations in their discourses in the South African case and whether the theory could potentially explain the South African reversal. For the state discourse, I reviewed official statements made by the President, Defence Minister, and ambassadors to the United Nations (UN) and the United States regarding the position of the state on nuclear weapons. In terms of the international discourse, I looked at annual reports made in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) General Conferences and resolutions at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). For the non-state discourse, I looked at the following national and transnational activists (TNAs): the African National Congress (ANC), the Anti-Apartheid Movement (AAM), and the World Campaign against Military and Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa.[443] There are several other major TNAs that were active in the South African disarmament case, such as the Catholic Church, Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF), and the World Council of Churches, among others. I, however, chose only the ANC, the AAM, and the World Campaign for the following reasons:

- they played a pivotal role in the campaign to denuclearise South Africa, and at various times, created coalitions with other TNAs, including the ones mentioned above; and

- their statements and other textual material are archived and accessible online, thereby enabling the researcher to conduct a systematic textual analysis.

Explanations for nuclear reversal

Most theories offered for explaining nuclear proliferation and reversal fall within one of the three models offered by Sagan (1996): security, domestic politics, and norms.[444] Others conducting detailed individual case-studies have talked about multiple factors which together cause reversal, such as a change in security threats, domestic concerns, technological challenges, regime-type, pressure from the United States and the UN, and sensitive nuclear co-operation.[445] Sagan (1996) provides the following explanations for proliferation or reversal:

- a change in security threats and conditions;
- domestic politics and interests making it politically expedient to either pursue or reverse a programme;
- norms of prestige and status associated with nuclear weapons (for proliferation) and non-proliferation norms informing reversal decisions.

These three models align with the realist, liberal, and constructivist schools in the field of international relations(IR).

Among security justifications, most realist explanations, such as those offered by Paul (2000) and Monteiro and Debs (2014) – – argue that a change in international or regional security conditions that caused the state to pursue nuclear weapons in the first place, also encourage reversal once the security threat is gone.[446] Others posit that security guarantees from allies, and the threat of punishment, such as preventive strikes, and external threats or pressures from the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union, explain reversal.[447] Mattiacci and Jones (2016), on the contrary, argue that it is nuclear latency that increases the likelihood of reversal, since it enables states to engage in nuclear-hedging.[448]

Liberal perspectives offer economic sanctions, cost overruns, inefficiencies associated with neo-patrimonial regimes, and domestic interest groups as reasons for reversal.[449] Some argue that weapons programmes in neo-patrimonial regimes with unchecked leaders or politically influential domestic groups are more susceptible to cost overruns and inefficiencies.[450] Solingen (1994) argues that economic liberalisation can drive reversal decisions, especially if domestic groups benefit in the form of debt relief, technology transfer, and investments from the international community.[451] Rublee (2009), however, contends that, although domestic coalitions can contribute to reversal, there are normative components to liberalising coalitions, which neoliberals do not admit.[452] Drawing from social psychology, Rublee (2008) argues that norms associated with the international non-proliferation regime exert a strong influence on nuclear reversal.[453]

Although these perspectives can explain some reversal cases adequately, they do not persuasively explain important cases that could have implications for future nuclear threats. In the cases of South Africa, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Iran, for example, the conventional wisdom positing security-based arguments is contested.[454] Theories suggest that South Africa dismantled its nuclear weapons after its security conditions

changed subsequent to the removal of the Soviet threat after the collapse of the USSR in 1989 and an end to superpower rivalry in Africa.[455] Other explanations include:

- the increasing isolation of South Africa on account of apartheid;
- the desire of the country to be part of the international community;
- pressure from the United States government on South Africa's apartheid government to join the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT); and
- concerns about undeclared nuclear material and technology falling in the hands of a black-led government.[456]

While these factors potentially contributed to the eventual dismantlement of the South African nuclear weapons programme , normative considerations also played a role. In an interview, President FW de Klerk said that one of the primary reasons behind his decision to dismantle the program was that nuclear weapons would "be morally indefensible to use" and "it was the right thing to do" to dismantle the programme.[457] While this could be categorised as an *ex post facto* moral justification of dismantlement motivated by other considerations, i.e. rhetorical action, it is also true that domestic and transnational activists tied the anti-apartheid cause to that of nuclear disarmament and brought pressure to bear on the international community and the apartheid government.[458] The explanations did not look at how such moral claims might have influenced the apartheid government's decision of dismantlement, either through domestic or international pressure. Intondi (2015) shows the vital role that black activists in America played in connecting nuclear disarmament to the struggle for racial equality in global liberation movements, and made the moral claim that the fight against the nuclear arms race, racism and colonialism was a fight for the human race.[459]

Moral claims are not necessarily in support of nuclear reversal. Several states and non-state actors (NSAs) have used moral claims invoking national security and the protection of citizens to justify nuclear aspiration and deterrence. Most TNAs, however, have used moral justifications in support of nuclear reversal and disarmament.[460]

Public and foreign policy studies find that alignment in certain aspects of moral claims between government and advocates may correspond with greater responsiveness in policy.[461] Others have found that when norms are presented in language that refers to existing norms, draws analogies or frames issues to appeal to policy gatekeepers, they are more effective in facilitating policy responses.[462] This insight has implications for studying the conditions under which moral claims can facilitate policy responses.

Moral claims and moral discourse

The objective of a moral discourse is to arrive at common moral claims. Such commonality is evidenced by moral alignment as manifested in claims made.[463] The logic underpinning this process can be either that of argumentation (i.e. communicative action, the value-based incentive of searching for the truth) or the logic of consequences (i.e. rhetorical action, speech acts motivated by strategic incentives). Most realist scholars argue that states use moral claims and moral discourse as rhetorical action.

Constructivists do not only deny this, but they also argue that communicative action could happen under certain conditions, and might influence state action.[464] There is, however, limited theorisation in IR on the nature of moral claims, and their impact on policy.

Moral foundations theory (MFT) offers a helpful taxonomy to address this. MFT posits five foundational concerns that underline the innate value systems of human beings, and constitute moral language: caring for and protecting others from harm, maintaining fairness and reciprocity, in-group loyalty, respecting authority, and protecting one's purity and sanctity.[465] Although MFT has not been used to study nuclear reversal and disarmament yet, scholars have used it to study moral claims in the use of nuclear weapons, for example, work by Rathbun and Stein (2020), and in other diverse issue areas, including public health, climate change, same-sex marriage, and stem cell research.[466] Greater alignment of moral foundations between state and advocates corresponds with more responsiveness in policy, while misalignment in moral foundations corresponds with conflict and a delayed response to advocacy.[467] I, hence, expected to find greater policy responsiveness in terms of policies undertaken towards reversal when there is greater moral alignment between state and reversal advocates. This is however expected only when the underlying rationality is communicative in nature.

Scholars argue that, when norms are presented in language that refers to existing norms, draws analogies, or frames issues to appeal to local agents or policy gatekeepers, they are more likely to be adopted.[468] Keck and Sikkink (2004) argue that TNAs often work through actors with leverage or influence on state policymaking ("leverage politics"), and use language to create symbols and new issues through interpretation and reinterpretation of existing issues ("symbolic politics"). Thus, if reversal advocates use moral foundations in ways that relate to or draw analogies with existing norms, or frame it in a way that enhances the authority of existing state institutions, they are more likely to be aligned with moral foundations of the state.[469]

Alignment is also more likely if claim-making actors are perceived to have moral authority, credibility or legitimacy.[470] The concept of authority is used to justify various political actors, including states, international organisations and other NSAs.[471] Sources of such authority are:

- policy partiality or expertise (e.g. "knowledge brokers", such as epistemic communities, or organisations that engage in **information politics**[472]);
- impartiality or neutrality (e.g. volunteer organisations, such as the Red Cross); and
- normative superiority or representation of ethical and principled ideas (e.g. certain religious or humanitarian entities).[473]

Moral alignment is, therefore, more likely if reversal advocates are perceived to have authority on account of being knowledge brokers, impartial, or possessing normative superiority.[474]

Moral alignment can sometimes be the result of rhetorical action on the part of the state, i.e. states engage in "cheap talk".[475] Moral foundations can align in this case without states actually intending to follow through on the commitments they articulate in their rhetoric. In this case, however, there is "rhetorical entrapment"[476] of the state, which TNAs could control by holding the state accountable, i.e. engaging in **accountability politics**.[477] Quissell (2017) found that accountability politics, or venue shopping, through the court system or elections could facilitate policy change even in the absence of moral alignment. When moral alignment does not occur between the state and reversal advocates, reversal may still occur if advocates hold the state accountable by activating an external authority or audience, which could be domestic or international courts, or a domestic voter base.[478] Hence, in the case of moral misalignment between the state and reversal advocates, reversal may still occur if advocates engage in accountability politics through an external authority or audience (see Figure 1).

Theoretical framework

Figure 1 below outlines the process of moral discourse that occurs at domestic and international levels. At a domestic level, the nuclear aspiring or reversing state and NSAs (including domestic NSAs and TNAs) engage in a moral discourse in which they make moral claims. Similarly, at an international level, the state engages in moral claim-making with other states and TNAs. Domestic NSAs and TNAs seek to influence the domestic policies and international negotiating positions of the state. State negotiators, in turn, persuaded at international level, attempt to persuade domestic audiences. The external authority or audience could be an active voter base, or a national or international court system, which NSAs activate. Many a time, TNAs form coalitions with domestic NSAs to persuade the state at domestic and international level to take steps towards nuclear reversal. This was evident in the South African case as well. The reversal decision by a state therefore could be influenced by this suasion either at domestic or at international level.

Figure 1: When moral claims lead to nuclear reversal
Source: Developed by author as part of her theoretical framework

The theoretical framework depicted in Figure 1 provides an analytical tool to understand the South African case of denuclearisation where reversal occurred in the presence of moral claims. The case is complicated however by the fact that the nuclear weapons programme was conducted in secret, and the state followed a policy of nuclear opacity

and strategic uncertainty when it came to taking a position on nuclearisation. Since some cases of reversal occurred in the absence of evidence of moral claims, they are neither necessary nor sufficient for reversal. Instead, I propose that they could bring about conditions that may lead to nuclear reversal.

Research design

I hypothesize that nuclear reversal could occur in the case of any of these conditions:

- when moral foundations align between state and reversal advocates, and they engage in communicative action;
- when reversal advocates engage in accountability politics under the circumstances when moral foundations align, but the prevailing rationality is rhetorical as opposed to communicative; or
- when reversal advocates engage in accountability politics in the absence of moral alignment.

Moral alignment is more likely when reversal advocates use moral foundations in ways that relate to or draw analogies with existing norms, underscore their authority, or buttress the authority of existing state institutions. In the study reported here, I tested this against the null hypothesis that moral claims do not contribute to nuclear reversal.

Literature on nuclear pursuit and reversal conceptualises the state proliferation process either as a dichotomous variable (i.e. the state is in possession of nuclear weapons versus not in possession) or on a continuum with various stages and "degrees of nuclearness".[479] Levite (2002) conceptualises reversal as the slowing down or rollback of a weapons programme.[480] Singh and Way (2004) divide the continuum of nuclearness into four stages: no interest, explore , pursue, and acquire .[481] I adopted their conceptualisation because it offers a nuanced approach to differentiate between proliferation stages and reversals observed empirically. I also added another stage to it: nuclear latency, which I situate between the stages of Explore and Pursue.) In the Latent stage, which I call stage 2, states do not possess nuclear weapons and are not actively pursuing nuclear weapons, but possess the technological capability to acquire them quickly.[482] I conceptualise the nuclear weapons proliferation process in the following stages:

Figure 2: Stage of nuclear proliferation

Reversal is a type of nuclear transition during which a state moves to a lower stage from a higher stage.[483] The independent variable is **moral claims** operationalised in terms of moral foundations according to the Moral Foundations Dictionary (MFD).[484]

Methods

South Africa established the Atomic Energy Board in 1948 through the Atomic Energy Act (No. 35 of 1948, as amended by Acts Nos. 8/ 1950 and 77/ 1962) to regulate the domestic uranium industry. In co-operation with the United States, under the Atoms for Peace programme, the South African government established the Pelindaba site and explored uranium enrichment technologies, including acquiring highly enriched uranium (HEU), during the 1960s.[485] On 20 July 1970, Prime Minister John Vorster announced that South Africa had designed a unique process to produce HEU.[486] The statements made during this period by state officials and reversal advocates frequently showed evidence of moral foundations. This became even more evident during the years when the issue of apartheid was strategically tied with the issue of denuclearisation by South Africa. I analysed whether the alignment or misalignment of moral foundations over the said time could explain this nuclear reversal. To identify moral alignment or a lack thereof, I looked for evidence of moral foundations in claims made by the South African state and reversal advocates, such as state actors in the international community and transnational non-state actors. This was a qualitative analysis that looked at where moral foundations were being drawn from, how they were used by various actors, whether alignment was happening, and to what degree. I then identified whether the actions taken by the South African state with regard to its nuclear weapons programme corresponded to this alignment or lack of alignment as posited by my theoretical framework.

I drew from six major moral foundations proposed under the auspices of MFT and assessed the content of the primary texts qualitatively for the presence of each of the foundations. I also drew from the MFD to code the content of the texts. Please note that, although most of the earlier research using MFT and MFD conducted quantitative analyses of content, this approach was not useful for the study on which this article reports because of the incomplete nature of archival material and the unavailability of relevant documents about the secret nuclear weapons programme. Most of these were destroyed before their existence was publicly acknowledged by President De Klerk.[487] In order to conduct a qualitative analysis of the texts, I looked for language that emphasises the following moral foundations:

- **Care or harm**: Language that emphasises the need to care for and protect others from harm – with underlying virtues, such as kindness, gentleness and nurturing.

- **Fairness or cheating**: Language related to ideas of justice, rights, equality, proportionality, and autonomy.

- **Loyalty or betrayal:** Language related to communitarian ideas, coalitions, patriotism, group values, etc.

- **Authority or subversion:** Language related to hierarchy, leadership and followership, deference and subordination to authority, respect for traditions, etc.

- **Sanctity or degradation:** Language related to culture, rituals, religious purity, holiness, righteousness or moral ways.

- **Liberty or oppression (new addition)**: Language emphasising experiencing feelings of oppression, persecution or domination.

Findings

As per Figure 2, the South African trajectory of nuclear weapons behaviour can be categorised into the following stages: Stage 0: No interest, Stage 1: Explore, Stage 3: Pursue, Stage 4: Acquire; Stage 0: No interest . Inclusion of the last stage in the trajectory as Stage 0 indicates South Africa's decision to dismantle its nuclear weapons programme, thereby, moving the country back to Stage 0 - No Interest. For this article, I was interested only in the three phases of *explore, pursue,* and *acquire*. During these phases, one can see an evolution in the foundations from which both the state and reversal advocates drew. In terms of alignment of foundations, there is greater alignment during the phases of e*xplore* and a*cquire*, than in *pursue*. Stage 4 is guided by a rhetorical rationality, although the South African state and the reversal advocates were drawing from the same foundations and used them in similar ways, South Africa was lodged firmly in the phase of *acquire.* A few similarities and differences are also seen in how TNAs used moral foundations in advocating for South African denuclearisation and how the international community used the foundations in international for a, such as the IAEA, the UNSC (UN Security Council), and the UNGA.

South Africa was one of the founding members of the IAEA, and an active and vital supplier of uranium to the world market for production of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. It had bilateral agreements with the United States, the United Kingdom and Israel for uranium supply, and was the beneficiary of nuclear fuel and technology from the United States for its domestic reactors used for research and for production of medical isotopes.[488] In the mid- to late 1960s, South Africa started exploring uranium enrichment technology towards producing HEU. In 1970, South Africa announced the construction of the Y-plant at Valindaba for the production of enriched uranium, ostensibly for peaceful use.[489] Between 1969 and 1979, the South African Atomic Energy Board (AEB), which later became the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), conducted all research and development (R&D) work connected to the South African Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE) device programme.[490] When the non-proliferation treaty (NPT) came into effect in 1970, and South Africa refused to join those who had become party to the treaty, it raised the suspicions of the international community.[491] South Africa, however, maintained the position that the NPT was an inherently discriminatory treaty that divided the world into nuclear haves and nuclear have-nots, and provided that as a reason behind the refusal to join, which was similar to the position of India on the NPT.[492]

Between 1970 and 1978, South Africa actively engaged in the production of HEU along with secret R&D work on a peaceful nuclear explosive, studies on implosion devices and gun-type devices.[493] In 1979, this work led to the production of, what was called, a "non-deliverable demonstration device," whose primary purpose was to demonstrate the South African nuclear weapons capability in an underground test.[494]

While the decision to pursue a secret nuclear deterrent capability could have been taken in 1974, we find clearer evidence of this after 1977.[495] In 1978, after PW Botha became

president, he gave orders to acquire a nuclear deterrent capability.[496] Between 1978 and 1989, South Africa secretly pursued a nuclear weapons programme, and built six weapons.[497] With the election of President De Klerk in 1989, a decision was however made to terminate the nuclear weapons programme. In February 1990, the president gave the order to dismantle the six nuclear devices that had already been developed and the seventh device that was incomplete. On 10 July 1990, South Africa acceded to the NPT. By April 1993, South Africa opened its facilities for inspection by the IAEA after the nuclear weapons and the associated technologies had been dismantled and related documentation been destroyed.[498]

In 1993, in a joint parliamentary address, President De Klerk announced that South Africa had built six nuclear weapons in order to have a nuclear deterrent capability and had dismantled the programme before joining the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state (NNWS).[499]

Stage 1: Explore (1970–1978)[500]

Although South Africa was an active member of the IAEA as a supplier of uranium and a recipient of nuclear technology for its domestic research and medical reactors, its membership became tenuous as the international community got increasingly suspicious of its nuclear intentions between 1970 and 1978, and called for its denuclearisation.[501] During this period, several resolutions were adopted in the UNSC and the UNGA that called for a range of measures against the apartheid regime of South Africa, including cessation of cultural, economic and military collaboration with the regime.[502] Certain countries, such as the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany and Israel, continued their military collaboration, including nuclear collaboration, in violation of a UN arms embargo against South Africa, at which the UNGA resolutions expressed alarm.[503]

In an UNGA resolution on apartheid adopted in 1974, nuclear collaboration is explicitly mentioned as one of the tools to pressure the racist regime economically.[504] There was, however, no explicit mention of a South African nuclear weapons programme. This changed in 1975, when the resolution explicitly called for governments to cease all nuclear co-operation with South Africa and stop delivering any nuclear technology that might enable the South African regime to acquire nuclear weapons.[505] UNGA annual conferences between 1976 and 1978 saw a number of resolutions passed condemning the racist regime in South Africa and laying out various measures, including denuclearisation of South Africa, cessation of all diplomatic, economic and military co-operation with the racist regime, and support of political prisoners and anti-apartheid activists in South Africa and around the world.[506]

UNGA resolutions connecting cessation of nuclear collaboration with South Africa with that of pressuring the racist regime also found mention in the IAEA General Conference annual reports.[507] Until 1976, South Africa was mentioned in the IAEA General Conference annual reports only in the context of its existing nuclear agreements and presence of research reactors for production of medical isotopes.[508] At the IAEA General Conference held in 1975, the annual report submitted contained only two references to

South Africa in the body of the text.[509] The IAEA Annual Report for 1976 mentioned apartheid for the first time when the General Conference argued that having the apartheid regime as the member for the area of Africa, was inappropriate and unacceptable.[510]

> The General Conference also requested the Board of Governors to review the annual designation of the Republic of South Africa as the Member for the area of Africa taking due account of the inappropriateness and unacceptability of the apartheid regime of the Republic of South Africa as the representative of the area of Africa and requested the Board to submit a report to the General Conference at its twenty-first regular session.[511]

The 1977 IAEA annual report mentioned the call for the denuclearisation of Africa made in the 1976 UNGA annual conference.[512] At the same meeting, the board replaced South Africa with Egypt as the "Member State in Africa most advanced in the technology of atomic energy, including the production of source materials".[513] The 1978 IAEA GC annual report continued to mention the UNGA resolutions calling for cessation of nuclear co-operation with South Africa and its denuclearisation.[514] In 1979, South Africa was expelled from the General Conference of the Agency held in New Delhi, as a result of sustained effort made by G-77 members in the IAEA.[515]

During this period, although UNGA resolutions were articulating their opposition to the racist regime in South Africa using moral foundations, in 1974 they explicitly called for the ceasing of nuclear collaboration of states with South Africa.[516] Between 1974 and 1978, the foundations that were prominently used were *care* and *authority*.

For example, the 1975 UNGA resolution argues that the UN

> Condemns the racist regime of South Africa for its policies and practices of apartheid, which are a crime against humanity, for its persistent and flagrant violations of the principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and for its continued defiance of the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council … Denounces the maneuvers of the racist regime of South Africa, which are designed primarily to perpetuate and obtain acquiescence in its abhorrent apartheid policies to deceive world opinion, to counter international isolation, to hinder assistance to the national liberation movements by the international community and to consolidate white minority rule in South Africa.[517]

It goes on to say that it –

> [Declares] that the racist regime of South Africa, by its resort to brutal oppression against the great majority of the people of the country and their national liberation movements, bears full responsibility for precipitating violent conflicts, which is bound to occur if the situation remains unchanged. It recognizes that the international community must take firm action against the racist regime of South Africa in order to avert any suffering in the course of the struggle of the South African people for freedom.[518]

Similarly, the discourse from the ANC and AAM during this period drew significantly from the *care, harm*, *fairness*, and *liberty* foundations. The use of the *authority* foundation was less pronounced than in UNGA resolutions and IAEA GC annual reports.

For example, the ANC in the January 1977 issue of its monthly official journal, *Sechaba*, says:

> The minority regime is so savagely repressive that ordinary people are called upon to show extraordinary heroism in making their demands for the most elementary human rights. It has always been so for the masses. Time and again they have shown more courage than it has taken for many a nation to gain independence, in other parts, at other times.[519]

It goes on to say:

> The freedom we are fighting for is different. It means one South Africa for all who live in it. It means power to the people. It means sharing the country's wealth by taking over the mines and great monopoly industries for the benefit of the people. It means the land shall be shared among those who work it. It means an end to bloodshed and war.[520]

State actors, as part of the international community, and TNAs used the *care* foundation in similar ways, which manifested itself in language that emphasised the connection between denuclearisation and human development.[521] For example, the UNGA Resolutions passed between 1976 and 1978 asked for the implementation of the Declaration of Denuclearization adopted by the Organization for African Unity and called for effective measures towards implementing the objectives of the 70s as a disarmament decade.[522] Part of this movement, the resolution argued, was for South Africa and other states with nuclear weapons to disarm and dismantle said weapons, and use the funds freed up for creating better living conditions for and development of people. [523]

It calls upon its member states to "promote disarmament negotiations and to ensure that the human and material resources freed by disarmament are used to promote economic and social development, particularly, in developing countries".[524]

The *care* foundation also frequently manifested itself in language that called for a halt of military and nuclear collaboration with the apartheid regime since such collaboration would further strengthen the defences and economy of the apartheid regime, which, in turn, was conducting brutality against the South African people.[525]

The ANC and the AAM used the *liberty* foundation more prominently than the IAEA GC and UNGA resolutions. It manifested itself in language that emphasised the domination of indigenous South Africans by the racist regime, and the latter's attempt at introducing nuclear weapons to the African continent as an effort to terrorise and dominate African people.

In a report released in 1976, the AAM says:

> South Africa has highly sophisticated military equipment, including modern fighters, missiles and rockets. It has developed various nerve gases and a whole range of ammunition. It is constantly in search of the most modern equipment, which is also highly expensive. As the feeling of insecurity increases, it responds by purchasing more and better weapons, hoping that this will be adequate to intimidate and deter Africans internally, as well as neighbouring African States which may consider supporting the liberation struggle.[526]

It goes on to say:

> It has always been known that all the major western powers have collaborated closely with South Africa in developing its nuclear technology and plants … South Africa has refused to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty and is now an incipient nuclear power; the grave danger which an apartheid nuclear bomb presents to Africa and the world is obvious.[527]

While IAEA GC and UNGA both emphasised the authority of the UN arms embargo, they repeatedly emphasised its violation by certain member countries, most prominently, the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Germany.[528]

The *authority* foundation was less pronounced in claims made by TNAs, but manifested itself in language that emphasised the fact that South African people should have self-determination and autonomy over their political and economic futures.[529] This language also touches upon the *fairness* foundation.

In the April 1978 issue of the Sechaba, the ANC says:

> The world should be aware of the fascist response to the twin problems of political unrest and economic instability. These measures which deepen the national oppression of the African people, depriving us of 'citizenship' in the land of our birth, and attack the few remaining rights of all nationally oppressed working people, make us aware of the need to combine more than ever before, the two aspects of our struggle: national liberation and class struggle.[530]

During this time, the official state communications from the South African government maintained that its nuclear programme was peaceful in nature.[531] In response to international suspicions regarding its refusal to sign the NPT, Ambassador Ampie Roux, the South African delegate to the IAEA, argued that states were "understandably reluctant to surrender, almost irrevocably, long-held sovereign rights without having precise details of all the implications".[532] The claims that it made domestically and with international actors during this time featured largely the foundations of *fairness* and *authority*. [533]

On 24 August 1977, in a speech at Congress of the National Party of Cape Province, Prime Minister Vorster accused the IAEA and the US for not respecting their commitments to South Africa. He said:

> The IAEA, which has a responsibility of ensuring that the obligations of the NPT are carried out by the signatories, must inspire confidence with all the parties to the Treaty and only then can it fulfill its functions satisfactorily … Furthermore, countries like the USA have not honored the commitments they have entered into bilaterally.[534]

Most of the international condemnation of the apartheid regime occurred as a result of active campaigning by the G-77, and domestic and transnational non-state actors, such as the ANC and the AAM. This international opprobrium led to a range of measures intended to put pressure on the regime, including UN sanctions, arms and trade embargoes, and cultural, educational and sport boycotts. Some of these measures were reflected in the IAEA, which adopted several resolutions against South Africa and sought to suspend its membership. In 1977, due to suspicions expressed by the United States regarding its nuclear facility in the Kalahari Desert, South Africa denied that it was a test facility, rebuking it with the need to maintain trust and goodwill in the international community that was committed to pursuing nuclear energy for peaceful use.[535] In doing so, South Africa drew from the foundations of *fairness* and *loyalty*. Although South Africa dismantled the reactor, a year later, after becoming prime minister in 1978, Prime Minister PW Botha provided explicit orders for South Africa to acquire a nuclear deterrent capability.[536]

It is to be noted that during this time, the South African state and the reversal advocates were mostly drawing from different moral foundations. Whereas the apartheid regime drew from largely the foundations of *fairness* and *authority,* the reversal advocates, including state and non-state actors, drew from *care, authority,* and *liberty*. Although both sides were drawing from the *authority* foundation, they were doing so in different ways and within different contexts. There is, hence, scarce moral alignment that is evident qualitatively in their claims. This corresponds with the lack of policy responsiveness displayed by the apartheid regime to the claims made by reversal advocates. The regime, in fact, went ahead with the production of six nuclear devices over the next few years.[537]

Stage 2: Pursue (1978–1979)

Throughout Stages 1 and 2, as the international community became increasingly suspicious of the South African nuclear programme, the state engaged in denials of such suspicions in international fora and through letters and communications to various other states, such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union.[538]

The foundations that were used frequently during this time were: *fairness* and *authority*. The *fairness* foundation manifested itself in language that emphasised the right of South Africa to pursue nuclear energy for peaceful use, and the *authority* foundation manifested itself in language that emphasised South Africa as a sovereign entity and the regime being legitimate with autonomy and authority over its nuclear future that its

detractors ought to respect.[539]

For example, the 1979 Plenary Meeting of the IAEA General Conference held in New Delhi, summarised the response of the South African delegation on the IAEA's decision to expel South Africa from the IAEA board of governors:

> Mr. DE VILLIERS (South Africa) considered the General Committee's decision wholly illegal and without precedent in the annals of the Agency. The credentials of the South African delegation were strictly in conformity with the Agency's Statute and the Rules of Procedure of the General Conference, as all past sessions of the General Conference had recognized. They had been issued by the same authorities which had issued the credentials of the South African delegations to the past 22 annual sessions of the General Conference. It could by no stretch of the imagination be argued that those credentials, at the 23rd session, were not in order. The proposal before the General Conference was a blatantly unconstitutional action, politically conceived, to prevent a Member of the Agency – a technical organization – from exercising its constitutional right to participate in the deliberations of the Conference.[540]

The UNGA resolutions adopted during this time explicitly accused South Africa of pursuing a secret nuclear weapons programme and called for its denuclearisation and exhortation to put all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards.[541] The 1979 IAEA GC referred to said UNGA resolutions and called for South Africa to submit its facilities to inspection by the IAEA.[542] It also provided information to the UN Secretary General on preparing a comprehensive report on South African plans and capabilities in the nuclear field.

During this time, statements on the South African nuclear programme in IAEA GC and UNGA resolutions drew from the foundations of *liberty* in addition to *care* and *fairness*.[543]

Similarly, statements from the ANC and the AAM drew from the three foundations of *care, harm, fairness,* and *liberty* or *domination*, with the most prominently used foundation being that of *liberty* or *domination* and *care* or *harm*.[544]

In the March 1979 edition of Sechaba, the ANC says:

> The ANC stands for national liberation from colonial and racist oppression in Apartheid South Africa, so-called historic, geographic, and ethnic claims of whatever kind or "tribal" affinity cannot dissuade us from that goal. We believe that each African country has to be decolonized within the confines of established boundaries and the oppressed people have a right not only to wage a struggle to assert their right of national self-determination and independence, but also to freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural development to ensure permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources.[545]

It goes on to say:

> That free South Africa must therefore redefine black producer or rather, since we the people shall govern, since we shall have through our own struggle, placed ourselves in the position of makers of history and policy and no longer objects, we shall redefine our position.[546]

Documents from the AAM and secondary sources show that there was an explicit attempt to connect the issue of apartheid with that of nuclear disarmament as a struggle for human rights.[547] Campaigns that connected nuclear disarmament with that of divestment and stopping financial aid were also made explicitly.[548] This was reflected in the statements made by ANC leaders in joint ANC-AAM conferences.[549]

The AAM was especially active in campaigning domestically in Britain against the British government collaborating with South Africa by providing arms and spare parts. In 1979, the AAM started the World Campaign against Military and Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa, which monitored the violations by Western countries against the arms embargo and submitted evidence to the special UN committee set up to monitor the embargo.[550]

During this time, the official state communications from the South African government continued maintaining that its nuclear programme was peaceful in nature, emphasising the foundations of *fairness* and *authority* (as a free nation with autonomy over its future) in its discourse.[551]

It is to be noted that here again, although both the South African state and the reversal advocates were drawing from the fairness and authority foundations, they were doing so in different ways and within different contexts. Whereas the South African state articulated *fairness* as their right to pursue their nuclear future, and the authority and autonomy as a sovereign state to do so, the reversal advocates articulated fairness as the subordinated and dominated people of South Africa to be given their legitimate right to self-determination, and not be terrorised by a racist regime with nuclear weapons. This stage too, hence, shows less alignment than what a quantitative analysis would have suggested. There is, hence, scarce moral alignment that is evident qualitatively in their claims. This corresponds with a lack of policy responsiveness displayed by the apartheid regime to the claims made by reversal advocates.

As evidenced by the UNGA resolutions in 1978 and 1979, during this time, the South African state was isolated by the international community, but was still supported by the United States, the United Kingdom and Israel.[552] These countries also voted against every UNGA resolution condemning the apartheid regime. Meanwhile, the apartheid regime continued ignoring calls by the IAEA and the UNGA to come clean regarding its nuclear programme and put all its reactors under complete IAEA safeguards.[553]

Stage 4: Acquire (1980–1989)

By 1979, South Africa had developed the first nuclear device, and by 1989, it had developed six nuclear devices.[554] During this time, as the opposition from the international community to the apartheid regime became fiercer, it resulted in the economic, military, cultural, and diplomatic isolation of the apartheid regime as the international community started a campaign that included sanctions, divestment by major businesses, and a cultural boycott.[555]

The UNGA resolutions adopted during this time explicitly accused South Africa of pursuing a secret nuclear weapons programme, called for its denuclearisation and exhortation to put all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards, and openly condemned the United States, the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland and France for continuing to supply South Africa with nuclear technology.[556]

The 1980 UNGA resolutions on South Africa, which were also mentioned in the 1980 IAEA GC annual report, called for all UN agencies to ensure the participation in their various conferences and meetings of liberation movements in South Africa recognised by the Organization of African Unity.[557]

During this time, statements in the IAEA and resolutions in UNGA on the South African nuclear programme drew from the foundations of *liberty* or *domination* and *loyalty* or *betrayal* in addition to *care* or *harm, fairness,* and *authority.*[558]

Similarly, statements from the ANC and AAM drew from the three foundations of *care, fairness* and *liberty*, with the foundation used most prominently being that of *liberty*.[559]

In the documents cited above, the *liberty* foundation manifested in the usage of language that included recognition and support of the South African liberation movement against the racist regime. It also called for other states, businesses, and international organisations to support the same, provide assistance to refugees, especially students and children, from South Africa, provide support for the political prisoners incarcerated by the apartheid regime, and invited leaders from liberation movements to conferences and meetings of international fora.

The *domination* foundation (connected to the *liberty* foundation) manifested in language that articulated the South African nuclear weapons capability as a tool of blackmail used by the apartheid regime.[560]

> Stressing the need to preserve peace and security in Africa by ensuring that the continent is a nuclear-weapon free zone, … condemns the massive buildup of South Africa's military machine, in particular, its frenzied acquisition of nuclear weapon capability for repressive and aggressive purposes and as an instrument of blackmail.[561]

Similar references articulated the danger posed by military, including nuclear, arms acquisition by the South African regime as a threat to world peace. The statement below

from the 1985 UNGA resolution (and subsequent UNGA resolutions until 1989) also drew from the *loyalty* or *betrayal* foundation by articulating the nuclear acquisition of the apartheid regime as a threat to the global community as a whole.[562]

> [A]ccumulation of armaments and the acquisition of armaments technology by racist regimes as well as their possible acquisition of nuclear weapons, presented a challenging obstacle to the world community, faced with the urgent need to disarm.[563]

The *fairness* foundation was drawn from in references that included condemnation of the exploitation of uranium resources in Namibia by the racist regime and its allies in the form of the United States, the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland, and France.[564] The *authority* foundation appeared in references that framed South Africa to be in violation of international law and the provisions of the UN Charter, and wilfully ignoring IAEA requests to put its nuclear facilities under full safeguards.[565]

Statements from the ANC and the AAM continued to emphasise the connection between the intentions of the racist regime to terrorise the South African people and her neighbours and acquiring a nuclear deterrent capability, for which, the ANC and the AAM argued, western nations were her allies.[566]

At the launch of the UN Special Committee against Apartheid, Oliver Tambo, an ANC leader, talked about the responsibility of the free world to support South Africans in their liberation struggle. [567]

These communications continued emphasising the foundations of *liberty, care, fairness,* and *authority* with *liberty* and *care* being the most dominant ones followed by *authority* of international law and international organisations such as the UN and the IAEA.

The South African state official documents continued emphasising the foundations of *fairness* and *authority*, but also increasingly drew from the *loyalty* or *betrayal* foundation. The latter manifested itself in language used by the South African state accusing the ANC (and the United Democratic Front) of being traitors and terrorists for its attempts to destabilise the regime, especially after the bombing of the Koeberg reactor by the ANC.[568]

Similar language was used by the state to discredit liberation movements in South Africa and its neighbours as attempts by the Soviet Union to establish its sphere of influence in Southern Africa.[569]

From the mid-1980s to 1989, as there was increasing pressure on the South African state to sign and ratify the NPT as a Non-Nuclear Weapons State (NNWS), it articulated its interest in joining at an opportune time, and the fact that it was conforming to the goals and tenets of the NPT in spirit.[570] The *fairness* foundation was manifested in language that stressed the continued right of South Africa to decide its nuclear future, and the *authority* foundation manifested in South Africa, at least rhetorically, agreeing to abide by the authority of the IAEA, NPT, and UNGA.[571]

It met with IAEA officials in 1984 and 1985 to negotiate the technical details of a potential safeguards agreement without explicitly committing to opening up its facilities for IAEA inspection in the near future.[572]

As declassified documents show, during this time, the top South African leadership was considering the ramifications of the potential accession of South Africa to the NPT.[573] The Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) argued for a "balanced approach to the NPT", wherein it states that maintaining a nuclear deterrent for the next few years, as suggested by Armscor, its central arms production and procurement agency in charge of its nuclear weapons programme, was not compatible with the domestic economic, social, and political requirements of South Africa. According to the DFA, continuing the nuclear weapons programme could be justified only on three separate grounds:

- certain future use, which would cause tremendous damage in terms of radioactive fallout;
- maintaining deterrence, which would increase South African global political, economic and diplomatic isolation; and
- national prestige.

The DFA argued that the national prestige of South Africa would be buttressed by her becoming reintegrated into the international community. In addition, if South Africa were to sign the NPT, as part of Article IV of the treaty, it would have access to nuclear technology for peaceful use, which South Africa needed for its domestic energy needs.[574]

In 1987, President PW Botha announced that his government was ready to sign the NPT in the near future and open up its facilities for IAEA inspection.[575] Subsequently, international pressure grew on South Africa to accede to the NPT.[576] In 1988, Pik Botha admitted that South Africa had the capability of producing nuclear weapons, but he did not admit to South Africa having any at that time.[577]

Qualitatively, in the discourse presented in the documents cited above, during this period, there was greater alignment in terms of the authority foundation between the apartheid regime and the reversal advocates, especially regarding the authority of the international community.

From the analysis above, it would appear that in the beginning of the acquire stage, the South African state was motivated by rhetorical action in terms of joining the NPT, but towards the end of this stage, it was also motivated by more normative concerns, such as being part of the international community.

Being part of the international community carried with it certain material and strategic benefits in terms of access to nuclear technology for the energy needs of South Africa. However, it is also evident that a greater moral alignment at this time, at least on the authority foundation, coincides with the South African decision to accede to the NPT and give up its weapons.

While the above does not prove that it was specifically moral claims that made South Africa engage in disarmament, it does demonstrate that an alignment in moral foundations in claims made by the state and reversal advocates when normative concerns were being articulated by the state corresponded to policy responsiveness. It is also to be noted that when moral alignment was not occurring, the ANC and the AAM were engaging in accountability politics through the IAEA, UNGA, and other international state and non-state actors in order to isolate South Africa culturally, politically, and diplomatically.

Contribution of the study

In identifying the conditions under which moral claims contribute to reversal, this study addressed the gap in the literature on nuclear reversal. Secondly, by applying MFT in a case where a mere quantitative analysis of the text was not feasible, it also shows that a quantitative analysis by itself does not necessarily help prove moral alignment. Instead, a qualitative analysis provides a clearer sense of whether alignment is occurring or not. The study, hence, made a methodological contribution as well by advancing the literature on MFT. This research was also relevant to policy, since if moral claims were found to be effective under certain conditions, this can have direct relevance for non-proliferation and disarmament strategies pursued by states and NSAs.

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ENDNOTES

439 Several peace activists coming from faith traditions have written about the destructive power of the atom bomb and made moral claims on why nations should not possess them. See, for example, works by Dorothy Day, Reinhold Niebuhr, Thomas Merton and Henry Nouwen.

440 Stephen D. Krasner (1983) defines regimes as "principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area." (1). Please see Krasner, Stephen D., ed. *International regimes*. Cornell University Press, 1983. See K Moore. *Disrupting science: Social movements, American scientists, and the politics of the military, 1945–1975*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009 and A Valiunas. "The agony of atomic genius". *The New Atlantis: A Journal of Technology and Society* 14. 2006. 85–104 for more on the moral claims made by some of the scientists from the Manhattan Project on the destructive power of the atom and H-bomb.

441 Levite (2003) defines nuclear reversal as "the phenomenon [in] which states embark on a path leading to nuclear weapons acquisition, but subsequently reverse course, though not necessarily abandoning altogether their nuclear ambitions". See AE Levite. "Never say never again: Nuclear reversal revisited". *International Security* 27/3. 2002. 3. For this paper, I use the term 'nuclear reversal' only in the context of a nuclear weapons programme and not pursuit of civil applications of nuclear energy.

442 See JM Gustafson. *The church as moral decision-maker*. Philadelphia: Pilgrim Press, 1970, 90.

443 The World Campaign Against Military and Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa (to be referred to as the 'World Campaign' in the rest of the paper) was launched in 1979 in Oslo, Norway, at the initiative of the AAM and had the patronage of several heads of state and the United Nations. They worked with AAM to strengthen an arms embargo against South Africa and served as a source to the United Nations Security Council for information on violation of the embargo. See <https://africanactivist.msu.edu/organization php?name=World+Campaign+Against+Military+and+Nuclear+Collaboration+with+South+Africa>.

444 SD Sagan. Why do states build nuclear weapons?: Three models in search of a bomb. *International security.* 21(3). (1996):54-86.

445 See RJ Einhorn, KM Campbell & M Reiss. *The nuclear tipping point: Why states reconsider their nuclear choices*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004; Levite *op. cit.*; M Reiss. *Bridled ambition: Why countries constrain their nuclear capabilities*. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1995; and AH Montgomery. "Stop helping me: When nuclear assistance impedes nuclear programs". In AM Stulberg & M Fuhrmann, eds., *The nuclear renaissance and international security.* Stanford, CA: Stanford Security Studies, 2013, 177–202.

446 See TV Paul. *Power versus prudence: Why nations forgo nuclear weapons* (Vol. 2). Quebec City, Canada : McGill-Queen"s University Press, 2000; NP Monteiro & A Debs. "The strategic logic of nuclear proliferation". *International Security* 39/2. 2014. 7–51; and G Gerzhoy. "Alliance coercion and nuclear restraint: How the United States thwarted West Germany"s nuclear ambitions". *International Security* Apr 1;39(4), 2015. 91-129.

[447] See AJ Coe & J Vaynman, Collusion and the nuclear nonproliferation regime. The Journal of Politics. Oct 1;77(4). 2015. 983-97; SE Kreps & M Fuhrmann. "Attacking the atom: Does bombing nuclear facilities affect proliferation?" *Journal of Strategic Studies* 34/2. 2011. 161–187; and E Mattiacci & BT Jones. "(Nuclear) change of plans: What explains nuclear reversals?" *International Interactions* 42/3. 2016. 530–558.

[448] Scholars define 'nuclear hedging' as a strategy of maintaining non-proliferant status by avoiding actively seeking to acquire weapons, but at the same time insuring against future security threats by retaining the ability to assemble nuclear weapons within a short period. See Mattiacci & Jones *op. cit.* and M Fuhrmann & B Tkach. "Almost nuclear: Introducing the nuclear latency dataset". *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 32/4. 2015. 443–461.

[449] JE Hymans. *Achieving nuclear ambitions: Scientists, politicians, and proliferation*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012; Montgomery *op. cit.*; Mattiacci & Jones *op. cit.*

[450] See Hymans *op. cit.* and Montgomery *op. cit.*

[451] E Solingen. "The political economy of nuclear restraint". *International Security* 19/2. 1994. 126–169.

[452] MR Rublee. *Nonproliferation norms: Why states choose nuclear restraint*. Athens, Georgia: University of Georgia Press, 2009; MR Rublee. "Taking stock of the nuclear nonproliferation regime: Using social psychology to understand regime effectiveness". *International Studies Review* 10/3. 2008. 420–450.

[453] Rublee, "Taking stock …" *op. cit.*

[454] This is not to say that security considerations did not play a role; rather that normative considerations were also a contributing factor.

[455] W Stumpf. "South Africa"s nuclear weapons program: From deterrence to dismantlement". *Arms Control Today* 25/10. 1995. 3. Stumpf (1995) attributes South Africa's decision to dismantle its weapons programme to a change in its external security conditions driven by the following developments: (i) ceasefire with Namibia, formerly West South Africa, and its subsequent independence on 1 April 1989; (ii) phased withdrawal of Cuban forces in 1988 from Angola following a tripartite agreement between South Africa, Angola and Cuba; and (iii) the fall of the Berlin Wall in December 1989 and an impending end to superpower rivalry in Africa. See also JW de Villiers, R Jardine & M Reiss. "Why South Africa gave up the bomb". *Foreign Affairs* 72. 1992. 98–109 and D Albright & M Hibbs. "South Africa: The ANC and the atom bomb". *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 49/3. 1993. 32–37.

[456] See WJ Long & SR Grillot. "Ideas, beliefs, and nuclear policies: The cases of South Africa and Ukraine". *The Nonproliferation Review* 7/1. 2000. 24–40; VJ Intondi. "Nelson Mandela and the bomb". *HuffPost.* 9 December 2013. <https://www.huffingtonpost.com/vincent-intondi/nelson-mandela-and-the-bo_b_4407788.html> Accessed on 8 January 2020 ; and Wilson Center. "Memorandum, "Main points arising from luncheon on 14 November 1989'". 17 November 1989. History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive. <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/123059> Accessed on 2 March 2020.

[457] President De Klerk is the former president of the apartheid government in South Africa who dismantled the South African nuclear weapons programme. For the full interview, see U Friedman. "Why one president gave up his country"s nukes". *The Atlantic*. 9 September 2017. <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/09/north-korea-south-africa/539265/> Accessed on 2 April 2022.

[458] See, for example, a poster produced by the World Campaign Against Military and Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa, available at <http://africanactivist.msu.edu/image.php?objectid=32-131-2B7>.

459 These activists echoed Langston Hughes's assertion that "racism was at the heart of Truman's decision to use nuclear weapons in Japan" – a conviction that got stronger as the USA considered using nuclear weapons in the Korean and Vietnam war. See V Intondi & VJ Intondi. *African Americans against the bomb: Nuclear weapons, colonialism, and the Black Freedom Movement*. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2015, 3 and H Gusterson. "Nuclear weapons and the other in the Western imagination". *Cultural Anthropology* 14/1. 1999. 111–143.

460 DC Atwood. "NGOs and disarmament: Views from the coal face". *Disarmament Forum* 1. 2002. 5–14. The Nuclear Freeze campaign, a civil society effort, helped ensure that arms control was on the agenda of states. See also DS Meyer. *A winter of discontent: The nuclear freeze and American politics*. New York: ABC-CLIO, 1990.

461 JW Busby. *Moral movements and foreign policy* (Vol. 116). New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010; K Quissell. "The impact of stigma and policy target group characteristics on policy aggressiveness for HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis". PhD dissertation. American University, 2017.

462 ME Keck & K Sikkink. Transnational Advocacy Networks in International Politics: Introduction. In *Activists beyond borders: Advocacy networks in international politics* Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press. 2014; A Acharya. "How ideas spread: Whose norms matter? Norm localization and institutional change in Asian regionalism". *International Organization* 58/2. 2004. 239–275.

463 Whereas moral claims are value-based statements with claims to universal validity, moral discourse is "an activity that involves the critical discussion of personal and social responsibilities in the light of moral convictions about which there is some consensus and to which there is some loyalty". See JM Gustafson. *Op. cit.*

464 Deitelhoff and Müller (2005) argue that whereas contested norms and weak institutions favour rhetorical action, in the presence of strong institutions and contested norms, communicative action prevails. Similarly, when norms are stable and institutions are strong, norm-regulated behaviour occurs. See N Deitelhoff & H Müller. "Theoretical paradise – empirically lost? Arguing with Habermas". *Review of International Studies* 31/1. 2005. 167–179.

465 J Haidt, J Graham & C Joseph. "Above and below left–right: Ideological narratives and moral foundations". *Psychological Inquiry* 20/2–3. 2009. 110–119; J Graham, J Haidt, S Koleva, M Motyl, R Iyer, SP Wojcik & PH Ditto. . J Graham, J Haidt, S Koleva, M Motyl, R Iyer, SP Wojcik, PH Ditto. Moral foundations theory: The pragmatic validity of moral pluralism. In Advances in experimental social psychology. 47. 2013. 55-130.. For an in-depth view into MFT, see <http://moralfoundations.org/>. Publications using MFT are listed at <http://moralfoundations.org/publications>.

466 BC Rathbun, R. Stein. Greater goods: morality and attitudes toward the use of nuclear weapons. *Journal of conflict resolution.* 64(5). (2020). 787-816. M Feinberg & R Willer. "From gulf to bridge: When do moral arguments facilitate political influence?" *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 41/12. 2015. 1665–1681; J Haidt & MA Hersh. "Sexual morality: The cultures and emotions of conservatives and liberals". *Journal of Applied Social Psychology* 31/1. 2001. 191–221; S Clifford & J Jerit. "How words do the work of politics: Moral foundations theory and the debate over stem cell research". *The Journal of Politics* 75/3. 2013. 659–671.

467 Busby *op. cit.*; Quissell *op. cit.*

468 Keck & Sikkink (95) op. cit. A Klotz. "Transnational activism and global transformations: The anti-apartheid and abolitionist experiences". *European Journal of International Relations* 8/1. 2002. 49–76; W van Deburg. "William Lloyd Garrison and the 'pro-slavery priesthood': The changing beliefs of an Evangelical Reformer, 1830–1840". *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* 43/2. 1975. 224–237.

[469] See Acharya *op. cit*.

[470] See Acharya *op. cit*. and C Ulbert, T Risse & H Müller. *Arguing and bargaining in multilateral negotiations*. Final report to the Volkswagen Foundation, 2004, 3. available at https://www.polsoz.fu-berlin.de/polwiss/forschung/international/atasp/Publikationen/4_artikel_papiere/26/ulbert_risse_mueller_2004.pdf. Accessed on 28 May 2022.

[471] Political actors have employed transnational moral authority as a power resource in order to influence transnational outcomes since pre-feudal times in Europe. See RB Hall. "Moral authority as a power resource". *International Organization* 51/4. 1997. 591–622; DA Lake. "Rightful rules: Authority, order, and the foundations of global governance". *International Studies Quarterly* 54/3. 2010. 587–613; RL Brown. *Nuclear authority: The IAEA and the absolute weapon*. Washington, DC : Georgetown University Press, 2015; and A Grzymała-Busse. *Nations under God: How churches use moral authority to influence policy*. Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2015.

[472] See Keck and & Sikkink *op. cit.* (2004) (95)

[473] See RB Hall & TJ Biersteker, eds. *The emergence of private authority in global governance* (Vol. 85). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002.

[474] For example, personalities such as the Dalai Lama, Desmond Tutu, the Pope and Thomas Merton, among others.

[475] See J Farrell & M Rabin. "Cheap talk". *The Journal of Economic Perspectives* 10/3. 1996. 103–118.

[476] The term "rhetorical entrapment" arises from the idea of "argumentative self-entrapment" proposed by Risse and Sikkink (1999). T Risse & K Sikkink, Human, rights norms into domestic practices: introduction. The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change. 1999 Aug 5;66:1; 254. Also see RR Krebs & PT Jackson. "Twisting tongues and twisting arms: The power of political rhetoric". *European Journal of International Relations* 13/1. 2007. 35–66.

[477] See Keck & Sikkink *op. cit.* (95)

[478] Quissell *op. cit*. found that a misalignment in moral foundations in claims made by policy gatekeepers and civil society advocates for policy responses to TB and HIV/AIDS in South Africa potentially contributed to a delay in the adoption of universal treatment. She argues that when moral alignment eventually occurred, it was through leverage politics and regime change. See also Keck & Sikkink *op. cit*.

[479] S Singh & CR Way. "The correlates of nuclear proliferation: A quantitative test". *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48/6. 2004. 859–885, (866)

[480] AE Levite. Never say never again: nuclear reversal revisited. International Security. Dec 1;27(3). (2002):59-88.

[481] Singh &Way. *Op. cit.*

[482] I do so because several states, such as Japan, South Korea, Brazil and Taiwan, which had nuclear weapon programmes at some point, gave up plans to actively acquire nuclear weapons, but possess nuclear latency. See Fuhrmann & Tkach *op. cit*.

[483] I draw from Jacob (2013) and Matiacci and Jones (2016), who build up on Singh and Way (2004) in conceiving of nuclear reversal as a state transitioning from stages 1, 2 or 3 to a stage lower than their current stage of nuclearness. See N Jacob. "Understanding nuclear restraint: What role do sanctions play? A study of Iraq, Taiwan, Libya, and Iran, 2013. (Unpublished doctoral thesis), American University; E Mattiacci & TJ Benjamin. (Nuclear) change of plans: What explains nuclear reversals? *International Interactions* 42/3. 2016). 530-558. and Singh &Way. *Op. cit.*

[484] *Moral Foundations Dictionary*. 2012. <http://moralfoundations.org/sites/default/files/files/downloads/moral%20foundations%20dictionary.dic> Accessed on 8 January 2020.

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Accessed on 31 March 2022. HEU generally refers to uranium that has been enriched
to a level that contains 20% of the U-235 isotope – this can be used to create a gun-
type nuclear device. Uranium that is considered to be weapons-grade usually contains
90% of the U-235 isotope. See AJA Roux & WL Grant. "The South African uranium
enrichment project". Presentation to the European Nuclear Conference. April 1975.
<https://inis.iaea.org/collection/NCLCollectionStore/_Public/06/196/6196511.
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African Prime Minister Vorster". 20 July 1970, History and Public Policy Program
Digital Archive. <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114143> Accessed
on 31 March 2022.

487 See V Harris, S Hatang & P Liberman. "Unveiling South Africa"s nuclear past". *Journal of
Southern African Studies* 30/3. 2004. 457–476.

488 See A von Baeckmann, G Dillon & D Perricos. "Nuclear verification in South
Africa". *International Atomic Energy Agency Bulletin (Austria)* 37. 1995. 42-48.

489 *Ibid*.

490 *Ibid*.

491 J-A van Wyk. "Atoms, apartheid, and the agency: South Africa"s relations with the IAEA,
1957–1995". *Cold War History* 15/3. 2015. 395–416. doi:
10.1080/14682745.2014.897697

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proliferation conundrum?" *The International History Review* 40/5. 2018. 1157–1158.
doi: 10.1080/07075332.2018.1428212

493 RE Horton. *Out of (South) Africa: Pretoria's nuclear weapons experience.* Occasional paper
no. 27. USAF Institute for National Security Studies. 1999. <https://nuke.fas.org/
guide/rsa/nuke/ocp27.htm> Accessed on 31 March 2022.

494 Von Baeckmann *et al. op. cit.*; Van Wyk *op. cit.* (47)

495 IAEA puts the date at 1944 of the then South African prime minister Vorster approving a
limited programme for developing a nuclear deterrent. See Von Baeckmann *et al. op.
cit.* and Van Wyk *op. cit.* Other sources have dated the approval for such a programme
to 1977/1978. See W Stumpf. "Birth and death of the South African Nuclear
Weapons Programme". Paper presented at the 50 Years After Hiroshima Conference,
Castiglioncello, 28 September – 2 October 1995. <http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/rsa/
nuke/stumpf.htm> Accessed on 31 March 2022 and P Liberman. "The rise and fall of
the South African bomb". *International Security* 26/2. 2001. 45–86.

496 See H Steyn, R van der Walt & J van Loggerenberg. *Armament and disarmament: South
Africa's nuclear weapons experience*. Lincoln, Nebraska: iUniverse Books, 2003 and J
Schofield. *Strategic nuclear sharing*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014, 86–92.

497 Von Baeckmann *et al. op. cit.*

498 *Ibid*. See also JW de Villiers, R Jardine & M Reiss. "Why South Africa gave up the bomb".
op. cit.

499 Wilson Center. "Speech by South African president FW de Klerk to a joint session of
Parliament on Accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty". 24 March 1993. History
and Public Policy Program Digital Archive. <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/
document/116789> Accessed on 31 March 2022 . See also Stumpf, "Birth and death
…" *op. cit.*

500 I choose 1970 as the beginning of the Explore stage since in 1970, South Africa announced
the construction of the Y-plant at Valindaba for the production of enriched uranium,
ostensibly for peaceful use. 1978 is chosen as the year that the Explore stage was
completed and the Acquire stage began, as in 1978, the first HEU product was
developed and withdrawn from the Valindaba plant. See Von Baeckmann *et al. op. cit.*

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513 *Ibid.*, p. 8.

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516 See <http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/3324(XXIX)>.

517 United Nations General Assembly. "Resolution 3411 (XXX). Policies of apartheid of the Government of South Africa". 1975, 38. <https://digitallibrary.un.org/ record/190013?ln=en> Accessed on 30 March 2022.

518 *Ibid*., p. 39.

519 *Sechaba.* "The will of an entire people forged under fire". Editorial. 1. First quarter. 1977. 1. <https://www.sahistory.org.za/sites/default/files/archive-files3/SeJan77.pdf> Accessed on 30 March 2022.

520 *Ibid*., p. 12.

521 Report available at <http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/31/69> Accessed on 30 March 2022.

522 *Ibid*.

523 *Ibid*.

[524] *Ibid*., p. 34.

[525] United Nations General Assembly. "Resolution 32/ 105. Policies of apartheid of the Government of South Africa". 1977, 31. <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/313/40/IMG/NR031340.pdf?OpenElement> Accessed on 30 March 2022.

[526] A Minty. "Apartheid: A threat to peace". AAM Archives. 6 January 1976, 6. <https://www.aamarchives.org/archive/campaigns/arms-embargo/arm18-apartheid-a-threat-to-peace.html> Accessed on 1 March 2022.

[527] *Ibid*., pp. 10–11.

[528] See endnote 64.

[529] South African History Online. "Apartheid in crisis". *Sechaba* 12. Second quarter. 1978. <https://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/sechaba-volume-12-april-1978> Accessed on 1 February 2022.

[530] *Ibid*., p. 5.

[531] Wilson Center, "South African Department of Foreign Affairs …" *op. cit.*

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[533] *Ibid*.

[534] Wilson Center. "Extract from speech by the South African Prime Minister at Congress of the National Party of Cape Province". 24 August 1977, 5. History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive. <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116617> Accessed on 1 March 2022

[535] Wilson Center. "Letter from South African Prime Minister Vorster to US President Carter on US-South Africa Relations". October, 1977. History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive. <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116634> Accessed on 1 March 2022

[536] See Steyn *et al. op.cit.* and Schofield *op. cit.*

[537] Von Baeckmann *et al. op. cit.*

[538] See, for example, Wilson Center. "Draft letter and aide memoire from South African Foreign Minister R.F. Botha to US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance". 30 September 1977. <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116635> Accessed on 1 March 2022

[539] Wilson Center. "Two Hundred and Eleventh Plenary Meeting of the Twenty-Third International Atomic Energy Agency General Conference in New Delhi, Regarding the Credentials of the South African Delegate". 5 December 1979. History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive. <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116663> Accessed on 1 March 2022

[540] *Ibid.*, p. 2.

[541] Documents of resolutions adopted at UNGA in 1978 and 1979 available at <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/362/01/IMG/NR036201.pdf?OpenElement>.

[542] Report available at <https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gc/gc24-627_en.pdf>.

[543] *Ibid*.

[544] "Editorial". *Sechaba* 13/3. 1979.

545 *Ibid*, p. 1.

546 *Ibid*., p. 19.

547 See World Campaign against Military and Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa. "Nuclear collaboration with South Africa". Report of United Nations seminar, London, 24–25 February 1979. AAM Archives. 1979. <https://www.aamarchives.org/archive/history/1970s/arm21-nuclear-collaboration-with-south-africa.html> Accessed on 15 March 2022 and A Fourie. "Non-alignment as a foreign policy orientation of the African National Congress". *Politikon: South African Journal of Political Studies* 19/2. 1992. 81–98.

548 This happened during stages 1 and 2. For example, in April 1977 and March 1978, AAM activists picketed in front of Barclays Bank in the UK as part of the AAM's campaign to persuade Barclays to withdraw from South Africa, which it did in 1986. See <https://www.aamarchives.org/archive/history/1970s/pic7707-hull-aa-group-picket-barclays.html> and <https://www.aamarchives.org/archive/history/1970s/pic7809-picket-of-barclays-bank-london.html>. AAM also targeted BP and Shell, among others. See <https://www.aamarchives.org/archive/history/1970s/70s27-bp-and-shell-factsheet.html>.

549 South African History Online. "Address at Conference on Southern Africa of the Socialist International and the Socialist Group of the European Parliament with the Frontline States, ANC and SWAPO by OR Tambo, Arusha, 4 September 1984". 2019. <https://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/address-conference-southern-africa-socialist-international-and-socialist-group-european> Accessed on 15 March 2022.

550 See <http://africanactivist.msu.edu/organization \ php?name=World+Campaign+Against+Military+and+Nuclear +Collaboration+with+South+Africa>

551 See, for example, Wilson Center. "Statement by South African Prime Minister P.W. Botha regarding talks with the Western Five (excerpts)". 19 October 1978. History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive. <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/118229> Accessed on 15 March 2022.

552 See endnote 98.

553 Van Wyk *op. cit.*

554 Von Baeckmann *et al. op. cit.*

555 For example, as part of the End Loans to Southern Africa campaign, AAM activists demonstrated outside the London headquarters of Fluor UK, the British subsidiary of a US company bidding for an oil contract with a South African state company. See <https://www.aamarchives.org/archive/history/1980s/pic-8004-demonstration-against-fluor-uk.html>.

556 UNGA General Conference reports and related documents (on international/transnational campaigns, UN Trust Fund for South Africa, nuclear and military collaboration with South Africa and policies of the apartheid regime) from 1980 to 1989 available at: <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/377/20/IMG/NR037720.pdf?OpenElement>, <https://research.un.org/en/docs/ga/quick/regular/35>, <https://research.un.org/en/docs/ga/quick/regular/36>, <https://research.un.org/en/docs/ga/quick/regular/37>, <https://research.un.org/en/docs/ga/quick/regular/38>, <https://research.un.org/en/docs/ga/quick/regular/39>, <https://research.un.org/en/docs/ga/quick/regular/40>, <https://research.un.org/en/docs/ga/quick/regular/41>, <https://research.un.org/en/docs/ga/quick/regular/42>, <https://research.un.org/en/docs/ga/quick/regular/43>.

557 Reports available at <https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gc/gc25-642_en.pdf< and <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/377/20/IMG/NR037720.pdf?OpenElement>.

558 *Ibid*.

559 *Ibid.*

560 Report available at <http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/40/89>.

561 *Ibid*., p. 75.

562 *Ibid*.

563 *Ibid*., p. 75.

564 *Ibid*.

565 *Ibid*.

566 See D Smith. *South Africa''s nuclear capability*. London: World Campaign against Military and Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa in cooperation with UN Centre against Apartheid, February 1980.

567 South African History Online. "Statement by Oliver Tambo at the meeting of the United Nations Special Committee against Apartheid, 12 January 1982". 2019. <https://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/statement-oliver-tambo-meeting-united-nations-special-committee-against-apartheid-12> Accessed on 15 March 2022.

568 N Jones. "United Democratic Front Trial in 1985: Statement by Observer at the Trial, Judge Natahniel Jones". ANC. 15 October 1985. <https://new.anc1912.org.za/trials-united-democratic-front-trial-in-1985-statement-by-observer-at-the-trial-judge-natahniel-jones/> Accessed on 15 March 2022.   . The apartheid government attributed internal unrest and violence to 'terrorist' activities by the ANC. See <https://omalley.nelsonmandela.org/omalley/index.php/site/q/03lv01538/04lv01539/05lv01562/06lv01570.htm>. Also, for a detailed account of the events leading up to the Koeberg bombing, see JA van Wyk & AM van Wyk. *The African National Congress and apartheid South Africa's nuclear weapons program*. NPIHP working paper (16). Washington, DC: Wilson Center, 2020 and JA van Wyk. Nuclear terrorism in Africa: The ANC''s Operation Mac and the attack on the Koeberg nuclear power station in South Africa". *Historia* 60/2. 2015. 51–67.

569 See, for example, Wilson Center. "Letter from South African Defence Minister Magnus Malan to Israeli Defense Minister Ariel Sharon". 26 April 1982. History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive. <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116771> Accessed on 15 March 2022.

570 See <https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gc/gc31-819_en.pdf>.

571 See <https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gc/gc32-848_en.pdf >.

572 IAEA. "Summary record of the discussion on the item 'South Africa's nuclear capabilities' at meeting of the Board of Governors held in February, June and September 1985". General Conference: Twenty-ninth Regular Session. 23 September 1985. Available at: https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gc/gc28dec-7_en.pdf Accessed on 15 March 2022. See also Van Wyk *op. cit*.

573 DFA. *A balanced approach to the NPT: Armscor/AEC concerns viewed from a DFA standpoint*. Pretoria: Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) Archive, 1988.

574 *Ibid*.

575 See <https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gc/gc31-819_en.pdf>

576 Van Wyk *op. cit*.

'Disgusting, disgraceful, inconsequential and dirty renegade?': Reconstructing the early life and career of Anglo-Boer War combatant and war prisoner 'Artie' Tully, 1889–1910[578]

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Abstract

Arthur William ('Artie') Tully is a largely forgotten name in South African military history. A professional boxer by trade, Australian-born Tully joined the republican forces during the Anglo–Boer War – also called the South African War – (1899–1902) while working on the Witwatersrand. Captured at Vaalkrans (5–7 February 1900), he became a prisoner of war on Diyatalawa in Sri Lanka (formerly Ceylon). After the Peace of Vereeniging in 1902, Tully, portrayed by his brethren as a traitor, rekindled his boxing career and established himself in Singapore, Southeast Asia, working as a bookmaker, turf commission agent and mine-owner. Tully's visit to Australia after a thirteen-year absence was largely ignored, just like his legacy in post-war studies, and to this day, he, like thousands of others, remains an obscured figure of the Anglo–Boer War. His life before the war and the factors that motivated him to join the republican cause remain unknown. For some Australians, he is an emigrant traitor of no consequence. South Africans ironically continue to celebrate the contribution of a range of other foreign participants but, for unknown reasons, continue to ignore or are blissfully unaware of the contribution of this Australian to their history. Against this background, the study reported here reconstructed the early life and career of a significant personality with a view to end his current obscurity.

Keywords: Artie Tully, boxing, Anglo–Boer War, prisoner of war, Australia, Singapore, South Africa, sport

Introduction

On 31 May 2022, a significant number of British Commonwealth members will commemorate the 120th anniversary of the signing of the Peace of Vereeniging – the treaty that brought the Anglo–Boer War (ABW) (also called the South African War [SAW]) to an end. On this occasion, as in the past, those attending will recall the heroism and courage of the fallen and the survivors of this conflict through public displays and other events. Australians have developed a particularly strong commemoration tradition concerning this war. During their last celebrations in 2020, they hosted their annual Anglo–Boer War Commemorative Service at the Anzac Memorial on the Beswick Barracks Parade Ground, followed by a Descendants and Friends' Day close to the war memorial in Adelaide.[579] Two months earlier, descendants of the men and women who served in the war led the Anzac Day Commemorative March, commemorating all the

fallen soldiers and others in wars in which the country had participated. The ABW owed its prominence to the fact that it was the first conflict in which Australia as a national geopolitical entity had participated.

Commemorations inevitably recall the acts, omissions and betrayals of the 'other' – ranging pacifists, dissidents and traitors – those villains who are "consensually" defined, and to whom a "treacherous reputation" is assigned, and the ones who are often demonised and turned into a non-person for their deeds and convictions.[580] Concomitantly with negative commemorations, such individuals are often silenced and marginalised and, at worse, rendered transparent and invisible.[581] Ducharme and Fine note that these consequences are "largely irreversible, successful status degradation processes relegate the offenders, and their reputations, to the area outside society's moral boundaries".[582] Ndlovu concurs with this sentiment and suggests that an act of epistemic violence is committed when this happens.[583] A case in point is the story of William Arthur ('Arty') Tully, an Australian professional boxer who joined the Transvaal forces during the ABW (1899–1902) while working on the Witwatersrand. Captured at Vaalkrans, he became a prisoner of war on Diyatalawa in Sri Lanka (formerly Ceylon). Today, Tully, labelled a traitor by his brethren, is a largely ignored figure in ABW studies. His life before the war, and the factors that motivated him to join the republican cause, also remain unknown.

The individual life story, notes Rasch (2016), offers a lens for understanding both the past and "the relationship between individuals and collectives at the end of empire"[584] and for the investigation of "wider issues around nationhood, ethnicity, race, sexuality and gender".[585] New ways of narrating the personal past became possible based on the insights gained.[586] Concurrently, new insights about the intersection between "the border-crossing trajectories of individual lives, imperial influences and post-imperial narratives" are gained.[587]

Against this background, the study on which this article reports, used a combination of official and newspaper archives as well as secondary literature to reconstruct the life and career of Artie Tully to use it as a lens to investigate the intersection of sport, international migration, identity, and the war on individual and collective lives in the age of empire.

In search of Arty Tully

Martin Marix Evans's *Encyclopaedia of the Boer War* indicates that one Joseph ('Artie') Tully, a boxer of Australian nationality, was born in Hobart in 1871, emigrated to South Africa in 1895 in search of fortune, and while there, joined the republican forces as a volunteer in the subsequent war against the British Empire.[588] According to a 1913 newspaper report, Tully was 43 years old at the time of an interview, which suggests that he was born in 1870.[589] This is confirmed by several contemporary newspaper reports. This difference, in name, is a vexing one and, over time, also proved to be problematic, as will be explained later.

Based on a diversity of fragmented sources, the consensus is that Tully was born and raised in South Carlton, Melbourne, in the state of Victoria. The son of Adelaide Tully,

who died in Carlton in 1914 at the age of 84, William Arthur was one of seven siblings – three brothers, George, Dave and Jack, and three sisters, Ada, Mary and Annie.[590] However, very little is known about his father or the extended family network, their social status within the Melbourne society and the state of their family life and relations. Tully attended the St. Francis Church School in Elizabeth Street in the city, also the alma mater of fellow boxers Tut Ryan and Jack McGowan.[591]

Living in Melbourne brought Tully in close contact with the general practice of juvenile entertainment, ad hoc and impromptu prizefighting contests in the side streets and alleys of the city, and the world of freakery where the human body and its characteristics, whether race or sexuality, is displayed as a curiosity for amusement and profit.[592] The city boasted many suburban halls, theatres, and pub backrooms, which regularly served as fighting venues. These spaces and others, such as the Lyceum Sports Hall, the Hibernian Hall and the Melbourne Athletic Club, frequently hosted events by physical culture entrepreneurs such as boxers, wrestlers, Indian club-swingers and dancers engaged in pursuing monetary opportunities. While colonials supported these performances well, some local newspapers, such as the *South Australian Advertiser*, deemed it appropriate to report a sentiment prevalent amongst the higher classes in the Mother Country that certain forms of entertainment such as "nigger and music hall shows" degraded or defiled spaces of high culture, and should therefore best be avoided.[593] This sentiment was shared by the *Melbourne Leader*, who, on occasion, advised that less rather than more is advisable.[594]

As a youth, Tully developed an early yearning for boxing and a penchant for good taste in dress and the selection of his friends. He was good-looking, friendly and strong, and he worked in the gym with "an elusive cleanness that made the gentleman fanatics of that period seek his company".[595] Under the guidance of Dan Creedon and Peter Maloney, Artie Tully became a hitter with either hand and was so fast that Martin Costelloe quaintly said, "[t]het [*sic*] kid is sure fast enough to drink water out of a sieve. But Artie Tully's sole trouble was that he would not train to fit his rubber body to withstand the strain of combat."[596] On romantic level, he was in a long-distance relationship with one Mary Brogan who insisted that the budding fighter quit prizefighting and find a steady and less precarious job. Tully instead joined the travelling troupe of English sprinter Billy Clarke and manager 'Ole' Warbler Evans, on their travels in search of fortune. While on tour in Murrumbidgee, and in response to verbal abuse by a local bully, one 'Scragger' Bogle, a challenge fight was arranged between him and Tully, which Tully won by knockout. This victory effectively launched him into a professional boxing career.[597]

However, the exact date for the start of Tully's fighting career is still uncertain. In a preview to a fight in Singapore in 1905, the local *Straits Times* reported that Tully's boxing career started in 1890, when he won his first three amateur contests.[598] This assertion however is contradicted by the career records reported by the authoritative webpage boxingrec.com.[599] According to this source, and based on reported events in the media, Tully's recorded career, inclusive of both amateur and professional contests, had indeed started a year earlier.[600] Based on the available evidence, boxingrec.com has retraced Tully's professional debut to January 1889 at the Apollo Athletic Hall in

Melbourne against Frank 'Young' McShane in a four-round encounter. Aged 19 years, the debutant faced a much more experienced fighter – one who had already completed nine fights of which he had won three, including three encounters against Albert ('Young Griffo') Griffiths, at the time, Australia's brightest lightweight prospect. Tully's debut, however, started on a good footing with a draw or no-decision result, followed by six more fights, of which he won five and lost one. All of this helped to build a ring reputation worthy of financial backing and attractive to potential challengers and entertainment-hungry paying customers. Lamb, Williams, E Currow, J Helm, C Rowell and Jim Saxon were some of his opponents.[601]

The first year of the new decade (1890) saw Tully fighting at least eight times within 12 months: each fight lasted either four or eight rounds. Amongst his opponents was Alf Forbes, whom he fought at the Crystal Palace, Richmond. This fight ended in a draw.[602] In his third encounter against William Lyndsay at the Apollo Athletic Hall in February 1891 and Jim Barron in July, he won five fights outright. This number was repeated the next year, including a contest against Sandy McGregor of New Zealand and a further five by 1892, including fights against 'Young' O'Neill at the Commotion Gymnasium in Melbourne[603] and Stan Osborne and an unnamed "Malay lad Esler".[604] For four years, Tully's income from boxing was supplemented by wood carting at a station.[605] His record during these four years reflected a majority of either drawn or no-decision fights with only a small number of victories.

For the first four years of Tully's career, he mainly fought in Melbourne venues, including the Apollo Athletic Hall, the Crystal Palace, Commotion Gymnasium, Melbourne Athletic Club, Abe Hickin's Gymnasium, and Curran's Gymnasium. He had the longest relationship with the first two, where he was thoroughly acquainted with the business of prizefighting and boxing. Since most of the venues belonged to practising boxers or physical culture entrepreneurs, these spaces served as more than hosting venues. It was also where support networks were formed, challenges received, and backers met to ensure the sustainability of the boxing industry. Fighters could thus better address the precarious nature of boxing as an occupation.

By 1893, Tully issued a challenge to Ned Burden and registered his willingness to fight Peter Murphy through the newspapers.[606] He fought Jack Goggin at Goggin's Hall at Captain's Flat in early November as a boxing exhibition.[607] Other fights included a contest against Charlie Gooley at the Salvation Army Barracks in Goulburn in November, which Tully won by knockout.[608] He also re-issued his challenge to Burden in mid-December of that year. In the absence of further fights in Victoria, Tully toured New South Wales and Tasmania with black boxer Peter Felix in search of fighting opportunities. They hosted boxing exhibitions at shows as part of what was called a "boxing combination".[609] One of these was a fight against one Franks in May 1894 in the town of Bega.[610] This period was disappointing, with initially only three fights in 11 months and at least one seven-month period of inactivity. Between December 1892 and June 1895, 18 months of limited fights and reduced income followed. Among his opponents at was one Harry 'The Stranger' Edwards in a fight at the Temperance Hall in Wagga in December 1894 for £10 – a side-bet and the gate takings. The fight ended in a draw, and the proceedings

were split between the two boxers and their management.[611] This fight was followed by a contest against one Myers, a local boxer, over four rounds in the same town. Generally, genuine "professional contests were few and far between, except [for] privately arranged matches, held in small halls at prohibitive prices of admission before select patrons, to whom money was no object".[612] In March 1895, just prior to departure to South Africa, Tully was challenged by Jim Richardson, which he accepted. Whether this fight took place is, however, not certain since each set his own conditions.[613]

Against this background, Tully and several his compatriots and fellow boxers, including Tut Ryan and Tom Duggan, departed for South Africa and the gold mining communities of the Witwatersrand. This exit, notes *The Bulletin*, was an attempt to search for the "New Mecca for a cut at the shekels of the gold and diamond men".[614] Chief in this regard was noted boxing promoter and trainer Jack Barnett who tracked the fighter down through the Australian newspapers and covered the required travelling costs after a swift agreement.[615] Tully departed with the express purpose of going to fight Jimmy Murphy in Johannesburg. He departed from his native land on a ship, the *Damascus,* and en route, while the ship docked at Albany in New Zealand, he fought in a four-round exhibition match against one R McBride.[616]

Arrival and career in South Africa (1895–1899)

According to contemporary sources, the boxing game in Johannesburg was in a boom phase in the 1890s and "money [was] good and plentiful".[617] In addition, the city had enough interested potential financial backers amongst the local business elite. Amongst the chief financial backers of sport and athletes were luminaries such as horse racing businessman Solly Joel, boxing enthusiast Barney Barnato, and baseball supporter, Dr Frederick Hollis Brenner, as well as several racehorse owners.[618]

Tully arrived in Johannesburg on 2 August 1895 in the company of compatriots Joe Goddard and Tut Ryan and set himself up at the Goldfields Hotel. The local media described him as a "very likely lad" and acknowledged and referred to him as the lightweight champion of Australia.[619] Prior to travelling to the Rand, the fighter had one fight immediately after arrival in Cape Town against 'Darkey' Parker. As per standard practice, fellow boxer Tut Ryan acted as Tully's trainer and, after assessing the local fighting scene, foresaw the possibility of several challenging fights against the likes of visiting boxers such as Barney Malone, Murphy or Billy Greaves as well as a local champion, Jim Holloway. Ryan also had Jimmy Murphy in mind for a fight – he indeed claimed that Tully came to South Africa with a view to fight the former. As a testimony of their regard for visiting overseas boxers with a suitable reputation, the local boxing fraternity appropriately welcomed the new arrivals with a reception at the local Empire Hotel where they "received the heartiest welcome from the local sportsmen present".[620]

After settling in, Tully started to prepare for a potential fight against Murphy, the original reason for his presence in South Africa. However, repeated challenges to Murphy met with impossible conditions and, as a result, proved fruitless and "remained unanswered and the source of media speculation".[621] A key problem was Murphy's insistence that

his opponent had to be of a particular weight, a demand that, according to some in the media, "is impossible for Artie to come to without reducing himself to a skeleton".[622] However, attempts by the challenger to spar against Murphy at an exhibition benefit opportunity as an alternative also failed. Following Murphy's continued refusal to accept his challenges, Tully claimed the South African lightweight title, to which his nemesis laid claim. In order to prove his worth and consummate his self-proclaimed new status, Tully proceeded to challenge another new arrival, Bill Heffernan, for a fight. Due to prior commitments, Heffernan however declined the challenge.[623] Ironically, Murphy, in turn, and because of a lack of other challenges, remained inactive – a situation which eventually forced him to accept a job at an iron foundry to "be relieved of the temptations which always follow in the track of idleness".[624]

Tully, described by the Johannesburg newspapers as displaying a "bronzed face, erect bearing, and high spirits [which] testified to his robust health" and looking forward to potential "showers of silver" and claiming a record of 76 fights with "only been unsuccessful on one or two occasions", in the meantime, continued to train.[625] In early September, he secured a fight against Barney Malone. However, the fight was a disappointment and declared a 'no contest', chiefly because of Malone's ring antics such as a deliberate attempt to engage in minimal combat to prevent a knockout or a defeat. In its aftermath, a public spat involving both disappointed backers and paying fans ensued.[626] While some criticised the referee for declaring the fight a no-contest, the *Johannesburg Times* directed its criticism at Malone and suggested that the outcome of the failed encounter was an attempt by the local boxing establishment to use Tully as "a buffer for a despicable managerial difference" between local parties of which he had no knowledge.[627]

Notwithstanding, Tully persevered and found ways of keeping himself occupied. In line with established practices overseas, the boxer acted as ring referee at other events, including at a circus midget fight event, in addition to training for potential fights.[628] He also accepted an occasional training role and provided advice and assistance as a ring second for fellow fighters – even at impromptu events.[629] This kept him busy until his second fight – an exhibition match against Patsy Donovan at a race meeting at the end of September.[630] Not an income-generating event, and with no better prospect of getting any profitable challenges, Tully started to consider the possibility of an early departure to England in search of fortune.

To pursue opportunities in the eastern part of the Cape Colony, the temporary partnership from Kimberley, Donovan and Tully left Johannesburg in early October.[631] This coincided with the start of the South African tour of renowned Australian heavyweight Tom Lees, who was on his way to Port Elizabeth with his horse Torpedo to participate in the annual race meeting there.[632] A week later, Donovan and Tully participated in a "grand fistic display" for a £500 side-stake and the "lightweight championship of South Africa" in Port Elizabeth.[633] This amount was by far the largest purse they had fought for since their arrival on the African continent. By November, the two performed at an event in the Olympic Rink in Kimberley where Tully fought an "American Darkie", Cohen, in an exhibition fight over three rounds while Donovan sparred against Harry Reynolds.[634]

Both were rewarded with gold medals for their part in the proceedings, after which they participated in a three-round 'spar' which was "fast and furious".[635]

Upon their return from their tour, the fighters found Johannesburg in a state of turmoil following the disruption of services including a lack of water and electricity following the escalation of a dispute between members of the 'Uitlander' community and the Transvaal government.[636] Matters came to a head during November–December when, in the face of fears of a coup against the republican authority and its sovereignty, the Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek Politie (ZARPs) was withdrawn from Johannesburg. With the Transvaal authorities and key members of Johannesburg mining and industry (the key backers of professional boxing) opposing each other and the normal activity and services to the city population disrupted, there was little prospect of any further fights and consequently little financial gain for the visiting boxers.[637]

In the absence of law enforcement, members of the Uitlander campaign, the Reform Committee, appointed their own law enforcers under Trimble, the former head of the ZARPs. Trimble, in turn, appointed notable boxer and so-called South African heavyweight champion James Couper as Chief Inspector of Police, who proceeded to appoint his now-unemployed fellow boxers Artie Tully, Owen Sullivan, Tom Duggan, Tut Ryan and Bill Doherty as sub-inspectors. This group was tasked with supervising the interim police force, closing and policing canteens and gambling houses. They were paid 25 shillings per day and were given accommodation at the Goldfields Hotel for their effort. According to Doherty:

> [A]s there were many lawless characters in the place the millionaire mine-owners and other rich men of Jo'Burg, decided that special constables would have to be sworn in. Owen Sullivan and I, because I suppose of our pugilistic eminence, were given a very high position in the force for we wore on our left sleeves the word "Inspector", which gained for us 25s a day.[638]

Within this law enforcement vacuum, some within the 'new' police force exploited the situation to their own benefit and engaged in blackmailing and extracting protection fees. Consequently, "some of the inspectors did richly out of the spielers" and even wished the crisis to last longer.[639] By his own admission, Doherty was involved, and he implicated Owen Sullivan and related that they occasionally collected up to £300, which was supposedly handed over to some of the charities in the city. Tut Ryan confirmed the allegations of profiteering amongst the sub-inspectors, and Doherty further suggested that others, such as Tully and Duggan, tried a similar scheme but were less successful.[640] These innuendos, however, were subsequently denied by Duggan.[641]

After the Jameson Raid in 1896, some overseas boxers, including Tut Ryan, left Johannesburg, and returned home or went to England. Tully, however, stayed and motivated his decision by declaring, "he never struck a better country, and he is not going to leave it".[642] In the end, this proved to be a life-changing decision. While others who remained ventured into mining labour, Tully returned to boxing, not totally discounting a

future visit or relocation to England.[643]Johannesburg, like most of the Australian mining centres at the time, were popular destinations for individuals from all walks of life, who were driven by all manner of motives, including "come-on men of the carnival world".[644] It was further fully integrated within the global theatrical circuit, which facilitated the continuous transnational movement of entertainers to pursue opportunities.[645]Remaining in South Africa therefore made economic sense. Tully, having spent half a decade in Johannesburg, also had established a network of sponsors, loyal fans and a social network, all of which were crucial for the socio-economic survival of itinerant boxers and entertainers. Like so many of his peers, he was used to a nomadic existence and relatively carefree lifestyle, a situation that made a domestic life rather difficult. As far as could be established, he also had no romantic attachments elsewhere. He therefore clearly developed a stake in the society in which he was located.[646]

As normality returned to Johannesburg after the Outlander challenge, Tully continued to work with fellow boxers around future fights to make a living and to prepare for a potential fight with Murphy.[647] This was done in the hope to benefit from any betting, silver showers and or side-stakes. Another important consideration for boxers was their drawing power for fans and financial backers. They therefore needed to stay in the public eye to prevent forced "retirement for 'resting on their laurels'" and, Tully as a result, continued to "fire of the blank verbal cartridge" (challenges) but to no avail.[648] However, the period after the Jameson Raid was a period of economic depression that negatively affected several sectors. Unemployment, a stagnant property market, high rentals, a down-turn in the building trades, a struggling retail sector and rising business insolvencies and falling wages all conspired to undermine the market in entertainment in which Tully and his contemporaries were operating.[649]

After eight months of inactivity, Tully fought Bill Heffernan at Searelle's Theatre of Varieties for a stake of £600, scheduled for 30 rounds.[650] The large gap between fights, prolonged inactivity and, arguably, insufficient preparation or a lack of ring fitness contributed to him losing the contest following a knockout in the thirteenth round. This was mitigated by the prospect of a scheduled fight against Murphy, who had finally agreed to a contest in June. However, this fight was preceded by Tully challenging long-distance runner, William Baker of Australia, for a £100-a-side "go-as-you-place" 24-hour endurance race. Tully participated in this challenge to generate an income and raise further sponsor and fan interest. The fighter-cum-runner appropriately styled himself as the "champion long-distance runner of Tasmania".[651] This claim, far from being an empty boast, seemingly had some substance. Judging by some newspaper evidence, Tully had a record of accomplishment in pedestrianism that started in 1888 in an international six-day event.[652] Lacking the conditioning required for a 24-hour-long event, Tully was defeated by Baker after the first day.[653] Fortunately, he beat Murphy in their fight on 4 July 1896 – one full year after arriving from Australia.[654] The year, however, concluded on a low point with Tully having to appear in the Johannesburg Criminal Court on an allegation of theft by Robert Mayricke, a new arrival in the city.[655]

During the first quarter of the New Year, Tully ventured into Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) for a number of exhibitions and prize fights.[656] Prior to his departure, he fought and defeated

one Jones in Mafeking.[657] Not fully acquainted with the state of boxing and prizefighting north of the Orange River, Tully arrived without any fixed programme intent to "come to see what the place is like" and to give a number of exhibitions to attract interest.[658] One of his first recorded performances was when he gave a boxing exhibition in the Bulawayo Market Hall in March. In addition, he fought twice: the first a six-rounder against one Davis for a small purse, and the second against Pats Carroll.[659] Two months later, in May 1897, Tully participated in what was billed as a "Boxing Competition and Grand Assault-at-Arms" together with fellow fighters Tom Duggan and Patsy Donovan. To generate local participation, they offered a silver cup for interested amateurs.[660] In addition to a scheduled fight against Jack Lee in late June, the three fighters continued to issue challenges to willing and aspiring fighters. Profitable encounters, however, remained in short supply. In September, Tully participated in a boxing exhibition at the Hatfield Hotel in Salisbury (now Harare) against two amateurs in six-round fights.[661] Although conditions to earn real money improved with a fight against Jim Holloway over 25 rounds in Bulawayo, conditions remained challenging.[662] The fight in October was billed as the "Lightweight Championship of South Africa and Australia" to attract fans and backers.[663] Promoted by fellow traveller Patsy Donovan at Cooke's Circus, the programme included a midget fight, an acrobatics exhibition, and a curtain-raiser over 20-rounds between J Lee and J Hardy. This occasion attracted an estimated paying crowd of around 700, which disappointingly saw Tully's corner stopping the fight in the sixth round. This attracted criticism from the likes of JR Couper, who accused Tully of foul play and suggested that everything was not above board, and that the result was predetermined.[664] This claim was strongly denied by Tully, who in response claimed that he suffered from a bout of fever at the time of the fight but not wanting to disappoint his backers and fans, he continued even fighting outside of his weight class.[665]

By December, after nine months of a less-than-profitable stay and tour of the territory, Tully was offered a benefit event and a rematch against Holloway – indicative of the respect and esteem he enjoyed among the locals in the aftermath of his countrywide tour.[666] This effectively concluded his time in Rhodesia and his departure to the Cape Colony. The first month of the New Year saw him hosting his own boxing carnival in the Eastern districts of the Cape Colony in Port Elizabeth.[667] With cooperation from the soldiers from the Middlesex Regiment, Tully hosted a programme inclusive of sparring exhibitions, formal fights and even some comedy. Following the proven methods, he offered medals to winners to encourage participation in the various events. During this period, he also fought Billy Greaves and Frank Daniels and secured a future match against Scotty Kane for £100, as part of two further shows.[668] The latter fight, a 20-round contest, finally took place on 16 March 1898 for a side-stake of £200. The programme featured several other fights.[669] Although Tully outclassed Kane "as regards science", noted a newspaper, he could not deliver a knockout.[670] The fight consequently ended in a draw.

By April, Tully returned to Johannesburg and now, boasting 81 career fights, resumed with issuing the customary challenges to both old and new rivals. Prospects, however, continued to look bleak. An attempt to secure a fight against Bennie Marks also failed since the latter prioritised a contest with Jim Holloway. To mitigate the new round of

inactivity, he participated in an exhibition with fellow boxer, Jack Slavin, at the Royal Theatre in Durban.[671] Concurrently, Tully issued a challenge to any lightweight in Africa for a fight for a stake of £200.[672] After returning to his home base in late June, Tully fought and defeated Bennie Marks in Johannesburg over 25 rounds.[673] This victory brought in a raft of challenges from the likes of heavyweight boxers Jack McAuliffe and Barney Malone; McAuliffe was much heavier and outside Tully's weight class.[674] Based on the monetary values offered, Tully declined most of the new challenges and declared through the local media that he would "take no notice of them unless a substantial sum is put in your hands as a guarantee of good faith".[675] In the meantime, he also started to make plans to tour the Cape Colony.

In September 1898, Tully fought McAuliffe at Scott's Theatre in Pietermaritzburg for a £200 side-bet over 25 rounds, after all the required guarantees had been deposited. Despite losing this bout, he continued to enjoy the respect of his peers, some of whom – such as Duggan, McAuliffe, Tom Denny, Harry Winters and others – not long afterwards volunteered their services free for a benefit event in his honour.[676] As the year neared its end, Tully fought Sid Fillis over twenty rounds for a side-stake "one man to win" in the Albany Hall in Johannesburg on Christmas Eve.[677]

At the beginning of 1899, Tully was in East London, where Scotty Kane challenged him to a knock-out fight.[678] This was followed two months later by a fight and victory over Frank Daniels while in the same city – his last fight before the start of the ABW. On 11 October 1899, with the start of the war between the South African Republic (or Transvaal) and the Orange Free State against Great Britain, Tully was back in Johannesburg amidst frantic civic activity to prepare for the duration and the consequential results of the conflict.

During the Anglo–Boer War (1899–1902)

Soon after the start of the conflict, a group of Dutch railway officials employed by the Dutch–South African Railway Company in Johannesburg established a Volunteer Military Corps to support the Transvaal forces. The leadership of the corps, some of whom were ex-soldiers, recruited other volunteers, both experienced and civilian, and received uniforms and a limited supply of rifles (short Mausers) from the Transvaal authorities. Otherwise, they had to supply their own horses and clothing before being placed in the Johannesburg Commando. Since some were British citizens and potentially guilty of treason, various groups travelled to Pretoria to discuss their status with the Kruger government. The affected were then all granted Transvaal citizenship, the franchise, and a certificate of citizen rights.[679] Tully was among those eager to serve, but there is no firm evidence that he was among those who became full citizens.

Tully, like a significant percentage of other recruits, both in the Republican and enemy forces, were civilians who joined the conflict for a variety of reasons. An analysis of the socio-economic composition of the Canadian forces in the conflict, for example, discovered that, while the first rounds of recruitment were aimed at enlisting ex-military men, the second round, due to a shortfall of experienced soldiers, targeted all sectors of

society and from all classes and creeds.[680] As a result, recruits included individuals from the white- and blue-collar sector, both skilled and unskilled, and ranged from professionals (teachers, doctors, engineers) to clerks and business proprietors, in addition to skilled artisans and semi- or unskilled factory workers and labourers. Under the category of 'miscellaneous recruits' were listed individuals, such as horse trainers, actors, artists and jockeys, while the farming sector also provided a good number of recruits.[681] Given this mix of recruits, Miller, in his analysis of the socio-economic composition of the Canadian war contingents, is of the opinion that the researcher can only speculate about the true motivation for an individual's enlistment and that a combination of factors rather than a single factor might have played a role in their decision to become soldiers. For some in the white-collar sector, boredom and a sense of adventure might have been a key driver, while for others, including those in the blue-collar section and agriculture, social pressure, a sense of duty, religious mission or economic incentives might have play a role. The latter, it is postulated, might even have trumped patriotism.[682]

As suggested previously, Tully's decision to join the Republican forces might have come about as a result of him having developed a stake in his new homeland. According to a business model developed by Licata and Chakraborty, loyalty is driven by three factors, namely satisfaction, stake, and the value of switching service provider (monetary or non-monetary), all of which are determined by the length and depth of the relationship.[683] Stake in particular, affects individual behaviour, commitment to people, and commitment to institutions with whom a relationship has been established. Further, the longer (five years plus) and deeper the relationship and feelings of satisfaction, the more certain it is that the relationship would evolve from "spurious loyalty" to true "attitudinal loyalty" to both an institution and a people.[684]By the start of the war, Tully was in his fifth year of residence and possessed a notable network of professional and social relationships (event organisers, hoteliers, circus owners, fellow boxers, etc.) in all the South African colonies. This allowed him to find sustainable and ongoing work, which allowed him to remain an independent contractor. The depth of these relationships – as demonstrated by his regular and repeated paid joint activities with others in the same profession as well as with event organisers – was satisfactory to both parties and therefore assisted in reducing the risk of unemployment and thus social precariousness that is so often associated with a brutal occupation such as boxing.

Tully's switch of loyalty from Australia to the Transvaal was, arguably, also aided by the existence of clear differences of opinion in his mother country and by the actions of other British-born volunteers. Some of the clergy in New South Wales, supported by sections of the Catholic press, were amongst those who were very critical about Australian involvement in the conflict. They, and other critics, equated the war against the Boer republics and the suppression of the Irish as essentially the same.[685] This stance was often ridiculed and criticised by the pro-war lobby and resulted in local Irish priests chose to remain silent in the face of accusations of disloyalty.[686] The Tully's or MacAtilla, as it was known in pre-Norman times, seemingly were Irish and this link therefore provides another possible reason for Artie's changed loyalties and decision to fight the British.[687]In addition, Irish Americans who established their own units to fight alongside the republic forces also might have served as a motivating force. Their actions,

notes Bhroméil, were motivated by their "natural inclination … to be anti-English" and a "sense of ethnicity" rather than a special love for the republican Boers.[688]

Judging the individual's actions of participation, non-participation, conscientious objection, opposition, dissent or the changing of sides during a war, require an awareness of the multi-layered nature of individuals and their circumstances. It further requires both taking account of nuances and complexity, and refraining from automatic labelling of dissenting individuals, based on a one-dimensional assessment as traitors and enemy agents worthy of being "closeted away in history's attic of shame".[689] Treason, Stockdale argues, is inherently complex and, according to Glick, involves "a man's feelings towards his origins, it involves his political ideology, and his code of ethics".[690]

Following the Boer forces' defeat at the Battle of Elandslaagte on 21 October 1899, the Johannesburg Commando was dispatched to the front. Upon their arrival at Dannhauser Station in Natal, the newcomers – including Tully – were assigned to the Braamfontein Field Cornetcy under Field Cornet Van der Byl. He, in turn, served under Commandant Ben Viljoen.[691] In this capacity, they participated and witnessed the battles for control of Ladysmith, Platrand, Colenso and Spioenkop.

The decisive battle in Tully's short but eventful military career was the Battle of Vaalkrans, fought on 5–7 February 1900. During this epic battle, which started on the 5 February and lasted three days, the 95-member Johannesburg Commando under Commandant Ben Viljoen suffered 29 deaths, 24 wounded, and only six unwounded, all of whom were captured.[692] Tully, who, according to CJ Blom, held the rank of corporal and was therefore in the thick of things.[693] Given the strategic nature of the terrain for the defence of Ladysmith, Tully and 30 of his men were reportedly ordered to occupy the hilltop on the southern side of Vaalkrans to prevent the British forces led by Generals Lyttleton and Wynne from gaining a strategic foothold. Despite their best efforts, Tully's group, assisted by the rest of the Johannesburg Commando, could not prevent the capture of Vaalkrans. Blom notes that this battle saw the "extermination of the Tully corporalship" and the removal of the captured to the prisoner-of-war camps.[694] Since Tully was not among the recorded death left behind on the battlefield, it is accepted that he was indeed a prisoner of war.

Prisoner of war (1900–1902)

Artie Tully, officially listed as 'James Tully', was awarded prisoner of war number 92. However, his date of capture, listed as 7 February, should be assumed as wrong since the decisive battle that resulted in the British occupation of Vaalkrans took place two days earlier – 5 February 1900.[695] Further, the use of the name 'James' instead of his Christian name, Arthur William, or the equally well-known ring-name, Artie, raises interesting possibilities. It might have been an attempt to conceal his identity and nationality to avoid death by firing squad for committing treason against the Empire. By mid-year, Tully, aged 29 years, was placed on board the ship Ranee II and, together with others, were imprisoned in the Diyatalawa Camp on the island of Ceylon (Sri Lanka).[696] The Ranee II, which transported two loads of prisoners to the island, offloaded on 2

September and 9 November 1900.[697] Tully's identity was widely known by this time but attracted no other penalties. This suggested that Tully might have been regarded as a Transvaal rather than a British citizen.

Tully's capture and subsequent imprisonment attracted significant comments from his fellow boxers, fans and compatriots. Fellow Australian Tom Duggan, his travel companion to and throughout South Africa, remarked:

> I'm blowed if I know. We were all disgusted. I don't know of any other Australian sports who did the same, while I know hundreds who went to the front for England. The Boers didn't like the idea of the Australians helping the old country.[698]

This remark suggested that Tully's choice was motivated by disloyalty and an attempt to please his local supporters rather than a distant nation. Consequently, a boxing fan, in a letter to the Sidney *Referee*, wrote:

> I am sending you this clipping from the Bloemfontein Post' for the benefit of my fellow pugilists in Australia, so that they will know how to treat such men as Jim Holloway and Artie Tully should ever, they meet.[699]

Similarly, another reader, writing under the pseudonym 'The Amateur', suggested that incarceration is an act of redemption and a means "to lessen the disgrace" and should therefore be prolonged.[700] For the *Bulawayo Chronicle*, Tully's imprisonment was nothing more than paying for his indiscretion and thus by implication, "just and proper".[701] There was therefore clearly an expectation that British society at large wanted to exact revenge on Tully.

Incarcerated with his fellow combatants of all nationalities, Tully and his long-time rival, Jim Holloway, organised and hosted boxing matches and gave lessons as part of their camp recreation programme.[702] Among the first reported was a contest involving young amateurs in February 1901. This was followed by two fights against different opponents by Holloway. They also arranged two boxing contests in the Camp Recreation Hall. The programme sometimes included wrestling and, on occasion, even provided for private side bets. Although billed as prisoner recreation, these events were often paid events with a nominal charge of between 1 and 5 shillings.[703] Camp officers and outside visitors often attended these occasions.[704] This close involvement of Tully with his Boer compatriots suggested an affinity that went way beyond superficial personal liking. Tully even remained behind when other foreign prisoners were transferred to the Ragama Camp in January 1902. He also remained a feature of camp-life long after the Peace of Vereeniging was concluded on 31 May 1902. He for example fought against Jim Holloway on 19 July 1902 in the Recreation Hall of the Diyatalawa Camp as part of the entertainment programme for the remaining prisoners.[705] Tully seemingly left the camp later in the year.

After the war (1903–1910)

According to the *Indian Daily News*, Tully arrived in Calcutta, India, from Ceylon in October 1902 with a view to fight Jack Hardman.[706] Realising the undermining potential of his military past, Tully was promoted as an Irish champion to attract paying customers.[707] He made his fighting debut in the city at the Corinthian Theatre on Tuesday night, 9 December 1902, and won the fight after three rounds, following a foul by his opponent.[708] This effectively relaunched his boxing career and attracted the interest of a range of potential opponents, such as fellow Australian JP Donovan and American Jasper Lamphier.[709] However, these fights fell through because Tully suffered successive bouts of sickness, arguably as a result of his period of incarceration as a prisoner of war.[710] During the early part of 1903, Tully focused on rebuilding his health and life. To earn an income, he staged physical culture shows and performed as an itinerant entertainer, including acts such as a punching ball exhibition and fighting against amateurs.[711] As matters improved, he also started to work towards reviving old boxing rivalries.[712] However, reintegration into community life posed its difficulties, and this period saw Tully being arrested and fined for public drunkenness and disorderly conduct.[713]

By 1904, having formally left the war behind him, Tully ventured into the world of horse racing and betting, specifically bookmaking, and settled in Singapore. Since Singapore was a British Colony and followed the same operating model as the Mother Country, Tully required a significant amount of starting capital, including the Tattersall entry fee of £250 and a yearly subscription of £4-4s. He also had to secure a standing security deposit of £300 for bets at any given time. Furthermore, every bookmaker had to deposit £500 cash prior to the quarterly race meeting, which was only returned when no claim was registered.[714] To accumulate sufficient start-up capital, Tully returned to the ring and fought several opponents all over Asia.[715] These fights, often billed as "the greatest glove contest ever seen in the East", were combined with complementary attractions, such as circus shows, which featured exotic entertainment such as midget boxing, juggling, club-swinging, comedy, ball-punching exhibitions, acrobatic cycling and "mystifiers".[716] Otherwise, he supplemented his income by appearing in exhibition boxing matches and officiating at boxing contests.[717] To ensure ongoing public support and reassure paying clients, events were coordinated by a committee of gentlemen "identified with sport in Singapore".[718]

Tully accumulated a meaningful and useful financial reserve thanks to these activities and arguably some financial discipline. Over three months, his advertised activities in the Singaporean media illustrate his improved financial standing. In June 1905, he deposited $5 000 as a "guarantee of good faith with the public" for bids on the horse racing meeting at the Selangor Turf Club.[719] This was repeated for the scheduled Penang Derby when a similar amount was deposited as a guarantee against all bets with a "well-known sporting owner".[720] By September, he deposited $10 000 as a guarantee for a series of races for the Maiden and Governor's Cup in October.[721] As further evidence of his solvency, a deposit was made to the *Straits Times* – a practice requiring that this security deposit be held until one week after the races.[722]

Tully extended his betting activities across Southeast Asia, including India and Malaysia, to ensure a consistent income. However, this venture was not cheap since he had several deposits as a guarantee to gain entry to the various events.[723] Among the key races for which Tully took bets were the Merchants, Ex-Griffins, Singapore Derby, the Governor's Cup, Grandstand Cup and Double Griffins Lawn Stakes and Paddock Cup races in Singapore, the Viceroy's Cup in Calcutta, and races at the Batavia Turf Club.[724] He was also a regular feature at the races in Deli (Sumatra) and obtained rights to do business at the races in the city of Taiping in Malaysia.[725] He also in limited fashion, extended betting to boxing and took bets for others in contests initiated by private individuals.[726]

Aided by the absence of any other strong competitors, Tully's business flourished. In this regard, an Australian visitor wrote to the *Referee* in Sydney, noting that Tully was "looking extremely well and fleshy" and "has blossomed into a turf commission agent, and is, I believe, doing well".[727] In 1908, Tully succeeded in obtaining a concession for tin mining in Siam – the culmination of a process, according to the available archival sources, that started in April 1907. In support of his application, he described himself as a former "miner in South Africa" and "in command of sufficient capital to work such a concession successfully".[728] This mine was formally opened on 22 February by the Inspector of Mines.[729]

With established interests in bookmaking and mining, Tully finally visited Australia in December 1908 – six years after his capture at Vaalkrans and 13 years after his original departure from his motherland. The visit attracted little attention.[730] Throughout, he continued to cite South Africa as his primary residence. After returning to Singapore, any further relationship with his roots was severed. Questions about his intentions to return in later years were simply met by a non-committal response.[731] Although still expressing the hope of being remembered by his peers, Tully was firmly committed to his new life in the Malay States and seemingly still proud of his South African connection.[732]

Assessing Tully

Arthur William Tully had a full and significant life as a boxer, soldier and entrepreneur, and thoroughly deserved his place in the annals of international boxing and the ABW. His embeddedness within South African and Australian history further shines a light on the interconnectedness of the sporting and military past of this two high-profile members of the British Empire. However, Tully's life also serves as a useful lens into the challenges that the exiles and expatriates had to face and the strategies that some had to employ to ensure economic survival while they operated within and moved through the colonial context. Displaying a high measure of resilience and motivation, Tully did not only embrace the challenges and obstacles that confronted him during his travels fully but continuously displayed a keen sense of agency as he moved through the Empire and beyond. When he chose sides in the ABW, it was consistent and with due regard to his assessment of his past, present and future. As an itinerant entertainer, Tully clearly valued his relationship with fellow boxers, promoters, fans and event organisers and their importance for his economic survival. Further, having developed a stake in his new homeland and after identifying the commonality between the republican struggle

and that in Ireland, his ancestral homeland, he chose against Australia and the British Empire. Far from being an opportunistic decision, Tully's enlistment reflected his history, his identity and his ethics, which turned it into much more than a treasonous and condemnable act.

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Book review

Military strategy: A global history

Jeremy Black

The idea and practice of strategy is universal across time and space, and predates the modern vocabulary around the term, which was essentially developed in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. This is the central, deceptively simple argument toward which Jeremy Black works in his sixth book of 2020, Military strategy: A global history. A former professor of history at the Universities of Exeter and Durham and a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI) in the United States, Black is an immensely prolific military and political historian who focuses here on the development of military strategy over the last six centuries. Much in the sweeping style of John Lewis Gaddis' On grand strategy,[733] Black delineates and compares a selection of broad global and domestic contexts for strategy from the Ming Dynasty in fourteenth-century China to the complex, geo-political competition of great and small powers of the modern world. In its broadest sense, the book looks to contribute to an understanding of the way military strategy partly shapes international relations and how strategy cannot be separated from the domestic policies of a country. In the process, Black also contributes to an understanding of strategy as a concept and to the elusive notion of strategic culture.

The book is structured according to certain meta-contexts for strategic practice that Black identifies, rather than simply according to time frames, causing the initial chapters at least to overlap noticeably. While discussions on the two world wars, the Cold War, and the contemporary world are afforded their own chapters later, the initial chapters look to generalise (albeit with characteristic precision) over large swathes of cultures and time periods. Naturally, maintaining a global perspective inevitably causes a trade-off with specificity when confining the book to only 300 pages. However, this trade-off does not necessarily harm Black's aim, which is to illuminate the continuity and variation of strategy across many individual cases. In the opening salvo, Black maps his conceptual terrain which, even without the rest of the book, is a masterclass introduction to strategy. In defining this core term, Black shows an aversion to constraining his analysis with a restricted view of the essence of strategy. Rather, he conceives of it in a 'total' sense, seeing strategy as the way in which actors generally go about shaping their domestic and international contexts through the pursuit of outcomes that provide them security and advance their interests. The contest for power is thus the crucial, arch-context of strategy.[734] It echoes the influential definition by Lawrence Freedman, who did away with parameters and defined strategy in his magnus opus with characteristic breadth as "the art of creating power".[735] The approach is helpful for what Black wants to achieve and appropriate to the scope of the book, although it does risk casting the conceptual

net too wide in many cases: anything that can be related to the contest for power, falls in the ambit of strategy. Nevertheless, Black understands this and defends his approach by noting that, unavoidably, "any strategy is contingent on complex contexts, both international and domestic, short- and long-term, and has no optimum dimensions".[736] This point is developed throughout the book and puts the concept beyond the institutional ownership of military institutions. Adding an additional dimension, Black also argues, "[those] who direct strategy are not always the same as those who evaluate its success".[737] A significant problem thus faced by those executing strategy, is for them to justify their decisions to those who frame the criteria for its success.[738] This sets up the interesting, ever-present puzzle of *who* is executing strategy, *what* they are trying to achieve, and, crucially, *who* they are trying to convince. It makes a visible overlap with what Katya Coleman has described as identifying the "legitimacy audience".[739] The second concept, 'strategic culture', is also treated broadly, and (as is often the case with this term) is a matter of just because it is difficult to define, does not mean that it is not there. Black treats the hotly debated term with delicacy, however, employing it to open discussion on specific social and cultural contexts within which military activity is shaped. An example is the question of how different societies approach limits in war-making, e.g. the treatment of prisoners of war, the use and extent of scorched earth policies, the tolerance of casualties and the notions of victory, defeat and what counts as 'appropriate' conduct.[740] With this 'total' view of strategy developed and having related it to his view of strategic culture, Black goes on to paint its various contextual contingencies and influences over time and space in succeeding chapters.

The first of the 'cases' in the book, as it were, concerns the strategies of what Black identifies as 'continental empires', spanning the years 1400 to 1850, with a focus on China, Turkey, Russia, Austria and France. Although countries such as China, Russia and France have maritime components to their strategic practice overall, the chapter considers their continental contexts. As an acute example of his trade-off with specificity, Black looks to justify this focus by arguing that, during this period, "there was scant sense other than for a while in the nineteenth century that geopolitical destiny inevitably lay with [maritime powers]".[741] With respect to China over this 400-year period, for example, while acknowledging significant variation within and between ruling dynasties, Black argues generally that the Chinese had "a sense that they dominated, and should dominate, the world," yet were notably orientated to their northern frontiers in the face of the persistent Mongol threat.[742] Black then contrasts the continuity and relative unity of Chinese culture with that of the Ottoman empire, which was seen as having to reconcile many different priorities and interests on many frontiers. Black also notes the significance of religion in Turkish strategy, which led to an initial enthusiasm for campaigns against Christendom in the sixteenth century. In this way, Black continues to highlight and contrast different contexts and pressures during different periods for different groups that guided their strategic practice. In terms of imperial Russia, Black notes its relative disregard for its Eastern interests and focus on European interests before hostilities with Japan in the nineteenth century. Turning to France, under Louis XIV, dynastic dynamics, ministerial factions, and the appeal to catholic interests are highlighted. Authoritarianism is a common theme in strategic considerations that emerges for these groups, which Black essentially sets up as a contrast for succeeding

discussions about the formulation and execution of strategy in the face of public politics – a *force majeure* that is present throughout most of the book.

The exposition moves to Great Britain during the 'long nineteenth century' (1688 to 1815, i.e. from the Glorious Revolution to the overthrow of Napoleon), to focus on strategy not dominated by the military or the court, but by maritime capabilities and the rise of public discussion and political accountability through parliament.[743] This sets the context for what Black calls "Republican Strategies",[744] which also takes shape in the United States and France in the late eighteenth century during the American War of Independence (1775–1783). Although the concept is not explicitly stated, this is where the idea of the legitimacy audience – the question of who is setting the conditions for success – becomes a key analytical tool for Black. As it relates to the United States, the discussion is effective because it highlights how intensely local American political culture really is and how it has been a driver of American military strategy for centuries.[745] What these discussions also continuously serve is the idea of strategic practice happening without the need for formal language around the term.

Having considered the rise of public politics and its effect on strategy in Great Britain, the United States and France in the eighteenth century, Black moves on to the nineteenth century to focus on the Napoleonic wars, where Clausewitz and Jomini (although not only they) sought to explain the science of command, contributing directly to how the term 'strategy' is understood today. Valuable here is the understanding of how the word 'strategy' became analytically separated from operational art. Jomini is now understood to have conflated the latter with strategy.[746] The United States again comes into focus with discussions about the Mexican American War (1846–1848), the American Civil War (1861–1865) and the ongoing conflict with American Indians during that period. Deigning to touch on developments in the global south – except for references to colonialism – Black again shifts to Europe and the lead-up from Napoleon's defeat to World War I. One of the crucial contexts focused on during this period, especially in terms of Austria and Germany (the empires that launched the Great War), was the dominance of military institutions in public affairs and how strategy was shaped when those military institutions began resisting political oversight. The picture that emerges from this discussion is one of strategy not so much determined by strong civilian control over the military, but rather one of strategy as an outcome of the struggle for control between civilian and military leaders (to the extent that they were even separate). The subsequent chapters on the First and Second World Wars emphasise not only the influence of technology on strategy, but also strength understood in terms of numbers, and the concept of limitless, 'total' war borne out of the nineteenth century focus on 'decisive' battles. In an analysis of the Cold War, Black continues to point out the complex contingencies for strategy in a world that explicitly sought to avoid 'total' war as nuclear weaponry proliferated.

A change of tack comes with the final two chapters of the book, where Black moves from being an historian to an effective commentator on current strategic affairs with an eye on the future. More than anything, Black emphasises the extraordinarily complex issues that pull strategy in every direction, such as rampant population growth,

resource competition, questions about national interest and identity, the development of artificial intelligence, and religious animosity. Here, Black also helpfully comments on the difficulty of writing about the present, for there is always "a lack of clarity about the relative significance of events, developments and causes" that overshadow the strategist's analysis.[747] From this, the reader takes that the variables influencing strategy often – although certainly not always – only become clear with hindsight. An important theme that Black drives home is that of popular determination and the inherent difficulties that Western democracies have in setting and executing longer-term goals in the face of deeply adversarial domestic politics.[748] During one election cycle, different government administrations could have completely different strategic approaches to the few 'complex' issues mentioned. What Black alludes to, though chooses not to address fully, is the interesting question of how government forms might shape strategy. While this topic falls beyond the scope of the book, a few pages spent with this problem in the abstract would certainly have been welcome. In a style that readers of Colin Gray[749] will recognise, Black offers few solutions to the future of strategy, and many warnings about inherent uncertainty, "individual conflicts emerged, and will continue to emerge, from particular circumstances".[750]

In reading this book, it is important to keep in mind the trade-off with specificity that Black takes on. Writing about global events across time is an inherently difficult task that takes a considerable amount of expertise, especially when not looking to write tomes, such as Freedman's *Strategy: A history*,[751] or Roberts and Westad's *The Penguin history of the world*.[752] While Black seeks to provide a global history, readers, especially those in the global south, may be excused for sensing it to be a global history and analysis from a Western (American and European) perspective, over-focusing on European and American strategic practice in the eighteenth to twentieth centuries. This can be defended since the cases used largely suffice in showing that, although strategy is shaped by complex contexts both international and domestic, it also has continuity in the sense that all groups naturally pursue outcomes that provide them security and advance their interests. This view opens itself to significant criticism from international relations scholars less sympathetic to realist schools of thought, which tend to be the dominant paradigms for strategic studies. Even so, the essential contribution that Black makes to strategy as a concept is that modern terminology is not a precondition for the practice of strategy nor, perhaps more significantly, the successful conduct of it.

With this book (and with many of his previous works), Black takes a seat alongside the heavyweights of strategic theory such as Colin Gray, Michael Howard, Hal Brands, MLR Smith, Lawrence Freedman and John Lewis Gaddis (to name but a few). The audience for this book would be wide, not only comprising students and practitioners of military strategy, but anyone trying to understand the geopolitical movements of centuries previous and present. If Clausewitz were alive today, setting a post-graduate or staff college course on strategy in pursuit of strategic education, he would surely list this book as prescribed reading.

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Book review

Blood money: Stories of an ex-Recce's missions as a private military contractor in Iraq

Johan Raath

Iraq was invaded by the United States (US)-led coalition in 2003 to topple Saddam Hussein's regime. The United States accused Hussein of hiding weapons of mass destruction. The invasion phase of the war lasted for a little over a month, and Hussein's regime was removed from power. Coalition Forces (CF) however failed to maintain control, law and order in the country. The result was a bloody insurgency war fought mostly in urban areas. The withdrawal of US troops from Iraq started in 2007, and was completed in 2011. Although the Iraq War technically came to an end, the country was ravaged by an ongoing civil war. The war created new opportunities for private military contractors (PMCs) to assist in providing various specialised security tasks since CF and the newly established Iraqi government were unable to meet the high demand.

Johan Raath was one of many ex-soldiers to seek employment opportunities in that war-torn country. *Blood money* is a memoir about his experiences living and providing security services in Iraq. According to Raath, "the book is not intended as an analysis of private security companies, but was conceptualised rather as a personal journey to illustrate the daily lives of PMCs working in Iraq".[753]

Raath served in the South African Special Forces for about seven years (1986–1992). He obtained a specialised skill set as a member of the 1-Reconnaissance Regiment ('1 Recce'). Ex-Recces and other special forces units, such as 32 Battalion, Koevoet and the Special Task Force of the South African Police Service were in high demand in Iraq due to their specialised training and operational experience in the South African Border War. Raath left the South African Defence Force in 1992 and pursued a career in providing high-threat security, such as VIP protection and specialised training. The war in Iraq created job opportunities, and he started working there in 2004. His journey as a PMC in Iraq lasted until late 2017.

Blood money caters for the popular market and military enthusiasts. Very little is known about the role that PMCs play in warzones. The best-known South African book that deals with the topic of mercenaries and PMCs is probably Eben Barlow's *Executive outcomes*.[754] Raath tries to break the stigma around PMCs often stereotyped as mercenaries, something about which he is very opinionated. According to Raath, the book is the first eyewitness account written by a South African about what it was like to work as a military contractor in Iraq. Raath tells his story from a grass-roots

perspective.[755]

The book consists of 17 chapters, and is in chronological order. It is easy to read and succeeds in keeping the audience's attention. The author uses an informal writing style to tell stories about experiences and events. For example, Raath writes,

> In Bagdad you might have power for two-thirds of the day, but in Basra it would never last for more than 12 hours, and sometimes only four. Without a decent generator, you are screwed. On the roads you have to dodge potholes and the many unfinished construction projects dot the city like discarded carcasses on a battlefield. The smell of sewage reminded me of parts of Bagdad.[756]

Raath provides some historical research, but the book is by no means academic in nature. He used sources such as media reports, Wikipedia and Encarta Dictionary to do research and to double-check information. A list of endnotes provides the reader with additional information at the back of the book. The author voices his personal opinion about various subjects and events (see for instance pages xvii and 144). The story includes the personal experiences of his colleagues and friends. Raath calls them by their nicknames, such as 'Grobbies', 'Diff', 'Jakes' and 'JoJo'. He adds these personal experiences to make the book more exciting. The audience gets a good understanding of the dangers associated with the job. The author discusses different topics, such as everyday life in Iraq, environmental conditions, being a foreigner in Iraq, cultural differences, acts of terror, tribalism, personal injury and health, to name but a few.

The reader looking for a story filled with action does not have to look much further. The book presents many stories of ambushes, contact with attackers, incoming mortar attacks, high-speed car chases, suicide bombing attacks, improvised explosive devices, drive-by shootings, hot extractions, emergency evacuations, the experience of facing landmines, acts of terrorism, killing squads, kidnappings, illegal arrests and much more. Although the work done by PMCs can be seen as low-intensity security most of the time, it is still very dangerous. According to Raath, around 500 PMCs were killed during the war and another 1 000 private contractors, such as drivers, aviation personnel and construction workers lost their lives. Nearly 40 South Africans were killed in Iraq. A roll of honour at the back of the book provides their details.

The reader gets a clear picture of what life in Iraq is like for foreigners and civilians caught in the middle of war. Heat, sandstorms, flies, smells, dirty water, food and poor personal living spaces are some of the environmental and personal conditions that are explained. The cultural and language differences are also brought to light.

Raath writes very little about his personal life and experiences as a recce. He focuses on the years spent as a PMC. He is, however, open about some personal experiences, such as injuries that he sustained while on the job. He explains his struggles with taking perhaps too much medicine to be able to complete tasks, as well as the long and difficult road to physical recovery. The job pays well, but comes at a high price in terms of physical and mental health.

Blood money succeeds in its primary goal: to tell the exciting personal story of being a PMC in Iraq.

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ENDNOTES

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Book review

Prisoner 913

The release of Nelson Mandela

Riaan de Villiers and Jan-Ad Stemmet

Readers who have read *The last trek – A new beginning: The autobiography* and the *Long walk to freedom*, will enjoy *Prisoner 913,* as it is the perfect book to balance the two points of view of the last prime minister of apartheid South Africa, as well as the first president of democratic South Africa.

Early in the book, the authors provide clarity on the differing prison numbers that belonged to Nelson Mandela. Commonly known as 'Mandela's prison number' and later used to brand HIV/AIDS awareness, 466/46 was indeed Mandela's prison number on Robben Island, whereas in the larger prison system, the number attributed to the imprisoned Mandela was 913.

Prisoner 913 provides a wealth of information about the events leading to Mandela's release from prison and all the encompassing political events that took place during that time. The book comprises a copious number of documents and records from archives of the Archive for Contemporary Affairs (ARCA) at the University of the Free State. The archive initially belonged to Kobie Coetzee (henceforth 'Coetzee'), the Minister of Justice and Prisons during the last years of the apartheid regime. Coetzee, in his capacity as minister, presided over Mandela during his last eight years of imprisonment and went on to oversee his eventual release. Coetzee, furthermore, initiated exploratory talks with Mandela from 1985 onward.[757]

Coetzee kept a file, detailing anything and everything Mandela did during those last years of his incarceration. This file was simply labelled 'Prisoner 913'. Shortly before the advent of democracy in 1994, Coetzee removed the file and took it with him. The historian Jan-Ad Stemmet was on the verge of gaining access to this archive when Coetzee suddenly died shortly after their initial meeting. By an extraordinary coincidence, Stemmet found his way to Coetzee's archive 13 years later, after Coetzee's late wife had donated it to the ARCA. Stemmet considers the archive to be "one of the greatest single discoveries in recent South African political history".[758]

The book heavily implies that the records Coetzee had on Mandela "exceeded the bounds of any conventional administrative function".[759] The file contained a vast amount of information that took Stemmet and his initial research partner on the 913

file, Professor Willie Esterhuyse, months to filter. The file even contained secret government memorandums. The archive further included clandestine recordings of most of Mandela's visitors in prison, which ranged from foreign dignitaries and government ministers to family members to other political role players.

The constant keeping of covert tabs on Mandela far exceeded the normal prerogative of prison wardens, but Coetzee further engaged in with what can easily be described as an intelligence operation that included multiple forms of surveillance on Mandela. Various questions arise from what Stemmet considers an intelligence operation of sorts. Such clandestine endeavours fall within the scope of the intelligence services. Was Coetzee the one advocating for this approach? If so, what was his ultimate aim with the abundance of information garnered from a thoroughly surveilled Mandela? In a time where many books and biographies are published on a specific topic, it comes as no surprise that there must have been teething problems when it came to corroborating a differing version. Perhaps Coetzee foresaw that the words of Mandela, FW de Klerk and other role players, such as the former head of the civilian intelligence services, Niel Barnard, would carry more weight than his own. Maybe this was one of the reasons Coetzee was so adamant for Stemmet to do research on his professional life.

The book notes the different types of transcripts in the archive, some being handwritten while others transcribed from clandestine recordings. The clandestine recordings, according to Stemmet, started with the rise of Mandela's political importance. Interestingly, the covert surveillance on Mandela provided far more information, one can assume, than would have been the case for less prominent political prisoners. This provides evidence of the motive of Coetzee, as the covert surveillance on Mandela was not monitored by the National Intelligence Service, but by Coetzee himself.

Despite the endeavours of guarding his most important prisoner, Coetzee's surveillance of Mandela provided a unique view of Mandela's beliefs and his approach to negotiating with the government. The book also provides a summary of Mandela's memorandum to PW Botha. Despite many inaccuracies regarding this memorandum and how it reached Botha, it still provides valuable insight into how Mandela politically approached the discourse with government. Mandela made it clear that he saw the need for interaction between the government and the African National Congress (ANC) and, rather sensationally, that he was acting without the consent or even knowledge of the ANC.[760]

Another piece of information unearthed from the archive is a secret document titled 'The management of Nelson Mandela'. No authors were identified, but it is considered by the authors of *Prisoner 913* to be the first document that relates to Mandela's unconditional release.[761] Worth a mention is the eventual meeting between Mandela and Botha. *Prisoner 913* provides an in-depth account of that particular meeting, written in a detailed record by Barnard.[762] The above serves as just a few of many examples of what was transcribed from the Coetzee archives.

Prisoner 913 provides much more clarity on the part Coetzee played, and delves deep into certain aspects which surrounded the release of Mandela, such as the unbanning of the ANC. One of the main focal points of this book is that the authors highlight the

differences between Mandela and De Klerk's narratives, and how often a selective point of view can lead to a misleading or a misunderstood narrative.

This book will provide interested readers with useful information to answer questions in other works about the release of Mandela. This thoroughly researched book lays bare a magnitude of information, which describes in detail the mechanics behind the scenes leading to the successful release of Prisoner 913.

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ENDNOTES

[757] R de Villiers & J Stemmet. *Prisoner 913.* Cape Town: Tafelberg, 2020, 11.

[758] *Ibid*., p. 3.

[759] *Ibid*., p. ix.

[760] *Ibid*., p. 93.

[761] *Ibid*., p. 117.

[762] *Ibid*., p. 99.

Books Review

A military history of the Cold War, 1944–1962
A military history of the Cold War, 1962–1991

Jonathan M House

The Las Vegas Strip is renowned for its legendary casinos and overwhelming buffets. One of the most lavish is that at The Buffet restaurant at the MGM Grand Resorts' Bellagio Hotel and Casino. The Bellagio is a world-renowned manmade wonder, and its twelve eateries are internationally famous. The buffet at The Buffet is just as magnificent as the Bellagio's magnificently expensive suites. The never-ending buffet menu is staggering. From an array of beef steaks to lamb to pork and wild boar to hot snow and Dungeness crab to a large Teppanyaki bar to salmon roe to Tobiko and a sprawling caviar station to mountainous shrimp, ceviche, tabbouleh dishes and trout to a range of pizzas, plus crisp vegetarian and vegan stations and an avalanche of everything sweet. All this for $50. For about $24, diners can devour as much house wine, draft beer, mimosas, screwdrivers, margaritas and Bloody Marys as they wish. This is all held together by a nearly sacred gastronomic guru, an executive chef. Jonathan House's two bulging volumes on the military history of the Cold War can be savoured in the same vein.

The chef

When it comes to the Cold War, there are thousands of titles to collect and as many to avoid. One name in the very industrious (commercially driven) world of contemporary history one can always trust is JM House. House (a celebrated historian, formerly of the US Army Command and General Staff College) has co-authored more than eighteen books and stands out as an expert on Soviet military history. His most famous work, *When titans clashed: How the Red Army stopped Hitler*, was co-authored with David Glantz.[763] The duo produced various historical analyses of Soviet military strategy. (Glantz wrote or co-authored more than 30 books on the subject, four of which he penned along with House.) Apart from military issues pertinently relating to Russia,

House has dabbled in the histories of different aspects of the defence establishment and from various eras. He is adept at scrutinising tiny topics and embracing mega themes with the same ease.

The very notion of a publication, which covers the military strategies of the entire Cold War, authored by a lone scholar, is to say at the least audacious. Usually, the subtitles of those types of quasi-epics end with "… in pictures". House took it on himself to compose a proper historiographical buffet – and succeeded.

Presenting Jonathan M House's all you can eat Cold War buffet

The main course

The titles are no hyperboles and cover the entire epoch. The one volume sprints through the era 1944–1962 and the other volume reviews 1962–1991.

Being what it is, the author stacks lip-smacking thematic slices with complementary topical links. House explains that one goal of his work is to illustrate the complex ping-pong that takes place between policy and the military. He mixes the gradual changes within the global Cold War ideology with those unforeseen sudden shifts within the in-house politics in the halls of power, together with the evolution in military strategy and breakthroughs surrounding military weapons and overall technologies.

Like any blue-ribbon chef, House seeks equilibrium, otherwise thematic herbs and topical spices could clash. The narrative does not become thematically lopsided or drawn askew by aimless embroidery. With the precision of a sushi chef, House peels away vastly complex topics and splices sinewy themes into digestible clarifications without tempering the historical potency thereof. The author also does not pepper the pot until the reader can take no more; he excels at making the important, but often mundane, fascinating with sprinklings of idiosyncratic facts.

House covers all the overarching Cold War military processes with a satellite instead of a microscope. This is very much a buffet and not an egotistically inspired niche platter of exotic delicacies. The first proper chapter (after having set the contextual table) is entitled 'Origins, interests and forces' and House ends it with that old party treat, the Cuban Missile Crisis. In the last chapters of the second volume ('American renewal', 'Schadenfreude for the Soviets', 'Weapons of mass destruction' and 'Conflicts in the 1980s') House masterfully wraps up the entire saga. He covers tidal events with huge gulps. Moving from era to era and continent to continent, the approach is partly thematic and partly chronological. The author assumes that the reader has some basic historiographical notion of the theme. It is therefore not a step-by-step introduction to the theme, but much rather a sprawling review.

Covering the entire Cold War, spread across two volumes and almost 2 000 pages, is of course still too short to imply a surgically intricate analysis of all facets. The realm of "mega history" is the appropriate notion. It is pointless to remark that, at times, the book sweeps across certain vastly complicated issues. Such a remark is also naturally slightly

biased and depends on the reader's own perceptions of what is of importance or simply fascinating. House, for example, makes mention of the 1973 OPEC (Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries) energy crisis in a very tight single sentence whereas the reviewer would have enjoyed a fatty piece on oil and the Cold War, with its vast military implications. House points out that he leaves clinical diplomatic history to others. Fair enough: that dish is served at a different historiographical eatery. That is a moot point.

Apart from the mere largesse of the spread, there are a few surprises. House is refreshing in that he covers '*Civil Defense and Civil Disorders*'. A vital topic in grasping this theme but one easily overlooked by scholars. This chapter is pure indulgence for the historian with a Cold War palate. It describes, among other aspects, the top-secret government bunkers that fascinate most of us. This includes the one constructed for the US Congress beneath the Greenbrier Hotel in White Sulphur Springs, West Virginia. The sprawling fallout centre was opulent and encompassed a large, impressive, auditorium (adorned with Americana) where Congressional sessions would resume after a possible nuclear attack, while the mushroom clouds were settling on the ruins of Washington. (The luxury hotel still operates with the enormous bunker open to the public.) The bunker of the Federal Reserve Board was in Virginia and bursting with currency with which to spark a post-apocalyptic economy.

House has the remarkable ability to intersperse familiar historical dishes with scrumptious, largely unknown, factual titbits, without diluting the earnestness of the overall theme at all. It must be noted how the writer succeeds in mixing all the different offerings without any change in tempo or temperament. The books not only reveal House's career-long knowledge of the entire Cold War with its infinite complexities, but also the author's fine penmanship. Apart from academic value, the volumes are a hearty read.

Free range?

Within Cold War historiography, approaches to themes are easily force-fed with some ideological orientation. Outlandish conclusions are easily sugar-coated by the fact that the facts are place. House does not give free range to any deductions but gives a clinical outline for his reasoning. The author's astounding knowledge of the themes enables him to weave together various strands to reach in-depth conclusions.

No vegan or soy alternatives

Carnivore's delight. No revisionist niceties in House's approaches. The issues are confronted with clinical candour instead of trying to re-edit the past with artificial flavouring. Present-day political correctness does not inebriate House's approach in dissecting the realities of the past. He obviously has compassion for his vast historical cast, but does not have any favourites.

All tastes

Forego for a moment that intellectual fast-food joint called Google and indulge in a fine historical buffet. The two volumes reviewed here succeed on different levels. Firstly, it is a solid piece of historical writing and a very insightful read. As a reference work, the books are of use for inexperienced students and highly committed scholars alike. It is very possible to utilise the volumes as the basis of an entire module (both at under- and postgraduate level). It is rather inconceivable that a library (academic or public) that keeps a contemporary history section would not have House's two volumes.

A scrumptious experience – but not cheap. The two volumes costs roughly the same as a plate at the Bellagio's The Buffet.

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ENDNOTES

[763] DM Glantz & JM House. *When titans clashed: How the Red Army stopped Hitler.* Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2015.

Book Review

Empire of destruction: A history of Nazi mass killing

Alex J Kay

Between 1939 and 1945, Nazi perpetrators deliberately killed more than 13 million civilians and non-combatants across the expanding German empire.[764] This number excludes those who had already perished in Germany in the 1930s before the Second World War had erupted. Such a significant figure is almost too large for anyone to fathom. However, when considering that Namibia has an estimated population of 2,5 million, Botswana 2,3 million, Lesotho 2,1 million, Eswatini 1,16 million and that all populations combined are roughly only 8 million, the figure acquires a bit more meaning.[765] A little less than half of the victims of these mass killings, approximately 5,8 million, were European Jews. The second-largest category of victims was the 3,3 million Soviet prisoners of war (POWs), followed by 1 million killed as preventive terror or reprisals in the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, Greece, Poland and other German-occupied territories. In Warsaw alone, roughly 185 000 victims perished during these anti-partisan operations. In addition, an estimated 300 000 mentally and physically disabled were also killed. To these figures, roughly 200 000 Roma and 100 000 of the Polish ruling classes and elites can be added.[766]

The Nazi Regime spared none among these targeted groups for annihilation. For instance, between 29 and 30 September 1941, German forces, assisted by Ukrainian auxiliary policemen, shot and killed 33 771 Jews at Babi Yar, a ravine on the outskirts of Kyiv.[767] The number murdered over these two days was more than the number of inhabitants currently living in the West Coast town of Saldanha in South Africa. Apart from the magnitude of the number killed, this figure does not show that men, women, infants, the elderly, the ill and the disabled were among the victims. "[E]ach individual death", so easily lost in these vast numbers, was "always singular", designating a human life and not merely a statistic.[768] By considering this, these numbers acquire an additional layer of significance. An additional layer is that each of these murders was also carried out at the hands of people using several methods.

Some of these first perpetrators were physicians and nurses who experimented with starvation and lethal injections. The first victims were German children who perished in the 'euthanasia' campaign. As these killing programmes expanded, three main methods came to dominate operations. These were "[s]tarvation, shooting and gassing, in that order" as the "preferred killing methods".[769] Carbon monoxide and gas vans were used in isolated cases in the early war years, such as during the murder of Polish psychiatric patients. However, for the most part, the other two methods proved far more efficient

in murdering thousands en masse in a short period at little cost. The effectiveness of shooting was particularly evident over three days in November 1943 when 42 000 Jewish forced labourers in concentration camps were shot during Operation Harvest Festival.[770] Despite such lethality, gassing also gained prominence in later war years after German leaders, such as Heinrich Himmler and Reinhard Heydrich, instructed subordinates to find a "less burdensome [method] for the perpetrators" than shooting.[771] They feared that the mass shooting of civilians of all ages would brutalise and psychologically alter these men to such an extent that they would be unable to reintegrate into post-war German society. Despite such misgivings, these fears seemed unfounded for most of the over 500 000, primarily German and Austrian men, involved in the Holocaust alone.[772] The thousands of participants in other mass killing campaigns can also be added to these ranks.

These perpetrators were spread across several state and party institutions and were sometimes simultaneously involved in several annihilation programmes. Some served in the German armed forces, others in the police or paramilitaries such as the SS (*Schutzstaffel* or protective echelon). They also came from different generational groups and varied socioeconomic backgrounds. As a group, they were therefore markedly diverse. However, the one commonality they shared was a collective trauma. These individuals experienced it either consciously during the age of Imperial Germany and the early years of the Weimar Republic or through intergenerational transmission. Such shared trauma arguably mobilised many to participate in collective violence and mass killings. The result was that "[h]undreds of thousands of mass murderers were at large simultaneously" both during and after the war.[773] These perpetrators seamlessly returned to quotidian life as schoolteachers, bank managers, physicians, town mayors, salesmen and other everyday professions. Most, if not all, were far removed from anything associated with violence. These individuals could return to 'normalcy' because the post-war context allowed it. Since the 1930s, under the previous National Socialist regime, the state had gradually dehumanised and removed legal protection from various designated groups. Some of these first efforts involved forced sterilisations. The result of this continuous process was that, by the time war erupted, the state had provided the perpetrators with a framework which legitimised collective violence and even genocide, as "a very specific type of mass killing", to "destroy a group" under "the cover of war".[774]

Therefore Germany did not carry out mass killings while simultaneously conducting a war; instead, "the logic of war was central to the rationale for targeting each and every one of the victim groups".[775] Each of these groups was considered "by the Nazi regime in one way or another as a potential threat to Germany's ability to fight and, ultimately, win a war for hegemony in Europe".[776] These policies and programmes formed part of the prioritisation of resources for the overall war effort. For instance, an estimated 18 million males served in the German military. They required rations, kits and equipment that had to be redirected from somewhere or someone.[777] The inhabitants of territories seized by the German empire, which needed food, accommodation and other vital resources, can be added to this figure. Consequently, the National Socialist regime deliberately starved the Soviet urban population and other victim groups to death to allow others to live. As resources became increasingly scarce in the later war years, the Nazi regime

even went so far as to eliminate some of those German soldiers who suffered from war trauma and might prove a burden to the war effort. Other motivations for these German policies were eliminating potential focal points of resistance to German occupation, preventing the provision of aid to partisans, and eliminating potential spies and elements that could cause destabilisation behind the front lines. Children, for instance, posed the threat of seeking revenge in adulthood for the murder of their parents. All of the "killing programmes [might therefore have] possessed a racial (and racist) component", but that was not the only or primary motivation behind them.[778] Instead, it was an actual Nazi strategy to win the war.

If any of these aspects of Nazi mass killings during the Second World War sounds interesting, then Alex J Kay's latest publication is highly recommended. However, potential readers should note Kay's warning in the opening pages. More so than the included images, much of the content could prove very disturbing and upsetting to most readers. Unlike the discussion, all the pictures are positioned in the middle of the book and can be passed over easily. As for the content, as Kay himself notes, most of the book does not shy "away from presenting the events in graphic detail" while at the same time making every effort not to "shock or [to] sensationalise" events. Kay succeeds in treating such a complex topic with the required sensitivity, which could not have been an easy task. However, for these reasons, it might perhaps also explain why at least some of the earlier chapters read almost like a clinically sanitised list of German atrocities, which occurred at this or that place, on this or that date, carried out by this or that *Einsatzgruppe* (task force or special action group) resulting in an 'x amount' killed. The wealth of detail is impressive and indicative of thorough research, but some discussion is desired at times to break what seems like an endless record of horrendous events. Furthermore, for those readers lacking a sound understanding and knowledge of the internal mechanics of the Nazi regime, these parts might seem even more convoluted. A brief explanation early in the book on the functioning and organisation of the German empire, its institutions and its leadership would have gone a long way to fostering many readers' general understanding of the context and ease their ability to focus on the central theses of the study. While at the same time, despite using 'mass killing' as the conceptual framework, Kay does not become entrenched in debates on theory, terminology, frameworks and concepts as some other academics sometimes do, which makes this work highly accessible to a broader audience.

Overall, the book fulfils its aim precisely as indicated by the sub-title; it is a book about *The history of Nazi mass killings* – nothing more and nothing less. The topic was meticulously researched as becomes evident early in the reading. Kay consulted numerous secondary sources, not only those written in English, and a variety of primary sources from multiple archives and innumerable perspectives. The compiled research is divided both chronologically and thematically into one compact volume. One of the main reasons that *Empire of destruction* is not yet another book on the Holocaust is that it is exactly not that. Kay explored seven identified victim groups in one single study. A further rarity is Kay's contribution to the historiography of the persecution of Soviet POWs. No previous monograph focused on the fate and treatment of Soviet POWs is available in the English language. That is not to say that these and other

victim groups have not been researched, but sources are often only available in Polish or other foreign languages. For these reasons, this comparative study provides a new perspective on this period of violence and moral degeneration, which could influence our current knowledge and understanding of the period while it simultaneously also raises a fresh set of questions. Some aspects of mass murder are mentioned, such as enforced nudity, but its significance within the broader framework of mass killing needs further exploration. Another question is where does the persecution of those individuals accused of homosexuality feature in the narrative? Nowhere are they even mentioned in the book. This leads to another question. What is the difference between 'victims', 'perpetrators', 'collaborators', and 'bystanders'?[779] Local actors who directly participated in the carrying out of these atrocities, such as the Belarussian police and other auxiliaries from Lithuania and other places, are mentioned, but only in passing. Granted, neither these nor other questions could all have been dealt with in this single study, but perhaps they will be answered in subsequent publications by Kay.

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ENDNOTES

[764] AJ Kay. *Empire of destruction: A history of Nazi mass killing.* New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2021, 1, 284.
[765] World Population Review. "2022 world population by country". <https://worldpopulationreview.com/> Accessed on 18 May 2022.
[766] Kay *op. cit*., p. 294.
[767] *Ibid.*, p. 86.
[768] *Ibid*., p. 7.
[769] *Ibid.*, p. 282.
[770] *Ibid.*, p. 210.
[771] *Ibid.*, p. 101.
[772] *Ibid.*, p. 3.
[773] *Ibid.*, p. 286.
[774] *Ibid.*, pp. 6, 288.
[775] *Ibid.*, p. 2.
[776] *Ibid.*
[777] *Ibid.*, pp. 2–3.
[778] *Ibid.*, p. 2.
[779] See for example MJ Chodakiewicz. *Between Nazis and Soviets: Occupation politics in Poland, 1939–1947*. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2004.

Book review

Apartheid's black soldiers: Un-national wars and militaries in Southern Africa

Lennart Bolliger

In his recent book, *Apartheid's black soldiers: Un-national wars and militaries in Southern Africa*, Lennart Bolliger examines the history of black soldiers from Namibia and Angola who served in the security forces of apartheid South Africa from 1975 until 1989. He focuses specifically on the three all-male units that consisted predominantly of black troops that were commanded by white officers – 32 Battalion of the South African Defence Force (SADF), 101 Battalion of the South West Africa Territorial Force (SWATF), and the infamous paramilitary police unit, Koevoet.[780] During this period, these soldiers primarily fought against the People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN) – the military wing of the Namibian liberation movement, the South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO) – in the anticolonial struggle in Namibia, as well as the post-independence civil war waged in Angola.[781] The book builds on some earlier works by Bolliger, as well as another work co-authored with Will Gordon.[782]

The central argument put forward by Bolliger in the book is that these soldiers' trajectories and experiences profoundly challenged the dominant framing of the wars of decolonisation in Southern Africa as national liberation struggles fought by and for Africans against settler and colonial state militaries. Bolliger clearly demonstrates that the history of these soldiers is largely incomprehensible within both popular and scholarly narratives of national liberation. He instead draws attention to the transnational and un-national dynamics that shaped the wars of decolonisation across Southern Africa. Bolliger explores two main questions throughout the book. Firstly, how and why did black soldiers from Namibia and Angola get involved in the South African security forces? Secondly, what were the legacies of that involvement for the individual soldiers and their families?[783]

The book follows a clear chronological order. It starts with a very detailed introduction in which Bolliger provides the rationale for the book, and discusses the sources consulted and the methodology he used in constructing the book. Thereafter follows the six core chapters. The first chapter of the book presents a historical overview of colonial rule in the former South West Africa and Angola from the late 1880s to 1990. Bolliger specifically focuses on the long history of black soldiers' involvement in different colonial armies, as well as the clear fractures that exist(ed) between and among political groups exploited by the settler colonial regimes. In the second and third chapters, he discusses how and why black soldiers from Namibia and Angola came to fight in the

South African security forces. Bolliger specifically questions the perception that these soldiers fought for apartheid, and shows that their motives and actions in joining the security forces were indeed very complex. The fourth chapter compares the military cultures of 32 Battalion, 101 Battalion and Koevoet. Here Bolliger shows that, contrary to their frequent depiction as one static whole, each of these units developed its own distinct institutional practises and mythologies that differed from one another. In the fifth chapter, the post-war politics of associations of former SWATF and Koevoet members in Namibia is discussed. Bolliger shows that, in this case, these veterans had not been persecuted or silenced – instead, different groups have demonstrated repeatedly and publicly for recognition from the SWAPO government since Namibian independence in 1990. The final chapter turns the attention to the very different post-war trajectories of former 32 Battalion and Koevoet members who moved to South Africa in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Bolliger shows that many of these former soldiers left the security forces since South Africa's transition from apartheid, and now work in private security or military industries around the globe. In the conclusion, Bolliger draws together the central themes of the book and discusses some points worth considering for future research.[784]

The book further includes a comprehensive list of abbreviations and illustrations as well as a detailed bibliography and handy index for a work of this nature. There are also four maps included in the book, which are more than adequate. The book further contains four very general figures. From a personal point of view, I think it would have been ideal to have included more photographs in the book – specifically of the various units during their existence, as well as portraits of some of the veterans themselves. I realise however that the latter would have been difficult to include owing to the protection of personal information or fear of victimisation.

I was particularly impressed by the depth of research that went into the book. Between 2014 and 2016, Bolliger conducted 148 interviews with black former soldiers and white officers of 32 Battalion, 101 Battalion and Koevoet as well as family members, government ministers, politicians, former guerrilla commanders and civil society representatives, both in Namibia and South Africa. These interviews provided the book with a rich tapestry of 'voices', which Bolliger cleverly organised when examining the history of the black soldiers from Namibia and Angola who served in the security forces of apartheid South Africa. He is commended for this, for an undertaking of such depth and breadth has never been attempted according to my knowledge. In fact, Bolliger puts local historians to shame in proving what can be accomplished with the right drive and motivation.

All in all, *Apartheid's black soldiers* is a riveting read from start to finish and a welcome addition to the historiography of the broader War for Southern Africa. By allowing readers or academics the opportunity to consider the varying reasons why black soldiers from Namibia and Angola joined the security forces of apartheid South Africa from a historical or sociological point of view, Bolliger helps us to move beyond our perceived understanding of this complex and emotive phenomenon in Southern African history. In doing so, he makes a distinct and valuable contribution to the historiography. I can only

hope that the future crop of historians in Southern Africa, and South Africa specifically, will utilise and build on the work of Bolliger. His book comes highly recommended and can be considered for inclusion into university course material, particularly postgraduate modules that deal with the military history and related aspects of the War for Southern Africa.

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[780] Bolliger's rationale for only focusing on 32 Battalion, 101 Battalion and Koevoet is that they not only came to constitute most of South Africa's troops in Namibia and Angola, but they also bore the brunt of the war, as they formed the spearhead of the security forces. Also, during and after the war, many members of these units repeatedly crossed boundaries between countries, liberation movements and military organisations. See L Bolliger. *Apartheid's black soldiers: Un-national wars and militaries in southern Africa*. Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2021, 3.

[781] *Ibid.*, pp. 1–2.

[782] L Bolliger. "Apartheid's transnational soldiers: The case of black Namibian soldiers in South Africa's former security forces". *Journal of Southern African Studies* 43/1. 2017. 195–214; L Bolliger. "Chiefs, terror, and propaganda: The motivations of Namibian loyalists to fight in South Africa's security forces, 1975–1989". *South African Historical Journal* 70/1. 2018. 123–151; L Bolliger & HW Gordon. "Forged in battle: The transnational origins and formation of apartheid South Africa's 32 'Buffalo' Battalion, 1969–1976". *Journal of Southern African Studies* 46/5. 2020. 881–901. Readers with a specific interest in the role of black soldiers in 32 Battalion are further directed to Gordon's PhD dissertation as well as a published chapter on the topic: HW Gordon. "Forged in battle? A socio-military history of South Africa's 32 Battalion (1975–1993)". PhD dissertation. Stellenbosch University, 2019; HW Gordon. "The evolution of 32 Battalion: From renegade guerrillas to township troopers". In IJ van der Waag & AM Grundlingh. *In different times: The war for southern Africa, 1966–1989*. Stellenbosch: African Sun Media, 2019.

[783] Bolliger, *Apartheid's black soldiers ... op. cit.*, pp. 2–3.

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NOTES TO CONTRIBUTORS

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