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BOOK REVIEWS

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Editorial

From a defence and security point of view, the second half of 2022 continued to be overshadowed by the ongoing Russo–Ukrainian War, which started as far back as 2014. While the Russian invasion continues to be condemned widely internationally as an act of aggression, there appears to be no end in sight yet for the war. Matters were further compounded in September 2022 with the partial mobilisation of Russian reservists, the sham referendums by Russian-installed officials to annex occupied territories of Ukraine, the ongoing human suffering and the concerted efforts to destroy the Ukrainian economy, industry and infrastructure. However, despite the dire situation, Ukrainian forces showed extreme resolve and conducted large-scale counteroffensive operations in southern and eastern Ukraine, which met with some successes.

As the war continues to linger, military practitioners and academics across the globe keep on monitoring the Russo–Ukrainian War with great interest as it keeps developing. The war also continues to provide stark insights into the changing nature of modern warfare and international relations – particularly in terms of enduring superpower competition, hybrid or conventional warfare, force structure and employment, defence policy, military alliances, doctrine, and intelligence and coalition operations, to name but a few. These issues remain extremely relevant and will continue to generate academic interest over the coming months and years, irrespective of the duration and outcome of the war.

While the international geopolitical focus remains squarely fixed on the events in Eastern Europe, the Far East and Pacific Rim regions continue to be marked by increasing tension mainly fuelled by the actions of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the People's Republic of China (PRC). There are continued reports of the DPRK launching short-range missiles into the Sea of Japan, which threatens the peace and security of Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the broader region. The military tension between the PRC and Taiwan also remains ever-present. This includes continued breaches of the Taiwan air defence zone and the ubiquitous threat of a full-scale invasion of the island nation. Our attention remains fixed on the geo-political situation in these regions in the hope that the situations do not deteriorate any further and that they will soon be brought under control through constructive dialogue and mediation.

The focus in Southern Africa remains fixed on the ongoing operational deployment of Southern African Development Community (SADC) and Rwandan forces to the ungoverned territory of Cabo Delgado in northern Mozambique to combat the Ahlu-Sunnah Wa-Jama (al-Shabaab)-linked insurgents. The earlier successes of the SADC Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) between October 2021 and January 2022 appear to have disappeared, and it would seem as if the operational initiative once more shifted in favour of the insurgents as the SADC mission has once more been extended. The earlier reduction in insurgent attacks enabled SAMIM to shift their focus from a purely interventionist force to that of a force organised for complex and multidimensional peacekeeping. This change in mandate necessitated the reinforcement of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) contingent deployed to Mozambique as part of the regional task force, which up until then mainly consisted of special forces. Elements of Combat Team Alpha were consequently deployed to the Mihluri Base in Macomia in northern Mozambique from May 2022 onwards to help counter the Islamic insurgency. However, despite these developments, the bigger issues – post-conflict reconstruction and development, the re-establishment and maintenance of law and order, the provision of basic services and, above all, dealing with the key drivers of the insurgency – remain near absent in the public and academic debates. Moreover, despite increased SAMIM force levels, the security situation in Cabo Delgado does not seem to have stabilised, with insurgent attacks spreading and violence on the increase. As part of SAMIM, the South African deployment continues to stimulate some debate in academic and military circles, and it remains an interesting lens through which to investigate issues relating to doctrine, force structure and design, military operations, defence policy and alliances among others.

In this issue of *Scientia Militaria*, Vol. 50, No. 3, 2022, the articles consider both historic and contemporary issues associated with war and conflict, as well as defence and security-related matters. As always, it is trusted that these articles will provide key insights and act as a source of influence for individuals involved in the broader ambit of military planning, operations, management, and higher education.

The article by Mpho Maripane argues that food scarcity during the South African War (1899–1902) led to large numbers of the population dying from starvation or diseases related to hunger. The situation was compounded due to certain towns in the country being under siege, while farms and homesteads were also burned down. The article reports three main causes of food shortages during the South African War: the unequal distribution of food rations during the siege of Mafikeng, particularly in the concentration camps; complaints by white communities about the 'spoiling of natives'; and the introduction of the 'no work, no food' policy. By doing so, Maripane provides fresh insights into a turbulent and still contested episode of South African history.

In his article, Piet Bester makes a case for the psychological well-being of soldiers in pre-deployment fitness-for-duty evaluations by screening for psychological risk rather than pathology. He starts by discussing the existing process of pre-deployment fitness-for-duty evaluations in the SANDF, after which he conceptualises the assessment for psychological risk rather than psychopathology only. Bester further links the pre-deployment assessment of fitness-for-duty evaluations to the positive psychology paradigm, and goes on to

suggest an integrative military model for soldiers' psychological well-being in the external deployment context – which, he ultimately argues, is a feasible process.

The article by Will Gordon reports on the support of South African Defence Force (SADF) conscription by the mainstream Afrikaans sister churches between 1968 and 1991. He argues that, from the 1950s to the 1990s, white men were conscripted to serve in the SADF. Although conscription was an undeniable, and often unavoidable, part of life for white South Africa, it varied in its application and duration. Gordon also points out that, while conscription was neither universally accepted nor popular, resistance to it was largely confined to English-speaking citizens whose objections were often seen as cowardly or treacherous. Nevertheless, conscription had an influence on the psyche of white South Africa and was viewed in a serious light by various religious denominations. Ecclesiastical positions also varied and often changed over the course of time. However, as Gordon argues, in the main, Afrikaans churches were sympathetic towards conscription, while English churches were likely to oppose it. The latter position has been extensively documented, but the former remains neglected. The article analyses the role that mainstream Afrikaans sister churches played in supporting the National Party policies of conscription and ensuring their congregants' compliance. The relationship between those churches and the SADF, inter alia by referring to changes in conscription legislation and the reaction of the churches to those changes, is also discussed.

In their article, William Sikazwe, Eustarckio Kazonga and Evance Kalula evaluate the knowledge of, attitudes toward, and practices of ethics of war of the officers and soldiers of the Zambia Army. They argue that the changing character of warfare throughout the twentieth and twenty-first centuries has resulted in uncertainties about how states will respond to acts of aggression in the face of ethics of war, or the moral rules of war. Moreover, it has become increasingly difficult for states to conduct permissible self-defence and military operations against non-state actors or sub-state groups. In the face of this reality, the authors set out to assess the said knowledge, attitudes, and practices among personnel in the Zambia Army. They conclude that, at the time of their research, Zambia Army officers and soldiers held very strong and positive attitudes towards the ethics of war. In addition, the personnel also widely accepted and supported the ethics of war and practiced the ethics of war extensively and regularly during both local and international military operations. Sikazwe et al. further recognise that much more research needs to be done in this field to increase knowledge levels and sensitivity to the ethics of war.

In his article, Saliou Abba focuses on the institutionalisation of the practice of intelligence-driven operations in the Gulf of Guinea, particularly before and during the Second World War. During this period, the colonial branches of the British, German and United States intelligence services conducted several clandestine operations in Spanish Guinea. Abba's article investigates the rationale behind these intelligence-driven operations, and he considers the ultimate value of these operations as part of the broader course of the Second World War in West Africa.

In the final article, Chris Magobotiti argues that the death penalty was long practised in South Africa as one of the sentence options for capital crimes, such as murder, rape,

treason, terrorism, and robbery with aggravating circumstances. Reflecting on some specific historical periods of the practice of the death penalty in South Africa, Magobotiti seeks to contextualise our understanding of the socio-political experience and perception of the death penalty to gauge its current relevance. He endeavours to determine whether the death penalty had a deterrent effect on capital crimes in South Africa during the pre-constitutional period. Magobotiti discusses key legislation, case law, execution patterns and deterrence literature in its context.

A selection of book reviews by Mpho Maripane, Ashwell Glasson, Gert van der Westhuizen, Louis Makau, Anri Delport and Evert Kleynhans conclude this issue of *Scientia Militaria*.

The Editor
Evert Kleynhans iD

"From spoiling natives to no work, no food": Food scarcity and the controversy of food rations during the South African War

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Abstract

Food became scarce during the South African War (1899–1902), which led to large numbers of the population dying from starvation or diseases related to hunger. This was due to certain towns in the country being under siege, while farms and homesteads were burned down. The study on which this article is based, examined three main causes of food shortages during the South African War: the unequal distribution of food rations during the siege of Mafikeng, particularly in the concentration camps; complaints by white communities about the "spoiling of natives"; and the introduction of the "no work, no food" policy. The study further reviewed the use of food during commemorations following the establishment of the so-called relief of Mafeking dinners.

Keywords: South African War, siege of Mafikeng, concentration camps, relief of Mafikeng.

Introduction

The Second Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902), also known as the South African War, is one of the most contested and controversial historical events in South Africa. It is nothing short of a political debate in terms of participation and commemoration. The war played a fundamental role in the history of South Africa and its current political stance. One of the major aspects of this war was how various events have been interpreted, which confirms that history is indeed political, and that there are bound to be various opposing views. Many of the views are often used to serve nationalist, mythological ideologies and political agendas. Black African participation in the war has been questioned and debated over the years, and the significance of the role they played was excluded from historical records and education curricula for a long time. A great deal of the information that we are slowly uncovering is now becoming 'add-on' type of information, which results in the war not being properly understood and our knowledge about it having many gaps. Without any doubt, the history of the South African War has been characterised by fragmentation of the knowledge we have on the conflict and the contradictory opinions that have been expressed about this War. One of the controversies and gaps of the South African War is the unequal distribution of food rations during the siege of Mafikeng and the discontinuation of food rations in the concentration camps.

The major focus of the study on which this article is based, was to establish how food was distributed to black Africans during the siege of Mafikeng and in the concentration camps, and to explore the motives that inspired the existence of the "Relief of Mafeking dinners". The focus on the siege of Mafikeng and the concentration camps is for two reasons. Firstly, the South African War began in Mafikeng, and food supply was affected when the area was under siege, which led to a scarcity of food. Secondly, the concentration camp system and the scorched earth policy aggravated food shortages after farms and homelands had been burned down and people were forced to live in destitute areas. The current study was undertaken to review literature that focuses on the issue of food during the time of the war and to assess how this situation affected black Africans. The main reason for this focus was that the issue has not received much attention, and starvation was one of the main causes of death during the war. It is also relevant to explore how the 'no work, no food' policy affected black Africans in the concentration camps. This is key in establishing whether the notion of a 'shared struggle' between the Boers and black Africans is accurate. Prior to exploring the reasons behind food shortages and how black Africans were affected by it, it was important to review briefly the history of war in South Africa and how black Africans became involved in conflicts that were not necessarily theirs. More specifically, it was vital to explore the siege of Mafikeng and the establishment of the concentration camps that interned both black and white people.

The archaeology and history of warfare in South Africa

According to LeBlanc, "[h]umans have been at each other's throats since the dawn of the species".[2] Archaeologists have always been aware of historical warfare and violence but were oblivious to the revelations regarding past events and people that could be uncovered through the study of warfare.[3]

Colonisation has somehow shaped the entire world through historical actions of politics and war, by either the colonisers or the colonised,[4] and the interpretation of warfare has thus not escaped colonial thought. These global colonial experiences have inspired concepts and systems of power and control through using violence and terrorisation as tools of operation to achieve domination.[5] The use of violence to exert power has been a fundamental part of South African history since 1652, following the arrival of Jan van Riebeeck.[6] It is also worth noting that wars do not just erupt out of nowhere, but result from back and forth contestations, which in most cases result in the issuing of ultimatums. As Stevenson states, "[g]reat wars resemble volcanic eruptions rather than earthquakes: warning signs precede them."[7] Like any other war that starts anywhere in the world, the reasons for the South African War are usually very similar to other wars. Wars could range from a fight over land and authority to ruling over an area to tensions over raw materials (such as diamonds and gold in the case of South Africa). Some people are drawn into war because of their interest to keep what they consider as belonging to them.

Before the arrival of Europeans to the hinterland of Southern Africa, most black Africans still occupied their ancestral land and lived in independent and self-governing chiefdoms. This changed when the settlers began exploiting the chiefdoms for their benefit. Through this exploitation, black Africans began to lose much of their political independence and

their military dominance.[8] As early as 1659, it was customary for European descendants to recruit certain racial groups to assist them in conflicts against other groups.[9] One such an example is that of the burgher commandos who used the Khoikhoi to fight against the San people.[10] The Khoikhoi also fought against the British in defence of the Cape.[11] This trend of African groups involved in wars against one another when defending the interest of white people was continuously evident in several conflicts that took place in South Africa. Around the 1800s, when the British had fully occupied the Cape Colony, the British continued with this practice.[12] The same trend occurred during the period of the South African War fought between 1899 and 1902.[13]

The South African War and the siege of Mafikeng

Mafikeng owes its existence to the Barolong who had settled in the Molopo plains area in the early nineteenth century. This area forms the modern-day border between Botswana and South Africa. At the time of their settling in the area, there were Khoikhoi and San groups who had been inhabitants for many years prior to the arrival of the new settlers.[14] Chief Montshiwa of the Barolong did not want to serve under the Boers who had arrived in their area. As a result, he fled with his people to a place called Moshaneng,[15] which is in modern-day Botswana. According to Matthews, he was "proud of his tribal affiliation" and did not like white Europeans.[16] While in exile, Chief Montshiwa ordered his brothers to create settlements with the aim of obstructing expansion by white groups.[17] One of the brothers formed a settlement close to the Molopo River and named it Mahikeng, which means a place of rocks/stones due to its topographical features.[18],[19],[20] Today, this is the capital city of North West, a province in South Africa.

Over time, another residential area by the name of Mafeking was established by the Europeans who had settled in the area.[21],[22] The name 'Mafeking' was perhaps a matter of the Europeans misunderstanding the original name, Mahikeng. To provide insight into the history of the different names used for the same area, Hopkins and Dugmore put it clearly and bluntly, "Mafikeng was originally Mahikeng, the British changed it to Mafeking and Bophuthatswana, the short-lived apartheid puppet state, decided on Mafikeng, which remains.".[23] In the dialects of the Setswana language, **h** is often used in place of an **f** but in some cases, the pronunciation is the same. The author uses 'Mafikeng' in this article to refer to the siege. It must further be indicated that most publications have maintained the name of Mafeking when referring to the siege, despite the fact that the name has officially been changed to Mahikeng. Even though the name has been officially changed to Mahikeng, most still refer to the area as Mafeking, perhaps because of the similar pronunciation or because the latter has been in use the longest. The use of the name Mafeking also creates the wrong impression, namely that only the European locality occupied by the British and named as such was affected by the siege. Instead, the entire geographical locality was affected by the war, including the settlements of the Barolong boo Ratshidi. It could be argued that the preference for the word 'Mafeking' is a deliberate act of continuously writing black Africans out of the history of the South African War. Other than the names discussed thus far, the area in Mafikeng in which the Barolong boo Ratshidi and other African groups had settled was also known as the *Stadt*.[24] 'Stadt' is a German phrase meaning 'town' or 'city' (see Figure 1).

Over years, the Barolong boo Ratshidi allowed the Boers, who were led by Andries Potgieter, to settle on a piece of land within their area. Doing so strengthened the bond between the two groups, which led to a beneficial alliance.[25] Through support given by the Boers, the Barolong boo Ratshidi were able to defeat other tribal groups and could thus reoccupy their ancestral land in the Molopo plains.[26] The Barolong boo Ratshidi were active participants in the war during the siege of Mafikeng, in which they supported the Boers. Disagreements over land ownership between the two groups led to the end of the alliance between them.[27] One could thus argue that the Barolong boo Ratshidi were betrayed by the Boers to whom they initially gave residence and whom they later supported in their conflict with the British.

The South African War was a conflict between the British colonial government and the Boer republics. At the time, the British led the Cape Colony and Natal, while the Boers had authority over the Orange Free State and Transvaal. According to Swart, "the South African War was the biggest and most modern of the numerous precolonial and colonial wars that raged across the southern African subcontinent".[28] The war was meant to be a "white men's war", fought to determine which white group had power in South Africa.[29] This has been shown to have been an incorrect assessment of the conflict, because black Africans were not pushed aside, as argued by Heale.[30] Instead, they were active participants who fought on both sides of the conflict.

Figure 1: Map of Mafikeng, with the *Stadt* that was occupied by the Barolong encircled in the dashed line, and the British Mafeking encircled in the solid black line[31]

Three main sieges took place during the South African War, namely –

- the siege of Mafikeng (13 October 1899 to 17 May 1900);
- the siege of Kimberley (15 October 1899 to 15 February 1900); and
- the siege of Ladysmith (2 November 1899 to 28 February 1900).[32]

Of the three, the siege of Mafikeng was the most important and the longest, lasting 217 days.[33],[34] It was in Mafikeng that the first shots of the war were supposedly fired during the Battle of Kraaipan on 12 October 1899.[35] The siege of Mafikeng was a historical event during which the town was surrounded by the Boer army, who were attempting to capture it. When the war began, the Boers surrounded the town of Mafikeng and held it under siege.[36] It has been reported that the siege consisted of several skirmishes and attacks rather than full-blown fighting.[37] Supplies and lines of communication were cut off to force the town to surrender.[38]

Besides the fact that Mafikeng was occupied by the British, who were in conflict with the Boers, according to Warwick,[39] there were other reasons why the area of Mafikeng was attacked. Firstly, the British area of Mafeking, as opposed to the entire area of Mafikeng, was the capital of the Bechuanaland Protectorate (modern-day Botswana). Secondly, it was a railway junction to Rhodesia (renamed Zimbabwe in 1980). Thirdly, the area served as a trading and market centre for the surrounding regions. Fourthly, British military supplies were stored in the area. The siege of Mafikeng had a devastating effect and caused starvation due to food shortages. Mafikeng was relieved on 16 May 1900, with some literature reporting the relief as being on 17 May 1900. Most importantly, the relief of Mafikeng did not mean the end of the war; instead, the war began to spread out and intensified throughout the country. One such event that affected the broader population during the South African War was the establishment of the concentration camps, which is reviewed later in this article.

Starvation and the establishment of soup kitchens during the siege of Mafikeng

Prior to the war, Colonel Robert Baden-Powell, the commander of the British military base situated at Mafikeng, stored provisions and fortified the town to prepare for a siege.[40] British authorities had thus anticipated the siege and ensured that the food supply was sufficient for them.[41] During the siege, the Boer soldiers burned down the homesteads of the Barolong boo Ratshidi, as well as the defences that were set up by the British.[42] A variety of literature has established that black Africans took part in the war, not only as labourers as argued in earlier research but also as combatants. As the siege continued over six and half months, food supplies became an issue. Black Africans complained about the manner that food was distributed to them, the number of deaths caused by starvation, and diseases related to famine.[43] Young black African children in the villages suffered from malnutrition. While black Africans became the victims of food shortages, the same was not encountered by the white communities in Mafikeng. Most black Africans either succumbed to starvation or stole food. Those who were caught stealing were apparently shot.[44] According to Willan, a case of cannibalism had even been reported.[45] This has, however, not been supported by any evidence and no literature discusses this incident in

Mafikeng. The quality of food had deteriorated towards the end of the siege.[46] This may have been due to no supplies making it into the town.

According to Ramoroka, Baden-Powell issued instructions to cut off all food rations that were given to black Africans.[47] Horsemeat and soup were instead offered to black Africans. According to Willan, the horsemeat that was served was not from healthy horses, but from the carcasses of dead horses. White starch was added to thicken the soup.[48] Hopkins and Dugmore mention that in some instances, dog meat was also mixed into the soup without black Africans' knowledge.[49] In such instances, the consumption of dog meat was not based on the willingness of black Africans to eat it. However, this view is contradicted by Ramoroka, who argues, "some of the Barolong ate dog carcasses after the administration of the material law issued an order that dog tax should be paid".[50] Comaroff *et al*. support this viewpoint by arguing that dogs were intentionally killed and their meat consumed by the Barolong.[51] Willan indicates that the soup was not given for free but sold to the black Africans in order to generate profit.[52] Black Africans could only afford to purchase enough food to keep themselves alive.[53] It could be argued that selling food to black Africans was an attempt by Baden-Powell to force them to leave the town of Mafikeng in search of food.[54] He knew very well that most would be shot by the Boers if they attempted to leave the secured area. White people who were sympathetic of the black Africans saw Baden-Powell's methods and treatment towards them as very cruel.[55]

Ramoroka discusses that cattle meat was given to the British but not to the black Africans.[56] This was because the British regarded themselves as being better humans than the black Africans – a view that is rooted in social Darwinism. Social Darwinist theory regarded black Africans as the lower class or the weaker race and was responsible for much existing racism.[57],[58] Black Africans were also regarded as sub-humans without intellectual capacity and not worthy of freedom.[59]

Ramoroka[60] argues that historians, such as Warwick[61] and Willan,[62] omitted the fact that the British also consumed horsemeat when the struggle for food intensified. The only difference was that black Africans were given meat from horses that had died due to diseases. Evidence for this comes from war diaries by Charles Bell and Major Baillie. The historians probably omitted this knowledge because they did not want to reveal the real plight experienced by the British during the siege, as it was beneath them to struggle.[63] Like black Africans, the British would not have consumed such meat under normal conditions.[64] The view that the British struggled for food is contradicted by Willan, who argues that even after the town had been relieved, there were still adequate food supplies for the British.[65] This was due to efforts made by Benjamin Weil, a British businessman and government contractor, to supply large quantities of food and essential supplies to the town before it was besieged.[66] It would seem that while both black Africans and whites experienced food shortages, the former were significantly more negatively affected by the lack of fresh and healthy meals than the British. The British were also responsible for food provision to the black population, which they followed based on colour lines.

No celebration without food: The Relief of Mafeking dinners

After the siege had ended in 1900, Benjamin Weil went back to London and celebrated the anniversary of the relief of Mafikeng with the so-called 'Relief of Mafeking dinners'.[67] According to information sourced from the Mafikeng Museum, the Relief of Mafeking dinners were formal occasions and were celebrated annually on 17 May at various locations in South Africa and England to commemorate the Relief of Mafeking (see Figure 2). Political dinners have taken place in Britain since the 1810s.[68] According to Brett, political dinners served the purpose of public meetings, press agitation, and petitioning for politicians, while in some cases they served to commemorate events.[69] The dinners were private events limited to the elite men and were attended only by military leaders with high rankings. They were made public through advertising via posters and newspapers, but the general population was not invited; they were only notified in order to render an audience.[70] The Relief of Mafeking dinners can therefore be regarded as political dinners because they were established to serve or celebrate a political event. The lack of substantial information on the Relief of Mafeking dinners makes it difficult to establish their history and significance clearly. It is also not evident whether these are still taking place or whether they had ceased to exist.

The celebrations were based on the experiences of lack of food in the town during the siege and the view that the British were regarded as the "defenders of Mafikeng".[71] This viewpoint conveniently forgot the valuable contribution made by the Barolong boo Ratshidi. The relief of Mafikeng became a legendary story in Britain, and Baden-Powell was regarded as a hero.[72] There is not much available information regarding these dinners to commemorate the relief of Mafikeng, except some information sourced from an exhibition at the Mafikeng Museum.

Although little information is available on these dinners, it can be argued that food was an important symbol of commemoration due to the suffering experienced during the siege. Issues of famine and starvation experienced during the siege and the efforts made by the British officials to prevent their combatants from starving to death highlight the significance of food during the conflict. Suffering because of food shortages that led to starvation and deaths meant that commemoration activities needed to feature food actively.

Figure 2: One of the Relief of Mafeking dinners held at Café Royal in London[73]

The author's research on the Relief of Mafeking dinners led to the discovery of a menu printed on silk (see Figure 3). The content of the menu is not, however, clear.

According to a menu published in Young (see Figure 4), it appears that a dinner party was held in Mafikeng, but whether black Africans took part in this dinner party is unclear.[74] Based on the menu found at the Mafikeng Museum of the dinner that took place at the Marine Hotel in Durban in 1900, it included dishes or courses named after prominent British leaders, such as "crumbed fillet steak à la Baden-Powell" (see Figure 5).

Figure 3: A Relief of Mafeking dinner menu printed on silk[75]

Figure 4: Facsimile of a signed menu of a relief dinner at Mafeking[76]

MARINE HOTEL DURBAN
Relief of Mafeking Menu
DINNER
Monday May 21st, 1900

Soup a la Roberts
Fried Sole a la Buller
Crumbed Fillet Steak a la Baden Powell
Laingsnek Cutlets   Ingogo Sauce
Kruger Marrow Bones on Toast
Kelly Kenny Curry

Roast Sirloin of Beef, Mafeking Horseradish
Roast Haunch of Mutton, Relief Sauce

Roast Duckling, Cecil Sauce

Cabbages, Potatoes, Green Peas

Boiled Plum Pudding, Mafeking Sauce
Jam Tartlets
Shrapnel of Fruit and Custard
Cheese, Dessert and Coffee

Figure 5: Menu for the Relief of Mafeking dinner held at the Marine Hotel in Durban in 1900[77]

Establishment of black concentration camps

An understanding of the South African War cannot be complete without studying concentration camps. These were established during the war by the British government as part of its military campaign against the two Boer republics.[78] Both Boers and black Africans were interned in these centres, even though allegations are that they were mainly established for the internment of Boers.[79] All concentration camps, whether for Boers or black Africans, were partly an outcome of the scorched earth policy through which farms were destroyed to create food shortages and dependency. Burning of farms owned by black Africans was against the instruction of Lord Roberts.[80] Access to food for those who were interned in the camps, as illustrated later, was also racially motivated.

There is a great deal of ambiguity regarding the establishment of the camps, with contrasting arguments made for their existence. This has led to academics interpreting concentration camps in very limited ways.[81] According to Porter, concentration camps were established to confine and isolate Boer commandos from other combatants.[82] For some, these camps were established for the protection of the Boers who were left behind on the farms during the war.[83] In this sense, concentration camps were described as "refugee" camps established by the British for the Boer women and children who were affected by the war.[84] According to Van Heyningen, those who considered these so-called 'refugee camps' through more humane lenses have argued that the term "concentration camp" is not appropriate and carries negative undertones.[85] Such scholars thus prefer the term 'refugee camp'. To illustrate their argument further, scholars such as Van Heyningen[86] and Pretorius[87] argue that the motives behind the establishment of the concentration camps during the South African War were not the same as those that led to the establishment of

the same facilities during the Second World War. The ones established by Nazi Germany were defined as "death camps", implying that the so-called 'refugee camps' were not death zones where many lost their lives.[88] In fact, the term 'refugee' is confusing considering the conditions at the camps, which were less than ideal. This description of concentration camps through humane lenses has rightly been challenged by other researchers such as Jewell,[89] Grundlingh,[90] and Turner.[91] They argue that calling such camps areas of refuge is a misrepresentation of history. As such, they consider this term to be deceptive and ambiguous as it implies that people entered these camps voluntarily to seek refuge. The reality is that people were forced off their farms and into these camps. The term internment camps has thus been considered by most researchers as more appropriate to define the camps.[92]

The camps where black Africans were interned were also known as 'refugee camps' established by the British to seem humane and to tone down the suffering experienced by this vulnerable group during the war. It is alleged that they also kept black Africans in these camps to avoid being known as the regime that "allowed black people to starve".[93] The word 'refugee' in this context is problematic. According to Turner, "a refugee is someone who lacks a home, a nation and citizenship."[94] Furthermore, those kept at refugee camps were considered as excluded from society.[95] Refugees are basically regarded as foreigners. Therefore, for a government to describe black Africans whose homes had been taken away by the same institution as refugees is quite problematic. Refugee camps are meant to be temporary.[96] Perhaps it was intentional to call black camps refugee camps, so that when their purpose was served, they could cease to exist, together with information about them. This could be the reason why it is difficult to find information on black concentration camps that existed during the South African War, or any information about the few that are known. Black concentration camps had been concealed from historical records for many years, and some researchers have gone to the extent of denying their existence.[97] Furthermore, in cases where the camps were acknowledged, it was argued that the living conditions in the black camps were more "humane".[98] Apart from the black African camps being regarded as refugee camps, Nasson mentions that camps for black Africans and those for the white population differed, as the black camps were actually labour camps established to provide labour during the war, as discussed later.[99]

To emphasise the distorted history of the South African War of 1899 to 1902, it is important to note that, while a great deal is known about white concentration camps and the living conditions experienced by the Boers during that time, very little has been presented on the concentration camps occupied by black Africans. Such disparity in information is caused by the various opinions on the black concentration camps and the way this population was involved in the war. Information regarding black concentration camps and conditions of life experienced by black Africans during the war has largely been concealed. This makes this part of history flawed.

The establishment of concentration camps for both black Africans and white Boers can be attributed to the failures of what was called the neutrality oath. This was a conditional contract issued by Lord Roberts. This neutrality oath had two specific purposes: firstly, it was aimed at enabling Boers who did not want to participate in the war to stay on their

farms and away from the war;[100] and, secondly, to allow those who had been involved in the war but wanted to stop fighting, to do so. Some Boers took up the offer and in return were given protection, which led to them being called "protected burghers".[101] The first two camps were established in Pretoria and Bloemfontein during 1900.[102] Lord Roberts apparently saw the need to "protect" Boers who had taken the neutrality oath by placing them in camps.[103] This was a strategy to ensure that they were not enlisted back into war.[104] Others failed to abide by this neutrality oath, and launched guerrilla war. This is a military tactic practised by one party when they are outnumbered.[105] Guerrilla warfare usually involves petty warfare strategies, such as ambushes and raids.

In reaction to the guerrilla attacks on railway lines, a proclamation was issued that stated that for every attack made by the Boers, homesteads would be burned down.[106],[107] This was the establishment of what came to be known as the scorched earth policy – which involved burning down farms in order to eliminate sources of accommodation and food.[108] This practice of burning down farms and the "clearing the country" initiatives were launched as a drastic war strategy against the Boers to deny them all provisions.[109],[110],[111] The implementation of the scorched earth policy was a deliberate act to cause destruction of property and food supplies on Boer farms,[112],[113],[114] and to literally "scour the landscape, remove all life-sustaining means and flush out the Boer commandos into forced engagements".[115] As a result, the Boers could not make good use of their farms.[116],[117] Harvests and storage facilities were burned down, animals were killed, and settlements became depopulated.[118] This led to starvation and a crushed economy.[119] As a result of the devastation caused by the scorched earth policy, more Boer women and children were left homeless and had to fend for themselves, while some of those who had financial means moved to cities due to food shortages and the fear of living close to black Africans.[120] Those who could not afford to move to the cities were declared "undesirables" and were forced into concentration camps.[121],[122]

The scorched earth policy not only destroyed farms owned by the Boers, but also those owned by black Africans. The destruction of black African farms was against the instruction issued by Lord Roberts, who had decided that the "kafir locations" be left alone.[123] As the war continued and many black Africans became destitute and homeless, the solution was to provide separate "refugee" camps to restrain them.[124],[125] It was also assumed that, if black Africans were not restrained in the so-called 'refugee camps', they would take advantage and "prey upon vulnerable white families".[126]

Unequal food rations and "no work, no food"

According to historical records, the distribution of rations in the concentration camps followed a system of inequality. The availability – or lack – of food in the concentration camps caused starvation and death. Food rationing in the concentration camps was determined by military doctors who had knowledge of nutrition.[127] Emily Hobhouse, an Englishwoman sent as part of a humanitarian group from England to assess the conditions of the concentration camps, wrote extensively about the horrific conditions and the death toll in the white concentration camps.[128] A report she wrote during her visits to the concentration camps mentioned that the camp system was "wholesale cruelty".[129]

As a result, she was labelled a traitor by the British government for exposing the real conditions of the war and the concentration camps.[130] Lord Kitchener apparently called her "that bloody woman" because of the trouble she caused for them in England.[131] The report also detailed some of the rations that were received in one of the concentration camps that housed white civilians, as illustrated in Table 1 below.

Table 1: Indication of the food rations documented by Emily Hobhouse at one of the concentration camps in the Orange Free State[132]

Daily measures of the rations	Conversion to kg	Food rations
½ lb	0,2 kg	Meat (with bone and fat)
2 oz	0,5 kg	Coffee
¾ lb	0,34 kg	Wholemeal (wheat bread)
1/12 lbs	0,038 kg	Condensed milk
½ oz	0,14 kg	Salt
2 oz	0,5 kg	Sugar

It is not suggested whether these rations were per person or for a family in one tent. The statement, "[o]nce they sometimes had potatoes, seven potatoes for seven people, but that has long been impossible", may suggest that the rations were given per family staying in a tent.[133] Those with money could purchase more essentials from the shops that were available in the camps, but these were apparently very expensive.[134] The rations were insufficient, which led to deaths, especially among babies and young children.[135] Some military doctors had apparently suggested to the camp superintendent that milk, oatmeal and fine mealie meal be added to the rations, but these calls were ignored.[136] Some of the Boers in the camps believed that most of the deaths were caused by the British adding ground glass to their sugar.[137] There is no evidence that suggests that this was indeed the case accounting for the number of deaths in the camps, or whether it was mere speculation. In the report, Hobhouse also mentioned that the food was repetitive and dull and not suitable for young children and babies since there were no vegetables.[138] The meat supplied to some of the camps was often rotten and infested with worms, and the coffee was coppery and undrinkable.[139] This means that, although the rationing of food in the camps was not the same, the experience in terms of food was similar. Van Heyningen argues that food rations indicate that food was used as a form of punishment and reward.[140] As a defence mechanism against the reports made by Hobhouse, the British shifted the blame to Boer women, and accused them of ignorance that led to the deaths of children in the camps.[141] Another delegation had to be sent to verify the reports made by Hobhouse.[142]

While the situation in the camps was dire and heart-breaking, these were the experiences in the white concentration camps. The literature records that Hobhouse did not visit black concentration camps.[143] Instead, she had designated someone to conduct such visits on her behalf. According to McGreal, Hobhouse visited the second largest camp in Aliwal North in 1901, where white women, children and a few men had died in large numbers.[144]

She decisively ignored the black camp that was situated close to the white one. Other researchers have come to Hobhouse's defence. According to De Reuck, Hobhouse had mentioned during her aborted second visit to the country that, due to time and strength, she had not been able to investigate the black camps.[145] She had instead instructed other members of the investigation commission to visit the camps, but it seems this was not done. This is a clear illustration that black African concentration camps were utterly ignored, which illustrates the perceived low value of a black African life. Hobhouse was apparently able to visit six concentration camps located in the Orange Free State but was not able to visit the camps in the Transvaal.[146] The speech she wrote for the unveiling of the Vrouemonument (Women's Monument) in Bloemfontein in 1913 suggested that she acknowledged the suffering and deaths endured by black Africans during the South African War. This was despite the fact that she did not visit the concentration camps where black Africans were detained. Hobhouse acknowledged that black Africans suffered as much as the Boers in the concentration camps, which was even worse considering that they did so for a fight that was considered not theirs.

While some have argued against defining black camps as concentration areas, some scholars such as McGreal,[147] Van Heyningen,[148] Nasson,[149] and Benneyworth[150] have interpreted these localities as "labour camps" that were established to serve military needs. They were expected to work for the British army and would be paid "native rates".[151] This apparently was the reason why these black concentration camps were mainly situated along railway lines – to enable them to work on the maintenance of the railways and to man the blockhouses in exchange for food.[152,153] Some black African men who were not incorporated into concentration camps were forced to work in gold mines.[154] The end of political or economic self-sufficiency of black Africans was heavily affected by the war. This saw a decline in their ability to sustain themselves, and they were therefore forced to seek work in the mines or on white farms and were forced to pay taxes.[155]

The British government also wanted to restore economic activities in the mines, which were affected by the war. The British government therefore introduced the no work, no food policy, which was administered by the Native Refugee Department.[156] The policy indicated that black Africans who were not employed in the gold and diamond mines (these included women, children and elderly men) had to do agricultural work to cultivate food for the army, while they were expected to pay for their own food.[157] According to Benneyworth, it was the same British policy that established the unequal rationing of food and medical and building supplies for black Africans.[158] Working in the white men's industries or on their farms was how most black Africans were able to access food rations.[159,160] Those who did not want to work or purchase food were left to starve.[161] The aim of the policy was to reduce the financial implications of the war, as well as to force black Africans to "provide labour in exchange of rations".[162] This meant that black Africans in the concentration camps had to work in order to receive food and other essential supplies. In early 1901, discriminatory food rationing took place in the camps in general.[163] In some of the camps, food rations were discontinued for those who refused to work for the British or for families of those who were in war against the British.[164] This resulted in an increase in starvation, diseases and malnutrition in the camps, especially those that interned black Africans.[165]

Archival material from the National Museum of Military History indicates that black Africans were treated unfairly during the war. An article found at the National Museum of Military History, dated only as "May 26", indicated that there were some white people who had alluded that it was not fair for the black man to be given more food than white people, or the same food rations as white people (see Figure 6). A situation of equality between the different races was regarded as spoiling the natives. The date and contents of the article suggest that the events took place after Mafikeng was relieved from the siege, but certainly during the course of the war. It was relevant to include this fact in this article in order to illustrate the situation in terms of inequality and the relations between the black Africans and their white counterparts.

Figure 6: A letter on "spoiling the natives" during the South African War[166]

There is little detailed information on the food rations in the black African concentration camps, as only fragmented records were kept – or no records at all – in terms of these camps. According to South African History Online, black Africans were usually left in empty and arid land without any tents and essential rations.[167] They had to source material from the surroundings, such as sacks, reeds and tins to make shelter.[168],[169]

Figure 7: Shelters in the black camps[170]

As mentioned earlier, black Africans had to work for their food rations, while the white camps received these for free.[171] Food rations were less than those offered to the Boers in the white camps, even though they had to work for it. Van Heyningen mentions that food rations for black adults were limited to 4½d worth a day, while white adults were limited to receiving 9d worth of food rations.[172]

Table 2: Indication of the daily food rations in the black concentration camps[173]

Daily measures of the rations	Conversion to kg	Food rations
1½ lbs	0,67 kg	Mealies, K/corn,[1] unsifted mealie meal
¼ oz	0,007 kg	Salt

Table 3: Indication of the weekly food rations in the white concentration camps[174]

Weekly measures of the rations	Conversion to kg	Food rations
1 lb	0,45 kg	Fresh or tinned meat
2 oz	0,5 kg	Sugar
½ oz	0,14 kg	Coffee

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[1] K/corn is "kafir corn", which is a form of sorghum. The term 'kafir' is generally an offensive term to describe black Africans.

It was believed that these rations were sufficient for black Africans, as it was assumed that their diet and nutritional needs were different from those of white people.[175] The lack of protein and vitamins in the black people's diet resulted in diseases such as pellagra, which was linked to "an all-maize diet".[176] According to Karthikeyan and Thappa, "pellagra is a clinical syndrome characterized by: (1) symmetric photosensitive skin eruptions; (2) gastrointestinal manifestations; and (3) neurologic and psychiatric disturbances".[177] Most black Africans died from such diseases due to a lack of vitamins and protein. Because farms were burned down as a result of the scorched earth policy, it would make sense that meat was also scarce since animals had also died of starvation.

Figure 8: A rare image of conditions and starvation in the black camps, not explicitly displayed to indicate the fatalities.[178]

It is also relevant to focus briefly on the black Africans who were interned in the white camps. According to Van Heyningen, these groups of black Africans in the white camps were rarely rationed and usually "fed off the scraps allowed them by the Boer families".[179] These black Africans lived among the Boers because Lord Kitchener still allowed the Boers to have servants.[180] The presence of black Africans in the white camps was to maintain these places to make them much more comfortable living areas than those where their counterparts were kept.[181] Their presence in areas occupied by white people was allowed, as they served as servants.[182] This made black Africans in these particular camps double victims of the war, as they were still required to serve their white masters even though they were 'prisoners' themselves. Some of the black Africans in the camps were apparently treated fairly by their masters. According to Nasson, Hobhouse had documented that, during her visit to the concentration camps, she experienced 'undue familiarity' where some white people shared food and sleeping areas with the black Africans.[183] Such actions were criticised by the British and they often regarded Boers who were friendly with the black Africans as not being well trained to behave as white men.[184]

Conclusion

The effects of the South African War (1899–1902) on black African people can be summarised as follows: "[t]he Boers said the war was for liberty, the British said it was for equality. The majority of the inhabitants, who were not white at all, gained neither liberty nor equality."[185] This devastating war had a lasting effect on politics, economy and the social landscape long after the end of the conflict.

As mentioned earlier, the events related to the South African War are very much fragmented. Much of what we have come to rely on is based on archival sources or available historical records that are biased to suit certain agendas. Some archival records are incomplete or missing. According to Benneyworth, continuing to base deaths and experiences in the black African concentration camps on fragmented records is flawed.[186] While this is the case, the available records are sufficient to indicate that the mortality faced by black Africans was dreadful and disgracefully high. According to Willan, it is evident that black "Africans had in general suffered much more than the white population".[187] This is also true taking into consideration how black Africans were viewed or regarded. There are many gaps in the history of conflicts. This is a general practice and is thus not only limited to the South African War. This means that understanding the actual events of conflicts is close to impossible because of the emotions involved. This may explain why, even though black Africans are now in positions to criticise and rewrite colonial history from a black African perspective, most do not seem to know where or how to begin. One could argue that archives are the first avenue to visit to explore, understand and present historical narratives.

Historical records have hidden behind the 'shared suffering' of the Boers and black Africans to undermine the negative experiences of black Africans during the war while interned in the concentration camps. While the food scarcity experiences can be regarded as part of a 'shared struggle', it is worth noting that, as much as historians have focused on the struggles of Boer women and children in the concentration camps and the war in general, the struggle experienced by black Africans should also be focused on through its own lenses or as a struggle on its own. It is also worth accepting that the struggles were not the same, as black Africans were initially not meant to be part of the war but suffered even worse fatalities than the Boers and lost their land. The reality is that we will never know the true fatalities that were experienced during the war but accepting the concept of a 'shared struggle' means continuing to accept and publish flawed information.

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Endnotes

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
A positive psychology perspective on pre-deployment fitness-for-duty evaluations for external deployments: A proposition for the South African National Defence Force

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Abstract

The aim of this article is to introduce the reader to a psychological well-being orientation for soldiers in pre-deployment fitness-for-duty evaluations by screening for psychological risk rather than pathology. This aim is reached firstly, by discussing the existing process of pre-deployment fitness-for-duty evaluations, then conceptualising the assessment for psychological risk rather than psychopathology only, followed by linking pre-deployment assessment of fitness-for-duty evaluations to the positive psychology paradigm and proposing an integrative military model for soldiers' psychological well-being in the external deployment context. The discussion is concluded by recommendations for military decision-makers to consider this approach of psychological risk assessment as a feasible process.

Introduction

As a member state of the United Nations (UN), the African Union (AU) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), South Africa is in the vanguard of bringing about lasting peace and stability on the continent.[189] In recent years, the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) has participated in peace-support operations in various African states, such as Burundi, Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and is currently involved in a counterterrorism operation in neighbouring Mozambique.[190] The SANDF has been involved in 14 peace missions between 1999 and 2019,[191] and averaged at one stage 2 300 soldiers at any given time.[192] Consequently, South African (SA) soldiers deploy in the African battlespace (ABS), which can be described as an environment where soldiers are increasingly placed in asymmetric situations against opponents who are not easily identifiable and who are probably better armed and equipped, with better access to communications and technology than the SANDF.[193] Various authors have reported on the changed nature of the ABS, and have confirmed the complexity and challenges resulting from these changes.[194]

These are complex situations, and Gouws[195] emphasises that the complexities of military operations domestically and abroad require soldiers who are more resilient than ordinary citizens. Moreover, soldiers are very likely to be exposed to psychological trauma that may inflict adverse neuropsychological effects.[196] The individual's ability to recover from such trauma depends on his or her previous history, his or her physiological status, and the social distress encountered.[197] Furthermore, the demands of the SANDF to deploy into peacekeeping and operations other than war scenarios to satisfy UN and SADC needs on the African continent lead to an increased operational tempo for soldiers. There is thus a considerable likelihood of exposure to trauma as well as prolonged deployment periods away from home that may exceed the typical SANDF deployment duration of twelve months for peace support operations.

For these reasons, the UN has also indicated that deploying soldiers should undergo adequate medical, dental and/or psychological screening prior to deployment, implying that they should have "no psychopathology".[198] It is therefore understandable that the SA cabinet decided in 1998 that SANDF soldiers should undergo health assessments that include the psychological state of soldiers[199] once every two years to ensure that they are combat-ready. This decision compelled the Military Health Services (Directorate Psychology) of the SANDF to conduct mental health screening of soldiers prior to deployment.

After an initial review of the literature on psychological fitness for military operations, the SANDF Director Psychology decided to screen soldiers for general psychopathology in the pre-deployment phase.[200] This is consistent with international trends to screen for pathology.[201] In the absence of an SA instrument or tool for assessing pathology, the Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory-III was used initially. However, because of high cost and low scale reliabilities when applied to an SA population, the instrument was rejected. A decision was made to 'screen out', which implied the identification of mental health issues that could adversely affect performance as opposed to 'screening in' when candidates who meet specific criteria are sought.[202] In the SA military health context, this screening process involved the so-called 'three Ds', namely disease, disorder and disability.[203] Against this background, the Military Psychological Institute (MPI) embarked on a process of developing a psychopathology-based clinical measuring instrument suitable for screening a supposedly 'normal population' or 'non-psychiatric population' whose members may be highly functional in the workplace, with no known diagnosed psychological disorders.[204] This was further complicated by the understanding that the absence of psychopathology does not imply the presence of mental health and vice versa.[205]

These dynamics highlight the limitations of a restrictive medicalised framework that would tend to screen for pathology only. Utilising a purely medical model in the study of human experiences may lead one to neglect other psychological risk factors that may have a negative effect on psychological well-being (PWB) that can be identified and addressed by interventions other than psychotherapy. After all, it needs to be acknowledged that there are conditions other than medical disorders that will make a person a psychological risk for deployment. Furthermore, useful insights may be gained from employing other psychological frameworks, such as positive psychology (broadly, the study of the

conditions and processes that contribute to the optimal functioning of people, groups and organisations).

Consequently, the author provides background to the current screening process, which places strong focus on screening for psychopathology. This article will compare psychopathology with psychological risk, introduce a positive psychology perspective, and propose an integrative military model for soldiers' well-being in the external deployment context as a basis for a future process of screening for deployment. This discussion will be concluded with recommendations for decision-makers in the SANDF.

The current screening process

The screening process currently employed in the SANDF is referred to as the Concurrent Health Assessment (CHA)[206], whereas the broader military psychology literature refers to it as "military-fitness-for duty-evaluations".[207] References to the CHA are closely linked to fitness-for-duty evaluations. The aim of these evaluations is to select those soldiers whose fitness for military duty would be sustained when operationally active, even in some extreme situations. From the perspective of military psychology, this means that soldiers can perform their operational and related duties safely and effectively, whilst maintaining a stable state of mental health state. Owing to the comprehensive nature of the process followed during the CHA, it is even possible for a soldier to be classified medically without evaluation by a so-called 'medical' or 'health board'.[208] Moreover, it is important to note that the CHA process does not include post-deployment assessments, forensic assessments, security vetting assessments or medical evaluation boards. As stated above, the focus of the CHA is routine assessments[209] to determine operational deployability. It is also worth noting that the SANDF prefers that, for a specific mission area, the fighting elements are deployed as an entire unit or entity, whereas the support elements are often compiled from various, often unrelated, units.

The current process requires psychological and social work assessment of the soldier preferably one week before medical assessments are due to begin, although this is not always possible in practice. Subsequent medical and dental assessments involve a pre-medical examination to obtain clinical data, other medical assessments, drawing blood to identify traces of substance abuse and HIV/Aids infection, HIV/AIDS pre-test counselling, as well as an oral health assessment by a dentist. These procedures also include the immunisation of the soldier or confirmation that immunisations are up to date and will remain up to date for the duration of the anticipated deployment period.

During the psychological assessment, soldiers complete the Psychological Risk Inventory (PRI).[210] This instrument was developed by the MPI as a screening tool to assist clinical psychologists in assessing the mental health status of SANDF members when large groups of people are to be evaluated within a short period. Since conducting clinical interviews on an individual basis is extremely time-consuming and labour-intensive, the inventory serves as a cost-effective tool to identify risk factors. It is important to note that the PRI is not a diagnostic tool, but a self-report measure that attempts to identify behavioural patterns that differ significantly from a so-called normal SANDF population. When at-risk behavioural patterns are identified, findings are probed and verified by means of a clinical

interview. The instrument can be administered by counselling or industrial psychologists but the clinical interview can only be done by a clinical psychologist.

According to the MPI, the PRI measures a number of primary, secondary and latent scales to assess the overall risk behaviour of soldiers in a normal population.[211] The **primary** scales of the PRI measure whether the respondents (the soldiers in this instance) are under *stress*; whether they are suffering as a consequence of past *trauma*; and whether they display *aggression* (by responding in the affirmative to questions with an aggressive and/or impulsive content, for example, being irritated by others). The **secondary** scales refer to the measurement of *withdrawal*, which represents a mixture of withdrawal, anxiety and depression indicators; *mood,* implying behavioural indicators associated with negative mood states; *dissociative* traits indicative of absent-mindedness, possible depression and inability to cope with day-to-day stressors; and *destructive behaviour,* which is a composite scale with diverse indicators of an ineffective coping strategy. Lastly, the **latent** scales measure *mild anxiety,* indicative of constant worry and feelings of being down-hearted and/or irritated for no reason; *low ego integrity,* indicative of a person's ego being under pressure based on vague and non-specific complaints; and lastly, *general negative behaviour.* The latter is not a scale on its own, but contains items that might provide valuable information that the psychologist could use if the respondent is identified for an interview.

In addition to these scales, the questionnaire includes a *risk indicator* consisting of a combination of all the items related to the primary, secondary and latent scales, but excluding items relating to moderating indices. There is also a *coping indicator,* which serves as a moderating value that allows the psychologist to make an informed decision on the state of the respondent's coping mechanisms in relation to the risk factors reported in the test. It is worthy to note that, although the developers of the PRI did not approach the development of the inventory purposefully from a positive psychology framework per se*,* the words 'coping indicator' are a positive psychology concept as it focuses on the positive rather than the negative as it refers to the ability to deal with a challenge.

Those with identified risk factors are then interviewed by a psychologist, and a determination is made with respect to their health status in relation to deployability. Based on a statistical formula, about 23% of those assessed will be identified for a clinical interview.[212] The psychologist then makes a decision with respect to the mental health status of the individual in relation to external operational deployability according to a colour code assigned to each individual.[213] These codes are green, yellow and red and indicate the soldier's external deployability.

A green operational status indicates no restrictions on the utilisation of the individual based on the confirmed medical (health) category. Yellow status implies a temporary restriction on deployment. In this case, an intervention may enable the status to be changed to green when conditions change as a result of the intervention. For example, an obese person who is assessed as yellow status goes on a diet, loses weight and is then determined to be within the norms set by the SANDF. When a soldier has a permanent inability (irreversible condition) to deploy operationally externally, as in the case of kidney failure,

red status will be attributed to him or her. During internal deployments, decisions will be based on a case-by-case assessment in relation to the nature of deployment, occupational class and the individual health profile of the soldier.

Essentially, the colour-coded system reflects a representation of the soldier's health status and is used to initiate follow-up visits to a healthcare practitioner (HCP) or interventions in respect of further treatment. As suggested above, this colour coding is done not only holistically, but also per discipline or component of the process. A person may be 'green' in terms of his or her physical health, but may be 'yellow' because of a mental health-related issue, which then will holistically make such person unsuitable for deployment, and an intervention will be required to change the person's status (colour code). All disciplines involved, such as psychology, social work, medicine and oral health, capture the interpreted results electronically and these are imported back on the Health Informatics System (HIS) of the South African Military Health Service (SAMHS) where they are accessible for a final decision to be made on a member's suitability for deployment.

Consequently, on completion of the whole process, a so-called 'confirming healthcare practitioner' (CHCP) evaluates all available information (inputs from all the disciplines involved) and determines the health status of the member. This HCP may require that additional medical information be obtained if an informed decision is not possible. Furthermore, all the information is captured on the HIS for future reference and statutory record-keeping requirements. Discipline-specific information is only available to practitioners of the discipline registered on the system and to the CHCP. For the sake of patient confidentiality, patient information is not accessible across different disciplines.[214]

The author's criticism against the existing screening process is that its strong reliance on the medical model leads little room for the consideration of other collateral information potentially relevant to an individual's deployability, for example, what is manifested in a person's behaviour on a day-to-day basis. Furthermore, the process is based on a self-report measure where the respondents report directly on their behaviours, beliefs, attitudes or intentions. As a result, the respondents may provide socially desirable answers, especially if they want to deploy. Although one may argue that it can be countered by response analysis through so-called 'lie scales' or 'social desirability scales', it would add up to those individuals 'red flagged' for a follow-up interview, making it time-consuming and hence burdensome. Consequently, another approach from a positive psychology perspective is suggested where the self-report data are not used alone.[215] However, before conceptualising the alternative approach, it is important to contrast the concepts of psychopathology vs psychological risk.

Psychopathology versus psychological risk

Psychopathology resides within the field of clinical psychology, and refers to the study of the symptoms and causes of mental distress and various treatments for behavioural and mental disorders.[216] In turn, a mental disorder can be described as a behavioural or psychological syndrome or pattern that occurs within an individual, which reflects an underlying psychobiological dysfunction, and which is associated with clinically

significant distress or impairment in one or more important areas of functioning.[217] Pre-deployment screening with a primary focus on psychopathology may lead to the medicalisation of normal behaviour,[218] and offers a restricted view of an individual's risk potential.

From a 'fitness-for-duty' perspective, an alternative approach focusing on the concept of 'psychological risk' seems attractive, as it relates better to a mental health model than to a medical or disease model. In this regard, a person who poses a potential risk from a psychological perspective may not necessarily be ill from a mental health perspective or meet the diagnostic criteria for a mental disorder. Yet, an overview of the psychology and risk-related literature yielded limited coverage of the concept of psychological risk as it might be applicable to military deployments. Nevertheless, useful insights regarding psychological risk could be gained from the fields of occupational health and safety, national security, criminology as well as literature on stress and coping.

From the perspective of occupational health and safety, psychological risk is seen as emanating from the work environment, namely poor work design or poor social context of the work, leading to physical and social outcomes, such as work-related stress, burnout or depression.[219] Born and Van der Flier[220] highlighted individual differences in their investigation of organisational risk and observed that there are relevant aspects related to individual differences, for instance coping styles (how people cope with the events they encounter).

From a national security perspective, Wiese[221] refers to the concept of 'security risk', which suggests that, because of a person's personality traits, needs, behaviour, ideological persuasion or extreme sensitivity in terms of past deeds, he or she might be persuaded by whatever means to cooperate with an unauthorised individual or organisation to divulge secrets of his or her employer, or on his or her own accord would divulge secrets to an unauthorised individual or organisation. Based on the work of Wiese, the author of this article, who also does consulting work related to compiling a risk profile of existing or prospective employees, conceptualised the 'risk profile' of an individual as the outcome of a process to determine whether such individual poses a risk to his or her employer or prospective employer. This is based on an analysis of the personality traits, lifestyle, needs, behaviour, value system or sensitivity in terms of past deeds and whether he or she can be persuaded by whatever means to cooperate with an unauthorised individual or organisation to cause intentional or unintentional damage to his or her company or any of the clients of such company.[222] This definition can be viewed as that of 'employment risk'.

McSherry[223] discusses psychological risk from a mental health perspective in a criminology setting and states that it is about identifying the risk of dispositions that might lead to reoffending or to harming others. Reference is made to a combination of both a clinical (qualitatively determined risk by an expert, based on consideration of all evidence) and actuarial approach (quantitatively calculated risk factor, based on weighted variables) to decision-making in terms of psychological risk, and a number of predictor variables have been identified from the literature. These variables are:

- past violence (relying on the history of past behaviour);
- pre-existing vulnerabilities, such as early signs of antisocial traits, difficulties in peer relationships and hostility towards authority figures;
- social and interpersonal factors;
- mental illness;
- substance abuse, especially when it co-exists with mental illness;
- state of mind;
- situational triggers, such as loss, demands, expectations, confrontations, ready availability of weapons, and physical illness; and
- personality constructs.

One can also see the relationship between these pre-existing vulnerabilities and the content of the PRI scales discussed above. Moreover, in an effort to deal with a normal population, the MPI states that psychological risk "refers to the behavioural indicators of [an] ineffective coping mechanism to deal with the psychological demands of everyday life".[224] The notion is that, if a person does not demonstrate the necessary coping strategies, the likelihood of the development and progression of a mental health disorder is increased if the problem is not identified and treated timeously. Taylor's description of coping strategies, as cited by the MPI, refers to the specific efforts, both behavioural and psychological, that people employ to master, tolerate, reduce, or minimise stressful events.[225] These coping styles may include active, passive or avoidance coping techniques.[226] There are a number of generalised and specific resources that could assist an individual when attempting to cope with various stressors.[227] These include self-respect, cultural values, tradition, intelligence, view of the world and healthy behaviour. According to Antonovsky,[228] these resources can be classified into eight groups, namely physical, biochemical, material, cognitive, emotional, estimation and views, interpersonal relational, as well as macrosocial and cultural. Naturally, as these resources come under threat in acute and/or prolonged stressful situations, psychological risk increases.

In the military context, the stress caused by stressful events is defined as "a non-specific number of reactions and responses of the body (mental, emotional and/or physiological) causing bodily or mental tension, strain or pressure following any demand made upon it, and designed for self-preservation".[229] Stress can be either good (referred to as **eustress**) or bad (referred to as **distress**) and can be caused by internal or external forces.[230]

When analysing the aforementioned perspectives on psychological risk, a number of broad themes come to the fore, namely context (social, work, personal), predictive variables, coping, and outcomes. Considering these themes, and for the purpose of this discussion, psychological risk can be defined as:

[T[he sum total of the outcomes emanating from an individual's ability or inability to cope with contextual encounters as determined by predictive variables affecting that specific individual.

The context refers to, but is not limited to, the social, work and personal environments of the soldier, while the predictive variables include, but are not limited to, such individual's past behaviour, pre-existing vulnerabilities, possible history of mental illness, social and interpersonal factors, substance abuse, situational triggers, and certain personality constructs. Should a soldier deploy to a mission area in, for example Sudan, the context would be the foreign country, Sudan, with all its characteristics, such as climate, culture, population and social system, the soldier's personal circumstances at home, and his or her experience of working as a soldier as part of a team interacting with the social system in Sudan. Furthermore, within this context, coping includes both unhealthy coping behaviours, such as over- or undereating, smoking, drinking and healthy coping behaviours, such as exercising.

With a rich understanding of psychological risk and knowing that it is directly related to the outcomes of an individual's ability to cope, one may ask what the consequences or outcomes of psychological risks are, especially those that lead to unsuccessful deployment, which is in itself a negative outcome or consequence. In essence, when a soldier becomes a challenge for his or her commanders during deployment, for example, by being charged through the legal system and/or by having to be repatriated prematurely because of health or behaviour-related issues, the deployment is viewed as unsuccessful. From the above, one could infer that there are numerous psychological risk factors that are likely to contribute to unsuccessful deployment by an individual or which could at least increase the risk of having an unsuccessful deployment if the person cannot cope with such deployment. Such unsuccessful outcomes may stem from psychopathology, such as suboptimal intelligence, anxiety disorders, and adjustment disorders (i.e. a lack of adaptability), as well as related factors, such as a lack of motivation, a history of ineffectiveness, difficulties with interpersonal relationships, and failure to seek mental health assistance when needed. In view of the theory of behavioural consistency[231] – which posits that past behaviour is the best predictor of future behaviour – factors related to inappropriate conduct but not necessarily associated with psychopathology could be considered as key elements of psychological risk., Such factors could include criminal behaviour, financial difficulties (which might cause stress for the individual or which might be an indicator of uncontrolled or impulsive behaviour), incidents involving substance abuse, poor performance, and even incompatibility with the military culture.

Negative outcomes therefore might not stem from psychopathology only, because psychological risk also includes other dysfunctional behaviours that cannot be diagnosed as psychopathology. Some of the typical dysfunctional work behaviours are absenteeism, substance abuse, presenteeism (functionally absent although physically at work), theft, bullying and sexual harassment.[232] Unmanaged psychological risks may also lead to an inability to manage the demands of the job,[233] the development of mental health problems (psychopathology), increased safety-related incidents, such as psychological and sexual harassment and third-party violence.[234]

Within the context of military deployment, uncontrolled individual behaviour might lead to an international incident and ultimately diplomatic embarrassment during, for example, a peace-support operation. It could also have a negative influence on unit cohesion that

restricts the ability of a military force to function optimally. From a private business perspective, one could say that the outcome would be overall poor business performance; in the military it would most probably denote a failed mission.

Based on the preceding discussion one could postulate how the changed ABS may place new demands on SA soldiers. In support, Rothmann et al.[235] emphasise that work has an influence on the well-being of employees and that, depending on the unique resources and demands in a specific work context, the determinants of well-being may differ in various working environments. Moreover, every occupation has its own specific risk factors regarding well-being, and the military is one of those places where the risks are higher and more than in other occupations such as, for example, a teacher. This suggests that deployment is emotionally demanding and that emotional coping is required. Content, resilient and coping soldiers are likely to function optimally.

From the above, it is clear that, while a psychological risk-based approach provides a more informed view than a psychopathology-based approach, it is still restrictive in that it focuses essentially on maladaptation in its many varied forms. It is therefore necessary to focus on and include other risk factors in the psychopathology-free majority of the population of soldiers and to assist them to live and work increasingly purposefully, become increasingly productive, and develop a sense of positive engagement and meaning during deployments specifically and in life in general. The next section will therefore provide additional insight into the positive psychology approach.

A positive psychology approach

From the discussion above, it was evident that it may be beneficial to consider elements of a positive psychology framework in the pre-deployment screening process. Various authors[236] present a variety of definitions of positive psychology. After analysing some of these definitions, it is worthy to make the following observation on positive psychology: positive psychology is the application of psychological principles to real-life issues by attempting to understand the causes and consequences of optimal human functioning to help one manage and succeed in the workplace. Positive psychology is furthermore about delivering better and more compassionate health care to employees, and providing effective and engaging education in ways that optimise achievement (psychological well-being and the development of community). In essence, positive psychology is about optimal human functioning.

Archana, Ahuja and Kumar emphasise the importance of positive traits that cover character strengths and virtues, which when in combination above a certain threshold will make the person a 'good character'.[237] Furthermore, within a military context, Mathews[238] describes positive psychology as a paradigm that provides a systematic conceptual basis and groundwork for an empirical assessment of the role of character strengths in adaptation and performance. Positive psychology is thus about efficacious adaptation and excellence in all domains of life, and therefore it has utility within the domain of military psychology where military commanders would like to command high-performing soldiers. It is, for example, for this reason that Milnič[239] investigated the application of

the *salutogenic* paradigm,[2] which also falls within the field of positive psychology and which focuses on health and well-being in the field of military psychology. Others, such as Bartone, also studied *hardiness*, another construct related to positive psychology and which refers to a collection of personality characteristics that functions as a flexible resource during encounters with demanding life events.[240]

Positive psychology is not meant to replace traditional methods and models employed by military psychologists; it rather entails adding concepts and methods to the military psychologist's toolbox.[241] The functionality of positive psychology in the military is further supported by Matthews[242] who argues that the military is a perfect 'home' for positive psychology, as the military comprise relatively young, healthy and pathology-free individuals. In a positive psychology framework, one would consequently focus on those factors that improve and strengthen the mental health of SANDF soldiers.

In the same vein and in support of Kasser,[243] the study on which this article is based, reasoned that rather than assuming that a good life is defined by the absence of psychopathology, many of the leaders in positive psychology have argued that PWB is a construct embedded in positive psychology, which should be studied in its own right.[244] Positive psychology is about having a proactive stance towards achieving optimal emotional, physical and mental well-being through self-acceptance, personal growth (for example changing your mindset and become more positive), having a purpose in life, mastering the environment, autonomy, and having positive relationships with others.[245] Various authors[246] argue that positive psychology as a discipline focuses on strengths rather than weaknesses. Furthermore, PWB has been identified as a predictor of risk behaviour[247] that is closely linked to an individual's job security and career behaviour. When an individual experiences job security[248] he or she is less likely to experience anxiety and stress, which will make such person more likely to control and deal with challenging situations through his or her coping mechanisms. Ruini[249] observes that PWB plays a buffering role in coping with stress and a protective role in mental health. It would thus be safe to postulate that 'good' PWB will lessen psychological risk in a soldier, as conceptualised above.

From what has been stated elsewhere, one can deduce what it means for a soldier to run minimal psychological risk for deployment in the military context, but the question arises how it can be understood and applied in the PWB context. An overview of the positive psychology literature – more specifically literature dealing with PWB – highlights the work of Rothmann and Cooper,[250] who designed an integrative diagnostic model for PWB in the work context. Closer analysis of this model suggests that it might be of good use in the context of fitness-for-duty evaluations in the military, especially when it is related to the abovementioned definition of psychological risk. This model was therefore explored in more detail while it was also contextualised to the military environment into what the author refers to as an integrative military model for soldiers' psychological well-being in the external deployment context.

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[2] Conceptualised by Aaron Antonovsky, the salutogenic paradigm refers to looking at health and illness not as a dichotomy but as a continuum. Salutogenesis focuses on the study of the origins of health rather than on the origins of disease.

Integrative military model for soldiers' psychological well-being in the external deployment context

Rothmann and Cooper's[251] model was designed to address PWB in the work context, which in this instance, would be the military environment in general and more specifically deployments outside the borders of South Africa, also referred to as external deployments. See Figure 1 below for a graphic representation of the suggested integrative military model.

Figure 1: Integrative model for soldier psychological well-being in the external deployment context

The context illustrated by the outer square in Figure 1 will typically refer to the anticipated mission area as a social system with everything related to it in combination with the physical and geopolitical characteristics of the country or deployment area, for example whether it is a desert or tropical forest, with its weather patterns and all other factors related to it. The military force (work context) includes own and opposing forces, the deploying soldier's situation back home, i.e. his or her family; the soldier's support systems; and things taking place in his or her home unit. The context will also include the psychological or personality makeup of the soldier, which would be his or her personality, psychological resources and interpersonal relationships as manifested in terms of group dynamics.

Moreover, a number of "outside forces",[252] which are not part of the individual or the organisation are present and affect the context, such as social change, race, gender, social class and community, family and other environmental factors, as well as 'organisational forces', such as job demands and job resources. As different soldiers tend to react differently to the same stressor, there are also moderating forces related to the context, such as perception, job experience, self-efficacy, social support, locus of control, sense

of coherence, psychological hardiness, coping and optimism that contribute uniquely to the manifestation of stress in each individual. In some cases, this will be eustress. In others, it will be distress based on the actual environment and how the individual interprets the environment in conjunction with the abovementioned stressors and other moderator variables.[253] Cilliers and Flotman[254] observe that distress due to non-coping manifests in negativity, emotional alienation, an increase in bureaucratic and autocratic leadership, poor decision-making and ineffective process and people management, which will all have an adverse influence on deployed forces. Individually, or in combination, these forces affect the well-being of soldiers, manifesting in physical effects, such as headaches, ulcers, insomnia and decreased immunity; psychological effects, such as anger, depression, tension and boredom; behavioural effects, such as substance abuse, overeating or undereating, and sleeplessness.[255] From these forces, one can formulate predictive variables on the basis of which one can predict the outcomes in relation to the particular soldier's ability to cope with these stressors. These predictive variables can be used to make predictions in terms of soldiers' future behaviour based on present and past behaviour.

This model can be further enhanced by other theoretical models, such as the Person–Environment Fit Model and the Person–Environment–Occupation Model. The Person–Environment Fit Model focuses on how the degree of fit and the interaction between individual characteristics and their perceived environmental influence one another.[256] The Person–Environment–Occupation Model demonstrates and conceptualises how a person and his or her environment and occupation (in this case, a soldier) interact dynamically over time.[257] It was however beyond the scope of this study, which suggested consideration of a positive psychology approach for pre-deployment fitness for duty evaluations for external deployments. This approach can thus be viewed as still in its infancy, and limited research is available on these models in this particular context. Future research could focus on linking these models to psychological risk in the military setting.

From the discussion above, the question arises how this positive psychology-related model could be applied to the fitness-for-duty evaluation process in the SANDF. The section below presents a proposal on a process that could be followed.

Proposed pre-deployment fitness-for-duty evaluation process based on positive psychology

It is evident that in the current process, the focus is stronger on a medical model of decision-making with respect to whether a soldier is fit for duty outside South Africa than on a positive psychology model. It is therefore suggested that the proposed pre-deployment screening process should go beyond the medical model paradigm, which resulted in a stigmatised process. Instead, a positive psychology perspective that focuses on optimal functioning should be gained by adopting a comprehensive risk assessment approach centring on "the whole person" context.[258] From this viewpoint, the medical process forms part of a more comprehensive process, considering the individual soldier in all his or her complexity. As a result, the broad spectrum of personal and systemic variables affecting adjustment and functioning in the deployment area could be considered. This should result

in recognising risk factors that may currently be overlooked. For example, behavioural risk factors of dysfunctional behaviour, such as a tendency towards dishonesty or bullying, will not be identified through the current medical model-driven screening process.

The main idea is to obtain as much information as possible to decide whether a person is an acceptable psychological risk for external deployments. For this reason, various role players are included to become part of the pre-deployment screening team. Their main aim would be to make an informed decision on whether a particular soldier is suitable for external deployment. Such an informed decision can be made through weighing up risk and moderating factors stemming from contextual analysis of the individual's full spectrum functioning – medical, psychological, social and behavioural. In this regard, De Soir[259] observes that, if a soldier's pre-deployment well-being is relatively low, it is likely to decrease further during the period of deployment.

Furthermore, it is suggested that the new decision-making process should function in the form of a panel, which is convened after the units and individuals earmarked for deployment have been identified and after all relevant medical and other information has been obtained. It is suggested that all role players in deciding on a particular soldier's fitness-for-duty or deployment be present at the panel, whether physical or virtual (for example, online with a program, such as Zoom or Microsoft Teams). This process can be easy if the required information is obtained because in most cases, a whole unit, such as an infantry battalion, will be deploying. However, it is usually the support staff (logistics, human resources, and finance) that comes from other units. In the large infantry units, it would be easy to involve immediate supervisors in the panel, but it might not be possible to involve support personnel from other units. In practice, this means that, if a specific platoon or company is deployed, the whole company and/or platoon is dealt with simultaneously at the panel. The objective of the panel is to identify those soldiers deemed to be imminently or potentially dangerous; thus, posing a risk to themselves and to others. Health information provided by healthcare practitioners (medical and psychological practitioners, social workers and other relevant medical experts) is supported by the inclusion of collateral information from command, the military legal practitioner, the spiritual guide (chaplaincy),[3] and counter-intelligence personnel. The inclusion of command refers to the person's immediate superior. Budd and Harvey[260] refer to the inclusion of the immediate superior and senior enlisted personnel when they describe them as usually the best sources of information on a soldier's behaviour and work performance, followed by the person him- or herself, the person's records and lastly psychological testing. This process is likely to counterbalance the limitations of self-report only alluded to above.

It is furthermore suggested that the person designated to command the external deployment be the chairperson of this panel. However, care should be taken not to divulge confidential medical information regarding the soldier, but to restrict inputs to the colour code mentioned earlier. Any information that the role players think ought to be considered for the decision should be mentioned at the panel. The military law officer could, for

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[3] This will be omitted if the person has no spiritual connection.

example, confirm whether the person has a record of misconduct or whether he or she has any outstanding court cases. Based on the author's personal experience, many of the soldiers who had been repatriated from external mission areas for conduct-related issues were already a challenge for their commanders in their home country. This kind of information can be considered to obtain a holistic picture of the 'whole person', not only the medical information. In this way, individuals that already present a challenge would be excluded from external deployment because of the psychological or behavioural risk that they pose, based on the notion alluded to above, namely that past behaviour predicts future behaviour.

The proposed process introduces a new pre-deployment screening model, although it may combine existing processes, such as confirming whether a person has any outstanding legal issues that function independently from one another. In this way, all the information would be made available in one place ('under one umbrella') and an informed decision could be taken under the chairmanship of the commander who has to command the force during the external deployment.

Concerns may be duly raised about the complexity and time-consuming nature of the proposed process. However, if the data collection and analysis functions are sufficiently decentralised along functional lines, the final panel discussion could be streamlined and time-efficient. For example, suppose the key role players limit their inputs to high-level findings (clearly defined risk and moderating factors). In that case, quick decisions can be made about individuals posing little risk while more time can be allocated for deliberation on individuals where risk factors outweigh moderating factors. The benefit of an informed decision – which was not possible in the past – will turn the scale in favour of such an integrated process. Information obtained from the panel discussions can also be used to determine trends and individuals who might require interventions. It might even be possible to identify positive psychology-related interventions, such as optimistic intervention, strength-building measures, or meaning-oriented interventions[261] to be implemented as part of preparing the force for the particular mission.

The suggested process is theoretical in nature and still needs to be tested in practice in against the existing process and in cooperation with the prospective role players. However, theorising is a good start, and when considering that the founding father of social psychology, Kurt Lewin, surmised, "[t]here is nothing so practical as good theory",[262] this statement implies that a good foundation has already been laid for a process that could possibly work. It would therefore be apt to make some recommendations to military decision-makers on the proposition to approach pre-deployment fitness-for-duty evaluations from a positive psychology perspective.

Recommendations for military decision-makers

Based on the discussion above, it is thus suggested that military decision-makers in the SANDF in general and more specifically in the SAMHS move away from the stigmatised view of psychopathology to that of psychological risk. From a positive psychology approach, psychological risk can be identified more effectively than from a medical

model, and it can be approached as something more manageable, such as any other workplace safety and health risk. In this way, commanders would also have increased control over managing the risks. Nevertheless, it will remain imperative, firstly, to identify those soldiers deemed imminently or potentially dangerous to minimise the risk posed to themselves, others or the success of the mission and, secondly, to assist the members in their well-being.

The importance of the role of leadership in managing the psychological well-being of subordinates is emphasised by Rothmann and Cooper[263] when they suggest that "good" leaders should initiate a process to assess the impact of the various risk factors on overall functioning at present and in the future. It is also important that leadership identify what can be done to improve the overall well-being of soldiers individually and/or as part of the 'military family' to enable them to function optimally and to be able to be utilised in the military in fulfilling its constitutional obligations.

Military decision-makers must be encouraged to initiate and support further research into pre-deployment screening processes and into coping under deployment situations with their unique stressors. It might also be possible to link such research to research on stressors in the mission area and dysfunctional behavioural patterns observed during external deployments. This could include research into identifying soldiers' existing coping mechanisms and developing programmes to improve their coping skills before and during deployments. Closely linked to these programmes is training that can be covered in employee well-being programmes that address issues, such as management of time and/or stress, self-management and coping strategies, addressing personality characteristics, such as psychological hardiness, resilience and personal effectiveness. In this way, areas for interventions, such as psychoeducation could assist in improving a soldier's general PWB. Positive psychology-based interventions can also provide effective tools for working with psychologically distressed soldiers.[264] Military psychologists could thus follow a positive psychology approach in screening soldiers for deployment and could consider looking into post-deployment programmes for reintegrating soldiers into their communities and non-deployment routines, as this is essential to lay the foundation for future deployments. Positive psychology-related reintegration interventions could focus on sharing the success stories of the deployment with families, the community and unit members who did not deploy. The crux of the recommendations made to military decision-makers is to make a deliberate effort to include positive psychology into the regime of the SANDF to improve the PWB of soldiers.

Conclusion

A positive psychology approach will not mean a move away from 'selecting out' soldiers unsuitable for deployment. It is however a 'tool' in the hand of the military psychologist as the current selection instrument becomes part of a more inclusive and more informative process of considering collateral information in deciding on the suitability of individuals for external deployments. It is likely to be advantageous for the SANDF, and it will make the deploying force commander part of the decision-making process. In this way, the force commander has more information on which informed decisions can be made than in the

past and more useful and succinct feedback can be given to sub-level commanders. This will give the clients of the SAMHS additional insight into the process that was followed to reach a decision, and the client (in this case, the force commander) will become part of making the decision. The client can take responsibility for assisting with the development of the affected soldier's PWB and will have a good understanding of what might be required to ensure the PWB of other soldiers as well. Furthermore, research on existing challenges in the various mission areas can be used to improve the selection process. Positive psychology elements included in a holistic approach could realise benefits for the different stages of deployment, such as the preparatory phase, the deployment and adjustment phase, as well as the preparation for reintegration once deployment has been completed.

This article does not provide a solution to military decision-makers but rather acts as an 'appetiser' for further exploration of positive psychology within the context of fitness-for-duty evaluations. It also supports the observation in a recent book on military psychology in South Africa that there is a need for a broad shift towards positive psychology and proactivity in the management of wellness in the SA military context.[265] Future research can further explore the integration of the Person–Environment–Fit Model, the Person–Environment–Occupation Model and other constructs related to positive psychology, such as engagement, resilience, hardiness, organisational affective commitment, flourishing, psychological capital and well-being, to name a few. Lastly, the SANDF in general and more specifically the SAMHS Directorate Psychology will benefit from the suggested expansion of this model and approach by, for example, developing a taxonomy of stressors related to deployment and trends in morale and engagement at different stages of deployment.

Endnotes

188 Piet Bester grew up on a farm in the Orange Free State. After matriculation, he did national service (conscription). Piet joined the South African Defence Force, attended the South African Military Academy, obtained various degrees, and completed the University of Johannesburg's Doctoral Programme: Leadership in Performance and Change. He is also a registered Industrial Psychologist and completed various military courses, including the Joint Senior Command and Staff Programme and Security and Defence Studies Programme, including a Post Graduate Diploma in the Management of Security at the University of the Witwatersrand. Piet is currently a senior lecturer at the University of Stellenbosch's Faculty of Military Science. His research interests include leadership, integrity, performance enhancement, test construction, and national security.

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
Examining support of South African Defence Force conscription by the mainstream Afrikaans sister churches (1968–1991)

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Abstract

From the 1950s to the 1990s, white men were conscripted to serve in the South African Defence Force (SADF). Although it varied in its application and duration, conscription was an undeniable, and often unavoidable, part of life for white South Africa. While it was not universally accepted, and certainly not universally popular, resistance was largely confined to English-speaking citizens. Objection was often seen as cowardly or treacherous. Conscription had an influence on the psyche of white South Africa and was viewed in a serious light by various religious denominations. Ecclesiastical positions varied and often changed over the course of time. In the main, Afrikaans churches were sympathetic towards conscription, while English churches were likely to oppose it. The latter position has been extensively documented, but the former remains neglected. This article analyses the role that mainstream Afrikaans sister churches played in supporting the National Party policies of conscription and ensuring their congregants' compliance. It also presents a discussion on the relationship between those churches and the SADF, inter alia by referring to changes in conscription legislation and the reaction of the churches to those changes.

Keywords: conscription, national service, South African Defence Force, Reformed Church, End Conscription Campaign, Defence Act, Chaplain Service.

Introduction

While much has been written about the role of South African (SA) churches in opposing apartheid and the attendant policy of conscription instituted by the South African Defence Force (SADF), few authors have examined the role of churches in supporting conscription. This article first reflected on the socio-ecclesiastical characteristics and effect of conscription in South Africa and briefly reviewed the opposition to conscription by churches. Secondly, the study drew on primary sources from the archives of the three mainstream Afrikaans sister churches – the Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk (NGK) (Dutch Reformed Church), the Nederduitsch Hervormde Kerk van Afrika (NHKA) (Dutch Reformed Church of Africa) and the Gereformeerde Kerke in Suid-Afrika (GKSA) (Reformed Churches in South Africa) – to analyse the relationship between the church and the military in apartheid South Africa. Reference is often made to changes in legislation regarding conscription. This not only places ecclesiastical events in their politico-military

context, but also serves as a yardstick to judge the support by churches for increasingly demanding conscription policies.

While voices were certainly raised against the policies of conscription from within the Afrikaans sister churches, these were a minority, and a discussion of these voices fell outside the scope of the current study. The internal tension between supporters and detractors, however, is a topic that deserves further research and could draw on ecclesiastical documents, such as the Cottesloe Declaration,[267] *Ras, volk en nasie*[268] (Race, people and nation), *Kerk en samelewing*[269] (Church and society), *Geloof en protes*[270] (Faith and protest), *Stormkompas*[271] (Storm compass), and the Belhar Confession.[272]

It should firstly be noted that, although the three Afrikaans sister churches are discussed individually, they formed a largely united front in their support of the SADF. The comparative lengths of the subsections in this article are not necessarily indicative of the level of support, but rather of the availability and accessibility of information from the archives of the different churches. Secondly, this article does not attempt to criticise the position that any church took, whether in support of or in opposition to conscription or, more importantly, to detract from the present-day validity of the churches (although certain statements and/or assertions may be questioned in historical reflection). The article merely provides a historical perspective on the less-discussed side of the ecclesiastical–military relationship in the SADF. It should also be noted that support of conscription did not necessarily equate to support of apartheid, since different theological considerations were at play. The theological underpinning of the support by churches of conscription is discussed in the next section.

Conscription in apartheid South Africa

Conscription was influenced and exerted its own influence on different spheres of South African society.

The socio-political sphere

Although conscription, by means of a ballot system (similar to that used at the beginning of the United States–Vietnam war) was introduced in South Africa in the early 1950s,[273] resistance was largely limited to criticism of the ballot system itself, rather than the concept of conscription,[274] although churches, such as the Jehovah's Witnesses, rejected conscription from the start. The fact that balloting was predominantly done by Afrikaans-speaking, National Party (NP) supporters irked the general public as well as some leading politicians. The perceived reluctance of Afrikaners to join the Allied war effort during World War II led Sir De Villiers Graaff, leader of the Opposition at the time, to comment that the people who were responsible for the balloting of conscripts "refused to fight during World War II. Now they are apparently listing the young South Africans who are to fight during World War III".[275] Although the idea that South Africans fighting in World War II were almost exclusively from the English-speaking communities of the country has been debunked largely by researchers, such as Albert Grundlingh,[276] a historian at Stellenbosch University, this is, nonetheless, indicative of the concerns of South Africans during the 1950s and 1960s. In practice, however, early conscription did not prove as disastrous as

some had predicted. Despite the NP overseeing balloting, the Defence Force continued to be viewed as a predominantly English-speaking force until the 1960s,[277] to the extent that a committee, chaired by World War II Veteran Brig. HB Klopper, was established in 1953 to "create a more even geographical and language distribution in relation to the manpower made available by the introduction of the ballot system".[278] The net result was that there was little or no actual resistance to the policy of conscription during the 1950s and 1960s along language lines.

In a trend that was to continue until the 1990s, early resistance to conscription came mainly from religious objectors. In the Union Defence Force (UDF), conscientious objection was allowed under the King's (later Queen's) Regulations, but the South African Military Code of 1957 effectively eliminated the possibility of conscientious objection.[279] The only exception was that members of pacifist churches, notably Jehovah's Witnesses, could request to be assigned non-combat roles in the SADF.[280] In 1967, conscription became universal for all white men in South Africa. Previously, conscription had taken place through a ballot system. The new, universal conscription policy continued the original provision for objection in the Defence Act (No. 44 of 1957).[281] Without being bogged down in the complicated legalities of the Defence Amendment Act (No. 85 of 1967),[282] a few factors are worth discussing. The latter act allowed for two courses of action. The first possibility, a new introduction referred to as "allotment", allowed the "registering officer" to assign a recruit to non-combatant duties, provided he *knew* that the recruit belonged to a "recognised religious denomination by the tenets whereof its members may not participate in war".[283] Significantly, the authority to grant this concession lay with the registering officer, i.e. one person, at his own discretion, who had the power to decide whether to indulge a conscript's objection or not. The second possibility, "exemption", did not, as might be assumed, exempt a conscript from national service. In effect, the outcome of exemption was exactly the same as that of allotment: military service in a non-combatant role, again based on belonging to a denomination that forbade participation in war.[284] The major differences between allotment and exemption were that exemption was considered by an exemption board (jointly appointed by the Ministry of Manpower and the Ministry of Defence), rather than a single officer, and that the exemption board did not have to *know* that the conscript belonged to the denomination in question; they just had to be convinced of it. Exemption was essentially carried over from the original act (No. 44 of 1957) with few changes. Significantly, both these routes comprised, in reality, religious objection rather than conscientious objection. The Defence Act (No. 44 of 1957) made no provision whatsoever for objections that were not based on adherence to a specific denomination. Additionally, the church had no input into the decision of whether objections had to be considered or not.

South Africa moved increasingly towards a security state from the mid-1970s,[285] and conscientious objection came to be viewed as dissent against the government. Daniel Conway from Loughborough University holds, "[a] key tenet of the state's claim to legitimacy is the right to organise for war and define the terms and content of the national security discourse."[286] He also describes the relationship between the state and conscription, as well as the way in which conscription influences social identity. Before stating –

> Conscription as a performative concept is premised on republican norms of citizenship as a practice where political status and agency are earned and acknowledged rather than automatically conferred[287]

he claims –

> Citizenship's central role in defining an individual's relationship with the state connects it with other politicised forms of identity, such as race and gender, which are constructed to mark boundaries and to include or exclude, empower or disempower.[288]

Conway's interpretation of conscription is particularly reminiscent of apartheid South Africa, where the state certainly did their utmost to distinguish between those who were included and those who were excluded, and between those who were empowered and those who were disempowered.[289] This process started at an early age, with the government setting great store by the cadet system, in which boys were compelled – and girls encouraged – to participate in drill teams.[290] Civil disobedience and unrest within the borders of South Africa were challenging the efficacy of the government,[291] pushing the state towards the precipice of increasingly severe retaliation. Pretoria had exhibited the practical implications of the national security discourse at Sharpeville in 1960, which resulted in a widespread international crisis of legitimacy of the internal policies of government, underlined by the doctrine of apartheid.[292] In reaction, Afrikaner society – with the support of their churches – emphasised the importance of obedience to the state through good citizenship, even if it meant standing alone against the perceived "total onslaught" of communism.[293]

The theory, perpetrated by the NP government, that South Africa faced a "multi-dimensional threat [read: 'total onslaught'] in the sense that the Republic's enemies attack the constitutional, the economic, the social and the security bases in accordance with a co-ordinated plan or strategy"[294] lay not only at the heart of conscription, but also at the heart of white SA citizenship, or even identity. Failure to render military service when it was needed not only carried the stigma of being a 'bad' citizen, but also detracted from the very being of the young, white SA male. Although the concept of a "multi-dimensional threat", as well as Pretoria's "Total National Strategy"[295] to combat it, was only verbalised in the 1970s, the reasoning that underpinned it had been present in SA thinking for much longer. James Roherty, from the Department of Political Science at the University of South Carolina, contends that SA Prime Minister PW Botha was "basically of a managerial bent"[296] and that his natural inclination was to think from a managerial perspective, trying to find ways in which to manage the status quo, rather than ways to implement new ideas. This may have been the reason why the Total National Strategy was only implemented in the 1970s, but former Regimental Sergeant Major of the Rand Light Infantry, John Keene, illustrates that, in the mind of the average, white South African, the road to a Total National Strategy might have started in World War II:

> I was born in 1946 […] At school […] most of our fathers had served in the Second World War […] And the mindset that we had developed at that stage

was that our fathers had fought a war for the liberation of the human race and that the world offered a lot. The big problem that seemed to be on the minds of our parents was the threat of Communism.[297]

Additionally, by the mid-1980s, South Africans were increasingly becoming aware that 'The Border' was as much an ideological construct as it was a reference to the boundary dividing Angola and Namibia.[298] In popular Afrikaans discourse, the ideological 'Border' had expanded to encompass the perceived greater communist threat, both in Southern and South Africa. The recollections of an English-speaking national serviceman, called up in 1982, are indicative of the dichotomy between Afrikaans- and English-speaking South Africans and might reflect why the NP government felt that it had become necessary to formalise their approach to protect South Africa:

> I didn't really believe in this whole Communistic [sic] onslaught and all of that. I sort of believed that […] affectively [sic] we were in Angola because of a buffer, and affectively [sic] it was to keep space between us and whatever. I didn't really believe in this, that there was a Red under every bed and under every tree. That was propaganda […] The Afrikaners believed that they were going to swarm over us.[299]

The Soweto uprising in 1976, now commemorated in South Africa as Youth Day on 16 June, sensitised the broader SA public to the role of the SADF in suppressing unrest. At the time, the war in Angola and Namibia had not yet reached anything resembling a climax and, for the most part, conscripts were still keen, if somewhat uncertain, to do their national service. When it became apparent, even before the events of 1976, that their duty might not be to protect the South African borders against the ever-maligned 'Red Danger', but rather against internal unrest, questions started to be raised.

In 1974, the Defence Act was amended twice, by the Defence Amendment Act (No. 8 of 1974) and the Defence Further Amendment Act (No. 83 of 1974). Together, these acts had a significant influence on objection to conscription. While the provisions for religious objection in previous iterations of the Defence Act were still in place, the government was taking increasing measures to curb the rise of conscientious objection. To this end, the Defence Further Amendment Act (No. 83 of 1974) made it a criminal offence to incite, or even suggest, conscientious objection.[300]

Political commentator Laurie Nathan holds that it was primarily the English-speaking universities and churches that were the initial catalysts for resistance to conscription, and claims that an average of 1 750 conscripts failed to report for national service from 1975–1978 and that 12 conscientious objectors were imprisoned between 1978 and 1982.[301] Nathan's contention is supported by an SADF Intelligence report from 1978, which claimed that the Youth Christian Workers (YCW), a religious organisation supported both financially and ideologically by the Roman Catholic Church in South Africa, not only had great influence among the black population in South Africa, but was also "reactivating" the conscientious objection movement to influence the (white) SA youth against conscription.[302] Gavin Cawthra of the University of the Witwatersrand adds to this

debate by maintaining that white South Africans who chose exile over national service in the 1970s and 1980s were sympathetic to the plight of black South Africans, but found it difficult to gain acceptance within black consciousness (BC) movements. Many of the anti-apartheid, anti-conscription movements and organisations that were established by exiled conscripts were "driven by the exigencies of their exclusion from the liberation struggle by BC activists".[303]

Dissent from within, in the form of conscientious objection, from one of the pillars of the SA security state, became an increasingly vexing problem to Pretoria. The Conscientious Objector Support Group (COSG) and the National Union of South African Students (NUSAS) became increasingly vociferous in their support of conscientious objection and their opposition to militarisation. Although the majority of white South Africa still supported the NP policy of conscription and were largely uncritical of the way in which the SADF was deployed, the government was sufficiently concerned about the activities of organisations, such as COSG and NUSAS, to introduce the Defence Amendment Act in 1983. Probably in an attempt to garner the support of the SA clergy, this act provided the opportunity for *religious* objectors (as opposed to *conscientious* objectors), who refused to serve in any armed force, to perform their national service in government departments other than the SADF, albeit at one and a half times the length of military service.[304] On the other hand, the sentence for *conscientious* objectors, or those who specifically refused to serve in the SADF, was increased from a maximum of two to six years.[305] The "carrot-and-stick" approach that American political scientist Richard Dale believes permeated Pretoria's foreign policy in Africa[306] also seems to have found its way into domestic policy regarding conscription.

The contention that garnering support from the clergy was a contributing factor in Pretoria's decision to change the attitude towards religious objection is reflected in the way in which the Exemption Board, deciding on applications for exemption from national service on religious grounds, was constituted. According to the stipulations of the Defence Amendment Act (No. 34 of 1983), the chairman of the board had to be a judge or retired judge of the Supreme Court of South Africa. The other five compulsory members of the board had to be three theologians (the wording of the act does not make it clear whether 'theologians' had to be interpreted in the academic sense of the word, or whether ordinary clergy would have sufficed) of different denominations and two members of the SADF, one of which had to be a chaplain.[307] A board that had to make decisions about religious objection was bound to contain a high percentage of theologians, but the excessive weighting in favour of men of the cloth over men of the law would also have given churches a sense of having a hand in their own destiny. If the SADF was prepared to rely so heavily on expertise from outside its own ranks, surely, the church must have reasoned, the SADF were making a genuine attempt to accommodate religious objectors.

The various Defence Amendment Acts had two consequences for the relationship between the state (and its armed forces) and the church. Firstly, Pretoria prevented SA churches from joining forces against conscription (and other political policies). The Afrikaans-speaking churches had always been more sympathetic towards the NP than the English-speaking ones, but the mollification provided by the act soothed many a conscience

among Afrikaans theologians. The largest Afrikaans denomination, the NGK, remained a stalwart supporter of the NP for another decade and never actively entered the debate about the validity or morality of conscription. Other Afrikaans churches largely followed suit, and the English churches remained the spiritual voice of caution. This is exemplified by the number of successful applications granted in 1984 in terms of the 1983 Amendment Act: 101 Jehovah's Witnesses, two from the Worldwide Church of God, three Anglicans, two Methodists, one Baptist, one Seventh Day Adventist, and five Christadelphians.[308] Secondly, by creating a clear dichotomy between *religious* objection and *conscientious* objection, Pretoria maintained the aforementioned "right to organise for war and define the terms and content of the national security discourse"[309] and the right to protect its own political legitimacy. Religious objectors were now no longer a noteworthy threat to the perceived sovereign rights of the state, as their protest was now diverted to spiritual rather than political spheres. At the same time, government had provided itself with a mandate to act decisively against those who opposed them politically. This is echoed by the marked increase in successful petitions for religious objection. By 1988, Jehovah's Witnesses alone accounted for 787 successful petitions, with 70 Plymouth Brethren, 57 Anglicans, 51 congregants from the Worldwide Church of God, 46 Methodists, and 30 Romans Catholics comprising the top six. However, the appearance of comparatively unknown denominations, such as the Victory Faith Centre, the Midnight Awakening Call Association, the Greytown Christian Centre and the Suppliant Faithist – albeit in modest numbers – indicated that the new law might have left a loophole that could be exploited in favourable circumstances.[310] Nonetheless, the almost complete absence of Afrikaans-speaking objectors highlights the dichotomy that existed between English and Afrikaans churches in their views on conscription. While it should be kept in mind that many men simply did their national service because it was required by law, rather than spending much time reflecting on its legitimacy,[311] a reflection on the theology underpinning the absence of objectors from Afrikaans sister churches further illuminates the dichotomy between the English and Afrikaans sections of the SA society.

The theological sphere

While the emphasis of this article is on the historiography, it is useful to reflect briefly on the hermeneutical considerations of the sister churches in their support of conscription. As mentioned in the introduction, the hermeneutics and exegesis that permeated the discussion by churches about conscription were different to those used in discussions about apartheid. Support of conscription and support of apartheid should therefore not be seen as two sides of the same coin, although there might have been overlaps at times.

The sister churches mainly used the hermeneutical lens of Augustine's Just War theory, including later developments on the theory by theologians such as Thomas Aquinas, Desiderius Erasmus, Martin Luther and John Calvin.[312] While a comprehensive discussion of this theory fell outside the scope of this study, some key points can be highlighted. Augustine held the view that war is an inherent part of humankind and, given the prevalence of war in human history, part of God's plan for humankind. Since God created *ex nihilo* (from nothing), war forms part of creation.[313] Going further, Augustine asked the rhetorical question, "[w]hen war is undertaken in obedience to God, who would

rebuke, or humble, or crush the pride of man, it must be allowed to be a righteous war?"[314] In a striking parallel to the views of the NP government in South Africa, Augustine was concerned with guarding the Pax Romana and its attendant orderliness – divine orderliness, since the Roman Empire of his time was nominally a Christian state – against the chaos that would follow a "barbarian" invasion.[315] As indicated in the previous section, Pretoria was keen to position South Africa as a bastion against communism, a position that many churches (Afrikaans and English) accepted. Against this backdrop, the Afrikaans sister churches viewed pacifism as an untenable position although, like Augustine, they had certain requirements that had to be met. These included waging war (and conscripting) only under the authority of a legal authority, minimising the impact of war on civilians, and waging war humanely.[316] Irrespective of the political policies of government, the sister churches therefore felt theologically compelled to oppose the spread of communism[317] – a social ideology inextricably linked to the concept of 'total onslaught' – and the logical way to do so was by supporting SADF efforts in Namibia and Angola and the associated policy of conscription. While a comprehensive theological criticism of their position fell outside the scope of this study, it deserves attention in future research. Gary Baines from Rhodes University claims that several "universal war themes" – inter alia dehumanising the enemy and gratuitous violence – could be found in the SADF.[318] These will provide ideal lenses to compare the socio-military realities of war with the theological debates about supporting it.

The South African Chaplains' Service

Although the Chaplains' Service went through several name changes – in 1973, the GKSA referred to it as the "Corps of Chaplains"[319] and the "Chaplains Section in 1976"[320] – this article uses the term 'Chaplains' Service' throughout for the sake of clarity. The Chaplains' Service published a document titled *Jy en militêre diensplig* (You and military service) – unfortunately undated, but it refers to Gen. Magnus Malan as Chief of the SADF, placing the date between 1976 and 1980[321] – to prepare young Christian men for national service. In the document, the Chaplains' Service emphasised that national service is the duty of every citizen and, significantly, the contribution of national service would turn the SADF into a defence force "uit die volk vir die volk [from the people for the people]". However, drawing on Christian tradition, they emphasised that Christians' "Godgegewe [God-given]" duty was to defend their country, thereby fulfilling their calling of bringing the gospel to heathen Africa.[322] Interestingly, they also drew on young men's emotions by claiming that they would not only serve God by completing their national service, but also protect their "mamma" and "meisie [girlfriend]".[323] Ian Liebenberg indicates an insightful relationship between ideology and crisis, which can be seen echoed in the Chaplains' Service. He claims that crises challenge the legitimacy of regimes, and that establishing or reinforcing certain ideologies is an effective method of combating such challenges.[324] The emotional appeal of the Chaplains' Service not only enforced the notion of protection against the perceived "total onslaught" against South Africa, but also reinforced the notion that national service was tied to masculinity. By contrast, the SADF tried to present objection as effeminate.[325]

This appeal is also found in a document published by the Algemene Jeugkommissie (General Youth Commission) of the NGK, which made the rather nationalistic claim that it is the duty of every national serviceman to ensure that the "land wat die Here aan ons gegee het [country which the Lord gave us]" is defended "vir onsself en ons kinders [for ourselves and our children]".[326] While this was an oft-repeated phrase in apartheid South Africa, its inclusion in a document issued by the NGK seems to indicate that the leadership of the church (at least those closely involved with the SADF, i.e. serving in the Chaplains' Service) realised that simply calling on their members for commitment to their religion was likely to be insufficient. They therefore included a more personal appeal in an attempt to convince more people to embrace military service. Taking this argument further, it can be argued that the NGK, by doing so, was going to all possible lengths to support not only its own agenda, but also that of government. Of course, it is a long-held Christian belief that the church should function within the parameters set by – and, indeed, in support of – the state.[327] Nevertheless, falling back on emotional appeals seems out of character for a religious organisation supposedly serving the state.

In something resembling delegation of authority from the spiritual to the secular, *Jy en militêre diensplig* informed people on the verge of starting their national service that, even though they might not understand the reasoning behind the training methodology, "[d]aar mag geen vrae gevra word nie! Onvoorwaardelik! [No questions may be asked, under no circumstances!]". Once again, they explain this by drawing on the established Christian tradition of supporting the state authority, by indicating that God wants society to be well organised and structured, and that the authorities achieve this by maintaining a defence force through national service.[328] The first indication of reciprocity by the SADF (and, by extension, government) is found in the section on chaplains and worship services. The document made it very clear that new recruits would meet a chaplain soon after reporting (possibly even before receiving all of their equipment). It provided quite a detailed description of the process to follow if the resident chaplain is from a different denomination. It also affirmed that Gen. Magnus Malan, Chief of the SADF at the time, personally desired every national serviceman to attend a religious service at least once a week.[329] Clearly, in exchange for encouraging potential national servicemen to embrace national service, the church expected a degree of influence from the SADF, and received it. Rather naively, the document attempted to extend this influence to the use of foul language during training, and claimed that the SADF had very strong regulations prohibiting members of the permanent force from using foul language, and promised that any complaints would be dealt with decisively. While it is apparent that the Chaplains' Service was trying to discourage the use of foul language among its national servicemen members, the ambiguous phrasing of the sentence is interesting: "[w] anneer daar klagtes kom oor onwelvoeglike taal of vloekery, word daar onverbiddelik opgetree [when complaints are received about foul language or swearing, decisive action is taken]".[330] It is unlikely that any such complaints would have been well received by the SADF. In the same vein, while *Jy en militêre diensplig* promised decisive action, it did not indicate at whom such action would be directed. Whether this was deliberate is open to debate, but it certainly seems to have covered all bases: on religious grounds, it could claim to have acted correctly by discouraging bad language, but on secular grounds, it fulfilled its duty to the SADF by encouraging potential national servicemen to embrace their national service.

Apparently, the Chaplains' Service realised that the guidelines provided in the late 1970s were unlikely to be successful, because they issued an amended publication in 1983, titled *Beheersing van die tong* (Controlling the tongue).[331] In this document, the Chaplains' Service drew much more heavily on scripture to guide the actions of national servicemen regarding reaction to foul language. Rather than suggesting that national servicemen lodge a complaint right away, it drew on the gospel of Matthew to suggest that they try to address the issue directly first, then take someone with them, and only after that, complain to the relevant military structures.[332] This change of stance had two outcomes: firstly, it was more realistic advice for recruits, and, secondly, it placed greater emphasis on the religious aspect of the conduct of a national serviceman in the army.

These examples are microcosms of the difficult situation in which any chaplaincy finds itself: on the one hand, it has a religious responsibility (arguably to a higher power), but on the other hand, the chaplaincy is in service of the defence force. The gravitation of the Chaplains' Service increasingly towards the religious aspects rather than the military is indicative of the growing influence of the church on the SADF.

Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk (NGK) (Dutch Reformed Church)

In a report to the executive committee of the General Youth Commission, the NGK noted that the church could play a role in preparing the youth for national service.[333] The NGK clearly took its role within the SADF seriously, as evidenced by a decision taken during negotiations between chaplains (presumably from the NGK, serving in the SADF) and the executive committee of the General Youth Commission. During these negotiations, the committee indicated that a process had to be established whereby reporting on the ministry of the church to national servicemen could be done officially. These reports not only served at local level, but were also consolidated up to the General Synod, the highest authority of the church.[334] At the same meeting, attendees provided extensive motivation in favour of suspending the requirement that congregants had to undergo a full year of catechism before they were allowed to confess their faith before the congregation and consequently be confirmed by the church. The attendees justified this decision by indicating that the SADF allowed the church up to 30 hours during basic training to minister to new national servicemen, which compared favourably to the approximately 20 hours of 'normal' catechism through the course of a year.[335]

The concessions that both parties (the SADF and the NGK) were willing to make in this agreement are significant. From the side of the SADF, sacrificing 30 hours of training time during an already brief training period was indicative of the lengths to which they were willing to go in order to keep the support of the NGK (and other churches, as this concession would not have applied exclusively to the NGK). On the other hand, confirmation is a central tenet of the NGK. Although confirmation is not considered a sacrament, it does serve to confirm the sacrament of baptism; members are expected to affirm that they, as adults, accept the commitments that their parents made at their baptism as children. It also allows confirmands to participate in the sacrament of communion. At the time, they were not allowed to do so before confirmation. The fact that the NGK even considered compromising on this central component of their ministry

indicates a very close bond between the church and the defence force. Another example of this relationship is clear from the 1982 General Synod, where the NGK prepared an extensive document outlining historical resistance to military service (and, by extension, conscription). The intention was to indicate that the historical examples dated back to circumstances different to those in South Africa at the time, and that a blanket acceptance of objection to conscription could not be considered by the NGK.[336] This coincided with the removal of Johan Heyns – one of the more vociferous critics of the position of the NGK towards apartheid and conscription – from an authoritative position in the church. He was reinstated and elected as moderator of the church in 1986 and was expected to be instrumental in shaping the rejection of apartheid by the church,[337] although this did not extend to rejecting conscription.

The relationship between the Chaplains' Service of the SADF and the NGK was clearly indicated in communication between the General Youth Commission and the Chaplain General on 21 January 1986. The Youth Commission expressed a desire to employ a national serviceman in a full-time capacity to develop literature for the Chaplains' Service. However, the Commission did not have funds to remunerate someone in such a position. In a clear indication of the spirit of cooperation between the NGK and the Chaplains' Service, the Chaplain General – while indicating that no official channels existed for the remuneration of such a position by the SADF – offered to include a sum, equal to the remuneration for the position, in the budget for the next year. It would still not be paid as a salary, but the amount would be paid to the Youth Commission who, in turn, could then remunerate the national serviceman.[338] The SADF was notoriously reluctant to make any concessions to national service. Although this concession was only for one national serviceman, the fact that the Chaplain General was willing to bend the rules to find ways to accommodate the Youth Commission is indicative of a strong relationship between the two organisations. The strong influence of the NGK in the Chaplains' Service is apparent from the fact that the Chaplain General made this offer despite the NGK admitting in a presentation to the Chaplain General on 18 November 1985 that having only one person (from the NGK) developing literature for the SADF limited the exposure of all national serviceman recruits to literature developed by the NGK.[339] This was contrary to the SADF policy that all soldiers could worship in their own denomination.

Another example of the tacit support that the SADF received from members of many churches (in this case, the NGK) can be found in a response to a Youth Commission memorandum on ministry to national servicemen returning from performing their military service. The memorandum suggested that ministers pay particular attention to returning national servicemen in their congregations, establishing whether these national servicemen had problems reverting to civilian life. The memorandum included examples, such as looking for work and re-adapting to civilian society.[340] While this memorandum in no way implied criticism of the influence of national service on congregants, it at least appeared to be cognisant of the possibility of national servicemen struggling to reintegrate into civilian society and attempts to take steps to address the problem. However, when asked for comment on the memorandum, a presumably senior member of the NGK made a statement that reflected the sentiment of at least a part of the NGK membership:

Laat ons nie te veel maak van die tema van 'aanpassing' nie. Dit is wel waar dat aanpassing in minder of meerder mate nodig sal wees (soos ons almal maar het na 'n vakansie of 'n vreemde roetine) [Let us not make too much of the theme of 'adapting'. It is true that adapting will be necessary to an extent (like we all have to do after a holiday or an unfamiliar routine)].[341]

While the effects of national service on the recruits have only been studied fairly recently,[342] comparing national service to a holiday borders on the ridiculous. The episode seems to indicate something of a disagreement within the leadership structures of the NGK. Certain members, such as those serving on the Youth Commission, while not necessarily critical of national service, at least acknowledged that it had social (and, by extension, religious) consequences, and they tried to put measures in place to mitigate these. By contrast, however, there was a group in the church who would not brook any challenge to the legitimacy of national service, even to the extent of comparing participation in a war to taking a holiday, thereby downplaying the need for religious leaders to intervene and, potentially, implicitly criticising the SADF policy of conscription.

The synod of the Western and Southern Cape, drafted a fascinating document at their 2015 meeting. In this document, while falling short of explicitly admitting that the NGK had supported the policy of conscription during apartheid, delegates admitted that national service "radikale gevolge gehad [het] vir individue en families op emosionele, ekonomiese en geestelike vlak [had radical consequences for individuals and families at emotional, economic and spiritual level]".[343]

Nederduitsch Hervormde Kerk van Afrika (NHKA) (Dutch Reformed Church of Africa)

The Nederduitsch Hervormde Kerk van Afrika (NHKA) should not be confused with the Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk in Afrika (NGKA). The former is a sister church to the NGK, while the latter can be seen as a daughter church to the NGK, established in 1963 for black congregants of the NGK family.

The NHKA only addressed the matter of conscription officially at the highest level – i.e. their General Church Meeting – three times, namely in 1977, 1983 and 1993 – although, like the NGK, they made extensive use of literature provided by the Chaplains' Service, which would have had to be approved at some level. The two formal discussions coincided with quite dramatic changes in legislation regarding conscription: in 1977, the period of conscription[344] was changed, and in 1982, the guidelines for dealing with objection were amended.[345] In 1977, the NHKA entered into correspondence with the Methodist Church (which did not wholeheartedly support the NP government and its policies the way the Afrikaans churches did). The Methodist Church emphasised the multiracial nature of its congregants, and bemoaned the fact that its chaplains were only allowed to minister to its white congregants in the SADF. While their letter refrained from explicitly stating it, there was a strong hint that they felt that the same ministry should be extended to black members serving in the armed wings of liberation movements outside of South Africa. Since this was unlikely, they desired to negotiate with the SADF to establish a clear

distinction between the clerical and the military duties of their chaplains. They were in favour of the former but wanted to distance themselves from the latter. Perhaps somewhat naively, the Methodist Church enquired whether the NHKA shared their position, and wanted to join them in their negotiations, pointing out that they were supported by the Roman Catholic Church, the Church of the Province of SA, the Baptist Union of SA, the United Congregational Church of SA and the Presbyterian Church of SA.[346]

While the position of the English churches is not surprising, the reaction of the NHKA is insightful, as they –

- categorically denounced the position of the Methodist Church, systematically pointing out that the SADF did not interfere with the ministry of chaplains;
- noted that the growing conflict in South Africa was not between black and white citizens;
- argued that the SADF did not serve white South Africans only;
- questioned the liberation theology tenets of the Methodist Church;
- questioned whether the Methodist Church had a mandate to minister to its congregants outside the borders of the country;
- labelled the Methodists that joined armed wings of liberation movements as terrorists; and
- concluded by not only rejecting the invitation by the Methodist Church to join them in negotiations with the SADF, then and in future, but also by suggesting that a meeting between the Methodist Church and the NHKA might serve as an opportunity to educate the Methodists on the true nature of the SADF.[347]

While most of the points raised by the NHKA could be questioned, perhaps the most significant was the suggestion that the Methodists did not quite understand what the SADF stood for and what it was doing. This clearly implies ties between the SADF and the NHKA (read: NGK family) that simply did not exist between the SADF and the Methodists (read: English churches).

At their general church meeting in May 1983, the NHKA reiterated their support to the SADF by affirming the Chaplains' Service as the "amptelike diensweg waarlangs die (Nederduitsch Hervormde) kerk (van Afrika) sy lidmate in die Weermag bereik en versorg [official service route by which the (Dutch Reformed) church (of Africa) may reach and care for its congregants]",[348] allowing the NHKA to do its "werk […] in die kader van die Weermag deur sy eie predikante [work … in the cadre of the Defence Force through its own ministers]".[349] This quid pro quo arrangement (not unusual in the relationship between mainstream Afrikaans churches and the SADF, as this article shows) is emphasised by the official recording of the appreciation the NHKA had for the way in which the SADF was willing to accommodate national servicemen chaplains from their denominations by allowing them to also serve in NHKA congregations while they were doing their national service.[350] While this concession only applied after national servicemen had completed the initial phase of their national service (basic training),[351] it was still a meaningful concession when compared to the restrictions to which other national servicemen had

to adhere. Nonetheless, again in an apparent reciprocal step, the NHKA indicated that, at least in theory, national servicemen chaplains should not be treated differently to any other national servicemen,[352] although in practice, the extraordinary measures put in place to accommodate national servicemen chaplains belied the official stance.

As far as official, overt support for government and the SADF went, delegates from the NHKA met with the Chaplain General in January 1983 (probably in preparation for the general meeting) to discuss the matter of "nie-militêre diens vir godsdienstige beswaardes [non-military service for religious objectors]".[353] While the proceedings of the meeting were not recorded, the outcome was that the NHKA took the decision to "ten volle vereenselwig met die voorgestelde wetgewing [fully support the proposed legislation]",[354] presumably relating to the Defence Amendment Act (No. 103 of 1982), which not only extended the period of conscription, but also changed the guidelines for objection.[355] No further mention is made of how the NHKA would treat religious objectors, regardless of their circumstances. It appears that the NHKA was quite willing to abide by whatever decision the SADF took regarding religious objectors, irrespective of denomination. While it might be understandable that the NHKA did not want to get involved in cases of objection from other religions and denominations, their wholesale acceptance of the SADF guidelines, without even the possibility of considering cases from within their own ranks, highlights the symbiotic relationship between church, state and military.

This is further emphasised in an article in the NHKA newspaper, *Die Hervormer*, which justified the SADF policy of conscription by, inter alia, pointing out that South Africa was enjoying a time of peace and prosperity and that, at least in part, it had the SADF to thank for that. *Die Hervormer* therefore claimed that the NHKA (and, implicitly, its congregants) could not object to doing their part to maintain the situation in the country.[356] In return, it could promise national servicemen from the NHKA that the SADF would provide "koffiekamers [coffee rooms]" in the operational area where national servicemen would have the opportunity to see a chaplain and/or have time for their own religious reflection.[357] In an article in the *Jong Hervormer* (an addendum to *Die Hervormer*, aimed at the youth), the editor took an openly political stance in support of conscription, echoing the government refrain of opposing terrorism and communism. In fact, the article contained precious little religious or theological content other than suggesting that good Christians also make good soldiers.[358]

By the 1990s, when it was clear that the political status quo in South Africa could not be maintained, the tables had turned, and the Chaplains' Service itself was under threat. Understandably, given the close ties that the service had with the mainstream Afrikaans churches, the African National Congress (ANC) was not favourably disposed towards the Chaplains' Service, and the prevailing opinion was that it would be disbanded or diminished under an ANC government. The leadership of the NHKA mentioned that they would have to act proactively in the interest of preserving the Chaplains' Service. However, they would not do this at all costs: if a restructured Chaplains' Service under the ANC embraced the concept of religious freedom, they would distance themselves from it, as "godsdiensgelykheid […] is vir die Christen en vir die Nederduitsch Hervormde Kerk onaanvaarbaar omdat dit strydig is met die evangelie [religious equality … is unacceptable

to the Christian and the NHKA because it is contrary to the gospel]".[359] Without getting entangled in the theology underpinning this statement (or, indeed, that underpinning the liberation theology opposed by the NHKA), it is clear that the mutually beneficial relationship had run its course and, in the build-up to a democratic South Africa, each party was starting to look after its own interests.

Gereformeerde Kerke in Suid-Afrika (GKSA) (Reformed Churches in South Africa)

Out of the three Afrikaans sister churches, the GKSA discussed the issue of chaplains and conscription at their highest meeting – the National Synod – most often (in fact, they did so at every synod from 1973 to 1988). However, with the exception of the 1982 synod, these discussions tended to be administrative rather than theological. In 1973, the GKSA extensively discussed the processes involved in appointing chaplains to the SADF. They pointed out that ministers would have to volunteer to serve as chaplains, since the Defence Act in force at the time (i.e. the Defence Amendment Act No. 66 of 1972) indicated that ministers of religion could not be compelled to do military service. However, the GKSA implicitly encouraged volunteering, to the point where they provided guidelines on selecting a chaplain from multiple volunteers.[360] No explicit mention is made of conscription, but the measures put in place to assure that national servicemen belonging to the GKSA would have access to a chaplain from their own denomination, imply acceptance of the policy.

At the next synod meeting, in 1976, the GKSA mentioned that the law made provision for chaplains to be "opgeroep [called up]" during times of war. They took no issue with the matter, indicating a more general acceptance of conscription. However, they did point out that the chaplain was, first and foremost, subject to the discipline of the church and only thereafter to the discipline of the defence force, provided it did not interfere with the chaplain discharging his duties.[361] While not exactly a critical position towards the SADF, this statement by the GKSA shows a clear hierarchical understanding of the nature of the relationship between the church and the military, with the former taking precedence in 1976. However, the GKSA did not object when the law changed again to include ministers of religion in the pool of potential conscripts, merely indicating that they would communicate the change to their congregations in 1979. Interestingly, at the same meeting, they discussed the possibility of providing congregants with communion "te velde [in the field]" and concluded that it would be out of order to do so.[362] The fact remains that more time was spent on discussing matters of protocol than on the inclusion of ministers in national service points, once again, an implicit acceptance and support of the policy, even though it raised practical ecclesiastical issues, which were considered in a serious light.

The strongest challenge to the SADF by the GKSA occurred at the 1982 meeting of the synod, where several matters were discussed, mostly relating to the tension between the calling and divinely ordained duties of a minister and the decidedly secular requirements of the SADF. Among these, the question whether an ordained minister should be allowed to do other work is particularly interesting. The GKSA decided that, should the SADF require "werk van kapelane […] wat nie tot die normale kerkordelike diens van 'n

predikant behoort nie [work by chaplains that does not, according to church laws, belong to the usual service of a minister]", guidance had to be sought from the chaplain's congregation before such work could be undertaken.[363] Unfortunately, it is not clear what they considered 'normal' work for a minister, but it can legitimately be assumed that much of the work of a chaplain would, indeed, fall outside of the scope of the 'normal' duties of a minister of religion. Theoretically, then, the SADF would have to consult with the individual congregation to get permission for their chaplains to discharge these non-clerical duties. In an additional challenge to the SADF, the GKSA decided, in principle, to reject the rank structures of the SADF. It can be inferred that they were referring to ranks in the Chaplains' Service, since these ranks resulted in a hierarchical society that did not align with their understanding of the nature of the Christian community.[364] It appears as though the GKSA, at the time, entertained the notion that the SADF might be willing to make concessions specifically for their denomination. In a concept agreement between the SADF and the GKSA, presented to and approved by the synod, they also demanded that the Chaplains' Service act, at all times and in all circumstances, according to the Scriptures, church laws and confessions of the GKSA.[365] This requirement implies either a very close relationship between the GKSA and the Chaplains' Service (if they had anticipated that it would be accepted by the SADF), or a relatively direct challenge to the SADF, since it would have been difficult for the SADF to accept the requirements of the GKSA to the exclusion of other denominations (who had their own church laws, if not the Scriptures and confessions).

By 1985, the issue of national service had diminished in importance, and the relationship between the GKSA and the SADF seemed to have stabilised. The only pertinent decision taken by the synod was that congregations had to limit their interaction with the Chaplain General, particularly if they did not support serving chaplains.[366] This decision presumably came about as a result of either a direct or an indirect request from the Chaplain General. While not a particularly important decision, it nonetheless points to a degree of cooperation, since at the highest level, the GKSA saw fit to intervene with their congregations on behalf of the Chaplain General. This stands in stark contrast to the 1982 decision about chaplains' duties, which required increased communication between the Chaplains' Service and congregations.

In 1988, the discussion at the meeting of the synod revolved around the commitments of newly qualified ministers during their national service. It appears that a practice had started to develop where national servicemen were appointed in congregations and then appealed to the SADF to spend time in their congregations, rather than in service of the SADF. This practice was denounced in fairly strong terms by the GKSA, stating that all eligible South Africans had to complete the same national service, and that their own newly qualified ministers were no different.[367] Again, this is essentially the opposite of the position that the GKSA took in 1982, when they discussed the duties that chaplains were allowed to fulfil in service of the SADF, and those they were not allowed to undertake. Additionally, the implied subservience of the needs of the church to the needs of the SADF could be questioned.

Conclusion

While it certainly cannot be said that the mainstream Afrikaans churches agreed with all the policies of the SADF, it is clear that, at worst, a cordial relationship existed between the two groups. Similarly, it would be unreasonable to argue that the churches had an influence on the policies and legislation of the NP government regarding conscription and objection thereto. This article demonstrated that there was an undeniable quid pro quo character to the interactions between the church, the state and the defence force. The three sister churches often held discussions at various levels about their interaction with and support of the SADF and the Chaplains' Service. While there were instances of comparatively minor discontent, the churches overall encouraged their congregants to embrace national service. Through their members in the Chaplains' Service, the churches provided guidance to current and prospective national servicemen, indicating that they were aware of the social and emotional challenges associated with conscription. However, none of the churches took an absolute position against the policy at any point, although they might have challenged the legitimacy of certain aspects. In return, the SADF was prepared to make concessions to the churches, including providing opportunities for ministry and pastoral care, as well as covering the salaries of chaplains. Legislation also changed to be orientated towards religious objection rather than towards conscientious objection. Religious objection was, of course, discouraged from the pulpits of the sister churches, although the influence of sermons encouraging national service seems to have diminished as society came to view conscription ever more as a measure to protect the political position of the NP rather than to defend South Africa against external threats.

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Endnotes

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Knowledge of, attitudes toward and practices of ethics of war of the officers and soldiers of the Zambia Army

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Abstract

Since the end of the world wars, the demise of the Cold War and the end of liberation wars in Africa, the changing character of warfare has given birth to uncertainties about how states will respond to acts of aggression in the face of ethics of war, or the moral rules of war. It has become difficult for states to conduct permissible self-defence and other-defence against non-state actors or sub-state groups, which do not have a sovereign (political and territorial integrity) to protect. In the face of this reality, it is not known how much knowledge military personnel world over have on ethics of war, what their attitude towards ethics of war is, and how they practice these ethics of war during war and operations other than war. Research was therefore conducted to assess knowledge of, attitudes toward and practices of the ethics of war of officers and soldiers of the Zambia Army.

A mixed method research was undertaken using explanatory sequential approach. A sample of 420 participants was drawn from officers and soldiers serving in the Zambia Army. Questionnaires were used to collect quantitative data, while focus group discussions and interviews were undertaken to collect qualitative data. The findings from the focus group discussions and interviews provided depth and understanding about how the officers and soldiers felt about ethics of war. The findings of focus group discussions and interviews also helped to explain the findings from the quantitative data.

Quantitative data were analysed at two levels. The first level of analysis comprised descriptive statistics in the form of frequency distribution tables, means and percentages. The second level involved inferential statistics by applying the chi-square test in order to determine the relationship, if any, between the independent variables and the dependent variables using the Statistical Packaging for Social Sciences. Further, the research used Spearman's rank correlation coefficient to measure the strength and direction of association between two ranked variables. Analysis of qualitative data begun during the data collection exercise by arranging the field notes according to salient themes in relation to the objectives. This was followed by pinpointing, examining and recording patterns within the data collected.

The conclusion of the study showed that, at the time, the majority of the Zambia Army officers and soldiers were reasonably acquainted with the knowledge of ethics of war. The study further concluded that Zambia Army officers and soldiers held very strong and positive attitudes towards the ethics of war at the time. In addition, the officers and soldiers also widely accepted and supported the ethics of war, as they considered them beneficial. It was evident from the research that the Zambia Army soldiers and officers practiced the ethics of war extensively and regularly during both local and international operations. However, more needs to be done to increase knowledge levels.

Introduction

The world has witnessed an evolution in the character of warfare since the end of the two world wars, the demise of the Cold War and the end of liberation wars in Africa. The changing character of warfare has given birth to uncertainties about how states will respond to acts of aggression in the face of ethics of war, or the moral rules of war, as it is sometimes called. In the past two centuries, the world has seen inter-state wars, the two world wars and a wide range of various types of conventional warfare. Frowe posits that, people have questioned how politicians and soldiers, who are perpetrators of these killings have been praised as heroes. Soldiers returning from wars have been accorded parades where they are decorated and awarded medals for their courage and skills in the battlefield, and generally, adventure seeking children aspire to become soldiers.[371]

With the demise of interstate wars and the emergence of wars against non-state actors or sub-state groups as the biggest threat to international security, legal scholars and political scientists are therefore re-examining the application of principles of *jus ad bellum* (justice of war), *jus in bello* (justice during the war) and *jus post bellum* (justice after the war). The reasons for resorting to war, the manner in which war is conducted, and the conditions after the end of a war are coming under the microscope. It has become difficult for states to conduct permissible self-defence and other-defence against non-state actors or sub-state groups, which do not have a sovereign (political and territorial integrity) to protect. Worse still, it has become difficult to determine whether to give this kind of aggressor prisoner of war status or not, according to Frowe.

The study on which this article is based, considered ethics of war, which is founded on the just war theory, which is the theoretical foundation of the morality of war. This theory holds that war can sometimes be morally justified, but even when it is justified, the means or methods used to fight a war are still limited by moral considerations, Frowe posits. The origins of just war theory can be traced back to St Ambrose and St Augustine. Augustine argued, war was morally justified if it was declared by the appropriate secular authority, if it had a just cause, and if it was fought with rightful intentions. Augustine further argues, a cause was just if it involved fighting to bring about a condition of peace or to punish wrong doers and promote the good. In those olden years, he said, 'intentions were rightful if the prince who waged the war did so with the intent of realizing one or more of these justifying causes'. According to Kansella and Carr, the foregoing conditions were later endorsed by St Thomas Aquinas who revived Augustine's view and built it

into his monumental inquiry and into the law of nature, which he understood to govern the relations of human beings. Just like St Augustine, Aquinas was mainly concerned with the just cause of war and argued, 'if a war qualified as just, then everything could be done to bring war to its desirable end'.[372]

Frowe further posits, 'it is important to understand that 'Just War Theory', which guides ethics of war, has been a perennial concern of political scientists, theologians, philosophers, warriors, military leaders and politicians on the morality of war and its conduct'.[373] A number of scholars, such as McMahan and Coverdale have all contended in their discourse that just war theory aims at providing a guide on the right way for states to act in potential conflict situations.[374] Christopher and other authors argue that the classical just war theory can be traced back to the ancient civilisations of India, China and Greece.[375] However, it resurfaced in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries following the devastating effects of the two world wars, the invention of nuclear weapons, and liberation wars or indeed operations other than war.

Sibamba writes that the Zambia Army has since inception been involved in domestic, regional and international operations.[376] At domestic level, the Army was employed to defeat the Adamson Mushala insurgency from 1976 to 1982.[377] According to the Zambia Army Archives, the Zambia Army was involved in the liberation wars of Southern Africa from 1965 to 1990.[378] Since liberation movements were a potential threat to internal security, Zambia found a just cause to engage in self-defence in accordance with the provisions of the General Customary Law and the UN Charter at Article 51, which give the right of collective and individual national self-defence.[379] Zambia further found itself engaged in internal security operations against the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) after Mozambique gained its independence. At the advent of independence of most Southern African States, the focus of the Zambia Army shifted to international engagements towards humanitarian interventions in the area of peace support operations. In most PSOs, Zambian troops were confronted with the obligation to protect the civilian population in accordance with Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter where the use of force is authorised.[380]

However, despite the involvement of the Zambia Army in these operations, it was still unclear whether the Zambia Army personnel were familiar with the existence of ethics of war or morality of warfare, as evidenced during the conduct of almost all operations undertaken by the Zambia Army during liberation wars, counter-insurgency operations and internal security operations. With a mandatory requirement for all United Nations PSOs to be conducted within the confines of the principles of the ethics of war or morality of war rules, it has become apparent that Zambia Army personnel should have the requisite knowledge on the existence and application of the rules of war. Non-adherence to these rules would make the Zambia Army culpable of committing war crimes or crimes against humanity. It was necessary therefore to undertake the current study to establish:

- how much knowledge officers and soldiers had of ethics of war;
- the attitudes of officers and soldiers towards the ethics of war, practices or adherence to these ethics of war; and

- whether knowledge of, attitudes toward and practices of the ethics of war were related to variables such as gender, formal education, type of service and length of service.

Since it was found that there was little coverage of ethics of war in military schools at the time, this study had to trigger inclusion of the subject into the curriculum. Most important was the contribution to the body of knowledge through innovation of a model to be used by officers and soldiers of the Zambia Army during training and when conducting both conventional and asymmetric warfare, since it is now an ethical requirement and it is also required by law. Further, it was expected the findings of the study would help the country in the formulation of defence policy, military strategy, as well as training and fighting doctrine of the Zambia Army or the Zambia Defence Force. The findings may also ignite interest for future research in ethics of war, especially among scholars of law and military studies.

Research problem

While much research is done globally on ethics of war, little has been done to establish how much is known by the military combatants, about their attitudes towards ethics of war, and whether they are practising these ethics of war during operations. This knowledge gap is conspicuous on the continent of Africa, and more so in Zambia where no or very little research has been done on ethics of war. The legal rules of war authorise a resort to war in self-defence, according to the provisions of the General Customary Law and the UN Charter at Article 51, which give the right of collective and individual national self-defence.[381] While the legal dimension of the rules of war have been used by the Zambia Army during military operations, it was not known at the time of the study:

- whether officers and soldiers had knowledge of the ethics of war;
- what their attitudes were towards ethics of war; and
- whether ethics of war were practiced during operations by Zambia Army officers and soldiers.

Other than the knowledge gap, the risk of non-compliance with the ethics of war would be a loss of credibility and potential indictment of Zambia Army personnel for war crimes or crimes against humanity. Above all, it was presumed that the study would help the Republic of Zambia to attain United Nations, African Union and international protocols.

Literature review

In the literature reviewed, theoretical conflict was identified in the interpretation of just war theory itself and the number of scholars who have questioned its reliability, especially in modern times. As highlighted in the literature, scholars, such as Babić, argue, 'the Just War Theory has very deep flaws in that it criminalizes war, which reduces warfare to police action, and finally implies a very strange proviso that one side has a right to win'.[382] McMahan and other writers who bring out this theoretical conflict argue that the concern of just war theory was with a rather pure conception of right and wrong.

These researchers posit that this conception of right and wrong made few concessions to pragmatic considerations. They were however unwilling to compromise matters of principle for the sake of considerations of consequences.[383] The arguments by the researchers offered an interesting line of inquiry using qualitative methods to determine whether members of the Zambia Army agree with these writers.

Another notable gap identified in the literature referred to a knowledge void. More specifically, this gap involved scarcity of literature, including literature from related research domains that focused on different demographics. In earlier studies, such as by Kelly and other authors, the focus has been mainly on Western wars conducted mostly in the Middle East.[384] However, despite this great work, none of these prominent authors give much detail on the African context. It was therefore clear that the just war theory in the African context needs further study in order to narrow the knowledge gap. Further, despite intense philosophical debate regarding ethics of war theories, little work has been done on whether a soldier has adequate knowledge of the moral dimension of war. Watkins and Goodwin, for instance, state that, across nine studies, they found consistent evidence that the judgments of ordinary individuals of soldiers' actions are influenced by the justness of the soldiers' causes, contrary to the principle of combatant equality as postulated by the just war theory and Western scholars.[385] This finding suggests further existence of provocative exceptions and contradictory evidence that was interrogated by this research.

Following a critical review of literature, another gap was identified by the researcher, namely a methodological gap. This gap is in the conflict with the research methods used in prior studies, and was mainly explored using a singular or common method. From the literature reviewed, this researcher found no literature that had used mixed methods to examine knowledge of, attitudes toward and practices of the ethics of war. The most vigorous literature found was a comparative study conducted by Verweij, Hofhuis and Soeters to assess the moral judgment of Dutch officers, officer candidates and university students.[386] However, this study was quantitative by nature and was done among military men and women using four dilemmas: two standard ethical dilemmas and two specific military dilemmas based on experiences from military practice, developed by the researchers. Given the fact that the structure of the test conducted by these researchers left many moral considerations undisclosed, they recommended the use of their test in combination with a qualitative research methodology.[387]

In addition to using mainly quantitative methods, very few scholars have used military population in their studies. As an exemption in the literature reviewed, the thesis by De Graaff is based on a military population from which the sample was drawn. De Graaff considered empirical studies of individual moral assessment of servicemen in practice. She equally used both qualitative and quantitative research methods in her study. However, her study was based on operational situations and excluded non-operational situations, which De Graaff herself acknowledges as a methodological weakness.[388] McAlister et al also provide good comparisons in their study where the sample population comprised soldiers. However, the weakness of this latter study is that the survey was limited to students in selected schools and thus not broad enough to generalise findings.[389] Overall, gaps in the literature reviewed are seen not only in the theory itself, but also in research methodology and population.

Methodology

The explanatory sequential mixed methods design was used in this study. This design is an approach in mixed methods that involves a two-phase project in which the researcher collects quantitative data in the first phase, analyses the results, and then uses the results to plan or build on to the second phase of qualitative data collection and analysis. The quantitative results inform the types of participants who have to be selected purposefully to participate in the qualitative phase. This has a considerable influence on the questions asked to the respondents. Qualitative data actually helps to explain the quantitative results in detail. The first two phases are then triangulated into a third phase where quantitative data provide general patterns and width, while qualitative data provide experience and depth to the study. The findings from qualitative phase help to contextualise and enrich the findings, increase validity and generate new knowledge, explains Creswell.[390]

In this study, the researcher applied a cross-sectional descriptive survey design during the quantitative phase, as data collected from a cross-section of officers and soldiers were representative of all rank structures for the study. The study was descriptive and specifically focused on the Zambia Army. Descriptive research attempts to describe, explain and interpret conditions of the present, according to Creswell.[391] The main purpose of descriptive research is to examine a phenomenon that is occurring at a specific place and time. It is concerned with conditions, practices, structures, differences or relationships that exist, opinions held and processes that are going on or trends that are evident,[392] . This was the most appropriate research design for this study to investigate knowledge of, attitudes towards and practices of officers and soldiers of Zambia Army. The study examined the phenomenology of ethics of war, conditions under which this is practiced, as well as the experiences and opinions of personnel of the Zambia Army regarding this phenomenon.

Participants in the research

The population comprised commissioned officers and non-commissioned officers serving in the Zambia Army. The target population comprised officers and soldiers from ten fighting units of the Zambia Army. Due to the nature of the institution under study, the actual population was not given for security reasons. Nevertheless, the Cochran formula, which uses proportions of p and q, was used, as recommended by Cochran in his literature on sampling techniques,[393] to determine the target population, which was a subset of the population for the purpose of the study. The calculation to determine sample size is explained in the next paragraph for ease of understanding. A total of 420 respondents were given questionnaires but only 413 participated in the study during the quantitative stage. During the qualitative stage, the number was small, as only 15 participants from each of the three provinces selected for the purpose based on convenience, were involved in focus group discussions, while three former army commanders participated in the interview.

Sample size determination

Phenomenological studies normally target smaller populations of not more than 50. In this study, the phenomenological approach therefore targeted a qualitative dimension of

not more than 50 respondents who participated in focus group discussions and personal interviews. The sample size for the quantitative dimension was determined by using a population determination formula, while questionnaires were used for collecting data for this purpose. Cochran developed a formula for large populations, which yields a representative sample for proportions.[394] This study used the following Cochran formula to determine the appropriate sample size:

$$n = Z^2 \frac{pq}{e^2} \dots\dots\dots\dots\dots\dots\dots\dots\dots\dots\dots\dots\dots\dots\dots\dots\dots\dots\dots\dots\dots\dots\dots\dots(1)$$

where:

n = sample size required

Z = 1.96 for a 95% confidence interval using a Z-table

E = the specified margin of error (±5)

p = an estimate of the proportion of the population that has a characteristic of interest

q = an estimate of the proportion of the population that does NOT have a characteristic of interest

q = 1-p since p + q = 1.

The maximum variability is obtained when p = 0.5.

Therefore:

$$n = 1.96^2 \frac{0.5 \times 0.5}{0.05^2}$$

$$= \frac{3.8416 \times 0.25}{0.0025}$$

$$= 384$$

Assuming an 8.5% non-response rate

$$n = \frac{3.84}{0.915}$$

$$n = 419.67$$

Therefore, n = **420**

Sample size

Both probability and non-probability sampling techniques were used in this study. From the population of officers and soldiers, 420 participants were randomly selected from

the ten fighting units, forty-two from each unit, and subjected to the questionnaire. The officers and soldiers who were selected to respond to the questionnaire were drawn from across all the ranks in the Zambia Army from the lowest rank of private to that of colonel. The two ranks of major general and lieutenant general were exempted from answering the questionnaire during quantitative data collection, as these two ranks were only held by the two most senior officers of the Zambia Army. Additionally, it was difficult to get the rank of brigadier general due to their national duty commitments. During collection of qualitative data, two four-star generals and one three-star general however participated in personal interviews.

Data collection

Field research was the main source of data collection. Structured questionnaire was designed and given to selected participants. Focus group discussions were arranged in selected provinces, and participants interacted to share experiences and opinions. Additionally, an interview guide was used and personal interviews were conducted with key participants in order to maintain the focus and relevance of the study.

Data analysis

Quantitative data were analysed at two levels. The first level of analysis was descriptive statistics in the form of frequency distribution tables, means and percentages. The second level involved inferential statistics by applying the chi-square test in order to determine the relationship, if any, between the independent variables and the dependent variables using the latest version of the Statistical Packaging for Social Sciences (SPSS 16.0). Data were further subjected to Spearman's rank correlation coefficient analysis to measure the strength and direction of the relationship among the independent and dependent variables further.

In the study, analysis of qualitative data began during the data collection exercise by arranging the field notes according to salient themes in relation to the objectives. This was followed by pinpointing, examining and recording patterns within the data collected. This type of thematic content analysis was used in the study because of its relevance to the description of a phenomenon and its association with a specific research question. This method of analysis was also tied to the specific theory on which the ethics of war is grounded. Thematic content analysis allowed for a rich, detailed and comprehensive description of data that were collected during the study. This led to a fuller understanding of research findings. Qualitative stage findings explained the results of the quantitative strand of the study.

Findings and perception

The study was able to establish the knowledge of, attitudes toward and practices of ethics of war of officers and soldiers of Zambia Army. The findings and perception about the findings are discussed in the following paragraphs:

Knowledge

In order to establish whether officers and soldiers of the Zambia Army had knowledge about ethics of war, the respondents involved in the study were assessed based on their own experiences and the extent to which they believed that they were fully knowledgeable about the ethics of war. The study findings showed that 41% of the respondents agreed to having full knowledge of the ethics of war, and 25% agreed strongly. Of the officers, 66.0% affirmed that they were fully knowledgeable in terms of the ethics of war. A further 11.0% of the respondents were neutral (i.e. neither agreeing nor disagreeing), while another 11.0% disagreed, and 12% strongly disagreed to being fully knowledgeable. These findings showed that the majority of the officers and soldiers felt that they had full knowledge of the ethics of war. A lack of certainty in 11% and disagreement by 23% of the respondents meant that there was a need to up-scale knowledge levels of officers and soldiers in the Zambia Army. Figure 5.1 reflects statistical details in this regard.

Figure 1: Full knowledge of ethics of war

In the Zambia Army, officers and soldiers are normally expected to possess a thorough grounding in knowledge of the ethics of war that would help them conduct themselves professionally during local and international operations. In this vein, the study revealed that, at the time, most of the officers and soldiers actually understood the fundamental principles of the ethics of war, with their predominant sources of information being the military schools and pre-deployment programmes. The military schools as source of information conducted scheduled training for the officers and soldiers based on a standard curriculum. The curriculum was broad-based and exposed trainees to various aspects of the military. However, although the curriculum used by the Army at the time was being well taught, it did not contain a comprehensive coverage of the ethics of war compared to the pre-deployment training to which the officers and soldiers had been exposed before being deployed on international operations. Unfortunately, pre-deployment training was also seldom allocated ample time to enable the officers and soldiers to be thoroughly trained to prepare them for deployment to foreign countries.

During the study, the officers and soldiers expressed the levels of their knowledge of the ethics of war by correctly identifying and articulating the principles of the ethics of war. It was clear that the majority of officers and soldiers had at least a fundamental understanding of the ethics of war. They were able to recognise that it was –

- ethical to use war for self-defence;
- ethical to declare war with the right motive or cause;
- ethical to declare intention before starting a war;
- ethical for legitimate authority only to declare a war; but
- unethical to kill non-combatants.

Unfortunately, many of the officers and soldiers failed to recognise that it could be ethical to use war as a means to enhance or promote peace.

Attitudes

One of the key issues of the study was to assess the attitudes of officers and soldiers towards the ethics of war. Five questions were appropriately designed into the questionnaire to enable the assessment of the attitudes towards the ethics of war in the Zambia Army. The study found that 74% of the Zambia Army officers and soldiers showed positive behaviour towards the ethics of war. This was buttressed by the computed grand mean of 3.79, which was way above the average Likert scale value of 3. The results on the other hand, showed a proportion of the officers and soldiers (20% disagreement) not expressing satisfactory attitude towards the ethics of war. It was also observed that only 6% of the respondents were disinterested in stating their exact attitude; hence, choosing to remain neutral. These findings entailed that the majority of the officers and soldiers of the Zambia Army demonstrated a positive attitude towards the ethics of war, which might be attributed to the levels of knowledge acquired.

Ethics of war are widely accepted as a norm in the Zambia Army by both officers and soldiers who maintain a positive posture towards ethics of war. Most officers and soldiers fully accept the ethics of war, feel personally responsible to uphold the ethics, and feel committed to promoting it. Generally, the Zambia Army officers and soldiers believe that the ethics of war are beneficial to them and they are therefore eager to learn more about these ethics. Some of the fundamental factors that were seen to affect the attitudes of officers and soldiers toward the ethics of war included their religion, level of formal education attained as well as length of service. This study was however not able to provide evidence to show that the acceptance of the ethics of war was directly influenced by the type of service in which the soldiers and officers were involved (whether commissioned or non-commissioned). Table 1 provides statistical details in this regard.

Table 1: Summary of findings on attitude towards ethics of war

Study variables on attitude		Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly agree	Mean
		1	2	3	4	5	
I fully accept ethics of war	f	38	41	22	183	129	3.78
	%	9%	10%	5%	44%	31%	
I feel responsible for upholding the ethics of war	f	45	44	51	164	109	3.6
	%	11%	11%	12%	40%	26%	
I feel committed to promoting ethics of war	f	41	50	29	174	119	3.68
	%	10%	12%	7%	42%	29%	
I believe ethics of war are beneficial	f	41	39	15	169	149	3.84
	%	10%	9%	4%	41%	36%	
I am eager to learn more about ethics of war	f	31	37	8	141	196	4.05
	%	8%	9%	2%	34%	47%	
Average (%)		**10%**	**10%**	**6%**	**40%**	**34%**	**3.79**
Summary		**Disagreement :20%**		**Neutral -:6%**	**Agreement -:74%**		

Source: Author's own compilation

Practices

To assess how the ethics of war were being practiced by Zambia Army officers and soldiers during their operations, a different five-point Likert-type scale was used in which: *1=Never, 2=Rarely, 3=Sometimes, 4=Most of the time* and *5=Always*. The findings showed that the majority of respondents (66%) agreed that the Zambia Army officers and soldiers practiced the ethics of war during their operations compared to 21% of the respondents who disagreed. This was further supported by the computed grand mean value of 3.78, which was above the Likert scale threshold of 3. Only about 13% of the respondents believed that the ethics of war were occasionally practiced by Zambia Army officers and soldiers during their operations.

While the study gave a positive outlook in terms of how knowledgeable the officers and soldiers of the Zambia Army were at the time, 34% of respondents were not sure whether they had knowledge of ethics of war and the percentage of those who thought they actually did not have the knowledge was too big to be ignored (i.e. 21%).Table 2 shows statistics of various variables that were studied to establish whether officers and soldiers of Zambia Army practiced ethics of war. Details in form of frequencies, percentages and mean give statistics of compliance to ethics of war, use of proportionate force and how officers and

soldiers of Zambia Army treat prisoners of war and the wounded. The findings on practices revealed that there was a need to give more information on principles of the ethics of war to officers and soldiers. This should be done by increasing coverage of the ethics of war in the curriculum at military schools and also by conducting seminars in units. Table 2 gives statistical details on practices of ethics of war.

Table 2: Summary of findings on practices of ethics of war

Study variables on practice		Never	Rarely	Sometimes	Most of the time	Always	Mean
		1	2	3	4	5	
Officers and soldiers fully comply to ethics of war during operations	f	46	50	65	173	79	3.46
	%	11%	12%	16%	42%	19%	
Officers and soldiers only use proportionate force during operations	f	36	48	81	107	141	3.65
	%	9%	12%	20%	26%	34%	
Officers and soldiers do not subject POWs (prisoners of war) to unnecessary sufferings during operations	f	43	48	64	99	159	3.69
	%	10%	12%	15%	24%	38%	
Officers and soldiers only use force in self-defence and protection of others during operations	f	39	39	52	78	205	3.90
	%	9%	9%	13%	19%	50%	
Officers and soldiers only obey legitimate orders during operations	f	49	44	35	78	210	3.85
	%	12%	11%	8%	19%	51%	
Officers and soldiers help to evacuate the wounded during operations	f	31	41	26	56	259	4.14
	%	8%	10%	6%	14%	63%	
Average (%)		**10%**	**11%**	**13%**	**24%**	**42%**	**3.78**
Summary		**Disagreement -:21%**		**Sometimes -:13%**		**Agreement -:66%**	

Source: Author's own compilation

Perception

Findings from the current research support most of the views by various authors in literature in terms of the need for adequate knowledge in ethics of war. Examining the need for soldiers to have adequate understanding of the moral law, Whitman, Haight and Tipton[395] refer to the events of 16 March 1968 when C Company of Task Force Barker of the American Forces in Vietnam entered My Lai, a suspected enemy stronghold and killed over 500 civilians.[396] These figures consisted mostly women, children and the aged who were found by the American Forces after their search mission. The search is reported not to have found any enemy soldiers. This event, the authors point out, more than any other event in the Vietnam War, had a profound influence on the United States Army for years to come. It became, and still is today the centrepiece of just war theory at all levels of army training, according to the authors. As a result of the massacre at My Lai, all soldiers in the United States Army get at least some instructions on the laws of land warfare (found in The Hague and Geneva conventions) and the just war theory that undergirds these laws. Their views underscore the importance of mainstreaming just war in the training curricula for military personnel.[397]

Kelly,[398] like other American scholars on ethics, confirms from his research and studies, American Military officers throw ethics of military to the wind for the sake of their career. He claims professional ethics suffer for the purpose of enhancing chances of career progression and praises from authorities. According to Kelly, the United States Army has not progressed far enough in resolving problems in professionalism and ethics. He argues that, improvement to the ethical climate of the military requires two significant changes. He says first change involves the philosophy of leadership held by senior officers; and the second involves internalization of the Army's ideal values of honesty, and integrity as subsumed into the perceived motto of duty, honour and country'.

Kelly concludes that the subject of ethics in the United States Army is moderately covered, and he recommends wide coverage of military education in ethics as the best way to improve ethics in the military profession.[399] During this study, similar experiences were reported by officers and soldiers of the Zambia Army during focus group discussions. This research also confirmed the views of Whitman, Haight and Tipton that there is a requirement to cover ethics of war at all levels of training at military schools in order to fill the gaps of knowledge that were identified during this study.[400] When it comes to the Zambia Army, many activities have been undertaken to modernise the structures and equipment. Efforts have been made to review the core values, the vision and the soldiers' creed, which have been included in order to instil in officers and soldiers a spirit of patriotism and unity. Internalisation of the values of discipline, personal courage, duty, loyalty, respect, selfless service, professionalism, integrity, godliness and *esprit de corps* is what is guiding the Zambia Army today.

From the reviewed literature, it was evident that, although a certain level of knowledge existed among the officers and soldiers, more still needs to be done to minimise violations of the ethics of war. This should be generalised, as it may not just be unique to the Zambia Army, but applies in Africa and beyond.

From the literature reviewed, the assessment of the attitude towards ethics of war by the study found the same pattern of acceptance to abide by these ethics. In his article, Simonovic writes about attitudes and types of reaction toward past war crimes and human rights abuses. He argues that, attitudes cannot be directly observed but they can be identified only on the basis of various indicators. He posits that, individuals, societies, and various international actors can and usually do have different attitudes toward past war crimes and human rights abuses.Simonovic further states that the most interesting part of his study are the prevailing attitudes, which are the ones that are supported by the dominant political forces within the post-conflict or transitional society itself.[401]

McAlister et al[402] conducted research with the objective of studying the cultural differences in moral disengagement, which lends support to attitudes used to justify violence. They studied five countries, and wrote a report, which was reviewed during this study because it involves the study of attitude, which is one of the variables investigated during this study. According to this group of researchers, aggressive responses to intergroup and international conflicts are partly determined by processes of moral disengagement. Their argument is that, through these processes, the perpetration of violence against potential victims is made acceptable by the expression of attitudes that influence personal and collective judgments of choices for resolving conflicts by acts of aggression. They posit that when moral disengagement occurs, violence is justified by invoking 'rights' or 'necessities', which provide excuses for the infliction of suffering upon others.[403] The officers and soldiers who participated in this study also mentioned a negative attitude against war crimes and human rights abuses experienced during operations. From their participation in liberation wars, the operation against RENAMO, and the counterinsurgency operations against Adamson Mushala, they have learnt lessons where they felt certain actions might not have been taken if they had knowledge on the ethics of war. It was clear in their minds that future operations should be guided by principles of ethics of war.

The findings of this research are in agreement with those by Gilman[404] who identifies the importance of the legal setting in the practice of ethics and enforcement of ethical codes of conduct. In his work, "Ethics codes and codes of conduct as tools for promoting an ethical and professional public service", Gilman maintains that law, regulation and parliamentary or executive orders are a critical part of an ethics regime. This is because law is seen as the basis for ethics or code of standards that are embodied not only as law, but also seen as laws that are effective.[405] Zambia's being state party to the Geneva Convention has implications significant for the behaviour of the Zambia Army officers and soldiers during their operations, including their conduct with respect to the ethics of war. It was established during this research that the Zambia Army officers and soldiers acknowledge their obligation to practice the ethics of war by conducting themselves within the norms of international law, including the Geneva Convention. At the time of this research, it seemed that Zambia Army's officers and soldiers have maintained an impeccable track record of ethical conduct in their international operations.

According to the findings of this research, the majority of officers and soldiers tend to practice the ethics of war during their local and international operations. Some of the

principles commonly upheld by officers and soldiers in practicing the ethics of war include proportionate use of force, not subjecting POWs to unnecessary suffering and only resorting to apply force in circumstances that justify either self-defence or protecting other people from harm. In addition, at the time of this research, the Zambia Army officers and soldiers were able to demonstrate their ability to apply the ethics of war correctly by obeying legitimate orders given to them by their superiors and by helping to evacuate the wounded. But despite the officers and soldiers being seen to practice the ethics of war to a significant degree, the quality of their practice could be enhanced if the Zambia Army would take measures aimed at promoting knowledge acquisition through means such as allocating more time to pre-deployment training and engaging more officers and soldiers in international operations. Pre-deployment training and actual deployment of the officers and soldiers provide rare opportunities for officers and soldiers to apply themselves to the ethics of war.

The Mushala Insurgency, RENAMO encounters and liberation wars, mentioned as background to this article, give insight about the changing operation environment, which has evolved from the traditional conventional warfare to asymmetric warfare. Although the aforementioned operations by the Zambia Army were not the modern type of terrorist actions, they still have a similarity in the sense that these activities were conducted by non-state actors and the targets were civilians. Although the Zambia Army engaged in warlike operations against the Mushala and RENAMO armed groups, these operations did not fall under international armed conflict but under internal armed conflict. The reason was that Mushala rebels were conducting their operations in order to express their discontent and to change the government of Zambia, while the RENAMO rebels – although coming from another country – were conducting their operations in order to get weapons and logistics to sustain their operations against the ruling government in Mozambique. The ethics of war were applicable to the Mushala and RENAMO armed groups as well since this was a moral issue, which was not based on legal dimensions. The Mushala and RENAMO armed groups could be indicted under the International Humanitarian Law because their activities could be termed as internal armed conflict. Conversely, the liberation wars could be termed international armed conflict since the war was between one state and another under the disguise of attacking liberation camps by one state, and self-defence by the other. Despite the study findings showing that knowledge, attitude and practices of ethics of war were reasonably good, it was clear that much was not known about the ethics of war during the aforementioned operations. Personal interviews and focus group discussions revealed events and activities that were against the ethics of war in the Mushala and RENAMO operations. This could be attributed to a lack of knowledge, which led to a negative attitude and a lack of practice of the ethics of war. The officers and soldiers now have reasonable knowledge about the ethics of war because of pre-deployment training for international peacekeeping operations with a bias on legal aspects of international humanitarian law.

The current research gives hope for a peaceful future by way of its findings that the attitude of officers and soldiers is positive. This provides fertile ground for adherence to the ethics of war in the sense that officers and soldiers of the Zambia Army are willing to acquire knowledge in the ethics of war. Further, it is reassuring that the research established that

the majority of officers and soldiers are practicing the ethics of war when conducting their operations. Attitude and practice are important prerequisites for the adherence to the ethics of war, and it is gratifying that officers and soldiers of the Zambia Army have these attributes. The research brought about a new understanding that generally, officers and soldiers have varying degrees of knowledge of the ethics of war. They have reasonable knowledge about the principles of the ethics of war and the consequences of not adhering to the requirements of *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello*. During the study, it was observed that acceptance of the ethics of war was to some extent influenced by religious beliefs, which could be dealt with in the curriculum of ethics of war for all military schools and during pre-deployment training. Issues of religion are sensitive, especially when it comes to global security, and this subject therefore requires a full study in order to understand how religion influences the ethics of war. The attitude of officers and soldiers towards ethics of war is positive, and this contributes to good practices during operations. However, the military world over would further enhance adherence to the ethics of war if the subject was widely covered at all levels of training in military schools. Seminars and conferences to discuss the ethics of war would also help by enhancing adherence to ethics of war.

Research benefits

Based on the findings, a model for improving knowledge of, attitudes toward and practices of the ethics of war of officers and soldiers serving in the Zambia Army has been developed. The model could be used starting from the recruitment stage of both officers and soldiers. Candidates could be required to meet set requirements on recruitment, and would start the ethics of war curriculum as officer cadets and recruits at their training academies and centres. The curriculum will be progressive as the officers and soldiers do their career progression. The model has been well designed such that it involves monitoring and evaluation at all stages of their career courses. The model will therefore assist in filling the knowledge gap that triggered this research. In addition, the findings will assist in formulating policies and strategies by the Ministry of Defence and the Zambia Defence Force. A manual could also be developed that would explain how the model will be operationalised.

Conclusion and recommendations

The general conclusion from both the quantitative and qualitative findings of the research was that, at the time, the majority of the Zambia Army officers and soldiers were reasonably acquainted with the knowledge of ethics of war. This knowledge of the ethics of war is acquired locally from the few available military schools, and training they undergo before being deployed for operations (United Nations pre-deployment training). Lastly, it was to some extent observed that officers' and soldiers' acceptance of the ethics of war seemed to be influenced by religious beliefs, which must be covered adequately in the curriculum and during pre-deployment training.

At the time of this research, it seemed that the attitudes of officers and soldiers towards the ethics of war were being affected by factors such as gender, level of education, length of service and type of service, although details of the variable relationships have not been included in this article.

Correct application of the ethics of war by most of the Zambia Army officers and soldiers was noted. Some of the factors that could have limited the application of the ethics of war during operations include, among many, the lack of a clear understanding of the ethics of war by some of the officers and soldiers as well as inadequate coverage of ethics of war in the curriculum at military schools.

The following recommendations are made based on this research:

- The Zambia Defence Force should consider creating an up-to-date staff development policy that would enable it to make adequate investment in staff development programmes and to motivate more officers and soldiers to upgrade their formal education to at least diploma or equivalent. This would indirectly build capacity in the officers and soldiers to acquire knowledge of the ethics of war.
- The selection of officers and soldiers to be deployed on operations should be based on certain criteria to ensure knowledgeable personnel are nominated to participate. Conduct during the operations should be evaluated at the end of the mission as an after action review (AAR) in order to draw lessons and identify weaknesses that need to be reviewed in the curriculum.
- The Zambia Defence Force should modernise its curriculum being taught in military schools. The curriculum should be updated with relevant theories and concepts of the ethics of war and consequences for non-adherence. In addition, important aspects of international law, culture and geography should be incorporated to broaden the understanding of the officers and soldiers, which could be a significant factor in making them adaptable to various operational environments. Further, the curriculum should be benchmarked so that the Zambia Defence Force curriculum is standard and more generic to the ethics of war curriculum of Defence Forces in other countries in order to avoid knowledge gaps.

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Endnotes

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The intelligence battle in the Gulf of Guinea: Espionage and counter-espionage operations in Spanish Guinea

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Abstract

The study, on which this article is based, focused on the redistribution of geopolitical maps that took place in sub-Saharan Africa after the advent of the Third Reich, which resulted in the institutionalisation of the practice of intelligence in the Gulf of Guinea. This historical plot testifies to the clash between the colonial branches of the British, German and United States intelligence services through clandestine operations in the Spanish Guinean colony. Addressing the issue of the perception of Spanish Guinea by the intelligence services of the various belligerent European powers, this article highlights the factors behind the apprehension of sub-Saharan Africa as a theatre of operations in the Second World War. The archival sources and the bibliographic data analysed from the perspective of Intelligence Studies, revealed the consideration of the colony of Spanish Guinea as a target of paramount importance by the German, French, British and American units in charge of the underground war, an offensive strategy, which inaugurated a new paradigm from military and security view points for Cameroon under the League of Nations trusteeship.

Keywords: Cameroon, Gulf of Guinea, Intelligence Services, Spanish Guinea, Security.

Introduction

Losses of the German former colonial possessions during World War I found a favourable echo with the establishment of Nazi Germany. Berlin was involved in a de facto integration of these losses into their ambitious global restructuring policy referred to as *Gross-Germanisches Reich.*[407] As for these territorial claims made by Chancellor Adolf Hitler with regard to the African continent, Kum'a N'Dumbé describes them in these terms:

> A map of territorial claims was drawn up […] by Biefeld at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; it was a kind of synthesis of the different reasons for which the following territories were to form the German colonial Reich of Africa: Togo, Dahomey, the Gold Coast (now Ghana), West Nigeria […] Cameroon […].[408]

The materialisation of this renewed interest of the Nazi regime in the colonial enterprise was characterised by the creation of the *Kolonial Politisches Amt.*[409] The objective here was to prepare the ground for future German colonial administration in their former African possessions and more particularly in Cameroon, which was under the administration of France and Great Britain at the time. To achieve this, Nazi Germany developed a strategy based on information gathering. An intelligence network, comprising clandestine cells, specialised in subversion, was to be established in the former German colonies in Africa. The objective of this network was to counter the British and French influence on the colonial scene.[410]

Spanish Guinea[411] corresponded to these expectations nourished by the German Command Staff: it was located in the Gulf of Guinea, it was an international maritime corridor used by commercial shipping, and it was located alongside French and British colonial possessions and the Cameroons. These assets constituted an ideal point of support for military purposes, and became a benchmark for intelligence agents during foreign missions. For France and Great Britain, on the other hand, German colonial revisionism constituted a flagrant violation of the status quo established by the Treaty of Versailles of 1919 guaranteeing access to all German colonial possessions.

Faced with the rising tide of claims by Nazi Germany targeting its former colonial possessions in Africa, Great Britain was forced to react. A maritime blockade was immediately instituted against Spain, owner of the colony of Spanish Guinea. This dissuaded all initiatives detrimental to British and French interests because the neutrality of Spain enabled England and France to benefit from a vast maritime corridor whose control ensured them a predominant influence in the Gulf of Guinea. It is in this context that the decision by France and Great Britain to create colonial branches of intelligence services within their respective colonial spaces, including in the territories that remained under their trusteeship, such as the Cameroons and Togoland, needs to be understood. Designating Spanish Guinea as a target of high strategic value, multifaceted security infrastructures would be active along the perimeter of the Gulf of Guinea during the war. For the French and British colonial administrations, it was an issue of collecting information but also of coordinating offensive and defensive operations in the area. The prioritisation of Spanish Guinea by Germany, Great Britain and France made this territory of strategic importance, which would in the long run pit the counter-intelligence services of the aforementioned countries against one another.

Reconstructing this conflicting historical period requires a theoretical framework to apprehend the different methodological facets. For operational reasons, Intelligence Studies – and more particularly its structural variant – were therefore used within the framework for this article. According to Thomas, this structural variant "examines the organization and legal framework of intelligence services, whereas political approaches instead primarily deal with the use of intelligence by policymakers and the interaction between politics and intelligence".[412] The current study analysed the deployment and interactions of intelligence services as a strategic tool used by both European colonial powers to ensure their domination in the colonial scene. From a methodological point of view, this article is based on declassified archival materials from a wide variety of sources containing intelligence memos and specific books. The documentary sources

made it possible to understand the deployment, operation and organisation of the various structures dedicated to collecting information and military activities oriented towards Spanish Guinea during the Second World War.

Insularity of the colony of Spanish Guinea: a strategic asset from a military point of view

In general, islands are strategic areas of military operations. Alfred Mahan, an American naval theorist, provides information on the strategic importance of islands, which he describes as "vantage points, positions from which the fleet can circulate on oceans".[413] This military function intervenes in a desire to control the sea lanes, a constant which supports the naval geopolitics of any power. The Mahanian perspective regards islands as defensive infrastructure, outposts in this case, which provide significant projection capacity to a naval power with a view to controlling the maritime domain. Taglioni and Bernardie subscribe to the Mahanian perspective. For them, islands have essential military functions because "the strategic and territorial issues weighing on islands motivate the installation of military infrastructures and often devote many islands as spaces for military strategic operations".[414] By virtue of its strategic position in the Gulf of Guinea, the island of Fernando Pó offered a wide spectrum of military use in the event of war. This island could easily be converted into a solid bridgehead for troops in the event of preparations for assaults on the British colony of Nigeria, the colonies of French Equatorial Africa, and the Cameroons under French and British mandate.

In addition, the proximity of Fernando Pó Island to the aforementioned territories gave it a further advantage: it was located only about 107 km from the coasts of French and British Cameroon, and was therefore considered as the ideal location through which to enforce a naval blockade. It should be emphasised that the Cameroonian coast is the entry and exit point for agricultural companies established in the hinterland of the African continent. The possible control of the island of Fernando Pó by an enemy force would therefore be a potential source of danger for the continued colonial commercial activity of the Allied countries along the coast, but also and above all for the economic development of the Cameroons under France and Great Britain mandate.

The multiple island configurations of Fernando Pó led France and Great Britain to consider Spanish Guinea as a German outpost established in their area of influence.[415] This posture was especially reinforced by the French, British and American military and political authorities and, on the eve of the First World War, the colony of Spanish Guinea found itself drawn into the spiral of the civil war that was raging in the Kingdom of Spain. The conflict saw Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini offer decisive support to the nationalists led by General Francisco Franco. This promoted the possibility of German military manoeuvres and intelligence operations extending to the Gulf of Guinea, not far from the coast of Cameroon.[416] The French authorities were gathering information that allowed them to construct their perception of Spanish Guinea as a source of threat.[417] One of the indicators reinforcing this perspective was the alliance forged between Franco's Spain and Hitler's Nazi Germany, which definitively established doubts about the neutrality of Spain during the Second World War.[418] This was because, throughout the war, Spain

provided logistical aid to Germany by placing the Canary Islands at the disposal of the German General Staff, until the eve of the defeat of Germany in 1945.

According to this logic, the possibility of a military requisition of the island of Fernando Pó by *Wehrmacht* troops was highly probable, especially since, during the post-civil war negotiations, Germany had shown particular interest in the colony of Spanish Guinea, as Whealy points out:

> In February 1937, the Germans, taking advantage of their military aid to Franco, submitted a draft agreement of six articles […] Later, ROWAK concluded a semi private contract with Spain merchants in Guinea for Okume wood, used in making plywood for building planes. The Germans wanted to buy all the wood the colony could supply. […] The Germans were also interested in obtaining a three years contract in the spring year of 1938.[419]

The 'Big Four' of metropolitan intelligence services and their branches

The listing of the colony of Spanish Guinea as a prime target attracted the intelligence services of belligerent European countries to the Gulf of Guinea. The various security and military officials flocked to the area for the establishment of their spy and counter-espionage antennas in the neighbouring colonies and in Cameroon under the French and British mandate. Among the intelligence services of the European capitals and the United States of America, the presence of the *Abwehr*, the *Service de Renseignement Intercolonial* (SRI), the Special Operations Executive, and the Office for Strategic Services were noted.[420]

The first institution, the *Abwehr*, was the main military intelligence service of the unified German armed forces, specialising in offensive counterintelligence activities. According to Gordon, the installation of this information gathering and special operations institution in Spanish Guinea was the subject of negotiations between the German Minister of Foreign Affairs, Joachim von Ribbentrop, and the Spanish Minister of the Interior, Ramón Serrano Suñez.[421] Kuoh goes further by specifying that the Command Staff of the German Army created a second Abwehr Office with its headquarters in Santa Isabel. The field agents of this German intelligence organ, he said, made contact with Cameroonians nostalgic for the past of the German protectorate.[422] In line with the information provided by Kuoh, Rigden adds that the *Abwehr* had a vast spy network, which had international ramifications, thanks in part to the peaceful relations between Germany and Spain, which increased its scope of operations.[423] Francoist Spain was already serving as a base of operations for *Abwehr* field agents, whose coordination and liaison activities constituted some of the essential missions of the German Embassy in Madrid. This diplomatic representation extended its scope of action around the Iberian Peninsula and into the Canary Islands and Spanish Guinea.[424] These colonial possessions in turn served as a base for what Rigden describes as sub-stations, additional operational posts responsible for gathering intelligence and organising subversive activities.[425]

The second institution, the Intercolonial Intelligence Service, well known by the French acronym SRI, was, according to Duthel, an initiative of the head of the socialist

government, Leon Blum.[426] The SRI was an answer to the problems posed by the management of information from the French colonies, but also and above all from the exacerbating rivalry that existed between the intelligence services of the metropolitan France and those of the colonial empire.[427] Le Page outlines more details on the issues related to the creation of the SRI:

> The creation of this service is to be compared to that of the Intercolonial Intelligence Service (SRI) in 1937. The SRI was attached to the Ministry of Colonies and ensured centralization and coordination of intelligence with the Minister. It functioned […] without there being any friction, on the contrary, the ministry received a mass of information disseminated without real reluctance by the research bodies. It had been designed to remedy a lack of synthesis and a scattering of resources.[428]

To put an end to this imbroglio, Prime Minister Léon Blum decided to create the SRI in March 1937. The SRI coordinated and centralised all information collected from the metropolis and the French colonies under the command of General Raoul Salan.[429] The attachment of the SRI to the Ministry of Colonies obeyed the will of the French authorities to control the sphere of colonial influence. The SRI system in the Gulf of Guinea was essentially defensive in nature and was based on contributions from the supervisory posts of the Yaoundé Studies Section and the Brazzaville Studies Section. However, this arrangement enabled the SRI to be rapidly deployable and fully autonomous during intelligence-driven operations in the neighbouring British colonies in West Africa. For example, to infiltrate the colony of Spanish Guinea, the method of approach chosen by the head of the SRI was the invitation of the Spanish colonial authorities to visit Yaoundé and Douala. The official objective was to lay the foundations for future security cooperation between the two territories, but for the French colonial intelligence officers, it was rather a question of allowing the SRI to send field agents discreetly to Fernando Pó, Bata, Rio and Benito, where the French consulate in Fernando Pó coordinated the operations.[430]

The third structure, the Special Operations Executive (SOE), was the main British counterintelligence unit tasked with conducting commando operations during the Second World War. According to Berthillot, these missions consisted of infiltrating enemy lines and organising campaigns of subversion, propaganda and sabotage.[431] The SOE distinguished itself during the war, a period during which Prime Minister Winston Churchill entrusted the unit with offensive counterintelligence missions in Ireland, France, Scotland and further afield. The profiles of the operational components of SOE made it a formidable and effective organisation, and its agents played a decisive role in the areas of deployment beyond enemy lines where the logistical support that their agents brought to friendly forces in occupied territories proved to be of immense value.[432] In West Africa, permanent SOE commando units were stationed in Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Liberia. Their missions consisted of intercepting all suspicious German and Italian shipping, and monitoring the movements of Vichy French supporters. This is confirmed by Jacobs, who states, "[t]he SOE maintained a presence in West Africa from where it could observe the Vichy France, Spanish and Portuguese territories in order to identify and hinder any threat to the British interest."[433]

The fourth and last intelligence service was the Office for Strategic Services (OSS) of the United States of America. The ancestor of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the OSS, actively took part in intelligence missions directed towards Spanish Guinea during the war. Declassified reports revealed the existence of an OSS intelligence network of undercover agents comprising European personalities of varied profiles, such as the colonial administrator, merchants as well as cocoa, coffee and timber dealers. The main reason for this sustained interest in such personalities was their influential positions within the socio-political and economical domains of Spanish Guinea. By infiltrating these eclectic social groups with close ties to the Spanish colonial power, the OSS agents were enabled to have access to top-level information regarding the Spanish colonial territory.

An example of this targeted approach operations is provided by a declassified intelligence report, which indicates a certain Ayala, a Spanish merchant, owner of a small stopover hut in Spanish Guinea.[434] His constant move from Ebibiying (Spanish Guinea) to Ambam (French Cameroon) and vice versa drew the attention of the OSS intelligence officers. The OSS requested the help of the Intercolonial Intelligence Service in order to approach the target. The technique used by officers of the Intercolonial Service in order to attract and recruit Ayala is exhaustively described as follows, "[i]t consists to amicable conversations ably conducted by the district commander of Ambam. To familiarise him with our values, a customised stay to Duala and to Yaounde was to be proposed to him in order to provide intelligence needed."[435] The scarcity of information on the activities of the OSS in the Gulf of Guinea perhaps points to the ad hoc nature of its wartime operations. The OSS only focused on pro-Nazi European or Western targets travelling between the African and Asian continents.[436] The most illustrative case was that of Heinrich Schuchmann, a German agent of the *Abwehr*, whose movements from Germany to Spain via Spanish Guinea, were tracked and monitored by the OSS.

Between 1934 and 1945, there was a notable revival in the offensive and defensive activities of the *Abwehr*, the OSS, the SOE and the SRI in the Gulf of Guinea. The deployment of these agencies influenced the security and military of Spanish Guinea and its neighbouring colonies during the war.

Abwehr operations in Spanish Guinea

The intelligence reports provided by Lieutenant-Commander Cottez to the SRI identified the availability of viable German military objectives in the cosmopolitan city of Santa Isabel, capital of Fernando Pó Island,[437] at the time, an important seaport and main entry and exit point for the local Spanish colonial economy. According to intelligence reports, the commercial function of the port was soon being converted into that of a logistical base for German troops.[438] The port of Santa Isabel had a significant advantage, similar to the coastal cities of British and French Cameroon.[439] Weary about the place being occupied by Spanish Guinea in the German project of reconquering Cameroon, the French authorities feared the exploitation of the geographical configuration of the island by Germany, especially since the defensive capacity of the colony of Spanish Guinea in general – and the island of Fernando Pó in particular – held several flaws.

According to Bureau of the Command Staff of the French Colonies, Spanish Guinea was crisscrossed by a number of under-resourced military camps. The barracks were commanded by soldiers with the rank of sergeant or corporal. Drawn mainly from the local population, their mission was to monitor the areas under their immediate control. The Spaniards, masters of the island, occupied the ranks of officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs). An intelligence officer of the SRI posted to Fernando Pó reported on this arrangement, and concluded, "in Santa Isabel capital of Fernando Pó, there is nothing like defence except the small warship, MALASPINA which tours the island from time to time and also makes trips to Bata. There are not many Spanish soldiers."[440]

For the French colonial administration, the information from the SRI confirmed the existence of German military facilities, a sign of renewed enemy activity in the area.[441] These facilities consisted of the construction of a secret military base and the recruitment of field agents for the *Abwehr*. In 1939, the French SIR also reported the construction of a secret German military base in Spanish Guinea, as described by this intelligence note:

> In Spanish Guinea, 400 Germans, under the orders of the former Engineering Colonel Von Der GOOLZ, were said to be occupied deforestation. In reality, they were alleged to be employed in the construction of several basins, four of which have already been completed at the confluence of the Muni and Tambony rivers. These metal basins are 100m long and 12m wide and are dredged 8m deep, separated by 20m intervals. This area is strictly off-limits, even to Spanish authorities. According to this engineer, these basins could serve as bases for submarines.[442]

The German construction site duly attracted the attention of the intelligence services of France and England. According to Miller, the latter concentrated their surveillance operations on the coasts of Spanish Guinea, and more particularly on the city of Fernando Pó.[443] The port of Santa Isabel automatically acted as a supply point for arms and ammunition for the vast network of sleepers who had left for the island of Fernando Pó, Bata and Cameroon under British mandate. According to intelligence briefs, the logistical network at the port of Santa Isabel supplemented the logistical support to German U-boats operating in the Gulf of Guinea and along the Cameroonian coast. Quartermaster Le Blais, stationed at the SRI outpost in Campo, revealed that he had detected the presence of a submarine whose identity remained unknown.[444] He recounted the scene as follows:

> It seemed to him [the intelligence officer] that it was a building the length of the "FOULAH" and entirely out of the water. He immediately went up to the weather forecast for better visibility. We then took the binoculars and could see on the water, a black mass quite similar to the kiosk of a submarine in the 300 ° […] in the afternoon, the quartermaster FELIX saw the submarine again towards 3.30 p.m. He immediately came to warn the SR postmaster, who put his theodolite on station. […] Returning half an hour later to the theodolite, he noticed that the "object" had moved barely 2 or 3 decigrades.[445]

For French authorities, the objective was to determine the true intentions of the crew of this vessel, while acknowledging the principal use of submarines in war. This case also raised several questions among colonial security and defence analysts: was it a manoeuvre meant to intimidate the Allied authorities in the region, or was it simply a logistical stop since the Gulf of Guinea was a known maritime corridor used by several naval and commercial shipping? Mainland Guinea was also known to host a refuelling station for ships in transit to Yanbasitu, located at the mouth of the Rio del Muni.[446] The mystery surrounding the unidentified submarine gave rise to all kinds of speculations, an attitude that confirmed the anxiety of the French authorities since the possible presence of a German military presence near the coast of Cameroon. An intelligence officer, codenamed M., called into question the first version of events reported by the quartermaster of the SRI post in Campo. He provided exhaustive details of the submarine incident:

> This submarine would be a pocket submarine of an excessively small type, maybe 250 tons […] at the front and at the back, a small machine gun closing with a cover. The informant who had never seen such a flag was asked by me to draw it on paper; it is clear from his sketch that this flag is a black swastika on a solid red background. […] The informant M. saw 3 Europeans descend from it who, Germans according to his information, were received that day by Arona, a German recently installed in Rio Benito.[447]

Several intelligence reports agreed on the German military activities in the waters off Spanish Guinea, and on the mainland, which in this case was the subject of sustained interest for the *Abwehr*. Intelligence officers in the field gave exhaustive details on the connections between the German nationals installed in the European colonies in Africa and those working for the German military intelligence services. Spanish Guinea was no exception in this regard. According to sources obtained by an SRI agent, the Woermann factory, one of the largest trading houses based in Bata, was in reality only a cover for the *Abwehr*.[448] An intelligence note of 7 November 1934 describes this collaboration between the Woermann house and the German military intelligence service as follows:

> It seems that the German organization in Guinea carried out by "Woermann Linie" would be able to provide serious back-up in men, equipment and supplies in the event of military operations attempted on Gabon. The Woermann factories are important and entrusted to men who seem to have other capacities than those of simple traders. Undoubtedly, it is not strange to find the Germans military allure […] The connection of this organization with the metropolis is ensured by the ships of the same company (Woermann) on a regular basis. There is therefore the possibility for Germany to suddenly intensify its traffic on Guinea at the opportune moment for a report of personnel, material or supplies.[449]

The Woermann Linie Company was not only limited to providing material support to the German intelligence network; it was also recruiting agents to increase the number of operational officers. The core of these deep-cover agents was made up of the Cameroonian veterans of the *Schutztruppe*, the colonial troops that previously served in African territories. German citizens like Marquardt, who formerly served in the navy, were also an

essential element of the *Abwehr* intelligence apparatus in Spanish Guinea.[450] Declassified archives describe an organisation that infiltrated several commercial activities, which enabled them to carry out their operations with discretion. From detailed information provided by French SRI agents, it was established that *Abwehr* agents belonged to a sleeper cell called '*Neue Guinea*' that was directed by the officer in charge, Otto Kroener, known under the codename PATRON. The ramifications of this intelligence network were felt in Cameroon. The liaison officer in Cameroon was a certain Otzmann residing in Kribi who had formidable number of field agents.[451] Otzmann's task was to relay pro-Germanic propaganda in mainland Guinea and Cameroon.

A certain Schunks von Goldfim did all he could to "praise the colonizing methods of his country".[452] In addition to human resources, German agents benefited from substantial logistical support. According to information obtained by the French SIR, the wireless telegraph stations belonging to the German commercial companies also provided technical support to the *Abwehr* agents. In one of the intelligence reports on this subject, it was revealed that the Woermann factory (which had a vast network of wireless transmitters and receivers) offered access to agents such as Von Goldfim, Otzmann and Kroener.[453] The telecommunications antenna that interested German agents most was the one that connected Ebolowa to Minkomesseng, a locality in Spanish Guinea bordering French Cameroon. In setting up the spy network, the German wireless stations provided speed in the transmission of instructions addressed to field agents. According to the information, Otzmann was responsible for recruiting individuals capable of rallying the *Abwehr* sleeper cell in Spanish Guinea and for collecting information on the security system of French Cameroon. This allowed a certain agent Zuber, who was a dual agent, to feed the intelligence sections of French Cameroon and mainland Guinea with details on recent security developments in the two respective territories.[454]

The response operation of the SOE cells in Nigeria and British Cameroon

For the French and British authorities, the departure of the German U-boats confirmed the desire of Germany to return to their area of influence in the Gulf of Guinea, which indeed required a multifaceted response. The British SOE operation aimed at scuttling a German naval vessel was one such action. Known by the code name 'Postmaster', the objective of the operation was to send a strong signal to the German authorities of the Franco–British political determination to defend their respective interests in the region. Aimed at boarding German vessels along the African coast, said scuttling mission was made possible thanks to the involvement of SOE agents installed in Douala (French Cameroon), Victoria (British Cameroon), Freetown (Sierra Leone), Monrovia (Liberia), Lagos (in the British colony of Nigeria), and in Fernando Pó (Spanish Guinea).[455] As a reminder, it should be noted that the SOE focused its missions on the foreign territories occupied by Germany and Vichy France. In the case of sub-Saharan Africa, the SOE mission was to create and maintain permanent contact with the Gaullist dissidents in the Vichy French colonies in Africa who were principal in spreading the propaganda of the provisional government of the French Republic in Algiers to the rest of the colonial empire.

The pretext found for the SOE commando operation in Spanish Guinea was that of the mistreatment inflicted on Nigerian nationals on the Spanish plantations. Contacted on the issue, inspectors from the International Labour Office (ILO) were dispatched to carry out investigations in the field. Great Britain appointed Charles Michie to defend the interests of Nigerian immigrants by ensuring compliance with new legal provisions, in particular contracts by the Spanish authorities. The real mission of Michie was however espionage on behalf of the British. Michie was in charge of reconnaissance missions on the island of Fernando Pó on behalf of the SOE missions in Lagos (Nigeria) and Freetown (Sierra Leone). This covert operation was intended for preparations for a possible invasion of this part of the island. Pearce also confirms the true status of Michie. For him, Michie was an SOE agent trained in sabotage operations. Pearce puts it like this, "he was to become a member of SOE, the sabotage organization set up by Hugh Dalton at the ministry of economic warfare".[456] To carry out his mission, Michie benefited from the help of two agents with very specific tasks: Mr Louis Franck, a banker of Belgian nationality, travelling with a fake British passport, and Mr Leonard Guise, a former district chief. Franck had the role of training the security personnel of the Nigerian police in the operating methods of the SOE. The governor of the British colony of Nigeria, Sir Bernard Bourdillon, assigned him some officers of the colonial troops for this purpose, and a training centre was created on Olokemeji, a farm near the town of Ibadan in Nigeria.[457]

As for Guise, Pearce describes him in these terms, "Leonard Guise, a district officer from eastern Nigeria, had been released from his normal duties and was acting as King's Messenger, operating between Fernando Pó, Victoria (British Cameroon), and Rio Muni (Spanish Guinea)."[458] Under cover of acting as His Majesty's Messenger to the Spanish colonial authorities, Guise was able to gather strategic information on the movements of German commercial vessels travelling along the Atlantic coast. The three SOE agents were working to develop a plan to intercept shipping belonging to Axis countries.

According to Van der Bijl, the execution of Operation Postmaster required local support.[459] The SOE thus instructed Captain Peter Lake to bribe the employees of the port of Santa Isabel. Lake encouraged them, in exchange for a large sum of money, to paralyse port activities and cause a blackout. Van der Bijl reveals, "[f]irst, Lake discreetly distributed funds to local bars and restaurants at Santa Isabel to entice their crews ashore during the night […] and also organized a power failure."[460] British Cameroon served as an anchor point for the operations of SOE units with the neighbouring island of Fernando Pó. This mission was entrusted to a certain Corporal Charles who carried out daily naval patrols in order to intercept postal packages.[461]

On 14 January 1942, Major Gus March-Phillips launched Operation Postmaster. He was an officer and was assisted by a crew comprising Captains Geoffrey Appleyard, Graham Hayes, Denis Tottenham, Frank Perkins, Tom Winter, Ernest Evison, Jock Taylor, Leslie Prout, André Desgranges and Anders Lassen.[462] A trawler, the *Maid Honor*,[463] requisitioned for the occasion, was anchored in Freetown as part of a reconnaissance mission. This was because, according to the information reaching the French and the British intelligence services, the Vichy French colonial territories served as a supply base for the German naval vessels.[464] The naval patrol allowed the SOE commandos to spot two merchant ships

and a commercial vessel belonging to the Axis countries: the *Duchessa d'Aosta*, flying the Italian flag, and the *Likomba* and the *Bibundi* flying the German flag. The vessel, which caught their attention particularly, was the *Duchessa d'Aosta*, an 8 500-ton vessel, carrying cargo of wool, animal skins, copra, asbestos fibres and electrolytic copper ingots.[465]

At the end of this investigation, the British naval patrol decided to carry out diversionary operations in the waters of Spanish Guinea, where the *Duchessa d'Aosta* was anchored. To do this, units of another ship, the *Vulcan*, and 32 men comprising four SOE agents, 17 volunteers and other members of the colonial armed forces, scuttled the Italian vessel.[466]According to Captain Mencey, the assault on the Port of Santa Isabel was launched at 22:30. Strong explosions resounded throughout the city of Santa Isabel, making the population believe that they were bursts of cannons announcing the feast of the new moon as tradition dictates. The head of the Guardia Colonial immediately rushed to the port and organised an emergency meeting at the Colonial Guard Headquarters. A decision was subsequently made at the end of this meeting to reinforce the defences of the island of Fernando Pó, which, according to Mencey, had significant flaws.

Conclusion

In short, from this article, it should be noted that the intelligence battle in the Gulf of Guinea was a result of Nazi hegemonic ambitions in Africa. The German desire to reconquer its former African colonies encouraged the European colonial powers in the Gulf of Guinea that the frontlines of their security and defence needed to shift to sub-Saharan Africa. This caused a cycle of a fierce underground warfare led by the colonial branches of the intelligence service in the Spanish territory of Fernando Pó. Actions carried out by the SOE, the SRI and the OSS contributed decisively to the containment of the German project of reconquering its former colonial possessions. With the turn of the tide of the war in Europe, Nazi Germany ended its military intelligence campaign in the Gulf of Guinea, thereby burying any further idea of reclaiming its former African colonies.

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Endnotes

[406] Saliou Abba holds a Ph.D. in History and International Relations from the University of Ngaoundéré in Cameroon. His field of research is Military History and Intelligence History where he published series of scientific articles. Dr Saliou Abba has also participated in colloquia organized by the Ministry of Defence of Cameroon and the Cameroon Commission of Military History. He is currently a Researcher Officer at the National Centre for Education, a public research centre of the Ministry of Scientific Research and Innovation specialised in Social Sciences and Humanities Studies. Dr Saliou Abba is also a member of the Cameroon History Society.

[407] This assertion literally means "Great Germanic Kingdom". This is a geopolitical project that consists of bringing together all German-speaking entities under the authority of the Führer, Adolf Hitler. In addition, this concept also encompasses the former colonial possessions England and France.

[408] A Kum'a N'Dumbé III. "Black Africa and Germany during the Second World War". In UNESCO. *Africa and the Second World War*, Symposium report and papers, 1980, 61–62.

[409] English translation: Foreign Colonial Office.

[410] G Saville. The Afrika Reich: a novel, Henry Holt & Co, New York, 2013.

[411] According to René Pélissier, 'Spanish Guinea' is a generic term designating all the Spanish territories in the Gulf of Guinea. It is partly island and partly continental and shares its limits with the British Colony of Nigeria and French Equatorial Africa. The island territory known as Fernando Pó and which interest us in this study has an area of 2 034 km². See R Pélissier. "La Guinée Espagnole". *Revue Française de Sciences Politiques* 13/3. 1963. 624.

[412] A Scheffer Corvaja, B Jeraj, UM Borghoff. "The rise of intelligence studies: A model for Germany?" *Connection: The Quarterly Journal* 1. 2016. 81. doi: 10.11610/connection.

[413] P Moreau Desfarges. *Introduction to geopolitics* (2nd ed)*. Paris: Editions du Seuil, 2004, 3.

[414] F Taglioni & N Bernardie. *Contemporary dynamics of small island spaces: From islands to island networks*. Paris: Karthala, 2005, 284.

[415] National Archives Yaounde (ANY), Political and Administrative Affairs (APA) 10.165 A. *Spanish Guinea prior to 1932: Army staff, intelligence division*, 29 May 1934.

[416] J-L Guébourg. *The small islands and archipelagos of the Indian Ocean*. Paris: Karthala, 2006, 19.

[417] ANY, APA 10.165 A, *Intelligence on Spanish Guinea.* Report of 14 May 1934…

[418] A-Cazorla-Sánchez. "Surviving Franco's peace: Spanish popular opinion during the Second World War". *European History Quarterly* 32/3. 2002. 393.

[419] R-H Whealy. *Hitler and Spain: The Nazi role in the Spanish Civil War 1936–1939*. Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1989, 89.

[420] For more details, consult P Jacobs. *Daring Raids of World War Two: Heroic Land, Sea & air Attacks*, Barnsley, South Yorkshire: Pen and Sword Aviation, 2015 and the Deputy Director for Plans for naval intelligence available at the following link: http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/1705143/SCHUCHMANN%20HEINRICH_0016.pdf.

[421] M-B Gordon. "El papel de España en la derrota de la Alemania nazi durante la Segunda Guerra". *Studia Histórica / Studia Contemporánea*, 18. 2000. 254.

[422] C-T Kuoh. *Mon témoignage: Cameroun de l'indépendance 1958–1970*. Paris: Karthala, 1980, 18–19.

[423] D Rigden. *How to be a spy: The World War II SOE training manual.* Toronto, Ontario : Dundurn Press, 2004, 81.

[424] *Ibid.*

[425] *Ibid.*

[426] H. Duthel, 2012, *La Légion et la bataille à Diên Biên Phù : la légion est leur patrie*, Norderstedt: Herstellung und Verlag, 2ème édition, p.192

[427] The French colonies have several intelligence services, such as the Study Section, Sector VII of Brazzaville and the Intelligence Service, in addition to the Police Forces. In a note addressed to all SEYA heads of post, the head of Sector VII denounced the lack of coordination and the non-respect of the protocol for transmitting information to the High Commissioner, which once again confirms the imbroglio observed within the intelligence system.

[428] J-M Le Plage. *The secret services of Indochina.* YouScribe. 2014. <www.youscribe.com/catalogue/livres/litérérature/romans-historiques/les-services-secrets-en-indochine-2496852> Accessed on 2 November 2014.

[429] H Duthel. *The legion and the battle at Diên Biên Phù: The legion is their homeland* (2nd ed)*. Norderstedt: Herstellung und Verlag, 2012, 192.

[430] S Laurent, 2001, « Les services secrets gaullistes à l'épreuve de la politique (1940-1947) » dans *Politix*, volume 14, numéro 54, p.146.

[431] E Berthillot. "Intelligence and counter-espionage between Dublin, London and Edinburgh from 1845 to 1945". PhD dissertation, University of Mirail-Toulouse, 2014, 715. <http://www.tel.archives-ouvertes.fr/tel-01237843> Accessed on 16 March 2016.

[432] Rigden *op. cit.*, p. 6.

[433] P Jacobs. *Daring raids of World War Two: Heroic land, sea & air attacks*. Barnsley, South Yorkshire: Pen and Sword Aviation, 2015, 57.

[434] ANY, APA 10400/E, Guerre 1939–1945. Security of the Territory . S.E.Y.A intelligence briefing no. 20, on Spanish Guinea. 13 January 1940, 7.

[435] ANY, APA 10400/E, Guerre 1939-1945 Sécurité du territoire. S.E.Y.A note de renseignement n° 20, sur la Guinée Espagnole du 13 janvier 1940, p.7.

[436] C Gorges Chalou. *The secret war: The Office of Strategic Services in World War II*. Washington, DC: National Archives and Records Administration, 2002, 122.

[437] ANY, APA 10.165/A, *Information on Spanish Guinea.*Intelligence Report n°5 of Lieutenant Commander COTTEZ.07 novembre 1934.

[438] ANY, APA 10.165 A, *Information on Spanish Guinea.* Report of 29 May 1934.

[439] The towns of Victoria and Tiko for British Southern Cameroon, the cities of Douala and Campo for French Cameroon.

[440] ANY, APA 10400 E, *War 1939-–1945. Security of the territory.* Note no. 612, General Staff of the Colonies.

[441] S Abba. « La colonie de Guinée Espagnole dans le dispositif de défense et de sécurité du Cameroun sous mandat ». Thèse Ph.D en Histoire Politique et des Relations Internationales, Université de Ngaoundéré, 2020, 153.

[442] ANY, APA 10.165 A*, Information on Spanish Guinea*. Note no. 612/2, Colonial Staff, 6 June 1939.

[443] M-B Miller. *Shanghai on the metro: Spies, intrigue and the French between the wars*. Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1994, 22.

[444] ANY, APA 10400 E, *War 1939–1945. Security of the territory*. Report n°325 on Coastal Surveillance of Campo.

[445] *Ibid.*

[446] ANY, APA 10400 E, *War 1939–1945. Security of the territory*. Intelligence report no. 508, 6 December 1939.

[447] ANY, APA 10400 E, *War 1939–1945. Security of the territory*. Note no. 3 of the SEYA from Kribi to SEYA chief of Yaoundé.

448 ANY, APA 10.165 A, *Information on Spanish Guinea*. Intelligence Report n°5 of Lieutenant Commander COTTEZ. 7 November 1934.

449 *Ibid.*

450 *Ibid.*

451 *Ibid.*

452 National Archives Congo Brazzaville. *Information sur le Doctor Schweitzer 1930–1935*.

453 ANY, APA 10.165 A.

454 The character of ZUBER seems more than interesting insofar as it allows us to identify one of the most important agents in the defensive counter-espionage device of Cameroon under mandate.

455 R Pearce. "Espionage in Africa: The case of the Duchess". *The Historical Journal* 26/2. 1983. 425.

456 *Ibid*.

457 *Ibid*.

458 *Ibid*.

459 N van der Bijl. *Sharing the secret: The history of Intelligence Corps 1940–2010*. Barnsley, South Yorkshire: Pen and Sword Military, 2013. 74

460 *Ibid*.

461 *Ibid*.

462 Jacobs *op. cit.*,56–57.

463 *Ibid*.

464 *Ibid, 57*.

465 *Ibid*.

466 *Ibid*.

Historical reflections on the deterrent effect of the death penalty on capital crimes in South Africa: Lessons from 1917–1995

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Abstract

The death penalty was long practised in South Africa as one of the sentence options for capital crimes such as murder, rape, treason, terrorism, and robbery with aggravating circumstances. Its practice has a matching effort for its abolishment or restricted application. Reflecting on some specific historical periods of the practice of the death penalty in South Africa, the author sought to contextualise the article, namely to understand the socio-political experience and perception of the death penalty in order to gauge its current relevance. The goal of the study on which this article reports was to determine whether the death penalty had a deterrent effect on capital crimes in South Africa during the pre-1996 constitutional period. In order to achieve the goal of the deterrence of serious crimes by the death sentence in South Africa, the author discusses legislation, case law, execution patterns and deterrence literature in its context.

Keywords: death penalty, deterrent effect, constitutionality, proportionality, capital crimes, execution patterns

Introduction

Section 277(1)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act (No 51 of 1977), made the death sentence a competent sentence for murder.[467] This section provides for eight capital crimes. It further provides that a sentence of death may be passed upon a person convicted of murder, treason, rape, kidnapping and child stealing, robbery and attempted robbery, housebreaking or attempted housebreaking – if there are aggravating circumstances. Section 1(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act defines aggravating circumstances to include, amongst others, the use of a weapon or firearm, violence or threats of violence. As the title suggests, the scope of the study stretched from 1917, which marked legislative shifts by adding capital crimes and made the death penalty mandatory for murder[468] through key moments until 1995, when the 1993 Interim Constitution outlawed the death penalty and its legislation, which was repealed in 1997, as discussed below.

In 1995, the death penalty was abolished by the Constitutional Court as a sentence option for capital crimes in South Africa.[469] Subsequently, section 277 of the Criminal Procedure Act was repealed by the Criminal Law Amendment Act (No. 105 of 1997).[470] In the Makwanyane case, the Constitutional Court held that capital punishment infringed the

rights to life and dignity, and constituted a cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment.[471] The state's major argument was that capital punishment was justified by its deterrent effect. This argument was rejected by the court on the grounds that there was no clear proof that capital punishment serves to deter murder.[472] The court also rejected arguments by the Attorney General, which attempted to justify capital punishment for its retributive function or measure to prevent criminals from killing again.[473] The court emphasised that various factors, such as elements of arbitrariness, possibility of error in the enforcement of the death sentence, inequality, destruction of life, make capital punishment cruel, inhumane and degrading, which is in conflict with the Constitution.[474]

The principle of proportionality, which says, 'punishment must fit the crime', has long been practised in South African sentencing law, in order to promote balanced sentencing of the offenders.[475] Van Zyl Smit notes that the Constitution endorses the principle of proportionality, which Chaskalson identified in the Makwanyane case as a factor to be considered when deciding whether a particular punishment was cruel, inhumane or degrading.[476] Similarly, Currie and De Waal point out that in the Makwanyane judgment, Chaskalson called for penalties to be proportional to the harm caused by crime as required by the Constitution.[477]

Currently, there are calls for reinstatement of the death penalty by certain small sections in South Africa, as a response to the perceived increase in violent crimes. This article seeks to contribute to an understanding whether the death sentence was historically a deterrent to capital crimes.

In order to achieve the goal of determining the deterrent effect of the death penalty, the study on which this article reports, applied a secondary methodology, which reviewed literature studies, legislation and case law with a narrow focus.[478] The first task of the study was to establish the historical sentencing patterns and the nature of cases and legislation in which the death penalty was commonly imposed by courts. The second task of the study was to determine if there is penal philosophical and statistical evidence that suggests whether the death penalty is a deterrent to serious crime, or not. In this regard, a deterrent effect was explored as the main focus within the proportionality principle. This suggests that incapacitation and other utilitarian sentencing justifications – including retribution – were not the direct focus of the study. This was due to the historical nature of the study, and the purpose of a narrow focus in accordance with the goal of this article. Based on this discussion, conclusions were drawn.

The death penalty in South Africa

The death penalty was applied in South Africa together with the gradual corresponding movement for its abolishment or limited application.[479] During the early colonial years in South Africa, there were public hangings at the Cape. Those years, the method of execution in South Africa was hanging by the neck, except for the 1914 execution of Jopie Fourie, found guilty of treason, who was executed by firing squad during wartime.[480] At the end of this period, capital crimes were murder, rape and treason.[481] The court had discretion, and the death sentence could be imposed where there were aggravating circumstances or evidence of grave circumstances.[482] The Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act (No. 31

of 1917) specified capital crimes, and section 338(1) provided for mandatory hangings in the case of murder.[483]

By 1935, section 61 of the General Law Amendment Act (No. 46 of 1935) introduced some shifts from mandatory capital punishment for murder, with the idea of "extenuating circumstances".[484] At the time, the meaning of the term 'extenuating circumstances' depended, to a large extent, on the interpretation and understanding of each individual judicial officer trying capital crimes.[485] The Act broadly considered extenuating circumstances to include the age factor (under 18), the lack of use of dangerous weapons, personal circumstances, first offender, state of mind, and aggravating and mitigating factors in the context of the death penalty. Currin cites the *S* v. *Lembete* judgment to illustrate the complex nature of extenuating circumstances. This judgment, unlike the previous cases, placed a duty on the accused to prove its presence in respect of a capital case.[486] This judgment took place in 1947, and is perceived as an important development in case law.[487] Extenuating circumstances were cited involving weight of evidence so circumstantial, an unplanned act and surrounding circumstances, extenuating circumstances were not proved by the accused at the court. In this case, the ruling of the court had serious consequences to the accused due to *pro Deo* system, among others, which often lacked adequate representation as a result of financial problems.[488]

By 1958, a number of amendments had been introduced to the Criminal Procedure Act (No. 56 of 1952).[489] This led to the creation of new capital crimes by section 4 of the Criminal Procedure Act (No. 9 of 1958) and each punishment of a crime depended on the discretion of the court.[490] The crimes ranged from robbery or attempted robbery with aggravating circumstances to infliction or threat of serious bodily harm, housebreaking and attempted sabotage. Subsequently, the General Law Amendment Act (No.76 of 1962) widened the definition of sabotage to include strikes, trade union activity, and writing slogans on the walls.[491] The crime of kidnapping was determined by an amendment to the Criminal Procedure Act (No. 56 of 1955). Participation in terrorist activities, such as sabotage and treason, was widely defined as a capital crime, and was created by the Terrorism Act (No. 83 of 1967).[492] Sentencing trends and patterns reveal that murder was most frequently the crime to result in the imposition of the death penalty in the early 1950s to the late 1960s.[493] In 1954, the number of executions totalled 73,[494] while in the period 1957 to 1968, the number increased to 93 executions. From mid-1961 to mid-1962, there was a dramatic increase in the number of hanged persons, to 128.[495]

In the period 1947 to 1969, execution trends and patterns reveal that capital crimes other than murder were seldom punished by death. For example, for rape, the number of executions is estimated to be around 135 for this period.[496] In the same period, the number for robbery or housebreaking with aggravating circumstances was around 70, and for sabotage, around 7.[497] From this picture, it seems that not all capital crimes were met with the death sentence. It appears that, in this period, most executions, approximately 90%, were for murder.[498] In 1951, there were around 37 executions.[499] From 1958 to 1960, 291 death sentences were imposed, and 140 executions carried out.[500] Of the number of death sentences imposed between 1963 and 1965, 794 executions were carried out. Currin,[501] Kahn[502] and Olmesdahl[503] seem to agree broadly on the increase in capital convictions and executions from the late 1950s to the mid-1960s. They also reflect on the growing

number of commutations of death sentences at the time. It is possible that the shift towards the notion of extenuating circumstances permitted wide possibilities by judicial officers in respect of convictions for murder.

Currin suggests that capital cases in the period 1950 to the 1980s have been executed in accordance with the rigid application of the principle of extenuating circumstances.[504] Others within the period have shown a strong application of the doctrine of 'common purpose', which developed in English case law.[505] It is stated that, in the English case of *R* v. *Maclin, Murphy and Others*,[506] the court defined the doctrine as follows:

> It is a principle of law, that if several persons act together in pursuance of a common intent, every act done in furtherance of such intent by each of them is, in terms of the law, done by all.[507]

Subsequently, the common purpose principle was adopted in South Africa as part of the common law as far back as 1886. In accordance with the common purpose principle, in *R* v. *Mgxwiti*, the accused, together with seven other persons, was charged before a judge and assessors in the East London Circuit Local Division with the murder of a woman.[508] The first and second accused persons were convicted of murder with no extenuating circumstances and were sentenced to death.

The conviction for murder was based on the finding that the court had proved a common purpose of the group of persons who attacked and killed the deceased, and that the appellant was part of such purpose. On appeal, the defence argument was that the appellant could not be held guilty of murder, on the doctrine of common purpose, unless he had associated himself with that purpose at the time when the deceased had not received a fatal injury. The contention was disputed and dismissed, and conviction for murder was endorsed.

Prior to 1950, the case of *McKenzie* v. *Van der Merwe* related to the principle of common purpose.[509] The evidence seemed to reveal that the accused, while in rebellion and acting in concert with other persons in rebellion, was an assistant commandant of the rebel forces in the Orange Free State during the 1914 rebellion. The rebels had come to the plaintiff's farm to cut his wire fences and take away his stock. However, the plaintiff did not succeed in his claim on the basis that there was no direct evidence that linked the accused with other rebel groups who were on the scene. According to Davis in the appeal, the contention by the complainant centred on the fact that "[e]very rebel was liable for acts such as those complained of, done by every other rebel in furtherance of the common purpose."[510] Subsequently, the appeal was rejected on the grounds that it was improper to make a narrow inference to hold the accused liable for the deeds of rebel forces within the limitations of the doctrine of common purpose.[511] It is worth noting that the court approach was more concerned with the causal connection with the individual accused than with the group of participants.[512]

In *S* v. *Malinga and Others*, four appellants were convicted of the capital crime of murder by a judge and two assessors, and were sentenced to death in the Durban and Coast Local Division.[513] It appears from the case that the appellant had consent to commit the crime

of housebreaking with the intent of 'breaking in and (or the former is the wording of this common law crime at that time) stealing'. One appellant was armed with a loaded revolver, with which he consequently shot and killed a policeman. The court pronounced that the other appellants should have foreseen the likelihood of such occurrence, and were party to and equally guilty of the murder. In this case, the court emphasised that mere association in a common purpose constitutes participation in the unlawful act, and that association in the common design makes the act of the principal offender the act of all. The association needs not be expressed; it may be implied from conduct. In this view, once participation by association is established, what follows is whether the accused had the necessary intention to commit the crime. In S v. *Dladla and Others*, the accused was convicted of the murder of a police informer.[514] The court judgment was that the accused should have foreseen the crowd's murderous intent to kill the victim, and it appeared from the evidence that the appellant had participated in the actions that resulted in the killing.

Gauging the pattern of sentencing in accordance with the doctrine of common purpose, there seems to be a shift from the earlier pattern of rendered judgments. From 1950 onwards, the application of the common purpose principle appeared to be understood narrowly or loosely as a mere attempt to secure convictions, compared to prior to the 1950s. This pattern of approach in sentencing decisions could be associated with the possibility of an increase in capital crimes. For example, in the case of S v. *Malinga and Others*, the state tried to prove its case by all means likely to set an example to deter other potential offenders. This is suggested by the role of an accomplice who turned informer and state witness, which resulted in the accomplice being discharged from liability for prosecution.

In 1963, in S v. *Mkaba and Others*,[515] the appellants were charged with –

- 17 counts of sabotage in terms of section 21 of the General Law Amendment Act (No. 76 of 1962);[516]
- six counts of contravening section 11(a) of the Suppression of Communism Act (No. 44 of 1950);[517]
- one count of housebreaking with the intent to steal; and
- the murder of a police informer.

The three appellants were convicted with no extenuating circumstances, and the death sentence was passed on each appellant. It appears from the evidence of the court that, at the time of the murder, the appellants were members of the regional committee of Umkhonto we Sizwe[518] in the Eastern Cape. The appellants' contention was that there were extenuating circumstances based on the fact that the murder took place in the context of political aspirations, and the motive was to further political objectives. Although the court recognised political motives, it concluded that these motives could not serve to extenuate the culpability of the crime. The court held that the murder could not be treated as if it took place in an open field or where there was political conflict. The court further held that the murder of the deceased was carefully planned with a common purpose, and dismissed the appeal.[519]

In cases where groups were accused of the crime of murder in the period between 1950 and 1969, there seemed to be a trend to convict the accused without strong evidence that linked with the act as an individual. For example, in the case of *S v. Malinga and Others*,[520] the court of appeal stated that association with an illegal common purpose constituted participation in the unlawful act, and association in the common design made the act of the principal offender the act of all. By contrast, in *McKenzie* v. *Van der Merwe*, the court refused to establish liability without showing direct proof.[521] These are the disparities in sentencing decisions and patterns with respect to the use of the common purpose doctrine.

The death penalty from 1970 to 1979

As described earlier, the period from the beginning of the 1950s up to the early 1960s was characterised by a significant upsurge in the resistance to the development of apartheid; yet, by the end of the 1960s, there was a political lull due to the detention of those found challenging the authority of the state.[522] By the 1970s, there was a revival in political resistance, and the period is mostly marked by the events of 16 June 1976, the Soweto student uprising, which consequently appeared to have resulted in new repressive laws and amendments in the penal realm to strengthen state social control measures.[523]

Execution patterns from 1971 to mid-1972 reflect 56 hangings. From mid-1972 to mid-1973, there were 55 hangings.[524] These hangings were mostly for the crime of murder, followed by robbery. The third type of crime to account for these execution patterns was robbery with aggravating circumstances. Rape is counted to have received less attention in respect of capital punishment during this period.[525] From 1974 to 1975, around 59 persons were hanged, from 1976 to 1977, there were around 87 executions, and from 1978 to 1979, there were around 148 executions.[526]

From 1971–1972, 91 persons sentenced to death by the courts were admitted to prison. On 30 June 1971, there were 41 persons who had been sentenced to death, but who were still awaiting execution in prison. From 1971–1972, 56 persons were executed, while during the previous year, 1969–1970, 80 persons were executed, and in 1970–1971, another 80 persons were sent to the gallows. In 1968–1969, 84 persons were executed. Midgley and Newman conclude that the figure of 56 executions for 1971–1972 represents a decrease of one third in the number of executions since 1968–1969, which showed a trend towards a decrease in the use of the death penalty, compared to the previous years.[527] Of the 56 executions in the period 1971–1972, 49 were for murder, three for robbery and murder, one for rape, and three for robbery with aggravating circumstances.[528] The execution trends and patterns in this period showed an increase in hangings. This suggests that conviction rates for serious crimes were on the increase, and a prevalence of such crimes in the context of uprising. Another dimension is that the doctrine of common purpose permitted judicial officers to arrive at the conviction of a group of persons, and to find the whole group liable for the unlawful conduct of one individual.

By the mid-1970s, there was a resurgence of politically related trials.[529] These cases appeared to have been tried under the ambit of the common purpose doctrine. In the case of *S* v. *Mahlangu*, there seems to have been strong elements of the application of

the common purpose doctrine.[530] The accused appeared to be youthful, and had left the country after the Soweto student uprising in 1976. In 1977, he returned with two men, heavily armed as African National Congress (ANC) guerrillas. On their way, the police stopped them. Mahlangu ran away, one other man disappeared, and Motlaung, the third man, ran into a warehouse in Goch Street, Johannesburg, where he shot and killed two men, threw a hand grenade and injured two other men (all civilians). It appeared that Mahlangu was not on the scene.

Later, both Mahlangu and Motlaung were charged, but Motlaung was declared unfit to stand trial due to brain damage and blows to his head sustained during the struggle at the warehouse when he was captured. Only Mahlangu was tried for the two crimes of murder. The court argued that the accused as well as Motlaung realised that, in the event of certain circumstances, the firearm in their possession would be used to kill. The judgment stated, "Mahlangu was equally liable for all the acts that Motlaung had done; the pulling of the trigger was as much the pulling by Mahlangu or by Motlaung".[531] Mahlangu was sentenced to death for his part in the killing of two men on 13 June 1977 and was executed on 6 April 1979.[532] While Mahlangu was associated with these acts, the court approach seems not to have taken into account the nature and the political context of this serious crime in the light of the upheavals of the time. It appears from the case that the youthfulness and political motives of the accused did not constitute extenuating circumstances in the sentencing decision. Thus far, the justification for the use of the death penalty was based on retribution, but mostly on deterrence and incapacitation. Nevertheless, it is difficult to prove the preventive value of such decisions during that specific period.

Capital punishment from 1980 to 1989

During the 1980s, capital punishment was increasingly imposed by the judicial decision-makers in South Africa as a mandatory sentence for specific capital crimes.[533] In this period, the death penalty was viewed as a deterrent sentence for adult offenders convicted of capital crimes. However, the manner in which some individual judicial officers applied their discretion has given rise to the perception that their penal philosophy was influential in determining the death sentence decision.[534] This suggests that sentencing disparities and elements of inequality with regard to capital sentences tended to be arbitrarily based on sentencing theories held by individual judicial officers as well as other factors.[535] As shown in the discussions, a pattern of sentencing can be illustrated by the decision of Judge Lategan, regarded as a harsh judge, who sentenced 29 individual offenders to death between 1 January 1986 and December 1988, while Judge Didcott was known to have publicly condemned capital punishment.[536]

In a 1989 research study conducted in the then Cape Supreme Court, differences were found among the judges when imposing the death sentence.[537] In terms of this study, of 32 judges who presided over capital cases from 1986 to 1988 in the Cape Provincial Division, three accounted for more than half of those sentenced to death, while other judges did not send anyone to the gallows at all. One judge imposed the death sentence in 44% of the cases he heard. The study also revealed that three of the judges heard only 15% of the cases, while responsible for 51% of the cases in which the death penalty was

imposed.[538] In contrast, there were also three judges who heard 32% of the cases, but only sentenced 12% of the accused to death. Disparities and variations in death sentencing decisions suggest that the life of an accused individual could depend on the trial judge. Similarly, one accused was sentenced to death, but the Appeal Court found he should have been discharged at the end of the trial, as there was no evidence that he had been at the crime scene.[539] The study pointed out that some accused petitioned the Minister of Justice for clemency, or for the stay of execution. Some succeeded while others did not. In one case, for instance, misfiling and error were discovered on the eve of execution, and this led to the perception that an innocent accused could have been executed despite criminal justice safeguards.[540]

According to Amnesty International, between June 1982 and June 1983, 81 blacks were convicted of murdering whites, and 38 were hanged in South Africa; yet, none of the 21 whites convicted of murdering blacks were executed.[541] Similarly, a Black Sash report states that "over 90 black men have been executed for raping white women. On the other hand, not a single white man has been executed for raping a black woman".[542] This suggests racial bias in the death penalty following sentencing decisions. Another study of the Black Sash found that the average prisoner on Pretoria's Central Prison death row came from a disadvantaged background, 92% did not complete school education, and 47% had been prosecuted for the first time while there were juveniles.[543] This is a complex and similar picture to that in the United States, as shown by studies in Florida and Texas between 1977 and 1986.[544] These differences in the stances and approaches of individual judges show how much meaning and interpretation were given to extenuating circumstances and other factors in accordance with the penal philosophy of the judges. Another dimension could be the number of capital cases decided by a particular judicial officer. Statistics released on executed persons from 1980 to 1990 give an insight into and a broader picture of judicial approaches to capital crimes, as shown in Figure 1 below:


Figure 1: Total number of executions in South Africa from 1980 to 1989.[545]

In Figure 1 above, the high number of executions in the 1980s can be attributed to the late 1970s uprisings. While in 1981 there was a decrease of 35 executions, in 1982, there was an increase of five, with a subsequent drop of ten in 1983. These numbers show less consistent trends, but quantitative shifts do not seem to be substantial, probably due to reprieves. In 1987, there was a more significant increase in executions than in any other year, as shown in Figure 1. In 1989, however, there was a substantial decline in executions, as shown above. Of the 53 executions in that year, two were for rape.[546] Murray, Sloth-Nielsen and Tredoux suggest that the 1989 figures might have been influenced by the political climate with respect to those sentenced to death for unrest-related crimes.[547] Historical sentencing studies suggest that the death penalty can be characterised as a state violent measure to coerce its opponents.[548] This is evident in the cases discussed above. The last executions took place in 1989 and a moratorium on executions was announced on 2 February 1990.[549]

Execution patterns, as shown in Figure 1 statistics, reveal very little about the deterrent effect of the death penalty in capital crimes. This is despite the fluctuation of figures, but from year to year there were significant figures of execution, which indicate that capital crimes continued to be prevalent during the period of executions.

It is important to note that capital punishment was described by some academics, particularly in relation to young offenders, as a broadly repressive and inhumane practice.[550] Such repressive penal measures were carried out by the state. Under the Bill of Rights, the state has no right to kill; rather, section 7(2) of the Constitution obliges the state to "respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights":[551] According to the Cape Provincial Division study, Murray et al. and Sloth-Nielsen and Tredoux remark that some judges imposed the death sentence more frequently than others in respect of the same cases of murder.[552] The latter researchers recognise that not all murders present the same circumstances; hence, it is not possible to treat the accused all in the same in a mechanical manner.

In *S* v. *Safatsa and Others*,[553] the sentencing court seems to have applied the law of common purpose in a manner that suggests a keen sense of continuity, compared to the pattern of approaches to crowd-related crimes in earlier years. In this case, six of the accused were convicted of the murder of the mayor of the town council of Sharpeville on 3 September 1984. A crowd of people numbering about 100 attacked the mayor's house, throwing stones and petrol bombs and setting the house alight. The deceased was caught by the crowd as he was running away from his burning house. Stones were thrown at him, and he was dragged into the street, where petrol was poured over him and he was set alight. He died at the scene.

The contention in this case seems to be the argument that there was no proved causal connection between each individual action of the accused and the death of the deceased.[554] In accordance with the common purpose principle, the court however believed there was no reason for the state to prove the causal connection between the conduct of the accused and the death of the deceased. Justice Botha referred to previous similar judgments on common purpose, such as Mgxwiti,[555] endorsing that sentencing trends suggest similar approaches. The judge stated, "consequently the acts of the mob which

caused the deceased's death must be imputed to each of these accused".[556] Regarding Safatsa, professors Burchell and Hunt identified the major challenge for sentencing courts as the notion of 'proof' of the participation of an individual with a common purpose.[557] In Safatsa, the notion of de-individuation, arising from crowd behaviour, was described in the expert testimony of Tyson (psychologist) as reducing a person's awareness of the consequences of his or her actions, due to the emotional situation, and could be seen as extenuating circumstances. But the court could not find extenuating circumstances, and the appeal against the accused's conviction of murder and the death sentence imposed, was dismissed.[558] Du Toit and Mangani, as quoted by Davis,[559] seem to suggest that the notion of de-individuation portrays crowd conduct away from the context in a manner that seems to be ahistorical and apolitical. They believe that the notion of de-individuation tends to decontextualise the mob acts as without political motivation, rather than as irrational mob psychosis.

In *S* v. *Thabetha and Others*,[560] the court accepted the notion of de-individuation in the crowd-related crime of murder, to constitute extenuating circumstances. The murder charges emanated from the events after the funeral of a civic leader. The accused were youthful: three were 17 years of age at the time of the commission of the crime, one was 19, and the other was about 14 years old. The judge considered, inter alia, the youthfulness of the accused to constitute grounds for extenuating circumstances during the appeal. In this regard, Skeen endorses the view that de-individuation should be proved, not as a generality but in connection with the individual accused.[561] A similar case in which the court found extenuating circumstances, inter alia on the grounds of de-individuation and the age factor, was that of the Queenstown Six[562] during retrial by Justice Jansen. As captured by Currin,[563] in passing sentence the judge considered the subjective state of mind of the accused that consciously or unconsciously led them to necklace[564] the deceased. The judge recognised the perception of the community regarding their sense of deprivation, alienation, frustration and experience of police actions. This judgment substituted the death sentence for less than two years' imprisonment.

In *S* v. *Khumalo and 25 Others*,[565] as described by Currin, unlike in the Queenstown Six judgment, Justice Basson found that all 26 of the Upington accused had intent to kill the deceased, as the motive was political resistance against authority.[566] Among those accused sentenced to death on common purpose without extenuating circumstances, there seems to have been young accused under the age of 18.[567] It appears from these judgments that capital crimes by persons under the age of 18 took different forms at specific historical moments. From the trend of these common purpose judgments, the trial court could not find the age factor and other social factors to constitute extenuating circumstances. Patterns of judicial sentencing approaches appear to place much emphasis on the degree of gravity of the crime, which appears to increase the level of culpability of the accused.[568] It seems that the approaches of judicial officers, particularly about capital crimes, tended to depend on and reflect the reasoning of the appointed judge. The Queenstown Six case of Judge Jansen and the Upington 26 case of Judge Basson seem to illustrate this perception.

In another common purpose case, *S* v. *Mgedezi and Others*,[569] the accused were convicted of murder at a mining compound. In responding to his critics, Justice Botha reflected

on the judgment in *S v. Safatsa and Others*.[570] The judge argued that the court never pronounced that a mere presence in crowd violence could lead to liability for the crime. Eventually the Appeal Court found that the trial court constituted a misdirection in the sense that there was no direct proof of the role of each accused in the death of the deceased, and the death sentence was substituted with a prison sentence. Compared to earlier cases, the pattern of Appeal Court judgments suggests a trend that seems to consider wider factors in the application of the common purpose doctrine. In *S v. Zwane and Others*,[571] the eight accused were charged with high treason, sedition and subversion. The charge appeared to subvert the authority of the state in respect of conspiring with the ANC and involvement in a people's court. The appeal court held that the necessary hostile intent required for high treason had not been proved, and conviction was confirmed for sedition in respect of all accused.

In *S v. McBride*,[572] the accused was convicted and sentenced to death for bombing a bar in 1987 in which three women were killed and 89 persons injured. The court appeared to recognise that the killing might have been politically motivated, but refused to view that as amounting to extenuating circumstances. As in 1965 in the case of Mkaba and Others,[573] the court held that there was no ground for interference with the notion of extenuating circumstances, and the death sentence was imposed by the trial court. Professor Milton, as an assessor in his minority judgment, reflected on the appellant's mind at the time of the commission of the crime, "[h]is age, he is a young man of an age still suggestive of lack of maturity and the thoughtless susceptibility to the stress of intense emotions."[574] The professor went on to ask:

> How am I to assess the morality of this act? In a normally ordered society – where every citizen enjoys the full range of civil liberties and equal access to political protest – this would be a totally senseless act and in my view without the slightest justification, in his moral blameworthiness no different to one who placed a bomb in a normal society.'[575]

Another case (unreported 1985) in which social and political backgrounds were raised in extenuation to politically motivated offences, was that of Andrew Zondo.[576] The accused was a young person at the time of the commission of the offence and was charged with planting a limpet mine in an Amanzimtoti shopping centre near Durban in 1985. The accused was convicted for killing five people and injuring others, and he was executed in September 1986. In this case, sociological evidence was presented by Professor Meer, who reflected:

> Well, a person like Andrew Zondo, born in 1966, grows up totally within the ambit of Bantu Education and Bantu Authorities, and to my mind these are the pillars of the kind of society which has been devised for him – Apartheid society.[577]

Van Zyl Smit calls for the necessity of a wider view in the search for proportional sentencing approaches.[578] In this regard, sentencing patterns over the years tended to be disproportionate and inconsistent. The death penalty statistical trends tended to question

the deterrent value of these sentences, although they continued to be applied despite criticism within and outside judiciary.

Deterrent effect of the death penalty

The justification of criminal deterrence is premised on the idea that punishment is meant to be the chief end.[579] This refers to the degree of severity of punishment for the purpose of prevention of future offending and no more through fear in the potential offender. Hypothetically, from a utilitarian viewpoint, a sentencer might base his or her reasoning on the need for public protection.[580] This refers to imposing the death penalty on an individual in order to deter potential offenders. This assumes that offenders have rational choice-making to consider benefits and costs before committing capital crime.[581] Bentham provides three preventive descriptions of deterrence punishment in the individual offender.[582] Firstly, the individual offender's physical power may be taken away, which relates to physical incapacitation through incarceration and capital punishment. Secondly, punishment may be inflicted to take away the desire to offend, which relates to rehabilitation. Thirdly, the theory believes that punishment may induce the offender not to offend again by intimidation, that is, punishment may seek deliberately to inflict pain.

Incapacitation seeks to deal with offenders in a manner that makes them incapable of offending for a substantial period of time in the interests of the public good.[583] This theory tends to be applied to certain groups, such as dangerous offenders, career criminals or other persistent offenders, and is likely to call for the sentencing option of imprisonment.[584] Wilson[585] argues that incapacitation theory makes no assumptions about human beings, while deterrence assumes rationality. Gross and Von Hirsch argue that courts tend to give weight to general preventive considerations as long as the sentence remains reasonable proportionate to the crime.[586] In terms of the deterrence effect of the death penalty, "it is difficult to establish whether there is correlation and causation which determine the deterrent effect of punishment".[587] This relates to whether severe punishment causes the reduction of crime.

Similarly, research studies suggest difficulties to find evidence that executions reduce murder rates.[588] The estimated relationship is indirect. This is due to a limited amount of data that can be used to determine the deterrent effect of the death penalty on capital crimes.[589]

The deterrence theory seeks to establish the relationship between execution risk and capital crime incidents. This difficulty is evident in Figure 1 above, which shows frequency of execution patterns and difficulty to determine the deterrent effect of executions in terms of capital crimes. Stolzenberg and D'Alessio[590] are of the view that:

> The reasoning behind deterrence theory is that individuals are free-will actors who rationally weigh the probable benefits and potential liabilities or costs before engaging in criminal activities. This requires the individual to have knowledge and personal experience with criminal punishment that is likely to be imposed by the state and awareness of how punishment has been meted out to the apprehended individual in the past.

Although most murders occur from interpersonal conflict, few result from a planned lethal act. In this view, the fear of the death penalty could deter a potential criminal, and the deterrence effect requires communication to the wider public and effective criminal justice system that increases conviction rate. Executions or hangings have, over the years, been associated with the escalation of violence in society, particularly in South Africa, as discussed above. People tend to imitate violent behaviour, including forms of killing other people.

Similarly, Ernest van den Haag is of the opinion that "it is difficult to statistically prove and just as impossible to disprove that the death penalty deters more capital crimes than available alternative punishments such as life imprisonment".[591] This includes life imprisonment without parole. He suggests that statistical empirical evidence on the deterrent effect of the death penalty is lacking. Conrad agrees with Van den Haag, namely that it is difficult to find empirical proof that capital punishment deters potential murderers.[592]

However, Conrad believes that the death penalty can still be inflicted only once on any offender, because it is a unique severe penalty. He maintains that the death penalty is likely to deter some murderers, but not necessarily all of them. If the death penalty is not frequently applied, then the argument for incapacitation of murderers for life imprisonment could prevail.[593] Hugo Adam Bedau,[594] Van den Haag and Conrad[595] and Stolzenberg and D'Alessio[596] concur on the lack of scientific evidence and analysis, which could result in conclusive findings that the death penalty has a deterrent effect. This is due to a lack of reliable data to support the claim in favour of or against the deterrent effect of the death penalty. Consequently, most studies on the deterrent effect of the death penalty lack empirical evidence to make conclusive findings.

Conclusion

Referring to the goal of this article, there is a lack of vigorous scientific analysis and empirical evidence to determine whether there is, historically, a deterrent effect of the death penalty in South Africa. The analysed historical sentencing data, case law and statistical execution patterns have shown little evidence of a deterrent effect of the death penalty in South Africa during the period 1917–1995. It is difficult to find a connection or causal relationship between capital crimes and the frequency of the death penalty, and whether it causes a reduction in capital crime, as discussed in the article.

Nevertheless, this article can provide a broadly historical indirect relationship between execution patterns and occurrence of capital crimes in South Africa before the abolishment of the death penalty. However, it is difficult to show the causal connection in terms of the limited empirical data and the review of the deterrence literature. The discussion also suggests the need to strengthen criminal justice efficiency in order to ensure apprehension of a suspect, increase conviction, sentencing consistency, and equality in sentencing in order to achieve greater deterrence. In this regard, more vigorous scientific study with applied methodology could be undertaken in the future.

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SCIENTIA MILITARIA
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Book review

A Russian on commando: The Boer War experience of Yevgeny Avgustus

Boris Gorelik

The book *A Russian on commando: The Boer War experience of Yevgeny Avgustus*[597] is a war memoir that details the experiences of Yevgeny Avgustus as a foreign (*uitlander*) volunteer in the South African War of 1899 to 1902. It is a fascinating read, which provides a behind-the-scenes look at the events that took place during this war. The book was edited by Boris Gorelik who engages the reader vividly in what Avgustus had recorded in his memoir. Since Avgustus was from Russia, the memoir was originally written in Russian and was translated into English by Lucas Venter.

The book is well organised, and the chapters are arranged according to their relevance. The titles of the respective chapters are clear in terms of the details presented in each chapter. Gorelik starts by acknowledging one of the most debated topics regarding the involvement of other nationals in the South African War. The war was previously known as the Second Anglo-Boer War but later became known as the South African War, taking into account that people other than South Africans were involved in this war as well. It is commonly known that other nations assisted either the British or the Boers in the war, but we seldom find information that delves deeper into these 'other' or *uitlander* volunteers in the war. To bridge a part of this gap, the book highlights the experiences of these 'other' foreign nationals who came to fight for a foreign cause in a war that was not theirs.

The introductory chapter sets the tone and discusses Russian interest in South Africa and the war, which led to their involvement in and contribution to the war even though in a limited capacity. Before the war, the relationship between Russia and South Africa was insignificant and close to non-existent, which was perhaps due to the geographical distance between the two countries. Russia became interested in South Africa and romanticised Boer campaigns and their lifestyle, i.e. conservatism and religion to the point where Boer generals were commemorated in various ways in Russia. This was despite the fact that, unlike the Germans and the Dutch, Russians had no kinship ties with the Boers. This discussion is thought-provoking and provides new insight into how the war gained international focus by allowing the reader to see how the war became a central focus during this period. Gorelik also introduces us to the main character in the book, Yevgeny Avgustus, a Latvian memoirist and writer, who became part of the Russian

combatants who volunteered in the South African War. Gorelik narrates the biography and historiography of Avgustus from his childhood, throughout his education, which ended in him dropping out of school, up to his adult life as a Russian commando who joined the Boer army as a soldier to fight "for a foreign nation and a foreign cause" (p. 55). The book takes us on Avgustus' journey from Russia to the Transvaal in South Africa. Background is given on how his fellow men tried to discourage his venture but also on his interactions with various soldiers in restaurants and cafés in Berlin. This is a clear indication of the passion he and his fellow men had for fighting for the Boer cause. Details on his travels provide an overview of the locations to which he had travelled and his experiences at each destination. Gorelik also details the horrors that took place when shots were fired in the commando camps, and that transpired in some of the battles in which Avgustus participated during the South African War, such as the Battle of Spion Kop and the Battle of the Tugela Heights. While reading the book, one's imagination starts to paint pictures of the events highlighted in the book.

Avgustus shares extensively the events that took place on the journey to Africa by ship. What grabbed my attention most was Avgustus' constant encounters with black people and their various tribes during the war. The brief descriptions of the type of labour that black people provided for their Boer masters grab the attention (pp. 76–82). We learn, for instance, that black people were used as labourers during the war. It is interesting to note Avgustus' first-hand experience of the work that black men (and women) did and his feelings towards them, whether negative or positive, because when it comes to the historical narratives of the war, the issue of black participation has been contested over the years. The writer spoke broken Dutch but also learned some isiZulu phrases, such as "hamba lapha", which means "get out of here" (p. 116).

More details of Avgustus' encounters with this group of people and other activities in which the black people were involved would have added much value to the book. In Chapter 4, Gorelik details what Avgustus was told of how black men had expectations of being free from the white man after the war and the ritual sacrifices these men had made. This is very interesting because, in my understanding of black people, rituals are usually performed during significant events or periods. The treatment of black men is again mentioned when Gorelik discusses an incident Avgustus experienced where a black man who was considered a spy was bound with a rope to a horse and dragged while being beaten by the Boer generals and ultimately shot after being confirmed a spy. This information in this book is a confirmation of what Pretorius had discussed and depicted in images in the book *Scorched earth* regarding Boer and British brutality against black people during the South African War.[598]

Another key aspect of the book is the issue of food rations during the war. Gorelik details Avgustus' experiences when he landed in Pretoria and the abundant food provisions that were available for the commandos when they first arrived. Food became scarce when the war intensified. We come to learn that food rations were provided by the British during the South African War, and it was interesting to read how the men sometimes had to source food and occasionally received food from black men in exchange for money.

Foreign nationals came from places such as Germany, France and Russia to participate in the war. In the process, various corps were formed. The writer notes the formation of the Russian corps as an act to correct the "uncoordinated" Boer military systems and techniques that existed at the time (p. 160). The aims of this corps failed due to a leadership crisis. Other men from Germany, France and Ireland, who were working in the gold mines, workshops, butcheries and bakeries, were coerced to join the Boer forces to survive due to stagnation in their businesses (p. 163).

I was particularly glad that Gorelik mentions the significance of the war at the start of the book. The point he makes is that the South African War was not only a South African matter but a global matter that captured the attention of other countries either rooting for or against the British or Boers, two devoted Christian nations who, instead of practising Christian conscience, called on God and prayed for the strength to exterminate each other. Memoirs by foreigners are often overlooked by historians and researchers when conducting research, and Gorelik indicates the relevance of memoirs relevance in research as they offer first-hand war narratives and views from an outside perspective. The memoirs are relevant to avoid biased views of war events.

The images used in the book are a good addition to help depict the characters mentioned and the variety of corps that volunteered in the war. The use of maps could have enhanced the illustrations. Had Gorelik mapped the locations within which Avgustus found himself, it would have provided further information on the locations of battlefields and commando camps.

Towards the end of the book, we learn more about the Russian corps and the poor military tactics employed by the Boers that caused them to lose the war. We also get to understand the real intentions of Avgustus in coming from Russia to South Africa to join the war. Was he prepared to die for a war that was not his? No, he wanted to learn the military tactics of the Boers and the operational systems of the British, as he was convinced that one day war would take place between Russia and the British.

I generally appreciate that Gorelik included some additional notes to clarify certain aspects, especially the discontinuation of the memoir, or rather its sudden ending.

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Endnotes

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Book review

Rhino War:
A general's bold strategy in the
Kruger National Park

Johan Jooste and Tony Park

As global trade in wildlife products increases, the dark illicit markets follow suit, supplying the ever-increasing appetite of end-users worldwide, especially in South-East Asia. As a result, illegal wildlife trade now ranks fourth in transnational organised crime. Moreover, it has been linked to the crime–terror nexus that plagues West and Central Africa and other regions internationally.

South Africa has been at the forefront of the battle against rhinoceros poaching for over a decade, with the initial growth of poaching in 2008. The rapid increase in the poaching of rhino in the Kruger National Park caught the South African National Parks (SANParks) off guard and ill-equipped in terms of rangers, resources and a strategy to counter the daily incursions of poaching gangs. By 2012, the then-CEO of SANParks, Dr David Mabunda, appointed Maj Gen (retd) Johan Jooste with a mandate to paramilitarise (p. 26) the Kruger National Park – firstly, to stem the tide of rhino poaching, and secondly, to reduce rhino losses to an acceptable level that would ensure the continuation of both the black and white rhino populations in the park.

The recent release of the book *Rhino war* by Johan Jooste, with supporting author Tony Park, maps out the journey Jooste undertook to build the capability of the Kruger National Park in order to counter the threat of rhino poaching. In the early chapters of the book, Jooste introduces us to his personal history and passion for conservation, much from his early days at 7 South African Infantry Battalion in Phalaborwa bordering the Kruger National Park with its abundant wildlife. Little did he know that he would return much later in his life to the park in a completely different capacity. Later, his posting as a lieutenant colonel at Jozini in North-Eastern KwaZulu-Natal, where he became an honorary ranger immersed in the heyday of conservation in remote regions, left an indelible mark on him and his wife, Arina, for things wild and untamed. Here, encounters with nesting leatherback turtles and his later command of a battalion group at Eenhana in the then South West Africa territory (now Namibia) further exposed the future general to wildlife conservation. The fact that one could find solace and joy in nature during times of war comes across strongly in Jooste's book.

His family supported him in his military career as he grew and took on greater command responsibility. The then General Jooste was offered the command of the well-known San Battalion. They were widely acknowledged as master trackers and feared for their obvious counter-insurgency talent in combatting Angolan forces in the brutal conditions of the African bush where close-contact warfare was the norm and not the exception. Here General Jooste also had command of national servicemen from South Africa who were qualified in nature conservation. Being a commander responsible for kinetic military forces and conservation staff may feel like a paradox, but it provided the context and golden thread for Jooste's biography. It is also clear that Jooste learned much from his San soldiers and conservation staff, reinforcing the adage that lifelong learning is crucial for military commanders.

Readers will enjoy the ease and honesty of the book as Jooste navigates the organisational and political culture of the Kruger National Park, where there was some apparent resistance to his appointment as an outsider being given such tremendous responsibility to turn around the response by the Kruger National Park to poaching.

From Chapter 4 onward, Jooste explains the various levels of activities and plans he had developed, from integrity management (polygraphs of park staff and management) to his assessment of the inherent weaknesses of the park in terms of human resources, infrastructure, logistics, ranger equipment and domain awareness. Finally, Jooste sought advice and insight across the spectrum to build a concept of operations (CONOPS), which provided a cohesive framework for establishing a shared vision for park law enforcement leadership and operations management. For readers, the book holds vital lessons about leadership in law enforcement and paramilitary operating contexts. Jooste builds on this theme throughout the book, which gives insight into the man behind the story.

Jooste outlines the seductive lure of technology and the world of technology suppliers, being an old hand at the game of defence and security contracting. However, his lessons have particular value for the conservation sector, which is receiving unsolicited and seemingly attractive bids to supply surveillance, antipoaching and human resource services to protected areas in the public and private domain – all of this in the name of stopping poaching. The reader will note some of the cautionary tales about purchasing military-grade equipment and services.

The highly politicised environment of state-owned enterprises and agencies needs no introduction in South Africa, often constraining innovation and change initiatives. In later chapters, Jooste highlights how he navigated institutional bureaucracy, personality politics (including the vociferous NGOs), along with relationships with the South African Police Service and the private sector to secure funding to support his vision and its practical resource needs. Jooste highlights the power of partnerships and securing goodwill from donors such as Howard Buffett and the Peace Parks Foundation. From supporting the design and later the implementation of specialist radar equipment, known as the Meerkat, to training rangers in holistic leadership, these partnerships began to pay dividends for the park. In the book, Jooste bravely tackles the spectre of corruption within the park and the ranger corps and its insidious grip on the staff. He also addresses the formal policy on

the much-touted shoot-to-kill (p 24) thinking that many conservation NGOs and activist groups promote to deter poaching. Human rights and the support of rangers and their families feature strongly in Jooste's thinking. This is a refreshing view in the conservation world, where most field rangers have traditionally been recruited from poverty-stricken communities adjoining protected areas, such as the Kruger National Park.

As many famous anecdotes point out, a general is only as good as the battles he wins and the loyalty of his subordinates. History, as expected, will judge the success of Jooste and the work of his team by the rhino poaching statistics. Objectively, the statistics began to come down significantly in 2016, and later, the success of Jooste's strategy drew attention from the Minister of Environmental Affairs at the time, Edna Molewa, who recognised that the work that was done by Jooste and his team could be adapted for use elsewhere.

As far as the reviewer knows, no other books have been published on this subject. However, there has been significant academic contestation from various quarters by political ecologists, human geographers and other academic domains. This biography will no doubt stimulate further debate and engagement on the concept of paramilitary strategies employed in protected species and protected area conservation.

In conclusion, the book provides a unique set of insights highlighting the man behind the story and the challenges that conservation faces in terms of the onslaught on wildlife worldwide. Nevertheless, Jooste discusses how poaching can be countered by utilising a hybrid of paramilitary concepts, training and law-enforcement theories, which has been through the crucible of harsh application.

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Book review

Across the border:
Surviving the secret war in Angola

Norman McFarlane

Norman McFarlane's book about his participation in the first incursion by the South African Defence Force (SADF) into Angola (1975–1976) adds to the growing list of memoires and reminiscences of the so-called 'Border War' that took place in Namibia and Angola from 1966–1989. Little was published on this war in the first two decades after its conclusion, but fortunately for historians of the future, this has changed since the middle of the 2000s with a steady stream of titles finding their way to the shelves of bookstores and libraries. The majority of these books published by mainstream publishers deals with the experiences of ex-members of the special forces, 32 Battalion, and the last phases of the war mostly seen through the eyes of former soldiers of 61 Mechanised Battalion. McFarlane's memoire is a valuable addition to the literature on the Border War as he was one of hundreds of thousands of ordinary national servicemen who were not part of one these units but who participated in the longest war in South African history – not because they wanted to but because some of them felt they had no other choice. It also adds to the (as yet) meagre list of books on Operation Savannah, as the SADF's operation in Angola in 1975–1976 was dubbed.

There are a number of reasons why *Across the border* will provide valuable material for researchers on the Border War as well as for conscripts who took part in it, apart from the fact that each individual's story is in itself unique. McFarlane, who was trained as an artilleryman but who also fulfilled duties as an infantry soldier and signaller, deals extensively and regularly with the moral dilemma faced by conscripts during the Border War: how does one justify one's participation in a war that was viewed by many (and are still regarded today) as unjust and nothing but a violent perpetuation of apartheid. McFarlane had more political savvy than most conscripts, as Donald Woods, the fervently anti-apartheid newspaper editor who was at one time declared a banned person by the government and was later forced into exile, was his uncle. Although he found Woods' arguments against apartheid convincing, that did not stop him from enlisting in the army. McFarlane admits that he was not brave enough to become a conscientious objector or to abscond, and that he was swayed – as were so many others – by the steady stream of government propaganda warning against the "Rooi Gevaar" (p. 27) and the "Swart Gevaar" (p. 27) (the perceived danger posed by communism and black people to the

South African way of life). Eventually none of these things mattered; McFarlane and his comrades only wanted to survive. He also deals with the dichotomy that characterises the thoughts of many ex-conscripts today: they now know that the war was unjust but they still long for the camaraderie of their days in uniform. McFarlane discusses these issues with an honesty not found in many of the tales of soldiers who participated in the Border War.

The author furthermore highlights another important aspect that plagued many soldiers long after they had stepped out of uniform for the last time – post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). McFarlane's experiences in what was the short and brutal war of 1975–1976 cost him dearly. He not only lost part of his hearing but his dreams are still haunted by what he had seen in Angola: the mangled rotting corpses of people killed by his unit's artillery shells and, especially, the body of a headless boy soldier glimpsed from a passing vehicle. These feelings were exacerbated by a sense of increasing bitterness and a sense of betrayal because of the way he and his comrades were treated by the authorities.

But McFarlane's story is also that of so many other soldiers who had fought in this and countless other wars. He relates the naivety of the young trainees, the anxiety, uncertainty and fear of young soldiers in a war not of their making. The sometimes sordid existence on the so-called 'border' also comes under the spotlight – the lack of food, water, cigarettes, hygiene, post from home and other comforts. The challenge of a strange and dangerous environment with its flies, mosquitos, snakes, spiders and seemingly non-sensible Permanent Force officers and non-commissioned officers today still evokes a peculiar sense of nostalgia. And then there was the utter and unheroic boredom. McFarlane goes into great detail at times, but his story never becomes a tedious read. He tells his story (which he calls a 'memoir' rather than an autobiography because of the unreliability of memory) chronologically in short chapters against the background of the political turmoil in South Africa. The book not only deals with McFarlane's initial period of military service, but also with some camps he had to attend later on in his life. It is a tale to which many conscripts will be able to relate. It will also provide valuable material for historians who want to explore further the daily existence of conscripts and so-called 'campers' in the Border War, their feelings and their mere struggle for survival. McFarlane's story, like that of so many others that has not been heard, is worth telling. The lyrics of a popular Afrikaans song that eventually helped to persuade McFarlane to seek help for his PTSD comes to mind, "[y]ou were never honoured, and no one will now … write about your life" (p. 336) – unless, one wants to add, like McFarlane, you do it yourself.

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Book review

Out of Quatro:
From exile to exoneration

Luthando Dyasop

In this memoir, Luthando Dyasop, a trained uMkhonto we Sizwe (MK) soldier, gives an account of his journey to exile and his life in exile, mostly as a prisoner in Quatro. Upon his release and on returning home, he embarked on a quest to clear his name and to highlight the gross human rights abuses in Quatro.

The name 'Quatro' started to appear in the South African vocabulary in the early 1990s when exiles began to return. When the stories of brutality and torture in the ANC camp in Angola were told by the former detainees they were labelled as dissidents and enemy agents. According to the author, if he did not experience life in Quatro himself, he would also not have believed the stories about Quatro. This memoir should appeal to anyone who ever doubted the existence of Quatro and its appalling tales.

Dyasop was born and raised in Mthatha in the then Cape Province (now Eastern Cape). In the opening chapter, he captures the simple township life of a young man with dreams, but the ills of apartheid felt by Africans would change the course of his life. At the age of 15, he had a crush on a girl, Belinda Wentzel, but realised that, because of his colour, he would never be able to marry her. She was white, and the law prohibited interracial marriages. He was also aware of the repression under Kaizer Matanzima where his opponents were arrested while others went into exile. Dyasop loved art and had hoped to make a career out of it, but this came to nought when he realised the course for which he wanted to enrol was not offered to Africans. Lastly, the broadcasts on Radio Freedom fuelled his desire to join the ANC in exile.

His journey to become a freedom fighter started when he left his home for Lesotho to join the ANC. Once in Lesotho, he was flown from Qacha's Nek to Maseru where he joined the ANC. His stay in Maseru introduced him to the much-needed political education and a completely new life of politics in exile, living on a United Nations stipend as a refugee. Together with a group of recruits, he was then flown to Mozambique. After a short stay in Mozambique, they were flown to Tanzania and then Angola. On the day they left Mozambique, they met Oliver Tambo, the then ANC president, who travelled with them to Lusaka from where they left for Angola for military training. Due to malaria, training was interrupted, and they had to move to a new base in Caculana in February 1982.

After completion of his basic training, Dyasop was selected for a commander's course, which he completed in August 1982. Dyasop and 15 others were selected to go to the Soviet Union for training in the use of special weapons. The training was however changed to take place in Angola. Training in this camp was meant for those who were to be sent back home to fight. Being prepared to be taken back home brought him and his comrades joy and hope. In September 1983, they were taken to Viana camp from where they were deployed to Malanje District. At this stage, Dyasop introduces the issues that would lead to the infamous 1984 mutiny of MK soldiers in Angola, which led to some mutineers being sent to Quatro.

Dyasop ended up in Quatro by association with a comrade called Skhumbuzo who started to confide in Dyasop and a small group, and accused the ANC leadership of hypocrisy and ill-treatment. One evening, out of frustration and disillusionment, Skhumbuzo attempted suicide and began shooting into the air. This led to panic in the camp fearing that it was an attack. Skhumbuzo was shot and wounded by his own commanders as he was mistaken to be an attacking UNITA member. Skhumbuzo and those seen with him that day were arrested and separated from the rest, and given a month-long punishment of hard labour. After about a week, the punishment stopped when they were sent on a mission to recover their looted supplies. Very few supplies were recovered, and the command ordered a second mission.

The mutiny began in February 1984 when the group refused to go on this second mission. Instead, they demanded to meet the ANC leadership to present their grievances. At that stage, they had two main demands: the suspension of the security department ('Mbokodo') led by Mazwai Piliso, and convening a national conference. In response, the ANC leadership sent a delegation to Angola, which suggested the formation of a Committee of Ten to present grievances to the ANC National Executive Committee. In February 1984, a group of Angolan forces (FAPLA) armoured personnel carriers (APCs) surrounded their camp. Skirmishes ensued, resulting in the loss of Dyasop's possessions when his tent was flattened. Sensing danger, he fired his bazooka, destroying one advancing APC. Thirty comrades were identified as the ringleaders. To Dyasop's surprise his name was not among these 30. Instead, a comrade by the name of Mbeko was mistakenly identified for the destruction of the APC. The rest of the comrades who participated in the mutiny were taken to Quibaxe and Pango.

In April, Dyasop was fetched by security under the pretext that he was being taken to Caxito, but he was taken to Quatro instead where he experienced torture and was regarded as an enemy agent. This is detailed in Chapters 19 to 21.

He describes the stay in Quatro as a life of everyday beating where the guards themselves would "[s]how signs of exhaustion from punching and clobbering us" (p. 151) and heavy punishment. Oliver Tambo visited Quatro in August 1987. He acknowledged that the mutiny and all that followed "was the worst period the organization has ever been through in its history" (p. 156).

Dyasop and others were released from Quatro in November 1988. Dyasop and three others approached the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Dar es Salaam for protection as well as financial and educational assistance. The UNHCR denied them assistance, since they were still ANC members. The group therefore resigned from the ANC, after which the UNHCR granted them assistance and they received a weekly stipend.

In Dar es Salaam, the group penned a document detailing their experiences at the hands of the ANC titled "A miscarriage of democracy: The ANC security department in the 1984 mutiny in Umkhonto we Sizwe". The document was published in *Searchlight* magazine, which exposed the gross human rights violations at Quatro. Dyasop and nine others then left Tanzania and went to Malawi. After a stay in Malawi, they were finally flown back home in April 1990.

On arrival at the then Jan Smuts Airport, they met Walter Sisulu and his wife Albertina as well as Govan Mbeki and Wilton Mkwayi who had landed on another flight. The prospect of having a serious talk was cut short when Dyasop and his comrades were whisked away by SA security police to a detention centre in Barkley West, where they were held under the notorious Internal Security Act. The group was released from Barkley West in May 1990. Dyasop finally managed to reach Mthatha again in June 1990.

When the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) was formed, Dyasop integrated. He did not stay long because he resigned after being denied leave to go home to bury his mother in February 1996. He failed to report on time because, on his return from the funeral, he injured his wrist while alighting a train. The attending doctor at Dunnotar Hospital booked him off sick for two months. The officer commanding rejected the sick note, and Dyasop was told to consult the unit sickbay. The SANDF doctor dismissed his sick note and told him to report for duty wearing the plaster while waiting to face the military tribunal for being AWOL (absent without official leave but without intent to desert). He then resigned from the SANDF.

After leaving the SANDF, Dyasop and two other Quatro survivors tried a brick-making company aiming to supply material for the construction of Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) houses. The company failed as tenders were given to those who were 'connected' through the newly introduced tender system.

He finally had an opportunity to appear before the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) hearings detailing his experiences at Quatro and the death of Sipho Phungula. Once again, the TRC process was not satisfactory to him. Despite his disappointment, Dyasop however felt exonerated because of the findings of the commission that the ANC was responsible for gross human rights violations. Another disappointment for Dyasop was the failure by government to honour the TRC recommendation for a compensation of R20 000 for four years for the victims, as the victims only received a once-off payment of R30 000.

Dyasop found healing from anger through a 13-month-old baby named Lesedi whom he was babysitting when he was unemployed. On his encounter with Lesedi he says:

Here I was with this innocent soul with a trusting gaze. His fragility and vulnerability to the world did not take away his resolve to take it a day at a time, whether under supervision or not. Just by being distracted by his need for attention and care, I found I could withstand the effects of the trauma of years of horror … I said to myself, "If I can hold on to this moment and own it, I can afford to paint a bit and write more, taking the challenge one day at a time" (p. 272).

Lesedi gave him the courage to "exit Victimhood Village, cross the Martyrdom Bridge and be free" (p.273).

Out of Quatro is an important addition to the history of the struggle for liberation. Painful as Dyasop's story is, the book is recommended for those with an interest in the struggle for liberation.

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Book Review

Faces from the front:
Harold Gillies, the Queen's Hospital, Sidcup and the origins of modern plastic surgery

Andrew Bamji

Faces from the front is not a fresh title recently hitting the shelves. The publication originally appeared in late 2017 with a reprint appearing earlier this year. The deceitfully 'thin-looking' publication contains unbounded treasures, which could be attributed to the author's passion for the subject clearly shining through. Andrew Bamji is not your average journalist or hobby writer turned amateur historian, but a physician in rheumatology by training, a published author, and a consultant archivist and researcher. In writing the book, Bamji drew from an estimated 2 500 case files, personal communication with a variety of individuals, and secondary literature. Given the depth of research, it is hardly surprising that the book has received much praise since its initial appearance and even won some awards, including the prestigious British Medical Association Medical Book Awards category 'Basis of medicine' in 2018.[599] However, is such significant acclaim warranted, especially from a historian's perspective? All too often some popular history writer makes it to some best seller or must-read list but is riddled with over-exaggeration, over-simplification or inaccuracies.

As the title suggests, this publication deals with three dominant themes. The book is partly biographical, as it focuses on the contribution made to medicine by Harold Gillies, the proclaimed 'father of plastic surgery'. On the other hand, it is partly institutional history. It traces the development of the first medical unit in Aldershot dedicated to dealing with facial reconstruction and establishing a dedicated maxillofacial hospital named after Queen Alexandra in Sidcup in mid-1917. The other dominant theme is the origins and development of modern plastic surgery, with the emphasis on 'modern'. As Bamji acknowledges in the early pages of his book, plastic surgery dates back to antiquity, with the first rhinoplasty and other reconstructive surgeries performed long before Gillies made his mark. Bamji explored the birth of modern plastic surgery as a specialist area from the First World War 1914–1918 to the 1960s.

The Great War was different from its predecessors due to its industrialised nature. Arguably, for the first time in history, more soldiers succumbed to wounds rather than to disease. In addition, casualties reached an unprecedented scale. The use of high-power

munitions, such as rifles, machine guns and artillery shells, caused untold damage to flesh, cartilage and bone. Artillery shells, in particular, caused significant injury as they exploded and broke into fragments of white hot metal. Underneath helmets, faces in the trenches were often at the right height and exposed to these weapons. Bullet rifles would often make minor entrance wounds but would blossom out on the other side of a cheek, exposing broken teeth, tongue and palate. Given the nature of these wounds and the lack of experience and knowledge in treating them, Gillies, with unofficial public financial support, assembled a multi-disciplinary team to reconstruct facial disfigurements. Each speciality made its own contribution – whether through surgery, the making of masks, tracing X-Rays or designing dental splints and prosthetics. The importance of such collaboration between individuals not only in the medical fraternity (and yes, most of them were men) but also in other disciplines forms another sub-theme in *Faces from the front*.

Gillies drew experts from medical specialties, such as dentistry but also the arts. Among them were some well-known names, such as Henry Tonks, the surgeon and artist, and lesser-known names, such as Archie Lane, a dental technician. Bamji opens up the world of personalities – or rather egos – in the medical realm in Britain and some parts of Europe. His writing on this theme is notable as he provides a realistic inside scoop on friction, conflict and disagreements between surgeons and other specialists.

Some healthy competition also existed between the Australian, Canadian and New Zealand sections of Queen's Hospital. In this, Bamji manages to shriek any accusations of hagiography and hero worship, as he even points out some flaws in Gillies himself. Rivalries, such as between Gillies and his younger contemporary, Archibald McIndoe, persisted until the latter's demise. It was also here that an excitable moment passed, albeit admittedly stemming from this reviewer's bias, as mention is made of South Africa in the text, despite not necessarily being in the most favourable light. Bamji tells of Capt. John Law Aymard, the South African ear, nose and throat (ENT) surgeon attached to the Aldershot unit and later the hospital in Sidcup. Aymard allegedly claimed to have been the inventor, instead of Gillies, of a new technique known as the tube pedicle procedure. Apart from a few sentences on these accusations, Bamji provides little further information on the presence of a South African section – or for the reasons of its absence – which is a pity. As many other readers of this journal will agree, the wider Anglophone world often forgets South Africa in writings on war participation. Such neglect is usually forgiven, given the state of our research institutions and challenges to access primary sources.

Many local readers will be thrilled, however, if they continue reading, as Bamji even includes the impressive tale of a South African soldier patient, Walter Bown, who later made his own notable contribution to South Africans by aiding in the establishment of the South African Council for the Blind and the Athlone School for the Blind.[600] Another sub-theme Bamji explored is the experiences both during and after the war of soldier-patients and later ex-servicemen. It is here in particular that Bamji makes a mark on contemporary historiography. As he himself argues, and with which many will agree, the leitmotif of most literature on post-war re-integration of those who sustained injuries is that of men being depressed, frustrated, unhappy and living in isolation, with limited career success. Bamji argues that post-war experiences were much more varied and diverse. As he

states, "family accounts show that not all wounded men were pitiable, miserable wrecks, embittered and destroyed" (p. 201). Instead, many "returned to a mundane life after an intense period of activity" (p. 177). Overall, Bamji excels in balancing the different narratives relating the experiences of physicians, staff, patients and relatives, including public perception, all in perfect harmony. Unlike most writing on similar topics, Bamji provides continuity by following these individuals all the way through to as late as the period after the Second World War in some cases. He further humanises the experiences of these men while at the same time illustrating the overall significance of medical achievement during this period by including visual sources.

Perhaps too often, images are included in books to attract buyers as they flip through the pages deciding whether to buy it or not, or to distract those readers who quickly get bored of too much text. In contrast, the images in *Faces from the front* form an integral part of the discussion. The inclusion of photographs, sketches, and even the occasional photograph, elevates the content of the book to the next level. Occasionally, there is some disconnect between the images and the related discussions. And sadly, references are often missing. Even so, it is an absolutely fascinating read! However, for those tempted to broaden their horizons by ordering a copy, just heed this warning: the publication is not for sensitive readers.

Despite my initial scepticism, I would highly recommend this book to anyone interested in the history of medicine, including historians and other academics of the social sciences. Postgraduate students will also benefit by taking note of the well-written and structured introductions and conclusions of each chapter, even if they are not interested in the topic. Beyond this, Bamji deserves the already received praise and award as he helped return the hidden faces of these men to the annals of history. For many decades, their tale has been overshadowed by that of other wounded men. As Bamji himself remarks, even the official history has glossed over and made limited mention of the treatment of facial injuries. As recent as 2002, many foreigners to Sidcup and the surrounding areas would have been ignorant of the significance of the opening of Gillies Pub by the care home residents housed in the converted Queen's hospital.[601] However, the situation has changed much in recent years, as literature, such as *Faces of the front*, gradually restored this chapter in history to public consciousness.

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Endnotes

[599] *Rye News*. "Book wins BMA award". < https://www.ryenews.org.uk/news/book-wins-bma-award> Accessed on 2 October 2022.

[600] See also H Marlow. *Blindness and the power of inner vision: The inspiring story of Mike Bowen and Lil Gillies who met in the aftermath of the Great War.* Vermont: Footprint Press, 2021.

[601] *News Shopper*. "Sunrise care home in Frognal House, Sidcup opens its own pub". <https://www.newsshopper.co.uk/news/16301834.sunrise-care-home-frognal-house-sidcup-opens-pub/> Accessed on 2 October 2022.