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Editorial

From a defence and security point of view, the second half of 2023 continued to be overshadowed by the ongoing conflicts in Europe, Africa, and the Middle East – the most recent being the Israeli–Hamas War that broke out in early October. These conflicts continue to have vast geopolitical implications, not only making their immediate regions unstable and volatile, but also having no clear resolutions in sight. While these conflicts will continue to stimulate debate in academic and military circles, they also provide a unique opportunity within defence and security spheres to explore topics, such as doctrinal developments, force structure and design, military operations, defence policy, and alliances.

In this issue of *Scientia Militaria*, Vol. 51, No. 2, 2023, the articles consider both historic and contemporary issues associated with war and conflict, as well as defence- and security-related matters. As always, it is trusted that these articles will provide key insights and act as a source of influence for individuals involved in the broader ambit of military planning, operations, management, and higher education.

The article by Louis Bester from Stellenbosch University argues that the terrorist attacks that occurred on 11 September 2001 in the United States of America led to a significant shift in combatting the new security threat in the so-called "War on Terrorism". This event drew international attention to security risks associated with ungoverned spaces, failed states, and the spread of terror. Consequently, it brought together the agendas of addressing failed states and countering terrorism, creating a potent framework for humanitarian organisations in which to operate. This consequently led to the emergence of interventions by non-governmental organisations, exemplified by initiatives such as the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). Furthermore, the deployment of European special forces to Mali in 2013 as part of MINUSMA aimed to restore constitutional order to the Malian government. This mission is still ongoing, serving as a relevant example of how special forces are employed within the context of peace missions in Africa. Bester's article provides an overview of the post-Cold War security dynamics in the region, the nature of conflict in Africa, and the utilisation of special forces in peacekeeping operations.

In his article, Emile Coetzee from North-West University focusses on Commandant Barnie van der Merwe – a South African Defence Force (SADF) career soldier who found

himself entangled in allegations of tender fraud and bribery in the acquisition of military vehicles and equipment supplies for the Defence Force in 1957. Following his arrest and subsequent conviction for corruption, his military career came to a halt in September 1963. Van der Merwe's case played a pivotal role in prompting the establishment of the 1964 Cillié Commission of Inquiry, which aimed to investigate suspected irregularities in arms procurement within the broader SADF and the Department of Defence. The findings by the commission illuminated the intricate web of corruption involving individuals – such as Van der Merwe – who were driven by personal enrichment. Coetzee's article delves into the details of Van der Merwe's illicit activities, identifying the specific nature of his crimes, and examining the historical significance of his criminal career.

The article by Anna la Grange from the University of Potsdam shows that, during the Second World War, the Union of South Africa introduced emergency regulations, including an internment policy, as measures to suppress anti-war activities within the country. These regulations and the internment policy had a notable influence on one of the most prominent anti-war organisations, known as the Ossewabrandwag, leading to the detention of many of its members in internment camps during the war. In 1946, a group of individuals, primarily comprising former Ossewabrandwag members who had been interned during the war, came together to establish the Bond van Oudgeïnterneerdes en Politieke Gevangenes (BOPG), roughly translated as "the Association of Former Internees and Political Prisoners". La Grange utilised the BOPG collection, which forms part of the Ossewabrandwag Archive located in Potchefstroom, South Africa, to offer a concise historical background of the BOPG. She investigated the organisation itself, and explored the potential influence of the organisation on its members by highlighting nostalgia or a longing for the past as a central aspect of its existence. By regarding the BOPG as a direct and enduring social expression related to the internment policy of the Union of South Africa, La Grange's article presents an initial effort to examine the BOPG and expound its role in the broader context of South African experiences and memories of the Second World War.

In their article, Marno Swart and Eben Coetzee – from Stellenbosch University and the University of the Free State respectively – argue that the field of International Relations remains defined by an enduring conflict between two opposing theories, namely offensive realism and liberal internationalism. They scrutinise which theory – offensive realism or liberal internationalism – provides a more convincing rationale for the formation of an alliance between the intelligence agencies of Israel and South Africa. In doing so, their article acknowledges the intricate and multifaceted character of intelligence cooperation within the broader context of statecraft and foreign policy. While scholars have indeed probed the explanatory capacity of offensive realism and liberal internationalism in elucidating the foreign policy actions of democratic and mixed partnerships (comprising both democratic and non-democratic elements), there has been a noticeable absence of efforts to apply these theories to the interactions of intelligence services. Consequently, the article endeavours to bridge this gap in the literature by providing an assessment of the relative effectiveness of offensive realism and liberal internationalism in accounting for the establishment of an alliance between the intelligence services of Israel and South Africa.

The article by Check Achu and Issiaka Diarra – from the Human Sciences Research Council and the University of Arts and Humanities of Bamako, Mali respectively – investigated the role of non-state actors in facilitating terrorism and insecurity in Mali. The authors analysed the security situation in Mali within the broader context of insecurity and religious conflicts in West Africa, and argue that transhumance, as a migratory pattern, and the permeability of international boundaries in the Sahel region, act as factors contributing to the insecurity and instability in Mali. Nevertheless, many contend that the root causes of terrorist acts and violent conflicts in post-independence Africa are not solely the result of unfulfilled promises to alleviate poverty and unemployment, but rather stem from people's experiences of inequality and relative deprivation. Achu Check and Diarra thus sought to elucidate some of the crucial theoretical considerations that Malian political leaders should take into account as they implement measures to address the fundamental challenges confronting the country. The authors also elaborate on the concept of ungoverned spaces, and assert that the vast, uninhabited areas in Mali specifically serve as breeding grounds for terrorists engaged in nefarious activities. In conclusion, Achu Check and Diarra propose that the Malian government should engage in renegotiating a social contract with the people of Mali and initiate efforts to rebuild a positive relationship between the Malian populace and the government.

In the final article, Desiré Fouché, Hennie Smit and Ivan Henrico from Stellenbosch University report on utilising the GFN online calculator to assess the ecological footprint of individual members of the Army Support Base in the Eastern Cape. The online ecological footprint survey was employed to gather quantitative data from the responses of each participant. Statistical analysis was conducted using the STATISTICA 14.0 software to determine the ecological footprints of the individual members at the Army Support Base in the Eastern Cape and their collective ecological footprints. Across various categories, officers consistently recorded the highest ecological footprints, while non-commissioned officers, Public Service Act personnel, and privates in general, registered lower scores. Additionally, the article shows that, in most categories, males outscored females, indicating a higher ecological footprint for males and, consequently, a more substantial impact on the environment. Fouché et al. show that the results of this study hold significance, as the study represents the first calculation of an ecological footprint for a military base in South Africa, and is one of a few global studies with a similar focus. They conclude that their findings could serve as a foundational point for future research within units of the South African National Defence Force, ultimately contributing to more sustainable resource usage.

A selection of book reviews by Hussein Solomon, Abel Esterhuyse, Laetitia Olivier, Louis Bester and Evert Kleynhans conclude this issue of *Scientia Militaria*

The Editors
Evert Kleynhans & Anri Delport

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The Role of Special Forces in Peace Missions: A Focus on MINUSMA within the African Context

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Abstract

The terror attacks on 11 September 2001 in the United States of America, and the subsequent declaration by George W Bush of a War on Terrorism, has renewed the focus on the use of special forces as the force of choice to combat the new security threat. It also focussed the international concern on the security threats occupying ungoverned spaces, failed states, and the threat inherent in the spreading of terror. This, in turn, created a merging of failed states and counter-terrorism agendas, which resulted in a powerful new framework for humanitarian actors. Non-governmental organisation interventions in the form of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), to mention but one example, appeared. The subsequent deployment of European special forces to Mali in 2013 as part of MINUSMA was in an effort to restore constitutional order to the Malian government. The mission is still in progress, and thus relevant as example of the employment of special forces within the context of peace missions in Africa. This article offers a brief glimpse at the nature of post-Cold War security, the character of conflict in Africa, and the resulting employment of special forces in peace missions.

Keywords: Special Forces, Peace Missions, Terrorism, Mali, MINUSMA

Introduction

The mere thought of special forces conjures up images of figures, clad in black, equipped with the latest technology and bristling with weapons, moving stealthy at night in a built-up area in order to capture or kill high-value targets. With so much so-called "kill and tell" literature[2] available on various media platforms documenting the missions of these secret warriors, one might be forgiven for having these mental pictures. Breede states that much of the published literature on special forces is 'descriptive, sensationalized, or simply boosting the image' of special forces.[3] In fact, special forces have probably become some of the socially most fascinating military units in contemporary times, with the public slurping up any new story. Even in high politics, these units are regarded as the favoured option, the 'easy button'[4] to push, when it comes to serious military matters. Although special forces have been around for decades, the early 2000s saw renewed growth in public attention as well as a rapid expansion in these units with regard to allocated funds, personnel, and the number of important missions.[5]

The terrorist attacks against the United States on 11 September 2001 and the subsequent declaration of the War on Terrorism by George W Bush pushed the special forces of the United States and many other Western countries to the forefront of fighting the new national security threat. Their expertise, equipment, and structure for counter-terrorism and counterinsurgency made special forces the natural choice for countering the asymmetric nature of terrorism.[6] Horn and Balasevicius, for example, note that the 'inherent responsiveness, small footprint, cultural and regional awareness', as well as the wide array of specialist capabilities of special forces have proved them to be reliable force multipliers in the past whose impact far exceeded the numbers deployed. These traits have clearly made them an indispensable component of national security and defence capabilities.[7]

The 2001 terrorist attacks also focussed the international concern on the security threats inherent to ungoverned spaces, failed states, and the use of terror. A merger of the failed states and counter-terrorism agendas developed, and this created a powerful new framework for humanitarian actors.[8] This introduced non-governmental organisation (NGO) interventions, which 'blur the insurgency and counterinsurgency domains with the peace mission paradigm'.[9] Two pertinent examples are the United Nations Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) and the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). Ironically, the growing involvement of NGOs in conflict zones seems to have encouraged insurgencies further, as insurgency seems to have become the means by which rebel groups can be included in national politics. In addition, insurgencies have to reconcile with NGO demands. Adebajo refers to the games that the powers play, putting the interest of the Western world first and dictating where, when, and for how long peace missions[10] will be deployed. This stands central to any analysis of United Nations (UN) peace missions.[11]

Although UN member state forces have been deployed in theatres where terrorism and violent extremists are present, they have only started to confront these complex threats in Mali directly since 2013. In 2016, of the 11 countries that were most affected by terrorism, seven hosted UN missions. Discussions among policymakers and experts concerning the security environment have focussed to a large extent on whether peace missions could undertake kinetic counterterrorism operations,[12] and what the possibilities might be for the UN Security Council to request peacekeepers to fight terrorists.[13] MINUSMA has become one of the deadliest missions in the history of the United Nations, suffering numerous fatalities as a result of hostile acts by various belligerent groups, including terrorist groups, such as al-Qaeda. MINUSMA is the first multidimensional peacekeeping operation[14] in a theatre where there are ongoing counterterrorist operations as well.[15] The deployment of European special forces to Mali in 2013, as part of MINUSMA, was an effort to restore constitutional order within Mali. The mission is still going on and thus relevant as a case study to explore the role of special forces in the context of peace missions.

Numerous publications have documented special forces as a security and defence phenomenon, specifically in terms of their training and operations. The same applies for peace missions internationally, specifically in Africa. Very little literature, however, focusses on the involvement and role of special forces in peace missions. The existing

theoretical gap can and has translated into the incorrect use of special forces in peace missions in some instances. A lack of education among joint force commanders (and often special force commanders) in terms of their correct deployment within peace missions risks results ranging from negative foreign policy fallout to the failure of peace missions. The study on which this article reports, explored the role of special forces in peace missions, using the role of European special forces in MINUSMA as case study.

The approach adopted in the study was analytical and descriptive in nature, drawing on publications about peace missions and special forces in general. This is expanded with official publications on MINUSMA and the deployment of special forces in the MINUSMA mission. Furthermore, existing international military and UN doctrine and manuals were consulted to gain insight into the practicalities of such deployments. The initial focus is on the nature of post-Cold War security and the contemporary nature of conflict in Africa, after which there is a brief analysis of a UN peace mission in Africa and specifically the European approach to the employment of special forces as part of the UN operational concept. The existing doctrine on the use of special forces in peace missions, as well as the challenges and dangers that might be encountered in the use of special forces in peace missions is also briefly discussed.

Nature of post-Cold War security in Africa

The former UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, stated in *An Agenda for Peace* that the concept of peace was easy to grasp, but that of international security was more complex, 'for a pattern of contradiction has arisen here'.[16],[17] The foundation of the pattern of order during the Cold War was, according to Sørensen, the bipolar military competition between the United States and the Soviet Union, supported by their allies. At the time, the world order pivoted on 'the creation of a stable balance of power that would secure peace and the independence of the state', as well as the rule of law, freedom and socio-economic well-being.[18] The end of the Cold War saw the international rule-based system losing its structured framework which ensured regulation of the internal and international behaviour of the Third World states (now known as "the developing world"). Gone were the ideological patrons who provided governments and potential insurgents with the means to destabilise and subvert national order. This opened the door for instability and the outbreak of violent conflict.[19] Surplus Cold War aid, in the form of weapons, became readily accessible to insurgent forces in several conflict areas, increasing vulnerability of constitutional order and fuelling the drivers of internal conflict. Many states now justified intervening in hostile countries by simply interpreting sovereignty in a way that suited their own national interests and those of their alliances, making use of their national security and defence capabilities to enforce their narrow political aims.[20]

Some of the underlying causes for internal conflicts are listed by Gilbert as –

- the disintegration of diversified multi-ethnic federations;
- the expression of ancient hatreds, the legacies of colonialism;
- the different versions of the democratic process in various states;
- the long lineage of illegitimate authoritarian regimes; and more recently

- the rise of Islamic fundamentalism after the terror attacks against the United States in 2001.[21]

Ngubane and Solomon neatly categorise these sources by dividing them under the headings 'military', 'political', 'environmental' and 'societal' sources of insecurity, specifically within the African context.[22] According to Cilliers, the structural drivers of violence in Africa – which will determine future levels of violence on the continent – are poverty, democratisation, the regime type, the population age structure, repeated violence, the bad neighbourhood effect and poor governance.[23] Cilliers argues that the tendency towards violence stems from the collective influence of some or all of these drivers. For violence to erupt, some form of politicisation and triggering effect is necessary, and there must be high levels of pre-existing social tension and discontent among the population.

The African continent has witnessed some of the bloodiest conflicts in the world since the 1960s. In fact, according to Bakken and Rustad, 2015 and 2016 saw the most conflicts in Africa since 1946.[24] They regard state-based conflicts[25] as the most deadly type of conflict in the world. An interesting fact is that many of the African conflicts between 2015 and 2017 show a strong correlation to the rise of the Islamic State (IS),[26] and IS was gaining traction in other existing conflicts involving Islam. This is troublesome, as governments, such as Nigeria, for example, are no longer fighting against Boko Haram[27] alone anymore, but against IS as well. Seen in the light that IS would be linked to other Islamic terrorist groups, the potential of the spill-over effect increases dramatically. In addition to this, terrorist networks are known to be associated with transnational organised crime, which inherently funds their activities, creating an added layer of national security threat complexity.[28]

Despite the fact that Africa had been an operational theatre for terrorist attacks long before 11 September 2001, the Western world, and more specifically the United States, had only started to regard the continent as part of the frontline in the fight against global terror after the attacks on the Twin Towers.[29] The international community is, however, concerned about a number of stumbling blocks hampering military or peace mission interventions in conflicted African areas. First, African conflicts are very complex due to a tendency for these to recur in areas that had previously been affected by war. Especially those regions where transnational armed or criminal groups are active are susceptible to the recurrence of conflict. Second, there is a severe risk inherent in the transnational mobility of groups, as well as the way this mobility can be exploited in mediatised asymmetric warfare. Much publicised terrorist attacks, such as by al-Shabaab on the shopping centre in Nairobi in 2013 is a case in point. This was a transnational spill-over from the conflict zone in Somalia to a major urban centre. The targeted area would have had to provide the terror group with a local support network and media coverage that would reach the whole world. Although such attacks hold no gain in territory or victory over enemy combatants, civilian populations are increasingly subverted by means of fear as primary tool of terror, and could in some instances encourage those states at risk of similar violence to back proxy groups in the conflict, and in doing so, escalate and prolong the internationalised civil war.[30]

Character of Post-Cold War Conflict

The intrastate conflicts in Africa, which broke out in the 1990s following the end of the Cold War, became increasingly non-conventional in nature, primarily because they were fought mostly in developing countries with limited conventional armed forces and capabilities. Van Vuuren, however, cautions that the danger of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons is still real.[31] He furthermore mentions that the organisation of armed forces becomes random and doctrines become vague, making strategic early warning very difficult to obtain. In the resulting low-intensity conflicts, the main types of belligerents would be indigenous ethnic groups, insurgents, and warlords with gangs, instead of soldiers organised in formal national armed forces. Conflicts would be characterised by large-scale killing and raping of civilians, the prevention of humanitarian aid reaching those in need, and the humiliation of UN peacekeepers.[32]

According to Reno, there are a number of features that characterise warfare in Africa.[33] The first is that both state and non-state armed groups favour the control of resources and commercial networks, which are responsible for sustaining the authority of groups and lining their pockets above that of population-centric warfare. Second, state and non-state armed groups are fragmented, adding much complexity to the friction and conflict. In the case of non-state groups, this could be due to state rulers employing divide and rule tactics by encouraging rebel leaders to start their own groups in order to buy them off, or in the case of state armed groups, to compete for state power in order to exploit natural resources. Lastly, due to the conflicts in Africa, many states are marginalised from the international economic and political networks. This could also be ascribed to numerous international state and non-state actors set on undermining the sustainability of these states' patronage politics, using "bad governance" as excuse.

Many of the conflicts in Africa are left unresolved at political and military level, which produces simmering anger and tension, and in turn merely gives belligerents time to rebuild their forces to start the conflict all over again. The populations who bear witness to these conflicts often become disillusioned with their governments, which appear to be only concerned with their own safety and security, at the expense of the population. Disregarding civil responsibility and accountability to the citizens results in an increase in political and social opposition, and gives rise to new security threats. Left unattended and unchecked by government, as it usually is, these threats will affect the 'Pillars of the State', which Barlow lists as intelligence, law enforcement, the armed forces, governance, the economy, the populace and perception.[34] African armed conflicts today include many insurgencies which, according to Vreÿ, all demonstrate one general trait, namely the lingering influence African states that emerged from earlier insurgent campaigns.[35] The cycle repeats itself as these newly emerging states fall prey to similar insurgencies due to political or economic reasons with unresolved friction serving as catalyst. One might argue that Africa has an ingrained insurgent strategic culture.

As dissident groups grow larger and more successful they start evolving from simple banditry to full-scale insurgency. These insurgencies, however, at some stage start depending on foreign assistance, which could be from state or non-state actors. Thom

suggests that these internal struggles could simply be proxy wars that are disguised as internal conflict.[36] Terrie also lists an external support base, sanctuary, and resources as some of the conditions for insurgencies to commence and endure.[37] Conflict dynamics have, in fact, become very complex, with the motives, methods and objectives of the actors involved leaning increasingly towards criminality. Although foreign nationals, who are operating in countries, such as the *Democratic Republic of the Congo (*DRC), might align themselves with those rebel groups that strive for democratic or liberation objectives, their motives are normally less altruistic and more selfish in nature than those of local rebel groups, and linked to economic gains. The globalisation of crime, enhanced by open borders, cheap global communications, and electronic financial transactions, thrive during these insurgencies and see illegal weapons, drugs and natural resources, such as diamonds, flowing freely in and out of the conflict areas.[38] This level of insurgency integration into society blurs the lines between war, organised crime, and large-scale human rights abuses. This is normally the entry point for peace missions. But with the increasing levels of complexity of these asymmetric conflicted spaces, conventional peacekeeping forces could be found wanting from a functional performance perspective. Special forces are especially suitable for deployment to such environments, but not without controversy.

Exploring the role of special forces during peace missions

Spulak reasons that the value of special forces in peacetime operations, such as peace missions, is derived from their unique role in times of conflict, violence and war.[39] Contrary to the popular, and stereotypical, belief that special forces only engage in 'the application of lethal effects', special forces actually have significant non-lethal capabilities.[40] In the past, there was unfortunately minimal focus on the deployment of special forces during peace missions and on the allocation of tasks to these units designed to transition periods of inactivity until more significant tasks presented themselves. Horn, however, argues that contemporary requirements in peace missions place a considerable demand on the deployment of special forces, as well as on the allocation of resources for these types of missions.[41] He notes that special forces are ideally suited to meet the agile threats inherent in social and political challenges characterising the future security environment.

Johansen echoes Horn's contention that special forces will keep on playing a vital role in counterterrorism in the future. Yet, it remains an open question as to what exactly future taskings might hold.[42] He lists a number of threat actors that would typically form the basis for operational tasking of special forces. These include irregular threats, transnational networks, and sub-state groups that are able to overthrow governments. These are all agile and asymmetric threats, which require agile, flexible and asymmetric responses. Added to this is increasing defence budgetary pressure, which forces governments to search for cost-effective ways and means to ensure that national and international security is maintained. With this in mind, the nature of special forces, combined with appropriate technologies, sets them apart from conventional forces and offers a new and different way for executing force and exerting a presence in global affairs.[43] The evolution of special forces over many decades has resulted in a corps of shadow warriors who have grown in capacity and skill to such an extent that they have moved away from so-called "state cracking" as primary methods of influencing opposing political elites towards state paralysis, and

morphed into a professional elite with 'often-unrecognised game-changing potential'.[44] It is these traits which, if incorporated correctly, could prove invaluable in peace missions.

Meredith is of the opinion that special forces could serve as conflict resolution experts, especially in places where civilian peacekeepers cannot hope to go or make an impact.[45] He argues that special forces operations show several similarities to traditional peace efforts, and list their approach to the task at hand as one important similarity. Special forces units can perform peacekeeping functions, which are aimed at removing the long-term causes of conflict, thereby functioning in ways beyond traditional military peacekeeping, which is aimed at the ending of hostilities as primary function.[46]

During the 2015 High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO), discussions focussed on the capabilities and methods that are required in order for peace missions to function safely and effectively in dangerous environments, with a particular focus on the importance of intelligence.[47] Of particular interest was the need for an effective system to assist with the gathering, analysing and operationalising of intelligence for peace missions in complex environments. This merely echoes the views of Major General Cammaert in 2006 on field intelligence assets, specifically referring to the MONUSCO mission in the DRC.[48] At the time, Cammaert effectively deployed special forces in a peacekeeping capacity to determine the exact figures regarding the strengths of various armed groups.

Since then, the United Nations have published a manual on peacekeeping missions for special forces in 2015 in order to formalise capability standards, and to enhance the preparation, operational readiness, and efficiency of the special forces of troop-contributing countries (TCCs).[49] Primacy is awarded to the conduct of special reconnaissance as principal task allocated to special forces deploying within a UN mandate. The purpose of special reconnaissance is to collect or verify information of strategic or operational significance. The United States,[50] Canada[51] and South Africa[52] have also included within the peacekeeping doctrine of their defence forces the role that special forces would play when mandated to function in a peacekeeping capacity.

The UN manual on peacekeeping missions for special forces describes how special forces could influence and deter those elements working against UN efforts to engage in the peace process, should the appropriate UN authorities deem it fit. Despite being described by Breede as 'a rather little-known policy document',[53] the manual fills a large gap in multilateral doctrinal literature on special forces deployments within peace missions. Contained in the manual, the standardised special forces capabilities and organisational structures are adapted to fit the UN peacekeeping requirements. The manual does not attempt to override military doctrine of TCCs and does not address any tactics or techniques.[54] According to the manual, special forces committed by TCCs to UN missions could be fully integrated into the overall operational plan of a UN peace mission. Special forces would also complement the efforts of conventional forces in the mission, and should be able to adopt a proactive approach in fulfilling the mandate of the mission.

In the US Army Field Manual on Peace Operations (FM 100-23), special forces are described as a valuable asset when it comes to the planning of peace missions.[55] Special

forces would typically assist in preparing the operational area by means of reconnaissance to gain intelligence updates on key terrain, personnel, or facilities. Special forces can also make contact with local and friendly agencies because of their language skills as well as area orientation or conduct operations to prevent synchronised defence or counterattacks by forces hostile to the peace mission. These units can provide temporary support, such as airspace control for landing zones, communication nodes, security, as well as advanced force assessments, to assist with the deployment of conventional peacekeeping forces or designated humanitarian assistance organisations.[56] The Canadian Defence Force acknowledges that the characteristics of special forces have many relevant applications in peace missions, but cautions that the overt deployment of these units can be very controversial in politically charged environments.[57] The units are, however, well suited for civil–military cooperation tasks, community relations, and community information activities. In addition, these forces can also assist with the raising, training, and reform of local security forces in hostile areas.

The US Special Operations Manual for the Joint Services (JP 3-05) describes foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) as humanitarian activities conducted outside US borders.[58] This is often conducted in conjunction with multilateral organisations, such as the United Nations. It comes as no surprise then that the most important capabilities that special forces can provide in FHA are their cultural knowledge, language capabilities, and their ability to work closely with multi-ethnic indigenous populations. Special forces can also provide initial and ongoing assessments of the causes of conflict to international relief organisations. These small, versatile and self-contained units can deploy rapidly and can provide a full spectrum of air, ground, and maritime support, with links to assets that are space-based.[59] When properly directed, special forces within the peace mission environment can –

- support sensitive reconnaissance missions;
- conduct operations aimed at targeting war crimes suspects and drug trafficking; and
- track terrorist training camps, to name but a few.

Commanders must, however, ensure that tasks are appropriate for these units, as special forces personnel are limited, they are high in demand, and should be focussed on tasks that would have a positive strategic effect.

The Participation of European Special Forces in Mali (2013 until present)

Background to the Conflict

The violent relations between the Tuareg ethnic minority in the north of Mali and the dominant Mandé ethnic group in the south of the country have been a dominating factor in Malian politics since independence of the country from France in 1960.[60] The policies implemented against the Tuareg by the post-colonial Malian government triggered the first Tuareg rebellion, which lasted from 1963 to 1964. The legacy of this rebellion would time and again result in renewed violence in the form of the second Tuareg rebellion from

1990 to 1996, the third Tuareg rebellion from 2006 to 2009, and ultimately the fourth and current Tuareg rebellion, which started in 2012. Prior to the outbreak of conflict in Mali in 2012, the country had been regarded as 'a beacon of stability and a model of democratic evolution in West Africa'.[61] A military coup in 2012 was followed by a swift takeover of half of the country by armed insurgents. The crisis was unexpected to both the coup makers and all the parties involved in the conflict. The outbreak of hostilities was the culmination of a number of historical, social and political factors, which served as triggers to the conflict. The desire for northern independence by the Tuareg was and is regarded as the dominant reason for each of these violent conflicts.[62]

Another trigger of the latest rebellion in 2012was the conflict spill-over effect of terrorism and unrest in Algeria and Libya into the Malian Sahara. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) had established bases in the northern parts of Mali in the early 2000s and became very active in 2007. The return in January 2012 of well-armed Tuareg fighters from Libya in the aftermath of the Arab Spring uprisings sparked a new rebellion in Mali, which saw a combination of the historic Tuareg claim to occupy "lost" territory and militant Islamism.[63] In March 2012, the increase in government corruption and general dissatisfaction with the Malian government among the Mandé led to a mutiny at a military barracks outside the capital, Bamako. This escalated into a military coup, which led to the overthrow of Malian President Touré. The coup weakened the government and seriously impaired its ability to offer effective resistance against the Tuareg rebellion.[64] The end of 2012 saw Mali effectively divided into the south (controlled by the government) and the north (under control of the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad [MNLA] rebel group).

The threat of violent extremist groups, such as Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), resulted in the African Union (AU) deploying a peace enforcement mission, the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA).[65] In January 2013, when the Islamist extremists attacked Konna, the strategically located town close to the capital of Bamako, France also decided to intervene in the conflict with a small military force. This French mission, Operation Serval, managed to repel the extremist attacks and to push them back north.[66] February 2013 saw the European Union (EU) launching a multinational military mission, the European Union Training Mission in Mali (EUTM-Mali), in order to train the Malian military. Two months later, the security situation had improved sufficiently for the UN Security Council to authorise the MINUSMA with a Chapter VII mandate.[67],[68]

In its efforts to help restore constitutional order and ensure free and peaceful elections, the United Nations is, however, constantly challenged by corruption and the weak political institutions of Mali. Chauzal and Van Damme argue that Mali had become a playing field for foreign powers.[69] Whereas Mali had initially been regarded as a so-called "no interest zone" by the international community, due largely to the apparent democratic normality in the country and the absence of strategic resources, some African countries, such as Libya and Algeria, have made the northern parts of Mali central to their Sahel strategies because the Malian government could not assert its political and military presence in these northern areas. It was only after the 2001 terror attacks in the United States that international attention started pivoting towards Mali as a good candidate for

the implementation of new security doctrines. The United States and France therefore significantly increased their security and military programmes in the region.

Once MINUSMA had replaced AFISMA and had taken over from France, MINUSMA quickly became the target of attacks by militants and spoilers[70] who wanted control. This was made worse by the unpreparedness of the Malian security forces and the ease with which militants could cross international borders.[71] MINUSMA received a proactive mandate to stabilise key population centres, to deter threats, and to take active steps to prevent the return of armed belligerents, and to use force if necessary, as was mandated within a Chapter VII mission. In attempting to do so, MINUSMA had become one of the deadliest missions in the history of the United Nations, with increasing fatalities among UN personnel. It has also become the first multidimensional peace mission to be deployed alongside the ongoing counter-terrorist operations by the French military.[72] Although most European countries had backed away from peacekeeping operations as a result of their experiences in Somalia and Bosnia, the Dutch government had decided to contribute a significant number of troops and key enablers to MINUSMA, as well as drawing in support from a number of European countries.[73] The Netherlands and Sweden featured prominently in providing special forces, surveillance drones, and Apache attack helicopters in order to establish the first explicit intelligence cell, dubbed the All Sources Information Fusion Unit (ASIFU), in a UN peacekeeping mission.[74] This cell works closely with special forces deployed in the mission area.

Involvement of Special Forces

In 2012, the UN Secretariat called on member states to assist in providing an intelligence capacity for this mission, due to the mounting pressure on MINUSMA to increase its ability to deal with the threat of armed groups attacking UN personnel.[75] As a result of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) starting to reduce its presence in Afghanistan, many NATO and EU countries saw the call of the UN Secretariat as an opportunity to get involved in UN peacekeeping and a new environment for their militaries to practice interoperability within multilateral operations. Those countries deploying forces to MINUSMA, however, favoured high-end but low-risk capabilities. The intelligence capacity had to focus on capabilities over numbers and improve performance and accountability.[76] Consequently, the Netherlands contributed 450 troops to MINUSMA in 2013, which included a special operations land task group (SOLTG) and an intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) company, which combined with air assets. This task force was stationed in Gao.[77]

From the onset, the deployment of special forces in MINUSMA was justified by the need for tactical human intelligence. These units accessed areas where it was difficult to collect crucial information, and which, once processed, was used to reduce the threat to the mission in a high-risk environment, as well as reduce uncertainty within the complex mission area. This intelligence not only contributed to the safety and security of peacekeepers, but also enhanced the situational awareness of the mission, which in turn informed all operations related to the protection of civilians.[78] These are all considered strategic enablers for peace mission success. Historically, MINUSMA became the first

peace operation to establish a stand-alone unit for collecting and analysing information within the organisational structure of the peace mission. This was ASIFU, which deployed in January 2014.[79] The primary countries contributing troops to ASIFU were Belgium, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden.

Following the example of the Netherlands, Sweden pledged a combined group of 250 intelligence operatives and special forces operators to MINUSMA in 2015. The intelligence capacity of this Swedish task force was about twice the size of that of the Dutch unit, and was situated in Timbuktu. Its capabilities included military reconnaissance personnel, a weapons intelligence team, and small unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). This task force had been able to operate as far as 120 kilometres from Timbuktu, with an overnight capability, and allowed the mission to gather information on local dynamics. However, despite the complex work it was doing in Mali, the Swedish task force would later complain that they were underutilised.[80] Germany also started contributing forces in 2016, and supported the Dutch contingent with intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets. The Dutch SOLTG consisted of approximately 90 special force operators under the command of the MINUSMA force commander and, together with the Dutch helicopter detachment, was mandated to operate throughout the entire country.[81]

The United Kingdom announced in 2019 that it would also deploy 250 troops with a long-range reconnaissance (special forces) capability.[82] This consisted of troops from the Irish Special Forces Unit and the Army Ranger Wing,[83] which was deployed as part of a German-led task force in Sector East in Mali. Their tasking involved '[to] support the collection of information within the operational environment for the accurate development, decision and implementation of mandate activities'.[84] Due to years of experience in counterinsurgency operation in Afghanistan and Iraq, the European countries contributing troops to MINUSMA were in a unique position to introduce new capabilities, technology, operational and doctrinal concepts to the MINUSMA peace mission.[85] This increased the expectations of what they could achieve. ASIFU was the primary component in synchronising all special forces and intelligence efforts for MINUSMA. Designed around Western intelligence doctrine and practice, the ASIFU headquarters was based in Bamako. The ASIFU collection assets were however located within the Dutch and Swedish ISR units. In order for the ISR units to obtain information from human sources, it made use of its special forces in these units, which in turn formed human intelligence teams, civil–military interaction teams, mission review and advisory teams, and liaison personnel.[86]

In late 2020, MINUSMA conducted Operation Mongoose in central Mali. This was part of the MINUSMA efforts to operationalise its mobile task force concept. This concept was aimed at increasing the mobility of the mission and its ability for rapid response in remote areas.[87] The operation involved the mobilisation of both land and air units, which included special forces and helicopter units from different military sections. This allowed MINUSMA to make further strides towards a more proactive posture in the protection of civilians. It is activities, such as Operation Mongoose, which are supported by the efforts of ASIFU. This unit would typically collect and analyse information to support activities, such as the provision of humanitarian aid, recovery and stabilisation efforts, and the facilitation of peace dialogue.[88] It strives to produce a wide range of tailor-made services

according to client requirements. Purposeful efforts concentrate on the provision of emergency intelligence support, operational intelligence support, and focussed intelligence operations, which enhance the overall success rate of the peace mission.[89]

Special Forces in Peace Missions – The Challenges

The most important challenge facing those employing special forces in peace missions is experiential knowledge and understanding of the role and employment parameters of special forces in peace missions. This predicament is unfortunately of a transversal nature, affecting policymakers and the senior command of conventional forces, right down to the special forces rank and file. Special forces are encultured to be deployed in the traditional warfighting tasks. However, for many special forces across the globe, the environment between war and peace where 'lethal actions and peaceful exchange ebb and flow', the so-called "grey zone",[90] is still unfamiliar territory. It may thus come as no surprise when senior special forces personnel acknowledge that they are unsure about the role and intentions of special forces in peace missions, and whether special forces should be involved in peacekeeping at all.[91] This, fortunately, is a challenge that can be resolved over time from the lessons learnt during missions, such as MINUSMA.

The mission criteria, which determine the advisability of the deployment of special forces in peace missions, as laid out in the UN Military Special Forces Manual[92] provide clear guidance with regard to the factors that need to be taken into consideration. The changes in international security conditions determine the grand strategy and defence policy of any country and should likewise inform the demands by policymakers for the services of special forces. Gray highlights the importance of educating the entire military establishment (special forces included) with regard to the limited yet crucial role that special forces could play in both their traditional warfighting as well as their peacekeeping role.[93] Failure to do so will almost certainly result in confusing command relationships, which will compromise missions and, in worse case scenarios, result in failure and death. It is thus crucial for all stakeholders to understand each other's operational context in order to solve command and control issues.[94]

If special forces are given unclear guidance in terms of tasks that must be performed rapidly, and if these tasks should only require a fraction of the capabilities that special forces possess, the chances are very good that their effort could fail. The withdrawal of the Swedish special forces from MINUSMA due to under-utilisation or as a result of employing them in tasks that did not require the expertise of special forces, is a point in case.[95] In the final debrief of the South African Special Forces (SASF) deployment under the United Nations in Burundi (ONUB), the mission commander spelled out his scepticism about the concept of using special forces in a UN role.[96] At the time, the role of special forces in UN missions was still an unchartered area and most of the SASF deployments to Burundi found that effective special forces operations within UN mandates were very difficult due to the following reasons:

- The rules of engagement under a typical Chapter VI[97] UN mission, such as ONUB, did not allow for special forces operations.

- The memorandum of understanding (MoU) and the standing operating procedures (SOPs) of the United Nations dictate that all personnel have to wear blue berets and insignia clearly identifying them as working under the United Nations. Furthermore UN vehicles have to be white. It is thus felt that the United Nations does not cater for the principles of surprise, stealth, good intelligence, pre-emption or swift aggressive action.
- The compilation of UN headquarters staff renders fast action with maximum surprise almost impossible due to the long channels of command, the difference in language among the staff, and the inherent difference in processes and procedures.
- The whole ethos of UN peace missions stands in grave contrast to the essence of a highly trained special forces unit.[98]

Conclusion

Changes in the character of conflict in the aftermath of the Cold War resulted in an existential growth in the need for peace missions around the world. A combination of reluctance and a lack of capacity by the major powers to respond to the increasing violent intra-state conflicts, especially in Africa, saw the African continent becoming the hub of approximately two thirds of the activities of all peace missions between 1990 and 2020. These peace missions evolved in parallel with the evolution of the strategic environment and of late have shown a trend towards more robust peace missions and military interventions. Since the start of the twenty-first century, the rise of illegitimate non-state actors has added fuel to the spread of cross-border conflicts in Africa. Greed and grievances of populations have been exploited by extremist groups, such as al-Qaeda, which seem to be making their own rules. Large-scale violence, mass killing, and raping of civilian populations have become common features of many conflicts, with humanitarian aid being prevented from reaching those in need, and the peacekeepers often being humiliated.

The growing need for the deployment of special forces in peace missions in Africa is linked to the evolutionary nature of the threat agendas, conflicts and peace missions on the African continent. Decreasing defence and security budgets will force governments to opt for more cost-effective ways and means to maintain global security, hence the justification for the use of special forces in peace missions. Their use of modern technologies, in particular, sets them apart from conventional forces and offers unique and different ways for executing force and exerting a presence; thus, making them ideally suited to meet the social and political challenges characterising peace missions.

The value of special forces in peace missions can be seen in the role it plays in times of conflict and counterinsurgency. In addition to their skills in the application of lethal actions, special forces also have significant non-lethal capabilities. They may, for instance, serve as conflict resolution experts, especially in places where peacekeepers cannot hope to go or to make an impact. Special forces units often perform peacekeeping functions aimed at removing the long-term causes of conflict, and by doing so, they operate in ways beyond traditional peacekeeping, with the ending of hostilities as primary objective. MINUSMA, for example, has become the deadliest mission in the history of the United Nations. Its

experience demonstrates that UN peace missions in asymmetric threat environments require capabilities for intelligence and special forces operations.

By deploying a variety of capabilities to counter the asymmetric threat, Mali became a laboratory for exploring new methods in UN peacekeeping. ASIFU provides a new intelligence capacity to deal with the threat of targeted attacks against UN personnel. It is a robust intelligence structure, which has led to controversy and conflict within the United Nations. The special forces of the Netherlands and Sweden were responsible for intelligence gathering to feed ASIFU. It was however found that the intelligence product generated by ASIFU was of little value to the mission due to the lack of its integration by ASIFU into the overall mission structure. It was also found that the cultural and language gap between the European special forces teams busy with human intelligence gathering and the Malian role players, combined with an inability to grasp the complexity of the conflict fully, were complicating intelligence gathering. Sweden complained that its special forces contingent was overly capable of the task at hand but underutilised, and they subsequently withdrew and replaced the contingent with an infantry reconnaissance unit. The primary lesson in the employment of special forces in Mali is that senior command is not always fully aware of the assets the special forces have at their disposal, how to integrate the efforts of those assets with the overall mission structure, or how to use the assets optimally.

The European special forces in Mali favour deploying high-end, yet low-risk capabilities. Emphasis is placed on intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities, with the addition of air assets and unmanned aerial vehicles. The primary aim of the special forces components is the collection and analysis of tactical human intelligence. Years of experience in NATO deployments and the advantage of having high-technology assets available to assist with reconnaissance and surveillance, underpin the success of European special forces in Mali, specifically in gathering information for ASIFU. Despite ASIFU generating good intelligence products, based on the raw data that special forces feed it, the products are of little value to the mission due to the inability of integrating ASIFU into the overall mission, the classification of information, and the unwillingness to share the information with other stakeholders. European special forces are restricted in their collection efforts in the field due to the culture and language gap, and the fact that the teams only consist of Europeans. They also do not fully grasp the complexity of the conflict in Mali. Sweden has complained that its special forces were underutilised, and subsequently replaced them with normal infantry. Currently, intelligence reports and targeting packs developed by ASIFU are passed on to the French special forces who are conducting counter-terrorist operations in parallel with MINUSMA. Despite having sufficient special forces in place, senior MINUSMA command seem not fully aware of the potential of the assets at their disposal, or how to use these optimally. The predicament will change over time with lessons learnt from missions, such as MINUSMA.

ENDNOTES

[1] Louis Bester (MMil, Stellenbosch University) is a serving member in the South African National Defence Force. His research interests include the role of special forces in conflicts, as well as trends in contemporary counterinsurgency. He is currently a prospective doctoral candidate researching the history of the South African Special Forces after 1994.

[2] This refers to first-hand accounts by former Special Forces operators on their exploits on operations.

[3] H Breede, 'Special (Peace) Operations: Optimizing SOF for UN Missions', *International Journal*, 73, 2 (2018), 221.

[4] A Finlan, 'A Dangerous Pathway? Toward a Theory of Special Forces', *Comparative Strategy*,38, 4 (2019), 255.

[5] E Shamir & E Ben-Ari, 'The Rise of Special Operations Forces: Generalized Specialization, Boundary Spanning and Military Autonomy', *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, 41, 3 (2018), 335.

[6] C Spearin, 'Special Operations Forces a Strategic Resource: Public and Private Divide', *Parameters*, Winter (2006–07), 58.

[7] B Horn &T Balasevicius, 'Introduction', in B Horn &T Balasevicius (eds.), *Casting Light on the Shadows: Canadian Perspectives on Special Operations Forces* (Ontario: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2007), 13–14.

[8] T Lyons, 'Humanitarian Aid and Conflict: From Humanitarian Neutralism to Humanitarian Intervention', in J Hentz (ed.), *Routledge Handbook of African Security* (London: Routledge, 2014), 144.

[9] F Vreÿ, 'Current and Future Trends in Insurgency', in D Baker &E Jordaan (eds.), *South Africa and Contemporary Counterinsurgency: Roots, Practices, Prospects* (Claremont: UCT Press, 2010), 62–63.

[10] The term 'peace mission' will be used throughout the article. It constitutes an appropriate generic term to include 'preventive diplomacy', 'peace-making', 'peacekeeping', 'peace enforcement' and 'peace-building'. Peacekeeping is the deployment of UN personnel (which include military, police or civilian components) in a conflict area, hitherto with the consent of all the parties involved. It is a technique that expands the possibilities for the prevention of conflict as well as the making of peace.

[11] A Adebajo, *UN Peacekeeping in Africa: From the Suez Crisis to the Sudan Conflict* (London: Lynne Rienner, 2011), 2.

[12] This refers to aggressive and offensive measures to eliminate or capture network members and their supporters.

[13] A Boutellis & NC Fink, *Waging Peace: UN Peace Operations Confronting Terrorism and Violent Extremism* (New York: International Peace Institute, 2016), 3.

[14] This means that the UN mission has a combination of military, civilian and police capabilities.

[15] J Karlsrud, 'Towards UN Counter-terrorism Operations?', *Third World Quarterly*,38, 6 (2017), 1215–1216.

[16] B Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping* (New York: Report of the Secretary-General, 1992), 6.

[17] According to Boutros-Ghali, despite the negotiation between major nuclear powers regarding arms reduction, the spread of weapons of mass destruction and amassing of conventional arms around the world increased; similarly so with racism being recognised as a destructive force in the world. New racial tensions simply found expression in violence and flared up in other parts of the world. Therefore, one evil is replaced with another.

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[21] LD Gilbert, 'A Retrospective Examination of Post-Cold War Conflicts in Africa: Ended, Abated and Prolonged Conflicts', *International Journal of Humanities and Social Science*,4, 9 (2014), 152.

[22] S Ngubane & H Solomon, 'Southern Africa's New Security Agenda', *Africa Insight*,32, 1 (2002), 60–63.

[23] J Cilliers, *Violence in Africa: Trends, Drivers and Prospects to 2023*, Africa Report 12 (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, August 2018), 11.

[24] IV Bakken &SA Rustad, *Conflict Trends in Africa 1946–2017* (Oslo: Peace Research Institute, June 2018), 6–7.

[25] This refers to those conflicts where there exist a contested mismatch that concerns government and territory where there is an armed struggle in which at least one of the parties involved is the government, and where there are at least 25 battle-related deaths in one calendar year. It is also known as an intra-state conflict.

[26] IS is a transnational militant Islamist terrorist group and former unrecognised quasi-state that follows the Salafi Jihadist militant organisation that seeks to establish an Islamic caliphate in Iraq and Syria, and to create a global Salafi-Jihadist movement.

[27] This is an Islamist militant organisation based in north-eastern Nigeria, which is also active in Chad, Niger, northern Cameroon and Mali. Their primary objective is the establishment of an Islamic State under Shariah law in Nigeria. Its secondary objective is the wider imposition of Islamic rule beyond Nigeria.

[28] K Aning & N Salihu, 'The African Security Predicament', in J Hentz (ed.), *Routledge Handbook of African Security* (London: Routledge, 2014), 14.

[29] JP Pham, 'Terrorism and Counterterrorism in Africa', in J Hentz (ed.), *Routledge Handbook of African Security* (London: Routledge, 2014), 43.

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[31] I van Vuuren, 'The Changing Nature of Warfare: Implications for Africa', *African Security Review*, 7, 1 (1998), 56.

[32] J Raitasalo & Sipilä, 'Reconstructing War after the Cold War', *Comparative Strategy*, 23 (2004), 250–251.

[33] W Reno, 'Conflict and War in Africa', in J Hentz (ed.), *Routledge Handbook of African Security* (London: Routledge, 2014), 22–24.

[34] E Barlow, *Composite Warfare: The Conduct of Successful Ground Force Operations in Africa* (Pinetown: 30° South, 2016), 127, 182.

[35] Vreÿ, 'Current and Future Trends in Insurgency', 59.

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[43] Finlan, *A Dangerous Pathway*?, 270.

[44] Finlan, *A Dangerous Pathway*?, 270.

[45] SB Meredith, 'The Use of Special Operations in Conflict Resolution: Assessing the Value of Peace Warriors', *Interagency Journal*, 6, 4 (2015), 30.

[46] Similar to traditional peace efforts, special forces specialise in mapping the causes and courses of the challenges which initially resulted into conflict in a theatre. They attempt to reconcile people, interests and values on multiple levels by building trust with the locals through hearts and minds campaigns. Belligerents are identified and isolated from the local population. Conflict prevention measures such as the strengthening of civil society, rule and law are implemented, and structural injustices are resolved.

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[48] PC Cammaert, 'Ongoing UN Operations and New Challenges in Peacekeeping', in AC Lugert (ed.), *Peace Keeping Forces: Today and Tomorrow*, Proceedings of the Blue Helmet Forum, 30 May-1 June 2005, Reichenau, 53.

[49] United Nations Peacekeeping Missions Military Special Forces Manual, January 2015, 4.

[50] United States of America, FM 100-23 Peace Operations, Headquarters Department of the Army, December 1994, 40.

[51] Canadian National Defence, Peace Support Operations, Joint Doctrine Manual, 2002, 3–14.

[52] South African National Defence Force. Joint Operations Division, Joint Warfare Publication, JWP 106 Part 2, Peace Support Operations, February 2006, 5–23.

[53] Breede, *Special (Peace) Operations*, 222–223.

[54] United Nations Peacekeeping Missions Military Special Forces Manual, 6.

[55] United States of America, FM 100-23 Peace Operations, 40.

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[60] WG Nomikos, *Mali Country Report: Risks from the EU's Southern Border, Europe's External Action and the Dual Challenges of Limited Statehood and Contested Orders* (Barcelona: CIDOB, 2020), 4.

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[64] SD Wing, *Mali's Precarious Democracy and the Causes of Conflict*, Special Report (Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 2013), 1.

[65] Boutellis &Fink, *Waging Peace*, 19.

[66] Nomikos, *Mali Country Report*, 8.

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[68] A Chapter VII mandate under the UN Charter is a more robust mandate, in that it allows the UN Security Council to determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression and to take military and non-military action to restore international peace and security.

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[84] Óglaigh nahÉireann (Irish Defence Forces), 'Irish Personnel in MINUSMA', 20 November 2019.<https://www.military.ie/en/news-archive/2020/irish-personnel-in-minusma.html>[Accessed on 8 April 2021].

[85] Karlsrud & Novosseloff, *Doing Less with More?*, 23.

[86] Rietjens & Dorn, 'The Evolution of Peacekeeping Intelligence', 206.

[87] United Nations, Letter from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council, 23 December 2020, 1.

[88] Rietjens & Dorn, 'The Evolution of Peacekeeping Intelligence', 202.

[89] Abilova & Novosseloff, *Demystifying Intelligence in UN Peace Operations*, 17.

[90] SR Coffman, RJ Shumaker & JM Givens, *Perception is Reality: Special Operations Forces in the Gray Zone* (Monterey: Naval Postgraduate School, 2016), 7.

[91] Comment by a senior Special Forces Operator on the annual Officer Commanding work session as captured in the minutes, 11–15 November 2019, 5.

[92] United Nations Peacekeeping Missions Military Special Forces Manual, 14.

[93] CS Gray, 'Handfuls of Heroes on Desperate Ventures: When Do Special Operations Succeed?', *Parameters* Spring (1999), 4.

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[95] Boutellis & Beary, *Sharing the Burden*, 13.

[96] Operational Debrief OP FIBRE 12: Special Forces Deployment to Burundi (ONUB), compiled by SASF Mission Commander, 31 December 2004, 11.

[97] Unlike the more robust posture of a Chapter VII mandate under the UN Charter, a Chapter VI mandate deals with the peaceful settlement of disputes. It requires countries with disputes that could lead to war to first of all try to seek solutions through peaceful methods such as negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.

[98] E-mail correspondence with retired senior Special Forces Officer, Pretoria, 16 March 2021.

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The Corrupt Commandant: *The Criminal Biography of Commandant Barnie van der Merwe*

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Abstract

Commandant Barnie van der Merwe was a career soldier who served in the South African Defence Force from 1934. By 1957, he had become embroiled in tender fraud and bribery in the procurement of arms and supplies for military vehicles and equipment for the Defence Force. His career came to an end in September 1963 when he was arrested and found guilty of corruption. His case contributed to the proclamation of the 1964 Cillié Commission of Inquiry into alleged irregularities in arms procurement in the Defence Force and the Department of Defence. The report issued by the commission illustrated the intrigue in which corrupt Defence Force and Department of Defence officials, such as Van der Merwe, played a part for the sake of self-enrichment. This article sheds light on Van der Merwe's criminality by indicating precisely how and against whom he committed his crimes and discusses the historical significance of his criminal career.

Keywords: South African Defence Force, Barnie van der Merwe, Corruption, Tenders, Fraud, 1964 Cillié Commission, Arms, Arms Agents.

Introduction[100]

On the morning of 28 June 1963, Warrant Officer Julius Rencken left the Poynton Building in Pretoria, carrying with him a lever arch file containing classified documents. He had taken the file from the offices of the South African Defence Force (SADF), which were in the Poynton Building. He was on his way to the nearby Pretorium Trust Building. When he reached the Pretorium Trust Building, he took the elevator to the sixth floor where he knew an arms agent would be waiting for him in a specific office. The person waiting for him was Nicolaas van Nieuwenhuizen, a Dutch-born South African (SA) arms agent who was the owner of the Interarmco company, an importer of arms and military equipment. Rencken handed Van Nieuwenhuizen the file he was carrying, and Rencken received a R100 reward. Seconds later, the South African Police (SAP) burst into the office and arrested Rencken.[101]

On 19 September 1963, Rencken appeared in court and was found guilty of breaking article 3(2) of the Official Secrets Act (No. 16 of 1956).[102] Rencken had to pay a fine of R800, or serve one year in prison if he was unable to pay the fine.[103] During his court hearing, Rencken did not acknowledge his guilt because he believed that Van Nieuwenhuizen had the right to study the information that was contained in the SADF file. The specific file contained:

- The concept budget for the Department of Defence (DoD) for 1963–1964;
- Documents that indicated companies that would provide ammunition to the South African Air Force (SAAF); and
- Information on companies that would manufacture the hand grenades the SADF planned to purchase.[104]

Rencken's mistake was his own undoing, but his case was certainly not the only one scheduled for court in September 1963 regarding the irregular treatment of certain arms agents by SADF servicemen. Another SADF officer, Commandant Barnie van der Merwe, had also been charged for crimes against the SA state and, despite his court case being handled swiftly in September 1963, the charges against him were for corruption through bribery.[105] Rencken's minor charge of revealing classified information was not in line with his job in the SADF because the publication of tenders was in the hands of men, such as Commandant Barnie van der Merwe, who had to interact and liaise with arms agents and civilian suppliers. Van der Merwe, however, made use of his direct links with arms agents and civilian businessmen for the sake of his own enrichment, as this article aims to prove.

Van der Merwe's case, like that of Rencken, would contribute to the proclamation of a commission of inquiry into alleged irregularities in arms procurement by the SADF and the DoD, known as the 1964 Cillié Commission. This commission in turn would become the showcase of a mid-twentieth-century SA arms scandal.[106] Such a bold statement does not allude to the possibility that this was the first arms scandal of the twentieth century. That it was an arms scandal that happened during the time the National Party (NP) was in control of SA defence is undoubtedly true. Yet, as Van Vuuren argues, during the 1970s and 1980s, questionable procurement practices were nothing out of the ordinary for the NP.[107] This arms scandal pre-dates Van Vuuren's work. It does however relate to the 1993 arms scandal, which is explained concisely and precisely in Paul Holden's book *The Arms Deal in Your Pocket*.[108] It resembles a preceding and not entirely dissimilar scandal in which arms procurement was not carried out fairly and legally. Using the 1964 Cillié Commission as a starting point for revealing underhand dealings in arms procurement under the NP government in the 1960s, it might be possible to research and reveal a systematic perspective further into the twentieth century on how the apartheid state armed their military by all means necessary. It is, however, important to note that in these underhand dealings, specific individuals played decisive roles in acquiring the necessary arms and military equipment and, in the case of Van der Merwe, to achieve personal goals – even wage a vendetta – and/or fulfil long-term financial ambitions.

The focus of this article is to present a concise criminal biography of Barnie van der Merwe, and to provide a glimpse into the alleged irregularities of arms procurement during the late 1950s and 1960s. The main aim of this article is to describe concisely Van der Merwe's dealings with the specific civilian businessmen and arm agents with whom he interacted and how his dealings could be construed as criminal.

The list of accusations against Van der Merwe is not derived from the *State versus Van der Merwe* case of September 1963; the main primary source was the verbatim record of the 1964 Cillié Commission.[109] Before Van der Merwe's criminal biography is attended to, it is important to take note of the historical background of the 1964 Cillié Commission.

Justice in the Old Synagogue: A Brief Description of the 1964 Cillié Commission of Inquiry

The 1964 Cillié Commission conducted its investigations from April to October 1964 under the chairmanship of Justice Pieter Malan (PM) Cillié, in the old Synagogue in Paul Kruger Street, Pretoria.[110] This commission was appointed under Proclamation 78, which was published in the *Government Gazette* of 3 April 1964 by the then State President, CR Swart.[111] The decision by the Verwoerd government to appoint this commission came after months of pressure that mounted on the shoulders of the Minister of Defence, JJ Fouché, from the official parliamentary opposition, the United Party (UP). The UP did not ignore Rencken's court case of September 1963 nor any of the charges lodged against other corrupt SADF officers, such as Van der Merwe. Brigadier Bronkhorst, a UP Member of Parliament for North East Rand and a military veteran, took corruption in the SADF very seriously and did not waste the opportunity to push Fouché for answers regarding alleged corruption with arms procurement.[112] Fouché tried to allay concerns of financial mismanagement in arms procurement with his brief responses, which included references to the September 1963 court cases of Rencken and Van der Merwe. Nevertheless, to satisfy their critics, the highest echelon in the NP government decided that a commission of inquiry would probably diminish UP criticism. The NP selected PM Cillié to chair the commission.

Cillié had been a member of the NP since his student years at the University of the Witwatersrand, and he had enjoyed the support of the NP, as his promotions in judicial posts during the 1950s prove.[113] With his appointment, the NP had hoped that Cillié would convince all, especially the UP, that the commission was a legal exercise for finding the truth, with acceptable evidence, behind any allegations of corruption in the SADF and the DoD. The question that begs to be asked is what the NP would have done if there were enough damning evidence against the Minister of Defence, the commanding officers of the SADF, and even the top officials of the NP. Owing to this fear, Cillié invoked article 4 of the Commissions Act (No. 8 of 1947). This meant that the commission would be held in camera.[114]

In the course of the work of the Cillié Commission, several private individuals and SADF officers were disclosed as being the main culprits mentioned in the allegations of corruption within the SADF and DoD. One of those culprits, from Cillié's perspective, was Commandant Barnie van der Merwe. Cillié specifically focussed on the charges laid against Van der Merwe as proof enough that a single officer's criminal conduct, and not that of the NP, the SADF or the DoD, was to blame for the corruption found in the cases against Van der Merwe and Rencken.[115] So, who was this rogue Barnie van der Merwe who would commit corruption while serving in the SADF? To establish the seriousness of Van der Merwe's crimes truly, a biographical study of him and his crimes is essential. A "criminal biography" is therefore necessary. Similar to how a political biography focusses on the history of the actions and statements of a political figure within a historical context, a criminal biography should do the same for a criminal. The information is therefore only focussed on the criminal aspects of a person's life with limited information about other aspects of his or her life.

Godfrey indicates that history and criminology, as two distinct social sciences, could assist each other in the research of criminal histories, of which the criminal biography is, in the author's opinion, merely a subgenre.[116] Despite criminal biographies being the focus of many popular publications, only a small number of academic studies of SA criminals exist. In particular, the works by Charles van Onselen on infamous criminals, such as Joseph Lis and Jack McLoughlin, should be noted.[117] It is however important to note that, within SA historiography, criminal biographies have not received the attention of other types of biography, such as political biographies.[118] This makes studies of criminals, such as Van der Merwe, not only desirable for understanding the SA criminal past but also necessary for erasing any misimpression of a corruption-free NP regime during the apartheid era. Van der Merwe's criminal biography alone is evidence that corruption within the SADF and DoD procurement processes was indeed a reality.

The attempt by the author to give a clear and concise explanation of why any life story about Commandant Barnie van der Merwe should be considered a criminal biography is vested in the basic definition by Venter 'that the criminal's biography should be explained not only from his position as a person but especially how his criminal acts derived from his motives'.[119] This means that Van der Merwe's status as an officer, family man and citizen should receive less attention in this criminal biography, and rather that a solid focus should be placed on his criminal acts. Nevertheless, Van der Merwe's life story could provide possible motives on why he chose to become a criminal while in the service of the SADF.

Commandant Barnie van der Merwe: Career Officer to Career Criminal

According to the genealogical website, geni.com, Barnie van der Merwe was born 9 August 1910.[120] He was the son of Petrus Johannes van der Merwe and Heybrecht Johanna Wilhelmina van der Merwe, from Middelplaats in the Northern Cape. He was one of nine siblings.[121] Barnie's father died three months before he was born, and his mother passed away when he was three years old. It is difficult to determine the effect of being orphaned at the age of three on Van der Merwe precisely. Living in an arid part of South Africa and coming from a large family could have created a desire in the young Van der Merwe to be rich, especially during his old age.



Figure 1: Commandant Barnie van der Merwe, circa 1963.[122]

In 1934, at the age of 23, Van der Merwe joined the Union Defence Force (UDF). It is interesting to note that he joined just as the Great Depression was over its worse

phase and, given the recruitment policies of the UDF at the time, a young Afrikaner, such as Van der Merwe, would have been a preferred enlisted man.[123] At the time of his enlistment, he had obtained a bachelor's degree in science from Stellenbosch University, and after his basic training, he became a second lieutenant.[124] By 1939, Van der Merwe was serving within the UDF Coastal Artillery, and he was eager to be deployed to North Africa. He spent a short time in Egypt but wished to serve in the Italian campaign. Van der Merwe wrote in an application letter that he wanted to be part of the 6th South African Armoured Division but was informed that he could only be included if he would accept a demotion from major to lieutenant.[125] Van der Merwe declined, and he was sent back to the Union to complete a staff course, which he failed.[126] During the remainder of the 1940s, he was in service initially as the Commanding Officer with the 1st Heavy Artillery in Cape Town, seconded for a short period to coastal defences in Port Elizabeth, and in the end, he joined the 2nd Heavy Coastal Artillery in Simons Town before joining the technical procurement staff at Voortrekkerhoogte (today Thaba Tshwane).[127]

By 1949, he had been promoted to the rank of commandant.[128] His promotion came after the NP victory in the 1948 general elections, and was in line with the pro-Afrikaner nationalist transformation policy that Minister FC Erasmus wanted to implement in the UDF. According to Jooste, Erasmus wished to transform the UDF into a pro-Afrikaner nationalist defence force, and Afrikaner officers, such as Van der Merwe, were therefore secure in their employment, with a variety of opportunities.[129] By 1957, however, it seems that Van der Merwe might have felt neglected and frustrated.[130] The argument can be made that it was Van der Merwe's greed that lead him to commit his crimes, as the SADF did award him, as will be seen below, for his years of service.

From 1957 to June 1963, Van der Merwe met with various suppliers and arms agents privately and did special favours for them to solicit bribes. These favours comprised providing specific arms agents and suppliers with early notifications of prospective tenders before being published publicly. Van der Merwe guaranteed arms agents that their tenders would be successful if they were willing to reward him financially for his support. Portions of the bribes would supposedly be handed to other decision-makers.[131] Even personal favours were granted, such as allowing Van Nieuwenhuizen to stable his horse on Van der Merwe's plot in Pretoria.[132] Van der Merwe mostly requested specific amounts of money for his bribes, but he would also accept expensive gifts.[133] As part of his September 1963 court case and during the 1964 Cillié Commission, the business relationships he had with Louis Ossip, Henry Victor Jaboulay and Nicholas Yale, Johann Bernard Litscher, Rudolph Kubler, Colonels Martins and Bass, Mr Sima-Hilditch and Nicolaas van Nieuwenhuizen formed the basis of the accusations against him. As required in any court case, the possible motives for criminal conduct had to be determined. Interestingly, Van der Merwe only provided the 1964 Cillié Commission with his motives.

Van der Merwe stated to the 1964 Cillié Commission that the last time he had been promoted was in 1949 and that this had given him the impression that the SADF was not appreciative of his loyal service or his academic degree and completed military courses.[134] This statement by Van der Merwe can be perceived as unfair, as the UDF had rewarded him with a Union medal in 1952 for 18 years' service.[135] Despite his egoistic reasoning

that he deserved more from his position as a senior officer responsible for the purchase of technical equipment for SADF military vehicles and weaponry, Van der Merwe earned a decent salary.[136]

Serving under Commandant JA Pienaar at Voortrekkerhoogte, Van der Merwe received a salary of R4 350 per annum, which, according to Cillié, was considered quite decent at the time. Van der Merwe replied that he could not survive on it because of the large size of his family (his spouse and eight children), and he had to find ways of supplementing his income. That his wife desired to travel to Portugal on a regular basis because her mother was living in Porto supposedly made it even harder for him to live on his salary.[137] Cillié was not swayed by his attempted justification for his criminal conduct. Van der Merwe also stated that he accepted bribes to build up financial reserves for his retirement. His plan was to deposit his bribe money in various international banks and when needed, it could be paid to his mother-in-law in Portugal, who would then transfer it to him in South Africa.[138] He would therefore never be poor again and would be able to enjoy his retirement more comfortably.[139]

In his final reply why he had sunk to the level of accepting bribes, Van der Merwe revealed new intrigue within the SADF, saying that he believed that it was in order for him to enrich himself from state tenders because General Sybrand Engelbrecht did the same.[140] According to Van der Merwe, Engelbrecht and his wife benefited from a tender for SADF uniforms that had been handed to the manufacturing company for which General Engelbrecht's wife was working at the time.[141] Studying the 1964 Cillié Commission's verbatim report, it appears that Van der Merwe was not imagining the involvement of Engelbrecht's wife in tenders with the SADF. She did work for a company called Group Agencies, who represented Cambridge Shirt Manufacturers (Ltd), a company from Durban that received a tender for SADF uniforms in which she played a main role. Despite her enthusiastic denial that her involvement might have influenced the relevant tender committee, she had, of course, receive remuneration for her work from Group Agencies, which she paid into her and her husband's joint bank account.[142] It is difficult to prove that General Engelbrecht and his wife were guilty of any corruption; however, that the allocation of the said tender to Cambridge Shirt Manufacturers was noticed by Van der Merwe and that he knew that Engelbrecht's wife worked for the said company are given facts. Is it therefore possible that Van der Merwe devised a plan to enrich himself through government tenders, knowing that Engelbrecht would not be able to act against him because of his knowledge of the uniform procurement tender? This appears to be a reasonable deduction.

Despite the reasons that Van der Merwe gave in mitigation during the 1964 Cillié Commission hearings, he was found guilty of several charges of corruption. Arrested on 28 June 1963, which was the same day that Rencken was arrested, Van der Merwe subsequently had his day in court in September 1963. Justice Theron was presiding, and gave Van der Merwe a somewhat light sentence of a R1 000 fine and three years of imprisonment, with the latter suspended if he was not found guilty of any further corruption for a three-year period (thus until the end of 1966).[143] Van der Merwe's fine made no dent in his financial reserves. Prior to his arrest in 1963, Van der Merwe deposited his

illicitly obtained money into five different international bank accounts, listed in banks located in Geneva, Switzerland; London, United Kingdom; and Toronto, Canada.[144] This was not a sentence given to punish Van der Merwe, but merely to give the impression that justice was served.

The light sentence handed to Van der Merwe can only help to create possible conspiracy theories about the NP intervening with the *State vs Van der Merwe* case of 1963. The Afrikaans and English press briefly covered the court case, and no public outcry was recorded.[145] Interestingly, Van der Merwe did not testify during his September 1963 hearing.[146] He did appear however before the 1964 Cillié Commission and gave testimonies about his crimes during several sessions.[147] Owing to the existence of a copy of the 1964 Cillié Commission report, which consists of 24 volumes, the extent of Van der Merwe's corrupt dealings can be easily traced.[148]

After his court case and the 1964 Cillié Commission report, Van der Merwe lived the rest of his days in complete obscurity. He was discharged from the SADF in September 1963.[149] On 9 November 1963, the Department of Social Securities and Pensions were informed of Van der Merwe's sentence and discharge and the decision by the SADF not to allow him to receive his annual pension.[150] Access to the various investments that he had made during his six years of criminal conduct might have been the only funds he had left for his retirement. He was therefore not impoverished after his SADF discharge, despite some of his wealth having been obtained through irregular and illegal means. Evidence exists in the records of the Rebecca Street Cemetery in Pretoria that Van der Merwe died in 1998 at the age of 88, and that his remains were cremated.[151] For over 34 years, Van der Merwe would live with the knowledge that he ended his career in disgrace. However, due to the lack of press coverage about his crimes, Van der Merwe and his criminal acts did not receive proper attention and analysis. As a criminal, Van der Merwe became an obscure figure in SA crime history.

The Corrupt Commandant's Crimes

Irregularities in the purchase of arms, ammunition and military vehicles between arms manufacturers, their agents and countries are not new, especially in SA history. As stated previously, the most recent corruption pertaining to arms procurement is concisely explained by Paul Holden in his work *The Arms Deal in Your Pocket*. Holden proves how the arms procurements by the African National Congress (ANC) government from specific European arms manufacturers in the early 1990s were riddled with fraud and corruption.[152] Hennie van Vuuren's 2015 book, *Apartheid, Guns and Money,* revealed what the NP governments of John Vorster and PW Botha had to do to keep the SADF properly armed due to the constraints of both the 1963 and 1977 arms embargoes against South Africa.[153] Despite the embargoes, arms agents still considered South Africa a lucrative market. As Stemmet *et al.* argue, arms agents operate within an organised network of providers and buyers.[154] Selling arms, ammunition and military vehicles is a competitive field, and arms companies would have required agents within South Africa to meet with the DoD and SADF to ensure they could adhere to tender applications that were proclaimed publicly. As Feinstein shows, spending money wooing the representatives of the military, such as

Van der Merwe of the SADF, to win their favour, is not a moral issue for arms agents.[155] What makes Van der Merwe an interesting case is that he played a definitive role in the corruption that took place by creating expectations for the arms agents to fulfil. In other words, he hustled them in line with his own schemes for self-enrichment. As will be seen later, Van der Merwe actively and wilfully cooperated with arms agents to become caught up in corruption, making it hard to determine precisely who the proverbial puppets and puppet masters were.

During hearings by the 1964 Cillié Commission, Van der Merwe appeared to testify for four days during June 1964. Questioned by the legal representatives of both the SADF and the DoD, Van der Merwe responded carefully.[156] Before Van der Merwe was called to deliver his account, his attorney addressed Cillié directly with a special request. The attorney wanted to ensure that the indemnity granted to his client by the SAP and the Attorney General would remain for the duration of the commission.[157] Interestingly, the SAP and the Attorney General had made a deal with Van der Merwe after his arrest on 28 June 1963. This created grounds for speculation over why this deal was made with an officer of the SADF who was clearly guilty of soliciting and accepting bribes from arms agents.

Van der Merwe's arrest was a carefully planned exercise in which Van Nieuwenhuizen was to meet Van der Merwe at a disclosed point south of Pretoria and hand to Van der Merwe an envelope with cash in it. At the precise moment that he accepted the bribe, the police surrounded Van der Merwe and arrested him on the spot.[158] No record is found in the 1964 Cillié Commission record on what Van der Merwe and the police agreed after his arrest, but the commission report (Volume 24) clearly indicates that the SAP conducted their investigation after Van Nieuwenhuizen had informed the under-secretary of Defence, Vladimir Steyn, of Van der Merwe's demands for bribes.[159]

With the indemnity granted to Van der Merwe and his attorney receiving the right to check any facts that could incriminate Van der Merwe further, Van der Merwe's questioning could begin. From his account, the names of various arms agents (including Van Nieuwenhuizen) and local SA suppliers came to the fore. These agents and businessmen were also ordered to appear before the commission and answer questions posed to them. A list of people who could have lodged a complaint against Van der Merwe had therefore been drafted, and will be explained concisely later in this section. The first person of note is Louis Ossip, who appears to have been the first businessman that Van der Merwe hoodwinked and from whom he had obtained monies. Dealings Van der Merwe had with arms agents, such as Henry Victor Jaboulay and Nicholas Yale, were part of an intricate web of intrigue that will only be discussed briefly in this article, because their cases deserve more detailed explanation in a study of their own. The same argument is made about the dealings that Van der Merwe had with Van Nieuwenhuizen, a rivalry so intense that it resulted in the destruction of a man's career.

The Louis Ossip Case

The first case against Van der Merwe was about his dealings with Louis Ossip. Unlike other individuals from whom Van der Merwe solicited bribes, Ossip was not an arms agent. He was an ordinary SA businessman who specialised in the selling of spare parts for heavy vehicles. In 1957, his company – General Spares (Pty) Ltd – tendered to supply the SADF with spare parts for their tanks.[160] In Ossip, Van der Merwe found a gullible first victim. Van der Merwe met with Ossip personally, taking with him details of the prerequisites for the specific tender and told Ossip that his tender would only succeed if Ossip paid Van der Merwe a specified amount of money. Ossip did not pay once only; he would continue to pay Van der Merwe, over the course of six years, various amounts in British pounds and SA rand with the condition that only by making these payments would he be guaranteed the successful award of a tender. It was only in 1963 that Ossip realised that there were no other competitors for the tenders for which he was paying. He immediately stopped the payments. By then Van der Merwe had already received over R20 000 from him.[161]

The Sidney Millyard Case

Sidney Millyard was a local agent for a spare parts agency known as S. I. & A Agencies, which was located at 12 Chapman Road in Germiston.[162] One of the companies that Millyard's agency represented was the Southampton-based Gordon L Poole company.[163] Millyard met Van der Merwe in May 1962 when the tender for spare parts for the Comet tank was released. Millyard and Van der Merwe met frequently at Van der Merwe's office at Voortrekkerhoogte and at Millyard's home on the Rand. It was during Van der Merwe's visits to Millyard's home that Van der Merwe mentioned to Millyard that he wanted compensation for his assistance to him.[164] In addition, Van der Merwe stated to Millyard that he would be interested in joining his company as soon as he had retired from the SADF.[165] By October 1962, Millyard had been informed by Van der Merwe that Millyard's tender application for the supply of Comet tank spare parts had been accepted, and that 80% of the tender had to be fulfilled by Millyard's agency.[166] Van der Merwe also wasted no time in informing Millyard that he wanted 50% of Millyard's commission. Throughout the first months of 1963, he repeatedly contacted Millyard to solicit payment. Millyard paid Van der Merwe a total of R3 000 in cash in three separate payments.[167] Van der Merwe called these '*ex gratia* payments'.[168] Millyard never questioned Van der Merwe's actions, and told the 1964 Cillié Commission that he abided by Van der Merwe's instructions.[169]

The Bernard Litscher Case

Bernard Litscher was an agent for Henschell Diesel Truck (Propriety) Limited in Wadeville, Germiston. He was contacted by Van der Merwe, who was seeking to acquire spare parts for buses in use by the SADF and for Panhard armoured cars.[170] Van der Merwe requested a personal meeting with Litscher at the Isando Club in Johannesburg. Enjoying a meal together, Van der Merwe indicated to Litscher that, if he was not willing to pay a certain amount to him, he could not guarantee that Henschell's vehicles would be accepted, following certain tests. Van der Merwe also stated to him that he was making

the request not only on behalf of himself but also on behalf of other senior members of staff, whose names he refused to mention. Litscher agreed to pay Van der Merwe a total amount of R20 000 and made payment on 6 March 1963.[171]

Litscher decided to pay the amount of R20 000 in cash to a certain Mr Zenner who represented the Swiss Bank Corporation in South Africa.[172] At first, Litscher believed that he was finally rid of Van der Merwe, but he was mistaken. Van der Merwe continued to call him and wanted to see him personally about the delivery of Henschell's goods to the SADF. They were reportedly faulty, and Van der Merwe demanded another R5 000 on 2 April 1963, supposedly to solve this issue and to satisfy the people he represented. Litscher became suspicious, and asked one of his colleagues, a certain Dr Molitor, to accompany him to the hotel where Van der Merwe wanted to receive the money in person. Van der Merwe did not count the cash when he received it, possibly because of the uneasiness Dr Molitor's presence created in the room. Litscher succeeded in having an eyewitness of the transaction with Van der Merwe, and this curbed any further attempts at extortion by Van der Merwe.[173]

The Kubler Case

On 12 June 1964, Mr Rudolph Kubler from the firm Wild of South Africa Ltd. appeared before the commission. Kubler was a director in the company, which specialised in sales of optical and surveying equipment. His company had sold theodolites to the SADF before but when Van der Merwe informed him of the periscopes needed with the procurement of Panhard armoured cars, the company obtained a significant tender as a sub-contractor.[174] Kubler indicated that Van der Merwe approached him thrice for financial remuneration for the information that he had supplied to facilitate the successful tender award.[175] However, Kubler refused to give Van der Merwe any money. Kubler is the only person on record that did not play according to Van der Merwe's rules. From the 1964 Cillié Commission records, it is however clear that Kubler would not have resisted the temptation to pay Van der Merwe had the latter not been arrested in June 1963, and Van der Merwe continued to call upon him for *ex gratia* payments.[176]

The Cases of Colonel Martins, Colonel Bass and Mr Sima-Hilditch

Van der Merwe stated at the 1964 Cillié Commission that he believed that, by his influence, a certain Colonel Martins had been appointed the SA representative for the London-based company Engineering and Industrial Exports. This company held the licence to manufacture the Belgian FN rifle and its ammunition.[177] A certain Colonel Bass became the main contact person between the company and Van der Merwe. When the latter requested to be paid a certain amount for his support for the FN rifle to be purchased for the SADF, Bass assisted Van der Merwe by opening a bank account for him in Switzerland. Van der Merwe received a total amount of R54 000 from 1961 to 1963, seemingly through the assistance of Bass. The amounts were paid to Van der Merwe's Swiss bank account and to a Lloyds Bank account that he held in London.[178]

Van der Merwe was not as fortunate in his dealings with a certain Mr Sima-Hilditch from the company Hildeah, in London. During a trip to London, Van der Merwe visited Sima-Hilditch and requested money from him to assure Van der Merwe's support for any SADF purchases from Hildeah. Sima-Hilditch made a promise to pay Van der Merwe but never did so. It seems that Van der Merwe never bothered Sima-Hilditch again.[179]

The Jaboulay and Yale Case

Like the Van Nieuwenhuizen case, the intrigue of the Jaboulay and Yale case is such that it warrants a publication of its own; however, it is important to note in this article that Van der Merwe was able to swindle Henri Victor Jaboulay, a World War II recipient of the *Ordre de la Libération*.[180] According to Jaboulay's own account before the 1964 Cillié Commission, he immigrated to South Africa after World War II to make his fortune in the textile industry. His original plans did not work out, so he became the local agent for several French companies, a number of them focussing on military craft and equipment, such as OFEMA (the French Office for the Export of Aeronautical Material) and the Potez Company (a French aircraft manufacturer).[181] Jaboulay and his partner, Nicholas Yale, knew Van der Merwe, and were interested in tendering for any product the SADF could purchase from either French or American firms. Jaboulay indicated to the commission that Van der Merwe informed them that he wanted to be remunerated for his assistance, by writing a specific amount on a piece of paper and handing it to them. Jaboulay agreed, but the specific amount is not known.[182] Several other payments and gifts were requested by Van der Merwe from Jaboulay and Yale, including a Citroën motorcar for a trip Van der Merwe took to France. However, Van der Merwe changed his mind about the car just before his departure, and demanded money instead. Jaboulay stated to the commission that a total amount of R3 420 was paid to Van der Merwe by 18 March 1963, for them to remain in Van der Merwe's good graces.[183]

The Van Nieuwenhuizen Case

Van Nieuwenhuizen's background was introduced earlier in this work, and his friendship with Van der Merwe was evident by the stabling of his horse on Van der Merwe's property in Pretoria. The intricacies of their relationship also merit another research project, especially as their friendship later became a bitter rivalry. This may have happened when Van Nieuwenhuizen decided to inform the Deputy Secretary of Defence, Vladimir Steyn, of Van der Merwe's criminal acts. It is also possible that the break in the friendship occurred when Van der Merwe and Van Nieuwenhuizen both returned from London having visited Britain, coincidentally, at the same time. Van Nieuwenhuizen stated to the commission that Van der Merwe had boldly informed him in London that certain equipment manufactured by Van Nieuwenhuizen's principal company, Galileo, was soon to be part of a tender issued by the DoD.[184]

Van Nieuwenhuizen's agency, Interarmco, was the appointed SA agency for Galileo and for the Spanish company Hispania-Suiza.[185] Naturally, Van Nieuwenhuizen indicated his interest, but as soon as they were both back in South Africa, he was persuaded to limit this interest. Van der Merwe became demanding, aggressively insisting that Van

Nieuwenhuizen pay him a certain amount of money for the information he shared with Van Nieuwenhuizen while they were in Britain. Van Nieuwenhuizen stated to the commission that he refused but became concerned when Van der Merwe did not change his demeanour. In response, Van Nieuwenhuizen threatened Van der Merwe with lodging a complaint against him with his seniors. Van der Merwe was not swayed, and as a last resort, Van Nieuwenhuizen promised to pay Van der Merwe an amount that he had to indicate in an official letter, to be placed in a sealed envelope, and handed to a bank manager whom Van der Merwe trusted.[186] Understandably, as a result of this tension, Van Nieuwenhuizen reported Van der Merwe to Steyn, and Van der Merwe was clearly more anxious when dealing with Van Nieuwenhuizen than in the case of the other people he hustled. The reason for his anxiety is not clear from the 1964 Cillié Commission report. Even so, Van der Merwe was able to swindle R21 500 from Van Nieuwenhuizen.[187] This was the final sum of money that he would receive before his arrest on 28 June 1963.

Justice PM Cillié indicated in his report, which was Volume 24 of the commission record, that according to his calculations, Van der Merwe obtained R106 000 from his bribes. In the author's master's degree thesis (2020), the amount is indicated as R123 920, which, based on the amounts stated in Volume 24, is higher than Cillié's estimate.[188] This amount of money can be considered as massive in the context of 1964 South Africa. No records have been found to indicate that Van der Merwe had to pay back any of the money, and he was possibly able to use that money, or a small part of it, in the last 35 years of his life following his discharge from the SADF in 1963. If this is the case, Van der Merwe was clearly not punished at all for being a corrupt senior officer.

Conclusion

Barnie van der Merwe committed several crimes during his time as an officer in the SADF. His criminal biography reflects several cases of his hustling of businessmen, such as Louis Ossip and Bernard Litscher, and of the way he manipulated arms agents, such as Jaboulay and Millyard, for the sake of self-enrichment. By being an active member of the SADF, Van der Merwe thus brought the SADF into disrepute by swindling arms agents for the sake of a successful tender award. Considering that he was securely employed and approaching retirement, what possible reasons could be found to explain Van der Merwe's crimes? Fear of being poor again appears to be a significant motivator, but envy towards his senior officer, General Engelbrecht, is also a plausible argument. The cases against Van der Merwe clearly reveal however that he was greedy and disregarded his duty as an officer for immediate reward. He was found guilty of corruption in an SA court of law and is to be remembered as a criminal. Based on the careful analysis of his criminal biography, this statement can be supported with relevant evidence, and thus Van der Merwe can be included in the criminal history of South Africa.

Did Van der Merwe work alone? This is difficult to prove with the available evidence but it would not be unfair to argue that he might have requested *ex gratia* payments for more than just himself. Why else did he receive a light sentence? Could it be that he was protected and those who protected him were members in the high echelons of the NP and the SADF? It is also curious why the matter surrounding his corruption did not continue in the parliamentary debates after 1964.

Whether or not he operated alone, Van der Merwe's case is proof of corruption in the procurement of military equipment and vehicles from 1957 to 1963. The 1964 Cillié Commission, however, indicated that Van der Merwe was not the only person participating in corruption or revealing classified information during said time. If this commission did uncover an SA arms scandal, the cases against Van der Merwe were merely one part of an intriguing, broader web of criminal conduct. The criminal biography of Van der Merwe is therefore only one narrative within a greater story about this arms scandal, which in turn is part of the South African criminal past.

ENDNOTES

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[100] This article is dedicated to my master's degree study leaders: Professor Johann Tempelhoff, the late Dr Jan-ad Stemmet and Dr Claudia Gouws. Gratitude must be express to Mr Dewald Nel, who assisted with photographing Barnie van der Merwe's personal folder in the Department of Defence Archives in Pretoria.

[101] 1964 Cillié Commission *Report of the Commission of Inquiry regarding the Alleged Irregularities in the South African Defence Force and the Department Defence (Cillié Report)* (Pretoria: Government Printing and Stationary Office, 1964), Volume 24, 31–32. [

[102] See The Union of South Africa, 'Official Secrets Act, No. 16 of 1956', *Government Gazette*, CLXXXIII, 5656. <https://archive.gazettes.africa/archive/za/1956/za-government-gazette-dated-1956-03-23-no-5656.pdf> [Accessed on 28 March 2023].

[103] 1964 Cillié Commission 24, *Report of the Commission of Inquiry*, 31.

[104] 1964 Cillié Commission 24, *Report of the Commission of Inquiry*, 32.

[105] 1964 Cillié Commission 24, *Report of the Commission of Inquiry*, 31.

[106] The press at the time called it the "Arms case", but at the time they published a small number of articles about the case; the scandalous nature of the case was not known. With hindsight, surely it can be called an arms scandal.

[107] See H van Vuuren, *Apartheid, Guns and Money* (Johannesburg: Jacana Press, 2017).

[108] See P Holden, *The Arms Deal in Your Pocket* (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 2008).

[109] EC Coetzee, *Noodsaaklike Onreëlmatighede? Die 1964 Cillié-kommissie en wapenaankope vir Suid-Afrika* (MA thesis, North-West University, 2020), 15.

[110] The building still existed in 2023. It is in Paul Kruger Street in Pretoria.

[111] Coetzee, *Noodsaaklike Onreëlmatighede?*, 49.

[112] Republic of South Africa, *House of Assembly*, *Debates of the Third Session of the Thirteenth Parliament 1964. Comprising the Period 17 January to 28 June 1964* (Pretoria: Government Printer, 1964), 813.

[113] Coetzee, *Noodsaaklike Onreëlmatighede?*, 44–48.

[114] Coetzee, *Noodsaaklike Onreëlmatighede?*, 49.

[115] 1964 Cillié Commission 24, *Report of the Commission of Inquiry*, 3.

[116] See BS Godfrey, 'History, Criminology and "Historical Criminology"', in BS Godfrey, P Lawrence & C Williams (eds.), *History and Crime* (London: Sage, 2007), 5-24.

[117] See C van Onselen, *The Fox and the Flies: The World of Joseph Silver Racketeer & Psychopath* (London: Jonathan Cape, 2007) and C van Onselen, *Showdown at the Red Lion: The Life and Times of Jack McLoughlin, 1859–1910* (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 2015).

[118] See A Banks & N Jacobs, 'Biography in Post-apartheid South Africa: A Call for Awkwardness', *African Studies*, 78, 2 (2019), 165–182.

[119] Loosely translated from H Venter, *Kriminologie: 'n Handleiding vir Studente in die Kriminologie* (Pretoria: Van Schaik, 1977), 10.

[120] Department of Defence Archives (hereafter DOD Archives), Personal File: P22075 Barnie van der Merwe. Attestation Form, 1934.

[121] Geni.com., 'Barnie van der Merwe profile'. <https://www.geni.com/people/Barnie-van-der-Merwe/6000000056375066018> [Accessed on 13 March 2023].

[122] See Anon, 'Secret Arms Trail: Verdict Monday', *Rand Daily Mail*, 18 September 1963.

[123] See FA Mouton, *The Opportunist: The Political Life of Oswald Pirow, 1915–1959* (Pretoria: Protea Book House, 2020). Also see I van der Waag, *A Military History of Modern South Africa* (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 2015).

[124] DOD Archives, Personal File: P22190/1 Barnie van der Merwe. Service Record.

[125] DOD Archives. Personal File: P22075 Barnie van der Merwe. Statement to Promotions Application, 22 September 1944.

[126] DOD Archives. Personal File: P22190/1 Barnie van der Merwe. Service Record.

[127] DOD Archives. Personal File: P22190/1 Barnie van der Merwe. Service Record.

[128] 1964 Cillié Commission 24, *Report of the Commission of Inquiry*, 12.

[129] See L Jooste, *F.C. Erasmus as Minister van Verdediging* (MA thesis, University of South Africa, 1995).

[130] Coetzee, *Noodsaaklike Onreëlmatighede?*, 57.

[131] 1964 Cillié Commission 8, *Report of the Commission of Inquiry*, 1477–1479.

[132] Coetzee, *Noodsaaklike Onreëlmatighede?*, 63.

[133] Coetzee, *Noodsaaklike Onreëlmatighede?*, 59–60.

[134] 1964 Cillié Commission 24, *Report of the Commission of Inquiry*, 12–13.

[135] Anon. 'Mense in die U.V.M.', *Kommando*, (July 1955), 26.

[136] 1964 Cillié Commission 24, *Report of the Commission of Inquiry*, 12.

[137] 1964 Cillié Commission 24, *Report of the Commission of Inquiry*, 12.

[138] 1964 Cillié Commission 9, *Report of the Commission of Inquiry*, 1692–1693.

[139] 1964 Cillié Commission 24, *Report of the Commission of Inquiry*, 12–13.

[140] General Sybrandt Engelbrecht was by the late 1950s the Deputy Quartermaster General and therefore Van der Merwe's superior.

[141] 1964 Cillié Commission 24, *Report of the Commission of Inquiry*, 12–13.

[142] 1964 Cillié Commission 15, *Report of the Commission of Inquiry*, 2965–2968.

[143] Coetzee, *Noodsaaklike Onreëlmatighede?*, 37.

[144] 1964 Cillié Commission 24, *Report of the Commission of Inquiry*, 12–13.

[145] Coetzee, *Noodsaaklike Onreëlmatighede?*, 35–38.

[146] 1964 Cillié Commission 24, *Report of the Commission of Inquiry*, 14.

[147] 1964 Cillié Commission 24, *Report of the Commission of Inquiry*, 14.

[148] The copy mentioned is part of the University of Johannesburg's special collection located at the Doornfontein campus.

[149] DOD Archives. Personal File: P22075 Barnie van der Merwe. Letter of Termination of Service. 28 September 1963.

[150] DOD Archives. Personal File: P22075 Barnie van der Merwe. Letter to the Department of Social Securities and Pensions, 9 November 1963.

[151] Rebecca Street Cemetery records, 1964 Burial Records, Barnie van der Merwe.

[152] See Holden, *The Arms Deal in Your Pocket*.

[153] See Van Vuuren. *Apartheid, Guns and Money*.

[154] See JA Stemmet, K Stemmet & B Senekal. 'South Africa in the International Arms Trade Network (ATN) during National Party Rule (1948–1994): A Network Analysis', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 40, 2 (2015), 48–70.

[155] See A Feinstein, *The Shadow World: Inside the Global Arms Trade* (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 2011).

[156] Advocate H Moll was the legal counsel for Department of Defence and Advocate JJ Strydom did the same for the South African Defence Force.

[157] 1964 Cillié Commission 9, *Report of the Commission of Inquiry*, 1685–1687.

[158] Coetzee, *Noodsaaklike Onreëlmatighede?*, 65–66.

[159] 1964 Cillié Commission 24, *Report of the Commission of Inquiry*, 16–17.

[160] Coetzee, *Noodsaaklike Onreëlmatighede?*, 58–59.

[161] 1964 Cillié Commission 24, *Report of the Commission of Inquiry*, 59.

[162] 1964 Cillié Commission 7, *Report of the Commission of Inquiry*, 1384.

[163] 1964 Cillié Commission 7, *Report of the Commission of Inquiry*, 1384.

[164] 1964 Cillié Commission 7, *Report of the Commission of Inquiry*, 1385, 1387, 1388.

[165] 1964 Cillié Commission 7, *Report of the Commission of Inquiry*, 1388.

[166] 1964 Cillié Commission 7, *Report of the Commission of Inquiry*, 1390.

[167] 1964 Cillié Commission 7, *Report of the Commission of Inquiry*, 1391–1393.

[168] 1964 Cillié Commission 8, *Report of the Commission of Inquiry*, 1402.

[169] 1964 Cillié Commission 7, *Report of the Commission of Inquiry*, 1389.

[170] 1964 Cillié Commission 8, *Report of the Commission of Inquiry*, 1470.

[171] 1964 Cillié Commission 8, *Report of the Commission of Inquiry*, 1472–1475.

[172] 1964 Cillié Commission 8, *Report of the Commission of Inquiry*, 1476–1477.

[173] 1964 Cillié Commission 8, *Report of the Commission of Inquiry*, 1477–1479.

[174] 1964 Cillié Commission 7, *Report of the Commission of Inquiry*, 1365–1369.

[175] 1964 Cillié Commission 7, *Report of the Commission of Inquiry*, 1370.

[176] 1964 Cillié Commission 7, *Report of the Commission of Inquiry*, 1380–1383.

[177] 1964 Cillié Commission 24, *Report of the Commission of Inquiry*, 25.

[178] 1964 Cillié Commission 24, *Report of the Commission of Inquiry*, 25.

[179] 1964 Cillié Commission 24, *Report of the Commission of Inquiry*, 26.

[180] Geneanet, 'Henri Victor Jaboulay profile', <https://gw.geneanet.org/mletbj?lang=nl&n=jaboulay&oc=0&p=henri+victor> [Accessed on 3 April 2023]. Also see RM van der Velde, *French-South African Arms Trade Relations as a Community of Practice, 1955–1979* (PhD thesis, University of Portsmouth, 2017).

[181] 1964 Cillié Commission 6, *Report of the Commission of Inquiry*, 1064–1065.

[182] Coetzee, *Noodsaaklike Onreëlmatighede?*, 59.

[183] Coetzee, *Noodsaaklike Onreëlmatighede?*, 59–60.

[184] Coetzee, *Noodsaaklike Onreëlmatighede?*, 63.

[185] 1964 Cillié Commission 24, *Report of the Commission of Inquiry*, 10.

[186] Coetzee. *Noodsaaklike Onreëlmatighede?*, 63–64.

[187] 1964 Cillié Commission 24, *Report of the Commission of Inquiry*, 15.

[188] Coetzee, *Noodsaaklike Onreëlmatighede?*, 67.

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The *Bond van Oudgeïnterneerdes en Politieke Gevangenes* as a Direct and Long-Lasting Social Manifestation Related to the Internment Policy of the Union of South Africa, 1946–1985

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Abstract

During the Second World War, the Union of South Africa implemented emergency regulations, including an internment policy, to curb anti-war efforts within South Africa. These regulations and the internment policy affected one of the biggest anti-war organisations, the Ossewabrandwag ("Oxwagon Sentinel"), and many of its members were detained during the war in internment camps. In 1946, the Bond van Oudgeïnterneerdes en Politieke Gevangenes (freely translated as "the Association of Former Internees and Political Prisoners") was formed by individuals, mostly Ossewabrandwag members, who were interned in South African internment camps. Using the Bond van Oudgeïnterneerdes en Politieke Gevangenes collection that forms part of the Ossewabrandwag Archive, this article provides a brief historical background to the Bond van Oudgeïnterneerdes en Politieke Gevangenes. Some key themes are discussed, and the focus is on the organisation, and the possible effect of the organisation on its members is explored by framing nostalgia or nostalgic longing as central to its existence. By considering the Bond van Oudgeïnterneerdes en Politieke Gevangenes as a direct and long-lasting social manifestation related to the internment policy of the Union of South Africa, the ongoing study – from which this article derives – constitutes a first attempt at exploring the Bond van Oudgeïnterneerdes en Politieke Gevangenes and understanding its role in the larger picture of the South African Second World War experiences and memories.

Keywords: Bond van Oudgeïnterneerdes en Politieke Gevangenes, BOPG, Ossewabrandwag, Memorable Order of Tin Hats, Internment, Emergency Regulations

Introduction and Contextualisation

The Bond van Oudgeïnterneerdes en Politieke Gevangenes (BOPG) was an organisation founded by individuals who were interned in South Africa during the Second World War.[190] Most of its members were former Ossewabrandwag (OB) members, and most also formed part of the subversive and activist wing of the OB known as the Stormjaers ("Storm Troopers"). The BOPG has not been analysed within the OB historiography previously, which is surprising given the growing number of academic works on the OB over the past few years.[191] Part of the reason why the BOPG has been missing from historiography until now is the position of the BOPG on the edges of mainstream historiographical concerns and the fact that traces of the BOPG in broader society are minimal, with all of its archival documents forming part of the OB Archive (OBA).

As one of the social manifestations that can be traced back directly to the OB, the BOPG had a protracted influence on the lives of its members, and existed until 1985 – more than thirty years after the OB had been disbanded officially. Hans van Rensburg, the former leader of the OB, remained honorary president of the BOPG until his death. This is perhaps one of the key indicators of the inseparability of the BOPG and the OB. It is safe to argue that the BOPG would never have existed without the OB. Two of the most authoritative historical texts on the OB, by Christoph Marx and Piet F van der Schyff respectively,[192] scarcely mention the BOPG. Apart from a few sporadic references to the BOPG in the works of Albert Blake,[193] Charl Blignaut, and Dawid Olivier,[194] the current study is the first to delve into the inner workings of the organisation. Much like the argument by Neil Roos that the 'memory of war service' bound South African (SA) Second World War veterans 'together until their very old age',[195] mostly in the form of various veterans' organisations, such as the Memorable Order of Tin Hats (MOTHs), the BOPG provided the same opportunity for former internees and political prisoners.

The current study analyses one of the long-lasting social manifestations of the emergency regulations of the Smuts government by highlighting the BOPG as an organisation. Other studies have already looked at, or in some cases briefly touched upon, the internment of OB members during the Second World War,[196] and the effect of the emergency regulations by the Union government on South Africa in general and on the OB specifically, has also been analysed from various social angles.[197] The study builds on previous studies by asking the following question:

> What were the long-term social consequences of the emergency regulations, and which role did the BOPG play after the dissolution of the OB in the lives of persons directly affected by the South African internment policy during the Second World War?

By utilising both the official BOPG newsletter, *Dankie*, along with the large number of interview transcripts that now forms part of the OBA,[198] and BOPG minutes and reports, the current study follows a socio-historical approach by highlighting the opinions of contemporaries to convey an overall picture of the organisation. As Patrick Finney notes, activities, such as recording interviews and testimonies on tape, '[are] a rather literal way of seeking to prolong the era of living memory beyond the life-span of participants'.[199] In the case of the BOPG, it is however interesting to note that this phenomenon is not limited to veterans and victims of war circumstances, such as holocaust survivors. In South Africa, the climate existed for former violent individuals who actively participated in acts of sabotage to prolong the era of living memory beyond the lifespan of those who were directly involved.

OB members formed camaraderie within the organisation, built on the idea that they would 'never abandon' their comrades, especially those held as internees and political prisoners, 'in their struggle'.[200] This sense of camaraderie took two specific forms. Firstly, they wanted to "help" fellow Afrikaners, and secondly, they wanted to "protect" them. These two themes, "to help" and "to protect", are visible early in the OB policy, and can be observed in some of the official pamphlets of the organisation, such as *Die OB: Vanwaar*

en Waarheen.[201] These themes are, however, also clearly visible in the long-term social consequences of the emergency regulations, as they had a lasting power that outlived the demise of the OB, and were, to a certain extent, adopted by the BOPG. These two themes are constantly highlighted in this article.

The article firstly provides a brief historical background to the BOPG. Secondly, some key themes and focusses within the organisation are discussed. It is also illustrated how the BOPG tried to take complete ownership of the history of the SA internment camps during the Second World War. Finally, the influence of the organisation on its members is explored by highlighting nostalgia or nostalgic longing as central to the existence of the BOPG.

Brief Description of the Bond van Oudgeïnterneerdes en Politieke Gevangenes

Four years after the last political prisoners had been released, the final official retreat of the OB was held in Bloemfontein. During this retreat, on 23 August 1952, the decision was made to officially disband the OB in its current form,[202] and to transform the organisation into 'a comprehensive republican movement'.[203] More than a year after this retreat, on 10 September 1953, the OB was effectively transformed into the Republikeinse Bond ("Republican League") under the leadership of former OB Assistant Leader JA Smith. The Republikeinse Bond only existed for a few months, and on 16 January 1954, it was also dissolved due to a lack of funds.[204]

With the official demise of the OB, and later the Republikeinse Bond, several organisations and sections that had been connected to the OB were also disbanded. This included the OB-Boerejeug ("OB Youth League") and the OB-Vroueafdeling ("OB Women's Section"). The OB members, however, came up with other ways to keep the ideals of the OB and the friendships formed through the organisation alive. The two most prominent manifestations were the OB-Vriendekring ("OB Circle of Friends"),[205] and the Bond van Oudgeïnterneerdes en Politieke Gevangenes (BOPG).[206] On 22 April 1946, six years before the dissolution of the OB, the BOPG was officially established.[207] Although this organisation was already established before the dissolution of the OB, it did not die with the OB.

The BOPG decided from the outset that membership should be limited to those detained in internment camps and prison cells. Within the organisation, there were two forms of membership: 'full membership' and 'honorary membership'. Full membership was for individuals physically detained in camps, prisons, or police cells. Those who enjoyed 'honourable distinction' because of their 'close association' with such individuals were also considered members – albeit only honorary members.[208] Members and honorary members enjoyed almost the same benefits, except that only full members could serve on the council of the organisation. The requirements for 'honorary members' were much more comprehensive. Honorary members had to fall into any one of the following three groups:

- Individuals who fought against war participation during the war years and who, 'regardless of the greatest danger and persecution', persevered outside the camps and prisons;
- Individuals who cared for and assisted the families of internees and refugees; and
- Individuals who participated in the Afrikaner Rebellion of 1914.[209]

The honorary member system allowed Hans van Rensburg, the former leader of the OB, for example, to serve as the honorary president of the BOPG, even though he was never detained in any camp or prison.[210] Several women were also visible in the activities of the BOPG, even though no women were interned during the war. Women played an indirect role in the BOPG and were prominent in social activities, such as dinners and wreath-laying ceremonies. Although the role of women within the OB has been analysed thoroughly in the past, the role played by women in the BOPG provides a perfect opportunity for future research on the organisation.

The BOPG was aware of the continuous decline in membership and, as a result, the need to 'bring comrades together in a close unit' was emphasised.[211] In 1961, the future of the BOPG was already a concern, mainly because most members were already seniors at the time. It was proposed that BOPG members let their sons join the organisation.[212] This involvement would be subject to several requirements:

- An age requirement (the specific age was never stipulated);
- A character test (mainly to test prospective members' 'Afrikanerskap [Afrikanership]'); and
- A knowledge test, which would be based on knowledge of the official publication of the BOPG, *Agter Tralies en Doringdraad* (1953).[213]

The proposal never materialised. Nevertheless, this does not indicate that fears surrounding the legacy and future of the BOPG disappeared. This matter posed a serious concern for members, and validly so, as the BOPG was officially disbanded in 1985. However, in its almost forty years – especially after radical changes to membership requirements, which became less strict and formal as time went by – several former OB members joined the BOPG. The experience of being detained and interned during the war, and for many simply belonging to the OB, remained a part of their identity, one that could not be suppressed.

The BOPG continued to affect members' lives for about four decades. For members of the organisation, the BOPG was defined as 'a group of people among whom the suffering of the past has forged a camaraderie'.[214] One of the main practical aims of the BOPG was to provide an opportunity for those who had been interned and detained as political prisoners 'to meet up from time to time' to commemorate and talk about the 'the pain and the joy of the struggle' during the Second World War.[215] The function of the BOPG has been described as 'being a leaven for our *volkslewe* ["national life"]', referring, of course, to Afrikanerdom.[216] This function resonated with the early objectives of the OB, which included:

- The 'expansion' of *volkslewe*';
- '[P]reserving the language and tradition of the Boer people';

- '[P]rotection and promotion of all Afrikaner interests'; and
- [U]niting all Afrikaners'.[217]

This overlap between the function of the BOPG and some of the early objectives of the OB was just one of the ways in which the BOPG experienced nostalgia for the heyday of the OB, and by which the long-lasting connection between these two bodies was made visible.

The goals of the BOPG, mainly contained in the constitution of the organisation and which are discussed later, also served as a lens through which members' greatest needs and concerns were viewed. In the early years of the BOPG, the need for a sense of unity was among the most important points of discussion. In 1947, three of the most important needs among members were:

- The need for a badge or an emblem for the BOPG;
- A conference at which the necessary rules, regulations, and constitutional matters could be discussed; and
- A dinner to rekindle old friendships.[218]

Regarding the need for a badge, one of the main requirements for the design was that it had to include themes directly related to the internment camps and prisons. One suggestion was that the coat of arms had to depict 'the barbed wire of the camps in the middle and the bars of the prisons on either side'.[219] This emphasis on themes directly relating to internment and internment camps shows that the BOPG members perceived their shared experience as internees and political prisoners as the basis on which this new community rested and was formed. This is proved even further by the decision made by the BOPG to limit the number of badges that were physically produced, and by issuing them only to a 'limited number of persons'.[220] This move not only formed a community but also added to the perceived prestige of belonging to the BOPG. The final coat of arms was approved at the BOPG conference on 4 October 1947 (see Figure 1).[221]



Figure 1: The BOPG badge.[222]

Adding the motifs of barbed wire and prison bars to the official BOPG coat of arms and the badge ensured that the effects of the emergency regulations and internment policy were physically visible. Because the BOPG was founded precisely for those affected by the emergency regulations and internment policy, it is obvious that the themes of barbed wire and prison bars would frequently appear within the activities of the organisation. In addition to the coat of arms and the badge, which physically depicted these motifs, the BOPG also decided to name their publication on the history of the camps *Agter Tralies en Doringdraad* ("Behind Bars and Barbed Wire"). Once again, this was seen as a tribute to how they were affected by the introduction of the internment policy by the Smuts government. The cover of the publication also depicted the motifs of barbed wire and prison bars (see Figure 2). As regards the second and third needs, the BOPG members wanted to discuss 'important matters' regarding the establishment and role of the organisation during a conference in Pretoria, and a dinner was arranged because 'everyone wants to revive old friendships'.[223]



Figure 2: Cover of Agter Tralies en Doringdraad.[224]

Key Themes within the Bond Van Oudgeïnterneerdes en Politieke Gevangenes: "To Help" and "To Protect"

As already mentioned, the objectives set out in the constitution of the BOPG offer the historian a unique lens through which to view the greatest needs and concerns of the members of the organisation. The official constitution of the BOPG set out four objectives for the organisation.

- To maintain and further develop brotherhood and friendship;
- To help fellow members financially and to support them to obtain employment;
- To raise funds for assisting members financially; and
- To 'record the history of internment and the internment camps' of the Second World War.[225]

One immediately apparent aspect is that the ideals of **helping** and **protecting** were again prominent, and all four objectives touched upon one or both ideals. The ideals of helping and protecting, which so prominently formed part of the OB, therefore still emerged years after the OB no longer existed.

By assisting members in obtaining a fixed income, the BOPG protected those individuals from financial insecurity. For example, funds were collected for 'aid purposes' to assist fellow members financially. Initially, these funds were channelled to the OB Noodhulpfonds ("Emergency Relief Fund"), but later it was mainly directed towards the recording of the history of the internment and the protection of important documents. The BOPG also tried to provide help and assistance by offering legal advice to members. For example, the secretary of the BOPG appealed to all persons who were found guilty of any political charge between 1939 and 1945 to forward information to the BOPG. This request was made because 'there is a possibility that the authorities may lift or remove any disadvantage or disqualification (legal impediment) that exists as a result of such a conviction to our benefit'.[226] All of these initiatives pointed towards the role of the BOPG in helping fellow members, mainly by protecting them from financial insecurity.

Many former internees and political prisoners decided not to join the BOPG. The reasons for this varied from individual to individual. Some of the most prevalent reasons were the acute need to leave the past in the past. FR Bartman, arrested and detained in 1942 for setting fire to a timber yard in Pretoria as an act of sabotage,[227] explicitly stated that the BOPG members were 'living in the past'.[228] Another former internee, Sven Eklund, who was interned in the Koffiefontein camp during the war, was also opposed to the idea of the BOPG, and believed that there was 'no need' for such an organisation.[229] Despite the opinions of former internees and political prisoners, such as Bartman and Eklund, it is obvious that the BOPG played a prominent role in the lives of some of these individuals who were affected by the internment policy.

The last objective, namely to publish a history of the camps, particularly occupied the activities of the BOPG. The decision that the history of the internment camps should be drawn up was already made at the first general meeting of the BOPG in 1946.[230] This goal was carried through to the very last days of the BOPG, of which the establishment of the OBA is surely the greatest physical remnant. This article argues that the most significant role that the BOPG played in the lives of affected persons was that it provided the opportunity to preserve a kind of own history of the camps – in publication and archive – for future generations. By doing this, the BOPG not only offered help and protection to affected persons but also provided an opportunity for them to protect the history in which they were directly involved.

'Our History'

The BOPG took the writing of the history of the Second World War internment camps particularly seriously, and tried to take full ownership of the history of this phenomenon, even referring to it as 'our history'.[231] Books conveying the "correct type" of history[232] were regularly promoted in *Dankie,* the official BOPG newsletter,[233] for example:

- Magda Boyce's *Rooi Verraad* (1949);
- Hans van Rensburg's *Their Paths Crossed Mine* (1956);
- Hendrik van Blerk's *En Drie Maal Kraai Die Haan* (1968); and
- FW Quass's *Tweede Rebellie* (1975).

The tendency to propagate the "correct type" of history is not unique to the BOPG. On a much smaller scale, this tendency could also be seen within the OB structure in 1944. For example, in the official Boerejeug circular of 14 June 1944, all members were encouraged to purchase AJH van der Walt's *'n Volk op Trek* (1944). Just as the above cases, this book by Van der Walt tells the preferred version of history, seeing that it was written by the then OB secretary of the Grootraad ("Grand Council").[234]

However, unique to the BOPG is the overemphasis by the organisation on the "correct type" of history. This was done by promoting certain books and harshly criticising any publications that were, according to the BOPG, 'blatant lies'.[235] Such publications were regularly identified and criticised in *Dankie,* and usually came with a warning to its members not to buy or read such books. Most prominent were:

- Hans Strydom's *Vir Volk en Führer* (1983); and
- George Cloete Visser's *OB: Traitors or Patriots?* (1976).[236]

The criticism against such books was conveyed in *Dankie* and in numerous interviews with BOPG members, who regularly stated their disdain for such publications. One BOPG member, Heimat Anderson, even consulted a lawyer about the possibility of suing Visser over statements in his book, *OB: Traitors or Patriots?*[237] In the December 1983 edition of *Dankie,* the BOPG also encouraged members to come forward with any documents or information that could prove Strydom's publication wrong.[238] Other books that retold the version of history preferred by the BOPG were marketed to BOPG members to teach 'children and grandchildren our own history'.[239]

By promoting certain publications and rejecting others, the BOPG members wanted to take full ownership of what they perceived to be "their own history". This objective was further realised by putting together a collection of works on the history of the camps, which would eventually take the form of a published book. Already in the planning phase of the book, every effort was made to ensure that it is as comprehensive as possible: 'If the book is to have value, then it must contain everything.'[240] Emphasis was also placed on 'facts'.[241] During the planning phase, it was repeatedly stated that no writing would be allowed in the book if it were not based on facts. During the writing process, contributors were reminded to focus on 'facts and dates', and that 'guessing and opinions' should not be part of the writing process.[242]

It is also clear that the BOPG wanted to gain as much attention as possible through the publication. The editors, therefore, faced a problem: on the one hand, the publication had to contain 'everything' related to the history of the camps,[243] but on the other hand, it must not be 'dry reading material'. As OL Nel, a prominent member of the editorial team, put it:

> If we compile a history of the camps and prisons, then, of course, it must contain everything, and if it includes everything, it will be rather dry reading material for the outsider, and the book will never be considered 'popular reading material.' In other words: I doubt very much whether the book will be a financial success.[244]

The above quote illustrates that the BOPG ranked publishing their version of the events higher than any possible financial gains from such a publication.

The BOPG wanted to exercise absolute control over every aspect of the history of the internment camps. In the 7 January 1948 edition of *Die OB*, the official newspaper of the OB, a former internee wrote an article in which he encouraged other internees to record 'interesting incidents from internment life' as part of a writing competition.[245] This article was written and published without the permission of the BOPG Council, and shortly after it had appeared, the secretary of the BOPG wrote a stern letter to the editor of *Die OB*:

> According to the constitution of the BOPG, no one may do or say anything regarding the BOPG except for members of its Union Council […] I would appreciate it if, in the future, you would send such matters as the article I am discussing to me first for approval before posting them [in *Die OB*].[246] (Author's own translation)

Some former internees and political prisoners raised serious and valid concerns over the objectivity of such a book, especially because it would be written so soon after the events had taken place. Sven Eklund, a former Koffiefontein internee, maintained that the book had to be postponed until 'things are clearer in an extended perspective'.[247] Hendrik van den Berg, who was also interned in the Koffiefontein camp, believed that ex-internees only had to be involved in 'gathering the necessary facts' and that 'the time is by no means yet ripe' to publish such a book.[248] GPJ Trümpelmann, who was the camp leader at the Leeuwkop internment camp,[249] also believed that the time was 'not yet ripe' for such a publication. Trümpelmann's opinion was that the authors of such a publication would not have been able to take the right perspective a mere two years after the war: 'For perspective, distance is necessary, and none of us can have that at the moment.'[250]

When ex-internees revealed such opinions about the compilation of a history of the camps, it seemed that the views of other BOPG members around them changed. These individuals were often labelled 'anti-Afrikaner', 'more German than Afrikaner', or even 'pro-English'.[251] In an article about Trümpelmann, he is described by one of the BOPG members as 'always a German and never an Afrikaner'. Furthermore, he was also branded as 'never pro-Afrikaans' and that he 'prefers English over Afrikaans' – a bizarre remark seeing that all Trümpelmann's correspondence and writings in the OBA is in Afrikaans.[252] Anyone, even those who shared the experience of being detained under the emergency

regulations during the war, could therefore be ostracised by the BOPG members if he or she deviated from the opinion of the wider group.

Despite the opposition of certain members, the BOPG continued organising the publication of the book, and in 1953, the BOPG published *Agter Tralies en Doringdraad*. The publication of this book can be considered a climax in the existence of the BOPG precisely because it fulfilled one of its four main objectives (i.e. to record the history of South Africa's Second World War internment camps). The book was published under the impression that it was 'the truth' and that no information in the book was open to any interpretation.[253] This pointed once again to the idea that the BOPG wanted to exercise control over the history of the camps.

The BOPG used this book as an attempt to take ownership of the history in which they were directly involved by passing on their version of events to future generations. The history of the camps was also used to emphasise the perceived sacrifice of those who were interned and arrested. The internees and political prisoners were framed as innocent victims of the emergency regulations and the war effort by the Union government: 'Children of a conquered people have … been put into prisons and camps, without trial, [and] without any charges being brought against them …'[254]

This depiction of internees and political prisoners as innocent martyrs is not new. Depicting such individuals in this manner is also apparent in the official anthem of the BOPG, "Voorwaarts":

> Oor die vlakte, oor die rante, oor riviere, dal en veld
> Ruis die stem van duisend helde wat geveg het teen geweld
> Wat hul lewe het geoffer vir die vryheid van ons land
>
> [Forward
> Over the plains, over the ridges, over rivers, valleys and fields,
> Resounds the voice of a thousand heroes who fought against violence,
> Who offered their lives for the freedom for our country] (Author's own translation)

Strangely, the BOPG framed its members as 'heroes' who had 'fought against violence', referring to their opposition to active participation by the Union of South Africa in the war.[255] Ironically, several of these individuals were involved in numerous acts of violence to sabotage the war effort by the government. This warped and entangled idea of presenting the internees and political prisoners as both heroes and victims is seen throughout *Agter Tralies en Doringdraad.* The long-lasting effect of emergency regulations issued by the Union government on the OB as an organisation and on its members, therefore, pointed to a dualistic character, one with two sides that formed a unity, despite being directly opposed to each other. On the one hand, unity, helpfulness, and camaraderie were embodied; on the other hand, themes such as martyrdom, despair, and bitterness emerged. This juxtaposition was detectable within the BOPG too. Pride was often entangled with martyrdom. In the correspondence between BOPG members and in interviews conducted with former

internees and political prisoners, camaraderie and togetherness were often juxtaposed with despair and bitterness.[256] This was also visible in several editions of *Dankie*.

Concluding the section on the BOPG planning and publishing *Agter Tralies en Doringdraad,* the historian Dawid Olivier's take on the book perhaps provides the best summary. *Agter Tralies en Doringdraad* is, in its true essence, a 'work of remembrance',[257] covering numerous aspects of internment and life as a political prisoner in South Africa during the Second World War. For the BOPG, however, their remembrance project and goal of preserving the history of the camps did not end with the publication of *Agter Tralies en Doringdraad*.

The members not only longed for the social aspect of the OB years but there were also constant efforts to collect memories of the internment experience. The members nostalgically collected certain physical relics of camp life. In *Dankie* of December 1965, for example, one member asked whether any fellow members still had a £1 camp coin so that he could complete his collection.[258] The BOPG also used *Dankie* to appeal to members to send objects related to the internment camps during the Second World War for permanent preservation.[259] With the establishment of the OBA at the Potchefstroom University for Christian Higher Education (PU for CHE, now part of the North-West University [NWU]), the need to preserve physical remnants only increased. *Dankie* also regularly published articles in which contemporaries were encouraged to send documents and other historical pieces to the archival department of the university.[260]

On 9 October 1976, the BOPG decided that – if the BOPG were to dissolve – all assets remaining would be transferred to the PU for CHE.[261] These assets would be used exclusively for 'the preservation, housing, exhibition, maintenance, expansion, improvement, insurance and protection of the Ossewa-Brandwag [*sic*] Archive'.[262] By making this decision, and by transferring these assets to the PU for CHE, the BOPG directly contributed to protecting some of the remnants of the OB, the BOPG, and the internment camps.

By 12 October 1985, the bond had R9 935,09 in fixed assets and R240,35 in a current account. The management requested that members donate money because the BOPG 'does not want to leave less than R10 000 to the archive'.[263] The total amount transferred to the PU for CHE was never officially recorded, but it amounted to around R10 000. These funds were mainly used for the improvement and expansion of the archive. It is therefore important to consider that the BOPG succeeded, to a certain extent, in keeping the history and memory of the OB, the BOPG, and the internment experiences of various members alive. With the death of the last prominent BOPG members, all documents and collections related to the OB and the BOPG were handed over to the PU for CHE library for safekeeping.[264]

The BOPG was officially disbanded on 12 October 1985.[265] For about forty years, the organisation played a role in the lives of those affected by the internment policy. The four objectives of the organisation have undoubtedly been achieved.[266] As regards the first objective, namely the preservation and cultivation of brotherhood, the BOPG contributed

to the bringing together of several Afrikaners. In a sense, the BOPG continued with the early objective of the OB, namely the bringing together of contemporaries. In this sense, the BOPG has kept alive the friendships of a handful of people who were bound together by one shared experience. The second objective, namely to offer help and stimulate employment among members, was already realised in the early years of the BOPG, sometimes on a small scale (such as legal advice) and sometimes on a larger scale (by forming a community where most members stumbled through the same employment obstacles). The third objective, fundraising for relief purposes, largely occupied the early years of the existence of the BOPG, especially when the emergency relief fund was still in existence. However, the greatest success of the BOPG, if one measures the organisation against its own goals, lies in the realisation of their fourth goal, the effort to protect the history of the internment and camps for future generations.

Although the BOPG publication *Agter Tralies en Doringdraad* can be described as a subjective retelling and a contemporary source rather than as a history book, the work still offers a glimpse of the influence the emergency regulations of the Union government had on internees and political prisoners.

The most significant role that the BOPG played in helping those affected by the internment policy is that the association provided the opportunity to preserve the history of the camps for future generations, not only through the publication of *Agter Tralies en Doringdraad* but also by the contributions made to the OBA. This allowed affected persons to protect the remnants of history within which they were directly involved. More importantly, for the historian, however, is the fact that the documents in the OBA not only contain what the BOPG termed the "correct type" of history but also that they provide an opportunity to understand not only the OB better but all its affiliated organisations – including the BOPG.

Nostalgia and the Bond van Oudgeïnterneerdes en Politieke Gevangenes

The BOPG was an organisation born out of the SA wartime internment experiences, but to a large extent, also born out of the OB. By implication, it was thus an organisation with nostalgic tendencies, a community built on members' shared past. Nostalgia operated both on individual and societal level, helping to create links between the individual and the group.[267] Much like veterans' organisations, such as the MOTHs, represented 'a response to a post-war society that neither understood nor adequately acknowledged veterans' experience',[268] the mere establishment of the BOPG was an indication that former internees and political prisoners craved camaraderie with those with whom they shared experiences during the war.

The establishment of the BOPG allowed several individuals affected by the internment policy to create a community where this experience formed a central point. As time went by, another mutual link between these individuals, namely their OB membership, also became apparent. Could it be argued that nostalgia or nostalgic longing might have been the linchpin that enabled the BOPG to exist for almost forty years? As already pointed out, the role of the BOPG in establishing the OBA shows that the organisation and its members perceived the heyday of the OB as a phenomenon worth protecting. Nostalgic

reminiscences of the OB days thus contributed to the need felt by the BOPG to create the OBA and to ensure its survival for future generations.

For some, the OB represented social contact and a community of like-minded individuals. This social aspect is seen in the numerous events hosted by various OB commandos across the country during the war. Events hosted by the OB included folk festivals,[269] dinners, wreath-laying ceremonies at monuments, camps, and hosting braais ("barbecues").[270] Social events were such a characteristic part of the OB during its prime that a 1941 morale report by the Union Defence Force reported, 'the different branches of the Ossewa-Brandwag [*sic*] are organising 'braaivleisaande' [barbecue evenings] and various other social functions' which were perceived with some envy by troops who mentioned in letters, 'they have nothing to cheer them up'.[271] Social events were thus an intrinsic part of the OB wartime experience. By the 1970s, many former OB members who had not been interned and who had not been affected directly by the internment policy had joined the BOPG.[272] The BOPG was thus something more than merely an organisation for former internees and political prisoners; it also represented a way in which the social aspects, the cohesion, the camaraderie, and the togetherness of the heyday of the OB could be relived nostalgically or – in a certain sense –even be continued.



Figure 3: Official invitation to a BOPG camp in September 1962[273]

The BOPG also arranged various social events, such as camps, picnics, formal dinners, and braais. Invitations to these events, such as the one depicted in Figure 3, were regularly published in *Dankie*.[274] These invitations sometimes emphasised that the former leader of the OB, Van Rensburg, would be in attendance, possibly because Van Rensburg was closely associated with the prime of the OB. At other events, such as formal dinners

hosted by the BOPG, OB symbols and icons were visible and formed an essential part of the social event (see, for example, Figure 4).

Figure 4: A scene at a BOPG dinner in 1969 with the OB coat of arms and flag in the background.[275]

Social events organised by the BOPG thus created a space where BOPG members could reminisce about the blooming period of the OB, a period characterised by social events to attain some level of unity in Afrikanerdom. Nostalgia and nostalgic longing typically encapsulate a slanted view of the past, in which only the positive aspects are remembered and longed for.[276] What is interesting in the case of the BOPG is that, despite this apparent nostalgic longing for the positive experiences of the OB days, there was also an inherent link with the harsh realities of being interned and incarcerated during the war, an experience that was so intrinsic to the BOPG that its entire foundation, name, and existence reflected it. This harsher side of the past was too traumatic for some former internees and political prisoners, such as Bartman and Eklund,[277] to become actively involved in the BOPG and to be swept up in the general nostalgia. Despite this, the BOPG successfully created safe spaces where numerous former OB members could reminisce.

The OB is often cast in a strictly political light, especially because of the link between the organisation and acts of sabotage during the war. It is however important to note that the OB meant many things to its members. The experiences of members when the OB was in its prime varied greatly not only from individual to individual but also from one phase to the next. These varied experiences are perfectly articulated by HL Pretorius, a former

internee and political prisoner incarcerated under the emergency regulations issued by the Union government. The quote below encapsulates the varied experiences of certain OB members, and gives good insight into the nostalgia juxtaposed with bitterness, and it thus justifies being quoted at length. The original Afrikaans is added below to convey emotions and sentiments that might have been lost in the English translation, fully:

> What I remember most clearly from the OB period is this … camaraderie, the mutual relationship amongst the people, the unanimity, the enthusiasm, and simply the love of your *volk* and the love of your country … Those are the beautiful aspects of the OB period for me. Another aspect about which I reminisce is the fact that I have lost many years of my life … I regret that I have lost many years of my life being locked up behind bars doing absolutely nothing … I was young, and that was probably the good years of my life. [Author's own translation]

> [Jy weet wat my uit die OB-jare die meeste sal bybly, is dié … kameraadskap, die onderlinge verhouding tussen die mense … die eensgesindheid, die entoesiasme en sommer net die liefde vir jou volk en die liefde vir jou land … Dit is vir my die mooi dinge van die jare van die OB. 'n Ander aspek waaraan ek terugdink, is die feit dat ek jare van my lewe verloor het … Ek is jammer oor die jare van my lewe wat ek verloor het; wat ek absoluut nutteloos agter tralies gesit en niks gedoen het nie. Dis seker, jy weet ek was jonk, die goeie jare van my lewe …][278]

Despite this juxtaposition, the BOPG goal of creating a sense of togetherness and a sense of community aligned with the goal of the OB of creating cohesion amongst Afrikaners,[279] a legacy that the BOPG kept alive. The BOPG thus brought together a group of people who were bound by the shared experiences of being OB members and, in some cases, being directly affected by the internment policy.

Conclusion

The effect of the emergency regulations issued by the Union of South Africa – especially the internment policy – on the lives of OB members and the OB as an organisation did not end with the release of the last prisoners and internees. A long-lasting influence is also visible, especially concerning the Bond van Oudgeïnterneerdes en Politieke Gevangenes (BOPG). This article discusses the role played by the BOPG in the lives of OB members who were affected by the internment policy. As pointed out, the adjustment after internment and imprisonment was often difficult for some members. It is not the aim of this article to delve too deeply into the camaraderie formed in these camps and prisons; however, it is argued that the formation of the BOPG would not have been possible without this camaraderie. The camaraderie in the camps and the way it was formed were not properly analysed. This consequently provides a good opportunity for historians to delve deeper into the BOPG.[280] The current study should therefore be viewed as a first attempt to explore the BOPG and to understand its role against the background of Second World War experiences, memories, and nostalgia in South Africa.

Much like the argument by Neil Roos that war service remained a crucial part of the identity of white SA men who volunteered to serve in the Second World War,[281] this article maintains that the BOPG formed a similar platform for ex-internees and political prisoners to highlight a critical part of their identity in the post-war years. The conclusion is that the BOPG adopted the OB stance of **helping** and **protecting**, and these two motives took various forms. As the current study is only an exploratory study into the BOPG, the article did not cover all of the similarities and differences between the BOPG and SA veterans' organisations, such as the MOTHs. Future research into the long-term effects of the Second World War on South Africans could explore this topic.

With the end of the Second World War, and a German defeat, the OB lost momentum.[282] However, the end of the war (1945), the release of the last political prisoners (1948), and the end of the OB (1952) did not mean that the effect of the emergency regulations also ceased. As a result of the emergency regulations, the BOPG continued to affect the lives of its members for forty years after the war (until 1985). The initial objective of the BOPG also focussed on the themes of help and protection, and later, most attention was shifted to preserving the history of the internment camps. Nostalgia played an important role in the social function that the BOPG fulfilled in the lives of its members, and this created a community where the heyday of the OB – especially the camaraderie, friendships, and support networks – could be fondly remembered and, to a certain extent, be continued.

This article argued that the biggest role played by the BOPG in the lives of those affected was that the organisation allowed its members to ensure the survival of important documents (directly related to what the BOPG considered to be 'our history') for future generations.[283] This was done not only by the publication of *Agter Tralies en Doringdraad* but also by eagerly collecting documents related to the SA internees and political prisoners of the Second World War. This process eventually culminated in the establishment of the OB Archive. This provided those concerned with the means to "protect" the history of the events in which they were directly involved. Without the protection of these documents, this article, along with numerous other publications dealing with the OB, would not have been possible.

ENDNOTES

[189] Anna la Grange obtained her Magister Artium in History (*cum laude*) from North-West University (Potchefstroom Campus) in 2020. She is currently pursuing a doctoral degree at the University of Potsdam. Her research interests include the role of South African troops in the two world wars, illegitimate violence, internment policies and practices, and the treatment of prisoners of war.

[190] As the *Bond van Oudgeïnterneerdes en Politieke Gevangenes* (BOPG) is the official name of the association, this article uses the Afrikaans acronym BOPG throughout to refer to the association.

[191] A Blake, *Afrikanersondebok? Die Lewe van Hans van Rensburg, Ossewabrandwagleier* (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 2021); E Kleynhans, *Hitler's Spies: Secret Agents and the Intelligence War in South Africa* (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 2021); A la Grange & C Blignaut, 'Die Ikonografie van Afrikanernasionalisme en die "Vryheidsideaal" van die Ossewa-Brandwag in die Suid-Afrikaanse Interneringskampe van die Tweede Wêreldoorlog', *Historia*, 66, 1 (2021), 88–118; A Blake, *Wit Terroriste: Afrikaner-saboteurs in die Ossewabrandwagjare* (Cape Town: Tafelberg, 2018).

[192] C Marx, *Oxwagon Sentinel: Radical Afrikaner Nationalism and the History of the Ossewabrandwag* (Pretoria: University of South Africa Press, 2008); and PF van der Schyff (ed.), *Die Ossewa-Brandwag: Vuurtjie in Droë Gras* (Potchefstroom: Potchefstroomse Universiteit vir Christelike Hoër Onderwys, 1991).

[193] Blake refers to the BOPG in his biography of Hans van Rensburg, *Afrikanersondebok*, but mostly in relation to the organisation's role in the lives of Van Rensburg and later also his widow, Katie van Rensburg. See Blake, *Afrikanersondebok*, 286–287.

[194] Both Blignaut and Olivier refers to the BOPG's publication*, Agter Tralies and Doringdraad*, but neither analyses the organisation itself. See C Blignaut, *Volksmoeders in die Kollig: Histories–teoretiese Verkenning van die Rol van Vroue in die Ossewa–Brandwag, 1938 tot 1954* (MA thesis, North-West University, 2012), 6–7; DP Olivier, *"A Special Kind of Colonist": An Analytical and Historical Study of the Ossewa-Brandwag as an Anti-colonial Resistance Movement* (MA Thesis, North-West University, 2021), 26.

[195] N Roos, *Ordinary Springboks: White Servicemen and Social Justice in South Africa, 1939–1961* (London: Routledge, 2005), 197.

[196] Blake, *Wit Terroriste*, 53–65; Marx, *Oxwagon Sentinel*, 515–529; AM Fokkens, *The Role and Application of the Union Defence Force in the Suppression of Internal Unrest, 1912–1945* (MMil thesis, Stellenbosch University, 2006), 115–118; JM van Tonder, 'Die Afrikaanse Kerke in die Tweede Wêreldoorlog (3): Internering', *Die Kerkblad*, 118, 3295 (2015), 14–15; P Furlong, 'Allies at War? Britain and the "Southern African Front" in the Second World War', *South African Historical Journal*, 54, 1 (2005), 16–29; HO Terblanche, *John Vorster – OB-generaal en Afrikanervegter* (Roodepoort: CUM Boeke, 1983), 133–170; C Blignaut, 'From Fund-raising to Freedom Day: The Nature of Women's General Activities in the Ossewa-Brandwag, 1939–1943', *New Contree*, 66 (July 2013), 121–150.

[197] Prominent works include A la Grange, 'The Smuts Government's Justification of the Emergency Regulations and the Impact Thereof on the Ossewa-Brandwag, 1939 to 1945', *Scientia Militaria*, 48, 2 (2020), 39–64; FL Monama, 'South African Propaganda Agencies and the Battle for Public Opinion during the Second World War, 1939–1945', *Scientia Militaria*, 44, 1 (2016), 145–167; C Blignaut, '"Rebelle Sonder Gewere": Vroue se Gebruik van Kultuur as Versetmiddel teen die Agtergrond van die Ossewa-Brandwag se Dualistiese Karakter', *Suid-Afrikaanse Tydskrif vir Kultuurgeskiedenis*, 30, 2 (2016), 109–131; FL Monama, *Wartime Propaganda in the Union of South Africa, 1939–1945* (PhD dissertation, Stellenbosch University, 2014), 66–77; Blignaut, 'From Fund-raising to Freedom Day', 121–150; and C Blignaut, 'Doing Gender is Unavoidable: Women's Participation in the Core Activities of the Ossewa-Brandwag, 1938-1943', *Historia*, 58, 2 (2013), 1–18.

[198] These transcripts form part of the Ossewabrandwag Archive in Potchefstroom, where both the transcripts and the audio recordings are stored. These interviews were conducted by staff from the university's archival department during the 1970s and 1980s, and in some cases audio tapes were recorded by BOPG members themselves and sent to the archives. This whole process is an impressive oral history undertaking that has not been addressed or fully investigated in any current literature on the OB. In 1960, the first edition of *Dankie* was published by the BOPG. The initial purpose was to serve as the official circular for the BOPG. Over time, it became known as the official organ of the BOPG. This publication offers a lens through which to view the activities of those who were directly affected by the internment policy and emergency regulations.

[199] P Finney, 'Politics and Technologies of Authenticities: The Second World War at the Close of Living Memory', *Rethinking History*, 21, 2 (2017), 157.

[200] Ossewabrandwag Archive (hereafter OBA), newspaper collection, *Die OB*, 7 April 1943.

[201] OBA, DJM Cronjé Collection, Box 1, File 5/4, *Die Ossewa-Brandwag: Vanwaar en Waarheen*, 36.

[202] C Blignaut & K du Pisani, '"Om die Fakkel Verder te Dra": Die Rol van die Jeugvleuel van die Ossewa-Brandwag, 1939–1952', *Historia*, 54, 2 (2009), 155.

[203] OBA, newspaper collection, *Die OB*, 27 August 1952.

[204] Marx, *Oxwagon Sentinel*, 553.

[205] Die OB Circle of Friends (or OB-Vriendekring in Afrikaans) was formed in April 1952 in the western Cape area and the group mostly met and operated in this part of South Africa. The group was led by WR Laubscher and M van Rooyen, both former OB members, who also played a prominent role in the formation of the group. Apart from arranging social events from time to time and organising fund-raising endeavours to assist with the payment and upkeep of the Amajuba farm, the group did not really affect the lives of former OB members. For this reason, the focus of this article is on the BOPG rather than the OB Circle of Friends; however, the Circle of Friends should at least be mentioned and considered as one other group that outlasted the OB. For more information on the OB Circle of Friends, see OBA, J Corin Collection, Box 1, File 1/3, "OB-vriendekring Geskiedenis"; and OBA, WR Laubscher Collection, Box 1, File 1/2, "OB-Vriendekring".

[206] Although the BOPG already existed before the official disbandment of the OB, it far outlasted the OB. It also provided an opportunity for many individuals with ties to the OB to meet up and rekindle old friendships that were formed during the OB years. OBA, unpublished pamphlet by HM Robinson, *'n Perspektief op die Uitstalling*, 10.

[207] OBA, BOPG Collection, Box 8, BOPG Minute Book, Minutes of the first BOPG general meeting held in Pretoria, 22 April 1946.

[208] OBA, *Dankie*, 1, 2 (1961), 11.

[209] OBA, *Dankie*, 1, 2 (1961), 11.

[210] OBA, BOPG collection, Box 8, BOPG Minute Book, Minutes of the first BOPG general meeting held in Pretoria, 22 April 1946. Van Rensburg remained the honorary president until his death in 1966, after which the BJ Vorster became the honorary president of the organisation. OBA, *Dankie*, 7, 1–2 (1967).

[211] OBA, *Dankie*, 1, 1 (1960), 21.

[212] This suggestion was made by the executive council of the BOPG, and printed in the official mouthpiece of the organisation, see OBA, *Dankie*, 1, 4 (1961), 7–8, 18.

[213] OBA, *Dankie*, 1, 4 (1961), 7–8, 18.

[214] OBA, *Dankie*, 4, 1 (1964), 2. Translated from Afrikaans.

[215] OBA, *Dankie*, 17, 2 (1977), 3. Translated from Afrikaans.

[216] OBA, *Dankie*, 4, 1 (1964), 2. Translated from Afrikaans.

[217] OBA, Grootraad Collection, Box 1, File 2/9, Ossewabrandwag Constitution, Article IV (5), c. 1940.

[218] OBA, BOPG Collection, Box 1, File 2, "Korrespondensie: Stigting van BOPG". Correspondence between BOPG members, 1 August 1947, 24 August 1947.

[219] OBA, BOPG Collection, Box 1, File 2, "Korrespondensie: Stigting van BOPG". Correspondence between BOPG members, 1 August 1947. Translated from Afrikaans.

[220] OBA, BOPG Collection, Box 8, BOPG Minute Book, Minutes of the BOPG conference of 4 October 1947, held in Pretoria. Translated from Afrikaans.

[221] OBA, BOPG Collection, Box 8, BOPG Minute Book, 5. Minutes of the BOPG conference of 4 October 1947, held in Pretoria.

[222] OBA, photo collection, record number F00513_1.

[223] OBA, BOPG Collection, Box 1, File 2, "Korrespondensie: Stigting van BOPG". Correspondence between BOPG members, 9 August 1947. Translated from Afrikaans.

[224] OBA, book collection, record number A8393.

[225] All four objectives are stated in the BOPG's official constitution. OBA, BOPG Collection, Box 8, BOPG Minute Book, Constitution of the BOPG. The quote is translated from Afrikaans, original Afrikaans: "Om die geskiedenis van die internering en kampe op boek te stel".

[226] OBA, *Dankie*, 1, 1 (1960), 10.

[227] Department of Defence Archives (hereafter DOD Archives), Army Intelligence Group, Box 49, File I:43(H), Subversive Activities (Sabotage and Treason), report, 1 October 1942.

[228] OBA, *Dankie*, 2, 2 (1962), 25. Translated from Afrikaans.

[229] OBA, BOPG Collection, Box 1, File 2, "Korrespondensie: Stigting van BOPG". Correspondence between BOPG members, 3 May 1948. Translated from Afrikaans.

[230] OBA, BOPG Collection, Box 8, BOPG Minute Book, 3. Minutes of the first BOPG general meeting held in Pretoria, 22 April 1946.

[231] This quote appears prominently and regularly in interviews with BOPG members and in the BOPG's official newsletter, *Dankie*. For some examples, see OBA, *Dankie*, 5, 3 (1965), 4; *Dankie*, 25, 1 (1985), 13 and *Dankie*, 25, 1 (1985), 24; OBA, interview transcriptions, tape number 109, 1985, "Mededelings deur Mnr. Leonard Johannes Marais van Bloemfontein", 16.

[232] Including *Agter Tralies en Doringdraad*, which is discussed regularly between 1965 and 1985 in various editions of *Dankie*.

[233] OBA, *Dankie*, 5, 3 (1965), 13; *Dankie*, 6, 1 (1966), 42–43; *Dankie*, 7, 1 (1967), 4, 24; *Dankie*, 7, 2 (1967), 11–12; *Dankie*, 8, 1 (1968), 4–5, 11–12, 27–28, 47; *Dankie*, 8, 2 (1968), 8, 14, 17, 43; *Dankie*, 9, 1 (1969), 11–12, 39, 45; *Dankie*, 9, 2 (1969), 4, 11; *Dankie*, 10, 1 (1970), 20, 32; *Dankie*, 10, 2 (1970), 8, 15; *Dankie*, 11, 1 (1971), 15; *Dankie*, 12, 1 (1972), 15, 20; *Dankie*, 13, 1 (1973), 7; *Dankie*, 15, 1 (1975), 10, 17, 22; *Dankie*, 15, 2 (1975), 32, 36, 39–41; *Dankie*, 16, 1 (1976), 14, 28–29; *Dankie*, 16, 2 (1976), 13–14, 28–29, 38; *Dankie*, 18, 1 (1978), 11; *Dankie*, 19, 1 (1979), 3, 20; *Dankie*, 20, 1 (1980), 3, 37, 39, 44, 46; *Dankie*, 22, 1 (1982), 29; *Dankie*, 23, 1 (1983), 35; *Dankie*, 25, 1 (1985), 47–49.

234 OBA, Assistent Kommandant Generaal (hereafter AKG) Collection 3/18/34, Folio 4, "Boerejeug". Newsletter 4/44, 14 June 1944.

[235] OBA, *Dankie*, 23, 1 (1983), 27–28.

[236] OBA, *Dankie*, 23, 1 (1983), 27–28; OBA, *Dankie*, 16, 2 (1976), 13–14.

[237] OBA, interview transcriptions, tape number 215, 1977, LM Fourie and H Anderson interview, 4–5.

[238] OBA, *Dankie*, 23, 1 (1983), 7.

[239] In this context, "our" refers to BOPG members. OBA, *Dankie*, 23, 1 (1983), 35. Translated from Afrikaans.

[240] OBA, BOPG Collection, Box 1, File 2, "Korrespondensie: Stigting van BOPG". Correspondence between BOPG members, 6 December 1947. Translated from Afrikaans.

[241] OBA, BOPG Collection, Box 8, BOPG Minute Book, Minutes of the BOPG meeting of 15 November 1947, Pretoria. Translated from Afrikaans.

[242] OBA, BOPG Collection, Box 8, BOPG Minute Book, Minutes of the BOPG meeting of 15 November 1947, Pretoria. Translated from Afrikaans.

[243] OBA, BOPG Collection, Box 1, File 2, "Korrespondensie: Stigting van BOPG". Correspondence between BOPG members, 6 December 1947. Translated from Afrikaans.

[244] OBA, BOPG Collection, Box 1, File 2, "Korrespondensie: Stigting van BOPG". Correspondence between BOPG members, 5 January 1948. Translated from Afrikaans.

[245] OBA, BOPG Collection, Box 1, File 2, "Korrespondensie: Stigting van BOPG". Correspondence between BOPG members, 5 January 1948. Translated from Afrikaans.

[246] OBA, BOPG Collection, Box 1, File 2, "Korrespondensie: Stigting van BOPG". Correspondence between BOPG members, 15 January 1948. Translated from Afrikaans.

[247] OBA, BOPG Collection, Box 1, File 2, "Korrespondensie: Stigting van BOPG". Correspondence between BOPG members, 3 May 1948.

[248] OBA, BOPG Collection, Box 1, File 2, "Korrespondensie: Stigting van BOPG". Correspondence between BOPG members, 30 December 1947.

[249] For more information on the names and locations of Second World War internment camps in South Africa, see Fokkens, *The Role and Application of the Union Defence Force*, 115–118.

[250] OBA, BOPG Collection, Box 1, File 2, "Korrespondensie: Stigting van BOPG". Correspondence between BOPG members, 6 December 1947.

[251] OBA, BOPG Collection, Box 1, File 2, "Korrespondensie: Stigting van BOPG". Correspondence between BOPG members, 3 June 1948.

[252] OBA, BOPG Collection, Box 1, File 2, "Korrespondensie: Stigting van BOPG". Correspondence between BOPG members, 3 June 1948. Translated from Afrikaans.

[253] I Raubenheimer, 'Aanbevelingswoord', in HG Stoker (ed.), *Agter Tralies en Doringdraad* (Stellenbosch: Pro Ecclesia, 1953), vi. Translated from Afrikaans.

[254] Raubenheimer, 'Aanbevelingswoord', vi. Translated from Afrikaans.

[255] OBA, BOPG Collection, Box 29, File 144, Official song of the BOPG ("Bond se lied"). The original Afrikaans lyrics are included to retain the lyric and poetic nature of the song.

[256] OBA, interview transcriptions, tape number 1, undated, HL Pretorius interview, 12.

[257] Olivier, *"A Special Kind of Colonist"*, 26.

[258] OBA, *Dankie*, 5, 3 (1965), 16–18.

[259] OBA, *Dankie*, 6, 2 (1966), 24.

[260] See for example OBA, *Dankie*, 9, 2 (1969), 18–19. The war museum in Bloemfontein also initially collected items related to the internment camps; however, this initiative was later completely taken over by the PU for CHE.

[261] OBA, *Dankie*, 16, 1 (1976), 15; OBA, interview transcriptions, tape number 119, 1976, J Ackermann interview, 1. This decision was possibly motivated by the fact that the PU for CHE already had numerous artefacts and documents in their possession at this point. One of the last decisions made by the OB before its official dissolution was to donate all the organisation's documents and records to the PU for CHE's Ferdinand Postma Library. For more information on the transfer of the records to the PU for CHE, see OBA, BOPG Collection, Box 18, File 83/3, "Ontbindingsfunksie", 12 October 1985; OBA, unpublished pamphlet by HM Robinson, *'n Perspektief op die Uitstalling*, 1–12; E Kleynhans, 'Documenting Afrikaner Fascism: A Historical Overview of the Ossewabrandwag Archive'. Paper presented at the Historical Association of South Africa (HASA), HASA / HGSA Biennial Conference, Thaba Nchu, 20–22 June 2018.

[262] OBA, *Dankie*, 16, 1 (1976), 3.

[263] OBA, BOPG Collection, Box 8, BOPG Minute Book, 453. Minutes of the BOPG conference of 4 October 1947. Translated from Afrikaans.

[264] After the death of JM Ackermann in 1981, for example, the organisation's membership radically declined and finding a safe place for its documents became even more important. OBA, *Dankie*, 21, 1 (1981), 14.

[265] OBA, BOPG Collection, Box 8, BOPG Minute Book, 430. Report by the chairman of the BOPG, 6 October 1984. These reasons were also published in *Dankie*, see OBA, *Dankie*, 24, 1 (1984), 7.

[266] All four goals are stated in the official constitution of the BOPG, see OBA, BOPG Collection, Box 8, BOPG Minute Book, 1.

[267] J Tosh, *The Pursuit of History: Aims, Methods and New Directions in the Study of History* (London: Routledge, 2015), 15–17.

[268] N Roos, 'The Springbok and the Skunk: War Veterans and the Politics of Whiteness in South Africa during the 1940s and 1950s', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 35, 3 (2009), 657–658.

[269] The Afrikaans term "volksfeeste" is a better description. At these events, traditional Afrikaner dancing took place and traditional food was served, with the aim of continuing the "ossewa-gees" born out of the 1938 centenary celebrations.

[270] DOD Archives, Adjutant-General (3)154, Box 469, File 361/4, Civilians Subversive Activities – Ossewa-Brandwag, Method and Organization of the Ossewa-Brandwag, 17 July 1941.

[271] DOD Archives, Army Intelligence Group, Box 50, File I:44(B), SA Troops Morale, November 1941.

[272] OBA, *Dankie*, 17, 2 (1977), 3.

[273] OBA, *Dankie*, 2, 2 (1962), 14. "Die Eiland" refers to Van Rensburg's farm in the Parys area. The farm was bought by OB supporters and gifted to Van Rensburg. For more information, see H van Rensburg, *Their Paths Crossed Mine* (Cape Town: Central News Agency, 1956), 166–268.

[274] See for example OBA, *Dankie*, 2, 2 (1962), 14.

[275] OBA, photo collection, record number F01334/1.

[276] Tosh, *The Pursuit of History*, 16.

[277] OBA, *Dankie*, 2, 2 (1962), 25; and OBA, BOPG Collection, Box 1, File 2, "Korrespondensie: Stigting van BOPG". Correspondence between BOPG members, 3 May 1948.

[278] OBA, interview transcriptions, tape number 1, undated, HM Robinson and HL Pretorius interview, 12.

[279] OBA, Grootraad Collection, Box 1, File 2/9, Ossewabrandwag Constitution, Article IV (5), c. 1940.

[280] A similar study has been done on the Zonderwater Italian prisoner-of-war camp by Donato Somma, who analysed the role of music in the lives of the prisoners of war in the camp during their detainment; see D Somma, 'Music as Discipline, Solidarity and Nostalgia in the Zonderwater Prisoner of War Camp of South Africa', *SAMUS: South African Music Studies*, 30, 1 (2010), 71–85.

[281] Roos, *Ordinary Springboks*; Roos, 'The Springbok and the Skunk'.

[282] For a more detailed discussion of all the factors that contributed to the demise of the OB, see Marx, *Oxwagon Sentinel*, 530–554.

[283] As explained, this quote appears prominently and regularly in interviews with BOPG members and in the BOPG's official newsletter. For some examples, see OBA, *Dankie*, 5, 3 (1965), 4; *Dankie*, 25, 1 (1985), 13 and *Dankie*, 25, 1 (1985), 24; OBA, interview transcriptions, tape number 109, 1985, "Mededelings deur Mnr. Leonard Johannes Marais van Bloemfontein", 16.

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Liberal Internationalism, Offensive Realism and Intelligence Liaison: The Case of the Israeli and South African Intelligence Services[284]

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Abstract

For better or worse, the study of International Relations continues to be marked by a protracted battle between two competing theories: offensive realism and liberal internationalism. The study on which this article is based, sought to investigate which theory – offensive realism or liberal internationalism – offers the most compelling explanation for the alliance formation between the intelligence services of Israel and those of South Africa. In doing so, the study acknowledged the nuanced and multifaceted nature of intelligence liaison within the broader framework of statecraft and foreign policy. Although scholars have indeed examined the explanatory merit of offensive realism and liberal internationalism in explaining the foreign policy behaviour of (liberal) democratic and mixed (democratic and non-democratic) dyads, attempts at bringing the two theories to bear on the interactions of intelligence services have not been forthcoming, a shortcoming the current study attempted to address. This article therefore seeks to bridge this gap by presenting an evaluation of the relative explanatory worth of offensive realism and liberal internationalism in accounting for the alliance formation of the intelligence services of Israel and those of South Africa. The significance of the study lies in its examination of international politics and realist thought within the realm of intelligence services. Throughout the article, we use "intelligence services" and "intelligence" interchangeably. This approach helps bridge a gap in the existing literature by exploring the applicability of offensive realism and liberal internationalism in explaining alliances between Israel and South Africa's intelligence services.

Keywords: Offensive Realism, Liberal Internationalism, Alliance Formation, Intelligence Services, Foreign Policy

Introduction

Do states have no permanent friends in the international system, and should we "pay attention to what policymakers are saying or what they are doing"? The aim of the current study was to determine whether there is an interconnection between what states stand for

in their policy formulation on the one hand, and their actual actions in the international system on the other, and whether "friends" truly exist in the system. To achieve this, the study examined whether offensive realism, proposed by John Mearsheimer, or liberal internationalism offers the most compelling explanation for the formation of an alliance between the foreign intelligence services of Israel and those of South Africa.[287] While scholars have indeed examined the explanatory merit of realism and liberal internationalism in explaining the foreign policy behaviour of (liberal) democratic and mixed (democratic and non-democratic) dyads, there is a lack of research on the interactions of foreign intelligence services. This article therefore seeks to address this gap by evaluating the relative explanatory value of offensive realism and liberal internationalism in accounting for the formation of an alliance between the intelligence services of Israel and those of South Africa.

It is, however, important to indicate that there were limitations to the study. Firstly, the availability of information on intelligence issues is notoriously problematic. Nevertheless, the current research was enforced by the rule "check and check again" (with this in mind, corroboration was important). Secondly, at times, intelligence services may pursue interests separate from, or even in direct opposition to, foreign affairs departments or the government of the day.[288] Such cases are, however, rare. Consider, for instance, that in their review of United States (US) intelligence practices during the 1970s, the 1976 Report of the House Select Committee on Intelligence (better known as the Pike Committee Report) found that '[a]ll evidence in hand suggests that the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency], far from being out of control, had been utterly responsive to the instructions of the President and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs'.[289] Moreover, in the majority of cases scrutinised in this study, the government of the day – whether that be in the case of Israel or (apartheid) South Africa – was acutely aware of the behaviour of their respective intelligence services. In cases where intelligence services pursue interests separate from the government of the day, the interests of the intelligence services are, moreover, likely to strengthen the case of offensive realism.

The article is structured as follows: in the first section, 'Foreign Policy: Rhetoric of States', the concept "foreign policy" is discussed, and theoretical insights from both liberal internationalism and offensive realism are provided. The second section, 'Intelligence Services, Offensive Realism and Liberal Internationalism' focusses on the important role intelligence services play. The third section, 'Into the Future we go: Expectations of Liberal Internationalism, Offensive Realism and Intelligence Services', reports on the potential outcomes of intelligence services adhering to either theory. The fourth section examines the Mossad alliance formation with the Bureau of State Security (BOSS) and the National Intelligence Service (NIS) during the apartheid era. This is followed by an analysis of the intelligence liaison between Mossad (i.e. the national intelligence agency of Israel) and the *State Security Agency* (SSA) in the post-apartheid era. Finally, the conclusion presents the findings of the study and an evaluation of whether the formation of an alliance between the Israeli and South African (SA) foreign intelligence services aligns with the theoretical arguments of liberal internationalism or offensive realism.

Foreign Policy: Rhetoric of States

Defining the concept "foreign policy" with absolute precision is challenging due to the diversity of interests, actors, decision-making processes, instruments and outcomes related to the concept. While no single overarching definition exists, this article provides two definitions to highlight certain common features. In addition, the article offers theoretical insights from both liberal internationalism and offensive realism to enhance our understanding of foreign policy.

Defining the term "foreign policy" is not easy, even though it is a common concept in contemporary International Relations (IR) discourse. Various theorists and theoretical perspectives offer different views and definitions of the term. Below are two examples:

> Foreign policy is the system of activities evolved by communities for changing the behaviour of other states and for adjusting their own activities to the international environment.[290]

> Foreign policy analysis focuses on the intentions, statements and actions of an actor – often, but not always, a state – directed toward the external world and the response of other actors to these intentions, statements and actions.[291]

Vale and Mphaisha propose that, in its most general form, foreign policy can be defined as 'the sum total of all activities by which international actors [including intelligence services] act, react and interact with the environment beyond their national borders'.[292] On his part, Landsberg states that foreign policy is a branch or subset of policy, and defines policy as:

> [A] purposive or goal-oriented course of action, pursued by decision-makers of a state, based on sets of social values, to solve problems on matters of public concern, on the basis of clear goals to be achieved.[293]

Foreign policy is therefore a planned course of action and strategies by the decision-makers of one state vis-à-vis those of another state in the external milieu.

From these two definitions, it can be deduced that there are four common features of foreign policy. Du Plessis proposes that, in the first instance, foreign policy is primarily viewed as an official governmental activity where the inter-state relations of one country vis-à-vis those of other states within the international system are manifested. This view is traditionally associated with state-centric realism where the dominant position of the sovereign state in an anarchic world system is emphasised. The second feature is that foreign policy is both an action (or initiative) and a reaction (or response) directed at the external milieu. The operational framework of foreign policy therefore transcends territorial sovereign borders. Thirdly, foreign policy involves a series of activities that result in decisions and actions pertaining to the pursuit of social values, interests and objectives. Lastly, the purpose of foreign policy is to create, control, adjust and alter external problems or issues, including those of the initiating actor or those of other actors involved.[294]

In the next section, the researchers endeavour to establish a distinction between the perspectives of liberal internationalism and offensive realism regarding the foreign policy of a state.

Liberal Internationalism

Jackson and Sørensen identify five values that underpin any (liberal) democracy, namely freedom, responsibility (accountability), tolerance, social justice, and equality of opportunity. In line with these values, liberal internationalism believes that any government in a (liberal) democracy desires to stay in office.[295] Consequently, Drezner argues that it would be foolish for a (liberal) democratic government to pursue a foreign policy that contravenes these liberal principles. For this reason, liberal internationalists confirm that realism is ill-suited to foreign policy of (liberal) democracies.[296] Doyle, for instance, asserts:

> [I]n (liberal) democracies, public policy derives its legitimacy from its concordance with liberal principles. Policies not rooted in liberal principles generally fail to sustain long term public support.[297]

The belief that (liberal) democracies hold different sets of values with regard to foreign policy issues from those held by realpolitik statesmen is predicated on the norms that deviate from the democratic peace argument. Ultimately, the majority of the populations of (liberal) democracies are likely to trust fellow (liberal) democratic countries and to prefer co-operation to self-help.[298]

Further, (liberal) democracies are likely to show strong support for international institutions as a source for promoting democracy and economic interdependence among states.[299] It is also expected that (liberal) democracies would support international institutions with military missions, such as humanitarian interventions and multilateral peacekeeping, as a source to promote peace and liberal norms in the international system.[300] Policies that are in contrast with liberal values – alliances with unsavoury regimes, or tolerance of human rights abuses to advance the national interest – should register significant opposition.[301]

With regard to the approach of (liberal) democracies to foreign economic policy, Gartzke et al. believe that these countries will realise that free trade is a win-win situation where all participating countries benefit. They will also realise that economic interdependence is a force of peace in the international system.[302] Because (liberal) democratic citizens are predicted to care more about absolute gains than about relative gains, there should be majority support for any liberalising measures, given that the economic benefits outweigh the costs.[303]For that reason, (liberal) democracies will pursue and promote laissez-faire policies rather than conflict and war in their foreign policy.

In conclusion, according to liberal internationalism, the foreign policy priorities and worldview of (liberal) democracies are that they are cautiously optimistic with regard to the international system. These countries will pursue national interest through international law and they will strive to promote democracy and human rights in the international system.

With regard to the justification and support for the use of force, (liberal) democracies will only use force in self-defence, humanitarian intervention, and the promotion of democratic regime change. On the subject of foreign economic policy, (liberal) democracies indicate the importance of absolute gains and the support for economic interdependence.

Offensive Realism

Mearsheimer, on the other hand, is pessimistic about the foreign policy of states. Because states live in a Hobbesian international system – i.e. they exist in a competitive and potentially conflict-prone environment – Mearsheimer believes that the top priority in the foreign policy of any state would be preserving its territorial integrity, the security of the homeland, and regional hegemony.[304] For this reason, it is impossible for governments to trust one another fully; thus, forcing all states to be guided solely by national interest.[305] Regarding international institutions, offensive realism believes that such institutions do not play a significant role in the international system. States will justify their actions through self-defence if there is any violation of their sovereignty. States will also use force to contain rising powers and will endure the costs if the adversary suffers.

When looking at foreign economic policy, offensive realism holds that states must be well aware of and understand the distribution of gains accruing from economic co-operation. Offensive realism is wary of the interdependence that could come from a liberal economic order, even if economic integration leads to a balanced distribution of gains. For offensive realism, vulnerability is just a substitute for interdependence, and a loss of economic autonomy together with heightened interstate frictions is employed. Consequently, "will both gain?" is not the question offensive realism asks; instead, it is, "who will gain most?"[306]

One may assume that, through speeches and policy documents, policymakers make their intentions clear. However, according to Mearsheimer, this statement is problematic because policymakers sometimes lie about their true intentions.[307] Since all states operate in an anarchic world, which forces them to provide for their own security, Mearsheimer asserts that the paramount reason leaders lie to their foreign audiences is to gain strategic advantage for their own country. States could thus maximise their prospect for survival by gaining power at the expense of their rivals. They may, however, also use deception. This would entail lying to achieve an advantage over a potential adversary. In a dangerous world, leaders would do whatever is necessary to ensure the survival of their own country.[308]

Mearsheimer identifies "liberal lies" as one of the techniques used by leaders in (liberal) democracies to justify their actions. Liberal lies are designed to cover up the behaviour of a state when it contradicts the well-developed body of liberal norms that is widely accepted around the world and codified in international law. Liberal democracies – and all other kinds of countries – sometimes act brutally towards other states, or they form alliances with particularly dubious states. When this is the case, the leader of such state will devise a story to tell the people of that state – or the whole world – in an attempt to disguise their illiberal actions with this fabricated idealistic rhetoric.[309] In short, elites

usually act like realists and talk like liberals, which invariably necessitates lying. For this reason, Mearsheimer believes that 'one should be very suspicious of the words that come out of the mouths of policy makers'.[310]

Intelligence Services, Offensive Realism and Liberal Internationalism

Intelligence services comprise one of the oldest professions in the world, and are the key to understanding international relations, global politics, and terrorism fully.[311] Warner defines intelligence services as a specific form of information and an essential aid that allows policymakers to make effective decisions and provide timely warning of events in which the specific government wishes to participate.[312] Intelligence is however also a form of power that plays a crucial part in "hyper-powerness", which allows states to project military force on a global basis, allowing them to dominate.[313] The term "intelligence" has been used broadly in three different ways:

- Intelligence can be seen as a **process**, which policymakers or operational commanders request, then collect, analyse, and feed the consumers.[314] In the definition of intelligence reports, "intelligence" refers to the proceedings of intelligence services, including human resources, assets, and financial management.[315]
- Intelligence can also be defined as a **product**. In the past, intelligence was circulated as a piece of paper, but in the contemporary world, the highly confidential information is distributed by means of multilevel secure electronic databases.[316]
- Intelligence services can be seen as **institutions** to deliver diverse services to government.[317]

The above involve efforts to shape the world in addition to merely reporting about it.[318] We must therefore remember that denial is 'the black art' all governments and intelligence services have been perfected a long time ago. Intelligence services are therefore the very opposite of the dictum that gentlemen do not read one another's mail.[319]

From what has been articulated above, one must remember that there is a definite link between foreign policy and intelligence services. Good quality intelligence and sound political strategising form the basis of successful foreign policy. Historical experiences have however shown that achieving this alignment is not always easy. Consider, for instance, the CIA assessment of the Iraqi possession of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) during the lead-up to the Iraq War in 2003. Although the assessment was a crucial factor influencing foreign policy decisions, the accuracy of the assessment was later called into doubt exposing a mismatch between the intelligence given and the real situation in the field. This misalignment had consequences for the US foreign policy goals and its reputation among nations.[320] One can therefore not help but ask, 'What are the perspectives of liberal internationalism and offensive realism toward covert operations?'

One of the most powerful liberal internationalist contributions that added to the debate on alliance formation in the international system is the democratic peace theory. Democratic

peace theorists, such as Doyle, strongly believe that, if an illegitimate alliance (i.e. intelligence alliance between a [liberal] democratic state and a non-democratic state) had been formed covertly, it does not prove liberal internationalism wrong because citizens of that specific country were not aware of the 'strange bedfellows'. According to offensive realism, 'logic flies in the face of the widely held belief in the West that liberal democracies behave differently'[321] in initiating covert action than that of non-democratic states. Non-democratic states, as the argument goes, 'are the real threat to the rules-based order and more generally the chief obstacle to create a peaceful world'[322]. But this is not how international politics works. Regime type matters little in a self-help world where states constantly worry about their survival.[323] The United States is the oldest (liberal) democratic state, for example, but its leaders formed close alliances with non-democratic states. Whether it was the alliance by George H Bush and the CIA with the Panama military dictator, Manual Noriega, in 1989, or the alliance by George W Bush and the CIA with Jordan, Egypt, Uzbekistan and Syria of hosting black sites, [324]these relations were established covertly to protect the respective administrations from potential public backlash. Even though both Presidents George H Bush and George W Bush were democratically elected by the public, they chose to deviate from the very liberal norms that underpinned their foreign policy. According to offensive realism, there is therefore little room for trust among states in the international system, and alliances are only temporary marriages of convenience: today's alliance partner might be tomorrow's enemy.

Into the Future We Go: Expectations of Liberal Internationalism, Offensive Realism and Intelligence Services

One needs to remember that, while the intelligence community serves the interests of politics, it does have a fair amount of autonomy. The purpose of this section is therefore to discuss the outcomes of intelligence services if they conform to the theory of liberal internationalism or offensive realism. The expectations that follow were not arrived at haphazardly, but derive from an examination of the theories advanced in this article.

Actions of intelligence services through the lens of liberal internationalism

When analysing the actions of intelligence services through the lens of liberal internationalism, the following characteristics can be expected:

- Relations between intelligence services will predominantly be based on ideological considerations, and the pursuit of national security will predominately proceed through the prism of liberal ideology;
- A high degree of trust among intelligence services from (liberal) democracies should be evident;
- A high degree of mutual respect will exist among the intelligence services of (liberal) democracies;
- There will be co-operation between the intelligence services of (liberal) democracies to prevent external or internal dangers;
- Important information will be shared with one another, especially those concerning dangers to one another's vital interests;

- There will be alliances between liberal democratic intelligence services;
- The intentions of one group would be clear to their allies; and
- The foreign policy rhetoric and the actions of intelligence services will correspond.

Actions of intelligence services through the lens of offensive realism

In contrast, when viewing actions of intelligence services through the lens of offensive realism, different characteristics emerge:

- Relations between different intelligence services will be based on interest, and not on ideological considerations;
- Intelligence services will regard national security as being a primary objective;
- Intelligence services will throw each other to the wolves to excel in the international system;
- There will be little room for trust because of the uncertainty with regard to each other's intentions;
- There is a possibility of temporary alliances;
- Leaders will tell liberal lies to justify realist actions of intelligence services; and
- Rhetoric of foreign policy will not correspond with the actions of intelligence services.

Formation of an Intelligence Alliance between Israel and South Africa

The cases of Israel and post-apartheid South Africa present us with examples of (liberal) democracies. Although some observers might question the inclusion of Israel as a (liberal) democracy, Michael Doyle, the pre-eminent proponent of liberal international thought (particularly democratic peace theory), forthrightly codes Israel as a *liberal* democracy since 1949.[325] There is, accordingly, nothing controversial in including Israel and post-apartheid South Africa as (liberal) democracies. Although Amstutz classifies apartheid South Africa as a 'partial liberal democratic state',[326] it is patently obvious that apartheid South Africa fell far short of the essential features of a (liberal) democratic state.[327]

What do we gain by including these two (liberal) democracies (to wit Israel and post-apartheid South Africa) and one non-democratic state (i.e. apartheid South Africa) in this article? The inclusion of apartheid South Africa as one of the cases to be probed provides us with a hard test for both theories. If liberal internationalism is correct, Israel and post-apartheid South Africa would act in a similar fashion, with no discernible difference in foreign policy rhetoric and outcomes among the intelligence services of the three states (Israel, non-democratic apartheid South Africa, and post-apartheid South Africa), as against this, apartheid South Africa would have acted in markedly different ways; thus, following a realist script. On the other hand, if offensive realism is correct, the cases (Israel, apartheid South Africa and post-apartheid South Africa) would act in markedly similar ways, regardless of the differences in political ideology.[328]

As we explore the intricate interplay between foreign policy rhetoric and intelligence co-operation, it becomes clear that the relationship is seldom as clear-cut as a matter of overt and covert strategies. As opposed to solely viewing these terms through a black-

and-white lens, it is important to point out that the study, on which this article is based, acknowledged the need for a nuanced analytical framework right from the start. Even though the researchers initially discussed perspectives of liberal internationalism and offensive realism in terms of foreign policy, it is of the utmost importance to recognise that real-world situations often lead to intricate scenarios that challenge simple categorisation. Against this backdrop, the purpose of this section is to focus on the alliance formation between the Israeli and South African intelligence services. After each case study, two primary objectives are pursued:

- Firstly, an attempt is made to determine whether liberal internationalism or offensive realism best describes the logic behind the alliance formed between the intelligence services of these two countries.
- Secondly, the researchers aim to determine whether intelligence services abide by the foreign policy rhetoric of their countries (with specific reference to alliance formation) or whether "they have a chance to establish their own foreign policy"?

The Mossad and BOSS and NIS Alliance (Apartheid Era)[329]

When focussing on the relations between Israel and apartheid South Africa, the 1960s is indeed characterised as an era of the decline of relations between these two countries. According to the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the main factors in this deterioration were 'Israel's moral and principled objection to South Africa's racial policy and political considerations'.[330] Golda Meir, Israeli Foreign Affairs Minister at the time, even depicted Israeli opposition towards apartheid South Africa by delivering a speech at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in which she declared that Israel does not condone apartheid, and pledged that Israel had 'taken all necessary steps to prevent Israeli arms from reaching South Africa, directly or indirectly'.[331] Although she maintained that this is why the relations between the two countries deteriorated, some scholars tend to disagree.[332]

Scholars, such as Sanders, however strongly believe that the SA apartheid policy was not the reason for the deterioration of relations between these two countries.[333] The actual reason is that Israel placed increased importance on its new relations with decolonised African states. According to Polakow-Suransky, the involvement of Israel in instigating relations with the involved African countries was because the Jewish state, unlike the United States and the Soviet Union, did not come with ideological demands nor demanded African states to take sides in the Cold War. As a result, African leaders regarded Israel as a fellow small nation facing comparable challenges.[334] Nevertheless, when these decolonised states decided in 1973, after the Yom Kippur War, to end their relations with Israel, Jerusalem turned to Pretoria in the hope of forming an alliance.[335] However, even though *The Guardian* reported that Israeli relations with South Africa started to strengthen after the Yom Kippur War,[336] there is sufficient evidence, dating back to the 1960s, which suggests that the intelligence services of these two countries already enjoyed a friendly and "understandable" relationship before Golda Meir's speech at the UNGA.[337]

While Meir staunchly advocated in the 1960s that Israel was not a friend of apartheid South Africa, Mossad and the most feared SA arm of the security apparatus, the BOSS,

already had a deep friendship between them.[338] According to Thomas, the BOSS matched Mossad in blackmail, sabotage, forgery, kidnapping, prisoner interrogation, psychological warfare and assassinations. Like Mossad, the BOSS had a free hand in the way it dealt with its opponents.[339] Subsequently, the two intelligence services quickly became bedfellows because they truly believed that both countries 'are situated in a predominantly hostile world inhabited' [by hostile people].[340] Mossad and the BOSS therefore realised that, if both countries were to survive in a hostile world, they needed to help each other with the making of nuclear weapons. The first step had been the export of uranium ore from South Africa to Israel.[341]

Although the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) implemented a policy which stipulated that no uranium oxide of bomb-making proportions would ever be available in the Middle East, this did not stop Mossad.[342] According to Sanders, more than 600 tonnes of uranium oxide were exported to Israel between 1961 and 1976.[343] Thomas stipulates that Mossad and the BOSS were given the responsibility for the numerous export operations. The shipments were carried on commercial EL AL flights from Johannesburg to Tel Aviv, and were listed as 'agricultural machinery'.[344] Rehman and Bukhari add that relations between the two countries became crucial when South Africa allowed Israeli scientists to be present when South Africa tested a crude nuclear device on a remote island in the Indian Ocean.[345] In return, Israel supplied the SA army with substantial quantities of US-manufactured arms.[346]

After the dismantlement of the BOSS in 1980, the NIS became the new foreign intelligence service of South Africa. According to Barnard, Mossad continued to show total discontent with regard to the Israeli non-alignment policy.[347]

> We [i.e. NIS] received excellent information from the Israelis about the political, economic and strategic situation in the Middle East and North Africa and, in turn, we provided information about southern Africa.[348]

In short, Barnard assures the reader that the relations between the NIS and Mossad were not determined by ideological preferences, but rather by the exchange of mutually beneficial information.[349]

Evaluation

As seen in the Israeli foreign policy rhetoric, the country wholly opposed the SA apartheid policy. According to liberal internationalism, the core reason for the Israeli disregard of the SA racial policy and political considerations was therefore, that it was in total contradiction with the Israeli domestic and international policies. If the liberal internationalism argument was therefore, accurate, Israel would not have initiated military[350] or intelligence relations with the apartheid regime. This was, however, not the case.

From an offensive realism point of view, the Israeli foreign policy elites were well aware that there might be a possibility of an international backlash if the news were made public that Israel and apartheid South Africa had initiated a close security relationship. The Israeli government therefore decided to mislead the international community by telling

liberal lies in the hope of secretly facilitating close military and intelligence relations with South Africa. These actions were in accordance with the theoretical argument of offensive realism according to which Mearsheimer articulates, '[w]hen (liberal) democracies form alliances with particularly dubious states, state leaders will try to disguise their illiberal relations with a fabricated idealistic rhetoric'.[351] As seen in Golda Meir's speech at the UNGA, her rhetoric was in contradiction to the beneficial friendship between Mossad and the BOSS. Interestingly, Thomas articulates that, while Meir condemned the SA apartheid policy in the presence of the international community, she was well aware of the close working relationship between the intelligence services of the two countries.[352] Even though the case study presented above suggests that Mossad disregarded the Israeli foreign policy rhetoric towards apartheid South Africa, one cannot help but ask whether other instances existed where Mossad initiated intelligence relations with non-democratic intelligence services. To answer this question, one needs to consider the intelligence relations between Mossad and the Chinese Central Investigations Department (CCP).

At first, the Mossad and CCP regarded one another as adversaries during the late 1950s. In fact, the CCP perceived Israel as a 'pawn in the hands of Washington' as one of the reasons why the CCP and Mossad clashed.[353] However, according to Thomas, this soon changed into a mutually beneficial relationship after both intelligence services agreed that they shared a common interest in curtailing Russian influence on the African continent.[354] The proposal from the CCP to ally against a common enemy, the KGB (the Russian Committee for State Security), was eagerly accepted by Mossad.[355] Thomas articulates that the CCP began sharing information with Mossad about the Arab movement in and out of Africa. Mossad kept its promise, and helped China in Sudan, where the Soviet Union had established strong relations with President Nimeri's military government.[356] When the dictator refused to become completely dependent on the Russians, the KGB however planned a coup. Mossad informed the CCP, who told Nimeri. He immediately expelled all Russian diplomats, and suspended Soviet Bloc aid schemes.[357]

To conclude, the evidence presented above supports Mearsheimer's theoretical argument that 'one should be very suspicious of the words that come out of the mouths of policymakers' and 'today's enemy can be tomorrow's alliance partner'.[358] Not only did Mearsheimer's proposition suggest that Israeli leaders would tell liberal lies to hide their intelligence relations with South Africa and China, but it also argued that states ally on the basis of the convergence of strategic interests.

The Mossad–SSA Intelligence Liaison (Post-Apartheid Era)

When focussing on the post-apartheid SA foreign policy towards Israel, it becomes apparent that the African National Congress (ANC) government has illustrated (on numerous occasions) discontent towards the Jewish State.[359] As a matter of fact, *The Times of Israel* reported that the former SA ambassador to Israel, Ismail Coovadia, accused the Jewish State of practising apartheid.[360] In addition, it would appear that the previous Minister of the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO), Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, followed the same line of argument when she proclaimed, 'the struggle of the people of Palestine is our struggle'. Nkoana-Mashabane concluded,

'[the] ministers of South Africa do not visit Israel currently.[361] Even the Jewish Board of Deputies that we engage with, they know why our ministers are not going to Israel.'[362] If the DIRCO perspective towards Israel was correct, how does one explain the agreement by the SSA to align itself with Mossad on at least two different occasions?

The first occasion occurred in May 2012 when Mossad discovered that Hezbollah (with the support of Iran) was planning an attack in Africa. After Mossad presented the facts to the SA national security elites, IOL News reported that the SSA agreed to co-operate with Mossad to prevent this attack from occurring. 'As a result of this operation, where South Africa also played a very important role, Iranian officials were arrested in Kenya with explosives.'[363]

The second occasion materialised when Mossad informed the SSA that its other concerns in Africa were the Rwandan rebel group, M23; the Somali Islamist militant group, Al Shabaab; and Global Jihad. According to the leaked secret report, SSA officials replied with the assurance 'that the SSA was ready to work together on these issues' but would be motivated by 'more comprehensive information from the start'.[364]

In conclusion, even though the ANC government proclaimed negative rhetoric toward the Israeli government, we cannot deviate from the finding that the SSA is co-operating with Mossad.[365] It would appear that, in the shadowy world of espionage, 'intelligence liaison is valuable because it can be conducted quietly and is not subject to the whimsical dictates of diplomatic posturing'.[366]

Evaluation

These case studies of post-apartheid South Africa are explained much better by offensive realism than liberal internationalism. According to the tenets of offensive realism, SA intelligence relations indicate that we cannot underestimate the truth that intelligence services, no matter the prevailing political ideology, will co-operate with one another to accomplish their own national interests successfully. In fact, there are many instances where SA intelligence services ignored the rhetoric of policymakers and decided to initiate relations with so-called 'dubious states'.[367] Consider, for instance, the SA stance towards the Soviet Union and Russia. After the apartheid struggle, it became evident that the ANC government perceived the Russians as allies in the international system.[368] After all, the Soviets provided valuable assistance to the ANC during the fight against the oppressive apartheid regime.[369] Al Jazeera's revelation that South Africa and Russia are co-operating extensively with each other in the sphere of espionage therefore came as no surprise.[370] The latter behaviour however becomes all the more interesting if we compare it with the accumulated wisdom of Niël Barnard[371]. As the former head of the SA National Intelligence Service, Barnard articulates that, even though the Soviet Union was deemed one of the biggest national security threats to apartheid South Africa, it did not deter the NIS from initiating (in absolute secrecy) 'a mutually beneficial relationship with a country that had once been a sworn enemy'.[372]

To conclude, although there is no nexus between the foreign policies of Israel and South Africa, and the actions of the intelligence services of the two countries, Pateman is of the opinion that, in the world of intelligence services, this is not a new phenomenon. As intelligence services are on the cutting edge of current affairs, 'they have a chance to establish their own foreign policy'.[373]

Conclusion

Based on the historical and more recent cases presented above, one can conclude that the offensive realism argument, i.e. 'there are no real friends or foes, only marriages of convenience'[374], is more suitable in terms of explaining the formation of an intelligence alliance between Israel and South Africa than the opinion of liberal internationalism that (liberal) democratic states regard each other as trustworthy friends in the international system. This goes against the argument posed by liberal internationalism that, in the domain of international politics, (liberal) democratic states are least likely to form alliances with non-democracies because of the conflicting domestic political values and foreign policy interests non-democracies exhibit.

Although the research and application of International Relations theories to Intelligence Studies are limited, it is expected that we will see more co-operation between the Israeli Mossad and the South African SSA due to the emergence of new enemies and terrorist organisations. Because the security and survival of (liberal) democratic states are being threatened by terrorists, such as the Islamic State (IS), Mearsheimer would suggest that we could expect temporary alliances being formed between Mossad, SSA, and other foreign intelligence services with the goal of ensuring state survival in an anarchic international system.

To conclude, what was the key finding of the study on which this article is based?

Early in the article, it was stipulated that liberal internationalism leads us to expect that the ideologies of states inform their interests. For this reason, (liberal) democracies would rather be inclined to form close friendships with one another due to the internal and external values they share. This theoretical argument has however been challenged by the alliance formed between the Israeli Mossad and the SA intelligence services. In the case studies of the Mossad and the BOSS and NIS alliance (apartheid era), and the Mossad–SSA intelligence liaison (post-apartheid era), it was shown that these intelligence services did not hesitate to form close alliances with other states (regardless of the political ideology) to advance their national interests in the international system. In the study, it was established that these alliance formations lean towards the theoretical arguments of offensive realism, namely that the behaviour of states is less likely to be based on the ideology and form of government of other states and more likely to be based on national interest. This finding provides us with a clear answer that, in the world of intelligence, alliance formation is focussed on advancing national interest – regardless of the political ideology of a state.

ENDNOTES

[284] This article stems from the first author's master's dissertation, with the second author acting as the supervisor at the University of the Free State. Mr Swart's MA dissertation was titled 'Is it what you say or is it what you do? Liberal Internationalism, Offensive Realism, and Intelligence Services'.

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[286] Dr Eben Coetzee is the subject head of the Department of Political Studies and Governance at the University of the Free State. He is interested in issues relating to nuclear proliferation, nuclear deterrence, nuclear terrorism, structural realist theory, the nature of theory, and the history and philosophy of science. He has published several accredited articles and book chapters on issues related to nuclear weapons, nuclear deterrence, nuclear terrorism, war, and IR theory. He is an NRF-rated researcher.

[287] The theories used in this article obviously do not exhaust the entire corpus of theoretical knowledge on the alliance formation and foreign policy behaviour of states and their intelligence services. Given, however, the predominance of the two, this article focusses on offensive realism and liberal internationalism, while acknowledging that other theories might also make significant contributions.

[288] G Thomas, *Gideon's Spies: The Inside Story of Israel's Legendary Secret Service* (London: JR Books, 2014).

[289] P Agee, 'Introduction', in GA Diamond (ed), *The Unexpurgated Pike Report: Report of the House Select Committee on Intelligence, 1976* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1976), ix–xvi.

[290] A Du Plessis, 'Foreign policy and diplomacy', in PJ McGowan, S Cornelissen & P Nel (eds), *Power, Wealth and Global Equity: An International Relations Textbook for Africa* (3rd ed.) (Cape Town: University of Cape Town Press, 1999), 119-146.

[291] McGowan *et al*., *Power, Wealth and Global Equity*, 121.

[292] P Vale & CJJ Mphaisha, 'Analysing and Evaluating Foreign Policy', in PJ McGowan, S Cornelissen & P Nel (eds), *Power, Wealth and Global Equity: An International Relations Textbook for Africa* (3rd ed.) (Cape Town: University of Cape Town Press, 1999), 88–102.

[293] C Landsberg, 'Foreign Policy-making in a Post-settlement South Africa', In C Landsberg & A Venter (eds.), *Government and Politics in the New South Africa* (Pretoria: Van Schaik, 2009), 250–267.

[294] A Du Plessis, 'Foreign policy and diplomacy', 121.

[295] R Jackson & G Sørensen, *Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches* (3rd ed.) (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).

[296] DW Drezner, 'The Realist Tradition in American Public Opinion', *Perspectives on Politics*, 6, 1 (2008), 51–70.

[297] MW Doyle, 'Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part 2', *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 12, 4 (1983), 323–353.

[298] Drezner, 'The Realist Tradition', 53–54.

[299] M Lind, 'Global Peace Requires National Sovereignty and a Concept of Great Powers: For Liberal Internationalism', *The Nation*, (2007), 21–24 (July 2, 2007).

[300] M Mandelbaum, 'Foreign Policy as Social Work', *Foreign Affairs*, 72, 5 (1996), 16–32.

[301] Drezner, 'The Realist Tradition', 55.

[302] E Gartzke, Q Li & C Boehmer, 'Investing in the Peace: Economic Interdependence and International Conflict', *International Organization*, 55, 2 (2001), 397–438.

[303] Drezner, 'The Realist Tradition', 55.

[304] Jackson & Sørensen, *Introduction to International Relations*, 60.

[305] Drezner, 'The Realist Tradition', 54.

[306] Drezner, 'The Realist Tradition', 54.

[307] J Mearsheimer, 'Structural Realism', in T Dunne, M Kurki & S Smith (eds.), *International Relations Theory: Discipline and Diversity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 77–92.

[308] JJ Mearsheimer, *Why Leaders Lie: The Truth about Lying in International Politics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).

[309] Mearsheimer, *Why Leaders Lie*, 22–23.

[310] P Schouten, 'Theory Talk #49: John Mearsheimer on Power as the Currency of International Relations, Disciplining US Foreign Policy, and Being an Independent Variable'. Theory Talks, 2012. <http://www.theory-talks.org./2012/06/theory-talk-49.html> [Accessed on 2 May 2015].

[311] Thomas, *Gideon's Spies*, 251.

[312] M Warner, 'Wanted: A Definition of Intelligence', *Studies in Intelligence*, 46, 3 (2002), 15–23.

[313] M Herman, *Intelligence Power in Peace and War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

[314] R Aldrich, 'Intelligence', in P Williams (ed.), *Security Studies: An Introduction* (2nd ed.) (New York: Routledge, 2013), 232–247.

[315] S Africa, *Well-kept Secrets: The Right of Access to Information and the South African Intelligence Services* (Johannesburg: Paarl, 2009).

[316] Aldrich, 'Intelligence', 237.

[317] Aldrich, 'Intelligence', 237.

[318] Aldrich, 'Intelligence', 237.

[319] Thomas, *Gideon's Spies*, 26.

[320] G Kessler, 'The Iraq War and WMDs: An Intelligence Failure or White House Spin?', *The Washington Post*, 22 March 2019. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/03/22/iraq-war-wmds-an-intelligence-failure-or-white-house-spin/> [Accessed on 22 August 2023].

[321] J Mearsheimer, 'Great Power Rivalries: The Case for Realism', Le Monde Diplomatique, August 2023. <https://mondediplo.com/2023/08/02great-powers> [Accessed on 22 August 2023].

[322] J Mearsheimer, 'Great Power Rivalries'.

[323] J Mearsheimer, 'Great Power Rivalries'.

[324] PJ Honigsberg, *Our Nation Unhinged* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009).

[325] MW Doyle, 'Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs', in ME Brown, SM Lynn-Jones & SE Miller (eds.), *Debating the Democratic Peace* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1996), 3–57.

[326] MR Amstutz, *An Introduction to Political Science: The Management of Conflict* (Dallas: Scott, Foresman & Company, 1982).

[327] Even though the historical context of liberal internationalism in South Africa is indeed an interesting historical context, it was not included in this article. However, for readers interested in exploring this topic further, M Cardo, *The Liberal Tradition in South Africa: Past and Present* offers valuable insights into the historical development of liberal beliefs within South Africa.

[328] M Rabie, *Israel and South Africa: The Ties that Bind* (Dearborn: First Publishing Corp, 1988). It is important to point out that the historical connections between apartheid-South Africa and Israel, along with the ANC's alignment with the Palestine Liberation Organization, undoubtedly had an influence on their state relations after apartheid. While this article mainly focusses on specific aspects of (apartheid) South Africa and Israel's intelligence ties, a comprehensive exploration of the historical background and its implications would require a separate and extensive examination. For readers interested in delving into this history, Rabie, *Israel and South Africa: The Ties that Bind* provides a comprehensive analysis of the historical links.

[329] C McGreal, 'Revealed: How Israel Offered to Sell South Africa Nuclear Weapons', *The Guardian*, 24 May 2010. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/may/23/israel-south-africa-nuclear-weapons> [Accessed on 12 April 2016]. On 23 May 2010, *The Guardian* newspaper of London published top secret South African documents revealing that Israel and apartheid South Africa had close military relations in the effort to successfully develop nuclear warheads. These documents also reveal that a secret meeting between then-Defence Minister Shimon Peres and his South African counterpart, PW Botha, ended with an offer by Peres for the sale of warheads "in three sizes". The documents provide the first written evidence that Israel has nuclear weapons despite its policy of ambiguity and neither confirming nor denying their existence. But the Israeli president's office has categorically rejected the acquisitions in the report and released a statement saying that "Israel has never negotiated the exchange of nuclear weapons with South Africa. There exists no Israeli document or Israeli signature on a document that such negotiations took place". Therefore, it is important to emphasise that this case study does not focus on the military relations between Israel and apartheid South Africa, but rather on the co-operation between Mossad and the South African BOSS in successfully exporting yellowcake uranium to Israel.

[330] Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Address by Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Silvan Shalom to the UN General Assembly Special Session to mark the 60th Anniversary of the Liberation of the Concentration Camps*, 2005, 24–28.

[331] Polakow-Suransky, *The Unspoken Alliance: Israel's Secret Relationship with Apartheid South Africa* (Cape Town: Jacana Media, 2010).

[332] Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Address by Deputy Prime Minister*.

[333] J Sanders, *Apartheid's Friends: The Rise of South Africa's Secret Service* (London: John Murray, 2006).

[334] Polakow-Suransky, *The Unspoken Alliance*, 29.

[335] On 6 October 1973, Egyptian and Syrian forces launched a co-ordinated attack against Israel. Taking the Israeli Defence Forces by surprise, Egyptian troops moved deep into the Sinai Peninsula, while Syria struggled to throw occupying Israeli troops out of the Golan Heights. Israel counterattacked and recaptured the Golan Heights. A cease-fire came into effect on 25 October 1973.

[336] McGreal, 'Revealed'.

[337] Thomas, *Gideon's Spies*, 251.

[338] Thomas, *Gideon's Spies*, 251. BOSS was created on 1 May 1969 with the mandate to investigate matters affecting the security of the state, to correlate and evaluate information collected and, where necessary, to inform and advise government, interested government departments and other bodies. However, the Information Scandal in 1978 (where covert funds were used to influence international perceptions of South Africa by purchasing media outlets and publications) resulted in the end of an era for BOSS.

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Transborder Insecurity in the Sahel: Assessing Non-state Actors in Enabling Terrorism in Mali

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Abstract

The study, on which this article is based, sought to examine the role of non-state actors in enabling terrorism and insecurity in Mali. The researchers analysed the insecurity situation in Mali within the broader challenge of insecurity and religious conflict in West Africa. The researchers contend that transhumanism as a migratory pattern, and the porosity of international boundaries along the Sahel region are enabling variables for the insecurity and instability in the country. Although the way transhumanism is practised today might have changed, the methodological approach by which it is carried out has not. However, many argue that the root causes of terrorist acts and violent conflict in post-independence Africa are not the unmet promises to address poverty and unemployment but rather people's experiences of inequality and relative deprivation. This article attempts to clarify some of the critical theoretical issues for which political elites need to look out as they put measures in place to address fundamental challenges the country is facing. The concept of ungoverned spaces is elaborated upon, and the researchers assert that the vast uninhabited spaces in Mali are breeding areas for terrorists with their nefarious activities. The article concludes by suggesting that the Malian government should renegotiate a social compact with the people of Mali and start re-engineering rapprochement between the Malian people and the government.

Keywords: Mali, Insecurity, Armed Conflict, Rebellion, Democracy

Rationale for the Study and Methodology

The first, second and third Tuareg rebellions were experienced between 1962–1964, 1990–1995, and 2007–2009 respectively. The fall of the Gaddafi administration in Libya in 2011 set in motion the fourth Tuareg rebellion in northern Mali in January 2012. In a precipitated move and jolted by the rapid advance of the rebellion towards the capital, Bamako, the military stepped in and deposed a democratically elected government. As the military could not address the challenges posed by the uprising, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, determined that the situation in Mali constituted a threat to international peace and security.[377] The UN declaration set in motion a series of foreign, regional and international efforts to address the security, governance, transitional justice, development, and humanitarian crisis in the country. The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali

(MINUSMA) was created in this regard. The mission of MINUSMA was to:

> Support the establishment of a state of authority throughout Mali, implementation of a transitional road map on the basis of a national political dialogue and an electoral process, the protection of civilians and UN personnel, the protection and promotion of human rights, support for humanitarian assistance and the protection of cultural and historical sites in Mali.[378]

The mandate given to the UN mission in Mali was therefore multidimensional, with an enforcement capability. This would allow the mission to defend itself in the event of an attack.

The current study assessed the motivation, objectives, operational strategy and manifestations of the activities of the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), a Tuareg separatist group, and Ansar Dine, an Islamist group (designated a terrorist organisation by the United States in 2013). While the two groups have their roots in Mali, their objectives of creating an Islamic caliphate in West Africa have necessitated an international coalition to address the security challenges posed by the activities of these two groups.[379] The collapse of the Gadhafi administration in Libya in 2011 and the successful coup d'état in Mali in March 2012 created a power vacuum in the region. Suddenly, vast expanses of land became ungoverned spaces. The coup responded to the lack of strength and initiative displayed by the Malian government to control the post-independence battle against a Tuareg rebellion and the threat of terrorism in the northern part of the country.[380] However, the ungoverned spaces, especially along the Libya–Mali border, facilitated the free flow of arms and light weapons to nomadic Tuareg people who already had an active rebellion against the central government in Mali for greater autonomy. The porous international boundaries in the Sahel region, and the illicit flow of money, arms and light weapons, have sustained the Azawad and Ansar Dine rebellions to date. The uprising also showed signs of transforming into more traditional guerrilla warfare, with rebels hiding in the mountain areas and occasional suicide bombing of military targets.[381] The study equally examined the porosity of international boundaries in the Sahel region and found that measures should be put in place to address the porosity of international borders and mechanisms to manage unoccupied spaces within a polity better.

However, the Sahel region of Africa is generally inhabited by pastoralists whose transhumance activities[382] disregard ethnic, geographical and international borders. Most resort to small arms and light weapons to protect their herd as a protection strategy. Communal conflicts among these pastoralists, the struggle for self-determination, and the activities of Jihadist networks operating in the region have created both the demand and the supply market for small arms and light weapons.[383] The Sahel (the Arabic word for **shore**) stretches for about 4 800 miles (7 725 kilometres) from the Horn of Africa to Senegal, at its broadest, and about 400 miles (644 kilometres) wide at its narrowest point. Although the region cuts across international boundaries, its peculiarity is the similarity and commonality in language, culture and race of the inhabitants. Despite these similarities in culture and race, the region has experienced transboundary threats, such as terrorism,

organised crime, and kidnapping for ransom.[384] The instability in Libya, and the fragile security and political systems in most countries in the region, have led to the flow of small arms and light weapons across international boundaries.

The interface between the flow of small arms and the porous nature of international borders in the region has generated a conflict–insecurity–development nexus, which has led to the prevalence of various forms of violence across the region. This spatial variation and similarity of violence in pastoral spaces have created a fertile ground for the emergence of national, regional and global actors in pursuing their appalling activities. The forming of alliances between local pastoralists and emergent regional, national and international forces can be attributed to three critical fundamental issues:[385]

- First is the remoteness of most pastoralist communities from the centre of economic activities in most of the countries in the region.
- Second, pervasive poverty, rampant unemployment, and the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in the area have caused a high propensity for violence.
- Third, the 'the clash of civilisations'[386] and the need for a particular civilisation to dominate and control the region and create spaces for operationalising their nefarious activities have been the cause of insecurity in the area.

However, the methodology adopted by the current study was the case study, based on two field studies, Cote d'Ivoire and Mali, and a review of relevant literature on insecurity and development challenges in the region. The case study approach comprised administration of a semi-structured questionnaire to state building and role players in the security sector, such as government officials, academia and civil society organisations. Questions were based on intangible variables such as:

- National strategies in reducing poverty, unemployment and inequality;
- Acceptable national conflict prevention strategies;
- Shared and acceptable conflict resolution and management strategies; and
- Common cultural points of reference.

The researchers used purposive sampling in selecting respondents for the study. The lead respondent was instrumental in introducing the research team to other credible actors in the field through the snowballing sample method. Data was collected per the Human Sciences Research Council of South Africa (HSRC) Research Ethics approval guidelines. Emphasis was on respondents who represented the developmental voices in Mali. The data collected were analysed using the content analysis approach. In our analytical narrative, the responses from respondents have been nuanced with the statutory nation-building instruments in Mali.

Using these data collection instruments, the study reflected on the insecurity challenges in Sahel, and assessed why guns have not been silenced in that part of the continent.

Two questions guided the study:

- What are the major stumbling blocks in achieving a conflict-free Africa?
- What needs to be done to ensure that a workable conflict resolution approach can be adopted and adapted in the region?

Primarily, this article demonstrates the findings of the study, namely the devastating consequences of insecurity in the area regarding the impact of the conflict on human security, poverty, employment and the unintended effects on the foundation of the state in the region. The study also established that, because of the persistent security challenges in the area, vital financial resources have been diverted from critical economic sectors, such as health, education, and environmental protection, to the fight against terrorism and organised crimes.

Some of the terrorist groups that have taken advantage of these socioeconomic, security and political challenges in the region to impose their ideological bearings on the people and countries in the area are:

- Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM);
- Boko Haram;
- Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS);
- The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO); and
- Many other splinter groups formed from the above.

The multiplicity and ideological orientation of these groups have complicated counter-insurgency operations, especially where national militaries are already overstretched. Interestingly, the fight against the Islamist groups was further compounded as President Amadou Toumani Touré (ATT) was a fervent supporter of the AQIM, on which he regularly relied to consolidate his power and authority in the northern parts of the country. The reliance on non-state actors by the ATT administration to consolidate state power facilitated the entry into the political arena of narcotic traders from South America. The involvement of narcotic traders provided the necessary financial resources to the ATT administration to address the liquidity challenges the government was experiencing. As a result, Mali became an important transit country for narcotics from many South American countries. The concerns of sub-regional powers were that Mali could become a failed state. While Mali was fast becoming a failed state, the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), a military response to Boko Haram set up by Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria, succeeded in countering the activities of Boko Haram around the Lake Chad area, the same cannot be said of Operation Barkhane in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. The failure of Operation Barkhane mirrored the tense and complex relationship between France and Mali. While the French political leadership was interested in addressing the security challenges posed by AQIM and many other groups in the region, the political groups in Mali were focussed on consolidating state power.

The Sahel region – the long stretch of land between Senegal and Chad and at the confluence between the Sahara Desert and West Africa – has witnessed a myriad of security challenges since the fall of the Gaddafi regime in Libya in 2011. There has

however not been any strong indication – at least not from researchers working in the region – of a link between the security challenges in Libya and insecurity in the Sahel. Although sketchy literature attributes this insecurity to the generalised collapse of the states in North Africa, there is a strong belief that most of the weapons used in the Sahel come from Libya. The political vacuum created in Libya after the fall of the Gaddafi administration, combined with the porous and vast unprotected international boundaries, has made the Sahel region an ideal territory for the operations of armed groups. In most of the countries in the Sahel, allegations of marginalisation and oppression of peripheral ethnic groups, such as the Tuaregs, Moors, Peul, and Fulani, have increased their vulnerability to join some of the armed groups operating in the region to alleviate the plight of the people of Mali.[387]

Transhumance as a Security Threat

Mali is an important country in the Sahel region, and most of its population practise transhumance as a way of life. The pastoralist world, by its very nature, is defined by territoriality, various forms of insecurity, and a lack of development, which together lead to violence in all its forms.[388] In Mali and other countries of the Sahel, pastoralists are still being accommodated at the periphery of the contemporary state structures primarily because their ways of life and the nature of their livelihood structure constantly alienate them from the centre of state activities. The practice of moving livestock from one grazing ground to another in a seasonal cycle, typically from the highlands in the dry season to the valleys and vice versa in the rainy season, has created a strenuous relationship between the pastoralists and farmers. As a result, and in the face of this existential threat to their livelihood, many pastoralist communities take it upon themselves to adopt alternative coping mechanisms, which they avail to community, national, regional and international actors to maintain and preserve their traditional livelihoods.[389] The alternative coping mechanisms include but are limited to transhumance, acquisition and expert utilisation of high-calibre weapons to protect their livestock and their families and to secure grazing lands and routes for livestock. Several clandestine organisations, including Ansar Dine and the Forces Nouvelles in Cote d'Ivoire during the 2010–2011 conflict, use these grazing routes to transport illegal weapons and to trade in contraband.

The implication of the pastoralists in aiding groups to destabilise countries and to weaken and undermine their security can therefore not be overstated. While the role played by pastoralists and expert hunters in aiding the Forces Nouvelles to defeat the government of Laurent Gbagbo in Cote d'Ivoire during the 2010–2011 crisis has been saluted, the role they are playing in Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso is challenged by governments of these countries and the International Community. Although it has been difficult to track the groups that support the pastoralists in carrying out these activities, their actions have been localised and contained considerably.

However, literature dealing with transborder insecurity and organised violence often adopts two contrasting perspectives. First is the from below view, which gives prominence to cross-border traders and transporters, and second is the from above philosophy, which puts the state at the centre of cross-border insecurity in the region.[390] This article however

focusses on the "missing middle" of non-state actors and agencies that have influenced the prevalence and propagation of violence and insecurity in the region. One of the key reasons why the "missing middle" has created spaces through which they operate, sometimes with impunity, is the absence of the state and the loss of power and authority by state services, but also the negotiated governance of the border by the "from below" agency and the "from above" alternative. While considerable financial and human resources have been deployed by states in the region – with the assistance of global partners – to address the recurring insecurity challenges in the area, the situation persists. The greater Maghreb, as well as uprisings in Libya, Tunisia, Sudan, Egypt and Western Sahara that have characterised the Arab geographical spheres, have led directly and indirectly to a complex relationship between security and political dynamics in the region.[391] To a greater extent, this has led to the intervention of the military in the political arena in as many as four countries in the area. The involvement of the military in the political space in Mali, Sudan, Burkina Faso, Guinea Conakry, and – to some degree Chad – has been attributed to the insecurity situation in the region. The key reason has always been that the military would be able to handle the insecurity situation better than the civilian administrations. Unfortunately, the involvement of the military in the political arena of these countries has not yielded the necessary peace dividends. Instead, the African Union and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) have been at the forefront of negotiating an international intervention to address the increasing terrorist attacks in the Sahel.

However, concerns have been raised that response strategies following the French intervention in the Sahel, militarily known as Operation Barkhane, have been discriminatory and repressive towards the local population in the northern part of the Sahel. Many argued that this is the reason for the further escalation of the conflict, as support by the local population for the extremist and armed groups has increased significantly.[392] A significant consequence from the involvement of the military in the political arena in these countries and the persistence of insecurity along the Sahel has been the prevalence of anti-French sentiment. Two key reasons explain this. First, there is a general understanding among the political and security elites in Mali and many other Sahel countries that France, the former colonial master, has not done enough to address poverty, insecurity and inequality in the region. The fundamental reason is that France is a predatory state in the region. They are mining all the strategic natural minerals in the area to benefit French companies and entities, with little or no royalties or beneficiation projects for the local population. Second, since the intervention of the French military in Mali and other Sahel countries, there has been no significant change in the security situation in these countries. Instead, attacks by armed groups have increased with heavy casualties. This anti-French sentiment has manifested in street protests demanding the withdrawal of French forces from the region. It has also strained the relationship between Mali and France, and in July 2022, the French Ambassador in Mali was declared a *persona non grata*.

Literature Review

The insecurity situation in Mali and other West and Central African states needs urgent humanitarian intervention. By all indications and judging by the large number of people

across the continent who require humanitarian assistance, there is a disjuncture between the principles articulated in Article 4 of the Constitutive Act of the African Union on the one hand, and the implementation strategy of the Act on the other. While Article 4(g) stipulates that no other country of the Union should interfere in the internal affairs of another, Article 4(h) of the same Act notes, 'the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State according to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity'. The Act further notes that a member state could request intervention from the Union to restore peace and security. The ambiguously formulated Article 4 of the Constitutive Act, as it pertains to intervention by the African Union in a member state, is perhaps one of the reasons humanitarian protection has been a major challenge on the continent, largely because it is a challenging task to determine what constitutes war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity. Most security challenges in a member state are usually termed internal challenges and the onus would therefore be on the member state to address such challenges. The fundamental challenge would be to understand how the right of intervention is to be interpreted and why the heads of states and of governments thought it necessary to include the right of intervention in a member state in the Constitutive Act of the Union.[393]

Moreover, literature on transborder insecurity in the Sahel is available in abundance, with various reasons why the phenomena have taken a higher proportion in recent years than in the decades preceding independence in 1960. However, few researchers – such as Nyaburi and Massaoud (2019),[394] and Teirila (2014),[395]– provide primary data on the reasons for transborder insecurity in the Sahel. They go as far as to provide credible approaches the international community should take to address such attacks. Overall, the proliferation of violent conflicts on the continent and the inability of most post-colonial African states to resolve these conflicts have necessitated a new agenda or framework for conflict resolution. As Bos and Melissen (2019),[396] Traore and Dabire (2022),[397] and Alemu (2019)[398] note, a new approach to conflict resolution would be incomplete if humanitarian interventions and human security issues are not prioritised. As a result, the well-being of the people affected by the crisis needs to take centre stage; if not, a return to armed conflict is highly probable. Many – including Chabal (2001)[399] and Dalox (2015)[400] argue should be an alternative approach to resolve disputes on the continent should be followed. More importantly, the authors argue that the post-colonial African states have arrogated to themselves the authority of violence as a political instrument. Chabal (2001) and Dalox (2015) insisted that disorder should not be construed merely as a state of dereliction but rather as a condition to address the fundamental role African states should play on the continent. According to Chabal (2001) and Dalox (2015), the disorder could lead to new forms of conversation, which would lead to the development of critical areas of societal advancement. However, the authors do not address how these local conversations would lead to building bridges across communities across Africa.

As Baines and Paddon (2012)[401] note, the time has come for the humanitarian community to reflect on whether material assistance alone is sufficient, or whether humanitarian relief should be accompanied or even driven by protection concerns. Homewood (2005)[402] argues that Africa views itself from the mainstream Western debate on what is good or bad about the continent. What is good in Western media is projected as good for the continent and

vice versa. However, Homewood (2005) further argues that in most cases, these Western analysts do not speak with one voice. This translates into the various discourses Africa considers in terms of development and poverty on the continent. The role of civil society and traditional authorities on the peace negotiation table (Alozieuwa & Demiroglu [2017];[403] Lavallee & Volkel [2015][404] relates to general interest by Western nations, through the international community, to address the questions of civil society, insecurity and political instability on the continent, as witnessed in the case of the French intervention in Mali, the Central African Republic (CAR), and Cote d'Ivoire.

There is also consensus on the role of local actors in resolving these conflicts. In place of these interventions, (Tandogan & Bouacha (2017)[405] suggest that conventional inter-community conversations could be an alternative form of conflict resolution on the continent. Credible transitional institutions with a local dimension most people could own should be the option. However, these options are usually discarded by major international organisations as not responding to global prescriptions. On the other hand, Lavallee and Volkel (2015),[406] hold that the situation in Mali has necessitated a new framework through which intrastate conflict on the continent can be resolved. Experience has shown that dialogue between communities on the continent is an essential platform where consensus on pressing issues can be found. The current study therefore attempted to allow local dialogue as a framework for conflict resolution and as an important instrument for development thinking. The study also conceptualised local voices as an essential vehicle for development and nation building on the continent, and emphasises that the asymmetric form of conflict, as experienced in Mali, would need an innovative approach to bringing the state, communities, and the international community together to resolve the dispute.

Conceptualising the Mali Conflict: Re-Assessing the Ungoverned Spaces Theory

Due to the advancing Sahara Desert, the complex web of weak state infrastructure, deliberate neglect, insecurity, economic challenges, and environmental privations has made the northern part of Mali a haven for smugglers, kidnappers, and traffickers of illicit goods.[407] For the United Nations, the inability of the Malian government to address these challenges is both a root cause and a symptom of recurrent crises in the country.[408] For many Malians, the failure to address the obvious challenges the country is facing is not necessarily the lack of a political will but incapacity by the state to perform its vital obligations to the Malian people. As a result of these failures, Mali is weakened and incapable of responding to development, security, and humanitarian crises.[409] A critical reflection on the inability of the state to provide vital functions to the population may theoretically be seen from an eclectic and class concept point of view. The propagation of these concepts within the Malian polity has widened the gap between the various classes in the country, and has equally increased wealth and the equality gap between the people. The rich are getting richer while the poor are marginalised further and pushed from the periphery of decision-making in the country. This has increased the likelihood of the marginalised to sympathise with the Jihadists.[410] Although resources are limited, the government has concentrated on providing in the vital needs of the people of Bamako and its environs, further alienating those on the periphery of decision-making. In this regard,

the ungoverned spaces concept has been used frequently to describe the prevalence and re-occurrence of conflict in the country.

The current study found that the propagation of the conflict in Mali is based on the ungoverned spaces theory. A careful examination of the locale of the conflict in Mali – and the Sahel in general – suggests that the epicentre of the conflict is situated around the ungoverned spaces of the country. Despite the disintegration of the state of Libya and the flow of small arms and light weapons across the border, the centre of the conflict in Mali has been at the periphery and in areas where state institutions have been absent. The "ungoverned spaces" theory holds that the vacuum created by the absence of the state in the northern part of the country is filled by non-state actors who use such spaces to recruit, plan logistics, settle, generate funds, and commit crimes.[411] States with limited financial and human resources and, more importantly, those with weak political systems and economic spheres, such as those in the Sahel, are vulnerable to having ungoverned spaces. Although ungoverned spaces can be associated with collapsed or sometimes failed states, some of the most ungoverned spaces on the continent are in well-governed and stable democracies. Nigeria, Cameroon, the CAR, Chad and the Democratic Republic of Congo are some countries with vast ungoverned spaces.

Nonetheless, three approaches have frequently been quoted to explain how states decide on how to approach the issue of inclusion, how to utilise space, and who will be excluded from state benefits, namely the population size of an area, the size of the state, and the financial and human capital of such country. According to these approaches, a country with a small land mass, such as Rwanda, has a better chance of properly administering all the areas of the country than the Democratic Republic of Congo. It seems that small countries with populations that are evenly distributed compared to large states with unevenly distributed populations have a good chance of occupying ungoverned spaces.

Admitted, there is an increased likelihood of violence in countries with large uninhabited areas giving the challenge the state will face in policing the whole country. While there is an exception to this assumption, such as the genocide in Rwanda, the general understanding is that violence and insecurity are prevalent in vast uninhabited areas. Lastly, a state with a solid financial base and significant human resource capital has the potential to administer its entire territory properly. Failure by the government in Mali and other Sahel countries to enforce their presence in all corners of their countries and to fulfil essential obligations to their citizens has given room for non-state actors to emerge and act as alternatives to the state.[412]

The current found that, for the government of Mali to address the insecurity situation in the ungoverned spaces, a new approach to governance and development thinking needs to be contemplated. While it is perfectly normal to adopt a more static and aggressive approach to defeat the non-state actors, the government should instead devise means through which state machinery could be implanted in the ungoverned areas. Working in collaboration with other development actors, the state should ensure that schools, healthcare facilities and roads are constructed in these areas. Working with the private sector, the government should create an enabling environment through which people in these spaces could do

business, and small and medium-sized enterprises should be established. Tax incentives to companies considering establishing in these areas should also be considered. A new approach in deploying state machinery in ungoverned spaces is therefore the way to go if insecurity and criminal activities are to be addressed.

Contextualising the Conflict in Mali: Identity, Power and Legitimacy

The discourse on the broad ideological dimensions of ethnic identity and power politics that characterise post-colonial Mali political spaces have created an asymmetric and tedious relationship between the various ethnic groups in Mali. The Fula, Soninke, Dogon and, more particularly the Tuareg ethnic groups, have long felt politically and economically marginalised from mainstream Malian society.[413] As a result, these groups draw the support of the local communities by presenting themselves as the saviours of the communities by defending them against the injustices meted out to them by the state.[414] Some of these ethnic groups have created alliances with other groups across the Malian border to create some form of a haven to safeguard their cultural identity. The Tuareg, for example, having kinship relationships, have made alliances with groups in Libya, Niger, Algeria and Mauritania to address some of their immediate challenges. The Tuaregs have felt marginalised by successive Malian governments. Their claim for better treatment and accommodation within the Malian state structure has been suppressed by the Songhai militia.[415] As a result, the aspirations of the Tuareg people have traditionally focussed on independence or autonomy, not the creation of a religious state or caliphate.[416] The question of identity has therefore been at the centre of the Tuareg demands. Admittedly, the MNLA raises a fundamental challenge to Malian territorial integrity and internal stability. People of Tuareg background in Niger, Mauritania, Algeria, and Libya have expressed determination and zeal to support the MNLA aspirations in Mali.[417] The challenge to Malian territorial integrity is not necessarily coming from internal Tuareg rebellion, but rather from support the Tuaregs have from neighbouring countries. As a result, Mali has been unable to address the challenge from outside the country, considering that it is unclear how many of the Tuareg community support an independent state, and political identity remains highly localised.[418] In this regard, the immediate challenge to Malian territorial integrity is not from the internal Tuareg grievances but from the international support the Tuaregs are receiving from neighbouring countries and other Tuareg communities in the diaspora.

Despite the complex development challenges in Mali for decades, the collapse of the Gaddafi administration in Libya and the return of heavily armed fighters from Libya in 2011 upset the precarious balance of power in northern Mali. Many who came to Mali were members of the Ansar Dine and AQIM groups with a solid Islamic tendency. AQIM traces its roots to the Salafi movement in Algeria, which waged a ferocious battle against the secular government in Algeria in the mid-1990s. The *Salafist pour la Predication et le Combat*, a splinter group from the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) aligned themselves with al-Qaeda in 2006 after their pledge of loyalty was accepted by the al-Qaeda leadership.[419] Successive countermeasures by the Algerian state pushed AQIM to establish a foothold in northern Mali, where they achieved notoriety through a campaign of kidnappings for ransom, especially United Nations (UN), European Union (EU) and United States (US)

diplomats. Kidnapping for ransom became a lucrative business for AQIM between 2006 and 2011, and they are believed to have received an estimated $70 million.[420]

Another significant Salafi movement that attempts to assert its power and authority over the Malian state is Ansar Dine.[421] The emergence of Ansar Dine in Mali can be traced to the negative economic impact of the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP) in the country during 1980s. The globally imposed financial restructuring programme exacerbated the severe economic, political and environmental grievances that the northern part of Mali was already experiencing. More importantly, the unimpressive educational infrastructure in the country had increasingly made room for *madrassas* – Quranic schools that teach a Salafi brand of Islam – to flourish.[422] The *madrassas* taught students in Arabic, not French or indigenous Malian, thereby creating a divide between Arabic, primarily spoken in the northern part of Mali, and the rest of the country, which is more accustomed to the official Malian language, French. Ansar Dine, loosely translated as "Defenders of the Faith", thus exploited this cultural divide within Malian society, and imposed its version of Sharia law on the learners and people living within the ungoverned spaces.[423] Leaders of the Ansar Dine movement also ensured that the leadership of the religious elders, the *ulama*, was restored and their authority on issues of faith and customs was rehabilitated. After being declared a terrorist organisation in 2013 by the United States and facing increasing attacks from the French and later UN forces in Mali, the numbers of the group dwindled, and many crossed the border into Mauritania, Algeria, and Libya. While the group still maintains a presence in Mali, most of its members have aligned with other Islamist groups, including AQIM.

One of the most active terror groups in Mali since 2012 is AQIM. The group seized control of northern Mali in January 2012 after successfully attacking a strategic army garrison. Working in collaboration with the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA), the group succeeded in sidelining MNLA, and secured a safe territory in the northern part of the country.[424] Their advance towards the capital, Bamako, was halted by the French army, which deployed considerable human and material resources into the country. Through Operation Serval, France halted the southern advance of the terrorists and liberated most of the major cities in the northern part of the country.[425] The leaders of the group maintained that their main reason for initiating the rebellion was the socioeconomic disparities between the northern and southern parts of the country.[426] At the time, they argued that all economic activities of the country were concentrated in the south of the region while the north wallowed in poverty, and suffered due to drought and starvation. Their objective, they argued, was to ensure that the entire Mali population benefitted from the resources in the country.

While the economic factor was the main driving force behind the rebellion, many argued that the ethnicisation of politics and development discourse in the country were the determining factors in the Malian conflict.[427] In the course of a negotiated settlement of the conflict, the *ulema* (religious elders) had expressed dissatisfaction in the manner in which the Tuareg are economically and politically marginalised in the country.[428] The peripheral way the Tuareg and other ethnic groups are accommodated in the country has equally raised concerns about the place of the Bambara ethnic group, which has

dominated the political space since the country attained political independence in 1960.[429] The Tuareg ethnic marginalisation is witnessed at two levels. First, is the non-appointment of people of the Tuareg ethnic group into strategic political and economic positions in the country. Many Tuaregs have argued that, for more than 60 years after independence, no Tuareg politician has been appointed as minister of defence or minister of finance. The situation, they argue, is compounded by relatively high levels of illiteracy among the Tuareg.[430] Second, some of the Tuareg leaders noted the wanton neglect of the northern part of Mali, which, ironically, is populated by ethnic Tuareg. These challenges have been at the centre of the Tuareg and separatist rebellion in the country since the 1960s.[431]

Renegotiating a New Paradigm for Conflict Mitigation in Mali: Some Critical Perspectives

While there have been four waves of Tuareg rebellions in the northern part of Mali since 1960, efforts at resolving the underlying conflict denominator have not improved.[432] Persistent feelings of marginalisation among the Tuaregs, combined with widespread droughts in the 1970s and 1980s and the failure of various governments to address the core grievances of the Tuaregs are widely believed to explain the renewal of the rebellion in 2011.[433] While a National Pact was signed between the government and Tuareg leaders in 1992, an implementation strategy was not adopted. The Pact called for a ceasefire between the belligerents, a reduced military presence in the north, and meaningful local autonomy through decentralisation.[434] However, the Moussa Traoré and Amadou Toumani Touré regimes did not implement these fundamental conflict resolution strategies. Feeling frustrated with the lack of progress in implementing the National Pact and the continuous marginalisation of the north, the rebellion resumed.[435] As a result, the various strategies adopted by the government to address the underdevelopment of the northern part of Mali failed. There is a need to renegotiate a new development paradigm for the country, one paradigm that addresses the concerns of the people and the challenges the government is facing in addressing these concerns.

One of the first policy orientations the government needs to consider is renegotiation of a new social compact with the people of Mali. The constitution of Mali and many other international law obligations to which Mali subscribes granted broad mandates to enact rules that carry the force of law.[436] The political elites in the country therefore have all the legal instruments to address the challenges facing the people. A re-engagement with the Malian people is essential to refashion the social relationship between the governed and the governors. An inter-Mali discussion on the social challenges the country is facing would go a long way to assuage issues and challenges that have laid dormant for decades. This discussion should involve civil society, traditional and religious leaders, government officials, and the private sector. The government and aggrieved parties could coordinate the process together with support from civil society organisations and international partners.

The success of the consultation process would lie in people and institutions taking responsibility for failure to implement the recommendations of the 1992 National Pact. To account for something is to explain or justify the acts, omissions, risks and dependencies for which one is responsible to people with a legitimate interest.[437] The

concept of accountability in government suggests that the government needs to provide answers to government priorities and targets.[438] Accountable government involves how officials conduct themselves concerning government responsibilities and obligations. The fundamental concern is being answerable to the people by providing answers to questions about how well or poorly officials have carried out their duties. Malian officials responsible for the non-application of the resolutions of the National Pact of 1992 consequently need to give account to the people of Mali. Implementing all the legal means at its disposal, the Malian government should ensure that the culprits are held to account according to the laws and traditions of Mali.

Another critical concept that the government of Mali needs to consider is decentralisation. Over the past three decades (i.e. since 1993), decentralisation has become one of the broadest concepts on the African continent. It has also been debated intensely by policymakers in the developing world. Evidence from data collected in several countries in the Global South suggests that decentralisation made governments more responsive to local needs by improving the capacity of provincial administrators and to disenclave people in neglected rural areas.[439] Several World Bank studies also show that satisfaction with government and local services improved notably after decentralisation.[440] From our observation, it seems the political elites in Mali would do the Malian people and the government much good if they could intensify the decentralisation process that commenced in the country in the 1990s. Although decentralisation is a complex governance process, the people of Mali would be able to own the development discourse in their regions. A post-conflict Mali should therefore, ensure that the decentralisation process continues, and the government should empower local traditional and religious leaders to ensure that they handle the development discourse in their regions with care and consideration.

A key element for the return to normalcy in Mali would be a return to democracy and constitutionalism with a particular focus on decentralisation. Over six decades since independence, Mali has experienced more than five coups that have truncated democracy and constitutionalism. For peace and tranquillity to return to the country, the military would have to return to the barracks permanently. The government would have to cultivate a new system of governance with solid Malian characteristics. Deliberative democracy fits the Malian context and would be a perfect governance instrument the government should adopt to reconnect with the masses.

Interestingly, there has been an unprecedented volume of talk about and in praise of democracy. Many governmental, non-governmental, and international organisations have been engaged in democracy promotion.[441] While the 1960s saw many citizens going to the polls, the last decades have seen a gradual decline in the number of citizens participating in the democratic process. A new form of participatory democracy would have to be fashioned to ensure that citizens participate in the governance process of their country. Deliberative democracy assumes that citizens' congresses at village and regional level deliberate on critical issues affecting their community. These special deliberative forums ensure that everyone in the community participates in the governance and development discourse concerning their area. Since the 1990s, we have observed that deliberative democracy has

subsumed participatory democratic processes. Deliberative democracy has been held to include school boards, community policing, deliberative polling, community consultations, citizens' assemblies, and judicial bodies.[442] These deliberative assemblies aimed to arrive at a consensus on a developmental matter, make a decision or reveal how individual preferences might change after the people have deliberated. The Malian socio-cultural and political setup favours the deliberative democratic model. Government and civil society would have to ensure that communities organise themselves into deliberative organs through which crucial developmental and political matters affecting the community could be debated, and consensus decisions reached. If Mali wants to escape the current security predicament, a new form of political engagement must be contemplated. Deliberative democracy would ensure that the voices of all in the country are heard, and nation-building parameters are defined and practised by the majority in the country.

Traditional and religious leaders remain influential political and socio-cultural actors in contemporary Africa, especially in rural areas where some have absolute political and traditional powers. Despite the desecration of their conventional symbols in the colonial and post-colonial eras, traditional and religious leaders still command respect and dignity from their people. In most cases, these traditional leaders still maintain the established system of accountability and consultation in their areas of command.[443] They also command respect, as they play an essential role as a link between the spiritual and those in the land of the living.[444] Sometimes, traditional leaders intercede with the spiritual world for the rain to fall during drought. Traditional leaders are also respected as they also intercede for a bountiful harvest.[445]

As a result of the crucial roles that traditional leaders play in African society, this article calls on the government of Mali, acting together with their social and international partners, to support the traditional leaders of Mali in their endeavours to bring peace and tranquillity to the country. Although traditional leaders have sided with successive governments in oppressing the people, their role in the new dispensation needs to be more nuanced and perhaps neutral as the country navigates new contours in addressing security and development challenges. Moreover, the government should establish a new social contract between the government and traditional and religious leaders. This social contract should stipulate the critical government priorities on which the government would want the traditional leaders to focus. Key to these priorities should be maintaining law and order in their various command areas. The Malian government should also ensure that traditional leaders encourage their people to participate in the different democratic processes, as the government would occasionally call upon the Malian citizens to attend these processes.

Conclusion

The changing patterns of conflict on the continent have necessitated new ways through which conflict resolution should be contemplated. In seeking to understand the causes of conflicts on the continent, several conceptual underpinnings have been proposed. The negative effect of unemployment, poverty, and inequality on the people is immeasurable. The affected parties have consequently resorted to unorthodox methods to change their economic situations. In some cases, the military has intervened to address political and

socioeconomic challenges. Nevertheless, how power is acquired and dispensed on the continent has been the primary cause of conflict in many African countries. In Mali, ethnic politics and regional development imbalances have been the driving forces of the various Tuareg rebellions in the country. What has been alarming is the lack of accountability towards those responsible for implementing the 1992 National Pact between the Tuareg leadership and government at the time. As a result, the Tuareg leadership have taken an unwavering position to ensure that their concerns are addressed. While the previous governments have found it challenging to manage the insecurity posed by the Tuareg rebellion and many others, the current administration has shown a strong political will to resolve the Tuareg question in Mali.

Overall, the article highlighted the causes of insecurity in Mali. It was argued that the porous international boundaries, especially those with Libya, Mauritania, and Niger, have enabled small arms and weapons to flow to belligerent parties in Mali. The article illustrated that Mali is a vast uninhabited country, and 'ungoverned spaces' have become havens for bandits to operate with impunity. The article concluded by indicating that the government needs to enter a new compact with the people to address the myriad of economic, political and cultural challenges the country is facing. The first would be to ensure that civil society organisations and traditional and religious leaders are empowered to accompany the government in realising this vital mission.

ENDNOTES

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The Ecological Footprint of Individual Members at the Army Support Base, Eastern Cape

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Abstract

The ecological footprint is a measure that calculates the demand for resources from the environment based on daily people's needs and desires. The study, on which this article is based, used the GFN online calculator to measure the ecological footprint of individual members of the Army Support Base, Eastern Cape. The ecological footprint online survey was used to obtain the quantitative data from the online results of each participant. Statistical analysis was performed using the STATISTICA 14.0 program to calculate the ecological footprints of the individual members of the Army Support Base, Eastern Cape and their combined ecological footprints. Officers recorded the highest ecological footprints in most categories, while NCOs, Private Services Act personnel, and privates in general recorded the lowest scores. Males scored higher than females in almost all categories, suggesting that they have a higher ecological footprint than females, and therefore a larger impact on the environment. The results of this study are significant as it is the first ecological footprint calculation performed for a military base in South Africa and one of only a few global studies similarly targeting the military. These results can be used as a basis for further studies in units of the South African National Defence Force, ultimately leading to more sustainable resource use.

Keywords: Ecological Footprint, South African National Defence Force, Military, Sustainable Resource, Environmental Management.

Introduction: Environmental Footprint Calculators and the South African Military

The development of environmental footprint (EF) calculators over the last few decades expanded the array of tools that could be used to ensure a more stable ecological future through sustainable resource use. The sections below present a short overview of the EF calculators available, and argue for the use of such a calculator to determine the environmental footprint of a South African (SA) Army unit.

Choosing the Most Suitable Environmental Footprint Calculator for the Study

Two main ways to determine the environmental footprint of a community or individual are using an online calculator, or mathematical calculation. See Figure 1 for a schematic representation of the different methods.



Figure 1: Schematic illustration of the two EF calculation methods[449]

Collins *et al.* explain the EFA methodology and why they chose not to use the Global Footprint Network (GFN) online EF calculator.[450] They focussed their study at household level to measure the environmental footprint of students, and used the research of Baabou *et al.* to explain the different mathematical methods to calculate the environmental footprint.[451] When calculating the environmental footprint at a level below national level, either a top-down or bottom-up approach is used, with the bottom-up using a component EF calculation, and the top-down using a compound EF calculation.

The top-down (compound) and bottom-up (component) EF calculation methods use National Footprint Analysis (NFA) data to calculate the lower-level (regional or provincial level) and the household EF respectively. The online EF calculation uses a top-down approach to measure the environmental footprint of an individual. Collins *et al.* agree that top-down EF calculation methods are more accurate than bottom-up methods, but such methods are also more data-intense, and there are no guarantees that local, provincial, or regional data will be available.[452] Figure 1 reflects a schematic summary of the two EF calculation methods, the ecological footprint analysis (EFA) and the online EF calculation.[453,454] Apart from the two mathematical calculations, several other online EF calculators exist. Both mathematical calculations and the online calculator have limitations and advantages.[455,456]

The GFN, Redefining Progress and World Wildlife Fund (WWF) are the most popular online calculators used by researchers.[457,458,459,460] Based on their research, Fernández *et al.* and Collins *et al.* chose to measure the environmental footprint of students at Cardiff University and the University of Siena using the GFN calculator.[461,462] The GFN calculator was easily accessible, easy to understand, quick to complete, provided individual data, and was available for individuals in more than 15 countries. These qualities made the GFN calculator the most suitable for use at Army Support Base (ASB), Eastern Cape (EC).

The South African Army and Environmental Footprint Calculators

In 2018, Smit and Van der Merwe focussed their research on military environmental literacy (MEL), which included the attitude, behaviour, and knowledge of the environment of members of the SA Army.[463] According to their research, the results obtained from the associations between the three different components showed a strong relationship between the improvement of an individual's attitude and his or her behaviour towards the environment. These results pave the way for the involvement and support of the military-integrated environmental management programme (MIEM) in the South African National Defence Force (SANDF). Smit extended this research on the MEL of members of the SA Army to the implementation of environmental military courses to produce environmentally responsible soldiers for the Department of Defence (DoD).[464] Using results from the 2017 annual MIEM to substitute the MEL results, Smit found a definite improvement in environmental literacy among students who had received some environmental education or training. Based on these findings, Smit concluded that soldiers needed to receive more environmental management training and education than was the case at the time.[465] This bottom-up approach would enhance the educational level of soldiers from a low to a high level, leaving the commanders and chief with the non-negotiable task to support and develop improved MEL for the DoD.[466]

The relevance of the calculation of the environmental footprint of individuals at the ASB EC is as follows:

- Once members of the ASB EC have been made aware of the EF calculation and completed it online, it would enable improvement of individual attitudes, which will eventually improve individuals' behaviour towards the environment.
- With the possibility to include the EF online calculation in the annual environmental training programme, it is possible to make a positive contribution to the MEL level of SANDF soldiers and improve the sustainability of resource use in the SANDF.
- By using the delimitation of Wackernagel and Beyers, Jorgenson *et al.*, and Galli *et al.*, the ASB EC would qualify as a community of soldiers in a municipal area with specific boundaries, shared road infrastructure and facilities that relate to military activities.[467,468,469,470]

The aim of the study reported on in this article, was to measure the environmental footprint of individuals at the ASB EC, situated in the Eastern Cape, a province of South Africa. The study could be extended to other arms of service, and it could be used to measure the environmental footprint throughout the SANDF.[471,472,473,474] Such a measurement of the environmental footprint of military personnel of the SANDF has never been done.[475] This research aimed to fill this gap.

Calculating the Environmental Footprint of Individuals at the Army Support Base, Eastern Cape

Different methods to calculate the environmental footprint have been designed over the years, the first being the land-use matrix (LUM), proposed by Wackernagel and Rees.[476] Others followed, either calculating the consumption of goods and services, or using the environmentally extended multi-regional input–output (EE-MRIO) analysis, which incorporates EF drivers of consumption to determine environmental impact and environmental footprint.[477,478,479] These are all mathematical methods. The first online calculator was designed by the GFN in 2007 after the early introduction of the land-use matrix. The online questionnaire focusses on specific categories, such as food, housing and transport, and expresses the score as an EF value.

Fernández *et al.* used a quantitative framework to analyse the daily effect of consumer demands and consumption patterns on the environment.[480] The researchers used descriptive statistical analysis to analyse the data obtained from the results provided by the online EF calculation regarding the consumer behaviour of primary school teachers. The results from the online survey, global EF measure in global hectare (gha), and environmental footprint listed in the different categories, were tabulated, making it possible to compare the carbon footprint, food footprint and goods and services footprint.

In the study reported on in this article, a similar methodological approach was used. A random sample of the population was used to complete the online EF calculation. The EF online questionnaire was used to collect quantitative data from each participant's

responses. The different categories and EF calculations were tabulated in a data matrix table to enable completion of the data analysis process. The qualitative data available from the data matrix table were then used to calculate the environmental footprint of the individual members of the ASB EC as well as their combined environmental footprint.

The choice of using the GFN online EF calculator as a data collection method was supported by the fact that no cost is involved, the calculation gives an immediate result, the questionnaire relates to the everyday lives of participants, and it is preferred by international researchers in the field.[481,482,483] The quantitative information, i.e. primary data, was obtained from the calculations of the online EF measurement.[484,485] The information is visually displayed in different categories as qualitative data. In Figure 2, an example of the results page of the GFN online EF calculator is depicted. For each answer, the calculator provides a value. At the end of the questionnaire, the calculation provides a graphic breakdown, and a visual percentage value of the land-use types and each consumption category, namely food, shelter, mobility, goods, and services. The value of the individual's overshoot day[486] and the number of earths it would take to sustain the individual's current living standard, the land-use type by consumption category, the ecological footprint, carbon footprint, and the carbon footprint as part of the ecological footprint are displayed (based on the individual's environmental footprint).



Figure 2: Results page of GFN online EF calculator[487]

These figures are unique to each participant. All participants who completed the online calculation provided data from their lifestyle, and choices for the measurement of the ecological footprint of the individuals at the ASB EC. The online calculation was explained in detail before the participants started with the calculation. The validity of the research method was not compromised because the questions listed in the online questionnaire were directly related to the research questions and linked to the research objectives. The data collection instrument plays a fundamental part in data collection as well as the way the relevance, validity, and accuracy of the study are presented in the conclusion and recommendations related to the research problem.[488]

The calculation of the ecological footprint of the individuals at the ASB EC was based predominantly on a quantitative research method. Both quantitative and qualitative research tools were used to formulate the actual online EF calculation process.[489,490,491]

The Study Area: Army Support Base, Eastern Cape

The study area for this study was the ASB EC, a military base in the city of Gqeberha, situated in the Eastern Cape, South Africa (Figure 3).[492]

The ASB EC houses three different arms of service, and covers an area of close to five km^2. The ASB EC is one of four units that are housed in the garrison. Most of the site is taken up by married and single quarters, a mess for officers and NCOs, and the golf course.



Figure 3: Schematic image illustrating the general layout of the Army Support Base, Eastern Cape (maps produced with ArcGIS®, Esri; imagery © 2023 Maxar)

The personnel comprise officers, warrant officers (WOs), non-commissioned officers (NCOs), privates, and Public Service Act Personnel (PSAP).[493] The ASB EC is a support unit, and is under command of the SA Army Support Formation. The ASB EC aims to serve all clients in the Eastern Cape, and to be ready to execute any logistical task as requested by the general officer commanding (GOC) SA Army Support Formation. The unit is primarily responsible for providing support services, namely procurement, transport, facility maintenance, technical maintenance, and safety and protection.

Surveying the Support Base, Eastern Cape

At the time, the ASB EC had 460 personnel, with males making up 68,6 per cent and females representing 31,4 per cent. The unit members are made up of 33 officers, 35 warrant officers, 198 NCOs, 96 privates and 98 PSAP.[494] The size of the sample determined the specific number of participants that were selected from the official name list of the unit to complete the online EF calculation. The names of the possible participants were entered on an Excel spreadsheet with name, rank, department, and gender as identifiers. Using the number of potential participants per rank group, made it possible to identify the ratio of male and female participants.[495] If a member was not willing to participate, was on leave or on a military course, the next member on the list was asked to complete the calculation. This rule was followed until the criteria for the sample size and gender split had been reached.

Participants who did not want to complete the calculation were removed from the randomly selected list, and the next person on the list from the same group was contacted to participate voluntarily. In the case where a person of a different gender to the one originally selected agreed to participate, an additional participant from the other gender was chosen from the next rank group to be able to adhere to or balance the gender split values of the ASB EC. Participants had the choice to complete the calculation in a predetermined venue (according to COVID-19 regulations) or complete the calculation in their own office (following COVID-19 regulations). On completion of the online calculation, the results page of the participant was printed and used to complete the data matrix table. The results page remained with the researcher for safekeeping. A total of 140 participants voluntarily completed the GFN online EF calculation. A total of 80 males and 60 females completed the calculation i.e. 57,1 per cent males and 42,9 per cent females. This represented a gender split of 1,3:1. Considering the number of males in the ASB EC, it was expected that more males would participate in this study. However, two reasons were listed for the smaller gender split that was recorded in the study: many male members were away on a military course during the data collection; and more females across all rank groups were willing to complete the online EF calculation.

Before starting the calculation, participants were reminded of the background and aim of the study. After completion, the results page of the calculation was printed, and the interpretation of the results was explained. Each participant received a number to ensure the confidentiality and anonymity of his or her results. All the EF results were then listed in the data matrix table according to the predetermined criteria.

Research Ethics and the Environmental Footprint Calculations

During this study, it was essential to address multiple ethical considerations for measuring the ecological footprint. Once the officer commanding (OC) ASB EC granted approval, ethical clearance was sought from both the Stellenbosch University Research Ethics Committee and the Defence Intelligence (DI) Division of the Department of Defence (DoD). Since ASB EC individuals were to fill in a questionnaire for data collection, the researcher ensured compliance with the ethical policy of Stellenbosch University.[496,497]

Once ethical clearance and authorisation had been obtained from the DoD, the participants were informed of the research in the form of a presentation on –

- why the information would be collected;
- what the purposes of the questionnaire and of the research were;
- the role the participants would play, and how; and
- how the research would affect the individuals, either directly or indirectly.[498,499,500]

During the presentation, an online example of the EF calculation was displayed to give participants a visual idea of what the research was about and what the questions would be that they would have to answer during the calculation. The participants were informed that no sensitive questions would be asked, that they would suffer no harm, and that they could withdraw at any time without any negative consequences.[501] The calculation was completed anonymously, and the data of each individual appeared next to a number to maintain confidentiality throughout the data collection and analysis process.

Results of the Environmental Footprint Survey

The results of the GFN online calculation of participants at the ASB EC are presented in the sections below. Table 1 lists examples of the scores achieved. These are presented in two parts.

GFN Results for Environmental Footprint of Individuals at the ASB EC

Table 1 (Parts 1 and 2) shows an extract from the complete data matrix table of the participants' scores for rank, department, gender, planet score, environmental footprint, carbon footprint, and carbon footprint (as a percentage), as well as land-use values, which include built-up land, forest, cropland, rangeland, fisheries, and carbon footprint. The consumer categories covering food (F), shelter (Sh), traffic or mobility (M), goods (G) and services (S) are also indicated. This extract (Table 1) is presented for display and page fit purposes.

Table 1: An extract of the data matrix table created of the individual EF results

Part 1							
Participant	Rank	Department	Gender	Planet score	EF (gha)	CF (TPA)*	CF (%)
Participant 1	WO	Emergency Services	M	8,2	13,3	27,3	71
Participant 2	Capt.	Transport	M	3,8	6,2	10,9	60
Participant 3	Maj.	Facilities	M	4,4	7,1	14,7	71

Part 2											
Participant	Land type						Consumer categories				
	Built-up	Forest	Crop	Grazing	Fishing	CF	F	Sh	M	G	S
Participant 1	0,2	0,7	1,0	0,1	0,1	5,0	0,8	1,9	2,6	0,8	1,0
Participant 2	0,2	0,7	0,9	0,1	0,1	3,0	1,1	1,7	0,4	0,9	0,7
Participant 3	0,2	0,8	1,5	0,2	0,1	6,8	1,7	3,0	2,7	1,2	1,0

Note: *TPA = tonnes per annum*

The statistical composition (median, mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum) of the GFN results according to the EF calculation categories for the individuals of the ASB EC is indicated in Table 2. Note that the land types (built-up land, forest, crop, fishing grounds, grazing, and the carbon footprint) indicate the amount of land needed for the specific lifestyle of the individuals of the ASB EC, and the consumption categories (food, shelter, mobility, goods and services) indicate the most important consumer goods and services.

Table 2: Values of EF categories according to statistical measures

	Median	Mean	Standard deviation (SD)	Minimum value	Maximum value
Overall scores					
Planet score	3,5	3,6	1,5	1,4	10,8
Environmental footprint (gha)	5,6	5,8	2,5	2,2	17,6
Carbon footprint (TPA)	9,9	10,6	5,0	3,4	32,2
CF (%) of environmental footprint	61,0	61,5	6,6	47,0	79,0
Categories					
Built-up land	0,2	0,2	0,1	0,1	1,2
Forestland	0,6	0,7	0,4	0,1	3,5
Cropland	1,0	1,0	0,4	0,5	2,7
Grazing land	0,1	0,1	0,0	0,0	0,6
Fishing grounds	0,1	0,1	0,3	0,0	3,9
Carbon footprint	3,3	3,5	1,6	0,5	11,1
Food (F) footprint	1,0	1,1	0,5	0,1	2,9
Shelter (Sh) footprint	1,4	1,7	1,3	0,1	10,3
Mobility (M) footprint	0,7	1,0	1,0	0,0	6,7
Goods (G) footprint	1,0	0,9	0,3	0,1	2,0
Services (S) footprint	0,8	0,8	0,3	0,1	3,2

The values in Table 2 show that the mean (average) planet score was 3,6, environmental footprint was 5,8, and the carbon footprint was 10,6, It is further indicated that 61,5 per cent of the carbon footprint forms part of the EF. In terms of land use categories, forestland (0,7) and cropland (1,0) have the highest (marked in blue) land type scores, while grazing land (0,1) has the lowest score (marked in red). Looking at the mean values of the consumer categories, the highest footprints are carbon (3,5), shelter (1,7), food (1,1), and mobility (1,0), while the footprint of service (0,8) has the lowest scores.

Statistical Significance of the GFN Results of the EF Categories of the ASB EC

In Table 3, the EF categories are displayed against the rank groups (NCOs, officers, PSAP, privates and WOs) based on their p-values.[502]

Table 3: Statistical significance (p-values) of EF variables

	Statistical significance (p-values)		
	Rank group	Department	Gender
Overall scores			
Planet score	≤ 0,01	0,16	0,08
Environmental footprint	≤ 0,01	0,16	0,07
CF (TPA)	≤ 0,01	0,20	0,14
CF (%) of environmental footprint	0,12	0,45	0,58
Categories			
Built-up land*	0,33*	0,34	0,08
Forestland*	0,11*	0,12	0,01
Cropland	0,16	0,03	0,06
Grazing land*	0,3*	0,70	0,11
Fishing grounds*	0,55*	0,14	0,20
Carbon footprint (CF)	0,02	0,15	0,12
Food (F)	≤ 0,01	0,09	0,11
Shelter (Sh)*	0,04	0,09	0,16*
Mobility (transport) (M)	≤ 0,01	0,53	0,83
Goods (G)	0,64	0,08	0,24
Services (S)	0,83*	0,45	0,50

Note = *data were winsorised*[503]

The different EF categories include the planet score, environmental footprint, carbon footprint, and carbon footprint as a percentage of the environmental footprint, the land-use categories: built-up land, forest, cropland, grazing land and fishing grounds and the consumer categories: food (F), shelter (Sh), mobility (M), goods (G) and services (S).

According to the statistical treatment of the data, only the planet score, environmental footprint, carbon footprint (TPA), food and mobility variables showed significant differences by reporting a p-value ≤ 0,05, In the case of the land-use categories: built-up land, forestland, goods and services data were winsorised to reduce the effect of outliers on the results. In the case of the various departments, no significant differences were recorded for any of the environmental footprint, land-use or consumer categories. In the case of gender, the only category that showed a significant difference was forestland while the data for the consumer category home or shelter were winsorised.

Statistical Significance of Different Variables (Rank, Departments, and Gender) Against the EF Categories

Rank groups

The letters (a,b,c) next to the scores in Table 4 indicate significant differences between rank groups and different EF categories at a significance level of 5 per cent ($p < 0,05$). If at least one letter overlapped between two groups (e.g. **b** vs **ab**), then the difference was not significant ($p > 0,05$). If there were no overlapping letters (e.g. **a** vs **b**), then the difference was significant ($p < 0,05$). The scores marked in blue show the highest scores, and those in red, the lowest scores.

Table 4: Results of EF categories against rank groups and EF categories

	Rank group mean (standard deviation)					
	ANOVA F-test	NCOs	Officers	PSAP	Privates	WO
Overall scores						
Planet score	F(4,135) = 4,16; p < 0,01	3,5(1,6)^{b}	4,7(1,7)^{a}	3,2(1,1)^{b}	3,1(1,1)^{b}	3,8(1,6)^{ab}
Environmental footprint	F(4,135) = 4,10; p < 0,01	5,7(2,6)^{b}	7,6(2,7)^{a}	5,3(1,7)^{b}	5,0(1,7)^{b}	6,1(2,6)^{ab}
CF (TPA)	F(4,135) = 4,31; p < 0,01	10,2(4,7)^{b}	14,3(6,6)^{a}	10,0(3,8)^{b}	8,8(3,0)^{b}	10,9(5,5)^{b}
CF as % of environmental footprint	F(4,135) = 1,85; p=0,12	60,9(6,2)^{b}	63,0(7,6)^{ab}	64,7(6,9)^{a}	60,6(6,0)^{b}	60,0(7,0)^{b}
Categories						
Built-up land*	F(4,135)=1,17; p=0,33	0,2(0)	0,2(0,1)	0,2(0,1)	0,2(0,1)	0,2(0,1)
Forestland*	F(4,1135)=1,90; p=0,11	0,7(0,3)^{ab}	0,8 (0,4)^{a}	0,7(.03)ab	0,6(0,3)^{b}	0,7(0,2)^{ab}
Cropland	F(4,135)=1,66; p=0,16	1,1(0,5)^{ab}	1,2(0,4)^{a}	0,9(0,26)^{b}	1,0(0,4)^{ab}	1,1(0,4)^{ab}
Grazing land*	F(4,135)=2,81; p=0,03	0,12(0)^{a}	0,1(0)^{a}	0,1(0)^{b}	0,1(0) ^{ab}	0,1(0)^{ab}
Fishing grounds*	F(4,135)=.76; p=0,55	0,11(0)	0,13(0)	0,10(0)	0,11(0)	0,13(0,1)
Carbon footprint (CF)	F(4,135)=2,93; p=0,02	3,52(1,63)^{b}	4,59(2,27)^{a}	3,58(1,47)^{ab}	3,03(1,02)^{b}	3,41(1,48)^{b}
Food (F)	F(4,537)=4,74; p ≤ 0,01	1,2(0,64)^{a}	1,24(0,55)^{a}	0,86(0,25)^{b}	1,16(0,56)^{a}	1,23(0,59)^{a}
Categories						
Shelter (Sh)*	F(4,135)=0,37; p=0,83	1,74(1,17)	1,82(1,09)	1,5(0,93)	1,6(0,89)	1,57(0,9)
Mobility (transport) (M)	F(4,135)=5,28; p ≤ 0,01	0,97(0,9)^{bc}	1,8(1,52)^{a}	1,39(1,11)^{ab}	0,54(0,61)^{c}	0,99(0,93)^{bc}
Goods (G)	F(4,135)=0,638; p=0,64	1,01(0,35)	1,05(0,32)	0,92(0,32)	0,96(0,32)	0,91(0.49)
Services (S)	F(4,135)=2,55; p=0,04	0,84(0,33)^{b}	1,08(0,58)^{a}	0,84(0,36)^{b}	0,78(0,26)^{b}	0,79(0,27)^{b}

Note = * *data were winsorised*

Officers show the greatest differences of all rank groups with a planet score of 4,67 while other rank groups have a planet score of ≥ 3. The reason for the large difference in planet score between officers and the other rank groups can be explained by the higher income of officers, their higher standard of living, a high transport footprint as well as high food and carbon footprints. The lower scores for NCOs, PSAP, privates and WOs can be explained based on their lower income, their average standard of living, making use of lift clubs or walking to work, and their inability to buy expensive foods, as expensive products would increase their carbon footprint. The perception is that expensive products may have a larger ecological footprint because they often utilise rarer materials and more energy-intensive production processes. However, the relationship between price and ecological impact is not universally consistent, and some high-quality expensive items might be more sustainable in the long run.

The small differences in planet score between the NCOs and WOs, and PSAP and privates might be ascribed to both groups having a lower income than that of officers, a trend also observed by Bayraktar.[504]

Similar statistical differences were recorded for the environmental footprint and carbon footprint of the different rank groups. Officers scored the highest environmental footprint of 7,6 gha and a carbon footprint of 14,3 TPA, while the other groups' scores for EFs were between 5 gha and 6 gha and CFs between 8,8 TPA and 10,9 TPA. The carbon footprint as a percentage of the environmental footprint shows very few significant differences with a p-value of p=0,12 and a mean value of 60 per cent for WOs and 65 per cent for PSAPs while officers show a value of 63 per cent.

Although there is a small difference between the different rank groups, the only constant high value was reported by officers. Since rank is an indicator of income, this was expected, and these results are corroborated by the research of Flint and Cordero *et al.*[505,506]

Departments

In Table 5, the letters (a,b,c) indicate significant differences between departments (groups) and different EF categories at a significance level of 5 per cent ($p < 0,05$). If at least one letter overlapped between two groups (e.g. **b** vs **ab**), then the difference was not significant ($p > 0,05$). If there were no overlapping letters (e.g. **a** vs **b**), then the difference was significant ($p < 0,05$). The scores marked in blue show the highest scores, and those in red, the lowest scores. To ease the representation of the results, the departments were combined into groups, namely:

- **Group 1** represents the Headquarters (HQ), Communication, Human Resources (HR), Senior Warrant Officer (SWO), and Control departments;
- **Group 2** represents the Support Supply Service Centre (SSSC);
- **Group 3** represents the Transport and Technical Maintenance Service Centre; and
- **Group 4** represents the Emergency Services, and Physical Training, Sport and Recreation (PTSR), and Protection departments.

Table 5: Results of EF categories against different departments and EF categories

	Department mean (standard deviation)						
	ANOVA F-test	Catering	Group 1	Group 2	Group 3	Group 4	Protection Section
Overall scores							
Planet score	F(5,134)=1,6; p=0,16	3,7(3,2)[ab]	4,0(1,5)[a]	3,3(1,3)[b]	3,6(1,0)[ab]	4,5(2,1)[ab]	3,5(1,4)[ab]
Environmental footprint	F(5,134)=1,6; p=0,16	6,1(5,2)[ab]	6,6(2,4)[a]	5,3(2,2)[b]	5,8(1,5)[ab]	7,3(3,4)[ab]	5,7(2,3)[ab]
CF (TPA)	F(5,134)=1,5; p=0,20	10,1(8,5)	12,0(5,3)	9,7(4,5)	10,2(3,4)	13,5(7,8)	10,1(4,2)
CF as % of environmental footprint	F(5,134)=0,9; p=0,45	57,2(4,3)	62,4(7,3)	61,9(6,7)	59,9(6,1)	61,7(9,1)	61,4(4,5)
Categories							
Built-up land*	F(5,134)=1,2; p=0,34	0,2(0,2)	0,2(0,1)	0,2(0,1)	0,2(0)	0,27(0,1)	0,2(0,1)
Forestland*	F(5,134)=2,0; p=0,09	0,7(0,6)[ab]	0,8(0,3)[ab]	0,6(0,3)[b]	0,7(0,2)[ab]	1,0(0,5)[a]	0,7(0,4)[ab]
Cropland	F(5,134)=2,5; p=0,03	1,17(0,7)	1,2(0,5)	0,9(0,4)	1,1(0,3)	1,2(0,5)	1,1(0,4)
Grazing land*	F(5,134)=0,6; p=0,70	0,1(0)	0,1(0,1)	0,1(0,1)	0,1(0)	0,1(0,1)	0,1(0)
Fishing grounds*	F(5,134)=1,6; p=0,14	0,1(0,1)[ab]	0,1(0,1)[a]	0,1(0,1)[b]	0,1(0,1)[ab]	0,1(0,1)[ab]	0,1(0)[ab]
Carbon footprint (CF)	F(5,134)=1,6; p=0,15	3,5(2,9)[ab]	4,1(1,8)[a]	3,2(1,5)[b]	3,5(1,2)[ab]	4,3(1,3)[ab]	3,5(1,5)[ab]
Food (F)	F(5,134)=2,0; p=0,09	1,2(0,5)[ab]	1,4(0,6)[a]	1,0(0,5)[b]	1,2(0,5)[ab]	1,2(0,7)[ab]	1,1(0,5)[ab]
Shelter (Sh)*	F(5,134)=0,9; p=0,45	1,7(1,8)	1,9(1,2)	1,5(1,0)	1,6(0,7)	2,1(1,2)	1,6(0,8)
Mobility (transport) (M)	F(5,134)=0,8; p=0,53	0,6(0,3)	1,2(1,3)	1,0(0,1)	1,2(1,1)	1,6(1,4)	1,0(1,1)
Goods (G)	F(5,134)=1,9; p=0,08	1,0(0,4)	1,0(0,3)	0,9(0,3)	0,9(0,5)	1,1(0,2)	1,2(0,3)
Services (S)	F(5,134)=1,9; p=0,09	0,94 (0,66)[ab]	0,95 (0,46)[a]	0,76 (0,25)[b]	0,81 (0,19)[ab]	1,11 (0,45)[a]	0,90 (0,41)[ab]

Note = * *data were winsorised*

The different departments do not show significant differences in the number of planets they need to live their daily lives, reflected in the p-value of p=0,16, However, Group 4 recorded a high score of 4,47 Earths, while Group 2 had a lower score of 3,28 Earths. These results are higher than the world average planet score derived from the studies by Lambert and by Fernández *et al.*, where an overall average number of 4,46 Earths or planets were recorded.[507,508] The EF score shows a similar pattern with fewer significant differences amongst the departments with a p-value of p=0,16. The highest score was recorded by Group 4 at 7,27 gha, and the lowest score was recorded by Group 2 at 5,33

gha. According to Bayraktar, a high income relates to a high environmental footprint because of the purchasing power that the individual has.[509]

It seems the carbon footprint and the carbon footprint (as a percentage of the environmental footprint) followed a similar pattern to the planet score and the environmental footprint. However, in the case of the carbon footprint as a percentage of the environmental footprint, Group 1 (HQ, Communication, HR, SWO and Control) recorded the highest carbon footprint as a percentage of the environmental footprint of 62,4 per cent, and catering, the lowest score of 57,2 per cent. One of the reasons for the high carbon footprint of Group 1 can be explained by the increase in consumption patterns of goods and services. The possibility exists that the individuals in this group have large families and earn a high income, which enables them to purchase luxury goods from supermarkets and choose to have a dominantly meat diet instead of vegetables, something also postulated by researchers, such as Bayraktar and Sarkodie.[510,511]

In general, departments in all categories of the environmental footprint achieved fairly similar results. Even if there were differences, these were not always significant. This may be because the departments are all made up of a mixture of different rank groups. While ranks are representative of income, the mix in ranks negates differences between departments.

Gender

As indicated in Table 6, significant differences were recorded between the environmental footprint, built-up land, cropland, and forest footprint scores. These p-values were $p \leq 0,08$ while the other categories recorded scores between p=0,11 and p=0,83, Males dominated all the scores except the carbon footprint as a percentage of the environmental footprint where females scored 61,9 per cent while males recorded 61,2 per cent. Males scored higher (marked in blue) in all the other categories. In their study of university students in India, Raj *et al.* found no difference between the EF scores of males and females; thus, corroborating the results of this study.[512] Reasons for this could be that males and females at the ASB EC live similar lives and take part in very much the same activities, have the same eating habits, and travel almost the same distances to work every day. Bayraktar recorded the same pattern in a study with Turkish pre-service teachers.[513]

In the current study, males recorded a higher environmental footprint than females. According to Flint, a large environmental footprint can be the cause of a high carbon, transport, food, and goods footprint.[514] On the other hand, a low environmental footprint can be contributed to a low food and service footprint, which implies a predominantly vegetable diet, recycling of waste, lower carbon footprint and choosing alternative energy and water consumption methods.[515] Three factors that play a significant role in a CF score are related to economic purchasing power, the number of family members, and level of income. People in many cultures have historically expected men to have a prominent role in economic activities, while women were often associated with household responsibilities; however, these roles and perceptions are evolving, and vary widely across different societies.[516] Other aspects that contribute to the carbon footprint are a

high food and mobility footprint, which add to the increase of gas emissions released into the atmosphere.[517,518]

Table 6: Results of EF categories against gender

	Gender mean (standard deviation)		
EF category	ANOVA F-test	Males	Females
Planet score	F(1,138)=3,1, p=0,08	3,82(1,6)	3,36(1,39)
Environmental footprint	F(1,138)=3,26, p=0,07	6,22(2,62)	5,46(2,28)
CF (TPA)	F(1,138)=2,16, p=0,14	11,20(5,29)	9,95(4,58)
CF as % of environmental footprint	F(1,138)=0,31, p=0,58	61,26(6,42)	61,90(6,96)
Built-up land*	F(1,138)=3,10, p=0,08	0,23(0,1)	0,20(0,1)
Forestland*	F(1,138)=6,11, p=0,01	0,76(0,33)	0,62(0,33)
Cropland	F(1,138)=3,65, p=0,06	1,15(0,43)	1,01(0,42)
Grazing land*	F(1,138)=2,52, p=0,11	0,12(0,05)	0,11(0,05)
Fishing grounds*	F(1,138)=1,68, p=0,20	0,12(0,06)	0,11(0,06)
Carbon footprint (CF)	F(1,138)=2,16, p=0,14	3,78(171)	3,34(1,58)
Food (F)	F(1,138)=2,6, p=0,11	1,23(0,57)	1,07(0,57)
Shelter (Sh)*	F(1,138)=1,95, p=0,16	1,78(1,12)	1,53(0,91)
Mobility (transport) (M)	F(1,138)=0,04, p=0,83	1,09(0,98)	1,06(1,19)
Goods (G)	F(1,138)=1,38, p=0,24	1,02(0,38)	0,95(0,32)
Services (S)	F(1,138)=0,45, p=0,50	0,88(0,33)	0,84(0,43)

Note = * *data were winsorised*

The results indicated in Table 6 reveal significant differences between male and female participants. Males recorded a larger environmental footprint than females in almost all categories, suggesting that they have a higher environmental impact than females. This trend is supported by the results of other studies.[519]

Combined Environmental Footprint and Result

A total of 140 participants completed the GFN online EF calculation. The individual values of the EF calculation were used to calculate the combined ecological footprint of the individual members of the ASB EC participating in the study. The individual EF results were listed in a data matrix table created using an Excel spreadsheet. The combined environmental footprint of all participants in the study was 825,5 gha, with an average of 5,89 gha per participant. After calculating the average environmental footprint based on the total number of ASB EC members, the combined environmental footprint of all members in the ASB EC is 2 709,4 gha. These results are higher than normal gha per participant and average planet score (3,6) when compared to similar studies. Raj *et al.*

calculated the environmental footprint of students at the University of Punjab at 5,58 gha in comparison with that of the general population of India at 0,91 gha.[520] In 2007, a world average of 2,7 gha per person was recorded. This increased to 2,8 gha in 2016.[521,522] Collins *et al.* and Galli *et al.* respectively reported a minimum of 1,6 planets in 2012 and a maximum of 2,4 planets in 2016 required by the world population to live their lives the way they were living at the time.[523,524] Lambert reported a higher than the world average planet score,[525] where an overall number of 4,46 earths or planets were recorded by students; 3,99 by academic personnel; and 4,55 by non-academic personnel. Other studies respectively recorded an EF per person of 4,84 gha, 3,89 gha and 3,65 gha.[526,527,528]

Rank Groups

The results show that officers had the highest scores in all categories, while PSAPs and privates had the lowest scores. The combined environmental footprint of the members of the ASB EC participating in the study was very high, and the average environmental footprint was higher than the world average of 2,8 gha.[529] A possible reason for this result is that a few researchers found that participants had a higher than average initial EF score when they completed the online EF calculation for the first time, and that they were not aware of the demands their lifestyles placed on the environment.[530,531,532,533,534] A review of the participants during the current study revealed that the majority of privates were living-ins at military quarters and were dependent on the accommodation that was available at the base. PSAP members might have shared their accommodation with other members, depending on their circumstances. Most senior ranks lived in their own homes and could make their own decisions about their lifestyle. Higher ranks had a higher financial remuneration bracket than privates and PSAP members, which gave them greater freedom in the choice of their living conditions. This result was also reflected by the research of Lambrechts and Van Liedekerke, and Raj *et al.* who found the same trends for higher-income groups.[535,536] This included the high food footprint, independence in terms of the mode of transport, number of years employed, and ability to follow fashion trends, use the latest technology, and keeping up with what is available in the market. Lower income groups are not in a financial position to follow such a lifestyle, a finding that is corroborated by the research of Lambrechts and Van Liedekerke.[537]

Departments

The departments are combined into smaller groups:

- Group 1 = headquarters (HQ) – communication, human resources, senior warrant officer (SWO) and control;
- Group 2 = supply support service centre (SSSC), procurement and facilities;
- Group 3 = transport and technical maintenance service centre; and
- Group 4 = emergency services and PTSR, as well as protection).

According to the findings highlighted in Table 5, the results of the departments in relation to the three identified EF calculation categories showed that Group 2 had the highest individual EF scores, while Group 4 had the lowest scores. From the results for the EF of different departments at the ASB EC, the individual EF was dominated by Group 4,

and the lowest score was that of Group 2. In terms of the land use category, the highest sub-groups were the built-up and forest land footprint for Group 4, and the lowest score was that of Group 2. Group 1 had the highest cropland and fishing ground footprint, while Group 2 again had the lowest score. The catering services recorded the highest grazing land score while all the other groups had a much lower grazing land score.

Group 4 consisted of the Emergency Services and PTRS, while Group 2 consists of SSSC, procurement and facilities. Group 4 was made up the three largest service centres while Group 2 represented the two smallest service centres. In their research, Lambrechts and Van Liedekerke determined that different components could differ in different departments. [538] One of the reasons for the different scores of the two groups might be that Group 4 was less concerned about environmental matters in contrast with Emergency Services and PTSR service centres who worked more closely with the environment. The number of participants might be another contributing factor as well as the possibility that most participants in Group 2 were males while Group 2 had an equal number of male and female participants. The possibility exists that most participants were officers, which put them in a higher income bracket, leading to a lifestyle that translated into a higher EF calculation, something also reported by Li and Young.[539] In addition, the high built-up and forest land, carbon, shelter, mobility and services footprint of Group 4 could be explained based on the studies by Collins *et al.*[540] and Raj *et al.*[541] These are all indications of large homes, big families, travelling long distances by car, and preferring to eat in restaurants rather than buying and preparing local fresh produce. The low sub-category scores of Group 2 (built-up, forest, grazing land, fishing grounds, food, shelter and services footprint) are indications of a group that limit travelling by car, eat more fresh foods, have smaller families, and are committed to recycle and reduce energy consumption, trends echoed by Fernández *et al.*, Galli *et al.*, and Lambrechts and Van Liedekerke.[542,543,544]

Gender

In the current study, males had the highest scores in 13 of the 15 categories (see Table 6). However, no significant differences between the overall environmental footprint of males and females were found. Results from various other studies indicate that males have a higher environmental footprint than females, while some researchers found no difference between genders, and some studies reported a higher environmental footprint for females.[545,546,547,548,549,550]

Raj *et al.* calculated a consumer footprint for students, and found three opinions in terms of the difference in gender EF:[551]

- No difference was found between the environmental footprint of male and female participants;
- Male participants had a higher environmental footprint than female participants; and
- Female participants had a higher environmental footprint than male participants.[552]

The three opinions above can be explained by the fact that, in some instances, men and women had similar lifestyles, travelled the same distances, consumed the same processed drinks and food, and used the same technology. Where male participants had a higher EF than female participants, the main reasons related to identical activities with the only difference being that men lived a more outgoing life, travelled more, ate in restaurants, lived with large families in their own homes, did not recycle and were more fashion conscious than women.[553,554]

In the last instance, female participants had a larger EF than the male participants, which could be linked to female participants who have to travel often in terms of transporting children to and from school, have the purchase power in the household, do not recycle and prefer to take the family to restaurants instead of serving home-cooked meals, use technology to run the household, such as for online purchases, have a prominent social life, and stay up to date with fashion.[555,556,557]

From these lifestyle examples, it is possible to explain the high EF of males and the low EF for females in the calculation of the environmental footprint of individuals at the ASB EC. Several factors, such as high income, longer travel distances, processed foods, fashion trends, and living with large families in their own homes might be reasons for the higher result for male participants. The reason for the lower EF of females might be connected to their weak purchase power, preferring home-cooked meals for their family, not following fashion trends consciously, rather walking or using a bus to travel from point A to point B, and not being empowered by the use of technology to make their lives easier.[558] Another reason for the higher EF of males might be that many participants were men. As a final comment, it should be taken into consideration that, although males generally recorded higher scores for most categories, almost none of these results were significant if statistically interrogated. This means that the results for women and men do not differ significantly.

Concluding Remarks

From the combined EF of the different categories, officers (Group 1 (HQ, Communication, Human Resources, SWO and Control), and Group 4 (Emergency Services and PTSR) as well as males, were the most prominent contributors to the overall environmental footprint of the unit. The high EF of officers might be attributed to several factors, including higher income, elevated CF, and increased shelter, food, and mobility footprints. For Groups 1 and 4, the predominance of officers and males further amplified the collective EF of the members. As far as gender is concerned, male participants recorded higher scores in almost all categories than female participants, although virtually all differences were found to be statistically not significant.

The results of the different rank groups are dominated by officers on the one side of the spectrum, while PSAP and privates on the other side had the lowest scores. This seems to indicate that financial income plays a significant role in the environmental footprint of individuals. No significant difference existed between the different departments, although Group 2 (officers) recorded the lowest score. Group 4 (privates) recorded the highest

scores, except in the case of grazing land, and was dominated by male participants who had higher incomes, more expensive lifestyles, more travel expenses and high consumer demand than female participants. Males generally dominate the structure of the ASB EC, and their higher environmental footprint is confirmed by these results and affirmed by various studies, as indicated earlier.

The main findings from this study are that level of income plays the most significant part in the calculation of the environmental footprint of an individual. A high income could influence 90 per cent of the other categories, and officers who fall in a high-income bracket play a dominant role in both the rank group as well as the different groups because where the participants in the group where mostly officers, high scores were recorded in the different categories. This means a high income reflects a more lavish lifestyle and a higher EF. Males dominated the EF calculation, evidenced by an overall high score in the different categories. Males and females in the ASB EC might therefore not have as different EFs as the raw results suggest, but more research is needed to confirm or refute this conclusion.

The study found the GFN online EF calculator to be a suitable tool to measure the ecological footprint of individuals at the ASB EC and to calculate their combined environmental footprint. It is an internationally accepted calculation, and can be used by individuals on their own or in a group context. It is easy to use, and calculations can be done over time to follow the progress of reducing the environmental footprint. The spectrum of the calculator makes it possible for individuals and groups or communities to work on different areas to reduce their environmental footprint. Within the three sub-categories, it is possible to identify specific areas that individuals need to change and where they could adapt their daily lives. The calculation of the environmental footprint of military personnel is a first for the SA military. This calculation could also be used as a benchmark against which to measure other military units.

The SA National Defence Force (SANDF) has a responsibility towards the environment, and one of the ways to commit to this responsibility is through education and training. To establish environmental literacy in the SANDF, education needs to take place at all levels of command, according to an environmental management system (EMS). Based on the research by Smit, the relationship between attitude, behaviour, and knowledge plays a critical role in how soldiers act towards the environment. It is therefore important to improve their knowledge about the environment.[559,560]

The current study identified several practical issues that could be addressed to improve the environmental footprint of members of the ASB EC. Officers commanding could reduce the number of cars inside unit lines; daily electricity consumption could be reduced by switching lights off during lunch and tea times; recycling of paper and plastic could be initiated both in offices and in the mess; and the unit environmental officer could employ an incentive programme for service centres that would contribute to reducing their environmental footprint.

The preparation of soldiers during basic training and again during formative and promotional courses for officers or NCOs is critical to embed the knowledge that individuals place demands on the environment, and to teach them how to reduce their environmental footprint. The current research established a benchmark for EF calculation in the SA Department of Defence and paved the way for future use of the methods developed for this study.

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ENDNOTES

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Book Review

Human Intelligence: Supporting Composite Warfare Operations in Africa

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Endorsing this outstanding book, Dr Thys van den Berg calls it a 'seminal and ground-breaking work on the practices and theory of military intelligence tradecraft' in a blurb on the cover of the book. While supporting this stance, I would argue that the book has relevance to all intelligence and indeed security agencies. Chapters, such as 'Understanding and the Language of Tradecraft' 'Agent Cultivation and Recruitment', and 'Surveillance and Counter-Surveillance', have relevance to all security agencies. The profound observations the author shares with readers – often from his own vast personal experiences– are equally relevant. Indeed, I cannot imagine a better author to have written this book. Barlow has served as a sapper commander with 101 Task Force, as second-in-command of 32 Battalion's Reconnaissance Wing, as agent handler for South Africa's Military Intelligence Division, and thereafter, as region commander of the covert Civil Cooperation Bureau (CCB) of the South African Special Forces. Upon leaving the defence force, he went on to become founder and chairperson of Executive Outcomes, arguably the most successful private military company in contemporary times. Barlow has also served as a major general in several African armed forces and as the Honorary Consul of Sao Tome and Principe to South Africa between 2019 and 2022.

The theoretical aspects of the book provide the veritable glue for the book laying the foundations for the later empirical chapters. The underlying theoretical structure also lends the book an inherent logic, and the chapters follow logically on each other, from understanding the importance and role of intelligence in human intelligence operations in Africa to intelligence tradecraft, and finally to composite intelligence in support of composite warfare operations. This volume builds on Barlow's previous book, *Composite Warfare: The Conduct of Successful Ground Operations in Africa,* and examines how African security agencies can structure and deploy their human intelligence resources more efficiently, and secure African state at a time when they face unprecedented internal and external challenges. Consider just two challenges here. The author notes that large foreign mining companies have their own security and intelligence structures to ensure the safety of their operations against criminal elements and anti-government forces. This intelligence-gathering capability can however be accessed easily by the intelligence services of the home countries of such mining companies. Similarly, the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine has renewed geostrategic power shifts between East and West. As rival blocs vie for influence in Africa, their intelligence footprint will expand on this blighted continent.

The centrality of intelligence is made clear by Barlow at the very start of the book. He writes, '[i]ntelligence drives strategy. Without it, failure waits.'[561] These two pithily symbolise vintage Barlow – erudite, succinct, and powerful. Intelligence, the author emphasises, is essential for pre-emptive action. The author powerfully demonstrates how African armed forces suffer as a result of a deficit of actionable intelligence to make strategic adjustments to high-tempo manoeuvre operations as well as low-intensity operations aimed at countering armed anti-government forces. Most critically, perhaps, is the time-lag – due to cumbersome bureaucracy – between the collection of intelligence and its verification and interpretation, and then giving an actionable intelligence report to political decision-makers. This time lag, Barlow argues, enables anti-government forces and other adversaries and challengers to plan and execute operations against governments, gain the initiative, and propagate their successes, thereby undermining public confidence in the government.

To increase the quality of intelligence products and to overcome the time lag, Barlow potently argues for a restructuring of intelligence structures, taking into account how they are postured and how they can become more forward-looking, pre-emptive and action-oriented with a deep operational reach. In Chapter 5, Barlow examines what such a revised African intelligence structure might look like in the form of the focussed activities division (FAD). This would be an independent, highly classified, self-sustainable, deniable, and low-visibility structure. Such a structure would be responsible for the conduct of specialist offensive intelligence activities and operations of immediate concern to the commander-in-chief and/or the chief of intelligence. Its core function would be to collect intelligence covertly and act independently on critical intelligence information that poses an imminent and significant threat to the state and its citizens.

As all conflicts and wars are fought across the information domain, the impact and power of perception should never be underestimated. The effect on altering and shaping public opinion is considerable. For this reason, Barlow argues for the creation of a perception modification group (PMG) within the FAD. Barlow goes on to argue, that the PMG of the FAD would be responsible for specialist informational warfare, influence, and propaganda operations aimed at altering, influencing, shaping, and entrenching perceptions through the judicious application of white, grey and black propaganda, disinformation, and other forms of perception modification. Although frequently referred to as "strategic messaging", such propaganda and disinformation are aimed at either the strengthening or the erosion of the support of a government or an organisation.

It is clear from the foregoing that the envisaged FAD would be an exceptionally powerful organisation. Whilst operationally appealing, the independence of such a division should come with some qualifiers. I believe that Barlow should also have added legislative oversight here, considering exactly how independent such a division should be, given the historic political abuse of such clandestine institutions on the African continent. In fairness to Barlow, he is quite aware of such abuse and cogently opines:

> Some governments, however, exploit their military and other intelligence collection agencies for their personal benefit and interest, creating an intelligence shortfall when faced with hostile challengers or threats. This misguided approach to intelligence impacts negatively on their domestic and foreign interests and their stability.[562]

This is all the more reason for complete clarity on the proposed independence of the division and issues of political oversight.

In an age of notable strides in technology, Big Data and Artificial Intelligence, Barlow refreshingly emphasises the role of humans as collectors of intelligence information. Whilst signals, imagery, or geospatial intelligence may provide evidence of a military build-up, only human intelligence assets can unveil the intentions and motivations of such a military build-up.

Perhaps, the most important aspect of this book is its focus on Africa. Most intelligence structures follow either the European or Soviet model. Barlow provides his deep insights on what makes the African operational environment unique, and on the way intelligence structures could adapt to this fast-changing environment. Here his chapter on 50 basic Africa rules is most insightful.

Erudite and incisive, the book gives evidence of the author's scholarship and deep command of his subject matter gleaned out of decades of operational experience. This book should be prescribed reading for any module in Intelligence Studies.

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ENDNOTES

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Book Review

Command: The Politics of Military Operations from Korea to Ukraine

Lawrence Freedman

Great Britain: Oxford University Press
2022, 589 pages
ISBN 978-0-241-45699-6

In a strategic context, the notion of command is almost as elusive as the ideas of strategy and strategic. Consider, for example, the phraseology associated with the command of terrain, the air, and the sea. Obviously, command is often associated with and tied to the idea of strategy. The Merriam-Webster dictionary defines "strategy", amongst others, as 'the science and art of military command exercised to meet the enemy in combat under advantageous conditions'.[563] In writing about the dimensions of strategy, Colin S Gray notes that "command" refers to the quality of military and political leadership in planning and conduct to use or threaten the employment of organised force for political purposes.[564] This is precisely the theoretical focus of Freedman's book *Command: The Politics of Military Operations from Korea to Ukraine*.

Very few command arrangements, Freedman notes, are friction-free.[565] And the quality of command, at all levels, is often a key variable in the creation of strategic effect. At both strategic and operational level, commanders are challenged by the pervasive influence of geography, the reality of friction, and an intelligent adversary, and are subject to the severe discipline of time.[566] Although much has been written about command throughout history, the problem is that modern strategic studies 'in its fascination with technology, its newly fashionable attraction to the face of battle at the sharpest end of war, and with its focus on broad social forces, often forgets the commanders behind the mask of command'.[567] It is these commanders, Freedman notes, who have to give the orders, and who have to lead those who are receiving the orders, and manage the allies who are often suspicious of 'being asked to take unreasonable risks'.[568]

Writing the book in the period of the 'enforced solitude of the Covid pandemic',[569] Freedman aims at exploring the dichotomy between political and military leadership, and between the political and operational spheres in war in the historical period since the end of the Second World War.[570] In the demarcation of the discussion, Freedman notes that the political purposes of government should infuse all operational decisions, while the problems and opportunities of the military operational domain should inform the development of national strategy. Civilian office-bearers do not necessarily have the required competencies for the implementation of defence policy. The military is skilled in the conduct of operations and the management of their logistical, intelligence, equipment, and tactical challenges. Politicians, however, have a critical role questioning 'the smooth

functioning of the command system, the causes of any reverses, the likelihood of casualties and the prospects for success'.[571] Above all, Freedman notes, politicians are accountable to the public for any wrongdoing and anything going wrong.

Freedman argues that the functioning of command as an interplay between the political and military domains is not restricted to times of conflict, violence, and war. In peacetime, the interface between the military and political spheres is critical in the long-term planning of defence, budgetary allocations, personnel management, and procurement of technology. The real test for the political and military overlap of command, Freedman rightly argues, however, is to be found during times of war: where and when military decisions at the campaign or so-called "operational level of war" are supposed to be free from political interference. But military decisions, Freedman argues, are never free from political interference where politicians do their job to interrogate the logic of strategy and the effectiveness of tactics. And, as Eliot Cohen points out in his book *Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime*, in times of war, political office-bearers should exercise active civilian control of the military domain.[572] Freedman's book is of specific interest in this regard, showing how political office-bearers sometimes actively engage with the military – and sometimes not at all.

The historical focus of the book is on the period after the Second World War with case studies that are selected to reflect the 'diversity of contemporary conflict'.[573] The case studies are rich in their diversity, complexity, depth, and time frames. In the reading of the various case studies, the reader is not left with only an in-depth and comprehensive understanding of the complexities of high command, but also with a respect for Freedman's comprehensive historical depth and contextualised discussion of the various case studies. Obviously, the case studies are skewed towards war involving the major powers – the United States, Russia, France, and Britain. In a strange way, though, the particularly interesting case studies are those that do not involve the major powers, namely those considering Israel, Pakistan, Iraq, and the Congo. The reader will also find the two case studies involving Putin's Russia of great interest, i.e. the Russian invasions of Chechnya and Ukraine. In combination, the reader develops an understanding of the Russian strategic culture and the way of war under the Putin regime. As a whole, though, the case studies succeed in providing the reader with a nuanced understanding of the complexities of high command and the dialectic of the political and military domains in the conduct of war.

Perhaps Freedman should have been more deliberate in differentiating between the case studies of the Cold War and those from after the Cold War. For the major powers – and as the author rightly acknowledges – at the time of the Cold War, war was shaped by the need to avoid a third world war and the difficulties of fighting irregular wars.[574] Freedman fails to highlight the fact that armed conflicts during the Cold War – and important from a command perspective – were mostly fought against easily recognisable foes. Freedman, though, is right in pointing out that post-Cold War conflict is increasingly shaped by new technologies that expanded the range of military options that are available.[575] Wars also increasingly unfold in a post-heroic way and as so-called "hybrid" or "grey-zone" wars.[576] Yet, the post-heroic wars following the Cold War tend to be much more indecisive, ending by way of international arbitration, peacekeeping, and withdrawal. This led someone like

Edward N Luttwak to argue in favour of 'giving war a chance'.[577] These realities have important consequences for command, especially since the current post-heroic wars are fought with small professional armed forces that place a high premium on force protection.

Of particular importance in the discussion of the different case studies is the unfolding of command in the military domain as both a political and bureaucratic process. There are commanders who are judged by their peers to be political in nature and that are often 'compared unfavourably with those that focus … entirely on preparing for and engaging in combat'.[578] From a bureaucratic perspective, commanders are often judged by their involvement in bureaucratic practices aimed at reputational management of manipulation of situations that suit their self-interests, who ensure they are noticed by their superiors, who take credit for the bravery of others, or who are looking out for their unit to make sure that it gets its chance of glory. Command also unfolds in the world of high and low politics. As high politics, command unfolds in the world of international relations and 'of security threats and border disputes, of ideological competition and alliance formation, of the United Nations and pressures for ceasefires'.[579] Command is however also shaped by the world of low politics and 'bureaucratic frictions, professional rivalries, personality clashes, and competition for scarce resources – of different organizational cultures and operational concepts'.[580] The world of low politics further includes the interplay between corporate armies and field armies, and between those officers in high command in the national capital and those in the field tasked with implementing the policies.[581]

Although this book should be read in its entirety by those in high command – both political and military – the last chapter of the book is compulsory reading for every student of war, professional and otherwise. The chapter, titled 'Past, Present, and Future of Command', addresses some of the most critical issues facing contemporary armed forces, albeit from a command perspective. This includes the changing character of command, the role of decentralised decision-making, the critical importance of intelligence and artificial intelligence, and issues of political control that may arise during armed control at all levels. In the end, command comprises a formal authoritative process of orders, a chain of command, and formal relationships. However, and as Freedman amply demonstrates, command is above all about informal networks that ensure that systems that rely on mutual trust work effectively. Perhaps the most important lesson of the book is the value of understanding the difference between loyalty and honesty when in command, and not to confuse loyalty with honesty and vice versa.

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Book Review

The Equus Men: Rhodesia's Mounted Infantry: The Grey's Scouts 1896–1980

Alexandre Binda

Warwick: Helion
2021, 280 pages
ISBN 978-1-914059-20-9

Introduction

The Equus Men: Rhodesia's Mounted Infantry: The Grey's Scouts 1896–1980 by Alexandre Binda is a meticulously researched and detailed exploration of the roles and functions executed by the Grey's Scouts during the Rhodesian Bush War (1896–1980). First published in 2015 and reprinted in paperback in 2021, the book provides the reader with unique insights and lessons learned from those who were themselves engaged in the conflict in an inimitable and specialised way of warfighting: warfighting by mounted infantry.

The focus of the book is on presenting the personal experiences of the men and women who participated in the conflict and on reflecting on these, rather than on political issues and realities that shaped the decisions about the deployment of the unit. Sufficient commentary about the political situation to contextualise the decisions made about the deployment of the Scouts is nevertheless included. Binda utilises the stories told by members of the unit to present the history of the Grey's Scouts in a very compelling and engaging manner from its origins, through its organisation and development phases, and ultimately in the detail about their operational experiences. The book provides an excellent understanding of the characteristics of mounted infantry forces as opposed to cavalry.

Binda was commissioned to write the history of the Grey's Scouts, and his requests for assistance from former members to gain access to documents and photographs were met with great enthusiasm. There are few surviving official records of the Grey's Scouts, but the Grey's Scouts' roll of honour, the list of names of those who had received honours and awards, and the Grey's Scouts nominal roll are all included in appendices to the book. The pictures in the photographic appendix provide the reader with a vivid image of how the Scouts lived, trained, and deployed. Despite the limited number of official records available, the stories encapsulated in the book reveal the spirit and ethos of the men and women who served in the unit, making the history of the unit come alive.

Binda's book reflects the history of the Grey's Scouts by means of its written history, photographs and maps, and refers to various times from 1896 to 1980 – all of which feature the lived experiences of the men and women who served in the unit. The author included

a comprehensive list of maps as well as photographs of documents and letters that all contribute to a very detailed depiction of the members and of the activities of the unit over time. The inclusion of the impressive array of photographs and documents elevates the book from being more than a collection of "action sequences" to a chronicle of personal encounters, as it also provides the reader with good understanding of the psychological and societal issues that influenced and moulded the organisational culture of the unit. The book reflects details and narratives about the origins of the unit from the time of the Bulawayo Field Force and the Matabele Rebellion of 1896, to developments in Rhodesia, which influenced the development of the Grey's Scouts from 1975–1976, to deployments between 1977 and 1978, and the situation in Zimbabwe–Rhodesia in 1979 and 1980.

Binda structured the book in chapters that each describes a specific period during which the Grey's Scouts were developing the unit into a cohesive force. These decisions and subsequent operational lessons learned ultimately informed the doctrine, training and warfighting methods adopted by unit members. The descriptions and facts presented offer personal narratives of how the unit developed and deployed over time. Moreover, the stories – as told by unit members – are at the heart of the value of this book, as it offers readers a comprehensive view of how and why the mounted infantry operations of the Grey's Scouts evolved over time. Binda succeeds in balancing the textual analyses, provided by the inclusion of maps and documents, with the stories told by members who served in the unit; thus, providing the reader with a unique background to the documents and photographs.

One of the strengths of the book lies in the detailed analysis of the establishment and development of the Grey's Scouts during the Rhodesian War. Binda provides in-depth descriptions and analysis of how the concepts relating to mounted infantry were developed and of how these concepts were ultimately operationalised.

The author provides us with a detailed account of the strategies, tactics, techniques and procedures used by the mounted infantry during the Rhodesian War. The book also offers important lessons learned in terms of the use of mounted infantry – specifically in the African deployment environment. The Grey's Scouts were not used in the context of cavalry deployments; the unit was exceptional as its members appreciated and utilised horses as a means of transport, as opposed to using horses as a fighting platform as is the case in the deployment of cavalry.

Binda identifies the advantages of mounted infantry, such as the cross-country abilities of horses, their ability to travel over long distances, their ability to work effectively at night, and their ability to alert riders to impending danger. Binda however also points to some of the limitations associated with the deployment of horses in the mounted infantry role, namely difficulties when moving through dense bush and marshy areas; the significant logistical support required; difficulties in maintaining silence; and the fact that certain geographical areas might have limited the use of horses due to diseases, such as African horse sickness and tsetse fly infestations. The personal accounts and photographs provided by members of the Grey's Scouts support the findings of the author as far as lessons learned are concerned.

The author's writing style is accessible, the prose is very clear and engaging, and the photographs, maps and lists of names of Grey's Scouts members make this a very engaging and enjoyable read. The book will prove valuable to both academic audiences as well as military enthusiasts. The chapters are well organised and provide the reader with a structured narrative through time.

Alexandre Binda's *Equus Men: Rhodesia's Mounted Infantry: The Grey's Scouts 1896–1980* affords us unique insights into the history of the Grey's Scouts. The author's meticulous research and insightful analysis offer a compelling examination of the establishment of the unit and its development over time. The book encourages readers to reflect not only on the stories as told by the men and women who served, but also on the broader societal implications of the war and the warfighting methods that were employed.

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Book Review

Speed, Aggression, Surprise: The Untold Secret Origins of the SAS

Tom Petch

London: WH Allen
2023, 470 pages
ISBN 978-0-7535-5939-0

The origins of the Special Air Service (SAS), as well as the operations and characters of this legendary and elite British army unit, have captured public imagination since the establishment of the unit in 1941 during the dark years of the Second World War (1939–1945). Recent years have seen many new publications about the SAS and its men. One thus wonders why anyone would bother to write yet another version of the by now well-known story of the origins of the SAS. The author of *Speed, Aggression, Surprise: The Untold Secret Origins of the SAS,* Tom Petch, makes a very bold statement in the introduction of his book, by claiming that the 'Boy's Own story' (p. xxv) of the formation of the SAS is a myth. While the popular belief is that David Stirling was the founding father of the SAS, Petch argues that the concept behind the formation of modern-day special forces was masterminded by Dudley Clarke, a much less known or even less mentioned staff officer working in the British War Office.

It is a well-known fact that the Prime Minister of Britain during the Second World War, Winston Churchill, was probably the most enthusiastic driving force behind the establishment of modern special forces. He also cultivated a romantic and heroic image of elite warriors engaged in desperate and daring actions against Nazi-occupied Europe. It was, however, Clarke who was credited by numerous sources for lobbying that the term "commando" be used to refer to specially selected men who perform specialised and often dangerous tasks behind enemy lines. This term, which hails from the mounted Boer commandos during the South African Second Anglo Boer War (1899–1902), is today still universally associated with special forces. Ironically, Clarke is only mentioned in passing by most authors writing on the SAS. Petch aims to highlight the real role that Clarke played in deception operations and the establishment of the SAS. The book is written in a popular history format, and will appeal to any lover of military history. Tom Petch, who served as a troop commander in the SAS himself, weaves deception and special forces operations together in a book, which often reads like adventure fiction. He takes the reader from the narrow passages of the War Office in Whitehall –with its red tape, negotiations and bureaucracy –to the Western Desert and Europe, where the fighting was bloody and no quarter was given.

Petch has done thorough research in compiling the book, as can be seen in the comprehensive archival work and sources listed. He conducted many interviews with

the last surviving member of the early SAS, as well as family members of the so-called "Originals", the first members of the SAS, and obtained previously unpublished photographs, letters and documents. Petch narrates the storyline from a third-person perspective, which gives the reader insight into the thought processes and the trials and tribulations of all the role players. The book is an easy read, and flows chronologically from the night before the outbreak of the Second World War in 1939, to the day of the German surrender in 1945. Petch not only introduces Clarke to the reader, but also William Fraser, one of the most successful frontline operators who served in the SAS from its inception to the end of the war.

The book is divided into three parts, comprising 13 chapters. Part One covers the period from 1939 to 1941, and introduces the main characters in the book. The initial establishment and first operations of the commando units are discussed, as well as the first ideas of deceiving the German Army. Part Two is situated in 1941, and covers the first interaction and collaboration between Clarke and Stirling in order to establish the SAS. In Part Three, which covers the period from 1941 until 1945, the story about the birth of the "real" SAS and the commencement of operations is related. The evolution of the unit is followed until its eventual disbandment when the war comes to an end. A good balance is struck throughout in telling the story of Clarke conducting numerous undercover operations to countries such as Türkiye and Spain (where he got caught by the Spanish police dressed in women's wear) to spread false information and mastermind deception plans, and Fraser, executing daring operations in the Western Desert and the forests of Europe. The progress of the war in general is also constantly hovering in the background to put the actions of both Clarke and Fraser in context for the reader.

As the title of the book (which cleverly plays with the abbreviation "SAS", which could denote "Special Air Service" but also "Speed, Aggression and Surprise") suggests, the work of the SAS entailed just that. Despite initial failures and much opposition from the conventionally minded British Army, the SAS, in conjunction with the Long Range Desert Group, another British special forces unit, achieved some spectacular successes by attacking airfields far behind the German lines. That the members of the SAS were a hard-drinking and rebellious group of strong-willed, self-selected outcasts and misfits who managed to fit together, is not disputed by Petch. Neither is it surprising that it was David Stirling's idea to establish a small unit that would harass the German supply lines. Petch does, however, highlight that it was Clarke who initially established the SAS Brigade as a fictitious parachute force, which was trained to go after German aircraft, tanks, and armoured cars. The fake formations that Clarke created entered the battle order of the Axis powers, and ultimately led to the Axis overestimating the British strength by 30 per cent and diverting forces from other fronts to counter these non-existing forces.

Clarke was also the person who had a considerable influence on Stirling, and assisted him to pitch his idea of a special forces unit to the higher echelons. Clarke wanted real men to jump from real aircraft and conduct real operations in support of the deception plans he devised to keep German troops occupied and away from where the real fighting was taking place. He was the one who was first to realise that special forces were not just special because of selection, training, weapons or methods, but because its impact was

strategic. Together with Stirling, Clarke made suggestions about selection and training, came up with ideas to overcome the shortage in manpower, and in general assisted to allow the SAS to function without being bogged down in British Army bureaucracy. While Stirling and operators, such as Fraser, therefore conducted operations behind the German lines, Clarke operated in the background as staff officer by dreaming up new deceits and providing a guiding hand in special forces development.

The book succeeds in telling the story behind the story of the creation of the SAS, as well as the important, and mostly unknown part that Dudley Clarke played in it. By introducing the role of William Fraser, Petch not only highlights Fraser's exploits in the SAS, but also allows the reader to get a good idea of how operations were conducted, as well as the challenges, dangers and exhilaration experienced by the operators. Petch's conclusion is that 'history is not written by the victors, but by those who write' (p. 414); hence, the need to tell Clarke and Fraser's stories and highlight the role they played in establishing the SAS. The book is well written and highly recommended to readers who love military history in general, and specifically those who have a keen interest in special forces as well as clandestine and deception operations.

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Book review

The White Redoubt, the Great Powers and the Struggle for Southern Africa, 1960–1980

Filipe Ribeiro de Meneses and Robert McNamara

Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan London
2018, 428 pages
ISBN 978-1-137-44757-9 (Hardcover)

In their book, *The White Redoubt, the Great Powers and the Struggle for Southern Africa, 1960–1980*, Filipe Ribeiro de Meneses and Robert McNamara, from Maynooth University and the University of Ulster respectively, explore the efforts by the white settler regimes of Portugal, Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), and South Africa to resist the wave of African independence movements during the 1960s and 1970s. They also examine how the international community responded to these efforts. Throughout the period from 1961 to 1974, Portugal, Rhodesia, and South Africa collaborated in their endeavours to maintain white settler minority rule in their respective territories. Despite facing challenges from several newly independent African states and major world powers, these countries provided mutual economic, political, and military support to one another during this period. Moreover, through these actions, they succeeded in transforming Southern Africa into a significant diplomatic concern during the Cold War. De Meneses and McNamara delve into the origins of this collaboration, analyse the reactions of the international community, and focus on the evolving security situations in each country – principally Portugal and Rhodesia, and by inference, Mozambique, and Angola. They show that the Portuguese Revolution in April 1974 started the process of dismantling the so-called "white redoubt" in Southern Africa, and that the subsequent diplomatic policy adopted by apartheid South Africa – more especially John Vorster's détente policy – resulted in the abandonment of Rhodesia in exchange for the illusion of securing lasting stability in the region. The book builds on some earlier works by De Meneses and McNamara,[582] and offers a transnational perspective on the complex defence, political, and security landscape of Southern Africa during the late colonial era.

The book follows a clear chronological order, and is divided into three core sections. In the conclusion, De Meneses and McNamara draw together the central themes of the book and discuss some points worth considering for future research. The sections and their chapters build on each other to provide the reader with an all-encompassing picture of the political build-up, the envisaged and actual military cooperation, and the eventual dismantling of the ostensible defence and security alliance between Portugal, Rhodesia, and South Africa. From a distinctly South African perspective, the second section – aptly called and dealing with 'The Rise and Fall of the Unholy Alliance' – along with its three chapters, is the most interesting section. This section has to do with the nuts and bolts of the so-called ALCORA exercise (the codename for cooperation between the

military forces of South Africa, Rhodesia, and Portugal from 1970–1974). The section succeeds in filling a definite gap in the Southern African historiography dealing with these events,[583] which to date remains sparse. However, there are some areas that deserve further historical attention. For instance, it is a fact that the Department of Defence Archives in Pretoria, South Africa, preserves copious primary archival material detailing the nature and organisation of ALCORA in minute detail. Of these numerous documents, De Meneses and McNamara only consulted approximately thirteen archival boxes worth of information, which is but a drop in the ocean in terms of the actual or related material dealing with ALCORA. Possible reasons why the authors only consulted limited archival sources at the Department of Defence Archives could be the over-classification of archival documents, and a challenging declassification process.[584] Nevertheless, while the authors succeeded in giving a strategic overview of the nature and functioning of ALCORA, several themes dealing with operations and administration, intelligence collection and sharing, and the human experience for instance deserve further historical attention.

The book further includes a comprehensive list of abbreviations and acronyms, as well as a detailed bibliography and handy index for a work of this expansive nature. It would have been ideal if at least a few maps and some photographs of the key role players in the book had been included.

The depth of research that went into the book is impressive. De Meneses and McNamara conducted primary archival research in Portugal, South Africa, the United Kingdom, Belgium, France, Ireland, and the United State of America. They also consulted several leading newspapers from the era, specifically from Portugal, South Africa, and Rhodesia. The primary sources were supplemented by a wealth of secondary sources, including contemporary reports and surveys, and books and articles. In doing so, they succeeded in marshalling together a host of primary and secondary sources, which allowed them to reconstruct the complex defence, political, and security landscape of Southern Africa during the late colonial era.

All in all, *The White Redoubt, the Great Powers and the Struggle for Southern Africa, 1960–1980* makes for an informative read from start to finish, and is a welcome addition to the historiography of the broader war for Southern Africa. By helping readers to understand the intricate dynamics that underpinned the mutual economic, political, and military support between Portugal, Rhodesia, and South Africa during the 1960s and 1970s, De Meneses and McNamara help us to move beyond our perceived understanding of this intricate and complex period in the history of Southern Africa. By doing so, they make a distinct and valuable contribution to the historiography of the area. Their book thus comes highly recommended, and can be considered for inclusion in university course material, particularly postgraduate modules that deal with the political and military history and related aspects of the war for Southern Africa and the broader liberation wars in the region.

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ENDNOTES

[582] See FR de Meneses & R McNamara, 'The Last Throw of the Dice: Portugal, Rhodesia and South Africa, 1970–74', *Portuguese Studies*, 28, 2 (2012), 201–215; FR de Meneses & R McNamara, 'Exercise ALCORA: Expansion and Demise', *International History Review*, 36, 1 (2014), 89–111; FR de Meneses & R McNamara. 'Parallel Diplomacy, Parallel War: The PIDE/DGS's Dealings with Rhodesia and South Africa, 1961–1974', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 49, 2 (2014), 366–389.

[583] See for instance P Correia & G Verhoef, 'Portugal and South Africa: Close Allies or Unwilling Partners in Southern Africa during the Cold War?', *Scientia Militaria*, 37, 1 (2009), 50–72; A Esterhuyse, 'The Strategic Contours of the South African Military Involvement in Namibia and Angola during the 1970/1980s', *Journal for Contemporary History*, 34, 1 (2009), 16–35; K Larsdotter, 'Fighting Transnational Insurgents: The South African Defence Force in Namibia, 1966–1989', *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 37, 12 (2014), 1024–1038; AM Gossmann. 'Lost in Transition: The South African Military and Counterinsurgency', *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, 19, 4 (2008), 541–572; K O'Brien, 'Special Forces for Counter Revolutionary Warfare: The South African Case', *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, 12, 2 (2001), 79–109; L Barroso. 'The Origins of Exercise ALCORA: South Africa and the Portuguese Counterinsurgency Strategy in Southern Angola', *South African Historical Journal*, 69, 3 (2017), 468–485; M Evans. 'The Wretched of the Empire: Politics, Ideology and Counterinsurgency in Rhodesia, 1965–80', *Small Wars& Insurgencies*, 18, 2 (2007), 175–195; J Miller. 'Things Fall Apart: South Africa and the Collapse of the Portuguese Empire, 1973–1974', *Cold War History*, 12, 2 (2012), 183–204.

[584] See E Kleynhans & W Gordon. 'Legislative Disconnect or Institutional Gatekeeping? Challenges of Researching South Africa's Military Past', *Scientia Militaria* 48, 1 (2020), 97-114 for a discussion of the challenges of research into post-1970s topics.

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