Adapting and Managing Logistics for Expeditionary Forces in Africa

A Private Military View

Abstract

The study on which this article is based, examined the approach adopted by the private military company, Executive Outcomes, to adapt, manage, and position its logistical requirements for sustainable offensive, defensive and containment operations in Africa. The logistical approach and doctrine of the pre-1994 South African Defence Force, despite its efficacy, was inadequate to ensure the force sustainment requirements of Executive Outcomes. Incorporating numerous lessons learned from the operations of the South African Defence Force in Angola, as well as engagements by Executive Outcomes in Angola (1993–1996), Sierra Leone (1995–1996), Uganda (1996), and Indonesia (1996), several adaptions were required to support and sustain operations in Africa, including the 72 Mobile Strike Force operations by the Nigerian Army against Boko Haram – a violent Islamist group – in 2014–2015. This deployment covered a distance of approximately 7 500 kilometres from the home base of Executive Outcomes in South Africa. The 72 Mobile Strike Force comprised both Nigerian Army members and private military contractors, and operated as an independent and self-contained unit. As the spearhead of the operations by the 7 Infantry Division of the Nigerian Army across Borno State, the approach of the strike force along with its logistics doctrine contained numerous lessons learned by Executive Outcomes in Angola and across other theatres of conflict and war.