Die Vraagstuk van Misleiding, Verrassing en Vertolking van Informasie in Oorlog, met Spesifieke Verwysing na die rol wat dit in Egipte se Aanval op Israel op 6 Oktober 1973 gespeel het

Abstract

The Question of Deception, Surprise and Interpretation of Information in War, with specific reference to Egypt's Attack on Israel on 6 October 1973.

Strategic surprise occurs to the degree that the victim does not appreciate whether he is attacked (moral surprise), or when, where or how the adversary will strike (material surprise). The effect of surprise is both psychological and physical, because the victim's moral, as well as his forces and equipment are destroyed. Surprise is an effective force multiplier, but it is not a guaranty for success. It creates an initial advantage that will not lead to success if it is not exploited. Successful deception is an effective way to ensure surprise. The enemy can be deceived with regard to capabilities. or if the capabilities are already known, with regard to the intention to use that capability. Through deception the enemy's thoughts are influenced. If his thoughts are influenced, his decisions and actions are influenced.

Surprise is prevented through an accurate determination of the existence and nature of a threat (enemy capabilities and intentions). The collection of information is seldom a problem, but the interpretation of information can easily go wrong. A number of factors influenced the interpretation of information: an inability to distinguish between 'signals' and 'noise '; a purposive enemy deception; perceptions, experience and expertise, as well as the particular situation. Why did Egypt succeed in surprising Israel in spit of Israel's knowledge of a possible Egyptian attack? This question can only be answered through an understanding of Egypt's deception plan and Israel's misinterpretation of information.