R.H. Harm


After the second World War, Stalin decided on a naval programme for Soviet Russia in which the strategies of a 'fortress fleet' and a 'fleet in being' were combined. The naval strategy was based on the premise that a Western attack could only be repulsed in home waters under cover of ground based air support.

Krushchev introduced no changes in the naval strategy in 1954. Admiral Gorschkov was appointed as chief of the Soviet navy and was directed to develop a missile armed and nuclear powered submarine force to defend the USSR. In 1961 the USSR decided to retain a defensive strategy but become tactically offensive as a result of the development of their navy on a world wide scale.

During the fifties the commercial as well as the fishing fleets expanded and the USSR became independent of foreign navigation and was in the position to acquire overseas bases.

Brezhnev didn't change this naval strategy. He built up a balanced fleet. Soviet Russia's basic naval problems could not be solved seeing that the navy was still dependent on foreign bases for replenishment and air support.


naval programme for Soviet Russia; Stalin; Krushchev; Admiral Gorschkov; development of a missile armed and nuclear powered submarine force; Brezhnev

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DOI: https://doi.org/10.5787/9-4-726


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ISSN 2224-0020 (online); ISSN 1022-8136 (print)

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