THE SOUTH AFRICAN STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVES IN ANGOLA, 1987–88

Abstract

Ever since 1988, a war of words has been waged about the question who
won the so-called Battle of Cuito Cuanavale – the SADF, or the Cuban and Angola
forces. A lot depends, of course, on what the South Africans’ strategic and
operational objectives were, and whether they reached these or not. On a somewhat
lower level, the debate has centred on the question whether the SADF wanted to
occupy Cuito Cuanavale. If they did, it becomes easier to argue that South Africa
was dealt a heavy reverse there; if not, such an argument becomes more difficult to
sustain. In this article, South Africa’s strategic and operational objectives are
analysed, based on archival sources. The basic conclusions are that the South
African government was realistic enough to see that it could not replace the MPLA
with UNITA by force, although it was hoped this might happen through elections.
As far as Cuito Cuanavale is concerned, the sources are unequivocal: Although the
occupation of the town was indeed discussed, it was never seriously considered. The
objective was simply to drive FAPLA over the Cuito River, to prepare the riverbank
as a defensive line, to turn it over to UNITA and then to pull back. By far most of
the South Africans’ objectives were reached.